A simple simulation model demonstrates that the outcome of a negotiation may critically be affected by (i) the structure of the negotiating problem -- the joint distribution of negotiators’ evaluations of potential settlements; and (ii) the negotiators’ tactical approach to the problem -- the decision rules that guide the choice of concessionary offers made during the bargaining process. Hampered by cognitive limits and faced with imperfect information about the other party’s interests, negotiators may relay on simple heuristics in choosing among possible concessions during the negotiating process. The model of single negotiations is extended to examine how the outcome of one negotiation may impact future negotiations. Focusing on two negotiator interests -- concern for self and concern for fairness -- the model shows how adjustments in tactical decision rules from one negotiation to the next sometimes leads to an unwarranted deterioration in the parties’ relationship.

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Date created

• 1990

Type

• Document

Processing Activity

• Processing documentation available at: https://wiki.albany.edu/display/SCA/Processing+Ingested+Digital+Files

License

• Creative Commons BY-NC-ND Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International

  
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ITEM CONTEXT

Part of

386b7d5fcd17a644199db727913a7a7a

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Part of

e3ebd4855fa658877b17f518e29a6ac9

Scope and Contents

Part of

23d738ba88f8333bc39725f9cb5bd0b8

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Collection

System Dynamic Society Records

Scope and Contents

Collecting area

• This collection is part of the University Archives