

Review of West by ...

western

An evaluation of political trends in our days faces a curious obstacle. The indubitable economic success of western regimes which to some degree most social classes participate stands out quite sharply against the quasi-permanent intellectual crisis which has become a dominant theme of the critics of these societies. Here the riddle offered by the contemporary west-German society is even sharper than that of its French counterpart. In France the non-economic crisis phenomena are all-pervasive ~~encompassing~~ extending to the functioning of the state apparatus and its political leadership. Germany in this century had never had such a wellfunctioning governmental machinery with few and inconsequential political groups even trying to ~~know~~ put up roadblocks. What then is the basis of the somber picture which the present German ~~group~~ of literat^{ure}, the ~~Boell~~ ^{Kubler} and the Enzensberger, the Dircks and the Sothe are painting of the state of the fatherland.

For our purposes it seems best to differentiate between two facets of this criticism which in the German considerations might often fuse and overlap. To some extent, this criticism is only a variant of the general complaint against advanced industrial society: materialism secularisation; all the difficulties experienced by the average person to ^{domesticate} ~~husband~~ commercial civilization into a servant rather than the master of their existence, the allpervasive phenomenon of privatization, both companion and consequence of the vanishing of clear-cut localization of political responsibility, are not particularly germane to German society. What then about the loss of national existence? How meaningful is the disappearance of a unified German national state in an era of rapid transformation of national states into subunits of vaster systems. But just here

enters ~~an additional~~ ^{the} challenge and novelty. The braking up of national unity with the two parts becoming sub-units of contending power systems. In the western two-thirds economic success on the basis of more or less traditional social arrangements have given some sort of legitimacy not only to the political arrangements but also to the accompanying integration ~~endeavors~~ ^{endeavors} into a larger western European framework; in the remaining parts the deprivations and dislocations connected with the putting up of a new social ~~economic and ideological structure~~ ^{economic and ideological structure} have not only widened cleavages between rulers and ruled, but have also provoked ^{disparaging} dismay as to the junior partnership of their state in the eastern block. This state of affairs determines both the domestic and the inter German policy of the eastern and the western state. Politics in eastern Germany consist of reactions and still more of ^{movements} anticipated reactions to official programs. In western Germany this present frame of politics ~~xxxx~~ has narrowed down equally drastically permissible policy alternatives. The realm of domestic politics is reduced to minor ~~variations and organisational arrangements~~ ^{controversies over socio-econ. priorities}. On the other hand any serious discussion of German politics has become ^{at the same time} necessarily ambivalent. It must be built on acceptance of the major western societal premises as the basis of present existence and prosperity but at the same time such a discussion cannot fail ^{to} notice the close relationship between deprivation of a unified national existence and present socio-political arrangements. From this state of affairs the greatest variety of conclusions may be drawn: to mention only the ~~two extremes~~ ^{two poles}: one may look at the inter-German relations and the division of Germany simply as a ^{consequence} ~~function~~ of eastern policy, and look at it as a majority-legitimacy contest with despotic tyranny helping to confirm an everything or nothing approach

*German politics
have become
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*at the same time
cautiously*

or -fused ^{with} to cultural criticism of western emptiness, ^{refusing the...} it may lead ^{...} to acknowledgement of responsibility for the historical sequence which led to the present state of affairs, mutual guilt for the degree of present estrangement, with the provisional character of the Bonn establishment emphasised as a point of departure for endless soul searching and reiteration of the desire ^{for} mutually acceptable solutions.

in the domestic structure.

What do these various discussion pointers mean in German foreign policy terms? ^{I think first of all a range of foreign policy alternatives after which deal with the complex equations} Each German policy either negatively or positively is at the same time a policy concerning means and ways for reunification. Few private individuals would, no official personage could abandon the contention that their policy at the same time serves the goal of reunification. Even the adherents of what is often dubbed as the Carolingian Empire concept, namely continuing and emphatic integration of Western Germany with Western Europe hold open some saving devices for future, even if indefinite reunification possibilities. It is the characteristics of their devices that none of them depends on any kind of positive action from the West German side. Whether it is the USSR involvement with the Chinese which makes them seek a reasonable understanding with the main power on their Western Front or in the same vein USSR preparedness to render to Poland their Eastern territories, allowing Poland to accommodate Germany in the West, in neither case ^{Western} there would be either a need for German major concessions nor for any action in the foreseeable future. All what is needed is firmness in East-West German relations, continuation of the Hallstein doctrine with its calculated impossibility to get into a more positive relation to any of the Eastern states, inflexible standing in regard to Berlin - possibly just because it is expandable within this scheme of things. ^{this is} Thus ~~the~~ words aside ^{only} a kind of reunification doctrine in reverse. Its purely negative, demarcationist, attentiste attitude towards reunification may much better be described as a accompaniment, though it might be left open whether it is a necessary accompaniment to a clear cut option for Germany's leadership function in a

Western European association. ^{Weyers, John H. an.} Jaspers 1959 had had the intellectual courage to draw from this concept ~~some~~ clear-cut conclusions as to the impossibility and undesirability of reestablishing the pattern of a Bismarck Reich, recognizing the new dividing line which separates Germany and only, somewhat illogically in my estimate from his own premises, insisting of the need and duty of rendering the East Germans political and cultural freedom within the context of their new political relationships. Whether as outcome of a future East-West equilibrium the conclusions of Jaspers will be validated, as they possibly might be, in the ~~poies~~, if the smoke of the many interconnected security issues will have cleared one way or another, I do not profess to know. That the actions, ^{more than} ~~then~~ also the slogans of many a German bureaucrat and politician can best or at least most consistently be interpreted this way, I will admit gladly. But there are other political alternatives ^{which need scrutiny.}

What conclusion
 the people
 come out

day, to establish a theory of cultural norms as a more adequate basis than the existing one for a system of punishment. In ~~Max-Ersnt~~ Mayer's seminar Franz Neumann utilized for the first time the critical instruments he had learned to handle when studying Hegel, Marx, and Karl Renner -- ^{the latter's} ~~whose~~ recent book on institutions of private law had become the foremost text of the new generation of socialist lawyers -- to criticize the thought processes of his professor of criminal law. From these seminars emerged his Ph.D. thesis on criminal sanctions.

By the time he had finished law school, Germany was in the throes of inflation, and ~~there followed the one and only excursion of~~ Franz Neumann ^{made his one and only excursion} into the field of business. Thereafter whatever business contacts he had were restricted to those of a lawyer, an author, ^{an academician's} or a somewhat reluctant administrator of real estate for the Institute for Social Research, ^{which he} ~~when he first~~ joined it in the mid-thirties, and ~~of an academician~~. If in 1922 he thought his business deals would spare him the need to turn to the law or at least see him financially through law-clerking, he was soon ^{disabused} ~~abused~~ of such illusions. But the rare gift of self-criticism, which he possessed in abundance, helped him to look at his business ventures in his later years in a strictly jocular fashion. ^{In the next three years he clerked in the} ~~While clerking for three years in~~ the law courts of the Frankfurt area, ^{while this} ~~was at best a tedious~~ ^{routines} ~~procedure~~, he was

amply rewarded by the fact that this ~~later~~ Frankfurt period gave him a chance ^{to establish close} ~~for steadily increasing~~ contact with Hugo Sinzheimer, for whom and with whom he worked throughout this period. Sinzheimer was a politician, a lawyer and professor, and the ^{creator} (initiator) of a scientific body of German labor law. But he was more than that; he had ~~(somehow)~~ the elements of an artist in him, and did not fail to impress his personality on whoever came under his spell. His name has gone down in political history as the chief architect of the ~~(attempt to build up the)~~ Weimar structure of economic democracy, ^{which aimed to compete} ~~with the aim of competing successfully~~ with the emerging Soviet system for the loyalty of the working class and at the same time ~~being strong enough~~ to enforce and guarantee the cooperation of the employers with the moderate union elements. But it would not be just to judge the man after the historically fateful failure of this attempt. Sinzheimer's lasting merit lies in his erecting a body of labor law which espoused the moral claims of labor in its relation to property and in his formulating the legal concepts which merged this body of new doctrine with the traditional structure of legal institutions.

It is within this framework, elaborated by Sinzheimer, that Neumann's own professional work progressed during the years of the Weimar Republic. Neumann always preserved a feeling of abiding gratitude toward his teacher. ^{To him} ~~He~~ dedicated ^{The} ~~to him his~~ last book ^{he wrote} ~~written~~ ^{his} ~~in the~~ Weimar period -- on freedom of coalition and the basic law. His ever-ready criticism of people and institutions never touched the person of his teacher.

But even at this early juncture in his career, Neumann's own style of thinking was ^{in some respects} ~~to some extent~~ the diammetrical opposite to that of his teacher. Sinzheimer, with all his ^{awareness of} ~~sensitivity to~~ the new social and ideological currents ^{of the day} and his ^{contributions to legal theory} ~~supreme ability to devise new legal concepts~~, remained throughout his life an inveterate romantic. For example, he could sincerely argue that the right to strike should not be constitutionalized, as labor conflicts only form a transitional stage in a society aspiring to higher social forms, and the constitution should not take it upon itself to bar such a felicitous development.

Franz Neumann, on the other hand, from the very beginning of his career excelled in critical analysis, in cutting with superb facility through the most elaborate intellectual structures and equating them with social and political realities. When he turned to creating ^{theories} ~~(conceptual structures)~~ of his own, these gifts may have led him at times to premature generalizations which did violence to the complexities of a given historical situation. But they served him admirably in a period such as the late twenties, when many of the illusions held by his elders were beginning to wear thin.

right word?

Neumann was separated by a ^{10 yrs} 25 year age difference from ~~those~~ leading Socialist intellectuals ^{such as} ~~like~~ Paul Levi, Rudolf ^{Rei} ~~Ber~~tschied, or Rudolf Hilferding, who had come to assume

was something of an anomaly in the otherwise unruffled waters of German academic life. It was the one place where promising young savants, ideologists peddling ~~their~~ spurious theories, *and* practicing politicians with a knack for journalism, like the present Bundspresident Heuss, rubbed shoulders with ponderous and scheming bureaucrats, academically trained trade union officials like Berlin's present Lord Mayor Suhr, and up-and-coming young lawyers like Neumann. If there ever was a universe of discourse in the class and status ridden Weimar Republic, it was in the halls of this unusual institution. It is known to all of you that Franz Neumann spent a good part of his time and energy during the last few years both here in New York and in Berlin, to make this institution again a going concern.

While ~~in his professional activities~~ until 1932 he concentrated mainly on labor law and related fields of industrial organization, he also gained ~~some~~ experience as an administrative judge, as the Berlin SPD ^{sponsored his} [had him] appointed ^{ment as} a member of the Bezirksausschuss, the local administrative court.

~~The~~ worsening political situation, rather than his own predilections, cast him in the summer of 1932 in the role of a political lawyer proper. Until then both the SPD and the Socialist unions had figured ~~as~~ albeit at heavy cost ~~as~~ among the dwindling forces of law and order. With the coup d'etat of Herr von Papen, they were ostracized, ejected from their

tions for which the author of Behemoth justly became renowned in the forties.

Yet there existed a deeper continuity between the German labor lawyer and the author of Behemoth; the most interesting and at the same time the most controversial part of his penetrating and unique analysis of the political, social and economic structure of Nazi Germany was his conclusion that the Nazi state had neither a coherent theory nor could be called a state, but rather consisted of four separate totalitarian bodies, ^{each existing on their} ~~existing~~ ^{according} ~~to their~~ own precepts and communicating ^{with the others on an ad hoc basis!} ~~among themselves via ad hoc arrangements~~. Now, I think it can easily be shown from what we have learned since the end of the war ^{and} Franz Neumann ~~would~~ have been the first to acknowledge it -- that the person of the leader exercised an unchecked and pernicious, but still very effective, monopoly of final decision, which is traditionally referred to as sovereignty if exercised within the framework of a territorial organization. Nevertheless, if the state is considered as a rational organization of power operating within the framework of a body of general rules, Neumann's usage has some overriding justification. In this sense the Third Reich cannot be styled as a state. And if there is a unifying theme in the ~~various~~ writings of Franz Neumann, it is the concept of rationality ^{state} as a yardstick for the acceptability of a political order. In Weimar days this rational organization, embracing the power of final political decision, was considered by him as the necessary vehicle of historical progress. Yet it was the decision of the

interpretations a very likely occurrence, even if he had never gone through Sinzheimer's school nor had found in the legal writings of Karl Renner a model to his own liking. It is therefore more interesting to dwell on what parts of the Marxist concepts became formative elements in his own interpretations rather than on fact itself. Franz Neumann lived ^{at} a time and in societies which offered unsurpassed ^{of opportunities to study} ~~possibilities for tracing~~ the interrelation of property patterns and political institutions, and also, as his own trade-union-sponsored endeavors for a reform of German cartel legislation showed, to participate actively in ~~this~~ process of transformation. In this realm he owed much to Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy of law with ^{its} ~~their~~ incisive treatment of property relations in bourgeois society. The Marx of the Civil War in France, ^{which} ~~when he nudged a little nearer to~~ Bakunin, and the Lenin of State and Revolution, in both their destructive and utopian qualities, left no trace in Neumann's thinking; and one of the most impressive accounts in his Behemoth remains the denunciation of the essentially nihilist character of Mussolini's thinking. The state of today and the state of tomorrow were for him a continuum ^{and} ~~for~~ subject to the same deformations. Had he been asked to define his own function in regard to both he might have answered, had he taken himself more seriously, that a merciless analysis of the institutions of today might obviate some ~~of the~~ pitfalls for the institutions of tomorrow. And ^{one of} ~~was not~~ the last ^{there} ~~transformation~~ ^{one} announced by him in 1950 -- the one which would spell the end of what he called the Classic relationship between economics and politics --

the heresy of the heresies? I refer to the supposition that political power might finally emancipate itself from its economic roots and itself become the basis for the acquisition of economic power -- a thesis against which, incidentally, his own Behemoth might furnish some interesting counter arguments.

But these ^{perambulations} peregrinations of his inquisitive mind cannot be considered out of the context of a double-pronged change ^{which occurred} in his way of dealing with problems: on the one hand, the more he read and studied -- and he was a voracious reader -- the more persistent became his feeling about the paucity of our actual knowledge of the societal process. Hence arose his impatient and urgent demand quickly to extend our knowledge of what really happens, because -- ^{and} in this respect ^{he} rejoined ^{ed} his intellectual forebears, but without any trace of their doctrinal certainty -- real freedom comes only through our understanding of the historical process. The second aspect of this change was a deepening scepticism with respect not only to presently available ^{knowledge} ~~understanding~~ and the true meaning of institutions but also to the efficacy of any and all constitutional devices in our age, whether ^{they} ~~it~~ be a separation of powers, transplantation of democratic political institutions via occupation powers, constitutional safeguards of the right of the individual, or the supposedly ^{de} centralising effect of federalism.

Yet in this mood of deepening pessimism, Franz Neumann did not compromise any of the major tenets of his intellectual ~~life~~; while he accepted the political alienation of man as

largely inevitable, he insisted ever more strongly on the primordial role of the rational state organization against all encroachments, whether they be occupational representation as substitute for ^{parliamentary representation or} replacement ~~of~~ executive responsibility, ^{by pseudo popular pressures} not to speak of totalitarianism proper. And in this sense his voice, rising in a disturbed and disturbing century, joins the illustrious ranks of all those for whom the rational organization of human society remains a permanent, yet always imperiled task.

Such German policies have been adversely commented upon by a small group of German professional and academic leaders last November, their memo sent to the Federal government carries among others the signatures of the German Nobell prize winner, the physicist Heisenberg, the Director General of the biggest German Radio Station v. Bismarck and the erstwhile president of what corresponds to the Council of Learned Societies Kaiser. Neither has the situation been eased by Soviet tactics of pulling the threat of the Ulbricht skeleton out of the closet if only to put it back in the box at regular intervals.

Both US and Soviet initiative towards a limited understanding have been hampered by two sets of exaggerated fears. The United States which shares without doubt major responsibility for German policies has abstained from taking necessary initiative for fear of extreme German reactions evoking what we might call the phantom of a switch of alliances. Soviet Russia, if not busy dangling before West German eyes the ocean of markets available in the east, evokes the equally unrealistic specter of free wheeling German military might. Yet, the USSR is fully aware of the narrow limits set to independent military action by a secondary power and she also knows how unlikely such action has become in the present day social and psychological climate of Western Germany.

A durable peace in central Europe may be on the agenda for generations. Meanwhile an uneasy status quo might profitably be translated into provisional arrangements. As to the frame of mind which should preside over the elaboration of such arrangements, let me conclude with a quote: it is taken from a recent statement drawn up with the idea to be read from the pulpits of protestant churches in both East and West Germany:

A few years ago Carlo Levi, the author of "Christ stopped at Eboli" paid his first visit to Germany. He came back to his Roman home with his mind full of images of mental landscapes rather than with production figures or memorable utterances of industrial, political or military tycoons. These images are often diffuse and ambiguous. They are seldom without a sad or remotely disquieting note. Having roamed time and again through the divided city of Berlin, he eventually comes up with a curious dream image. He finds himself transposed into a dream valley with a huge meadow completely covered by a huge flock of patiently feeding sheep of identical color and shape. Though all alike, they are kept in two separate flocks by bears and wolves who glare fiercely at each other. He asks the shepherd^s for the reason for this division and they show the questioner brandmarks apparently identifying different owners. Yet, on closer inspection, these marks, though of an ominous and repugnant type, are in reality all alike. Pressed to find a more satisfactory answer, the shepherd knew no better than to fall back on the Emperor's order.

Is Germany's recent history just a wierd sequence of accidental and meaning~~less~~ happenings, culminating in a giant industrial civilization with its human material reduced to ~~xxxxxx~~ robots, puppets, dregs - all, as the poet conveys, with an empty heart? If Carlo Levi is right, should not his reproach go to industrial society at large, rather than to its particular German sample? Have Germany's chrome-plated ~~bars~~, its neon-lighted streets, its teeming factories and bustling people, bent on getting the mostest the fastest, not for better or worse become representatives of western civilization at large?

For Levy, then, the division of the German sheep is essentially meaningless. Yet in his reasoning the fact that this separation ~~artificially~~ tears asunder a nation recedes behind another observation. ^{For him} In his mind the separation becomes artificial because these German sheep are all showing signs of the same affliction: An empty heart. This observation might have much to recommend itself. But is this Germany's affliction or of the industrial society's at large? Have not Germany's chrome plated bars, its neon lighted streets, its teeming factories, its bustling people bent on getting the mostest the fastest, become representative of industrial civilization at large? There exists then a certain justification for looking at the events of the thirties--Germany's severe economic crisis and the concomitant political upheaval--the ^{subtrial} background against which ^{the Third Reich and the} the separation of the German flock ^{in the 40's} must be seen, ^{since similar conditions} as nothing unique. ^{political} It might have happened elsewhere, ~~in the industrial world.~~ Yet if emptiness of the heart--alienation as we might call it--is a common condition of the industrial civilization, why then ~~internalize its consequences~~ ^{is the best way to deal with it by eliminating it} in the particular instance through Germany's partition? What then are the changes where lie the impediments of reuniting the flock?

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Viewed in this light the German 30ies and 40ies mark the interruption of social and economic growth by a non-representative and unique constellation of severe economic crisis and concomittant political upheavals. To come back, for a moment, to "Levi's flocks of sheep, representing the divided East and West Germanies, all that seems to be necessary is to join the artificially separated flocks. Where are the difficulties? What are the chances for such an operation? Must we, as Levi seems to imply, start a general hunt for all bears and wolves; or is there a specially obnoxious sort roaming around in Germany. In order to understand the German problem, lets look at the 40ie. At the end of the war Germany's future looked bleak indeed. The country lay prostrate, both morally and economically. There were foreign occupiers, many of them resolved to make up for their losses, and all apparently uniformly bent to eradicate the evil of Hitlerism from German state and society. There were many millions of refugees from eastern and southeastern Europe and especially the territories now in the hands of the Russians, Poles and Czechs. They streamed into a country whose resources had been sucked dry by a war which, at least in its last stages, had been fought on German territory. Recriminations between refugees and natives were compounded by the hatred between the former followers of Hitler and his victims. Then came the experience of de-Nazification. Undertaken with the intention of cleansing the body politic from the poison of Hitlerism, yet, carried out on an unrealistic and much too grandiose scale, especially in the American zone of occupation, it was destined to failure from the outset.

But, as the blame could be put on the broad shoulders of the Americans it, curiously enough, created a bond of unity between ~~xxx~~ Germans from all walks of life, with the most varied political background.

Meanwhile, the political scene had started to shift. Interallied unity had broken down and the outlines of the new West-East cleavage, symbolized by the ~~xxxx~~ Berlin blockade of 1948-49, had become clearly visible. West Germany, soon to be united under a common German administration, saw the decisive emergence of a fruitful division of labor between the Americans, quickly changing from occupiers to protectors, responsible for security and over-all policy, and the Germans, able to devote their full energy to tasks of reconstruction. Major policy decisions remained in American hands. This protected those engaged in rebuilding the German political structure against having their work undermined by a new nationalist onslaught which had proved so fateful to their Weimar predecessors in the 20ies. Then comes the equally American-born currency reform of 1948. It is this event, rather than the defeat of Hitler in 1945, which forms the great divide in the mind of every German, between the bad days of Hitler and the early occupation regime, and the steady road to the so-called Wirtschaftswunder. In ordering the currency reform the American authorities had left one cardinal issue to the Germans: the German authorities could have ~~made~~ ^{taken} arrangements for those people who had born heavy bomb damage and especially the refugees, as a starting point for a radical equalization of social and property structure, amounting to some sort of sharing the poverty. Or, they could as they did, defer indemnity problems till later,

and let everybody start from whatever position he found himself in, in early summer 1948.

Hindsight seems to provide a certain justification for the fitful and fateful decision to rebuild the economy, free from restrictions and egalitarian notions. The combination of premiums for hard work, know-how and established property relations achieved the desired result, speedy reconstruction and eventually prosperity. By pushing the millions of newcomers mercilessly into vigorous participation in the scramble for eking out, what in the beginning 40ies was a meager livelihood, most of them were quickly integrated into the budding west German society. Until the wall went up three and a half million east Germans followed the same road towards speedy integration into the West German economy. They took to the only effective vote remaining to them under the Ulbricht regime: they voted with their feet. Thus, furnishing the West German economy with a unique reservoir of readily available labor.

Now, a decade later, the West German experiment seems to have fully justified the expectations of its joint American and German architects. By all known standards West Germany is one of the most prosperous countries of Europe and of the world at large. Under these circumstances it will surprise no one that the record of the main architect of the new Germany, Konrad Adenauer, has kept up pretty well in the public mind. After almost 13 years in office Adenauer's popularity curve in January 1962, though somewhat down from the 57 high of 75%, showed 64 % quite satisfied with his performance.

You will realize that 13 years is exactly the time span allotted to the Weimar regime, with its ~~at~~ ever-changing cabinets and one year more than Hitler's thousand year Reich.

No wonder, that public orators and pollsters are apt to compare Adenauer with Bismarck. This comparison is instructive mainly because of the fundamental divergencies. To put it bluntly, Adenauer's domestic record is emphatically better than that of his 19th century predecessor. When the "iron chancellor" a mere youngster of 75, was forced from the political scene in 1890 he had failed in his major domestic projects. He was as little able to subdue the Catholic Church as he was to destroy the Social Democratic Party. Neither by temperament nor by design was he capable or willing to broaden the state structure sufficiently and give the great majority of people a true share in the sinews of government. Adenauer, while by no means without autocratic traits, is closely tied to, and forms part of a democratic party machine. As any other successful politician he sounds out, listens to, and is ~~in~~ ~~his~~ ~~own~~ strongly influenced by a network of interest organizations. Opinions about his willingness to satisfy the one or the other group will vary. Judging from popular reaction among the agricultural population, he is still their all-time favorite. By the way, many people think that either the bankers or the industrialists, or the Catholic Church should have less influence in the councils of government; and incidentally, the fact that 42 % of the population has no opinion at all regarding the influence of Jewish groups, shows, that antisemitism does not play a significant part in present day German popular consciousness.

Given the present political climate of western Germany Mr. Ulbricht's attempt to infiltrate and subvert the west German establishment belong decidedly among his least successful investments. At any rate, the splinter party which the Communists supported sub rosa in the October 1961 West German election and which ran on a straight pacifist platform drew exactly 1.9 % of the vote.

The Communist problem leads us straight to the foreign policy field. First a ground rule: In present day Germany foreign policy issues can be less easily separated from domestic problems than anywhere else. Due to the division of Germany and the two regimes established on its national territory, inter-German issues constantly overlap with purely domestic concerns. Major political battles are fought in terms of western democracy against Communist rule. This constellation makes it easy to perceive why Chancellor Adenauer had no chance to match Bismarck's record reestablishing German unity in the 20th century.

Bismarck operated in a multi-state European system; it consisted of units of comparable size and strength, each of them able to make independent foreign policy and military decisions. Adenauer operates within a hierarchically ordered world-wide state system; the freedom of action of all units except the super powers, remains strictly limited. There is, however, one point of legitimate comparison: today, as 100 years ago, opinions might seriously differ on what would form a desirable unit for a German state. Bismarck opted for what in his day was known as "little Germany" -

he dismissed the idea of uniting the Germans of Prussia and the South German states with those living under the Hapsburg crown. What are today's views on the territorial shape and the type of government of Germany? There is one area of near unanimity. Most Germans whether living east or west, consider a severe modification of the oppressive and unrepresentative Ulbricht regime as a legitimate and immutable ~~xxxx~~ goal. Whether Germany should again be brought together as a state unit, is another question. West German official utterances and various semi-official study groups drawing up blueprints for future reference assume, as a matter of course, that the political and social regime which has done so well in West Germany will eventually be introduced in one form or another ~~into~~ the region now under Mr. Ulbricht's rule. Yet, interestingly enough, a number of intellectuals have challenged this premise. Like everybody else, they firmly uphold the claim for East Germany's freedom from oppression. But they reject, as politically unfeasible and morally unjustified, the reestablishment of the German empire within the frontiers of either the Bismarck or even the Weimar state. They foresee the possibility of a continuation of a two separate state units, possibly belonging to two different systems of alliances. Whether the second solution of two permanent, more or less democratic Germanies, maintaining tolerable relations with each other is more than a pipe dream, is hard to say at the present juncture. That the reunification of Germany, western style, would raise difficult, albeit not insuperable problems is easy to see: First, there looms the large question of how an all German union would affect the fortunes of ~~the~~ western Europe?

Should the European union, now in the slow process of establishment, eventually embrace a reunited Germany? How would the Federal Republic's western partners, Italy and France today, England tomorrow react, when faced with a 70 million unit? Of course, there is one possible argument trying to smooth over such difficulties: the closer the integration of Europe will become, the less relevant the size and the strength of the individual participant. However, given the many uncertainties as to the constitutional form the European is eventually to take, this matter of size does not seem all that unimportant. Think only of General de Gaulle's drive to substitute the Europe of the Fatherlands for an integrated Europe. At any rate, England and France, while giving lip service to German unity when diplomatically required, show little enthusiasm for its realisation. Now the lukewarm attitude of the western states towards the goal of German unity might possibly be overcome by abundant American guarantees. But the concerted hostility of Germany's eastern neighbors poses more formidable difficulties. Could such fears which the resurgence of a unified western-style Germany would raise be banned? What would be the impact, if a united Germany would give a solemn promise to recognize the Oder-Neisse line, provisionally recognized at Potsdam, as Germany's permanent frontier? As you know, a truncated western Germany so far has scrupulously avoided the slightest move in this direction, for understandable reasons of domestic and international tactics, while the east German government has made a great show of recognizing the immutability of this so-called peace frontier.

And, overshadowing everything else, how would the USSR feel about the reestablishment of a united Germany?

This opens up the entire range of the so-called Rappallo problems, The likelihood and possibilities of closer relations between the USSR and Germany. First let us become quite clear about the meaning and the limits of the historical parallel of 1923. At that time the USSR and the Weimar Republic reached a limited agreement on settling some differences, by the same token they enhanced both partners' bargaining position with third powers. This device netted Germany a number of tactical advantages. But, nevertheless, throughout the 20ies, the deep cleavage between their respective social regimes prevented any attempt at converting a certain parallelism of interests into a more far reaching joint action. It needed the Ribbentrop - Stalin pact on Poland's partition to effect such purely temporary collaboration between opposite brands of totalitarianism. The far-reaching results are known to all of us under the name of Second World War.

Today, the USSR is a hegemonial power in her own right. The Federal Republic is an important secondary power, operating within the protective orbit of the other hegemonial power, the US. It is rather obvious that Soviet Russia ^{had} every interest to loosen the ties between the Federal Republic and the United States. It is at least possible that she will be willing to pay a high price, even going as far as agreeing to the reunification of Germany. Yet this price would only be preferred in order to enhance the security and the power of the USSR. It is unlikely that this goal could be reached if a Germany of over 70 million people would remain in a position of exercising an option between the blocks.

In the last analysis there exists only one device which in the mind of the USSR will protect it against the risks inherent in German unification. A drastic change in the German social system excluding the chance for further German switches. But what might appear as a necessary price of reunification to Soviet Russia, would appear as an exorbitant price to the overwhelming majority of all Germans. They never considered reunification a question of alternatives between social systems but thought only in terms of westernstyle unity.

Chancellor Adenauer's policies fit into this pattern. Mostly concerned with cementing German relations with the western powers, he also uncompromisingly upholds German claims to westernstyle reunification, possibly even in the 1937 frontier. In his mind the dual policy of western integration and toughness towards the east would produce such unity in freedom. As a tactical device for internal consumption, this position is fully understandable. It may even be conceded that the Chancellor's favorite speculation as to a possible impact of a widening rift between Soviet Russia and China on Germany's position has a however small element of reality. Would such a rift, as the Chancellor is fond of thinking, lead to the USSR's agreeing to some sort of western-style German unity? Would such a concession, from the Russian viewpoint, not just compound the risk of a potentially hostile China on her eastern border, with that of a strong Germany with unsatisfied national claims on the western confines of her block. Is it not more realistic to assume that a Chinese-Russian rift might, as we are seeing already now, intensify the USSR's search for ways and means to cement the present status -quo on the Elbe?

*His answer
question whether*

What does all that mean for the present ~~xxxxxxxx~~ highly unsatisfactory state of affairs with its intermittent political warfare, pressure on the Berlin lifelines and the sharpening of oppression in East Germany. If a permanent settlement is not yet in sight, can at least a basis for a limited agreement be found? There are areas where accommodation spells defeat, others, where it is a neutral device to continue a form of coexistence. Among the first I would count: guaranteed access to a West Berlin establishment, remaining outside Soviet control. As important: continued active pursuit of greater freedom for the East German population without necessarily raising the specter of a change of sovereignty and alliances.

In the areas of possible compromise I would include: the form in which cognizance is taken of the existence of the East German regime. In our century many techniques have been developed to acknowledge the existence of a state organization without necessarily becoming one of its well-wishers.

West-German industrialists have worked out a whole body of rationalizations why to continue their presence at the Leipzig fair, why not show the same inventiveness in the business of political forms? Into the second category belongs also greater flexibility as to the future relations between West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The same area of possible compromise includes agreement, tacit or open, to keep atomic weapons, in contrast to carriers of such weapons, out of the hands of West and East Germans alike. Official West German reticence about relations with and guarantees for Poland and at best contradictory statements on German desires for direct Nato, meaning German access to nuclear weapons have not been helpful.

The US proposals regarding attempts to work out a mutually acceptable compromise on Berlin seem to embrace four points. I am starting with the one which is least immediately concerned with the DDR recognition situation. Proposed US - USSR agreement not to give direct access to nuclear weapons to either west or east Germany. (we leave open, for the moment, whether this agreement would be formulated in a way to exclude such information^{from} from third parties) Such an agreement would be a clarification of US policy which, while oscillating showed a certain, by no means clear-cut, tendency in that direction. The USSR seems to have evinced interest in such an agreement not only in regard to West Germany but also in a wider third party formulation; this might facilitate its internal block arguments; keeping such weapons out of the hands of China may be made to appear as necessary quid pro quo for keeping the same weapons out of west German hands, therewith minimizing any threat of an increasing west German hold over US policy.

To what extent would such an agreement involve a German sacrifice? West Germany's official position in regard to acquisition of nuclear weapons for Nato - read Germany - has been shifting back and forth. The argument for pressing the United States in this direction has rested on the point that independent access would release west Germany ^{from} a questionable reliance on American willingness to retaliate via atomic weapons for USSR attacks on either Berlin or West Germany. The army minister Strauss has recently, but not very consistently, rejected such a German claim for nuclear weapons but his subordinates and more or less official journalists have still kept to the old line of demanding such access. It may well be that Germany only raised the issue in order to get a more satisfactory solution in regard to the problem of

German participation and consultation in regard to the use of US nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. The so-called official opposition, the SPD, while underplaying the issue is not very intent on getting nuclear weapons, but, more important, 8 prestigious opinion leaders from the academic and the church world, have, in November, come out flatly against independent German nuclear weapons in a memo addressed to the government which meanwhile has been published. Given this situation, the west German government cannot strongly object to the abovementioned type of USSR US agreement.

All the other points involve directly some measure of recognition for the government of the DDR.

1) a projected non-aggression pact between Nato and the Warsaw pact nations could possibly be interpreted as formalizing informal west German declarations that it will not use force to change the present territorial status. Inasmuch as the USSR and the DDR now regard the wall in Berlin as a state boundary, such a non-aggression agreement would involve a ^{recognition} ~~defacto agreement~~ of the split of Berlin, including the present means of separation, i.e. the wall. West Germany might want to minimize the value of such a declaration by arguing that the West German government has a number of times declared unilaterally not to want to use force to change the present ~~xxxxxxx~~ status; therefore such an agreement would involve nothing new. However, psychologically, such an agreement would undoubtedly involve an element of stabilization and recognition for ^{the DDR} ~~east~~ Germany. This is especially true if the agreement ~~does not xxxxxxxx~~ is not put into effect by unilateral declaration of the parties concerned, but would involve exchange and deposition of instruments.

Moreover it is quite possible that the USSR would want to enlarge on such an agreement by including indirect aggression via propaganda. In this case it might want to make a commission to be set up (see below) the arbiter of ^{indirect} aggression. This might raise major difficulties.

2) Mixed commissions to discuss trade and other matters. This would raise relations between west Germany and the DDR to some kind of de facto recognition level. It would be likely to involve both interzonal trade agreements as well as the handling of various still existing common services (water, electricity) as well as contacts) criminal police); while it would neither increase nor narrow down the scope of such contacts, it would give them wider significance through raising them from the strictly administrative to the governmental level.

3) Of all points the one of most immediate importance is that of the shape and form of the Access to Berlin Authority. Hitherto air traffic was excluded from any form of DDR control and was only subject to combined Allied USSR flight safety control; the enlargement of such safety controls to traffic controls has so far been successfully fought by the western powers. If air flights as projected, are included under the traffic controls, no means of independent access to Berlin would remain. On the other hand, any attempt at interference with such traffic would fall under the jurisdiction of the new authority. Full east German participation in such control would not only enhance the DDR recognition claim but would give the DDR also direct influence on ^{the Berlin} its decisions. For this very reason ~~it must be~~ ^{must} West Germany's endeavor to keep both the DDR and the West German government from acquiring full membership status in such an authority, granting them only, - as had already been

done in Geneva conferences - technical adviser status. However, it is very problematic, whether the USSR could agree to such down-grading, therefore there will probably be a US attempt to solve the issue by putting the decisive role into neutral hands. This, however, might weaken the authority from the outset, in as much as neutrals, when the going gets rough, might evince a tendency to withdraw their services.

Queries: a) why should the USSR after 3 1/2 years of propaganda and diplomatic pressure on the Berlin issue, be willing to be satisfied with arrangements short of full-fledged Berlin control which, moreover, at least on paper, will lead to arrangements which safe-guard free access to Berlin, ^{a west} remaining outside their control. The short answer to that is, that the USSR will certainly try to enlarge on the proposals in the direction of free city status, withdrawal of western allied troops or alternative introduction of Russian troops into west Berlin, as well as already mentioned above, cessation of propaganda, ~~into non-aggression~~ non-aggression agreements. However it seems likely that the USSR will enter an agreement even if not given satisfaction on major points.

USSR motivation for such an agreement, in the opinion of some, would rest on the cynical view that, in as much as the USSR and the DDR keep physical controls they can always after a time ~~xxx~~ renew pressure, multiply incidents and paralyze the authority's activities. ~~xxxxxxx~~

More likely theory: main Russian goal is not the taking over of Berlin or general expansion into the west, but gradual recognition of the present status-quo on its western frontier by the western powers. Stabilization of the position of the DDR

satellite is part of this program.

Such goals include two sets of objectives: 1) west Berlin must be reduced to the point where it can no longer interfere with life in East Germany; a necessary step was the - very belated - construction of the wall, preventing depopulation of the DDR
2) Optional steps are reduction of propaganda influence emanating from west Berlin. This may partly be reached by preventing maximally inter-city-traffic; destroying continued Rias broadcasts useful but not important, as west German broadcasting stations would anyhow take over. Main Berlin objective therefore already obtained by construction of wall with everything else being technical by-play.

2) Agreements on renunciation of force (if obtainable with prohibition of propaganda clause), Technical commissions and Berlin Access authority are very important to the USSR, ~~because~~ the very fact of these arrangements involves in itself a measure of de facto recognition of the DDR; this de facto recognition, exactly as the putting up of the wall, will have a stabilizing influence on the DDR. ^{It might} allow the Russians to dismiss Ulbricht in the foreseeable future, ~~and~~ ^{By} liberalizing the regime, Gromulka style, ^{it will} increase its viability, and therewith enhance the ^{status of the} status-quo, raising it to a more definitive level ^{both by mutual consideration & a measure of de facto recognition}

West German attitudes: at first, the west Germans seems to have legitimate complaints with which the USA asked for west German ^{to} comments on its proposals. These procedural questions aside, the much propagandized official reasons for the west German opposition are not the real ones. Officially west German reticence rests on the likelihood that any concessions will erode Berlin's

position. This however is not likely, even if the USSR would wench on the agreement in the foreseeable future, ~~xxx~~ West Berlin would at worst have bought additional time. West Germany's real opposition rests on the fact that any accord necessarily is a sort of way station, cementing the status quo and eternalizing Germany's split. However, the west German government is somehow caught between two contradictory requirements: a) it cannot refuse its agreement to any move safeguarding, if only on a temporary basis the status of Berlin; b) it has to ^{the} void impression of being willing to formalize the division of Germany. it is therefore unlikely that west Germany will obstruct an agreement, but it will try to keep concessions in re de facto recognition ~~at~~ a bare minimum. As there is now a firm cartel between the government and the opposition in regard to foreign policy (only the small coalition partner, the FDP shows sometimes some maverick tendencies before being promptly called to order by big brother CDU) there is no domestic difficulty to put an agreement through. Moreover, any too vocal opposition by ~~a~~ refugee organizations (anyhow more interested in Polish border and diplomatic representation issues not touched upon in the agreement) is counterbalanced by already mentioned academic groups who propagaize ~~re~~ recognition of facts o f life in foreign policy. If the agreement should, in the foreseeable future, lead to a certain Polish type development in the DDR, public opinion will not only tolerate, but actively support the agreement.

In 1952 the successful Dulles-Eisenhower campaign ^{was} ~~had~~ ^{was} ~~inofficially~~ ^{was} ~~been~~ opened by an article of Mr. Dulles in Life Magazine entitled: A Policy of Boldness. In this article Mr. Dulles advocated the abandonment of the negative policy of containment and the adoption of new policies leading to the liberation of the captive people dominated by the USSR. As the popular response to this new departure, fully endorsed by Candidate Eisenhower in August 1952, was a mixed one, there soon appeared the first of the increasing number of glosses and qualifications for which future generations of diplomatic apprentices might best remember the incumbent Secretary of State: Liberation must take exc usively take place by peaceful means. Neither this disclaimer nor the meticulous balance between the Internationalist's viewpoints of liberal republicanism and the policy of national retrenchment of the Taft variety of ^{peaceful} republicanism ~~held~~ by Candidate Eisenhower in his campaign speeches seems to have decisively affected the election outcome. If any specific foreign policy statements did have a clear cut effect on the outcome of the 1952 campaign, then it was Candidate Eisenhower's "I shall go to Korea" and the express promise to bring the Korean war to a just, speedy and honorable conclusion. It was the prospect of General Eisenhower as both the purveyor and the [✓]garantor of peace which turned out to be the most decisive campaign asset^t.

The opening shot in the 1956 campaign in the foreign affair field is again contained in a Life Magazine article. ^{This was} Half campaign style biography and hero worship, half the authorized words of the master himself, leading up to the propagandistically so effective handshake at the doorstep of the ^{Bible} resbyterian Church, showing Mr. Dulles not as a passive recipient of a God's blessings, but as a confidence exuding.

morale builder. In the general commotion over ~~xxxxDulles~~ the incumbent Secretary of State's exasperating ways of expressing himself one fact seems to have been overlooked: Whatever his ~~unfortunate~~ ^{unfortunate} penchant for mixing cynicism, moral rectitude and pursuit of the nation's interest, the famous statement about the ability to get to the ~~the~~ ^{range} of war without getting into ~~the~~ war as a necessary art, as well as the often overlooked preceding sentence speaking of "selective retaliation" against targets reasonably related to the area of aggression, with the emphasis that the aggressor does not have to loose much more but just something more, ~~are~~ ^{represent} an advance over the 1952 campaign. They incorporate its experiences. In his own weird ways Mr. Dulles takes care to fuse the two currents which during the previous campaign often remained disjoint ^{ed} and contradictory: the promise of dynamic action and the priority of maintaining the peace. "You don't want the other fellow to get a way with murder and allow him to keep the initiative, but at the same time, ^{you do not want to disturb} peace, meaning continuation of present US life habits and relative security from ~~active~~ ^{hostile} interference, [should not be disturbed]. Therefore you threaten the other fellow with some, however not the ultimate, consequences ... massive retaliation, you remember, has been ~~the~~ the object of another of the Dulles glosses and you arrive at not too unfavorable a settlement. [There is one, however small, kernel of truth in Mr. Dulles' theorems. The emphasis is on the element of risk involved in any action. However, around this admission ranks a number of major distortions. The ^{re is just the} insistence that there is some way to control the risk by carefully measuring the amount of ^{violence} ~~violence~~ you are to apply, and then ^{there is} what has already been sufficiently discussed by the Secretary's political opponents, ~~the~~ ^{his} peculiar way ~~to~~ ^{of} relating the complex interaction ^{among} between Chinese, Russian, Korean, Indochinese, French and American interests and the uneasy and essentially unstable compromises

resulting from their clash, to Mr. Dulles forthright actions. Thus Mr. Dulles' campaign opener, keyed to overcome the fear that peace might crumble if the United States take risks implying military action, has not been a very fortunate ~~campaign~~ start. After this false start ~~it might well be that the opinion will be on the increase~~ that bi-partisan spirit should lead ^{to} renouncing ^{any} discussion of foreign policy subjects except in terms of meaningless generalities without any attempt to analyze our situation. From a purely tactical viewpoint this might be an appropriate Republican campaign strategy if Mr. Eisenhower should be a candidate. This would give the Republicans ^{past the possibility of electing} a possibility to rely on Mr. Eisenhower's reputation as a peace president. But, Mr. Eisenhower ^{may} not be a candidate and it is questionable whether another Republican candidate could run on Mr. Eisenhower's peace reputation ^{alone}. Anyhow, even ^{if Mr. Eisenhower runs} under the first assumption the Democratic party would have all interest to stress the objective factors of the situation which determine American foreign policy, rather than the more or less fortuitous personal elements. ^{If a truly} Bipartisan spirit in foreign policy, ~~to~~ to my mind, means maximum suppression of purely pressure group viewpoints; whether ~~they pertain to interests of~~ economic groups, national minorities or religious groups, and concentration on discussing the policy choices open to the United States under ^{or foreseeable} the present circumstances. If the parties want to fulfill their political function, bipartisan policy cannot be tantamount to suppression of ^{meaningful} discussion ^{of foreign policy alternatives}.

(The Duty to discuss the foreign policy issues is the more clearcut as ^{people are} the population is at present utterly confused ^{as} how to cope with the contradictions inherent in the present situation. There is first the

~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ vast majority's deep and ingrained hatred of communism, its desire to do away with its tyrannical dictatorship, hence its willingness to listen to the appeals of liberation movements, its satisfaction over our ability to hold the fort in Europe, its magnanimous support of all Free-Europe-type organizations, its deep concern with every new inroad which the communists are making in Asia and their willingness to hold the line in ^{Korea} Formosa or even Quemoy, ^{and its} in ~~their~~ feeling of satisfaction over each new pact which the indefatigable Mr. Dulles's ^{may} ~~trips~~ might bring us ^{home from} in Teheran, Bangkok or Karachi. But there is also, at the same time and ^{among} by the same people, the growing knowledge of the radically changed conditions of modern warfare, the quick succession of stupendous new weapons, the atomic, the hydrogen bomb, with the intercontinental missile ^{on} at the horizon, and ^T the question arises in the minds of these people: what's the use of clinging to our bastions here and there if the war might anyhow be fought under strategic concepts which make the present modus operandi meaningless; and even worse, possibly increasing the danger because they ^{are local bastions} multiply the local occasion where a conflagration might start, ^{and} a related thought is coming up, : what is the use of war; if our physicists assure us that our traditional concepts of peace and war are meaningless and that after the next war the conditions of life will have more similarity with those of a tribal society than ^{to} what ~~used to be~~ ^{the} our world ^{is} in 1955.

This contradiction between ~~the~~ preparedness to fight the advance of communism and if possible to liberate its victims, and the voice of technological reason counselling the maximal avoidance of modern wars is the real dilemma which faces the voter of 1956, and he is assuredly entitled to ask the politician 'How do you propose to solve this dilemma?' Without wanting to be unduly harsh ^{to} with the incumbent Secretary of State, we must admit, though he is very conscious of ^{the dilemma} it, his formula

why?

contradiction?

are all designed facing it. His predecessor Acheson, given to more coherent thinking, in his recent book has given the weight of his authority to an answer, which is becoming quite fashionable these days: the concept of the limited war. None of the major powers would utilise any of the new fangled weapons, but would stick to let, us say, the military technique of 1914. The recent glosses of the incumbent secretary of state on his massive retaliation concept as well as the recent utterances of one or two of yesteryear's planners, General Ridgway and former assistant secretary Nitze are all nudging closer to the intermediate version of graduation in atomic warfare. The version would use atomic weapons for limited objectives, thus trying to combine traditional warfare with some measure of atomic warfare giving us something between 1914 and 1945 style wars.

Let us for a moment examine the most favorable assumption; strictly limited warfare. Dean Acheson has evoked the period between the 30 Years war and the French revolution, when the European people, if they did not attain an enforced peace, were careful not to let war get out of hand. But to what extent does this parallel hold? These policy makers had something more in common than the fears of the repetition of the excesses and devastations of the 30 Years War. They lived their lives under mutually acceptable forms of social organization, they worshipped common gods, rationalism and deism, and all fed on Voltaire. Modern dictatorship utilises the threat of encirclement to cement its tyranny at home.

Modern democracy, at least in itsarrison state variety, which we are rapidly approaching, has not particularly developed the art of accommodation either. Moreover even if in the 17&18 centuries for reasons of population control and husbanding economic strength armies were kept rather small, did not their masters relentlessly try to improve their military techniques and utilise improvements as speedily as they became available. Moreover are we in the 20 century still able to switch our alliances as rapidly and with any concomitant loss of face as the European cabinets of the 18?