

*Mr. J. W. Brown 1968
Charlottesville, Va 22901
Professor Selovers
Kroladziej
Tel. 703-2166*

OUTLINE

COMMENTS ON WEST GERMANY

Hans Speier

I shall comment mainly on:

- I. Special conditions of the FRG.
- II. West German views of the state of international relations and the function of force.
- III. West German views of the use or threat of force in support of her national objectives.

There is no German consensus on either II or III; there is a range of opinions dependent, among other things, on age, party affiliation, and sophistication, and partly hidden from view by official declaratory policies.

I.

- A. The German outlook on international affairs and on German national objectives is an outgrowth of special geographical and historical conditions:
 - (1) Geographical location in Central Europe, exposed to military insecurity;
 - (2) Defeat in World War II, loss of territory, division of country, with people in the two parts of the country living in different social systems;
 - (3) The Nazi heritage
 - (a) Giving the Soviet Union political and propagandistic advantages vis-a-vis the Federal Republic;
 - (b) Restricting the freedom of the West German foreign and military policies vis-a-vis West European allies;
 - (c) Limiting rationality in politics by both excessive self-doubt and excessive self-assertion;
 - (4) The limitations of sovereignty imposed upon the Federal Republic by the Western powers as a price for rearmament and membership in NATO, including:
 - (a) West German renunciation of force in pursuing reunification;
 - (b) Renunciation of ABC-weapons production;

- (c) Integration of West German armed forces in NATO;
- (d) Residual rights of the victors in World War II;
- (e) The special, contested, status of Berlin.

B. Efforts to regain freedom of maneuver in foreign policy include:

- (1) Pacification of German-French relations (under Adenauer);
- (2) Economic restitution and military aid to Israel (under Adenauer) and normalization of diplomatic relations (under Erhard);
- (3) The new German policy toward Eastern Europe (initiated by Schroeder and extended by Brandt).

These efforts have had limited success:

Re. (1): The Federal Government can ill afford to pursue European policies that are not approved by DeGaulle, because the Germans need the French -- or believe they do -- in support of their East European policy and fear political sanctions that DeGaulle could take against them (e.g., French recognition of the GDR, further French rapprochement with the Soviet Union).

Thus, DeGaulle has been able to frustrate German support of British efforts to enter the Common Market.

He has pursued a policy against NATO which West Germany must tolerate without (fully) approving it.

He has discriminated against the FRG regarding its nuclear status, by refusing to sign the NPT but expecting, if not encouraging, the FRG to do so.

Re. (3): The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent emphasis on the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine has been a serious set-back to West German participation in the detente policies of the Western powers. Ulbricht's influence in Moscow and Eastern Europe has grown.

- (4) A policy area in which German freedom of choice has substantially increased is the economic and financial one.
- (a) In connection with the crisis of the French franc last November, West Germany was able to assert her interests against the United States, Great Britain, and France.
 - (b) Similarly, German freedom of economic action outside Europe is growing. E.g., Erhard in 1964 still stopped his efforts to initiate a trade agreement between West Germany and Mainland China when President Johnson objected. In the meantime, German-Chinese trade has increased from 200 million DM in 1963 to 1.1 billion in 1968. Chinese imports of German heavy industrial equipment exceed Chinese agricultural and consumer-industrial exports to Germany in the ratio of 8:3. (German DM is the only Western currency accepted by the Chinese.) With the end of the Vietnam War in sight -- however far in the distance -- Willy Brandt recently talked in public about the possibility of a trade agreement with China.
- (5) Returning to relations with her allies, freedom of German action is increasing. This is partly the result of Bonn's economic bargaining power in economic negotiations with the United States on offset agreements and German arms purchases. US leverage is exerted, above all, by the American commitment to protect Germany and Western Europe, if necessary by nuclear means and by the troops stationed in Germany as an earnest of that commitment. In addition, the US supports, by declaratory policy, the goals of German declaratory policy, particularly as regards the international position of the GDR and Berlin. The US also protects the Federal Republic against political isolation in Europe, which is a middle range goal of Soviet foreign policy.

German leverage resides in her economic strength and in the expectation that peace and stability in Europe is in the interest of the United States, in any event, so that the FRG can politically afford to spend a lower percentage of its GNP for defense than the UK or the US.

While in the last years of the Adenauer era and at the time Erhard was German Chancellor, the Germans insisted that they needed both Washington and Paris and could neither follow DeGaulle too closely in his anti-American policies nor let themselves be used by the US against France, the international situation has recently offered more room for German freedom of maneuver in NATO. This is not only the result of French economic weakness and of signs of political instability in France, but also of DeGaulle's policy after August 21, 1968.

At DeGaulle's last visit to Bonn French-German relations were extremely cool. German "Gaullism" now is at a very low ebb. At the same time, the British are making a strenuous effort to assume the role in Europe that the French cannot or do not perform. (Stewart's visit with Brandt, Denis Healey's policy speech in Munich advocating a "European Caucus" within NATO, Wilson's subsequent visit in Bonn -- all in February 1969.)

Thus Bonn for the first time in its policy regarding NATO and Europe may be facing Paris and London as contenders within the alliance. In the past, in Bonn's view, the veiled antagonism between Washington and Paris dominated the scene, and the Germans had been unable to indulge their support of British wishes to join the Common

Market against French resistance. Now, the British, after their retrenchment east of Suez may exercise their European option, thereby reducing French influence in Bonn.

II.

German views of the state of international affairs and the role of force in them are difficult to summarize briefly, because considerable differences of opinion exist on this subject.

There is fairly general agreement, however, on the following propositions.

- (1) The two nuclear giants are predominant in world politics. American nuclear superiority still is conceded. The increase in strategic Soviet nuclear power relative to that of the US is a cause of concern, but comfort is derived from the notion -- which is a matter of faith -- that nuclear war will not occur.
- (2) US nuclear power, rather than the conventional power of NATO, contains Soviet expansionism in Europe.
- (3) The threat of force to hold the Soviet Union in check cannot and must not be German force. It must be NATO force and primarily the US nuclear component.

All but the German Gaullists realize that French nuclear power is no viable alternative to the US nuclear umbrella, occasional extravagant French claims to the contrary notwithstanding. Informed Germans have pointed out in public that the capability of the force de frappe is a small fraction of the now defunct Multilateral (nuclear) Force that was once proposed by the US: and that the power of the MLF, itself, would have been only a very small portion of the US nuclear capability.

- (4) In addition to deterrence many Germans believe that two other forces work for peace:
- (a) A self-generated trend toward liberalization in the communist orbit in Europe, including the Soviet Union. This belief has not been seriously shaken by events in Czechoslovakia. The process of liberalization is conceived rather as taking a zig-zag course, but it is held to be irreversible. Tendencies toward re-Stalinization in the Soviet Union are, on the whole, minimized or overlooked.
 - (b) The efficacy of detente efforts by the Western powers including Germany is frequently argued in terms of the economic needs of the communist countries. "Bridge-building" with the East is presented as an altogether humane, economic, non-political endeavor to break down distrust and relax political tension between East and West while waiting for the day on which communism will be weakened. Moscow will yet concede that the West did not want to weaken it. This, at least, is Willy Brandt's repeated assertion, whether you consider it disingenuous or naive. Whatever it is, Brandt is in distinguished company.
- (5) Among more geo-politically oriented Germans, conflict between China and the USSR is considered to work in Europe's favor, as Moscow must avoid war on two fronts -- a kind of constellation about which the Germans, of course, know a great deal.
- (6) The build-up of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf worries the Germans, but it is considered a NATO rather than a specific German concern.

(7) As to the underdeveloped areas, Germany has responded to some American pressure to assume some of the burden of aid. Thoughtful Germans talk about the population explosion and the North/South conflict. Men like Freiherr von Weizsäcker have rationalized the intense German interest in peaceful atomic development as an effort to be able to deal with hunger, which is viewed as the most important political world problem of the future.

III. National Objectives and the Use of Force

1. Peace

- (a) Since the Germans have no nuclear weapons of their own, the maintenance of nuclear peace is regarded primarily as an American concern. But the avoidance of nuclear war is, of course, in the vital interest of Germany as well, because of her location on both sides of the frontline of the East-West conflict.
- (b) In Europe, Germany need no longer fear aggression from the West, but she is most seriously exposed to the Warsaw Pact conventional superiority to Western strength on the central front of NATO and to the deployment of about 750 Soviet MRBMs against Central Europe. The FRG cannot safeguard her security interests except through NATO. Any erosion of NATO solidarity either because of a mistaken sense of decreasing danger from the East, or because of intensified conflicts of national interest in the Western camp produces grave security problems for West Germany. So did the appearance of Soviet troops on the Czech-Bavarian frontier. And so would unilateral Western arms reductions and, above all, any weakening of the US commitment to protect Europe.

(c) To the extent that the maintenance of peace involves US-Soviet negotiations on arms control, such negotiations are easily suspected in Germany of being conducted at the expense of the non-nuclear powers, and possibly at the expense of Western Europe or Germany. Even early "consultation," the new magic formula of the Nixon Administration, is not likely fully to remove this suspicion and the political resentment engendered in the process. But the Federal Government supports arms control and arms reductions, both nuclear and conventional, providing they are bilateral in character.

2. Deterrence

As long as peace is not secure, the Warsaw Pact must be deterred. It will be deterred only by a NATO strategy providing for very early escalation of conventional fighting to strategic retaliation. In the German view, no increase in conventional strength but only a firm commitment to the strategic nuclear option will prevent large-scale conventional war.

Thus, German attitudes on this vital issue are contradictory. The Germans believe that while strategic nuclear war must be avoided, threatening strategic nuclear retaliation is the only means of preventing large-scale conventional as well as nuclear aggression. Increasing conventional NATO strength is believed to make the nuclear "option" less credible and therefore to function as an incentive to Soviet aggression.

3. The presence of US conventional forces in Germany is nevertheless held to be vital, but not so much for purposes of waging conventional war, if necessary, as for the purpose of committing the US more firmly to the nuclear option.

A reduction of US forces in Europe is undesirable also, because it would confront the Germans with economically inconvenient and politically disagreeable choices. (Denis Healey argued recently that such reduction would increase pressure for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.) If the Germans increased their own conventional forces, they would arouse old fears among other West Europeans, while at a time fearing themselves that the US commitment to Europe as well as the number of US troops in Europe would wane.

4. Intellectuals like comprehensive views of international affairs. They even like to speak of an international "system." Men having political responsibility for the foreign affairs of their country do not necessarily share this view. Their universe of discourse usually is smaller, either because they are specialists in the government of a global power, concerned, say, with economic aid or base rights or with some geographically delimited area; or else because as government officials of a smaller country they simply have fewer operational concerns with global issues. In Helsinki the focus of foreign policy is Moscow, and even in Paris it takes the effort of a unique man to think of France as a world power.

The Federal Government thinks of Germany as a middle power.

Unlike other European powers, it did not have to participate in decolonization, since Germany lost her colonies in World War I.

It wants no part in overseas conflicts, and has refused to participate in armed struggles of its allies; for example, in Cyprus or in Vietnam. The Germans regarded the Korean War as a token of American anti-communism, but many Germans have grown more and more critical of American policy in Vietnam, although they cannot vie with the anti-Americanism of DeGaulle.

In the seven-day war in the Middle East, German sympathies were with Israel; official policy was one of neutrality, but most Germans disapproved of DeGaulle's stance.

5. US policy on the NPT was at first very widely resented in Germany. After many concessions made by the US to Germany, the treaty will no doubt be signed in Bonn, but I believe that we must reckon with a long-lasting hidden resentment on the part of many Germans. It was most significant, in my view, that the heated, and at first hysterical German debate over the NPT led Bonn to seeking support of German national interests in the nuclear issue with other non-nuclear powers, like Japan, Brazil, India, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, against the US, Germany's most powerful ally.
6. We are used to regarding reunification as Bonn's most important national policy objective. Today, this view can no longer be held without qualification.
 - (a) Bonn has always renounced the use of force to obtain reunification.
 - (b) Since the formation of the Grand Coalition Government in December 1966, it has discarded the once-sacred Hallstein Doctrine by establishing diplomatic relations with Rumania and Yugoslavia, thus running certain incalculable risks and making a considerable concession to former communist demands that the Hallstein Doctrine be abandoned.
 - (c) Earlier, the Erhard Government had offered to conclude agreements on the renunciation of force. The Kiesinger-Brandt Government has extended this offer also to the Ulbricht Government. This is another concession to Soviet/East German pressure and barely stops short of formal recognition of the GDR.

- (d) When talking about the right of the Federal Government to speak for all of Germany, the Grand Coalition Government is substantially more moderate in its language than any previous West German government was.
- (e) It has also indicated to Poland a conciliatory modus operandi for solving the moot issue of the Oder-Neisse Line.
- (f) It now talks about German unification in an indeterminate time perspective as a long historical process and it has adopted the view that such unification may well come about in the context of much broader changes in Europe.
- (g) It has put stress on reducing the qualitative differences that exist in the forms of life in East and West Germany, respectively, rather than on changing boundaries or on forming an all-German government.

This policy, which could be adopted only by a coalition government of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, has borne no fruit as yet and, indeed, it may fail altogether. The only result, thus far, has been continued Soviet intransigence and a fortified cold-war stance on the part of Ulbricht.

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- (1) Geographical location in Central Europe, exposed to military insecurity; → Ruhr Berlin / ~~right to intervene (OKK)~~ / ^{Soviet forces} / ^{trained for} / ^{intervention}
- (2) Defeat in World War II, loss of territory, division of country, → [right to intervene] with people in the two parts of the country living in different social systems; -- fight forward to "Europe" - ^{grand designs}
- (3) The Nazi heritage
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*(Emergency legislation
Wasser:
UN Charter 33/107)*

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*unification - Brezhnev doctrine
monthly 3 -> (GDR)*

- (4) A policy area in which German freedom of choice has substantially increased is the economic and financial one.
- (a) In connection with the crisis of the French franc last November, West Germany was able to assert her interests against the United States, Great Britain, and France.
- (b) Similarly, German freedom of economic action outside Europe is growing. E.g., Erhard in 1964 still stopped his efforts to initiate a trade agreement between West Germany and Mainland China when President Johnson objected. In the meantime, German-Chinese trade has increased from 200 million DM in 1963 to 1.1 billion in 1968. Chinese imports of German heavy industrial equipment exceed Chinese agricultural and consumer-industrial exports to Germany in the ratio of 8:3. (German DM is the only Western currency accepted by the Chinese.) With the end of the Vietnam War in sight -- however far in the distance -- Willy Brandt recently talked in public about the possibility of a trade agreement with China.
- (5) Returning to relations with her allies, freedom of German action is increasing. This is partly the result of Bonn's economic bargaining power in economic negotiations with the United States on offset agreements and German arms purchases. US leverage is exerted, above all, by the American commitment to protect Germany and Western Europe, if necessary by nuclear means and by the troops stationed in Germany as an earnest of that commitment. In addition, the US supports, by declaratory policy, the goals of German declaratory policy, particularly as regards the international position of the GDR and Berlin. The US also protects the Federal Republic against political isolation in Europe, which is a middle range goal of Soviet foreign policy.

German leverage resides in her economic strength and in the expectation that peace and stability in Europe is in the interest of the United States, in any event, so that the FRG can politically afford to spend a lower percentage of its GNP for defense than the UK or the US.

While in the last years of the Adenauer era and at the time Erhard was German Chancellor, the Germans insisted that they needed both Washington and Paris and could neither follow DeGaulle too closely in his anti-American policies nor let themselves be used by the US against France, the international situation has recently offered more room for German freedom of maneuver in NATO. This is not only the result of French economic weakness and of signs of political instability in France, but also of DeGaulle's policy after August 21, 1968.

At DeGaulle's last visit to Bonn French-German relations were extremely cool. German "Gaullism" now is at a very low ebb. At the same time, the British are making a strenuous effort to assume the role in Europe that the French cannot or do not perform. (Stewart's visit with Brandt, Denis Healey's policy speech in Munich advocating a "European Caucus" within NATO, Wilson's subsequent visit in Bonn -- all in February 1969.)

Thus Bonn for the first time in its policy regarding NATO and Europe may be facing Paris and London as contenders within the alliance. In the past, in Bonn's view, the veiled antagonism between Washington and Paris dominated the scene, and the Germans had been unable to indulge their support of British wishes to join the Common

(SPD)

Market against French resistance. Now, the British, after their retrenchment east of Suez may exercise their European option, thereby reducing French influence in Bonn.

II.

German views of the state of international affairs and the role of force in them are difficult to summarize briefly, because considerable differences of opinion exist on this subject.

There is fairly general agreement, however, on the following propositions.

- (1) The two nuclear giants are predominant in world politics. ^{the side existing} American nuclear superiority still ^{referred as a ~~conf~~ reason} ~~is conceded.~~ ^{the mounting} The increase in strategic Soviet nuclear power relative to that of the US is a cause of concern, but comfort is derived from the notion -- which is a matter of faith -- that nuclear war will not occur.
- (2) US nuclear power, rather than the conventional power of NATO, contains Soviet expansionism in Europe.
- (3) The threat of force to hold the Soviet Union in check cannot and must not be German force. It must be NATO force and primarily the US nuclear component.

All but the German Gaullists realize that French nuclear power is no viable alternative to the US nuclear umbrella, occasional extravagant French claims to the contrary notwithstanding. Informed Germans have pointed out in public that the capability of the force de frappe is a small fraction of the now defunct Multilateral (nuclear) Force that was once proposed by the US: and that the power of the MLF, itself, would have been only a very small portion of the US nuclear capability.

(4) In addition to deterrence many Germans believe that two other forces work for peace:

(a) A self-generated trend toward liberalization in the communist orbit in Europe, including the Soviet Union.

Surprisingly!
This belief has not been seriously shaken by events in Czechoslovakia. The process of liberalization is conceived rather as taking a zig-zag course, but it is held to be irreversible. Tendencies toward re-Stalinization in the Soviet Union are, on the whole, minimized or overlooked.

(b) The efficacy of detente efforts by the Western powers including Germany is frequently argued in terms of the economic needs of the communist countries. "Bridge-building" with the East is presented as an altogether humane, economic, non-political endeavor to break down distrust and relax political tension between East and West while waiting for the day on which communism will be weakened. Moscow will yet concede that the West did not want to weaken it. This, at least, is Willy Brandt's repeated assertion, whether you consider it disingenuous or naive. Whatever it is, Brandt is in distinguished *international* company.

(5) Among more geo-politically oriented Germans, conflict between China and the USSR is considered to work in Europe's favor, as Moscow must avoid war on two fronts -- a kind of constellation about which the Germans, of course, know a great deal.

(6) The build-up of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf worries the Germans, but it is considered a NATO rather than a specific German concern.

(7) As to the underdeveloped areas, Germany has responded to some American pressure to ^{share} ~~assume some of~~ the burden of aid. Thoughtful Germans talk about the population explosion and the North/South conflict. Men like Freiherr von Weizsäcker have rationalized the intense German interest in peaceful atomic development as an effort to be able to deal with hunger, which is viewed as the most important political world problem of the future.

III. National Objectives and the Use of Force

1. Peace

- (a) Since the Germans have no nuclear weapons of their own, the maintenance of nuclear peace is regarded primarily as an American concern. But the avoidance of nuclear war is, of course, in the vital interest of Germany as well, because of her location on both sides of the frontline of the East-West conflict.
- (b) In Europe, Germany need no longer fear aggression from the West, but she is most seriously exposed to the Warsaw Pact conventional superiority to Western strength on the central front of NATO and to the deployment of about 750 Soviet MRBMs against Central Europe. The FRG cannot safeguard her security interests except through NATO. Any erosion of NATO solidarity either because of a mistaken sense of decreasing danger from the East, or because of intensified conflicts of national interest in the Western camp produces grave security problems for West Germany. So did the appearance of Soviet troops on the Czech-Bavarian frontier. And so would unilateral Western arms reductions and, above all, any weakening of the US commitment to protect Europe.

(c) To the extent that the maintenance of peace involves US-Soviet negotiations on arms control, such negotiations are easily suspected in Germany of being conducted at the expense of the non-nuclear powers, and possibly at the expense of Western Europe or Germany. Even early "consultation," the new magic formula of the Nixon Administration, is not likely fully to remove this suspicion and the political resentment engendered in the process. But the Federal Government supports arms control and arms reductions, both nuclear and conventional, providing they are bilateral in character.

2. Deterrence

As long as peace is not secure, the Warsaw Pact must be deterred. It will be deterred only by a NATO strategy providing for very early escalation of conventional fighting to strategic retaliation. In the German view, no increase in conventional strength but only a firm commitment to the strategic nuclear option will prevent large-scale conventional war.

Thus, German attitudes on this vital issue are contradictory. The Germans believe that while strategic nuclear war must be avoided, threatening strategic nuclear retaliation is the only means of preventing large-scale conventional as well as nuclear aggression. Increasing conventional NATO strength is believed to make the nuclear "option" less credible and therefore to function as an incentive to Soviet aggression. *(3 MacArthur)*

3. The presence of US conventional forces in Germany is nevertheless held to be vital, but not so much for purposes of waging conventional war, if necessary, as for the purpose of committing the US more firmly to the nuclear option.

A reduction of US forces in Europe is undesirable also, because it would confront the Germans with economically inconvenient and politically disagreeable choices. (Denis Healey argued recently that such reduction would increase pressure for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.) If the Germans increased their own conventional forces, they would arouse old fears among other West Europeans, while at a time fearing themselves that the US commitment to Europe as well as the number of US troops in Europe would wane.

4. Intellectuals like comprehensive views of international affairs. They even like to speak of an international "system." Men having political responsibility for the foreign affairs of their country do not necessarily share this view. Their universe of discourse usually is smaller, either because they are specialists in the government of a global power, concerned, say, with economic aid or base rights or with some geographically delimited area; or else because as government officials of a smaller country they simply have fewer operational concerns with global issues. In Helsinki the focus of foreign policy is Moscow, and even in Paris it takes the effort of a unique man to think of France as a world power.

The Federal Government thinks of Germany as a middle power.

Unlike other European powers, it did not have to participate in decolonization, since Germany lost her colonies in World War I.

It wants no part in overseas conflicts, and has refused to participate in armed struggles of its allies; for example, in Cyprus or in Vietnam. The Germans regarded the Korean War as a token of American anti-communism, but many Germans have grown more and more critical of American policy in Vietnam, although they cannot vie with the anti-Americanism of DeGaulle.

These Groupings
E/W
N/S
nuc / arm-nuc

In the seven-day war in the Middle East, German sympathies were with Israel; official policy was one of neutrality, but most Germans disapproved of DeGaulle's stance.

5. US policy on the NPT was at first ^{initially} ~~very widely~~ resented in Germany. After many concessions made by the US to Germany, the treaty will no doubt be signed in Bonn, but I believe that we must reckon with a long-lasting hidden resentment on the part of many Germans. It was most significant, in my view, that the heated, and at first hysterical German debate over the NPT led Bonn to seeking support of German national interests in the nuclear issue with other non-nuclear powers, like Japan, Brazil, India, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, against the US, Germany's most powerful ally.

6. We are used to regarding reunification as Bonn's most important national policy objective. Today, this view can no longer be held without qualification.

(a) Bonn has always renounced the use of force to obtain reunification.

(b) Since the formation of the Grand Coalition Government in December 1966, it has discarded the once-sacred Hallstein Doctrine by establishing diplomatic relations with Rumania and Yugoslavia, thus running certain incalculable risks and making a considerable concession to former communist demands that the Hallstein Doctrine be abandoned.

(c) Earlier, the Erhard Government had offered to conclude agreements on the renunciation of force. The Kiesinger-Brandt Government has extended this offer also to the Ulbricht Government. This is another concession to Soviet/East German pressure and barely stops short of formal recognition of the GDR.

Russ:
E/W
N/S
un / und

not actively sought

- (d) When talking about the right of the Federal Government to speak for all of Germany, the Grand Coalition Government is substantially more moderate in its language than any previous West German government was. *(responsibility etc than right)*
- (e) It has also indicated to Poland a conciliatory modus operandi for solving the moot issue of the Oder-Neisse Line.
- (f) It now talks about German unification in an indeterminate time perspective as a long historical process and it has adopted the view that such unification may well come about in the context of much broader changes in Europe.
- (g) It has put stress on reducing the qualitative differences that exist in the forms of life in East and West Germany, respectively, rather than on changing boundaries or on forming an all-German government.

This policy, which could be adopted only by a coalition government of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, has borne no fruit as yet and, indeed, it may fail altogether. The only result, thus far, has been continued Soviet intransigence and a fortified cold-war stance on the part of Ulbricht.