{UTF-8}
********************************************************
	.Collateral Damage
********************************************************~
	|

Counterinsurgent Supporter Attrition Rate=
	Min(Fighting Intensity of Counterinsurgent Force*Proportion Lost from Population not Insurgency\
		*Relative Proportion of Government Supporters in Population
	, Population in Support of Government/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Insurgent Supporter Attrition Rate=
	Min(Fighting Intensity of Counterinsurgent Force*Proportion Lost from Population not Insurgency\
		*Relative Proportion of Insurgent Supporters in Population, Population in Support of Insurgents\
		/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Proportion Lost from Population not Insurgency=
	Max(1-Proportion Lost from Insurgency not Population,0)
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Unintended Fatalities from Population= INTEG (
	Counterinsurgent Supporter Attrition Rate +Insurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,
		10000)
	~	People
	~		|

********************************************************
	.Competitive Contagion
********************************************************~
	|

Quality of Insurgency Intelligence=
	0.5
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Proportion of Those Targeted that are Susceptible Insurgent Supporters=
	Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence + (1-Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence\
		)*Relative Proportion of Insurgent Supporters in Population
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Proportion of Those Targeted that are Susceptible Government Supporters=
	Quality of Insurgency Intelligence + (1-Quality of Insurgency Intelligence)*Relative Proportion of Government Supporters in Population
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Rate of Winning over to Support for Insurgents=
	Min(Number of Susceptible Government Supporters Contacted by Insurgency Campaigners in a Week\
		*(Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Insurgent Support+Recruitment Factor from Collateral Damage\
		)
	, Population in Support of Government/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Number of Susceptible Insurgent Supporters Contacted by Government Campaigners in a Week\
		=
	Number of Government Campaigners*Number of People Contacted by Each Government Campaigner in a Week\
		*Proportion of Those Targeted that are Susceptible Insurgent Supporters
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Government Support=
	0.03
	~	People/Person
	~	like infectiousness - probability per unit time of transmission, given two \
		people in contact.
	|

Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Insurgent Support=
	0.03
	~	People/Person
	~	like infectiousness
	|

Number of Government Campaigners=
	Proportion of Government Supporters Willing to Contact Insurgent Supporters*Population in Support of Government
	~	People
	~		|

Number of Insurgency Campaigners=
	Proportion of Insurgent Supporters Willing to Contact Government Supporters*Population in Support of Insurgents
	~	People
	~		|

Number of People Contacted by Each Government Campaigner in a Week=
	40
	~	(People/Person)/Week
	~		|

Number of People Contacted by Each Insurgency Campaigner in a Week=
	40
	~	(People/Person)/Week
	~		|

Number of Susceptible Government Supporters Contacted by Insurgency Campaigners in a Week\
		=
	Number of Insurgency Campaigners*Number of People Contacted by Each Insurgency Campaigner in a Week\
		*Proportion of Those Targeted that are Susceptible Government Supporters
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Population=
	Population in Support of Government+Population in Support of Insurgents
	~	People
	~		|

Population in Support of Government= INTEG (
	Counterinsurgent Leaving Rate+Rate of Winning Over to Government Support-Counterinsurgent Supporter Attrition Rate\
		-Rate of Winning over to Support for Insurgents-Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Public\
		,
		800000)
	~	People
	~		|

Population in Support of Insurgents= INTEG (
	Insurgency Leaving Rate+Rate of Winning over to Support for Insurgents-Insurgency Recruitment Rate from Public\
		-Insurgent Supporter Attrition Rate-Rate of Winning Over to Government Support,
		200000)
	~	People
	~		|

Proportion of Government Supporters Willing to Contact Insurgent Supporters=
	0.0001
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Proportion of Insurgent Supporters Willing to Contact Government Supporters=
	0.0001
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Rate of Winning Over to Government Support=
	Min(Number of Susceptible Insurgent Supporters Contacted by Government Campaigners in a Week\
		*Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Government Support, Population in Support of Insurgents\
		/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Relative Proportion of Government Supporters in Population=
	Population in Support of Government/Population
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Relative Proportion of Insurgent Supporters in Population=
	Population in Support of Insurgents/Population
	~	dmnl
	~		|

********************************************************
	.Control
********************************************************~
		Simulation Control Parameters
	|

Adjustment Time=
	1
	~	Week
	~		|

FINAL TIME  = 100
	~	Week
	~	The final time for the simulation.
	|

INITIAL TIME  = 0
	~	Week
	~	The initial time for the simulation.
	|

SAVEPER  = 
        TIME STEP
	~	Week [0,?]
	~	The frequency with which output is stored.
	|

TIME STEP  = 0.0625
	~	Week [0,?]
	~	The time step for the simulation.
	|

********************************************************
	.Quality of Intelligence
********************************************************~
	|

Intelligence Decay Rate=
	0.015
	~	dmnl/Week
	~		|

Losses in Quality of Intelligence=
	Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence*Intelligence Decay Rate
	~	dmnl/Week
	~		|

Effect of Popular Support for Government on Intel f(
	[(0,0)-(2,2)],(0,0),(2,2))
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Max Quality=
	1
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Quality Gap=
	Max Quality-Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Improvements to Quality of Intelligence=
	Insurgent Defection Effect*Popular Support Effect*Baseline Gap Improvement per Week*\
		Quality Gap
	~	dmnl/Week
	~		|

Baseline Defection Rate of Insurgents to Government=
	1
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Baseline Gap Improvement per Week=
	0.25
	~	dmnl/Week
	~		|

Baseline Popular Support for Government=
	800000
	~	People
	~		|

Effect on Intel of Insurgents Defecting to Government f(
	[(0,0)-(2,2)],(0,0),(2,2))
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Insurgent Defection Effect=
	Effect on Intel of Insurgents Defecting to Government f(Relative Rate of Defections to Counterinsurgency\
		)
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Popular Support Effect=
	Effect of Popular Support for Government on Intel f(Relative Popular Support for Government\
		)
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence= INTEG (
	Improvements to Quality of Intelligence-Losses in Quality of Intelligence,
		0.6)
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Relative Popular Support for Government=
	Population in Support of Government/Baseline Popular Support for Government
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Relative Rate of Defections to Counterinsurgency=
	Rate of Defection to Government/Baseline Defection Rate of Insurgents to Government
	~	dmnl
	~		|

********************************************************
	.Recruitment
********************************************************~
	|

Forgetting Rate for Fatalities from Population=
	Memory for Fatalities from Population/Time to Forget
	~	dmnl/Week
	~		|

********************************************************
	.Recruitment and Defection
********************************************************~
	|

Increase in Memory for Fatalities=
	Population Attrition Rate
	~	dmnl/Week
	~		|

Baseline Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Populace=
	750
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Rate of Defection to Government=
	Min(Number of Times Insurgents Contacted by Defection Campaigners in a Week*Effectiveness of Messages Encouraging Insurgents to Defect\
		,Trained Insurgent Fighters/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Attrition of Insurgent Defectors=
	Fatality or Desertion Rate*Insurgents Defected to Government Support
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Baseline Leaving Rate=
	0.003
	~	dmnl/Week
	~		|

Insurgents Defected to Government Support= INTEG (
	Rate of Defection to Government-Attrition of Insurgent Defectors,
		2)
	~	People
	~		|

Baseline Populace Training Rate=
	500
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Baseline Training Rate=
	250
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Counterinsurgent Leaving Rate=
	Baseline Leaving Rate*Recruits from Populace to Counterinsurgency
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Fatality or Desertion Rate=
	0.025
	~	dmnl/Week
	~		|

Populace Training Rate=
	Min(Baseline Populace Training Rate,Recruits from Populace to Counterinsurgency/Adjustment Time\
		)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Trained Counterinsurgency Fighters= INTEG (
	Foreign Training Rate+Populace Training Rate-Rate of Attrition of Counterinsurgents,
		130000)
	~	People
	~		|

Insurgent Training Rate=
	Min(Baseline Training Rate,Recruits from Populace to Insurgency/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Public=
	Min(Baseline Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Populace,Population in Support of Government\
		/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Number of Campaigners for Defections to Counterinsurgency=
	Proportion of Counterinsurgent Fighters Campaigning for Defections*Trained Counterinsurgency Fighters\
		+Insurgents Defected to Government Support
	~	People
	~		|

Baseline Insurgency Leaving Rate=
	0.0004
	~	People/Week
	~	Notional
	|

Defectors to Insurgency=
	Min(Effectiveness of Insurgents at Gaining Defections*Recruits from Populace to Counterinsurgency\
		,Recruits from Populace to Counterinsurgency/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Effectiveness of Insurgents at Gaining Defections=
	0.0001
	~	dmnl/Week
	~		|

Effectiveness of Messages Disrupting Groups=
	1
	~	dmnl
	~	Notional
	|

Effectiveness of Messages Encouraging Insurgents to Defect=
	0.0001
	~	People/Contact
	~		|

Foreign Counterinsurgency Support= INTEG (
	Foreign Recruitment Rate-Foreign Training Rate,
		50000)
	~	People
	~		|

Foreign Recruitment Rate=
	250
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Foreign Training Rate=
	Min(250,Foreign Counterinsurgency Support/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Insurgency Leaving Rate=
	Min(Baseline Insurgency Leaving Rate*Recruits from Populace to Insurgency/Effectiveness of Messages Disrupting Groups\
		,Recruits from Populace to Insurgency/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Insurgency Recruitment Rate from Public=
	Min(Memory for Fatalities from Population*Recruitment Factor from Collateral Damage+\
		Proportion of Supporters Joining Insurgency per Week*Population in Support of Insurgents\
		,Population in Support of Insurgents/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Memory for Fatalities from Population= INTEG (
	Increase in Memory for Fatalities-Forgetting Rate for Fatalities from Population,
		4500)
	~	People
	~		|

Number of Contacts by Each Campaigner=
	5
	~	(contacts/Person)/Week
	~		|

Number of Times Insurgents Contacted by Defection Campaigners in a Week=
	Number of Contacts by Each Campaigner*Number of Campaigners for Defections to Counterinsurgency
	~	contacts/Week
	~		|

Population Attrition Rate=
	Counterinsurgent Supporter Attrition Rate+Insurgent Supporter Attrition Rate
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Proportion of Counterinsurgent Fighters Campaigning for Defections=
	0.001
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Proportion of Supporters Joining Insurgency per Week=
	0.001
	~	dmnl/Week
	~	Proportion of Supports Joining Insurgency
	|

Recruitment Factor from Collateral Damage=
	0.025
	~	People/Week
	~	Theta
	|

Recruits from Populace to Counterinsurgency= INTEG (
	Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Public-Defectors to Insurgency-Populace Training Rate\
		-Counterinsurgent Leaving Rate,
		80000)
	~	People [0,200000]
	~		|

Recruits from Populace to Insurgency= INTEG (
	Insurgency Recruitment Rate from Public+Defectors to Insurgency-Insurgent Training Rate\
		-Insurgency Leaving Rate,
		10000)
	~	People
	~		|

Time to Forget=
	26
	~	weeks
	~		|

********************************************************
	.War of Attrition
********************************************************~
	|

Proportion Lost from Insurgency not Population=
	Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence+Max((1-Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence\
		)*Trained Insurgent Fighters
	/(Population+Trained Insurgent Fighters), 0)
	~	dmnl
	~	Kress & Szechtman
	|

Effectiveness of Counterinsurgent Fighter=
	(1+Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence)*Baseline Counterinsurgent Effectiveness
	~	(People/Person)/Week [0,0.1]
	~		|

Baseline Counterinsurgent Effectiveness=
	0.0015
	~	(People/Person)/Week
	~		|

Baseline Effectiveness of Insurgents=
	0.0005
	~	(People/Person)/Week
	~		|

Baseline Popular Support for Insurgents=
	100000
	~	People
	~		|

Effect of Insurgent Supporters on Insurgent Fighting Effectiveness f(
	[(0,0)-(2,2)],(0,0.8),(2,1.2))
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Effectiveness of Insurgent Fighter=
	Insurgent Effectiveness Factor due to Popular Support*Baseline Effectiveness of Insurgents
	~	(People/Person)/Week
	~	Alpha in Kress & Szechtman, 2009
	|

Fighting Intensity of Counterinsurgent Force=
	Effectiveness of Counterinsurgent Fighter*Trained Counterinsurgency Fighters
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Fighting Intensity of Insurgent Force=
	Effectiveness of Insurgent Fighter*Trained Insurgent Fighters
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Insurgent Effectiveness Factor due to Popular Support=
	Effect of Insurgent Supporters on Insurgent Fighting Effectiveness f(Population in Support of Insurgents\
		/Baseline Popular Support for Insurgents)
	~	dmnl
	~		|

Rate of Attrition of Counterinsurgents=
	Min(Fighting Intensity of Insurgent Force,Trained Counterinsurgency Fighters/Adjustment Time\
		)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Rate of Attrition of Insurgents=
	Min(Fighting Intensity of Counterinsurgent Force*Proportion Lost from Insurgency not Population\
		,Trained Insurgent Fighters/Adjustment Time)
	~	People/Week
	~		|

Trained Insurgent Fighters= INTEG (
	Insurgent Training Rate-Rate of Defection to Government-Rate of Attrition of Insurgents\
		,
		10000)
	~	People
	~		|

\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*Competitive Contagion - Hearts and Minds
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,100,0
10,1,Population in Support of Government,397,148,44,36,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,2,Population in Support of Insurgents,399,490,41,27,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,3,5,1,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(383,249)|
1,4,5,2,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(383,395)|
11,5,332,383,321,8,6,33,3,0,0,2,0,0,0
10,6,Rate of Winning Over to Government Support,299,321,76,25,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,7,9,2,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(409,395)|
1,8,9,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(409,249)|
11,9,732,409,321,8,6,33,3,0,0,4,0,0,0
10,10,Rate of Winning over to Support for Insurgents,501,321,84,26,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,11,1,9,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(443,239)|
1,12,2,5,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(352,422)|
10,13,Number of Susceptible Insurgent Supporters Contacted by Government Campaigners in a Week,85,320,90,43,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,14,13,6,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(212,343)|
10,15,Number of Susceptible Government Supporters Contacted by Insurgency Campaigners in a Week,714,322,91,40,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,16,15,10,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(613,327)|
10,17,Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Government Support,232,402,81,36,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,18,17,6,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(302,337)|
10,19,Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Insurgent Support,547,249,79,30,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,20,19,10,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(514,296)|
10,21,Population,391,64,34,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,22,1,21,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(388,103)|
10,23,Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Public,397,203,76,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,24,23,1,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(397,187)|
10,25,Counterinsurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,397,203,65,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,26,25,1,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(397,184)|
10,27,Insurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,409,538,65,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,28,27,2,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(409,522)|
10,29,Insurgency Recruitment Rate from Public,409,538,72,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,30,29,2,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(405,520)|
10,31,Insurgency Leaving Rate,409,538,47,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,32,31,2,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(409,522)|
12,33,0,373,28,201,16,8,132,0,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
Competitive Contagion - Hearts and Minds
10,34,Counterinsurgent Leaving Rate,397,203,59,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,35,34,1,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(397,184)|
10,36,Population in Support of Insurgents,247,75,81,42,8,130,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,37,36,21,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(335,68)|
10,38,Adjustment Time,581,363,54,11,8,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,39,38,10,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(549,343)|
10,40,Number of People Contacted by Each Government Campaigner in a Week,-85,255,94,34,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,41,Adjustment Time,322,276,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,42,41,6,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(305,294)|
10,43,Proportion of Those Targeted that are Susceptible Insurgent Supporters,60,420,88,31,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,44,Relative Proportion of Government Supporters in Population,588,158,84,28,8,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
10,45,Relative Proportion of Insurgent Supporters in Population,223,484,100,26,8,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,46,45,43,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(120,466)|
10,47,Proportion of Government Supporters Willing to Contact Insurgent Supporters,39,108,95,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,48,Number of Government Campaigners,154,160,78,20,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,49,1,48,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(256,147)|
1,50,47,48,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(74,159)|
1,51,2,45,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(332,497)|
10,52,Population,351,543,43,11,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,53,52,45,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(275,550)|
1,54,21,44,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(468,88)|
1,55,1,44,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(475,147)|
1,56,44,63,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(655,182)|
10,57,Proportion of Insurgent Supporters Willing to Contact Government Supporters,760,528,95,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,58,Number of Insurgency Campaigners,611,484,71,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,59,57,58,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(629,501)|
1,60,58,15,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(719,450)|
10,61,Number of People Contacted by Each Insurgency Campaigner in a Week,845,415,94,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,62,61,15,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(825,387)|
10,63,Proportion of Those Targeted that are Susceptible Government Supporters,739,224,95,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,64,63,15,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(750,270)|
1,65,2,58,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(511,496)|
12,66,0,188,234,64,19,8,4,0,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|I|0-0-0
Word of Mouth for Government
12,67,0,604,416,64,19,8,4,0,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|I|0-0-0
Word of Mouth for Insurgency
1,68,40,13,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-54,346)|
1,69,48,13,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(83,237)|
1,70,43,13,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(68,382)|
10,71,Recruitment Factor from Collateral Damage,489,203,81,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,72,71,10,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(493,251)|
10,73,Quality of Insurgency Intelligence,858,135,72,19,8,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,74,73,63,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(810,170)|
10,75,Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence,64,508,54,28,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,76,75,43,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(62,472)|
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*Recruitment and Defection
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,100,0
10,1,Recruits from Populace to Counterinsurgency,606,-90,76,48,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,2,Recruits from Populace to Insurgency,599,268,82,40,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,3,Insurgents Defected to Government Support,953,64,77,26,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,4,Foreign Counterinsurgency Support,605,-235,75,27,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,5,Trained Counterinsurgency Fighters,949,-99,73,29,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,6,8,5,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(949,-241)|
1,7,8,4,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(734,-241)|
11,8,1388,794,-241,6,8,34,3,0,0,3,0,0,0
10,9,Foreign Training Rate,794,-274,57,25,40,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,10,12,5,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(838,-112)|
1,11,12,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(735,-112)|
11,12,1404,794,-112,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,13,Populace Training Rate,794,-71,48,33,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,14,4,8,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(691,-272)|
1,15,1,12,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(703,-154)|
12,16,0,599,-354,147,16,8,132,0,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
Recruitment and Defection
10,17,Population in Support of Government,205,-117,44,36,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,18,Population in Support of Insurgents,211,283,52,26,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,19,21,2,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(458,295)|
1,20,21,18,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(325,295)|
11,21,332,393,295,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,22,Insurgency Recruitment Rate from Public,393,332,61,29,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,23,24,17,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(314,-129)|
11,24,780,386,-129,6,8,34,3,0,0,3,0,0,0
10,25,Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Public,386,-165,69,28,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,26,17,25,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(252,-182)|
1,27,18,22,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(261,313)|
10,28,Trained Insurgent Fighters,954,240,74,28,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,29,31,28,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(841,246)|
1,30,31,2,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(735,246)|
11,31,1244,796,246,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,32,Insurgent Training Rate,796,273,57,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,33,2,31,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(686,225)|
10,34,Effectiveness of Messages Encouraging Insurgents to Defect,754,125,113,37,8,131,0,16,0,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
10,35,Memory for Fatalities from Population,597,415,45,34,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,36,35,22,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(420,336)|
12,37,48,382,412,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,38,40,35,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(514,413)|
1,39,40,37,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(428,413)|
11,40,48,471,413,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,41,Increase in Memory for Fatalities,471,440,64,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,42,48,796,409,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,43,45,42,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(753,409)|
1,44,45,35,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(675,409)|
11,45,48,714,409,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,46,Forgetting Rate for Fatalities from Population,714,447,60,30,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,47,35,45,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(670,379)|
1,48,50,18,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(317,273)|
1,49,50,2,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(450,273)|
11,50,1100,378,273,6,8,34,3,0,0,3,0,0,0
10,51,Insurgency Leaving Rate,378,245,58,20,40,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,52,2,51,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(448,258)|
11,53,764,443,85,8,6,33,3,0,0,4,0,0,0
10,54,Defectors to Insurgency,491,85,40,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,55,1,54,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(591,33)|
1,56,58,17,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(304,-105)|
1,57,58,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(450,-105)|
11,58,1516,365,-105,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,59,Counterinsurgent Leaving Rate,365,-66,58,31,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,60,53,2,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,3|(443,245)|(443,245)|(480,245)|
1,61,24,1,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(461,-129)|
12,62,48,328,-244,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,63,65,4,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(489,-241)|
1,64,65,62,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(387,-241)|
11,65,48,443,-241,6,8,34,3,0,0,3,0,0,0
10,66,Foreign Recruitment Rate,443,-270,72,21,40,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,67,53,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,3|(443,-82)|(528,-82)|(529,-82)|
1,68,70,3,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(948,121)|
1,69,70,28,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(948,188)|
11,70,1596,948,159,8,6,33,3,0,0,4,0,0,0
10,71,Rate of Defection to Government,1021,159,65,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,72,34,70,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(844,155)|
1,73,28,70,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(925,199)|
10,74,Recruitment Factor from Collateral Damage,257,401,78,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,75,74,22,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(361,366)|
10,76,Proportion of Supporters Joining Insurgency per Week,173,355,83,22,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,77,Adjustment Time,862,-198,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,78,77,8,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(821,-224)|
10,79,Adjustment Time,444,-202,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,80,79,25,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(427,-192)|
1,81,1,59,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(432,-85)|
10,82,Proportion of Counterinsurgent Fighters Campaigning for Defections,1159,-165,113,36,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,83,Number of Campaigners for Defections to Counterinsurgency,1226,-66,94,27,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,84,82,83,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1191,-117)|
1,85,5,83,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1122,-57)|
1,86,3,83,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1143,3)|
10,87,Number of Contacts by Each Campaigner,1242,169,85,22,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,88,Number of Times Insurgents Contacted by Defection Campaigners in a Week,1372,71,91,30,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,89,83,88,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1311,-44)|
1,90,87,88,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1291,128)|
1,91,88,71,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1162,155)|
10,92,Adjustment Time,1107,230,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,93,92,71,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1062,208)|
10,94,Effectiveness of Insurgents at Gaining Defections,320,65,66,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,95,94,53,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(407,86)|
10,96,Adjustment Time,503,148,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,97,96,54,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(498,123)|
10,98,Adjustment Time,378,194,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,99,98,51,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(378,212)|
1,100,76,22,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(287,343)|
10,101,Time to Forget,658,505,47,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,102,101,46,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(671,490)|
10,103,Baseline Insurgency Leaving Rate,236,154,63,19,8,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,104,103,51,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(299,195)|
10,105,Effectiveness of Messages Disrupting Groups,138,204,83,28,8,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,106,105,51,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(263,225)|
10,107,Adjustment Time,433,380,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,108,107,22,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(424,361)|
10,109,Adjustment Time,737,326,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,110,109,32,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(760,304)|
10,111,Population Attrition Rate,330,515,43,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,112,Counterinsurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,125,494,83,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,113,Insurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,126,554,68,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,114,112,111,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(240,505)|
1,115,113,111,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(233,533)|
1,116,111,41,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(411,490)|
10,117,Baseline Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Populace,203,-232,75,31,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,118,117,25,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(290,-201)|
10,119,Baseline Leaving Rate,215,-48,51,30,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,120,119,59,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(279,-56)|
10,121,Adjustment Time,799,2,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,122,121,13,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(797,-21)|
10,123,Baseline Populace Training Rate,690,29,58,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,124,123,13,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(728,-10)|
12,125,48,1272,73,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,126,128,125,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1208,73)|
1,127,128,3,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1086,73)|
11,128,48,1149,73,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,129,Attrition of Insurgent Defectors,1149,100,66,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
10,130,Fatality or Desertion Rate,1206,21,51,23,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,131,3,128,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1102,57)|
1,132,130,128,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1172,51)|
10,133,Baseline Training Rate,831,335,54,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,134,133,32,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(817,309)|
10,135,Counterinsurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,205,-62,82,19,8,2,2,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,136,135,17,0,2,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(205,-81)|
10,137,Rate of Winning Over to Government Support,205,-62,83,19,8,2,2,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,138,137,17,0,2,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(205,-81)|
10,139,Rate of Winning over to Support for Insurgents,205,-62,81,19,8,2,2,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,140,139,17,0,2,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(205,-81)|
10,141,Rate of Attrition of Counterinsurgents,949,-51,65,19,8,2,2,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,142,141,5,0,2,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(949,-70)|
10,143,Insurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,211,328,68,19,8,2,2,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,144,143,18,0,2,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(211,309)|
10,145,Rate of Winning Over to Government Support,211,328,83,19,8,2,2,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,146,145,18,0,2,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(211,309)|
10,147,Rate of Winning over to Support for Insurgents,211,328,81,19,8,2,2,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,148,147,18,0,2,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(211,309)|
10,149,Rate of Attrition of Insurgents,954,287,65,19,8,2,2,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,150,149,28,0,2,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(954,268)|
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*Quality of Intelligence
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,100,0
10,1,Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence,723,314,57,33,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,2,Population in Support of Government,212,122,85,30,8,130,0,19,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12|B|128-128-128
12,3,48,462,315,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,4,6,1,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(618,312)|
1,5,6,3,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(515,312)|
11,6,48,565,312,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,7,Improvements to Quality of Intelligence,565,339,69,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,8,48,1029,315,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,9,11,8,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(956,314)|
1,10,11,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(831,314)|
11,11,48,888,314,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,12,Losses in Quality of Intelligence,888,341,63,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
10,13,Effect of Popular Support for Government on Intel f,412,116,82,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,14,Effect on Intel of Insurgents Defecting to Government f,491,504,73,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,15,Baseline Popular Support for Government,166,210,78,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,16,Baseline Defection Rate of Insurgents to Government,149,450,96,25,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,17,Insurgent Defection Effect,544,427,52,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,18,17,7,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(538,359)|
1,19,15,28,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(272,235)|
1,20,2,28,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(306,198)|
1,21,1,11,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(814,259)|
1,22,14,17,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(489,463)|
10,23,Intelligence Decay Rate,910,408,59,21,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,24,23,12,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(857,355)|
10,25,Baseline Gap Improvement per Week,646,153,76,23,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,26,25,6,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(571,212)|
10,28,Relative Popular Support for Government,327,238,78,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,29,Popular Support Effect,464,214,53,19,8,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,30,29,6,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(534,244)|
1,31,28,29,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(401,226)|
1,32,13,29,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(459,165)|
10,33,Relative Rate of Defections to Counterinsurgency,368,421,62,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,34,16,33,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(268,434)|
1,35,33,17,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(454,423)|
10,36,Insurgents Defected to Government Support,368,468,77,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,37,Rate of Defection to Government,129,370,69,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,38,37,33,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(245,394)|
12,39,0,543,19,99,21,8,132,0,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
Quality of Intelligence
12,40,0,568,-26,40,20,8,0,0,0,-1,0,0,0
10,41,Max Quality,719,195,40,11,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,42,Quality Gap,670,240,47,15,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,43,1,42,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(694,273)|
1,44,41,42,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(702,210)|
1,45,42,6,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(608,260)|
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*War of Attrition
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,100,0
10,1,Trained Counterinsurgency Fighters,323,122,61,30,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
12,2,48,548,124,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,3,5,2,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(499,124)|
1,4,5,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(416,124)|
11,5,48,455,124,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,6,Rate of Attrition of Counterinsurgents,455,157,69,25,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,7,1,5,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(423,109)|
10,8,Fighting Intensity of Insurgent Force,279,270,68,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,9,Fighting Intensity of Counterinsurgent Force,621,267,77,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,10,1,9,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(568,105)|
1,11,8,6,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(353,193)|
10,12,Effectiveness of Insurgent Fighter,148,343,54,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,13,12,8,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(204,266)|
10,14,Effectiveness of Counterinsurgent Fighter,713,175,74,42,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,15,14,9,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(684,219)|
10,16,Trained Insurgent Fighters,324,466,62,31,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,17,16,8,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(269,405)|
10,18,Population in Support of Insurgents,25,393,81,19,8,2,0,19,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12|B|128-128-128
1,19,18,43,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(86,429)|
10,20,Proportion Lost from Insurgency not Population,647,397,88,24,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,21,Foreign Training Rate,300,172,57,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,22,21,1,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(303,157)|
10,23,Populace Training Rate,300,172,47,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,24,23,1,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(303,157)|
10,25,Insurgent Training Rate,324,516,47,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,26,25,16,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(324,497)|
12,27,48,545,465,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,28,30,27,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(501,466)|
1,29,30,16,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(420,466)|
11,30,48,461,466,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,31,Rate of Attrition of Insurgents,461,493,60,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,32,20,30,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(556,427)|
12,33,0,600,30,55,11,8,4,0,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
War of Attrition
10,34,Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence,621,305,41,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,35,Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence,588,433,41,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,36,Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence,901,493,41,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,37,Baseline Counterinsurgent Effectiveness,783,87,54,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,38,37,14,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(757,118)|
10,39,Rate of Defection to Government,324,516,69,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,40,39,16,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(324,497)|
10,41,Baseline Effectiveness of Insurgents,23,236,70,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,42,41,12,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(79,284)|
10,43,Insurgent Effectiveness Factor due to Popular Support,176,483,72,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,44,Effect of Insurgent Supporters on Insurgent Fighting Effectiveness f,-12,531,95,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,45,44,43,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(86,505)|
1,46,43,12,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(162,415)|
10,47,Baseline Popular Support for Insurgents,-50,461,71,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,48,47,43,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(55,470)|
10,49,Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence,934,222,54,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,50,Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence,815,461,54,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,51,9,30,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(557,377)|
10,52,Adjustment Time,493,222,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,53,52,6,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(479,198)|
10,54,Adjustment Time,491,551,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,55,54,31,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(479,528)|
1,56,16,30,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(409,428)|
10,57,Population,731,452,43,11,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,58,57,20,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(704,434)|
1,59,16,20,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(573,554)|
10,60,Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence,865,285,54,28,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,61,60,20,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(782,387)|
1,62,60,14,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(836,217)|
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*Collateral Damage
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,100,0
10,1,Population in Support of Government,742,69,44,36,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,2,Population in Support of Insurgents,746,413,45,35,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,3,5,1,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(728,170)|
1,4,5,2,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(728,313)|
11,5,332,728,242,8,6,33,3,0,0,2,0,0,0
10,6,Rate of Winning Over to Government Support,671,242,49,33,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,7,9,2,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(754,313)|
1,8,9,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(754,170)|
11,9,732,754,242,8,6,33,3,0,0,4,0,0,0
10,10,Rate of Winning over to Support for Insurgents,818,242,56,26,40,131,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,11,1,9,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(788,160)|
1,12,2,5,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(705,342)|
1,13,14,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(631,65)|
11,14,492,559,65,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,15,Counterinsurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,559,89,75,16,40,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,16,Unintended Fatalities from Population,420,220,49,35,3,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,17,14,16,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(420,65)|
1,18,20,16,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(420,419)|
1,19,20,2,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(633,419)|
11,20,396,559,419,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,21,Insurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,559,446,64,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,22,2,21,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(620,468)|
10,23,Fighting Intensity of Counterinsurgent Force,526,278,80,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,24,23,15,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(591,191)|
1,25,42,14,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(334,76)|
1,26,42,21,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(295,388)|
10,27,Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Government Support,671,294,75,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,28,27,6,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(671,277)|
10,29,Number of Susceptible Insurgent Supporters Contacted by Government Campaigners in a Week,913,370,62,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,30,29,6,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(796,307)|
10,31,Insurgency Recruitment Rate from Public,754,459,72,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,32,31,2,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(752,446)|
10,33,Insurgency Leaving Rate,754,459,47,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,34,33,2,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(752,450)|
10,35,Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Insurgent Support,818,287,55,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,36,35,10,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(818,270)|
10,37,Number of Susceptible Government Supporters Contacted by Insurgency Campaigners in a Week,818,287,84,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,38,37,10,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(818,268)|
10,39,Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Public,742,124,76,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,40,39,1,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(742,108)|
12,41,0,572,-89,121,9,8,132,0,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
Collateral Damage
10,42,Proportion Lost from Population not Insurgency,277,237,75,26,8,131,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,43,Proportion Lost from Insurgency not Population,342,319,73,36,8,130,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,44,43,42,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(310,278)|
10,45,Counterinsurgent Leaving Rate,742,124,59,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,46,45,1,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(742,105)|
10,47,Adjustment Time,614,388,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,48,47,6,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(636,328)|
10,49,Adjustment Time,855,313,42,19,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,50,49,10,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(841,287)|
10,51,Population,858,29,43,11,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,52,Relative Proportion of Government Supporters in Population,778,-21,84,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,53,1,52,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(787,19)|
1,54,51,52,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(831,2)|
1,55,52,14,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(598,-10)|
10,56,Population,845,446,43,11,8,2,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,57,Relative Proportion of Insurgent Supporters in Population,752,504,74,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,58,57,21,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(637,489)|
1,59,56,57,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(818,462)|
1,60,2,57,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(758,444)|
10,61,Adjustment Time,652,141,44,27,8,130,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,62,61,15,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(603,114)|
10,63,Adjustment Time,565,512,67,18,8,130,0,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,64,63,21,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(562,486)|
1,65,23,20,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(595,338)|
1,66,1,14,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(627,24)|
10,67,Recruitment Factor from Collateral Damage,818,287,81,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,68,67,10,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(818,268)|
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300  Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*Whole Model
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255|-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,100,0
10,1,Recruits from Populace to Counterinsurgency,502,184,78,40,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,2,Recruits from Populace to Insurgency,505,499,75,32,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,3,Insurgents Defected to Government Support,682,258,77,26,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,4,Foreign Counterinsurgency Support,502,38,79,26,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,5,Trained Counterinsurgency Fighters,761,159,73,29,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,6,8,5,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(761,33)|
1,7,8,4,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(603,33)|
11,8,1388,632,33,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,9,Foreign Training Rate,632,57,45,16,40,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,10,12,5,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(663,159)|
1,11,12,1,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(603,159)|
11,12,1404,633,159,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,13,Populace Training Rate,633,200,48,33,40,131,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,14,4,8,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(608,-9)|
1,15,1,12,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(601,125)|
12,16,48,1009,159,10,8,0,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,17,19,16,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(960,159)|
1,18,19,5,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(872,159)|
11,19,48,916,159,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,20,Rate of Attrition of Counterinsurgents,916,192,69,25,40,131,1,0,-1,0,0,0
12,21,48,1021,497,10,8,0,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,22,5,19,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(869,114)|
10,23,Fighting Intensity of Insurgent Force,965,355,68,19,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,24,Fighting Intensity of Counterinsurgent Force,1116,374,77,19,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,25,5,24,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1060,161)|
1,26,23,20,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(971,261)|
10,27,Effectiveness of Insurgent Fighter,966,495,54,19,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,28,27,23,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(965,431)|
10,29,Effectiveness of Counterinsurgent Fighter,1127,559,54,28,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,30,29,24,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1121,468)|
12,31,0,914,-1,57,19,8,4,1,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
Lanchester War of Attrition
12,32,0,496,-31,75,24,8,132,1,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
Recruitment and Defection
10,33,Population in Support of Government,127,174,44,36,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,34,Population in Support of Insurgents,142,510,41,27,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,35,37,33,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(116,271)|
1,36,37,34,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(116,414)|
11,37,332,116,339,8,6,33,3,1,0,2,0,0,0
10,38,Rate of Winning Over to Government Support,59,339,49,33,40,131,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,39,41,34,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(142,414)|
1,40,41,33,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(142,271)|
11,41,732,142,339,8,6,33,3,1,0,4,0,0,0
10,42,Rate of Winning over to Support for Insurgents,206,339,56,26,40,131,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,43,33,41,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(171,260)|
1,44,34,37,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(90,444)|
10,45,Number of Susceptible Insurgent Supporters Contacted by Government Campaigners in a Week,-122,417,61,29,8,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,46,45,38,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-11,336)|
10,47,Number of Susceptible Government Supporters Contacted by Insurgency Campaigners in a Week,229,397,55,31,8,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,48,47,42,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(258,335)|
12,49,0,86,-21,81,19,8,132,1,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
Competitive Contagion (Hearts and Minds)
1,50,52,2,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(366,526)|
1,51,52,34,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(237,526)|
11,52,0,297,526,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,53,Insurgency Recruitment Rate from Public,297,562,50,28,40,131,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,54,56,1,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(363,152)|
1,55,56,33,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(231,152)|
11,56,780,297,152,6,8,34,3,1,0,3,0,0,0
10,57,Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Public,297,117,64,27,40,131,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,58,33,57,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(177,121)|
1,59,34,53,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(227,551)|
10,60,Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Government Support,23,256,45,44,8,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,61,60,38,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(40,296)|
10,62,Effectiveness of Persuasive Message for Insurgent Support,237,263,54,28,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,63,62,42,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(252,300)|
10,64,Population,-75,340,34,11,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,65,33,64,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-62,308)|
1,66,34,64,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(9,477)|
10,67,Trained Insurgent Fighters,785,501,62,31,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,68,70,67,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(683,498)|
1,69,70,2,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(606,498)|
11,70,1244,638,498,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,71,Insurgent Training Rate,638,525,57,19,40,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,72,2,70,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(600,468)|
1,73,67,23,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(755,316)|
10,74,Population in Support of Government,1216,202,60,39,8,130,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,75,Population in Support of Insurgents,915,296,73,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,76,Population,213,452,43,11,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,77,Effectiveness of Messages Encouraging Insurgents to Defect,419,375,64,34,8,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,78,79,33,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(18,162)|
11,79,1228,-53,162,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,80,Counterinsurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,-53,186,75,16,40,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,81,Memory for Fatalities from Population,406,604,45,34,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,82,81,53,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(338,545)|
10,83,Unintended Fatalities from Population,-192,317,49,35,3,131,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,84,79,83,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-192,162)|
12,85,48,192,609,10,8,0,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,86,88,81,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(324,609)|
1,87,88,85,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(238,609)|
11,88,48,281,609,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,89,Increase in Memory for Fatalities,281,636,64,19,40,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
12,90,48,605,598,10,8,0,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,91,93,90,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(562,598)|
1,92,93,81,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(484,598)|
11,93,48,523,598,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,94,Forgetting Rate for Fatalities from Population,523,636,60,30,40,131,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,95,81,93,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(479,568)|
12,96,0,-200,-1,35,19,8,132,1,16,-1,0,0,0,0-0-0,0-0-0,|12|B|0-0-0
Collateral Damage
10,97,Proportion Lost from Population not Insurgency,-385,337,68,19,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,98,97,79,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-311,140)|
10,99,Proportion Lost from Insurgency not Population,977,428,68,19,8,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
10,100,Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence,1324,372,40,20,3,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
12,101,48,1318,234,10,8,0,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
12,102,48,1326,574,10,8,0,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
10,103,Insurgents Defected to Government Support,1408,198,77,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,104,Proportion Lost from Insurgency not Population,-421,151,56,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,105,104,97,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-435,238)|
10,106,Fighting Intensity of Counterinsurgent Force,-307,403,80,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,107,106,79,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-279,240)|
1,108,110,34,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(237,503)|
1,109,110,2,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(367,503)|
11,110,188,298,503,6,8,34,3,1,0,3,0,0,0
10,111,Insurgency Leaving Rate,298,476,42,19,40,3,1,0,0,0,0,0
1,112,2,110,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(360,481)|
1,113,115,2,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(357,499)|
1,114,115,1,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(357,184)|
11,115,764,357,303,8,6,33,3,1,0,4,0,0,0
10,116,Defectors to Insurgency,405,303,40,19,40,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,117,1,116,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(397,235)|
1,118,120,83,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-201,427)|
1,119,120,34,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-47,510)|
11,120,1516,-201,510,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,121,Insurgent Supporter Attrition Rate,-201,537,64,19,40,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
1,122,34,121,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-104,613)|
1,123,106,121,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-264,494)|
1,124,97,121,1,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-339,509)|
10,125,Unintended Fatalities from Population,358,689,75,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,126,128,33,4,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(231,170)|
1,127,128,1,100,1,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(363,170)|
11,128,396,297,170,6,8,34,3,1,0,1,0,0,0
10,129,Counterinsurgent Leaving Rate,297,197,54,19,40,3,1,0,-1,0,0,0
10,130,Foreign Recruitment Rate,502,83,60,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,131,130,4,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(502,64)|
10,132,Rate of Attrition of Insurgents,785,551,65,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,133,132,67,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(785,532)|
10,134,Adjustment Time,59,391,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,135,134,38,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(59,372)|
10,136,Adjustment Time,206,384,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,137,136,42,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(206,365)|
10,138,Number of People Contacted by Each Government Campaigner in a Week,17,458,67,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,139,138,45,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-47,438)|
10,140,Number of People Contacted by Each Government Campaigner in a Week,229,447,67,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
10,141,Rate of Defection to Government,505,306,69,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,142,141,3,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(582,285)|
10,143,Rate of Defection to Government,785,551,69,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,144,143,67,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(785,532)|
10,145,Baseline Effectiveness of Insurgents,966,533,50,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,146,145,27,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(966,516)|
10,147,Insurgent Effectiveness Factor due to Popular Support,966,533,77,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,148,147,27,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(966,516)|
10,149,Baseline Counterinsurgent Effectiveness,1127,606,54,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,150,149,29,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1127,589)|
10,151,Improvements to Quality of Intelligence,1324,411,73,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,152,151,100,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1324,392)|
10,153,Losses in Quality of Intelligence,1324,411,68,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,154,153,100,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1324,392)|
10,155,Adjustment Time,-53,221,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,156,155,80,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-53,202)|
1,157,33,80,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(59,177)|
10,158,Relative Proportion of Government Supporters in Population,-53,221,84,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,159,158,80,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-53,204)|
10,160,Adjustment Time,-201,575,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,161,160,121,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-201,556)|
10,162,Relative Proportion of Insurgent Supporters in Population,-201,575,75,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,163,162,121,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-201,558)|
10,164,Number of Government Campaigners,-122,465,47,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,165,164,45,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-122,448)|
10,166,Proportion of Those Targeted that are Susceptible Insurgent Supporters,-122,465,99,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,167,166,45,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(-122,448)|
10,168,Number of Insurgency Campaigners,229,447,47,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,169,168,47,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(229,430)|
10,170,Number of People Contacted by Each Insurgency Campaigner in a Week,229,447,103,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,171,170,47,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(229,430)|
10,172,Proportion of Those Targeted that are Susceptible Government Supporters,229,447,103,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,173,172,47,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(229,430)|
10,174,Adjustment Time,632,92,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,175,174,9,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(632,73)|
10,176,Adjustment Time,633,252,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,177,176,13,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(633,233)|
10,178,Adjustment Time,916,236,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,179,178,20,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(916,224)|
10,180,Recruitment Factor from Collateral Damage,297,609,81,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,181,180,53,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(297,590)|
10,182,Adjustment Time,297,163,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,183,182,57,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(297,151)|
1,184,64,99,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(427,381)|
1,185,67,99,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(880,465)|
10,186,Adjustment Time,297,235,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,187,1,129,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(394,190)|
10,188,Adjustment Time,297,609,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,189,188,53,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(297,590)|
10,190,Proportion of Supporters Joining Insurgency per Week,297,609,85,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,191,190,53,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(297,592)|
10,192,Adjustment Time,638,563,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,193,192,71,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(638,544)|
10,194,Time to Forget,523,685,56,11,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,195,194,94,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(523,677)|
10,196,Adjustment Time,298,514,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,197,196,111,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(298,495)|
10,198,Baseline Insurgency Leaving Rate,298,514,68,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,199,198,111,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(298,495)|
10,200,Effectiveness of Messages Disrupting Groups,298,514,66,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,201,200,111,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(298,497)|
10,202,Adjustment Time,405,341,42,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,203,202,116,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(405,322)|
10,204,Effectiveness of Insurgents at Gaining Defections,405,341,66,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,205,204,116,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(405,324)|
10,206,Population Attrition Rate,281,674,48,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,207,206,89,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(281,655)|
10,208,Attrition of Insurgent Defectors,682,303,67,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,209,208,3,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(682,284)|
10,210,Baseline Populace Training Rate,633,252,63,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,211,210,13,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(633,233)|
10,212,Baseline Recruitment Rate to Counterinsurgency from Populace,297,163,88,28,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,213,212,57,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(297,146)|
10,214,Baseline Training Rate,638,563,59,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,215,214,71,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(638,544)|
10,216,Baseline Leaving Rate,297,235,53,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,217,216,129,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(297,216)|
10,218,Recruitment Factor from Collateral Damage,206,384,81,19,8,2,1,3,-1,0,0,0,128-128-128,0-0-0,|12||128-128-128
1,219,218,42,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(206,365)|
1,220,100,29,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1234,456)|
1,221,100,99,0,1,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1171,396)|
12,222,0,294,71,88,28,8,4,0,0,-1,0,0,0
This view is hidden because the variables appear elsewhere.
12,223,0,147,215,40,20,8,0,0,0,-1,0,0,0
///---\\\
:GRAPH War_of_Attrition
:TITLE War of Attrition
:SCALE
:VAR Trained Insurgent Fighters
:DATASET Current
:VAR Trained Counterinsurgency Fighters
:DATASET Current
:VAR Trained Insurgent Fighters
:DATASET Factor of 10 Reduction in Popular Support
:VAR Trained Counterinsurgency Fighters
:DATASET Factor of 10 Reduction in Popular Support

:GRAPH Civilian_Deaths
:TITLE Civilian Deaths
:SCALE
:VAR Unintended Fatalities from Population
:SCALE
:VAR Population in Support of Government
:SCALE
:VAR Population in Support of Insurgents

:GRAPH Popular_Support
:TITLE Popular Support
:SCALE
:VAR Population in Support of Government|Support for Counterinsurgency at Baseline
:DATASET Current
:LINE-WIDTH 1
:VAR Population in Support of Insurgents|Support for Insurgency at Baseline
:DATASET Current
:LINE-WIDTH 1
:VAR Population in Support of Government|Support for Counterinsurgency with Popular Support Messaging
:DATASET Popular Support Messaging
:LINE-WIDTH 1
:VAR Population in Support of Insurgents|Support for Insurgency with Popular Support Messaging
:DATASET Popular Support Messaging
:LINE-WIDTH 1
:VAR Population in Support of Government|Support for Counterinsurgency with Defection Messaging
:DATASET Defection Messaging
:LINE-WIDTH 1
:VAR Population in Support of Insurgents|Support for Insurgency with Defection Messaging
:DATASET Defection Messaging
:LINE-WIDTH 1
:L<%^E!@
1:Baseline.vdf
1:Popular Support Messaging.vdf
1:Defection Messaging.vdf
9:Baseline
22:Contact,Contacts
22:Fighter,Fighters
22:People,Person
22:Week,Weeks
23:0
15:0,0,0,0,0,0
19:100,0
27:2,
34:0,
4:Time
5:Quality of Counterinsurgent Intelligence
24:0
25:100
26:100