

into a dialogue of adaptation. And I am that speaker. I talked several times of my 'symbolic' treatment - whose treatment I recently remembered my old symbol, returning back to JM: Moses on the mountain seeing the land but being prevented from entering it. In the present case the situation is somewhat different. It is not that I am being 'deprived' of something - rather would I feel an alien in that new country - perhaps this would also be true of Moses! I hardly can speak as 'Moses'! (No - it is the position of some one who lives 'between the times'. I believe of course to an old world, a world in which even God had a meaning.) Bob says quite nicely; one cannot talk to a statue - they always talk about God! Only I realize that not only is God dead, but the whole world from which I come. And - this is rather remarkable - I realize this without repentment and even without a radical change in the same time, being doubly not in agreement with either the 'unlimited possibilities' or the real danger. If this position could be symbolized in a name, even if it were a constructed name - this might be the answer. No else is there who takes a similar stand? Kierkegaard was probably nearest to it, though there was something in the 'Journals', and a tendency to understand the danger with the result that it all came out as 'pat. Bloch in utopian in another sense - he really is a dreamer and poet. If Mann had had a solution for the real issues, Bloch never gets near them. I and Alexander were two 'reactionaries', though of very different persuasion - I see myself has not yet worked through to a 'position'. A way will help him, and were it only in opposition. People of greater distance will not help either - Geoffrey, Elliot, Horkheimer, Heidegger, Goldstein - they all are 'reactionaries' in their own ways. Romy - Bob is probably the nearest to my position - as it were, weighted in the other direction: another generation and therefore nearer to the future, but as open to the 'past' as is probably possible for his generation.

This survey has not helped much as yet, but it has brought home to me why Jonas and Bob, besides some 'personal' readers, are the two with whom I debate there - a very funny couple - but for obvious reasons important 'touchstones'.

Language occurs as a name. It is not what I need, but it points in a direction. I am looking for a symbolic name which expresses my 'position'. Now 'position' may mean many things - I mean points to my 'historical place'. Is there a symbol for my ambivalent position? I mean it must not be a 'big' word - modest and transparent.

I. Two and a half weeks have passed since the Jonas letter was finished. I have done very little on this topic since, except the important trial with the Dialogue. And though the lack of response on the part of Jonas damped my enthusiasm for a little while, it has not made a real impact so far. Of course, the proof of the pudding will be the reaction when he is here, and I cannot commit myself to anything before I have undergone that 'ordeal' in the true sense of the word.

In the mean time I have occasionally pondered a seemingly external issue; who is to speak in such a dialogue? In fact, it is not entirely external - the nature of the speakers may influence the substance. And so I have decided to use my well proven technique of associating on this machine for some clarification. Other sources may be Howard, who is due to-morrow, and Jonas himself.

1. What I have so far dug up is no good. Julius and Evagoras - well I even thought of Abaddon - of Ego et Ille - all no good. I must try to 'break down' the problem by first asking: what are the partners to represent?

a) all ancient paradigms break down, unless I find a pair who was confronted with similar issues in a similar age. This is quite unlikely, and I shall probably be confined to the present. Now what in the present are the two to represent?

This brings back a problem, which I solved the other day, as it were, in passing. It concerned my partner and his role. I decided that he should not represent any definite position - this will only create trouble and hamstring me in the free flow. He is to be no more than an 'occasion', giving me a chance to 'move on', to deal with 'side issues', and especially to let matters rest. So my real problem is not: who discusses? But who is me? The partner will fall in place once I have defined myself.

b) Now obviously I cannot 'represent' any one, since I do not argue for any established position. I really argue for myself, and in a way for Camus, but with reservations. Now is there a disguise in which I can appear?

In what role do I appear? Which 'side' of mine speaks there? Would going back to those autobiographical notes of 51 be of help?

Put it the other way around: in what role do I not appear: as economist, as man of action, as Jew, as German - though of course all these factors have contributed to making the speaker who he is - as does Mother and Father and the rest of my personal history. Sheets 22-5 of EXPLORATIONS contain good material, though I rightly say there that I have not broken through as yet. But I must not let myself be diverted

I have done very little on this topic since, except the fragment and the fragment. And though the lack of resources on the part of those engaged in this work is not a little while it has not been a real success on the part of the publishing and the reaction when he is asked, and I cannot commit myself to any thing before I have undertaken that work in the true sense of the word.

In the mean time I have occasionally and a seemingly external interest in the work of those who are to speak in a dislogue in fact, it is not only the external influence of the work, but also the internal influence of the work. I have decided to use you as well as to be associated with some of the other members of the group, and I have decided to use you as well as to be associated with some of the other members of the group.

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into problems of substance. Who am I that speaks?
 I talked several times of my 'spiritual testament' - whose testament?
 I recently remembered my old symbol, reaching back to 1914: Moses on the mountain seeing the land but being prevented from entering it.
 In the present case the situation is somewhat different. It is not that I am being 'deprived' of something - rather would I feel an alien in that new country - perhaps this would also be true of Moses! (I hardly can speak as 'Moses'!) No - it is the position of some one who lives 'between the times'. I 'belong' of course to an old world, a world in which even God had a meaning. (Boell says quite nicely: one cannot talk to atheists - they always talk about God!) Only I realize that - not only is God dead, but the whole world from which I come. And - this is rather remarkable - I realize this without resentment, and even affirm basically what comes without, at the same time, being blindly utopian with regard to either the 'unlimited possibilities' or the real dangers. If this position could be symbolized in a name, even if it were a constructed name - this might be the answer. Who else is there who takes a similar stand? Karoly was probably nearest to it, though there was something utopian in the 'tonus', and a tendency to underestimate the dangers, with the result that it all came out so 'pat'. Bloch is utopian in another sense - he really is a dreamer and poet. If Mann - heim had pat solution for the real issues, Bloch never gets near them. Paul and Alexander were two 'reactionaries', though of very different persuasion - Janas himself has not yet worked through to a 'position' - I may well help him, and were it only in opposition. People of greater distance will not help either - Geoffrey, Eliot, Horkheimer, Riezler, Goldstein - they all are 'reactionaries' in their own ways. Funny - Bol is probably the nearest to my position - as it were weighted in the other direction: another generation and therefore nearer to the future, but as open to the 'past' as is probably possible for his generation.

This 'survey' has not helped much as yet, but it has brought home to me why Jonas and Bob, besides some 'personal' readers, are the two with whom I debate there - a very funny couple - but for obvious reasons important 'touchstones'.

Janus occurs as a name. It is not what I need, but it points in a direction: I am looking for a symbolic name which expresses my 'position'. Now 'position' may mean many things - Janus points to my 'historical place'. Is there a symbol for my substantive position? Immanenz I! It must not be a 'big' word - modest and transparent.

One thing is clear at once: speaking to a foil... more answers to the outline... it there is one, will not do... it with the highest level... to them, and best from some concrete... the confusion of the age - what does it mean? (a) perhaps the J.L. can help... down to earth... as there an inner logic... (1) the confused... common children's... divided: I emancipate... the unconscious - the new art... S. emancipate... new education - parity of women and children... (S) danger of utopianism - avoidable... (2) danger of self-destruction: I physical dangers: atom war... as a consequence of anarchy. I stop here - clearly this is the outline of a paper... I already stream-lined, and will be more so when I mend the details. (1) is this accidentally? What of all the weight is now... it lies almost exclusively on the 'real' historical... present and future. In the letter the emphasis is on... remember the, possibly, disproportionate space which... given to Genesis. It is easier to discuss 'ideas', than 'facts'... though this is not a fair distinction here? Discussion means... ring dialogue. Perhaps I should try it after all, just to see whether there are any blocks and where.

Sept. 11. This is written in connection with the hopes on Jonas and... stand (critique) breaking off on sheet VI) I am pretty sure by now... that the partner must remain a foil, and that the focus must be... by what I am going to say, though of course the objections... etc. of the partner are a vehicle to push the dialogue... but somehow all his things are 'loaded', namely an support... to an argument that is set by me.

(a) so I am back at the question: how an issue promising ideas in the... looking in both directions. This is really the strength and weakness

II. Sept. 3. In the mean time much water has flown down the Hudson. My ups and downs following Jonas' reaction have settled on a more or less firm resolve to continue. The next 'judges' may have an effect on this, though I doubt. Much more important will be the success or failure in solving the actual Dialogue issue - at the moment I take it for granted that this is only feasible form - in agreement with Jonas, whatever else is hidden behind his affirmation of this.

1. Now there are several 'dialogue' problems
 - a) there is the issue indicated in the heading above: who am I, and who discusses with me?
 - b) there is the 'outline', that is, the sequence of the discussion. And it seems obvious that the outline is not independent of who is going to discuss. Thus some clarification as to a) should precede further mulling over of the outline
 - c) a third issue is the 'level' of the Dialogue. There are two 'limits': approximation to the 'essay' and, on the other end, the 'loose' writing of the Jonas letter - almost a process of 'free' namely unplanned association with many loose ends. Of course, it is easy to say that the true level is somewhere between. Maybe, this too is not independent of the 'partners'. If my partner is colorless, the burden of exposition falls on me, incl. opposing points of view. If the partner is there in his own right, the arguments can be distributed in the manner indicated in the Jonas Critique Notes, sheet III.
2. these deliberations seem to speak for pondering the 'partner' issue, that is, the topic of these Notes. At the same time, as the remarks on sheet 1 show, the associative technique is not very conducive here. The issue has similarities with finding the right title for a book - a problem of 'infall' rather than of intellectual 'Bemuehung'. How many years of pondering had to pass before I stumbled on OEK?

Another method might be just to start with some set-up, e.g. myself talking to a young physicist who worries about the resistance of the old. But my feeling tonus at this thought is rather negative, and I can even say: why. This will compel me to consider seriously an opposing position - in itself a good procedure, but one for which I am not 'ripe'. This was the beauty of the Jonas letter, and the basic reason for its 'coming off', that I could forget about anything except my own position and its clarification.

So why not stick to this, by making the partner a foil? The answer is: lack of focus. This is quite obvious in the J.L.: it starts somewhere, and ends somewhere, moving in the meantime in all possible directions. Can I find a focus when speaking to a 'foil'?

II. Sept. 3. In the mean time much water has flown down the Hudson...
(a) there is the issue indicated in the heading above: who am I...
(b) there is the 'outline', that is, the sequence of the discussion...
(c) a third issue is the level of the dialogue...
3. these deliberations seem to speak for pondering the 'partner'...

3. One thing is clear at once: speaking to a foil permits many more answers to the 'outline' issue...
a) perhaps the J.L. can help. I started with Metaphysics, but came down to earth around p.20 - avoidable evil - emancipation...
(1) the confused struggles of the Age on many fronts - their common 'chiffre': Emancipation - must now be explicitly subdivided:
Space - Economics - Development
1. emanc. from Nature: Economics - Sexual Revolution - taming of the unconscious - the new Art
2. emanc. from Man: social revolutions - anti-colonialism - new education - parity of women and children
3. emanc. from Gods: Barth-Tillich-Hamilton-Camus
(2) danger of Utopianism - avoidable evil (an historical category)
(3) danger of self-destruction:
1. physical dangers: atom war (chemical war) - tampering with genes - subliminal psychology
2. super-collectivism (Mankind rather than Man) - possibly as a consequence of anarchy.
b) I stop here - clearly this is the outline of a 'paper', perhaps not a bad one, but certainly it lacks the 'openness' of a dialogue...
(1) is this accidental? First of all, the weight is now different - it lies almost exclusively on the 'real' historical issues...
4. Sept. 11. This is written in connection with the Notes on Jonas and Staud. Critique (breaking off on sheet VI) I am pretty sure by now that the partner must remain a foil, and that the 'focus' must be implied by what I am going to say...

...ness of my position, and as a quite general characterization, much more so than 'imminentist', 'Rebel' with 'transformation', perhaps of a more general nature, which I am not incidentally the...
...this is a position of 'distance' which is good, what I say here on sheet 1/2 about the absence of 'resentment' and 'disappointment' in well. All I need is a symbol which expresses this idea of 'distance' between what historical figures held that position. Erasmus - Mill/Pascal - Mill/How good the comparison is between Mill and myself, as far as the 'position' is concerned. - To be sure I am pretty sure that there are names from the end of antiquity, though I am not sure whether they meet the requirements of a positive attitude toward the future. Mill is probably by far the best among those mentioned so far, but I can not do what I wish to do with Aristotle - for this I am not enough in accord with Mill's substitutive view. I will make sure whether he ever used a symbolic name. Perhaps a telling pseudonym, 'Indo-gentilly', I should read some good Platonic dialogues to test the possibilities of the form; best those where the partners are foil. This idea of a pseudonym actually used by, say, Mill, Erasmus, Tocqueville, is not bad.

What about the 'Jew' What was the position of RAMBAM? Are there other 'wise' men? Is there a less ambiguous symbol for what I seek? It is quite interesting that Paul always delg to be 'and der Grosse', that is, a special symbol, whereas I look for a temporal symbol.

December 11. I don't know whether what I wrote today, is just a passing fume or a new beginning. anyhow, in more or less abandoning the idea of a German trip in May, I may have 'vacated' the next 3-4 months for a return to these concerns.

I had best begin with summarizing what happened since these notes were written. Contrast of all, Bob's enthusiastic response to the J.L. and his rejection of the dialogue, coupled with the invitation to write letters to him. From what was said here before, after the demise of Jonas, he remains as the ideal "partner". And though with one exception besides Bob the dialogue was welcomed, I should try a first letter to him. Perhaps I can start out with his last book, 'Inquisition' as I did here, as a substitution of the science elite for the role of the 'partner' with a special class monopoly and the need for a special morality, and also 'substitute metaphysics'. This first letter might contain a rough outline of the whole, to be filled out in subsequent letters. Should he reply? There are external difficulties in this because he is too busy with other matters and, probably, not that interested in this enterprise to sacrifice something else. The letter

native would be that I imagine his answers, and thus treat him as my foil, as I have treated Helen Taylor. The trouble with this is that I will discuss issues which are far removed from Bob's thinking such as 'sanctity of being', probably all 'illuminatist' issues. Still, such issues could be introduced 'polemically' as warning against the modern overstress of 'activity'. I certainly should try - only thus can I discover whether his image will fire my imagination, as the - wrong - image of Jonas obviously did. And I probably should try the first letter without bothering about an outline, though I can hardly continue without first having one.

Dec. 27. Not much has happened during these more than two weeks. The other objector besides Bob to the Dialogue has withdrawn the objection, but I might yet have a try with a letter to Bob. And the passages in his last book from which I might take my bearings, are clear, actually the last three pages 32-4. I probably will also follow the idea of putting down, as it were, the overall outline of the whole enterprise, culminating in the notion of a new 'clerisy'. Thus everything is there - except the impetus to write. And contrary to the advice I gave a few weeks ago, just sitting down at the desk will hardly do - I need some inspiration.

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I. On this memorable day of the Julier - 34 years ago! - I am trying to take stock of what was the main content of the last two months. It may be useful to make explicit the various 'moods' in which I responded to the responses and non-responses to my letter to J. It began with a profound disappointment about his total silence after the receipt and the somehow cursory comments of Lore. I soon recovered and awaited the visit in equanimity. When it became clear that they had come up here exclusively because of the letter - be it Neigung or Duty - the rest of resentment disappeared. Now from the outset it became clear that he had not seen the main motive behind my writing this letter to him: is it worth my while to spend time on all this - am I up to the mark, never mind whether he agrees with my position as a whole or any parts. His interest was exclusively 'sachbezogen', and his opposition was aroused because of my anti-ontological stand, my disregard of his divergent position in the book - where is the 'discontinuity of emergence' to be placed, if at all - and a number of incidental statements which irritated him. And up to the last morning the time was spent on arguing out these points. As will be seen presently, the result of these discussion is very fruitful for me. Quite a number of important issues will have to be thought through again, quite apart of a number of corrections - of substance and of formulation - which are beyond discussion.

Still, the really important part of the talks occurred yesterday morning as a ^{result} of my direct challenge. And it is important to gain a precise understanding of what he really meant in his answer. I must beware of my tendency to soften such blows by hearing more and other things than have actually been said - interesting enough falsifying the truth in an optimistic manner. This must be avoided to the greatest possible extent.

The first - unfavorable - fact is his asking permission to go to the John first. Legitimate as such a request is, I cannot help feeling that this Mottimer kam ihm sehr gelegen. And there is no doubt that, when he started to speak, the mode was one of hesitation. It may be good to list all reservations I can remember:

1. if I were 53, he would advise to let the matter rest for the time being
2. the reemphasis that important sections need thorough reconsideration, coupled with the admission that this can be done.
3. the implied conviction - I do not remember from what remarks I draw this conclusion - that a systematic statement requires more
4. fully confirmed by the obvious relief when I mentioned the Dialogue form, though he himself considers a statement which shows the umbilical cord, as inferior (as does Iris Murdough). He probably understood the meaning of 'dialogue' in the Platonic sense - not as a Gespraech between two only, and he might have been less enthusiastic about it.

How it is only that I fail to myself to say that I am only trying to take stock of what was the main content of the last two months. It may be useful to make explicit the various 'moods' in which I responded to the responses and non-responses to my letter to J. It began with a profound disappointment about his total silence after the receipt and the somehow cursory comments of Lore. I soon recovered and awaited the visit in equanimity. When it became clear that they had come up here exclusively because of the letter - be it Neigung or Duty - the rest of resentment disappeared. Now from the outset it became clear that he had not seen the main motive behind my writing this letter to him: is it worth my while to spend time on all this - am I up to the mark, never mind whether he agrees with my position as a whole or any parts. His interest was exclusively 'sachbezogen', and his opposition was aroused because of my anti-ontological stand, my disregard of his divergent position in the book - where is the 'discontinuity of emergence' to be placed, if at all - and a number of incidental statements which irritated him. And up to the last morning the time was spent on arguing out these points. As will be seen presently, the result of these discussion is very fruitful for me. Quite a number of important issues will have to be thought through again, quite apart of a number of corrections - of substance and of formulation - which are beyond discussion.

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... of ... I ...

- Now it is only fair to myself if I list the 'positive' statements:
 - 1. he waved aside the question whether topic and general treatment was 'competent', though - rightly - referring to the response of my fellow economists
 - 2. he strongly favored the 'CREDO' idea, provided th at one sees value in that enterprise, which he is not quite sure
 - 3. considering my age, nothing can be gained by 'waiting'.

If I am to 'integrate' these statements into a definition of his 'feeling tonus', I would say: he did not feel quite comfortable under this challenge, but I don't think that his qualified approval was only an expression of 'humaneness'. I made it as easy for him as one can to be more skeptical, that is, to express himself that way. It certainly was no enthusiastic endorsement - for this reason some other responses (Bob, Hans, Hilde) are important - but his reaction does not stand in the way of continuation. Incidentally, at the moment I feel that I should not show it to Nanda - she cannot help me in any positive sense, that is, her praise would not silence what doubts I have and her negative response might unduly block me. Probably, even less than Jonas, would she be able to take a detached view, namely detached from controversial substance. And this is exactly what I need. In other words, I wish that some one came along to say: I fundamentally disagree with your position, but I am glad that you formulated it, and I am confident that it will help in the discussion. This is not quite what Jonas said, quite apart from his reservations - probably well taken - against the 'originality' of the position. We both agreed that this itself is a minor criterion.

Speaking in terms of a Gallup Poll, I would have wished for a yes of 75-80%, but got probably only 60, if that much. I cannot know what this will do to my unconscious, considering that I probably have to leave it alone for 2-3 months if not longer. But at the moment I feel that I should return to it. I do not know whether the better procedure will then be to write a number of clarifying notes on the major controversial topics, or to start with the Dialogue, entering the corrections as they come along. It is not a bad moment to intersperse this 'fallow' period. When I have noted down the topics which need further clarification, I really have come to a point where it may be all to the good to leave the matter alone for a while. I shall anyhow accumulate more reactions during this fallow period.

Sept. 3 In retrospect I realize that I forgot the most important response, namely a total absence of response to the 'Wurf' as such. It certainly did not 'hit' him, and if it did the hit was negative. But this is more an indication of his attitude than of the basic quality of my thinking. Under this aspect Bob and Hans, esp. Bob will be important Jonas after all belongs to the 'old', even if he is open: not to the new, but to the weaknesses of the old. His dream is to mend these defects rather than to march into the new world as a responsible critic but supporter. There indeed 'die Geister scheiden sich' -

II. The critical topics can be subdivided:

1. Epistemological problems

(1) Erfahrung versus Idee

I do not intend to enter into a substantive investigation. But in order not to forget: the alternative itself, in spite of its honorific ancestry, may - from my point of view - be not so clear cut. My two cases of 'illumination' may offer the best test cases, especially since in the first I deny the 'effability' or (conceivability) of the experience, whereas in the second - moral illumination - I assert (without any proof so far) that we can know what the experience 'means'. Where then does 'interpretation' start? What does interpretation mean? Picking my true 'primary experience': my life with Ottilie Loewe, was it an 'experience' that I was 'alone', or an 'interpretation'. Is the word 'alone' in this context just a 'cry' 'representing' the experience in a non-contestable manner, or is it an interpretation open to 'discussion' and an alternative answer? Jonas threw doubt on the experiential nature of the 'unappealable death sentence' - leaving alone the allusions which 'sentence' imply and which are indeed an interpretation - is knowledge that I must die an 'experience' or an 'idea'?

(2) is the 'logical chain': Human = Good = Content of the Ought etc. correct? Is it a circle or a tautology? - *system on "ontology"*

2. Substantive problems: (I note that in a random manner - there may well be a hidden 'order')

(1) is Indifference really the supreme Evil? Do I use the term 'indifference' here in the same meaning I speak earlier of the indifference of the Universe?

(2) where to place 'emergence'? Amoeba or Man? Is there more than one 'great revolution' - this might compromise the issue, though? I do not see at the moment what such a compromise would do to my Dualism, and to all what I say of 'hybrid man' etc.

(3) the role of the 'non-moral' in the HUMAN, or even in the GOOD - the place of virtues - 'insight' as a virtue

(4) is it true that the moral task is only 'negative' - GOOD as an autonomous growth

(5) Solidarity too narrow a definition of the 'substance' of the good. It is itself an 'attitude' no 'substance'. And it overstresses(?) the 'social' aspect of the GOOD

(6) my treatment of 'indifference' of the Universe has a 'pessimistic slant', in spite my reference to the 'zeitenden Boten' - should be corrected: the sun warms, even if the earthquake devours.

(7) what happens when we have overcome the 'emergency' situation in Bacon's terms, namely abolished all avoidable evil? Is there no positive task beyond, which can be indicated now? (I am inclined

to deny such a possibility, though generally etc. other a'...
 of very such a possibility, though generally etc. other a'
 a classification of the 7 substantive issues as relatively
 vantage points
 (1) with the exception of (I) and (2) they all belong to my
 section II. In my doubts and expectations of my treatment of the
 issue in my treatment of 'indifference' I feel I am aware of the
 situation in the latter (3), (4), (5); matter in the latter (1)
 or, won't it see it now (1) and (2) in other words, as I can see it now
 the substance is involved in these controversies concerning
 the 'insight'
 (2) It is different with the 'emergence' issue, because it in-
 volved my entire 'cosmological' scheme. At the same time
 when as good as there I have the opposing position right
 near me, I certainly must come to terms with Jonas' position
 and I will not hide behind the back of the 'micro-bio-
 logical' they would anyway have a question too.
 - I am already willing to admit that some
 thing very important happened with the 'emerge' - separation
 of an 'inner' world - self-being - and a 'outer' world -
 logical autonomy etc. That I must study it whether it is
 'concerning' the 'essentials' of the human, namely, a
 for what it is, he says now cannot do (much)
 about his biological basis, therefore 'ontological'
 properties: the 'emerge' in the beginning of 'freedom' will
 be in the center.
 II. From this working program can easily be derived that it will be
 needed to be necessary to clarify issues (I) and II (S), before I can
 do anything else. I have the material for II (S) at hand - where
 what is the material for (I) 'not' (I)?
 Another task to be performed before I return to writing concerns
 the other issues listed in the sheets of 'EMERGENCE', which
 other themselves as possible candidates for inclusion. But above
 all, I must come to a decision what the weight is to be given to
 the 'weight' and to be distinguished between 'ontology'
 and 'insight'. It would be nice if something were to occur to
 me concerning the 'insight'.
 I. In this connection two issues in regard to my relation:
 1. 'Insight' and 'insight' (I) and 'insight' (II) towards 'insight' (I)
 and 'insight' (II) is not really interesting, but - by contrast to dis-
 cuss it! - he brings home the basic question of 'insight':
 who is going to do it - in other words, who has taken over
 the role of 'insight'? 'insight' (I) and 'insight' (II) is the scientific
 issue - indeed another minority who "own" the newly relevant
 "means of production": knowledge and know-how. And both ends with
 the warning that more expertise is not enough, and that we must
 begin today with preparing what is required besides.

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...of the ...

...of the ...

to deny such a possibility, though Serenity etc. offer a 'Vor-
ahnung'.

3.a classification of the 7 substantive issues is relatively
simple:

(1) with the exception of (1) and (6) they all belong to my
section II: doubts and expansions of my treatment of the
ought. In some cases I feel little 'commitment' to the po-
sition taken in the letter: (3), (4), (5). I am open to re-
examine (1) and (7). In other words, as I can see it now, no
fundamentals are involved in these controversies concern-
ing ETHICS

(2) It is different with the 'emergence' issue, because it in-
volved my entire 'cosmological' scheme. At the same time -
which is good - there I have the opposing position right
near me. I certainly must come to terms with Jonas' position.
And I will not hide behind the backs of the micro-biolo-
gists - they would anyhow deny my position too.
Quoting Hamilton, I am already willing to admit that some-
thing very important happened with the amoeba - separation
of an 'inner' from an 'outer' world - self-defence of its bi-
ological integrity etc. What I must study is whether all this
concerns 'essentials' for the human problems, namely
for what is 'aufgegeben' to him. He anyhow cannot do (much)
about his biological basis. Therefore Jonas' metaphysical
propositions: the amoeba is the beginning of 'freedom' will
be in the center.

II. From this my working program can easily be derived. It will in-
deed be necessary to clarify issues I(1) and II(2), before I can
do anything else. I have the 'material' for II(2) at hand - where and
what is the material for I(1)?

Another task to be performed before I return to writing concern
these other issues listed in the sheets of EXPLORATIONS, which
offer themselves as possible candidates for inclusion. But above
all, I must come to a decision what the weight is to be, or ra-
ther how the 'weight' has to be distributed between 'philosophy'
and 'politics'. It would be nice if something were to occur to
me concerning the 'dialoguers'.

1. Sept. 2. In this connection two pieces of reading are relevant:
Bob's new book and Lichtman's Toward Community (Santa Barbara)
The latter is not really interesting, but - by omitting to dis-
cuss it! - he brings home the basic question of all 'reform':
who is going to do it - in other words, who has taken over
the role of the 'proletariat'? Bob's answer is: the scientific
elite - indeed another minority who "owns" the newly relevant
"means of production": knowledge and know-how. And Bob ends with
the warning that mere expertise is not enough, and that we must
begin today with preparing what is required besides.

definite place in favor of the partner: the arguments of the
 'new' appear as modifications of the old.
 - what we want to say is - let's say - I am willing to
 let the partner have a say in the matter, but I am not
 willing to let the partner have a say in the matter of the
 future of the world.
 I have not yet decided the place of the
 partner in my letter - except the part
 where I say 'I am willing to let the partner have a say
 in the matter of the future of the world, but I am not
 willing to let the partner have a say in the matter of the
 future of the world.'
 More important: this approach would present the entire
 as an alternative to the 'old' - would be possible, and
 - the 'new' in the broad sense for the
 future. What I believe is the difference
 between the two is that the 'new' would be the
 result of a new 'revolution' as a new
 (this would fit in well with the new cosmology).
 It is a different kind of 'class' - it is by no means
 a social arrangement. Nor does it carry an egalitarian
 for - as the proletariat is a definite hierarchy, open
 to all who are 'able' enough. Class monopoly is
 formed into a 'natural' monopoly, with the moral
 obligation.
 (but even if the moral problem were solved, the structure of such
 a society would be utterly different from all democratic
 things for the people, but little by the people. This
 combination of 'minority' with 'openness' has already
 the theoretical aspects of medieval society. Are these
 which would come up in the future?
 (what is the political situation at this time? that the political
 situation is not the same as it was, without crowding out the
 'non-metaphysical' ones. Of course, this is a very
 different beginning - one which is 'new' - the partner's
 situation would be a question, that is
 setting both tone and content. One thing must be retained
 the present situation: it must be 'new'. It might be a
 complaint about the lack of support of the state, an
 action of the state (it might present a nice
 for later contrasting these 'class' with the new class. What
 matters is the substance of the state. And, in the absence of
 other 'new' lines, I would have to wait for it).

2.

2. It is at this point that I come in. Bob does not spell out what
 the guiding rules should be of that new elite. Is not my whole
 enterprise concerned with elaborating these rules? Not only in
 the specific sense of the 'cleric' issue, that is, of the moral re-
 quirements of the new power holders. But in a broader sense: what
 is the new world view to be of those who are to shape the future
 a) this broader range includes

- (1) the place of Man in the Universe - Life and Death
- (2) his historical task: Emancipation
- (3) the significance of the "aesthetic" sphere - Serenity
- (4) the moral realm - "WE" - Good - Evil - Ought - illumination
 - "limits" of free decision imposed by the past (Simmel prob-
 lem, "structural" obstacles)

b) the list is not meant as exhaustive - for additions see the
 various lists in EXPLORATIONS. The question is whether this ap-
 proach yields a 'focus'. Moreover it may help to determine who
 speaks and to whom? Obviously I cannot pose as a member of the
 new elite, though I try to 'advise' them. Is my partner a member?
 The objections are obvious: if I shape it that way, I cannot use
 my partner as a mere foil. But it may be worth examining whe-
 ther the viewpoint thus imputed to the partner is perhaps
 broad enough not to block me. Let down preliminary items of
 agreement and disagreement:

- (1) Agreement
 1. we are alone in a diagnostic sense
 2. Conjuratio
 3. fight against avoidable evil - Emancipation
 4. non-metaphysical basis of "ought"
- (2) Disagreement
 1. Death?
 2. Camus' "limits"?
 3. Man or Mankind as subject of Emancipation
 4. the 'non-pragmatic' spheres of experience: Serenity - illum-
 ination as basis of the ought.
 5. the content of the 'good': the meaning of "we" (see point 3)
 - the structural limits - the 'virtues' - what lies beyond
 'emergency'
 6. knowledge and action
 7. autonomous and contrived 'order'

c) I have before me the Sils Notes (sheet V), where a similar idea
 is mentioned, though then the form was still that of the let-
 ter. I was then thinking of a "young natural scientist". Consid-
 ering the AMOEBA problem, it might now be a biologist. And the
 'motive' that then brought this man in touch with me, was his
 concern about the 'reactionary' attitude of the older generat-
 ion. My task would be to create the higher 'synthesis', with a

It is at this point that I come to a point that I feel I should mention. The things I have said about the moral sense of the classic, that is, of the moral sense of the new power holders, but in a broader sense, that is, in the way that we view the world and the future, are not only in the moral sense, but also in the way that we view the world and the future.

- (1) the place of man in the universe - life and death
- (2) the historical task: the moral sense
- (3) the significance of the "moral sense"
- (4) the moral sense: "good" vs "evil" - "right" vs "wrong"

the list is not meant as exhaustive - for additions see the various lists in the appendix. The question is whether this approach helps to determine what is a moral sense. However, it may help to determine who speaks and to whom. Obviously I cannot pose as a member of the new elite, though I try to advise them. They are my partner & member. The objections are obvious: I shape it that way, I cannot use my partner as a mere tool. But it may be worth examining whether the viewpoint thus imputed to the partner is perhaps broad enough not to block me out of preliminary items of agreement.

- (1) Agreement
- 1. We are alone in a diagnostic sense
- 2. Contract
- 3. Right against avoidable evil - assumption
- 4. Non-metaphysical basis of "ought"
- (2) Disagreement
- 1. Death
- 2. "Contract"
- 3. Man or mankind as subject of moralization
- 4. The "non-metaphysical" spheres of experience: severity - mildness
- 5. The content of the "good": the meaning of "we" (see point 3)

7. Autonomy and contrived 'order'

8. Knowledge and action

9. I have before me the list (sheet V), where a similar idea is mentioned, though then the form was still that of the letter. I was then thinking of a young natural scientist. "Contract" being the word I might now use. And the 'motive' that then brought this man in touch with me, was his concern about the 'reactionary' attitude of the older generation. My task would be to create the right 'atmosphere', with a

definite bias in favor of the partner: the arguments of the 'old' appear as modifications of the 'new'. If I am willing - and able! - to grant the partner an independent standing, this might not be a bad way. I am afraid, it will require more 'advanced planning' of the dialogue that may be good for its free flow.

(VERY IMPORTANT: I have totally neglected the place of depth psychology in my entire Jonas letter - except the brief reference to my 'personal equation' on p.4. The issue probably belongs to the discussion of 'structural obstacles' to moral decision.) Another OMISSION: relation of 'equality' and 'liberty' in d) how would such a set-up affect the title and the names of the discussants?

3. More important: this approach would present the entire enterprise as an alternative to Marx. The 'demurrals' would be specified, substituting Veblen's engineers in the broadest sense for the proletariat. What a belated vindication of Veblen! The difference from V. and Marx would be the skeptical evaluation of the new elite as such, and the demand for their 'reformation' as a new clergy. (this would fit in well with the new cosmology)

a) it is quite a different kind of 'class'. It is by no means closed by social arrangements. Nor does it carry an egalitarian illusion as does the proletariat. It is a definite hierarchy, open in principle to all who are 'gifted' enough. Class monopoly is transformed into a 'natural' monopoly, with the moral device: Noblesse oblige.

b) but even if the moral problem were solved, the structure of such a society would be utterly different from all democratic dreams. Everything for the people, but little by the people. This combination of 'minority rule' with 'openness' has similarity with the theocratic aspects of medieval society. Are these issues which could come up in the dialogue?

c) what attracts me to this slant is that the political issues in widest sense are coming to the fore, without crowding out the 'non-metaphysical' ones. Of course, this slant may demand quite a different beginning - one much 'nearer home'. The partner's Eigenstaendigkeit would show in his starting with a question, that is setting both tone and content. One thing must be retained from the present start: it must be a 'bang'. It might be a passionate complaint about the lack of support of the Eliots etc, an accusation of 'trahison der clerics'. (it might present a nice chance for later contrasting these 'clerics' with the new clerics.) What matters is the substance of the start. And, in the absence of another Jonas letter, I would have to draft an 'outline'.

III. Sept. 4. By accident I stumbled upon Colin Wilson's OURSIDER.

The book is now 10 years old, but I could not have found it at a more opportune time. In a way it precedes - and largely expands - Friedman's Problematic Rebel. Its importance for me is twofold. It adds important names and books to my 'roster': Hesse (Demian and especially Steppenwolf), Shaw (Bethsalem), Blake, T. E. Hulme (Speculations) and even the last Wells (Mind at the End of its Tether). Secondly, his stress on the pre-rational, though it seems to me badly confused with 'ideas'. He knows much more about the 'content' of Serenity than I do, includes all sorts of religious dogmas etc. As to the 'positive' aspects I am probably much less 'romantic' - in this respect his attitude is not so different from Friedman. But critically I agree with much, and I marvel in retrospect about the response the book found when it appeared.

But the main thing reading this book has brought home to me, is the need for clarifying, first of all to myself, the 'nature of my position'. I must try to do this while still here - it may reveal not only "why I am so clever", but rather contradictions, lacunae etc. which had better be handled before I go much further.

1. Among the points I share with Wilson is his rejection of the 'objective' approach in 'philosophy' (he goes however much further in his typical opposition to such thinking generally, with the usual bias against Science). This is paralleled with his emphasis on 'intuition', which however climaxes in the ridiculing of 'action' in favor of 'contemplation'. He rejects 'objective metaphysics' all right - Ontology - but he puts the content of his intuition in its place: Aljoscha's awakening - Ramakrishna's vision etc.

a) Now this raises the first question about my position, namely the 'nature' of my 'illuminations', or rather of that which is illuminated. Jonas assured me that I stay within 'immanetism', so long as I confine myself to 'psychological' description. I am not happy with this answer. The very distinction between 'ordinary' and 'extra-ordinary' experiences introduces some sort of 'transcendence'. This feeling is enhanced by the fact that not only do these two types of experience differ as to content, but also in the manner in which they are 'acquired' and by whom. There is a radical democracy in the ordinary experience: every one seems to have it. And there is an 'active' element in acquiring them: one can go out on the search for them, though of course, they can not be 'made' pure and simple - something must 'happen' outside of oneself. In contrast the 'extra-ord' experiences seem to be 'aristocratic' - a point which needs further study: can one 'learn' having them? Moreover they are beyond all 'making' - this is the psychological root of the 'contemplative' interpretation. A third point concerns their 'effability'. I have so far argued

as if there were a gulf between the effability of ordinary experience and the ineffability of Serenity. I have insisted that the meaning of the ethical illumination can be articulated. something is wrong there. S. Sept. 11 - last day in K.L. I. I mean time Hans was here. My diary notes contain the personal aspect of the visit - here the purpose considerable return for my work is to be set down. (in spite of violent opposition to my cosmic views the response in toto was much better than that of Jones. Or I should say: that what this enterprise means, quite apart from all content, and by no means only under the 'private' aspect: 'Jeder grease delirante sollte seine Erfindungen und diese Weise niederlegen'. This was climaxed by a true enthusiasm when I read to him that piece of a dialogue - 'Jeder habe ich erst richtig verstanden, um was es geht. All in all, a real encouragement, and another limitation that the address of the letter is really not the best possible audience more respondents must be heard, but their verdict would have to be truly devastating to make me change my mind, or rather my feeling, that I should continue. Now to Hans critical comments on the content: (1) On the surface it was similar to one of Jones' points, namely protest to my isolationism in the Universe, and my 'redoubting' nature to a secondary place. But it was not so much a critique on the point where I draw the dividing line - Man versus 'total' Nature - as it was with Jones - there lives in Hans a truly mystical feeling for the unity of the world, animate or inanimate. Moreover, and this opens another vista which had been touched only in passing by Jones: a protest against the 'negativism' in Nature in favor - well, the sanctity of Being. (2) Here now I touch a really fundamental point, and it is interesting that Hans brought it home whereas Jones, who may well have felt the same when he reproached me for having emphasized the 'glorious' side of the action of the cosmic forces, what happened, and what is a most important realization, is that I wrote that letter in an exclusively 'existentialist' mood. It is indeed an extreme formulation, in which - as in Gamma (who really dominated me while I wrote this) - the 'sanctity' of the Universe and, to use a short-cut, the 'beauty' experience are both there, but utterly unconnected. In this I knew better, when I devoted so much space to the sanctity of Being, to its relation with the Ought, the faring interrelations of both etc. etc. what happened that all this was somehow beyond my vision when I wrote the letter, considering that what I wrote in this saw by no means a disavowal, but as old hat from the early days with Alexander? How this total blocking

VI
JONAS CRITIQUE

III. Sept. 4. By accident I stumbled upon Colin Wilson's 'UNDESIRABLE'... The book is now 10 years old, but I could not have found it at a more opportune time. In a way it precedes - and largely expands - Friedmann's 'Problems of the Mind'. Its importance for me is twofold. It adds important names and books to my 'reader's' (Dante and especially Steppenwolf), (Shaw) (Kierkegaard), (Blake, T. E. Hulme) (Spencer) and even the last (Wells) (Mind) and of its letter). Secondly, his stress on the pre-rational, though it seems to me badly contrasted with 'ideas'. He 'knows' much more about the content of Serenity than I do, includes all sorts of religious dogmas etc. As to the 'positive' aspects I am probably much less 'rationalistic' in this respect his attitude is not so different from Friedmann. But critically I agree with much, and I marvel in retrospect about the response the book found when it appeared. But the main thing reading this book has brought home to me, is the need for clarifying, first of all to myself, the nature of my position. I must try to do this while still here - it may reveal not only "why" I am so clever, but rather contradictions, lacunae etc. which had better be handled before I go much further. Among the points I share with Wilson is his rejection of the 'objective' approach in philosophy, (he goes however much further in his typical opposition to such thinking generally, with the usual bias against science). This is paralleled with his emphasis on 'intuition', which however differs in the richness of 'action' in favor of 'contemplation'. He rejects 'objective metaphysics' all together - Ontology - but he puts the content of his intuition in its place: Al-Jochacha's 'awakening' - Hamakrishna's vision etc.

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as if there were a gulf between the effability of ordinary experience and the ineffability of the Meaning of Serenity, though I have insisted that the meaning of the ethical illumination can be articulated. Something is wrong there.

2. Sept. 11 - last day in K.L.I. the mean time Hans was here. My diary Notes contain the personal aspect of the visit - here the quite considerable return for my work is to be set down.

a) in spite of violent opposition to my 'cosmic' views the response in toto was much better than that of Jonas. Or I should say: there was a response to the total idea, an intuitive understanding what this enterprise means, quite apart from all content. And by no means only under the 'private' aspect: 'jeder grosse Gelehrte sollte seine Grundanschauungen auf diese Weise niederlegen'. This was climaxed by his true enthusiasm when I read to him that piece of a dialogue - jetzt habe ich erst richtig verstanden, um was es geht. All in all, a real encouragement, and another confirmation that the addressee of the letter is really not the best possible audience: two more 'respondents' must be heard, but their verdict would have to be truly devastating to make me change my mind, or rather my feeling, that I should continue.

b) Now to Hans critical comments on the content:

(1) on the surface it was similar to one of Jonas' points, namely protest to my isolating Man in the Universe, and my 'reducing' Nature to a secondary place. But it was not so much a critique on the point where I draw the dividing line - Man versus 'total' Nature - as it was with Jonas - there lives in Hans a truly mystical feeling for the unity of the world, animate or inanimate. Moreover, and this opens another vista which had been touched only in passing by Jonas: a protest against the 'negativism' in Nature in favor - well, the sanctity of Being.

(2) here now I touch a really fundamental point, and it is interesting that Hans brought it home whereas Jonas, who may well have felt the same when he reproached me for having emphasized the 'gloomy' side of the action of the cosmic forces. What happened, and what is a most important realization, is that I wrote that letter in an exclusively 'existentialist' mood. It is indeed an extreme formulation, in which - as in Camus (who really dominated me while I wrote this) - the absurdity of the Universe and, to use a short-cut, the 'beauty' experience are both there, but utterly unconnected. In Sils I knew better, when I devoted so much space to the sanctity of Being, to its relation with the Ought, the jarring interrelations of both etc. What happened that all this was somehow beyond my vision when I wrote the letter, considering that what I wrote in Sils was by no means a discovery, but is old hat from the early days with Alexander? How this total blocking out?

c) now this is, of course, easy to mend. But the problem lies elsewhere and is much more serious. I indicated it already in Sil though I was not aware of the scope of the difficulty.

(1) obviously I was 'honest' when I wrote that letter, and one can also not say that I somehow 'overlooked' an issue, as it happens in 'objective' writings. The view on the other world was blacked out emotionally - it simply was 'overshadowed' by the Camus view. I was that person when I wrote this. But the fact is that I am also another person. And this is different from 'contesting' an opposing view, say, the metaphysical-ontological approach. At the moment I am rather unwilling to concede anything to this viewpoint. But it may well be that I grow 'mellower' and try to find some middle ground or what not. This is something quite different from what is at stake here. I never 'forgot' the ontological view. But I 'forgot' the sanctity of being though - different from the ontological view - I am aware of it and affirm it - if I am aware.

But it is still worse. I am not sure whether I would have been able to write the letter, and with the 'punch' it has, had I been aware of this contrasting feeling. And be it said at once: this is in all likelihood just one example, even if a rather essential one, for such 'forgetting' of the 'opposite'. In the course of the work, possibly again stimulated by critical reactions, other such blacked-out vision may reappear. And again it may be true that I would have been paralyzed had these views been open. What does all this signify?

(2) Clearly it points to something 'subjective' which far transcends the personal equation. The latter is supposed to be to formulate the character indelebilis in all its limitations, perversions and what have you. But it is supposed to be 'permanent' and 'total'. What happened in the letter is that a 'fleeting' and 'partial' Lebensgefuehl usurped the vision. How can I guard myself against this, without falling back into the position of Buridan's ass?

And be it noted: it is primarily not even a question of being 'fair' to the 'object' - also an important aspect. First of all, I want to be fair to the 'subject' - if the enterprise is to establish a Weltbild as seen through a temperament, at least this 'temperament' should be reflected in its totality.

d) One can say that 'time' will be the guardian. My 'moods', if that is the word, change, and thus the vistas. If I wait long enough all the essential vistas will open up, permitting the proper balance. So will be the critique I receive - my critiques re-

presenting other partial vistas. And at the moment it seems to me that these are really the only two safeguards - that there is no 'systematic' way to solve the problem. I must maintain the attitude of listening to the 'voice of my interior'. My reason - not my 'listening device' must know that the 'counterpoint' to which I listen is 'incommensurate' with the 'dialectic' form. Will help a great deal. Not only can the interlocutor bring up the alternative view - the 'poor form' makes it possible to interpret even afterwards what was overlooked to begin with. As an example, it might be possible for Vargas to raise the question of the sanctity of being, after I have quite one-sidedly stressed the other view. This will compel me to modify, but there is no gain in starting, as it were, with exaggerations, if only they are modified in the process.

(e) Summarizing I come to the following results as to the technique of handling this problem: (1) collect the ideas in all the notes which are relevant, especially in the Sila Notes. I may find there more 'complementary' vistas.

(2) It may be necessary to include also vistas which I myself do not hold, that is, positions which are worth while referring to or criticizing. Consequently, I should probably show parts to respective 'experts' and provoke critical remarks. A little polemics in the letter, except incidental remarks which could well be omitted. This should basically remain so. But of course, there are exceptions which may be taken care of.

(3) At this point the problem is framed by a more general one: how to break down the mass to be handled, which is equivalent to saying: I must have an outline. There is much mulling over of this problem in these notes and, especially, in EXPLOSION. It will probably be wrong to try to improve (on the ideas as stated in the letter. Such improvement may not be independent of the outline, that is, of the manner in which the fundamental ideas are to be applied. And after the problem 'form' seems to be solved for better or worse, a survey of the content is the most urgent task. I know that even the outline of EXPLOSION changed almost up to the end. So it is not a question of laying down the law for all times. But I simply cannot write for long without having a provisional outline.

I know, and restated it yesterday in my personal notes, what the big issues are: Philosophy v. raw politics - or 'abstract' versus 'concrete'; the personal education; the 'classics' - perhaps as the 'goal' of the whole enterprise.

presenting other partial vistas. And at the moment it seems to me that these are really the only two safeguards - that there is no 'systematic' way to solve the problem.

At any price I must maintain the attitude of listening to the 'voice of my interior'. My reason - not my 'listening device' - must know that the 'counterpoint' to which I listen is 'incomplete'. Now the Dialogue form will help a great deal. Not only can the interlocutor bring up the alternative view - the 'loose' form makes it possible to intersperse even afterwards what was overlooked to begin with. As an example, it might be possible for Evagoras to raise the question of the sanctity of Being, after I have quite one-sidedly stressed the other view. This will compel me to modify, but there is no harm in starting, as it were, with exaggerations, if only they are modified in the process.

e) Summarizing I come to the following results as to the technique of handling this problem:

- (1) collect the ideas in all the Notes which are relevant, especially in the Sils Notes. I may find there more 'complementary' vistas.
- (2) it may be necessary to include also vistas which I myself do not hold, that is, positions which are worth while refuting or criticizing. Consequently, I should probably show parts to respective 'experts' and provoke criticism. Altogether there is little polemics in the Letter, except incidental remarks which could well be omitted. This should basically remain so. But of course, there are exceptions which must be taken care of.
- (3) at this point this problem is joined by a more general one: how to break down the mass to be handled, which is equivalent to saying: I must have an outline. There is much mulling over of this problem in these Notes and, especially, in EXPLORATION. It will probably be wrong to try to 'improve' on the ideas as stated in the Letter. Such improvement may not be independent of the Outline, that is, of the manner in which the fundamental ideas are to be applied. And after the problem of 'form' seems to be solved for better or worse, a survey of the content is the most urgent task. I know that even the outline of OEK changed almost up to the end. So it is not a question of 'laying down the law' for all times. But I simply cannot write text without having a provisional outline.

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- (1) collect the ideas in all the Notes which are relevant, especially in the Sils Notes. I may find there more 'complementary' vistas.
- (2) it may be necessary to include also vistas which I myself do not hold, that is, positions which are worth while refuting or criticizing. Consequently, I should probably show parts to respective 'experts' and provoke criticism. Altogether there is little polemics in the Letter, except incidental remarks which could well be omitted. This should basically remain so. But of course, there are exceptions which must be taken care of.
- (3) at this point this problem is joined by a more general one: how to break down the mass to be handled, which is equivalent to saying: I must have an outline. There is much mulling over of this problem in these Notes and, especially, in EXPLORATION. It will probably be wrong to try to 'improve' on the ideas as stated in the Letter. Such improvement may not be independent of the Outline, that is, of the manner in which the fundamental ideas are to be applied. And after the problem of 'form' seems to be solved for better or worse, a survey of the content is the most urgent task. I know that even the outline of OEK changed almost up to the end. So it is not a question of 'laying down the law' for all times. But I simply cannot write text without having a provisional outline.

I know, and restated it yesterday in my personal Notes, what the big issues are: Philosophy versus Politics - or 'abstract' versus 'concrete'; the personal equation; the 'clerics' - perhaps as the 'goal' of the whole enterprise.

(4) I just saw (EXPL.22(2)) an important passage, relating to my 'discovery' of the Dialogue: I could not have done it so long as I did not know what the content was. Does this mean that I shall have to write more letters or expositions of the ideas, before I can transkate them into the Dialogue? This may well be so and creates another difficulty. Well, only practice can show, but it is good to be warned.

3. Sept. 12 - last morning. All the time I wanted to write down some points in which I distinguish myself from representative ideas in the history of philosophy - one of the reasons why my point of view is both eclectic and, in a way, original

- a) here are three aspects of importance
 - (1) Immanism versus Transcendetism, that is, Plato
 - (2) Activisk versus contemplative living, that is, Lucretius
 - (3) Intuitionism versus ~~Voluntarism~~ ^{Voluntarism}, that is, Existentialism ^{Rationalism?}
- b) the ~~Scheme~~ works, since I share with each opponents two characteristics
 - (1) with Plato: Activism and Intuitivism
 - (2) with Lucrezius: Immanentism and Intuitionism(?)
 - (3) with Camus & Sartre: Immanentism and Activism
- c) on the other hand, time honored ideas: Revelation - Eschatology - Gotteskindschaft - original sin - even God turn up in modified form
 - (1) God as omnipotent power
 - (2) Revelation as Intuition and Illumination
 - (3) Eschatology as Fight against avoidable Evil
 - (4) Gotteskindschaft as my conception of We
 - (5) Original Sin as Anti-Utopianism and Finitude
- d) what is lacking is naturally all ideas bound up with transcendence and Ontology
 - (1) Incarnation - Resurrection - "Success Story"
 - (2) Platonic Ideas - "Essenced"
 - (3) Monism - Rational 'System'
- e) I doubt that this list exhausts the issue, but I quite like it. At one point I should bring this parallelism ect. into the open. I might even reflect a little more about this - there may be a clue to the Outline in the arrangement of these 'principles'. Some other 'principles' - less fundamental, ones - need further consideration: Freedom-Order as a 'relative' Gestalt - autonomous versus contrived order the Emergence stages in Evolution - Ormuzd and Ahriman: the proper 'mix' of Optimism and Pessimism (is in some manner implied in c (3))

... I want to add to the foregoing an important consideration. I have repeatedly said to myself - at the moment I am not sure how much of this has found its way into these or other Notes - that I am a typical transition person - well, my comparison with Mill pointed in the same direction. Now it seems important that I am aware, and even mention it in the Dialogue, a form as an vertical one, what the features are which betray me as such a 'Man in between'. It also seems important to distinguish two different types of such features: definitely transitional ones, which are likely to disappear even if all goes well - and certain 'untranslatable' ones which may disappear to the detriment of the future development.

(a) transitional features

(1) 'My stress on being alone'. It is quite amazing to realize in retrospect that my polemics against 'solipsism', 'existentialism' etc. in a way hit myself. The very emphasis on this being alone betrays the fact when something else was believed, hoped or what have you. For the truly 'modern' man his 'loneliness' is so much a matter of course that he will hardly start out with this emphasis.

(2) Perhaps the same is true with my 'ambivalence' as to death. The horror of 'not-being', is related to a very special conception or experience of 'being', the loss of which is felt as intolerable.

(3) The concern with 'we' as something not obvious again is consequence of an 'individualist' past. I will presently show that this is a subtle issue, in which also the second type of features enters.

(b) 'untranslatable' features

(1) To continue with the above, the 'eschatological' character - that is, Man or Mankind, that is, the danger of 'over-collectivization', of which the 'modern' man is little aware.

(2) My emphasis on the 'intuitionist' and 'illuminational' basis of all knowledge and, moreover, my 'valuation' of the mental states, thus defined, as opposed to the 'active' sphere - Hamilton's attitude. I can also say: there is a definite danger of too much 'Marxist' relative to the over-emphasis on 'Marx's' in part, the overvaluation of 'science', belongs in the same context - as does the under-valuation on the part of the 'real' reactionaries.

(c) on a different plane lie those strange omissions in the U.I. like the disregard of the 'nascity of being', or of depth psychology, which are simple 'mistakes', but must have a reason in my personality. The extreme 'Man-nature' may also belong here.

(A) I have seen (S) an important passage relating to my 'discovery' of the dialogue: I could not have done it so long as I did not know what the content was. Does this mean that I shall have to write more letters or expositions of the ideas, before I can translate them into the dialogue? This may well be so and creates another difficulty. My practice can show, but it is good to be warned.

3. Sept. 15 - Last morning. All the time I wanted to write down some points in which I distinguish myself from representative ideas in the history of philosophy - one of the reasons why my point of view is both eclectic and, in a way, original.

(a) here are three aspects of importance

- (1) Immanent versus transcendent, that is, Plato
- (2) Activist versus contemplative living, that is, Aristotelian
- (3) Intuitionist versus voluntarist, that is, Existentialist

(b) the ~~XXXXXXXX~~ works, since I share with each opponent a characteristic

- (1) with Plato: Activist and Intuitionist
- (2) with Lucretius: Immanentist and Intuitionist (?)
- (3) with Camus & Sartre: Immanentist and Activist

(c) on the other hand, time honored ideas: revelation - Bachstelzology - Gotteskindschaft - original sin - even God turn up in modified form

- (1) God as omnipotent power
- (2) Revelation as Intuition and Illumination
- (3) Bachstelzology as fight against avoidable Evil
- (4) Gotteskindschaft as my conception of We
- (5) Original sin as anti-Utopianism and Finitude

(d) what is lacking is naturally all ideas bound up with transcendence and Ontology

- (1) Incarnation - Resurrection - "Success Story"
- (2) Platonic Ideas - "Essences"
- (3) Nomism - Rational 'System'

(e) I doubt that this list exhausts the issue, but I quite like it. At one point I should bring this parallelism into the open. I might even reflect a little more about this - there may be a clue to the outline in the arrangement of these 'principles'. Some other 'principles' - less fundamental, ones - need further consideration: Freedom-Order as a 'relative' Gestalt - autonomous versus contrived order the emergence stages in Evolution - Ormuzd and Ahriman: the proper 'mix' of Optimism and Pessimism - (is in some manner implied in c (3))

4. Sept. 17. Back home I want to add to the foregoing an important consideration. I have repeatedly said to myself - at the moment I am not sure how much of this has found its way into these or other Notes - that I am a typical transition person - well, my comparison with Mill pointed in the same direction. Now it seems important that I am aware, and even mention it in the Dialogue where it fits, what the features are which betray me as such a 'Man in between'. It also seems important to distinguish two different types of such features: definitely transitional ones, which are likely to disappear even if all goes well - and certain 'unfashionable' ones which may disappear to the detriment of the future development.

- a) transitional features:
- (1) my stress on 'being alone'. It is quite amusing to realize in retrospect that my polemics against 'eclipses', 'exile' ect. in a way hits myself. The very emphasis on this being alone betrays the past when something else was believed, hoped or what have you. For the truly 'modern' Man his 'loneliness' is so much a matter of course that he will hardly start out with this emphasis
 - (2) perhaps the same is true with my 'ambivalence' as to Death. The horror of 'non-being' is related to a very special conception or experience of 'being', the loss of which is felt as intolerable
 - (3) the concern with 'we' as something not obvious again a consequence of an 'individualist' past. (I will presently show that this is a subtle issue, in which also the second type of features enters).
- b) 'unfashionable' features
- (1) to continue with the above, the Seaborg issue is characteristic: Man or Mankind, that is, the danger of 'over-collectivization', of which the 'modern' Man is little aware.
 - (2) my emphasis on the 'intuitionist' and 'illuminational' basis of all knowledge and, moreover, my 'valuation' of the mental states thus defined, as opposed to the 'active' sphere - vide Hamilton's attitude. I can also say: there is a definite danger of too much 'Martha' relative to the over-emphasis on 'Maria' in past ages. The overvaluation of 'science' belongs in the same context - as does the under-valuation on the part of the real 'reactionaries'.
- c) on a different plane lie those strange omissions in the J.L. like the diergard of the 'snactity of being' or of depth psychology, which are simple 'mistakes', but must have a reason in my personality. The extreme hiatus: Man-Nature may also belong here

Jan. 21, 1967.

This is another attempt at "getting at myself", trying to pick up the pieces where the Jonas Letter left them. There are plenty of Notes searching for the reasons which made that earlier attempt fail: crudeness of exposition which treated the basic ideas without stressing their interconnection - omission of central points - but above all absence of "structure" and "direction", that is, no unifying and thus ordering theme. Transforming the Letter into a Dialogue might have its advantages, but it cannot cure the defects mentioned. Some of them, above all, the last seemed to be circumvented in the scheme devised a year ago under the name of "radii" issuing from some "center piece". But whatever its relative merits, it does not inspire me at this juncture, the alternative danger looming large there: an arid treatise about matters which, in my present state of knowledge, I can only deal with impressionistically. This admission points to what is positive in both the Letter and the morsels of Dialogue: immediacy of expression - a minimum of abstractness, though there is a good deal of it in the latter parts - in a word the "confessional" tone or the preservation of the umbilical cord linking my observations to their existential origin. It is to preserve this link that I now try the Diary form, which failed me once before in fall '65. The difference between then and now is that, however vaguely, I have a starting point if not a topic, which should protect me from losing myself in a limitless sea of impressions and reactions. It is the formulation of this "topic" which is my first task.

But before doing so I want to assure myself against myself in what I am embarking upon. The term 'diary' is perhaps not well chosen. I do not intend to describe my 'day'. Rather one or two quite specific problems are to be investigated, without knowing at this time where this will lead to, and whether anything will ever come of this other than private ruminations. Knowing myself and the danger of "freezing" as soon as the 'public' is considered, I shall have to guard myself again and again against the intrusion of extraneous considerations of this kind. What the notion of 'diary' to convey to myself is the attempt to clarify the issues selected by a continuous suit of ruminations. The "level" of rumination will have to be that intermediate stage between 'dreaming' and 'thinking', as which Eriksen defines 'free association'. It is to be open, and to keep open, the deeper layers, but while trying to "catch" what emanates there, that peculiar intellectual "control" is to be exercised which I have applied for many years in writing notes - a strange 'filtering process' or 'steering process', in which I listen to the 'voice of the interior' but somehow know which tones 'fit'.

Now the 'topic'. It really is two topics, or rather two aspects of a central issue, an 'objective' and a 'subjective' one. In a way the objective aspect has been suggested by Helton: the 'thematic hypotheses' which underlie all 'organized' knowledge. This formulation - organized knowledge - already goes beyond what Helton aspires to. His problem are the ultimate 'principles' - Cassirer's term - from which every scientific statement takes its bearings, extended from the physical sciences to science generally. I think that the relevance of such principles extends, beyond 'science' proper, to all knowledge, including ethical and aesthetic valuations -

x Helton: "organization of knowledge" and total weltanschauung.

Now the second aspect comes into view if one asks for the subjective origin of these thematic hypotheses. Assume that "least action" or "conservation" are found as such hypotheses, founding in a particular age all basic theories - what is their 'rationale' if they are beyond testing? One avenue of study would be the "sociology" of knowledge with its historical ramifications. It may enter after all my own concerns. But these are, first of all, directed to what can be called the "psychology" if not "~~para~~ psychopathology" of knowledge. There the subjective angle comes into view. More specifically, I will try to dig up the thematic hypotheses which underlie my "theorizing", first of all, in Economics, but beyond that in my general "views of the world". Then I will search for the personality roots in me of these views, utilizing what little I know of 'depth psychology', especially the hypotheses of Eriksen which I have just reread.

As I just said, under the first aspect OEK will be a mine to be explored, but also the Jonas letter, which now serves as material for a more fundamental study. If I should get somewhere with this exploration, the work last summer would reveal itself as an indispensable stage of clarification. *Now also the Friedman book (1, 28, 87)*

Jan. 22.

Before setting out in a systematic way, I should perhaps demonstrate to myself my procedure on a sample. To stay in line with Helton I choose one or more thematic hypotheses from 'my' Economics. Its most original feature is its 'engineering' aspect, in which reality is made fit for scientific investigation by prior 'action'. That this needs to be done is a consequence of 'objective disorder' as it presents itself to the merely contemplative observer. In a word, there reveals itself a 'distrust' in the autonomous order of economic processes. What is important is that there is hardly any objective test to confirm this hypothesis. I have made this ^{clearer} in the recent Position Paper than in the book itself. It is all a question of what size of the standard error of any explanatory hypothesis one is willing to accept as 'useful', namely for prediction. Not only is this a purely pragmatic criterion - usefulness for prediction - but there is no fixed criterion as to what 'number' of the error falls 'outside the pale'. Stated differently, it all depends on "how much disorder" one is willing to put up with, speaking now in terms of the actor or "passer" in such a system - again a judgment for which no fixed criteria exist. Even if one is willing to admit the intolerability of certain 'limits', as e.g. represented by the Great Depression - even this is not beyond dispute - there is a "broad band" of experience, relative to which there is disagreement as to the 'line' beyond which true disorder begins. It is really a question of 'sensitivity' to 'deviation' from, say, full resource utilization or potential output maximum. And quite obviously I tend to draw the line rather narrowly.

It is from this point that the second issue can be attacked: the underlying personal equation. This equation comes into the open when I say that even small deviations from the optimum, in themselves harmless, yet present a threat, namely the threat of getting out of hand. And this threat exists because, another thematic hypothesis, there does not appear to be built a compensating mechanism into the system. What Harrod and Demar assert for small deviations from the path of steady growth, I assume to be true of any small deviation from the 'norm', whatever it may be. And it is then only one step to the personal disposition: there is no reliable force in the 'world' to which one could

Entrust the autonomous tendencies. Order is only to the extent to which it is made. And the next step would be to ask: which character structure tends toward such a view, and what sort of 'conditioning' tends to produce such a character structure. Clearly there is an absence of 'trust' and 'hope', to use Eriksen's terms. And to follow his etiology, something has gone wrong in the first stage of human development, that is, in the infant-mother relationship.

Now quite a number of problems arise from this 'result'. To what extent does this 'defect' blind the observer, or rather: judge, in evaluating reality? Must the subjective 'myopia' necessarily arrive at a distorted view of the world? Or could the resulting verdict on the nature of, say, economic processes still be 'true'? Considering the 'many-faceted' structure of reality, might perhaps such myopia bring into the vision important objective features which a '20-20' vision might conceal?

A different question would be concerned with the 'range' of objective consequences which the subjective attitude might cover. In other words, where outside Economics can I find a similar concern with 'order', and a similar answer of my own? This question is important under the aspect of Holton's hunch that it is on the level of such thematic hypotheses that the link between the findings of the different fields of knowledge can be found - at least, for a given age and culture.

But it may at this juncture be fruitful to pursue first another avenue. My 'hypothesis' of dangerous tendencies toward disorder in autonomous economic processes is limited to late capitalism. I do not maintain it for earlier stages. Now the ultimate reason for this restriction is enlightening. What has changed between 1800 and 1950 - so I say - is "liberation" of western Man from some of the bonds and compulsion which kept him to an orderly path hundred years ago. As I put it at the end of Ch. 4, Man at that time, or at least the image of Man as it emanates from the theory then conceived, is one of a pseudo-particle in analogy with subhuman nature.

Now this proposition - itself difficult to verify because of our ignorance concerning social causation - implies some more 'hypotheses'. One concerns inanimate nature, for which autonomous order is there acknowledged, in accord with science generally. On the other hand, if it is true that the age of modern capitalism offers the first historical instance of 'human freedom' in the sense of 'choice of action', a fundamental dialectic is postulated between 'freedom' and 'order', at least so long as this 'freedom' is not itself under 'self restraint', rational or otherwise. Only in passing I refer to my parallel proposition put forth in the Price of Liberty, of which my present economic views are a systematic exposition applied to a different field.

Again raising the question the 'subjective' question, which 'virtues', to use Eriksen's word, are absent from the observer who arrives at this diagnosis, but perhaps also from the object of study itself, namely late capitalist market society? To pinpoint the latter issue, I left it open whether my absence of 'trust' imagines 'disorder' in economic processes, or whether my myopia made me more sharp-sided for an actual defect of the economic world. Now, after having narrowed down my thesis to the 'contemporary' economic world, I ask with more conviction whether that which, in my view, makes for disorder, betrays not only a neurotic trait in the observer, but is an actual neurotic trait in the object studied? And my neurosis - I still do not know precisely what it consists in - just kept me to see the critical defect in society.

I have difficulty in assigning any of Eriksen's virtues to what would be required in order to achieve that mixture of insight and self restraint necessary to run the modern market 'spontaneously', or to achieve in the economic sphere that kind of 'spontaneous conformity' to which I attributed the functioning of the English political system. (it might be helpful to study the 'forces' once more which in my hypothesis have contributed to the building up of that attitude, including the counter forces which, since the war, seem to dissolve it.) Will and Purpose, as mentioned by Eriksen, have perhaps some connection with what I search for. But considering the great importance I assign to EXPECTATIONS, the failure may primarily be one of 'cognition', that is, a failure of the prevailing system of information - an institutional and not a psychological, not to say: moral issue. Still, even if I give this factor its full due, as I do in OEK, there remains a 'purposeful' problem of new action directives - an issue that will gain importance the nearer we come to a cybernetic society with all its implications. (remember today's TV discussion with Theobald.) I notice that the term 'purpose' appears in Eriksen's and my list, but I am not sure whether the uses are commensurable. There is, in other words, no doubt that the capacity of purposeful action is fully developed in the modern marketer - it is rather a question of the content and direction of the prevailing purpose. I shall have to dig much deeper here.

Still, a preliminary summary amounts to this. In my theoretical work I place emphasis on a tendency toward growing disorder - 'tendency' is a good word, remembering Marx's use of the term. It can, and has been counteracted - and the need for 'making order'. I now wonder whether this should be called a 'thematic hypothesis' - is it not an observable tendency, especially if I apply the inclusive meaning of 'order' which the Position Paper has assigned to it? What speaks against it is - perhaps - the 'blindness' of my colleagues. But I can also say that their being caught in an obsolete frame of reference - is this not a thematic hypothesis? - is the reason for their blindness. And - a problem to be studied - it might well be that new thematic hypothesis arise from reinterpretations of experience. Anyhow I can say that my particular disposition - absence of trust - has made me especially sensitive to an objective feature of the contemporary economic world, a feature which a more trusting soul might well play down. In this shortcut formulation the productive significance of subjective dispositions, even neurotic ones, for the gaining of true knowledge comes well into the open. And judging - prematurely - the significance of this 'diary', it looks as if it was in the line of other Notes, serving my clarification rather than yielding any 'ostensible' text. This does not speak against continuing along these lines, but it shows how far from any 'public' utterance I am.

Jan. 23
~~Jan. 23~~. I restate the major finding, which is at the same time a modification of my initial statement: my particular subjective disposition - absence of 'trust' in the anonymous 'ways of the social world' - has made me especially sensitive to a real, by no means 'imagined', feature of the real economic process. The connection, and this is the next step, goes even further. Many others, from Malthus on, have felt that something is wrong with the economic world, and must be put right by human action. But they all look for a determinate mechanism which, contrary to the optimistic belief of the Smith School, states in the direction of disorder. With them disorder is the consequence of a "wrong

necessity" rather than of an - in itself praiseworthy - freedom. And, contrary to my 'instrumental policy' which is concerned with 'taming behavior', the 'action' which the other critics prescribe, are all concerned with 'changing the stage sets', incl. Marx. In this sense the apologists as well as the critics of capitalism belong together, as opposed to my thesis that, at least as far as 'order' is concerned (there are other criteria, such as justice, beauty - meaning genuine 'living' rather than accumulating - which my point does not cover), behavior is in the center.

Now I wonder to which character trait this peculiar diagnosis is to be related. Does it too arise from the lack of a 'trust' - this time not directed to 'anonymous' forces, but to the average marketer placed in a position of freedom of choice? In a way Marx, to take him as prototype of the other group, also 'distrusts' the operation of the market. But what in his view is ultimately wrong is the 'crimes' committed in pre-history and since repeated - crimes committed against Man who, in his prehistoric essence, is 'good'. And we only need place him in a proper environment, for him ~~xxx~~ to display his inherent 'sociality' (I must not forget that, with all reservations mentioned in Vol. III of Capital, the new aeon is a 'realm of freedom' - though he never spelled out whether it was 'Man' or 'Mankind' that was to be free!) A similar optimistic view prevails among the other members of the opposite group, showing even in the most modern conception which equates 'EXTR. ACTION' with RATIONALITY. Conversely, my dissociating rationality from maximization opened the way to a fundamental critique of economic behavior, like what I hint at in Ch. 5. True, Marx too envisages a different behavior in the state of the future, inspired by the communist incentive: from every one according to his ability - to every one according to his needs. But the idea is that this new behavior, or rather the possibility of its realization, is a consequence of the new order, not a precondition of its coming into being.

But even this does not exhaust the problem. I am by no means taking the 'Christian' position of original sin, which would exclude on principle that Man uses his new freedom 'socially'. I make it all a problem of 'learning' - as the English spontaneous conformity is seen by me as a product of historical learning, fortified by all the instruments of formal and informal education. I do envisage the possibility of a coincidence between micro-strivings and macro-rationality through the learning process. However - this is seen as the product of Control.

4 With this a new element appears on the scene. I now feel that my subdivisions of Control, esp. the one between manipulative and command controls, is not satisfactory for the issues I now discuss. To tell a marketer what he has to 'expect' lies in a dimension different from 'forcing' him to change his action directive. In the first case a new tool is added to the actor's arsenal with the help of which he can better 'control' his environment. Since it is left to him what conclusions to draw from new information, it is not he who is 'controlled'. Conversely, by 'educating' him into an attitude of homeostasis through mobilizing all the agents of "mind shaping", he is made to will something which he originally did not will.

Now however this may be, the latter type of Control is very much part of my scheme, even if I have played it down both in the book and in the P.P.

Jan. 24.

Again summarizing, I have so far these thematic hypotheses: (1) an actual threat of disorder, endangering both 'living' and 'knowing'; (2) imputation of this threat to the historical novelty of emancipation from past external compulsions of natural, social and ideological origin - disorder arises as a consequence of "disoriented freedom". This dis-orientation has itself two roots: inevitable limitations of micro-information under the social and technological conditions of modernity (nota bene: there the 'stage set' changes enter! In a general way they arise from the same phenomena which create 'freedom'-wealth creating technology - but they refer to different 'aspects' of these phenomena: productivity versus immobility), and "arbitrary" choice of AD. This leads then to the third thematic hypothesis: establishment of 'order' is conditional on macro-control in a double sense: widening the range of micro-information and, more critical, streamlining AD's.

What makes these postulates "thematic hypotheses" rather than empirical findings is the 'normative' element implied: what 'degree of disorder' is 'intolerable' - how much 'disorientation' has been added by the new freedom - how much streamlining (and thus suppression of freedom) is to be encouraged? In all three respects I tend toward an extreme position, seeing, as it were, disorder all around - asserting a large qualitative difference between disorientation in the earlier 'state of nature' and the modern state of freedom - advocating, in spite of confessions in favor of 'manipulative' controls, command controls as ever present 'threats'. To put it in psychological terms: I worry about disorder; I distrust spontaneous behavior; I prefer "servitude to well meaning masters" to the risks of micro-autonomy. And speaking of 'knowing' rather than of 'living' I limit the purely "observational" procedure to the random notions of blind natural particles, invoking ^{ordering} "action" as the creator of "knowable" phenomena whenever Man rises above environmental compulsion that approximates him to 'Natural particles'.

Looking now at the character structure, I am trying to relate Eriksen's categories with Abraham's. The table in Eriksen, ¹⁹⁵⁴ p. 136, can help. It is the only place where he relates his 'virtues' to the traditional categories: oral, anal, phallic. And it is interesting that the virtue "will" is related to the anal sphere. Speaking crudely, I can say that, together with Hope, the oral characteristics are underdeveloped with me, whereas the anal features speak for a high development of Will, with sadistic undertones. It is now easy to coordinate the 'sensitivity' to disorder to the weakness of Hope, where as the tendency to "put the world right" by Control flows from a highly developed, if not overdeveloped Will. (remember the story of the Orient Express!). Clearly the two "defects" compensate each other - too little trust, too much will.

Now I should not stop here. "Wanting all my control sadism", the main point in ch. 12 is not simply dreamt up: there is a distrust against the 'planner', and consequently a desire for micro-autonomy, that 'quarter truth' of the Western world. And do not forget my instinctive revulsion against 'conformity', when I myself am concerned - my assent to Paul's statement that we are lucky not having to live under Socialism, and all my instinctive rebellion against the admired conformity in Britain and, conversely, my love for American 'anarchy'. Furthermore the often stated hunch that, deep down, I am an anarchist in human terms who must control himself so as not to go to pieces.

Now what comes to mind in trying to explain this is that the "will phase" was really mastered no better than the hope phase. As the ^{hope} ~~hope~~ ^{phase} ~~phase~~ ^{per} ~~per~~

mastered no better than the 'hope-phase'. As my overdeveloped superego shows, my notion of a market in which purposive controls keep the arbitrary AD's of the members in line, is a replica of my own state, in which an anarchic id is kept in line by a tyrannical superego. Or to restate what I said before: lacking the trust that all will be well in the end - Marschak's trust! - the 'elementary particles' of my being never achieved the spontaneous order that could dispense with compulsion 'from above'. I could, in other words, diagnose Germany so well, because I am a replica of it. Or I have been doing to myself all the time what I propose to do to the market. And quite possibly, as may the case with Camus, my warning against the controllers arises not so much from faith in 'good spontaneity', as from sheer rebellion of my anarchic forces against the 'outrages' of the superego.

If this last interpretation is correct, we have another interesting instance in which 'bad' personal traits prove socially useful: the tax planner is an objective danger, given human propensities, as they are today (before the new clerics are formed!) Thus however wrong my "ultimate motives", they serve a socially useful purpose.

But now I just mentioned my positive solution: the new clergy with their new vows given as the price of "controlling other people's liberty". In a way it is only a pointed form of a generally accepted postulate: only if Man's morals improve can the world be saved. I specify this by realizing that what matters is the morals of an elite. Now what is behind all this in psychological terms? It is a strange mixture between 'idealism' and recognition of the anti-democratic tendencies of the future. I was glad to find in Lorenz a solution, which relates the issue to general "animal" problems (ritual etc.). Such ideas would hardly occur to me spontaneously. In other words, I do not find in my psychological equipment tools which would open up such insights. And probably quite naturally so: we deal there again with 'spontaneous' developments in which Nature - through natural selection - achieves in the individual what socially good. It is quite interesting to see that I am willing to 'learn' such things, but they do not come naturally to me.

Afternoon. I must pursue this idea of the 'clergy' further. Not only is this an undemocratic elite, but its members somehow are "trunketed" personalities, even if by their own will. There is something of the Glasperlenspiel about them - but, as I just ascertained, I must go much further back: to Plato and the Paedagogische Provinz. There is probably a huge literature about this idea, including all the utopias, not least the socialist utopias. Now all this has two basic aspects, a sociological and a psychological one. As to the former, the elite is identified with its 'role'. Instead of playing many roles, as it is regarded as 'normal', of which the 'professional' one is only one to be discarded outside professional activity, these ruling elites are supposed to sacrifice all other roles to that of responsible ruling. And to the extent to which other 'drives' cannot be eliminated, their application is to be subordinated to the dominant role: community of wives and children, common property etc. The aim in this 'emasculatation' of other drives is to prevent 'individualistic' tendencies to develop from these other roles, namely tendencies which might interfere with the exercise of responsible ruling.

Now the psychological roots are a fear of the 'id', that is, again of the anarchic forces

which, it is assumed, the individual is unable to control spontaneously. Therefore institutional 'protection' is required, because of the assumed weakness of the 'rational' forces incl. any 'education' of the 'passions' which would permit these leaders to lead 'normal' lives. All this fits well into the views of Christianity concerning human nature, fearing the appetites of sex, possession, and 'simony'. But what shall one say about this from the ~~which it is assumed, the individual is unable to control spontaneously~~ aspect of Freudian psychology, and the stress on genitality?

Jan. 25.

In a way this problem of the 'clergy' falls outside the issues I am discussing here. Not only have I not mentioned it in OEK - it belongs in the sphere of the Jonas letter. But it also falls in the realm of proposed solutions rather than of the Schau of what is. True, there are probably also 'thematic hypotheses' underlying proposals for solution, and the above discussed mixture of 'distrust' and 'exaggerated superego' fits well in the analysis of this proposal. And again I must ask: does my 'neurosis' see more clearly danger zones in the real world - the unworkability of checks and balances in the new social order and the danger of too much trust in 'rationality' of leaders, not to say, in their morality.

7 But returning to OEK I raise another issue. What does my stress on 'consensus' mean? It drastically reduces the practical choice of economic macro-goals. On the surface it contradicts the central place of 'distrust' and 'exaggerated will'. For this dictatorial compulsion rather than spontaneous consensus seems more appropriate. Of course, one can read in my strict limitation of goals to Stabilization and Balanced Growth a distrust as to the feasibility of further-going 'reforms', e.g. redistribution of wealth and income. I am trying to "play safe", and in this way "weaken" Control in the interest of spontaneous conformity. There is, in other words, an apparent inconsistency in, on the one hand, appealing to Control in the interest of order and, on the other hand, in limiting it in the interest of spontaneity. This has also to do with another inconsistency: in both my Stabilization and Growth analyses I operate with the EXTR.PR. as universal AD. My apologies for this. I do not know how to go about with another AD, and I want to emphasize the EXP aspect. It does not meet the main point. This is that only with EXTR AD will the 'weak' controls described really attain the two macro-goals. Under a homeostasis AD adjustment may be much more difficult. And the real problem is lack of universality of AD. Anyhow what I really mean in Ch. 12 is: given EXTR AD and the expectational controls described in Ch. 11, Stabilization and Balanced Growth can be achieved without further limitation of individual spontaneity. Why is this so important to me?

The answer is: I am afraid of the 'disorder' which stronger controls may provoke, not to speak of revolution. In other words, there is not only distrust in automatic working of an uncontrolled society, but also in the effects of "excessive" control. And I am willing to sacrifice a good deal of 'justice' to this risk.

What I have never realized before but what is very important, this skepticism extends not only to the 'practical' aspect but also to the theoretical. If revolutionary action is unlikely to establish order, the states and processes so initiated cannot be subjected to 'theory'. Therefore I must modify my most fundamental principle: no knowledge without action, by saying: no knowledge without "consensus-strengthening" and thus order promoting action. In other words, consensus now becomes another condition for social knowledge: unless affirmation of the particles can be achieved they will behave in a disorderly manner.

and thus make the research object 'unknowable'. This result is quite in line with general experience - one cannot generalize about the course of revolutions. On the other hand it introduces another uncertainty: there are no general 'rules' as to what destroys consensus - British Reform Bill or post 1945 British Welfare State - what privileges a ruling stratum is will to fight for etc. Thus the reservation: only such controls will achieve their goal of order and thus of an analyzable research object as will not destroy consensus, is true but of a Pythian nature. By raising micro-autonomy "to the rank of a genuine goal" (OEK, 318) I really raise "consensus" to such a goal, understood as the will of the large majority, assuming that this will can be mobilized for one of two alternatives, or even for one among many. What will strengthen or violate this 'coordination' of wills remains an open question to be tested only by practice. It is there that my 'timidity' comes into the open, namely my distrust of wilfulness and conservatism as dominant features in human motivation. At this point my absence of hope is stronger than my presence of "will" - the fear of basic disorder arising from human freedom is not overcome by the availability of control generally - even the choice of controls must take into account this underlying negative potentiality, which ultimately frustrates 'excessive' contrivances of order.

Now again, "wrong" as all this may be as a psychological make-up, it may well point up important 'reality' phenomena. There is a danger of 'reaction' to excessive controls which will frustrate the aim of these controls. And even if they succeed in totalitarian revolutions, the victory may be temporary only. More important, while the victory lasts the 'particles' are thrown back into a 'subhuman' state - Russia during the 30s; China now - a fundamental dilemma, to say the least. Lenin and Mao may have been 'necessary' for the final 'liberation', but not to include their case in the 'generalizations' of economic 'ordering', but to treat them as marginal cases inaccessible to theorizing, may be a correct procedure.

I have just reread Holton and also Eric Weil in the Daedalus volume. This offers the following idea. I say that knowledge requires 'ordering action'. But the choice of such action is goal-oriented. So I must choose my goal first, which implies a 'value' judgment or a bestowal of meaning to one goal over others. This 'meaning' necessarily attaches via goal to the 'ordering actions' and thus to the resulting structure of the research object. In a word, 'meaning' and 'fact' are no longer separable. What meaning has then 'objective truth'? Such truth is possible only if truth can be discovered in the 'meaning' of the chosen goal, that is, if there are objective criteria for values. Besides this there remains, of course, the 'instrumental' truth, namely the objective statement that a given action is a suitable means for a chosen end. But why this action and not another one can be justified only to the extent to which the goal is justified. What has all this to do with Polanyi's 'personal' component in knowledge?

Febr. 4

The long interval was spent partly on Polanyi, partly on frustration. First P. Much too late I realized that he is, of course, the man for Heuristics! Though, if one looks carefully, he has no more to say than I knew beforehand. But the assertion that the difference between Science and Art or Religion is, at best, one of degree, as far as

the 'objectivity' of the propositions, verifications and validations is concerned, is along the lines here explored. But he does not try to unveil the underlying thematic hypotheses - it all boils down to the ever repeated assertion of 'personal commitment'. Very often one does not know whether he describes psychological phenomena, or speaks of substance. Thus the actual return was meager, and I am slipping progressively into a state in which I do not know any more what I am doing, or should do. It is a nadir in the more than two years of struggle to find myself a topic. With the belated insight into the failure of the Jonas letter more than just the attempt has gone out of the window. These sheets bear witness to my attempt to fall back of more 'objective' issues, studied under a 'non-existential' aspect. I suspect that this wavering between the 'detached' study and the 'committed' confession indicates more than just a temporary frustration. It is itself a fundamental problem, and I simply do not know where to turn between these alternatives. The writing of the P.P. has amply shown that on the level of "scientific objectivity" something 'flows', whereas all existential profession is blocked at the moment. These Notes here show this unambiguously. They are anything but a 'diary': they are just notes, as I write them down over the years. They may contain valuable 'material' worth preserving - but 'material' for what? It might be useful to pursue the idea of my own 'thematic hypotheses' in connection with the philosophical papers for the Conferences. This would then supplement 'objective' analysis by carrying it through to the 'foundations'. But to that extent these Notes belong to the 'past', filling out a gap. They do not contribute to the future - I am at the moment an author on the search for a topic.

What also frightens me is a feeling that all I have said and have to say is somehow trivial. I thought, when I wrote those 6 challenging pages in K.L. after my return from Santa Fe, that I had found an Archimedean point - a 'platform' sufficiently distant to allow me to survey all the essentials of the present situation. I do not believe this any more, and am really again on the search for just such a platform. At the same time I wrote a few days ago that my inner feelings are those of a man who thinks that he has the decisive word 'on his tongue'. How to go about to 'remember'? going on with the search? Emptying my mind? Just waiting?

Febr. 6.

I just reread what I wrote about "elements of my permanent make-up", which I noted down on the very first day when I started these Notes in 51. There is much that coincides with what I dealt with here, but also a few useful new hints: insecurity and protest against the prevailing order coupled with demand for 'justice', but tempered by 'conservatism' - fear of my personal future coupled with 'Pelagian' hopes. In other words, the existing "order", even if acknowledged as such intellectually, is attacked morally, and my own "present state" is seen as precarious, while an 'ideal future' is imagined. There is little doubt that I have got hold of something valid when I relate these personal traits to my objective vision. And were I to write an autobiography, this relationship would be interesting. But considering my aim - what is this anyhow? - what can I use this for? I must be clear that the topic: thematic hypotheses, interesting in itself, and possibly a challenge for that meeting at Nanda's in March, is no topic for me to write a book about. It might come in handy at some point - but that very 'point' is at issue.

Where do I stand - what do I want to say, or to speak about? What do I have to say that has not been said many times, and probably better? True, other people also have the chuzpah to burden the world with their mediocre visions - Huxley is a case in point. But I have my standards of excellence which I must meet, whatever others may think. I did meet these standards with OEK, whatever legitimate critique may be put forth against it. It says something that had not been said before, certainly not in that manner, and something which I think worth saying even after the lapse of almost three years since the completion of the manuscript.

Compared with this, how can I defend the Jonas letter? Reading Polanyi has somehow taken the wind out of the 'intuitive' sections. Moreover, whereas OEK may need modifications and supplementations, it is a whole. Not so the Letter which, as has become clear, reflects a passing 'mood' in which certain issues overshadowed all the rest. Not only is it at best 'half the truth', but the other half is somehow in conflict with what I said there. This may even be true of the 'intuitive' parts, which after all had a polemical - anti-theological - intent. Do they not reflect the contrary, namely an ontology, even if I - rightly - refuse to go beyond the "experience"? To put it bluntly: what I am hinting at there, is this not what others call the 'divine'? My polemics against the narrow 'activism' of Hamilton - soon to be tested in a personal talk - is it not also an implicit recognition of "something more"? And was Jonas not right in being embarrassed - an embarrassment which has not been overcome to this day.

At the same time, because of these sections, the Letter is an advance beyond the Bloch piece. And it also implicitly formulates my position vis-a-vis Bloch more clearly than the earlier piece did: we both in different ways interpret the 'divine' in immanent terms - Bloch in a linear perspective, Pelagian, historical, in other words, Hegelian and Marxist - I myself in a strange 'vertical' manner as a Kingdom which is really 'at hand', to enter which 'grace' must operate, though not the theological grace. All the less so, since contrary to Bloch I do not postulate a 'happy end'. Not even Optimismus mit Trauerflor, which acknowledges the possibility of failure, but not the 'certainty' as I do in historical perspective. What nevertheless separates me from Tillich is the belief in 'relative' improvement or defeat of avoidable evil - a 'semi-utopian' attitude. And above all, the severance of whatever 'serenity' and the 'good' may point to, from traditional religion and certainly from Christianity. It may well be that the polemical interpretations of his theological opponents - as Pantheism ect - fit much better in to my frame of reference, though I would always shy away from the word.

Thus my position is a complex one after all, resting somewhere in between Tillich - Bloch - Hamilton - the 'Moderns'. Is it worthwhile to clarify this further? Is this, in other words, a position which I would like to 'propagate'? Is it one with which 'MaN' can live? Do I live with it, or am I deceiving myself again by taking another part for a whole?

Febr. 11

I have reread the last part of Polanyi. Though it gets more mystical by the page and, in line with this, more dogmatic, there are a few indications of importance. Like myself he related all criteria "for achievement" in the biological field to decis-

ions made by the observer (p. 342). But much more important is the postulate (380 ff) that 'values' are ultimately not a problem of 'contemplation', but of 'acting'. And this is meant in the radical sense that only by "committing" oneself - not by "observing" - can we know what a value is, and what the 'right' value is. Of course, as a consequence, all our specific 'acting' is dependent on values thus chosen by commitment, which includes the 'activity' of thought incl. science. This, however, is nothing new to me. What is new, and needs deliberation, is the more fundamental attempt at overcoming the value relativism, not on the contemplative level, but by an action. This somehow comes near to the Marxian position - quite different from the role action plays in ORK as a means, not of "opening one's eyes", but of establishing a world which can be 'seen', that is, be understood, interpreted etc. in general terms, or reduced to more elementary principles. Obviously there is a parallel to the theological 'circle': only 'believing' means 'seeing'. Believing there is an act, in the same sense as P.'s commitment.

But - is one free to 'believe' or to 'commit' oneself? It is there where P., in spite of all his protestations, falls back into the 'subjective' sphere. There Christianity sees more deeply, as does Marx: in the latter case it is the 'interests' (incl. the unconscious motives of the non-proletarian sympathizers - take my own 'reduction' of my thematic hypotheses to my 'neuroses' etc.) In the former case it is 'grace' that presents me with 'faith'. Whatever the truth of the content of these two answers, they point to a deeper level where 'commitments' are made or 'given' - with P. it looks as if they were a case of 'personal' decision. And all the sophistry concerning the difference between "personal" and "subjective" do not bridge that gap. The 'universal intent' with the help of which the 'personal' is defined, does not help explaining how one gets there. When I fell back on 'compulsion neurosis' in that famous talk in Frankfurt, I may have talked nonsense substantively, but I was barking up the right tree, as far as the problem of the 'source', the 'origin' or the driving 'force' was concerned.

Afternoon.

Another letter from Hamilton, accompanied by a review of Norman Brown's newest book. I wonder what will come of that meeting with him on March 30. But to continue from this morning, my Jonas Letter has, or implies, another solution to the problem of how to 'discover' values, or what is 'right'. There is is acts of 'contemplation' which 'open the eyes': my two kinds of 'illumination' - the aesthetic and the moral one. And in each case it is "psychological evidence" or the 'self confidence of reason', that places the seal on the 'vision'. If there remains a 'risk', P. also acknowledges this risk, up to the last page (404): "the emergent noosphere is wholly determined as that which we believe to be true and right ---- it comprises everything in which we may be totally mistaken".

Thus it was a mistake to present matters in the Jonas Letter, as if the conjuration, that is, the call to 'action', were totally independent of the two types of 'intuition'. It is not true that 'Im Anfang war die Tat' - rather the Tat must orient itself in line with the insights gained and held to be true.

What then is the meaning of the contemporary emancipation? It offers for the first time the opportunity to act in accord with the aesthetic and moral intuitions - an opportunity, not an assurance. Only if the self-set rules in 'handling' nature, other men, and the insights gained by intuition, are superior to the tyranny of nature, man and God

will the opportunities created through emancipation mature^{ms} in 'freedom' rather than in anarchy. This raises anew the question: what is freedom? But even more urgent is the other question: is the universe really 'meaningless'? Must I go that far in my protest against the 'mother'? Is a world in which I can have the Figaro experience really 'meaningless'? Of course, it is a healthy counter force that I am just reading again Malraux. There all the negativities show up without disguise. But remember, this is all 'evil' in the traditional sense - how can I maintain my fundamental condemnation of 'indifference' if the 'indifferent universe' turns out to be not entirely negative?

Febr. 16.

The above is a fundamental challenge to my fundamentals. Is it a sign of strength or of weakness that I question again what should be firm? More important is a precise formulation of the issue.

Does my attitude to the 'universe' not reflect the same attitude I have toward the economic process? The latter is "chaotic", and therefore 'bad', but it can be "made good". In the same sense the universe is indifferent and thus 'bad', namely "irresponsible", but Man can improve on it within his sphere - I call this in Jonas Letter the process of 'humanization'. At this point my hiatus between the human and the subhuman world finds some justification. Whatever may be true of the 'transitional' nature of every stage of evolution from the stone to Man - "responsibility" arises - "emerges" - on the human level only I will have to tune down the radical hiatus which I stated in the J.L. between the human and the subhuman levels of animate nature. But there simply is no "freedom" in the subhuman sphere, sufficiently wide to allow for genuine moral choice. There are the fuzzy borderlines of ELSA etc, but basically freedom 'emerges' on the human level.

March 20

After six weeks of complete frustration - partly fostered by Bea's illness - a thought has emerged today. I was rereading these Diary Notes with an eye to the Nanda meeting tonight - a mere ritual as I said to Jonas. But still I want to state my position in accord with Holton, who is supposed to be there too.

I was surprised to find a number of interesting ideas. But the "brainwave" occurred when I read on sheet 5, 2 bottom about the significance which this pursuit of the subjective roots of my thinking have on the formulation of theory, and of a theory which may well have considerable objective validity. What about writing an intellectual autobiography after all?

The reason why I refrained from this - since 1951 - was the emphasis on "biography", that is, the personal aspect pure and simple, the questionable nature of which became so clear again when I read Arnold Brecht. But could the emphasis not be on "intellectual"? Could not the personal aspect serve the enlightenment of objective issues?

The Preface to OEK contains a sketch of a purely "objective" course of mental development, though confined of course to Economics. The Price of Liberty, which follows related lines - as is stated in these Notes - is disregarded, as is the book on the Universities my concern with the Jewish problem, the Bloch piece, and perhaps other "extra-curricular" products, which I fail to identify at the moment. Anyhow, OEK would be in the center, and

the first problem would be to identify the "thematic hypotheses" and perhaps to relate them to other work. This might give me a chance of elaborating on such hypotheses generally, along the lines of Holton. All this would remain in the "objective" sphere. The question then comes: what are the subjective roots, and I cannot in abstracto determine how "indiscrete" I would have to be. Somewhere the transition would have to be found to the "metaphysical" problems, as indicated in the Jonas Letter. And there is no reason why I should not take up the issues which stood in the center of the "search" for the last 2 1/2 years: interpretation of the "meaning of the 20th century" - my "utopia" - the ambiguity of the meaning of freedom etc.

I must be careful: in the emotional atmosphere of the 'discovery' I am likely to minimize the difficulties or even insuperabilities. But at the moment it appears that this would take from ^{me} two burdens: (1) the excessive subjectivity of a purely existential confession and (2) the obligation to be elaborate in the discussion of the objective, esp. the political-metaphysical problems. Perhaps the "light touch" for which I have been searching all these years could be realized, without falling into the trap of an existential outburst along the lines of the Jonas Letter.

To gain perspective, I would have to try an outline. Obviously no outline conceived earlier is of any help. Even the outline would have to be the product of a happy mixture of "controlled free association". It would be an Essay after all - no serious of letters nor a diary, no Pascalian Thoughts nor a Dialogue. But the implicit "confessional" character might help to keep the style fluid. Though the umbilical cord to the personal would be more obvious than in all prior attempts, the major topics would be objective. And the relating ~~for~~ of the "objective" to the "subjective" would be an original attempt.

The immediate problem is: when to start? I spent the last two weeks on collecting material for a Schuetz paper. Should I continue with this, and leave the elaboration of this idea to the vacation? There may be merit in letting the idea sink in, and see whether the steam will go out after some lapse of time. And it may even be that the Schuetz paper might clarify some objective problems, which are relevant for the bigger issue.

August 28, 67. K.L. Just a brief note of another brainwave. I reread yesterday the Jonas letter, and found it to my great surprise much better than I had remembered. Not that it is in any way ripe for publication, or even could be used as a first draft. But it contains a number of interesting ideas, worth further elaboration. (see also sheets 38-9 in my regular diary notes). Now again the question is: what form. And I am ~~now~~ now moving away from all artificial tricks in the direction of straightforward essay writing. Only with one big difference, and this is the brain wave to be explored: no longer do I think that it should be a "systematic" piece, driving home a special point, such as the prediction, affirmation and reservation with regard to the wave of the future. Rather, and this leads back to 65, Montaigne now appears to me as a useful model. In other words the "whole" might be a collection of smaller essays, dealing with quite different issues: all of them related to me past experience and thinking. In other words, it would be indeed an "intellectual autobiography", but without any chronological pretenses, and without any systematic sequence. My experiences in the political realm, in education, in scientific work plus methodology, its relations to my personal life, to my human relations, esp. the problem of friendship in our time, and what ~~more~~ in this context human relations, in this context the Jonas letter could fit in as an excursion into "philosophy" or what this ~~is~~ present. Let me mull this over.

August 31.67. These are strange days. After weeks of running away from anything below the meereest surface, the rereading of the Jonas Letter has reopened the 'depths'. But they really look like the region of the "id" - utterly confused, contradictory, so far unmanageable. The subjective tonus that accompanies that exploration is not gayer or more affirmative than the malaise of the preceding weeks, but I prefer it yet. If I try to give all this a 'direction' - maybe a dangerous and even murderous undertaking - it concerns a new line which the struggle with existentialist ideas - Bloch piece; Atlas; Jonas Letter - might take. There is a good deal about the psychological background of all this in my private Notes, sheets 39-41. Here I am trying to draw from this "objective" conclusions, with a hope that a new "work program" might emerge. Even if most of the coming year will be filled with "chores" of one kind or other, it seems to be almost a question of intellectual life or death that there is something else, however remote as a topical preoccupation, which gives "meaning" to my being around still. The difficulties with which I have been struggling now for the better part of three years, relate to the fact that I know full well what this X is not to be, but the notion of what it is to be changes continually. It is not to be one of two "marginal" enterprises. Neither a "detached" - "scientific" - study nor a purely personal autobiography. But it is to contain elements of both of these extremes. In "tone" even if not necessarily in substance, the Bloch piece went too far in the "personal" direction. The "Equality" probings of 64, and most of the "outlines" sketched after I thought I had solved the issue in Santa Fe, went too far in the other directions. In some way the Jonas letter came nearest to what seems to be a balance, though it too retains one feature of the "objective" extreme that will have to be overcome. This is the "preaching" quality, or the "didactic" eros, trying to "solve" a problem and summon the World to accept it. What makes the Jonas Letter appear "onesided" today and not really "true", namely reflecting what I "really" mean, has to do with this didactics. I might formulate the "theme" in this way: while acknowledging difficulties and even worse, I want to elicit an affirmative attitude toward the "trend": technology / large-scale organization - increasing planning on all levels. True, I have acknowledged the problem of who is to plan the planners, and have even placed it in the center of some of my later outlines. But in doing so, I have not only taken for granted that we should ride the wave of the future, but I have committed myself to an increasingly "speculative" emogasis. After all, what else than wild speculation is all this business of a new clergy etc. and though this arose from one of my "good" characteristics, namely of not being satisfied with "critique" alone - opposite: Horkheimer and Co., including Marcuse - it somehow does not participate in that "life blood" testimony, which otherwise this presentation is supposed to be - unless I do what I tried on some earlier sheets of these Notes, namely to relate all this to my private make-up, a doubtful and ultimately not very interesting undertaking, when seen from the "public" point of view. I cannot say that it was these notions, instinctively felt, that blocked the continuation of these Notes during the first half of this year. But they are certainly good reasons. Now there came that "brainwave" of a few days ago, indicated at the bottom of sheet 7, 2.

Now the main idea there was to take the "didactic sting" out of the whole, by transforming it into a sort of intellectual autobiography, with emphasis not on the "course of my life" or any other sort of narrative, but on certain "problems" or areas of experience, such as politics, education etc, namely areas which have been central in my life. incl. philosophy and metaphysics. My first reaction, after a few hours elation because something seemed to be feasible after all, was one of "resignation", most clearly expressed in my private Notes. But perhaps this is again "extremism". Perhaps it is possible to retain a "direction", e.g. by placing the several sections of such a "confession" in the service of enlightening the "burning" issues of the age - all the issues which formerly were supposed to be handled didactically. I do not at this moment see clearly what the 'form' would be of this "synthesis", but it should not, in principle, be impossible. What matters is to find a way which retains the "objective" slant without committing me "to save the world". I suppose that in such a presentation many problems could be left unsolved, even if they were shown up with emphasis. In other words, wisdom would have to be the outstanding trait of such a piece, not a "call to action".

The greatest difficulty I foresee at this juncture is: how to achieve unity and brevity? As such the enterprise looks forbiddingly comprehensive, even if I am not obligated to carry each part to its 'systematic' conclusion. There is, in other words, a problem of "selection", made difficult because it is no longer a question of building up a systematic argument, as the outline of Santa Fe had intended. I suppose that much more mulling over will have to go into this, before something tangible arises. Perhaps not so bad in a situation in which only leisure hours can be devoted to this anyhow. Whatever the outcome may be, at this moment I am certainly back in the button maker's spones -

Jan. 29, 68. In the midst of the preparations for symposium I another brain wave, stimulated by reading Mitscherlich. What irks me in the Jonas letter is the feeling that I lived there far beyond my capital. I have made much too many dogmatic statements, esp. as far as morality is concerned. My general attitude is much too "positive", as far as the future of emancipation is concerned and, above all, as far as the absolute values are concerned. Not for nothing do I have the perverse feeling that I might well argue on the other side - I could and - I should! In other words, should I ever return to this enterprise, would I not be much more truthful, and would it not also be much more valuable, if I were to expose my "dialectical" position in most of these matters. In the end the balance may well turn into one direction - at the moment I honestly do not know in what direction. But this should be the result of many detailed examinations of concrete issues, not imposed by some abstract reasoning. Of course, my concern with the problem of Suzanne Langer shows my "longing for absolutes". But I only need be confronted with a book like the posthumous Tillich, to be in rebellion against that "search for absolutes". Just if I want to "exhibit" myself, as I really am, this dialectics is indispensable. And once more - it may be objectively more valuable in an age of extremes - where "progress" and "reaction" fight each other. I may have travelled a long way since Sils in 64, and it may mean a retreat from positions of Bloch, Jonas, not to say Tillich or Riezler. Be it - I cannot suppress real sympathy for Mitscherlich.

March 29, 68. Obviously the days preceding a Symposium are "critical" - again I must report a "brainwave". And paradoxically - it is the very opposite of the one noted on the preceding page. It came when I wrote a letter to Bloch, introducing the German text of ~~CEK~~. On that occasion it became clear to me as never before that the book is an academic tract - anemic, scholastic, overburdened with methodology. But there is a substantive position implied, which comes out in my critique of not only the "traditional" approach, but also Marx. In a word, POLITICAL ECONOMICS demonstrates not only a research technique, but a "way of life". As I put it to Bloch today, one can base on it a theory of "utopian socialism" - utopian because the "law of development" is denied - socialism, because more than meets the eye considering my stress on decentralization, it is a theory of "mixed systems". But this means more than a detached study of an autonomous phenomenon - the "mix" is willed and planned, and in principle there are no limits to such planning. But the anti-Marxian strain shows in the belief, and the appeal, to "reason" on every level - remember the last paragraph in Bob's review.

What follows? Can I rewrite the essence of the book in such terms? It is impossible to say at the moment what I can use of the old text, and what has to be added. More important perhaps, there may be many thoughts in these Notes since Sils, which might find a place in such a draft. Of course, and this is difference from what I was groping for during the last year, or even since the Jonas letter - the biographical aspect would recede, and would at most "shine through" as the "temperament through which such a Weltbild is shown. Anyhow this is a much more adequate way of revealing myself.

I took a first look into Galbraith, and it is obvious that I must read the book. Even if all my instincts rebel against him, he has something to say to my problems. It might also be necessary to look into the original utopians. Anyhow I put aside Moldenhauer, Lorenz v. Stein, and I will have to look in the library for other sources. Besides Veblen, whose "engineers" fall in the category of the "leaders" a la Bob and Galbraith. I suspect that all this is anticipated in St. Simon.

Now, of course, if anything is to come of this, the "utopian" strain must be emphasized much more strongly than in the book. The conclusion of my Marx lecture - I refer to my course - gives an indication what this amounts to. And there will be the rub: even if I could recommend my scheme as a preliminary solution - possible today because of our knowledge of the New Economics, and the presence of "key positions" unknown to older Utopians, I could not pose as an "optimist". This will be the touchstone: whether I succeed in amalgamating what I have to say on the positive side, with my skepticism otherwise. In a word, how to synthesize POL EC with Atlas? It goes well, the "Promethean" aspect of Atlas. But I cannot accept the Boch hybris - well, this position will have to be elaborated. But it might indeed be that there lies the long sought for Archimedean point. And as far as publishing is concerned, I probably can persuade Nanda to take it into the studies on Humanism, forgetting about CREDO.

Now I am writing all this in the "heat" of the original conception, and I shall have to see what this looks like in the cold light of critical evaluation. Would it not be nice if I could in this manner connect the stages of my work over the last 20 years? Even the symposia would gain some meaning!

April 1. All is over, and it looks as if my feelings were quite different this time - much more positive. Of course, it is too early - last time the bad reaction came only after a few days. The trouble with Morgenbesser was a minor annoyance, as was the repeated experience with Neisser. But more may come. Objectively there is no doubt, that both sessions were much better this time. There simply was not that kind of defense of fixed position. And the response of Nagel showed that even in this realm understanding is possible. Of the other speakers I had the best impressions of Wartoffsky. Looking through my notes, I recognize that not much useful was said otherwise. And yet at least the topics discussed were worth while. Unfortunately the discourse with Jonas did not go well. The reasons for this lie deep * I fear that not much can be done, because in his own way he is 'fixed'. But it is ultimately the fixation of the Old Testament.

However, in the mean time bigger even have happened - the President's speech last night. For the record this is my guess: (1) North Vietnam will decline. (2) this will shoot our "peace candidates" to pieces (3) The war will not only go on, but with popular request will be escalated (4) for this a "war president" is required - Johnson will be drafted. I don't think that Humphrey will take over. Apparently he is only halfheartedly for the war, and anyhow he has no public image. If I am right, we are heading for just those bad times I have feared all through. I will see in the end my demand for direct controls accepted - Heaven knows what kind of war and against whom this will be then. In addition the growing tension in the Near East - it could not look worse.

Now on this background I turn back to my "brainwave". It has received support in the mean time from two sides. First, the idea of the students to hold another symposium in the fall on the political aspects of OERK - it is grotesque that not a single word was uttered about this in the Conference - it shows what guys our political scientists are. I am happy about this plan. It will strengthen my contact with the right kind of students. And it will ~~compel~~ compel me during the summer to, ponder the very issues that would have to be dealt with in another book.

The second push came from my Talk with Kecske yesterday. It has deepened my insight into the very two problems which I regard as ultimate unsolved; There is, first, the problem of "social causation", and secondly the ~~the~~ fact that the situation for which my argument is built up is, in a way, no less marginal than classical capitalism. The two issues are strangely connected. Taking a methodological start, it has been clear to me for a long time that I must have some answer to the social causation problem, if my transition from instrumental insight to action is possible. with this I touch my beloved innovation of knowledge being inseparable from action. This now needs specification. Obviously if there is no "knowledge" of some however loose kind in the field of social causation, action cannot occur and the link with knowledge cannot be established. So it all boils down to the fact that, in our marginal situation, earlier conditions of theoretical knowledge have disappeared - what in another context (Notes for 2nd Symposium) I called the pressures of Nature and Tradition. This placed Control in the center. but I must not say that the old pressures or ties have disappeared completely, and not only because this is factually not so. But if they had really disappeared there would be no more social causation. what happened is that the factors making for regular behavior patterns have loosened in certain fields, while persisting at least to some extent in

others, how this 'breakdown' is distributed among the various realms of action, is a most important subject for further study.

At the moment I say tentatively: in the narrow field of economic choices the breakdown is far reaching - so far that we cannot generalize on any autonomous patterns. On the other hand, the response to "controls", though by no means strict and therefore also not usable as a simple major premise, functions to some extent. This is what makes POL. EC. possible - within the limits often stated.

and it is important to realize that here the goal problem enters. It is the breakdown of tacitly accepted macro-goal - based on religion or fighting faiths like enlightenment, early communism etc. - which has loosened the ties - apart from the issue of affluence which I rightly stress. Of course, the drive for accumulation should be included in those "faiths", and for good reasons. In other words, the diagnosis of our time must be carried far beyond what I did in OEK. It must include the whole nexus of social patternization, and its partial dissolution, with precise location of the "weak" and the remaining "strong" spots. All this will include the discussion of our contemporary "revolutions" - from the real revolutions in the East to the "revolution of expectations" to the hippies, that is, the exit from society. And, of course, the healing forces, if any. But it is essential that the thesis of the unity of knowledge and action must be limited to marginal situations like ours, and cannot serve as a general principle of social analysis.

All this shows how important it is to move down "into the arena" of real social issues, from my present lofty position of methodological abstraction. In a word, the case analyzed in OEK, will reveal itself as another "special case" for which the general rule must still be established. This is case the "opposite limit" to early capitalism - the hungry rat is replaced by the "desocialized man" in its many variations: complete privatization - mass consumption - hippy. Thus the social order must be imposed - in a way a strange parallel to Germany, as I describe it in the Price of Liberty.

Finally, this time the "vindication of goals" cannot be avoided. The problem there is: where to take any, even provisional, standards, once "faiths" in the above sense has broken down? Perhaps even Bloch's new book - my book - will help here. Kecske indicated that "society" in an unspecified sense can be the source of a substitute faith - well, all this will have to be discussed.

How to proceed? It may be too early to play around with outlines - I almost certainly have not yet collected all the essential issues. So I had better go on in this manner, namely in "applied Heuristics".

April 7. For once my pessimism has proved wrong: the Vietnamese will negotiate, in spite of the strange provocations of our Air Force. But in the mean time the tragedy with Martin Luther King occurred, and no one knows as yet what the consequences will be. I am strongly reminded of the murder of Rathenau. It is not even clear whether we can go to Washington, as has been planned for so long.

For the rest my brain does not work. As a general "mood" my brainwave is still very much alive, but my hope that I might continue my Heuristics today, is not fulfilled. Altogether my mood is not bad - so far no repetition of the depression after the first symposium. I think I know what ultimately caused it then.

April 9. An interesting review by Lichtheim on some recent Marxist writings (New York Review). It brings home to me that I cannot escape a discussion of the Materialist Conception of History in relation to the Thought-Action problem. Nor can I escape the discussion of "idealism" as the basis of Goal formation. There is an interesting relationship between Max Weber and Kant in relation to values. Probably I must reread both the Critique of Practical Reason and of Judgment.

For the rest I will soon have to form an idea which thoughts of OEK are to be taken over and perhaps be elaborated. In that respect my three talks at the Symposia may help - after all, they discussed some of the "underlying" issues: besides the "ontological" value issue in Jonas the Wartofsky-Morgenbesser issue of whether there is still a "super-duper theory" - perhaps the problem of Heuristics (but I am not sure) - the Murray problem of last summer: there is a magnificent dynamics from Technology to Affluence to loosening of Beh. Patterns to threat to Affluence - another dynamics, already indicated in Marx: self-organization of Capitalism in the form of building of Command Positions - obviously also the issue of "social causation". Among the economic issues: the problem of "disorder", logically and historically (in this respect correction seems necessary: it is not really true that traditional Economics is simply a limiting case of Political Economics. This is true only to the extent to which "order" is conceived as predicability only. If it is taken in the wider sense of "livability", the laissez-faire situation was not "orderly". This thought was stimulated by Keeske.) - Logic of I.A. relative to other decision models? - my "conservatism" in relation to my striving for conformity relative to goals, but at the same time my method is independent of this.

I had better go once more over my P.P. Furthermore reading of the proofs might help too.

But it is quite clear that the major problem is the Archimedean point - where to start from - where to drive to? There the overall "diagnosis of our time" - end of Ch. 5 and also Lucacs Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein may help: the end of "natural selection". Another issue will be the "temper" in which this is to be written. At the moment I am "activistic" - beyond the skeptical mood which seized me last summer. More in line with the Jonas letter, though less "existentialistic" or "confessional".

I suppose that I must also review all the notes written since Sils. There are most likely certain ideas stated which will fit here. Of course I must face the fact that I cannot play around with this for another five years - not to say: 14 years if I count from 1950 on. If the students bring the Symposium off, it will be a great help, at least in raising the pertinent questions.

→ I did - actually from 1968 to 1980

April 29. In the mean time a slight shift of emphasis has taken place, namely toward the "year 2000". I have just ordered the respective issue of Daedalus. In a way it is a reaction against Jonas' paper with its strong Aristotelian tendencies over against the "openness of the future". My first concern should be to ascertain those trends which seems unalterable: population increase - progress in industrialization etc. It might be very useful to distinguish possibilities - biological, psychological etc. - from what seems inescapable.

The general problem is to hold the proper middle line between being tough and being soft. In this respect I am back at an issue which preoccupied me in Santa Fe. This relates to the issues discussed earlier here via type of "Goals". In a way it will be a "substantive" reply to Joans, to whom I conceded too much the other day. Altogether my feeling grows that the book was not only "timid" and over-formalistic, but also much too narrow in range. In a way it relates to what I should do, as Galbraith Affluent Society relates to ~~the~~ later book. On the other hand, I must be careful to keep it "snappy" - I cannot embark on another year long project.

I expect that the Daedalus issue saves me the reading of the entire literature about the "future". In a way the most immediate issue to be tackled concerns the restructuring of the governmental process. In a negative way, Kaysen's paper becomes ever more important, and I might say a little more in reply to it if we should ever get to a publication of those papers.

~~Jan 28 In what shall I relate my "vision"? I think to make a "personal equation. What about "ideology"? Is this one component of the personal equation, and thus a "step further below"? It would then at a level "parallel" with the Freud-schen aspects. Bob nowadays - but already in the Human Prospect - operated at this level - does this offer useful insights for me?~~

(6) this now finally raises the problem of the 'structural impediments' to proper self-affirmation

*No! a
Christian
slip!*

1. there is what I can call the 'existential' block: being aware of our failures concerning our neighbor, we cannot be just to ourselves - is this true? A new insight opens: we cannot 'like' ourselves, but we can well affirm ourselves in the sense that we regard ourselves as worthy of improvement, and 'say so', that is, summon good intentions. But in this manner the acceptance of the imperative becomes itself a means to better self-affirmation, which in turn is said to be a condition for acceptance of the imperative. I ~~can~~ now think that this is wrong, based on the wrong idea that we should like ourselves.

Before continuing another idea just came up: perhaps the "as yourself" refers to the Golden Rule: give justice as you expect to be given. It would then not refer to the 'domestic policy' of the Self, but to its foreign policy, and establish reciprocity. This 'sober' interpretation fits well into the spirit of the Old Testament - but what about the New?

I have so far been interested in my former 'domestic' interpretation because of the Simmel problem and the positive feedbacks of good or bad action. Now these feedbacks have actually nothing to do with my attitude to myself, loving or hating, but with its objective structure. Obeying the Command makes me into a person who, next time, can obey even better, and conversely. The 'converse' is especially important because it sets limits to obedience, together with the "non-existential" blocks: personal and social. Anyhow I seem to be able to discuss this important aspect without committing myself to a psychological theory which establishes proportionality between Selbst- und Fremdliebe.

(7) there is still the issue, hinted at earlier, whether the Imperative is always 'concrete', telling me what to do to be just in the given situation, or whether it also contains a general command to 'make itself supergluous'. I think that this problem falls away with my insight that, the agapedic state cannot be willed or made, other than through the parallel, of the faithless prayer. In other words, there is no other way of "promoting" the state of Neigung than according to the command.

e) I have said nothing about EVIL. More and more I think that the passages on sheet 2 of the draft should be moved to the discussion on GOOD etc. - there is a way of leaving there the passages about the dualistic split, but the issue is cardinal because of my defining the task of the conjuration as fight against a.e. By specifying this fight as Emancipation for our age, I seem to be in line with what I define as GOOD: identification. Then EVIL is everything obstructing this. Now in this connection the problem of my two kinds of evil becomes central. Why is negation of GOOD, that is, 'active' EVIL less bad than indifference? I think that I have got something there, but it is not 'argued' out. Ivan and Dmitry are good symbols, but for what? The analogy with Nature and second Law is fine. But what I have to prove is, either there is no fundamental Beeses - no Jago or Ilse Koch - or they

I will certainly have to discuss the meaning of 'as yourself'. Perhaps I should offer both interpretations: need for self-affirmation and simply Golden Rule, that is both the domestic and the foreign policy. I might start out with the Golden Rule as the commonsense interpretation. But the self-affirmation issue should come up because of the Simmel problem and what I call the 'structural limitations' to just action and just states in a given historical moment.

Generally I feel that this business of the 'inner split' is not fully thought thru. There was in 'ils a confusion between 'self-agape' and 'self-justice'. I have now decided to interpret the biblical command as referring to Justice - so that reference to 'as yourself' must also refer to justice, that is "self-affirmation according to one's deeds toward the others". To the extent to which I am just in my 'foreign policy', I may affirm myself 'domestically'. But it is quite another problem in what manner just foreign behavior affects my 'structure' and, conversely. In saying so I postulate an influence of my deed on my being. I said before that in every just act my vital forces are engaged in a twofold manner: they supply the 'fuel' - energy for the just act, but by put to that use they are themselves 'tamed' (which I rightly denied for the non-human cosmic forces). What does that mean? 'Civilizing my instincts'? Is this the link between Justice and Agape? Is NEIGUNG the result of the 'civilization' of the vital forces? Is 'liking' and 'disliking' or indifference the consequence of action - just or unjust - on the vital forces? Finding indifference there raises an entirely new problem: I have so far dealt with EVIL and INDIFFERENCE as properties of action, not of being - perhaps this creates all the trouble. This must be thought through once more, taking in also what I said about the GOOD.

what actually happens in this 'historical dynamics' is: widening intuition

these who do the 'evil deed', not for a 'higher purpose' however mistaken, but for the sake of evil doing. This meets the case of Ilse Koch and the Jago symbol. And they may indeed be subjects for Pathology. What is evil in all other 'no-good' behavior is the disregard of the "we" relationship, in analogy with Nature. But this includes e.g. vengeance, crime of passion etc. - can these be related to 'callousness'? They are failures of identification all right, but the intuitive blindness comes from a 'hot, not a 'lukewarm' heart. Something is wrong there. Perhaps I should simply acknowledge the difficulty and my inability to solve it.

Under 7 c (same sheet) I discussed my two kinds of EVIL and the alleged 'primacy' of indifference. Applied to what I just wrote this would mean that some one who opposes the Employment Act is 'better' than some one who does not 'care'. 'Care' must then mean: he knows of the plight of unemployment; he knows that it can be cured; but he could not care less. Why should he be worse than some one who also fulfills the first two conditions but opposes? Under the ~~xxx~~ macro-aspect the indifferent may be less of a nuisance. What I have said under 7 c all refers to the micro-aspect. Put differently, the indifferent Man may indeed be further away from the blessed state of NEIGUNG, but he may well be a lesser obstacle to the establishment of a JUST order than the opponent. And since it is JUSTICE and NOT AGAPE that is 'aufgegeben' I am in deep water.

Another attempt might be from the side of "lack of imagination". If it is true that the GOOD must first be intuited before it can be acted upon, if it is further true that once intuited we cannot deny the GOOD, both the 'fiend' and the "callous" have failed to 'see the light'. Can one say that the 'fiend' has seen a 'false' light? And that it is better to see a false light than to be blind? Better in view of later conversion? All these are 'clever arguments', but this is not what I want. But there are good reasons why I hesitate to give up my 'primary evil': the equation between the indifference of the Universe and that of the heart.

In a way my distinction between the 'positive opponent' of the Employment Act and the one 'does not care' is not correct. The opponent also does not care, that is, indifference rules his heart too. Perhaps I should confine the "active" evil deeds to

are curable. In a way this is what I have asserted so far. A 'deeper' proposition is that the 'life forces' are still awake in the positive evil man, and therefore there is a 'chance', whereas in a dead heart these forces are gone. This links up with what I say earlier about Mächtigkeit of the cosmic forces being the fuel for the Ought Positive Evil then is 'fuel abused', whereas inertia of the heart means 'burnt out'. Of course, I cannot deny that even a burnt-out fire can be ~~rekindled~~ rekindled, and it is not obvious that 'making better use of existing fuel' is easier to accomplish than rekindling. Still, there is the Biblical word, and somehow there must be an 'existential' experience behind my proposition.

d) perhaps a concluding section should deal with the 'dynamics' of Man in the direction of HUMAN. Again this fits in well with Emancipation. And ELSA comes in handy together with the dreams of the Prophet.

8. July 28 "relationship between MAN and HUMAN"

I thought last night that I was through with clarification. This is not so at the very center, namely the realistic meaning of HUMAN as opposed to the 'hybrid' MAN. The difficulty arises from the fact that no empirical notion of homo sapiens is conceivable in which NATURE is eliminated. I have already said so on sheet 3: even 'redeemed' MAN, which is the equivalent of HUMAN, 'lives' by the cosmic forces. What he has overcome, and totally overcome - MAN overcomes it sporadically - is the 'indifference' of these forces. Now this is much too vague - obviously digestion in the HUMAN will not be subject to Agape. In other words, Nature will not, and cannot be subject to Pflicht or Neigung in the totality in which it participates in sustaining HUMAN. In other words, I must pinpoint the sphere in which the indifference of the cosmic forces as operating in homo sapiens can, and should be overcome

a) the critical sphere. Can I simply say: the sphere of 'inter relations'? I think that I can. My 'quarrel' with the Universe - Nature at large - is entirely confined to its 'interrelation' with MAN - it does by no means refer to it as center of Energy. When I said earlier that our own 'relationship' with Nature resembled that of push and pull, I was indeed using a symbol taken from 'inter-natural' relations. What I complain about is that the Universe 'behaves' toward me in the same manner as it 'behaves' toward 'itself', or rather that the 'elements' of Nature treat us as if we were nothing but such elements. We are indeed also such elements, but we are also something else. And it is the degree to which this 'something else', namely treating the neighbor as myself, inspires out interrelations

b) Thus MAN becomes HUMAN by "identifying" with all others "aus Neigung". Doing so "aus Pflicht", that is, by obeying the OUGHT, is a second best, and really all that is commanded, namely being just = applying the golden rule. Or, as I can also say, MAN becomes HUMAN by aspiring to the GOOD = striving to establish a 'state' through a sort of 'behavior' in which IDENTITY is approximated through identification.

c) this means in this sense: Emancipation toward a genuine 'we'

9. But I am in trouble in another respect: my use of EVIL in "avoidable evil". I can defend my terminology only if (1) EVIL is the "anti-GOOD"; (2) avoidable EVIL coincides - neither less nor more - ~~then~~ with "INJUSTICE". Injustice must then mean: all actions and omission which deny IDENTITY. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ What I called earlier the 'flexible' aspect of the formula comes into effect here: the content of the INTUITION widens (Negro, animals) and, above all, the technical ability to 'identify' increases (poverty, disease).

A strange development. A letter by Greffrath suddenly made me think - as preparation for an answer - of rereading the J.L. I was much surprised to find it good - even the second part. And I wonder whether I should have it xeroxed and should circulate it - not only Gr. but Nanda, perhaps Bob, Marianne Marschak - why? Might it be a possible Appendix to the book? Or might I take over some parts into my later chapters? This morning I reread the extensive Notes which I wrote afterwards. I remembered them as more critical than they appear to me now, though a number of issues are mentioned there that would have to be included - modified - in a printed version. Whether already before xeroxing needs to be examined.

This is the list of major points:

1. Sheet I of Notes:

- a) the chain of Human-Good - Ought ect - is this an ontology? *See Notes*
- b) must I discuss "emergences" antedating the rise of Man?
- c) must I discuss "virtues".
- d) is the moral command really only "negative"?
- e) "solidarity" seems to "formal" an issue to serve as the substance of the good
- f) my treatment of the "indifference of the universe" is too pessimistic. This cuts across a later issue: Heiligkeit des Seins
- g) what happens when the "emergency" situation is overcome?

2. Who is to be the active forces - substitute for Marx's proletariat - Veblen

3. "ordinary" and "extra-ordinary" experience Sheet IV

4. Sanctity of Being - have I really forgotten it, as I say in my Notes? Is not my discussion of the second dimension really concerned with this? It must be made explicit, but I think that it can be added.

5. Sheet V, 1: a "partial Lebensgefuehl" dominated me when I wrote the J.L. This subjective element may have colored the content and may have made it one-sided. I speak later - Sheet VI, 2 - of my being a "man in between" or a "Man of transition" - This should probably be mentioned at the beginning or the end. Does this not necessarily limit my vision, and should it not? I mention on Sheet VI, II some features that indeed would not be valid for the next generation.

Now looking over this list, there are few points only that need correction or addition. I should mention those:

1. extension of my fulfilled present to include sanctity of being. But this makes it necessary to point up its dangers too.
2. "partial Lebensgefuehl" and "Man of transition"
3. perhaps "ordinary and extra-ordinary" experiences.

None of this is fundamental, and I even wonder whether I should start making changes before xeroxing. The danger is that I miss the style of the letter, and ruin the impact.