

A Heuristic Model on the Role of Education in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

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Abstract:

This paper examines the importance of educating children and youth in complex humanitarian emergencies. It presents two principle arguments: 1) Education is vital for the well being of children and youth affected by conflict; and, 2) It is a primary means through which to address the root causes of conflict and the trends that sustain it. It questions a number of implicit assumptions about conflict and humanitarian assistance that hinder the development of more wide-scale use of education programs in conflict areas.

We propose a heuristic model that informs dialogue and decision-making about the trends that sustain conflict and the rationale for emergency education as a form of humanitarian assistance. Though we have written this paper for a system dynamics audience, future presentations of this material will target international, national, and indigenous private, governmental, and non-government organizations working in conflict regions.

Over the last three decades the international community has wrestled with a new, highly destructive, and intractable form of conflict. The vast majority of these conflicts are not waged between states, but are fought internally over resources, territory, power, ethnicity,

religion, or other communal rivalries. They displace and kill millions of people, and have far-reaching effects.

“Complex humanitarian emergencies” devastate the lives of children and youth and the social structures they rely upon for their basic needs.

The international community traditionally tends to these children and youth by providing food, shelter, and health programs. Beyond these basic needs, it is not immediately evident why education in situations of conflict is also an immediate priority. It is difficult to imagine how education plays a role in helping children and their families survive and heal, and how—when implemented alongside other interventions that protect non-combatants and restore their entitlements—it plays an important role in addressing the root causes of conflict and advances reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Emergency education programs minimize loss of life and physical harm because they protect children and youth from threats to their well-being in conflict situations and reinforce their ability to guard their own safety over the long-term. They disseminate critical information about sanitation, disease, malnutrition, landmines, HIV/AIDS, human rights and peace. They provide settings where children and youth can be supervised, enlisted in constructive activities, and protected from being induced into the arms and drug trade, prostitution, banditry, or forcibly recruited into child-soldiering, sexual slavery, forced-labor, and other behaviors that prolong conflict and put them and others at risk. Education programs build skills and knowledge that reinforce livelihoods within the legitimate economy, and they rebuild and maintain the individual and social capital that serves as a foundation for post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Some examples of recent conflicts considered “complex humanitarian emergencies” include: Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, East Timor, Sudan, Kosovo, Angola, the Palestinian territories, Mozambique, Colombia, Eritrea, Iraq, and Sierra Leone.

Education programs also tend to young people’s emotional and social needs. Children and youth often suffer the loss of their families, homes, and communities, causing crippling physical and emotional trauma. In Rwanda, for example, UNICEF reports that 80% of the children surveyed lost immediate family members, and one third of them witnessed their murders.¹ Education developed in collaboration with the local population rebuilds social relationships required for the ongoing nurturance of children and youth’s social, emotional, cognitive, moral, and spiritual development, and reestablishes locally appropriate channels for the transmission of local knowledge and skills distributed within the local community. It provides a sense of security, home, community, and optimism for the future—preconditions for healthy child development and post conflict reconstruction. Moreover, emergency education promotes mechanisms to deal effectively with potentially destructive formal and informal education practices

¹ United Nations. “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”. New York: United Nations, 1996. p.5. 39.

during conflicts that teach hatred and revenge, promote radical and violent ideologies, and ‘mythologize’ past events in manners that sustain conflict.²

Emergency education programs also work to protect, maintain, and reestablish local education systems. Conflicts devastate education systems at enormous short and long-term social and economic cost. In Afghanistan, for example, by the end of Soviet occupation, decades of civil war and the fall of the Taliban government, an estimated 85% of trained teachers had left the profession, fled the country, or been killed³; 3.4 million out of a total of 4.4 million children had never attended school.⁴ In Sudan, about 50% of pupils do not reach the fifth grade; only 12% of Sudanese teachers have a basic Teacher’s Training Certificate; and in areas controlled by the SPLM, there was no formal schooling at all between the years 1987 and 1996⁵

As an assessment of the current status of education in Somalia states,

The key trait in recent years has been destruction: [the] entire education system has been almost totally destroyed. There is inadequate training of teachers, inadequate quality of teaching, inadequate monitoring systems....in short, inadequate teaching and learning. In fact, the education situation in its entirety is problematic, and so is, evidently, the implementation of Education for All.⁶

Only one in ten children are enrolled in primary school in Somalia, and approximately 17% of adults are literate.⁷ Of the small percentage of children who are in internationally or locally supported schools, there are chronic problems of inadequate support and low educational quality. For example, out of 1,233 students in Tanzanian refugee camps, only 3.7 % passed evaluation tests with marks above 50 per cent.⁸

Emergency education programs have the potential to mitigate the impacts of conflict on education systems. They can establish dialogue with education stakeholders and provide them with incentives for, and assistance in, maintaining access to appropriate forms of education throughout conflicts. They have the capacity to train teachers and school officials, generate relevant and effective curriculum, build and maintain infrastructure, and maintain the educational momentum of children and youth displaced from school by conflict. Education programs rebuild and protect the social capital that conflicts threaten,

² See Leaning and Arie, Human Security: A Framework for Assessment in Conflict and Transition, Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies, Harvard School of Public Health. Vol.11, No. 8. September 2001.

³ Asian Development Bank, *Afghanistan: A Nation in Anguish, Assistance for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction*, 20 November 2001, 10.

⁴ Asian Development Bank, 10.

⁵ The Global IDP Project.

<http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/58AC5E3657B5D541C1256CDE0081BB47>. (April 7, 2003). Geneva.

⁶ UNESCO 1996, cited from Sommers, Marc. Children, Education, and War: Reaching EFA Objectives in Countries Affected by Conflict, April, 2002.

⁷ The Global IDP Project.

<http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/A8FED0FFC23BF4DCC1256D4400742E9D>. (March 23, 2003). Geneva.

⁸ UNHCR. “Situation Report: Kigoma, Tanzania.” Dar es Salaam, June 1999.

social capital that is required for post-conflict reconstruction and development. Furthermore, emergency education programs collect critical data and information on the status of education that provides a basis for policy making, and generate a body of knowledge and expertise with the potential to reinforce the long-term development of relevant, equitable, efficient education systems.

UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral donors and lenders, government agencies and non-governmental organizations have begun the work of emergency education and persistently call for greater efforts to educate children and youth in emergencies. Yet when considered alongside its potential, the “field” of emergency education is still in a nascent stage. The majority of children and youth displaced by conflict go without structured, relevant, equitable, and quality education programs that are vital to their short and long-term well-being. There continues to be a lack of systematic and large-scale efforts on the part of a wide range of governments, ministries of education, international donors and lenders, universities, and international, national, and indigenous organizations to leverage the education sector to help forestall conflict, mitigate its consequences, and promote peace, reconciliation and reconstruction.

Though no highly reliable estimates exist, recent estimates suggest that in excess of 27 million children of school age affected by conflict go without schooling.⁹ Many are left to fend for themselves in highly dangerous environments. Of that 25 million children, 90% of them are estimated to be internally displaced within their countries, and very few of them have access to secondary education. According to the Global Survey on Education in Emergencies conducted by the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, only 6% of refugee youth are enrolled in secondary school, and likely fewer internally displaced youth are in school.¹⁰ Between 2.5 and 5% of refugee populations are children unaccompanied by adults.¹¹

The Perception that Education is a Development Initiative and Inappropriate as an Immediate Form of Humanitarian Assistance

There are numerous obstacles that have hindered the development of systematic and large scale programs to provide children and youth with appropriate education programs in conflict regions. One of the most formidable obstacles is the tendency on the part of many international stakeholders, including many international multilateral and bilateral donors and lenders, to make rigid distinctions between “relief” operations and “development” operations. Relief funding is earmarked for what are considered to be life-sustaining deliverables—food, shelter, and health. Development funding is reserved for larger social, economic, and political programs after conflict subsides and governments capable and willing to assume the responsibilities for the welfare of local populations reemerge.

⁹ Global Survey on Education in Emergencies; Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children; 25. See also, Sinclair, Margaret. “Education in Emergencies”, in [Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries](#); UNHCR, Geneva. 2001. p. 5

¹⁰ Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children; iii.

¹¹ Summerfield, Derek, The Nature of Conflict and the Implications for Appropriate Psychosocial Responses. http://earlybird.qeh.ox.ac.uk/rfgexp/rsp_tre/student/natconf/toc.htm P.2 Cited July 10, 2004

Not only does this approach to dealing with conflict ignore the critical benefits of educating children as a way of addressing their enduring vulnerabilities outlined above, it is also accommodated by questionable assumptions about the nature of conflict and the priorities and capacities for humanitarian response. It appears that the implicit assumption behind many international approaches to humanitarian assistance is that conflict is a temporary aberration of normal, stable functioning of a state. In this view, it is characterized by the onset of anarchy resulting from the weakening of local and national governments and abject poverty.¹² Once conflict subsides, it follows, the state will re-emerge and resume responsibility for protecting the well being of the population and tending to its affairs. The government will guarantee the human rights of its citizens, rebuild infrastructure, and resume control over the bounds of the political economy. It will rebuild education systems upon a clean slate, often with international assistance, which has awaited the emergence of a legitimate functioning government willing and able to provide education.

Yet conflicts are themselves emerging forms of political economy, with dynamic and resilient links to global issues and global economy.¹³ They have the capacity to become endemic and sustain themselves indefinitely. Conflicts are not anarchic; the combatants make rational choices in their best interest by systematically asserting control over productive assets, trade, resources, and territory. They lead to and are perpetuated by emerging international economies based in the arms and drugs trade, banditry, raiding, and the control of economic resources.¹⁴ They erode individual, social, physical, financial and environmental capital, and systematically undermine the capacity for peace, stability, development, and the re-emergence of an effective state that is capable of meeting the basic needs of its citizens. They draw successive generations into behaviors and livelihoods that directly or indirectly contribute to conflict. Even after peace agreements are signed, complex emergencies leave anything but a clean slate: if insufficiently addressed, the underlying political, economic, socio-cultural and environmental trends associated with complex emergencies continue to erupt into violence and large-scale conflict.

When the international community provides populations affected by conflict food, shelter, and health alone, it often does little to interrupt cycles of conflict and the trends that sustain it. In fact, in many circumstances it merely aids and abets the emergence of resilient *systems* of conflict.¹⁵ If international efforts to mitigate the impact of conflict and address its root causes are to be successful, they must reinforce livelihoods within the legitimate economy and populations' individual, social, economic, environmental and physical capital; and they must protect children and youth from recruitment into activities that put themselves and others at risk and sustain conflict.

¹² Duffield, Mark Post-modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-adjustment States and Private Protection. Civil Wars, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 65-102. Frank Cass London. 65.

¹³ Duffield, Mark, 65-155.

¹⁴ Duffield, Mark, 65.

¹⁵ See Anderson, Mary, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. Pp. 147.

The heuristic model below examines the relationships between conflict, the resources and behaviors that sustain it for long periods of time, and its impacts on individuals and their behavior. It is intended to raise questions about implicit assumptions stakeholders may have about conflict, and the policies that govern what types of humanitarian assistance they support.

A Heuristic Model on the Role of Education in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Overview

The model presented below is intended to inform dialogue on the nature of complex emergencies and the role of education as a means to address the trends that sustain them over time. The causal relationships it proposes are taken from the experiences of complex emergencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Rwanda, the Sudan (both in Southern Sudan and the current conflict in Darfur), Somalia, Colombia, and others. It, by definition, is a simplification of the trends at work in conflict situations and their impacts on individuals and communities. There are many exceptions and nuances to the relationships we propose, and there continues to be a lack of rigorous research and data emanating from complex emergencies necessary to inform policy making. It is not intended as a measurement tool, but rather an exercise aimed at engaging stakeholders in collaborative thinking about the nature of conflict and its implications for humanitarian response. The computer-generated model was designed to accompany facilitated, interactive dialogue with stakeholders who play an active role in formulating its assumptions and testing its results. Presented below are the results of runs of the model conducted by the authors, based on our own assumptions (articulated in this paper) and informed by available research.

For the purpose of simplicity, we refer to livelihoods and coping mechanisms that either directly or indirectly perpetuate cycles of conflict as the “negative economy”, and those that do not support cycles of conflict as existing within the “positive economy”. We rate individuals’ physical, intellectual, emotional, and social capacity—and their resulting capacity to cope and engage in livelihoods to support themselves—qualitatively on a scale from 0-100. The average scores of individuals engaging in activities that either directly or indirectly perpetuate conflict in the “negative economy” or contribute to the legitimate “positive economy” are then calculated in converters labeled accordingly.

The conflict environment depicted in the model consists of trends commonly associated with complex humanitarian emergencies. The combatants are irregular forces, often poorly trained and organized, fighting under unclear or unstable chains of command. There is often systematic murder and rape, and ravaging of the countryside and critical resources for survival—livestock, agriculture, stores of food, infrastructure and towns. There is widespread ignorance or rampant disregard for principles of international humanitarian law. Civilians are the targets based on communal antagonisms or along lines of identity politics, and they often have a component of genocide and ethnic cleansing.¹⁶

¹⁶ Leaning, Jennifer; Personal communication; Harvard School of Public Health. February, 2002.

Civilians forced to flee the conflict, either to escape violence or because combatants have systematically eliminated their capacity to provide for themselves and their loved ones, are internally displaced or live abroad as refugees. Of those who will die, the vast majority will die from malnutrition and disease.

The model suggests a number of general trends that indicate the emergence of cycles of conflict.

- A large number of people will be stripped of their assets and productive capacity, either gradually or rapidly by violence and forced migration;
- A much smaller number of people, often perpetrators of violence, will gain at their expense;
- Combatants will seize control over an increasing share of commodities such as oil, copper, cobalt, diamonds, and timber, and use their value to support their fighting forces;
- Increasing numbers of people will find themselves either directly or indirectly contributing to cycles of violence, through being:
 - Forced to participate in activities that sustain conflict (through kidnapping or forced recruitment into fighting forces, for example).
 - Induced into fighting forces, often encouraged by the emergence of radical and politicized ideologies of hatred and revenge, or out of necessity for survival.
 - Compelled to resort to behaviors that contribute to conflict out of necessity for survival, such as banditry, raiding, trade in drugs and arms, or cultivation of illegal drugs, and other illegal activities often controlled by perpetrators of conflict.

Globally, the number of children under eighteen induced or coerced into fighting in armed forces, paramilitary groups, or militias is estimated to be around 300,000,¹⁷ with the youngest children being between 7 and 10 years old.¹⁸ Children were actively engaged in 33 conflicts between 1995-1996 alone.¹⁹ Many young children are indoctrinated in youth movements, military schools, or as in the case of Afghanistan and Pakistan, in madrasas that funneled children directly into fighting forces. In Afghanistan, 10% of combatants were under the age of 16; and 17% were between 16 and 18 years of age. In the later stages of conflict these numbers increased to 19% and 26% respectively, (a total of 45% of combatants were under the age of 18).²⁰

¹⁷ Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, "The Use of Children as Soldiers in the Middle East and North Africa Region"; http://www.id.gov.jo/human/activities2000/middleeast_report.html, (January 23, 2002).

¹⁸ The United Nations. '<http://www0.un.org/cyberschoolbus/briefing/soldiers/soldiers.pdf>'.(January 23, 2002). New York.

¹⁹ Brett et al. 1996, quoted in Summerfield, Derek, The Nature of Conflict and the Implications for Appropriate Psychosocial Responses. http://earlybird.qeh.ox.ac.uk/rfgexp/rsp_tre/student/natconf/toc.htm P.2 Cited July 10, 2004

²⁰ Summerfield, Derek, The Nature of Conflict and the Implications for Appropriate Psychosocial Responses. http://earlybird.qeh.ox.ac.uk/rfgexp/rsp_tre/student/natconf/toc.htm P.2 Cited July 10, 2004

- Conflict will also diminish individual, social, economic, physical, and environmental capital that forms the base for the legitimate economy. Young people will be vulnerable to conditions that erode their emotional, social, physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being. Many will be forced into prostitution and sexual slavery to provide for themselves and their loved ones. Rates of diseases such as HIV/AIDS will increase, sometimes dramatically.²¹ Many children will die or be permanently handicapped by landmines. In a study of 206 communities in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Mozambique, one household in 20 reported that a member was a victim of a landmine. One third of them died in the blast.²²
- Children and youth—those who were in school to begin with—will now find their educational momentum disrupted and few will return without an effort to get them into some form of temporary schooling. They will find themselves with few opportunities to learn new skills they may need to provide for themselves. Many young children are heads of households, and the channels through which their parents and larger community transmit their values, morals, proscriptions for living, knowledge and skills are severely disrupted.
- Many of the most qualified and skilled will flee abroad to seek work and send remittances back to their families, resulting in ‘brain drain’.

The model suggests that as increasing numbers of people find themselves participating in behaviors that contribute to conflict, either by choice or by necessity, they further diminish the capacity for others not to, and will in fact attract greater numbers of people to follow suit.

The model also suggests, however, that the international community can assist populations affected by conflict decelerate cycles of conflict through education programs specifically designed to minimize the above trends and protect children and youth from threats to their well-being, and from participating in activities that put themselves and others at risk and contribute to trends that perpetuate conflict. We define emergency education programs as ‘education programs designed to shape the content and skills acquired by populations affected by conflict or crisis to protect their physical, emotional, spiritual, social, and intellectual well-being. This includes efforts to shape that which an individual learns directly and indirectly in the ‘home’ environment, from peers and the community at large, informally, in non-formal education programs, and in schools.’²³

The model assumes that education programs have the potential to:

- Protect children and youth from forced recruitment or inducement into fighting forces, banditry, raiding and other activities that put themselves and others at risk;

²¹ <http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ierh/Research&Survey/HIVStat.htm>

²² Summerfield, Derek

²³ DiFrancesca, James. ‘The Role of Education in Complex Emergencies’; paper presented at the Harvard Graduate School of Education; 2001. p.3

- Minimize the number of young people participating in the arms and drug trade or other activities that indirectly support cycles of conflict;
- Help protect children from threats to their well-being through reinforcing their coping mechanisms and helping them to understand the context in which they live;
- Help reestablish social networks and programs that nourish the ongoing emotional, social, physical, intellectual, and spiritual development of young people;
- Maintain educational momentum and recruit more children into schools, including girls and the disabled;
- Counteract the propagation of radical ideologies of hatred and revenge, and encourage engagement in the development of constructive processes by which individuals and communities understand and respond to conflict;
- Train teachers and other education stakeholders;
- Collect critical data and information on the educational dimension of the demography of conflict and forced migration, of important value to education stakeholders in the short and long-terms; and,
- Rebuild education infrastructure.

The Model in Greater Detail

Figure 1. The migration of people into coping mechanisms and livelihoods that directly or indirectly support the “negative” economy occurs because of a reinforcing feedback loop (or vicious cycle). There are two main stock/flow chains: population and capital assets. The population stocks are divided into people who are in the positive economy and people in the negative economy. Capital assets are similarly divided into assets in the positive economy and those in the negative economy.

As assets are shifted from the positive, legitimate economy to the negative economy by systematic raiding, banditry, seizing of resources, and other means, the ability of the positive economy to support its population is weakened. The negative economy becomes “more attractive” as its average income becomes greater relative to the average income in the positive economy. By necessity or by design, more people migrate into behaviors that support the negative economy. And the greater numbers of people in the negative economy are responsible for taking more capital assets from the positive economy. Figure 1 shows this reinforcing feedback loop. The graph on the left shows the rapid migration into the negative economy that occurs simultaneously with the dramatic loss of assets to the negative economy (in the graph on the right).

Figure 1: The Vicious Cycle “Engine”




Figure 4: Because this intervention focuses on young children, it only has the affect of influencing the behaviors of those children leaving school and entering into youth where they employ their capacity and skills to support their livelihoods within their local context. As a result, the overall impact on the rate of migration to the negative economy is relatively small. Figure 4 shows the pink line (#3) for population in negative economy as below that of line #2—meaning the rate of migration is less due to this intervention. Similarly, capital remains in the positive economy longer on the second graph. And the third graph shows a slow increase in average capacity for the overall population in the positive economy. The reason an increase in average potential weakens the strength of the reinforcing loop is two-fold. We assume that an increase in capacity increases the ability of people in the positive economy to generate income (average incomes increase). Second, we assume that the increased capacity includes a feeling of social connectedness and moral well-being that will cause people to be less likely to move to the negative economy.






Figure 5: Decelerating The Vicious Cycle “Engine”
 -Building Human Capacity & Well Being In Youth




Figure 5 depicts an emergency education intervention targeted at youth. We assume for the purpose of argument that no education is provided for young, primary age children (though this is a highly unrealistic policy decision, and not one that is necessarily recommended). The model suggests, however, that the livelihoods and coping mechanisms of youth have a greater potential impact upon trends that perpetuate cycles of conflict, at least in the short and medium term.

Figure 6: This policy suggests the potential for a somewhat greater impact on trends that sustain activities in the negative economy than emergency education programs that target young children only. The green line (#4) on the population graph indicates that this policy slows down the rate at which people migrate into the negative economy—and more so than programs that target young children only. Its impact is limited, however, by the fact that such a program will only slow down the rate at which individuals will participate in activities that sustain conflict, while the trend of assets seized by the negative economy—critical resources such as land, livestock, and infrastructure, for example—continues to have the affect of dragging people into activities that sustain it.






Figure 7: Decelerating The Vicious Cycle “Engine” Further- Reinforcing Coping Mechanisms and Livelihoods within the Legitimate Economy While Building Human Capacity




Figure 7 depicts a scenario in which humanitarian assistance programs, including emergency education programs, endeavor to return both individuals and the productive assets they rely upon for their livelihoods back to the positive economy, and to work to minimize activities that perpetuate conflict.

Figure 8: The orange line (#5) suggests a significant movement of individuals and assets from the conflict economy to the legitimate “positive” economy. Education initiatives targeted at children and youth that work to reinforce livelihoods and reestablish the availability and trade in assets within the legitimate economy have the potential to minimize the growth of the conflict economy, and reinforce the foundation for post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.






Figure 9: Post Conflict




Figure 9 contains the same model as before, which we use as the basis for simulating the crisis and its aftermath. We assume that, unlike in the first set of simulations, the crisis lasts 24 months instead of 48 months—and at the 24-month point, a peace settlement is reached and large-scale conflict ceases. At issue in this model is the rate at which the population can recover, both in terms of capacity of the population to engage in successful livelihood strategies, as well as the re-growth of the legitimate economy. Importantly, we assume that many of the trends that perpetuate cycles of conflict persist even after peace agreements are signed and wide spread violence subsides.

Figure 10: Waiting Until Conflict Subsides to Build the Capacity of Youth

Figure 10: The graphs depict the same three variables as before. The blue line (#1) simulates a base case scenario where nothing is done during the 24 months of the crisis (i.e. no education; no economic interventions). The red line (#2) simulates a situation where youth are trained immediately after the conflict ends. The numbers in the negative economy are slightly less as a result of this intervention. The return of assets into the positive is not significantly impacted.






Figure 11: Provide Education Programs for Children & Youth During and Post-Conflict




Figure 11 depicts the impact of emergency education programs for children and youth both during the conflict and post-conflict. It suggests the likelihood of significant gains in maintaining and building the capacity of children and youth and the viability of the legitimate economy. The assumption at work is that through addressing the root causes of conflict throughout and forestalling the entry of individuals and assets into the conflict economy, the conflict has a shorter duration and there is significant potential for quicker recovery post-conflict. This potential is illustrated by the pink line (#3).





Figure 12: Prevent the Loss of Assets and Provide Education Programs for Children & Youth During and Post-Conflict






Figure 12 depicts a scenario in which efforts are made to prevent the loss of assets from the positive economy. As might be expected, this improves the overall outcome shown on the green line (#4) on the population and asset graphs. A combined education initiative and economic intervention show the best results for slowing the development of a negative economy (which can perpetuate conflict) and for increasing the rate of rebuilding post-conflict.

Considerations for stakeholders:

The trends associated with complex emergencies suggest that there are a number of critical considerations for stakeholders in the field of humanitarian response, education, and development that merit further discussion and analysis. Among these considerations are:

- Υ Over and above the critical justifications for emergency education programs based on their potential to save lives and protect and nurture the emotional, social, physical, and cognitive well-being of children and youth, greater efforts to provide education are also justified by their potential to limit trends that perpetuate prolonged conflict and reinforce the overall capacity for peace, reconstruction and rehabilitation.
- Υ The assumption that relief efforts should be limited to food, shelter, and health interventions ignores the diversity of threats that children and youth face in complex emergencies, and ignores the tendency for conflicts to be cyclical and self-sustaining and undermine long-term capacities for peace and reconstruction.
- Υ Greater emphasis should be placed on the importance of providing education programs that meet the unique needs of youth affected by complex emergencies, in addition to young children.
- Υ To maximize their effectiveness and accountability, emergency education programs should rigorously assess the political, economic, socio-cultural, and public health parameters of conflict, the trends that prolong conflict over time, and monitor and evaluate the capacity for education programs to protect young people, reinforce their livelihoods and coping mechanisms, and limit their participation in activities that put themselves and others at risk.
- Υ There is a pressing need for more informed dialogue between stakeholders in humanitarian assistance and international development, donors and lenders, ministries of education, and other international, national, and indigenous private, governmental, and non-government organizations working in conflict regions, as well as universities, particularly schools of education, about the role of education in complex humanitarian emergencies. This includes the potential for education practices to underlie and precipitate conflict, education as a form of immediate humanitarian assistance, and education as a basis for long-term post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.
- Υ Greater research and informed dialogue is necessary on the tendencies for complex emergencies to encourage “brain drain” and further deplete the capacity for post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation, as well as the potential for education programs to forestall or exacerbate this trend.
- Υ Schools of education, working together with practitioners and other stakeholders in humanitarian assistance, have an important role to play in conducting and distributing

research and analysis, and providing education and outreach programs to build the capacity of international and national staff working on education issues in conflict regions.

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