

July 11-2/1966.

Kandahar Lodge, Manchester, Vermont.

Dear Hans:

Jonas

This letter is an experiment, and I have chosen you as my guinea pig. The purpose is to continue our dialogue which started years ago when I first had read your Immortality paper. Or was it even earlier when you showed me in 59 the draft of your Practical Uses of Theory? Anyhow over these past years we both found it helpful to show each other our mudpies. Not that we always responded with unreserved applause. For this to happen our fundamental positions are - shall I say: still - too different. But they lie in a productive distance from one another - near enough for mutual understanding, far enough for challenging questioning. This is so because our convictions are not dogmatically frozen. Using traditional labels, I see in you an "ontological monist", but one who struggles toward that position rather than one who speaks of it ex cathedra. And my clinging to "existential dualism" springs from intellectual perplexity rather than from self-satisfied preference. But the most productive stimulus in our exchange is that we do not just take a sympathetic interest in each other's concerns, but that our impulse is identical: to discover meaning where on the surface none seems to be, and to discover such meaning first for our own sake, even if also others may benefit afterwards. In a word, what unites us is a religious - for more than one reason I do not say: theological - concern.

Now let me confess to you that, over the last two years,

all my intellectual efforts have been devoted to this task, even if the only visible fruit of my labors is the little piece written for the Bloch Festschrift. It is unlikely that I would have chosen this particular "leisure time" activity, had I not been involved in these issues much longer, in fact, all my life. It is no exaggeration to say that, from the time of my adolescence, nothing else has truly interested me. Not by chance do I count among my friends - the sequence is purely chronological - Tillich, Ruestow, Mannheim, Bloch, and last but not least yourself. You may object that my choice of profession speaks against this claim. Still, if not some of my earlier writings, my last book ~~book~~ certainly gives me away. Even in my economic and sociological work, what held my interest through four decades was the "foundations". And what ^{made} me popular in Kiel and Frankfurt was, rather than my departmental work, the "Kindergottesdienst," as my late companion Fritz Burchardt used to call the weekly meetings with a selected group of students, in which Karl Barth, Dreigroschenoper, or the emancipation of women took precedence over Schumpeter's theory of interest. A certain intellectual agility has helped me to conceal my heresy from my professional colleagues, but a perspicacious fellow like Kenneth Boulding easily found me out.

So what I have tried to do in recent months has been to shed a mask and to talk turkey, while there is still time. But the result has so far ^{been} most disappointing. Not that I lack ideas - some of them seem to me even bright ones - but I simply cannot find the proper "form" to organize my thoughts in such a way ~~that~~

that they become communicable. Is it the immensity of the task? Is it lack of clarity in my mind? Is it simply my dilettant^t incompetence which blocks articulation? All this, no doubt, and more of the kind. But in recent days it dawned upon me that perhaps there is a meaning in this failure. You will laugh when I tell you the "Anlass" to ^{this} suspicion. Of all things, it was the reading of Maurice Friedman's book.

Let me say in passing that, though not really a good book, it is much better than I had expected and than Aiken's stupid review indicates. Friedman barks up the right tree though the bark is more noisy than revealing. He is for ever ruined by his blind admiration for Buber. You know my strong reservations to Buber's work and person - in the elemental sphere the two are, * alas, * inseparable, because "Du gleichst dem Geist den Du begreifst". And when Buber-Friedman explain Job's final submission to Jahweh as the consequence of Job having achieved his ultimate aim, namely of establishing a dialogue with God, I was for a change reminded of a Jewish joke. Levi comes home excitedly, shouting "The King has talked to me"! "What did he say," asks his wife. "Get out of the way, you dirty Jew"!

And yet, this heavily overworked notion of the "dialogue" gave me a clue to my own troubles. Probably I have not reached ^{the stage} where I could communicate ~~it~~ ^{with} an anonymous public. Nor will the monologue of writing down my free associations make a whole out of the scattered parts. But perhaps something will jell if I address ^{myself} to one real person. This may transform the abstract message into a concrete encounter, while the privacy of my utterances is preserved. It will give a

~~It will give~~ a focus to my thoughts without forcing them prematurely into a systematic order. I can present them in the tentative and loose form beyond which I have not yet progressed, and I can myself express doubts and point to gaps, being author and critic at the same time. In a word, I can speak "ins Unreine".

Now I have told you the purpose of this letter, and the role I have assigned to you as reader. No obligation to respond falls on you though, needless to say, any response will be more than welcome. But if I succeed in loosening my tongue by speaking, nay, stammering and stuttering, with you as my imagined listener you have discharged, by your very existence, a function of cardinal import to me.

My preliminary apologies are not over. Not only do I use you as a "means" (though I hope not only as a means), but I cannot help approaching my subject in a most cavalier fashion. I am consciously erecting a structure over an epistemological and psychological abyss. I am trying to find words for a fundamental inner experience. Thus I shall speak about what is ultimately ineffable, conceptualizing what precedes thought. And in claiming more than subjective validity for such experience, I know full well that by being channeled through the mind and, in particular, my mind, what is experienced will be distorted by the limitations and deformations of the receptacle. And yet I simply leap over these chasms, finding dubious consolation in the fact that better men on my side of the fence - from Pascal to Camus - could not ~~AM~~ do otherwise. And my "opponents," who concern themselves with "essence" rather than with "existence," have to contend with no less worrisome paradoxes. So I leap.

I. The Primary Experience - Die Urerfahrung.

SOLITARII IN MUNDO CONJURAMUS * ERGO SUMUS.

We are alone in the world but we band together -
Only this ~~is the validation of our being existence,~~
^{can}

I am not quite happy about this formula because, as every attempt at "formulating" it reduces the fullness of the encounter. Moreover, it suppresses altogether one central mode of experience for which a secular term has still to be coined: what in religious language is called "grace", pointing to experiences that are - or are not - "received" without our being able to do anything but being "prepared" for them. I shall ~~x~~ say more about this later, yet it is no accident that I do not begin there.

Let me comment on the three parts of the formula in succession.

1. We are alone in the world. It is essential to see that this is no "atheistic" statement, at least so long as we do not prejudge the issue by insisting on the notion of a God who is defined by "Providence" and Justice, who "loves" Man and will never forsake him. This God is indeed ^{I believe} an anthropomorphic creation, and though the Bible - especially the New Testament - shows many traces of this nursery product, He is not the God who speaks to Job, nor the God to whom Jesus cries out on the cross. The profundity of the story of Job shows in God himself rejecting any such sentimental image, and not only by what he explicitly says about Himself. In chiding at the end, Job's friends for their proclamations of Theodicy, and in declaring that Job, in proclaiming cosmic in-justice, has spoken "truth of me", He defines Himself as omnipotent force, as pure Being above any Ought.

As such modern Man cannot deny Him. The relevance of the Book of Job for us is its utter realism. Whatever our response may be to the a-moral indifference of the cosmic forces, and we shall see that Man's very validation as Man depends on the nature of that response, the supra-human power of these forces remains a primary datum of our experience. The world and Man's fate in it are precisely as Job describes it - with the exception of the happy ending which is part of the old folk tale, and not of the drama proper. True, this is a random, not an evil world, and the odds are not necessarily against Man. Occasionally the "galloping messengers of the king" may come in time, but we must not trust in their ever arriving. And there is no technological utopia which could free us from the rule of these cosmic forces. Even if one day we succeed "in" creating life", all that we can achieve will be a new combination of given elements and a rechanneling of the forces that act upon the world.

X
2

So long as we remain aware that all conceivable "control" cannot "tame" ^{these} forces, it is a matter of choice whether we want to "dignify" what is beyond our own power with a name hallowed but also corrupted by tradition. I am inclined to think that a moratorium placed on the use of the word "God" may be good for our intellectual and emotional health. It will perhaps free us from the temptation of kneeling before an anthropomorphic idol, and will help us to walk, in the knowledge of our limitations, erect - what Bloch calls accomplishing "den ~~AUFRIECHEN~~ aufrechten Gang."

And yet I must be careful not to fall with this very first step into dogmatism. There have been men and women in every age, sophisticated and simple-minded ones, who have spoken of the immediate experience of a God of Justice, Mercy and Love. How can I argue my case before them? I cannot, because no arguments can destroy feelings of evidence. Not having experienced such evidence myself I cannot denounce it as self-deception. Thus from the outset a doubt hovers over my most fundamental assertion. However, the "believers" themselves are no better off. Accepting the testimony of the greatest among them, the evidence of "Dear" God does not seem to be a firm possession of the recipient. As Augustine or Luther describe it, falling out of the state of evidence (entering which is taken as the highest gift of Grace) is as torturous an experience as it is recurrent. Which one is then the true experience? Is the beatific tonus of life in the knowledge of the Redeemer worthier of trust than the intuition of being alone, not to say the despair of feeling condemned for eternity?

We ~~shall~~ meet with this very same impasse again and again, whenever decisions must be taken while the "evidences" - psychological, moral, political - conflict. On the level of "knowledge" such conflicts cannot be compromised. The degree to which reconciliation can be accomplished on the level of "action" measures the strength of communal bonds. But I am running ahead. Here no more needs ^{be} acknowledged than that the "theological" decision is unarguable, and all we can do is to respect one another's evidences.

Not all theological disputes need end in a draw. I strongly protest against the fashion to substitute for the diagnostic statement that we are alone, the nostalgic complaint that we are "exiled" or "abandoned". ~~But~~ ^{we} cannot have it both ways. In speaking of exile and abandonment, we point to a lost home and a guardian that has forsaken us - in a word, we restore an image of a transcendent reality which, in the same breath, we expose as our own invention. The psychological roots of such contradiction in modern Western Man, can easily be traced to his Judaeo-Christian heritage. But as again the Book of Job demonstrates, as does the cry of the dying Jesus, the experience of an indifferent Universe has its roots in that very tradition, not to mention the Moira of Greek tragedy. Difficult as it may be for us to be alone, nothing is gained by pretending that others were not.

No better is the case of the "Death of God" theologians, if they mean what they say which not all of them ^{seem to} do. To be dead now, God - the Christian God - must have been alive some time in the past. This places those self-styled "radical" theologians alongside with the "exiles" and "abandoned". Yet all that radical critics of Theology can responsibly maintain is that they do not find the Christian God in the world they encounter. It is they who have "died" to their childhood beliefs. But to proclaim that God has "died" or even only "withdrawn, or is "eclipsed", is ~~an~~ ortho-logical speculation rather than primary experience. ^P This leads us finally to what Camus has denounced as the "existential escape", illustrated on Kierkegaard or Jaspers. In full recognition of the "absurd . . . born of the confrontation between the human

need and the unreasonable silence of the world . . . they deify what crushes them and find reason for hope in what impoverishes them". (Sisyphus, pp.21, 24). Paradigmatic for this attitude is a quotation from Jaspers: "Does not the failure (viz. of the Universe to respond to Man) reveal beyond any possible explanation and interpretation, not the absence but the existence of transcendence?" And to dispel any doubt that there is no unconquerable Dualism separating Man and World, Jaspers defines that existence as "the unthinkable unity of the general and the particular" (quoted from Sisyphus, p. 24-5). Since in the wake of Kierkegard the paradox is ^{here} elevated to the bearer of ultimate truth, no logical argument can prevail against this version of my favorite joke that "God does not talk to a liar". But it is to this kind of reasoning that I would apply Laplace' retort to Napoleon: Sire, je n'ai pas besoin de cette hypothese. I put this forth as an existential assertion against a Cosmodycy purchased at the price of standing experience on its head.

I said it before but it needs ~~xxxx~~ repeating: the Universe is indifferent, it is not evil. Were it evil, ~~be it~~ in the clutches of the Calvinist Devil or of the Gnostic Demiurge, it would be more "human." To watch such a cosmic ~~xxxxxxxx~~ spectacle might cause unsufferable pain. And yet the spectacle would be performed for Man and with him as chief protagonist. There would be Providence, even if not Justice or Love, and Man could have trust in his fate however perverted. But what puts terror in Pascal's heart - the first one who found words for the primary experience of the World's ~~indifference~~ indifference- is the contemplation of those infinite spaces " of

which I know nothing and- the crucial insight - which know ~~of~~ nothing of me". This goes beyond what Job has to bear. Job is in the hands of a God who does not "care" for him but who knows of him, speaks to him, and in a strange way even justifies him. Contrariwise our encounter is with anonymous forces and its mode is not dissimilar with the push and pull as which Newtonian Physics describes the relations among mechanical entities. Elemental as these forces are since they bring us to life, sustain us for a while and kill us in the end, we cannot truly "fear" them in the manner in which the Bible speaks of the Fear of the Lord. Though they stand for Being, theirs is an "alien" Being - the breaking open of an ultimate "Dualism".

key

What I have said so far assigns to the cosmic forces a role beyond good and evil. But these very same forces have irretrievably sentenced ~~includes all "structure" organic and inorganic~~

from life?

Man to Death, and if there is validity in the Entropy Law this

sentence includes all "structure", organic and inorganic. This poses the most perplexing existential problem: how to reconcile the irreversibility of the tendency toward "maximum disorder" with true indifference on the part of the World toward Man's endeavors? *very "19th century" world view*

a merely descriptive one for surveyable portions of the space-time continuum. It is an "engineer's law" (no perpetuum mobile)

Agnostic Existentialism, having renounced belief in Immortality in whatever form, has been unable to overcome this dilemma. Take again Camus for whom, with transcendence foreclosed, Life is the ultimate value, a value which is bound to increase as the limits on Life recede. Or, paraphrasing Nietzsche he might say: What Life strives for is "deep eter-

which, exactly?

I don't share your complaint against death premature death - yes

"Entropy law" describes the probability course of a closed-system model, i.e. of an "isolate" - has nothing to say about the beginning or end of the "totality of things" - of Hand!

nity." Camus goes still further (Sisyphus p. 45): "What counts is not the best living but the most living", and a little later: "there can never be any substitute for twenty years of life and experience" (p.47) He does not feel quite comfortable with such a "vulgar" standard of pure quantity, and tries to soften the blow by adding to quantity some qualitative meaning (p.46). But what ~~it~~ matters is something else. If Life is the supreme good, Death becomes the supreme evil. The Universe is then no longer "silent" but in ordaining the ~~finality~~ finiteness of all creation it speaks with a diabolic vengeance. The ultimate datum of our experience is no longer the "absurd" indifference of the world but its malevolence.

Achilles!

or the only?

fallacy

παντοφύετος

We must not try to attack this contradiction with "logic", nor should we gloat over another "paradox". I believe that the problem is genuine, and that it points to a dimension in our anticipating the Experience of Death which modern Existentialism ~~are~~ ~~helpful~~ ~~guides~~ has failed to grasp. Light will fall on this when we now proceed to the second part of my formula.

2. But we band together. These words fall badly short of what they are to imply. The Latin term "conjurare" renders more fully the multiplicity of connotations, some of which I will try to detail.

Once more the modern Existentialists are helpful guides. For them the response of Man finding himself alone is "Rebellion". And it is again Camus who has penetrated most deeply into the complexities of the rebellious attitude. To understand him fully one must be aware of the evolution which his thinking underwent.

some of them

In his original vision, which differs little from that of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit or from Sartre's L'Étre et le Néant, Man is alone not only in confronting the Universe, but also among his own kind. Rebellion then takes the form of defying the fate ^{how?} which the absurdity of the World holds in stock for him, in resisting the temptation to anticipate the ^{organic} cosmic Death sentence by committing suicide. Such rebellion "is not aspiration, for it is devoid of hope." It is "the certainty of a crushing fate, without the resignation that ought to accompany it." (Sisyphus, p.40) "It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will". (p.41) In a curious footnote (p. 77) referring to Malraux's work, Camus admits that "the social question"... cannot be avoided by absurd thought"...One must, however, limit oneself". But most probably it was not lack of space or time which then prevented Camus from discussing the "social question." Like his hero Sisyphus he had eyes only for the gods above and for the void which had swallowed them.

It was an historical event - the German occupation of France - which turned his gaze in the "horizontal" direction. His problem now becomes, not whether to repudiate oneself by suicide, but whether to repudiate others by murder. And murder - this is the burden of L'Homme Revolté - is the inevitable result if Man, finding God's throne empty, usurps it for himself. Be he the Grand Inquisitor, the Superman or the Commissar, they all act in the place of a God who "cares". And - a terrible dialectic - insisting on the unadulterated virtue of their principles they arrogate to themselves the nihilistic freedom that "kills what

x much killing was done under food

remains of God in the principles themselves." (The Rebel, p.215.)

However, while aware of this danger, the Rebel ^{time} does not place himself at the service of the status quo and its injustices. He knows that "those who find no rest in God or in history are condemned to live ^{why?} for the humiliated" (p.271) But they must do so within "limits" set as strictly as those which Nemesis has set to the motion of the sun (263). "Rebellion is in no way the demand for total freedom ... the freedom to kill is not compatible with the motives of rebellion (241). And a strange echo of old Jewish wisdom: "if one single human being is missing in the world of fraternity then this world is immediately depopulated" (249) } *on that grounds?*

I confess that I know of no other proclamation of Man's response to living in a post-Christian and post-Marxian climate - without God or History to fall back upon - which equally satisfies ^{also for reason?} my own instincts. But Rebellion thus understood is a most uncomfortable posture to assume. The Rebel "cannot ... absolutely claim not to kill or lie, without rehaunting his rebellion and accepting, once and for all, evil and murder. But nor can he agree to kill and lie, since the inverse reasoning which would justify murder and violence would also destroy the reasons for his insurrection. Thus the rebel can never find peace".

Camus knows no answer which would once and for all conquer this dilemma, and certainly none on which an institutional solution could be built. This is brought home to us even more clearly when we turn to Dr.Roux, the tired hero of La Peste, in whose image Camus conceived what was later to find philosophical expression in L'Homme Revolte. On the surface Dr.Roux's task seems

unequivocal. As a medical doctor caught up in a plague, he is called upon to "heal". And he accepts the call unflin^gglingly, while painfully aware of his inadequacy in the face of an overwhelming catastrophe. But it is not "victory" he is fighting for, and even the final fading away of the plague does not deceive him, while listening to cries of joy rising from the town, "Rieux remembered that such joy is always imperiled ~~that~~ that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good..... and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city." These are the last words of the book, and they ^{sum up} ~~set forth~~ once more the human condition. But how to meet it - a ~~lesson~~ lesson learnt " in a time of pestilence" - Rieux tells us in the preceding paragraph. " He knew that the tale he had to tell could never be one of final victory. It could only be the record of what had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts.....by all who strive to be healers."

All this is implied when I speak of "conjuramus" or of "banding together" as our response to being alone. The Latin term happily blends the elements of banding oneself with an oath, and of a conspiracy aiming at a positive goal. It lacks the aura of resentful reaction to what is negative, an aura which Camus takes so much pain to remove from his notion of Rebellion. In a word, it turns our gaze toward that for which, rather than that against which, we are to struggle. But perhaps

I place too much of a personal interpretation upon these words.

Therefore I had better spell out the specific "Yeses" and "Nos" which I want them to convey.

There is a No to Job's submitting to the all too realistic display of heavenly fireworks. Considering the many controversial issues of textual interpretation little is gained by pointing to the apparent contradiction between Job recanting his challenge and God, a moment later, justifying it. On the other hand, Job's earlier reply to his friend Bildad: TILL I DIE I WILL NOT RENOUNCE MY INTEGRITY, and the most famous and also most tampered with passage in the whole book: HE MAY SLAY ME, I WILL NOT QUAVER. I WILL DEFEND MY CONDUCT TO HIS FACE, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ portray the "erect posture" in which "Man by himself" is to meet his fate. It is the NO which Ivan Karamazov echos when he "turns his ticket in" - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ he does not acknowlege God, but because he refuses to accept the world He created. Or Rieux's NO, who believes himself "to be on the right road - in fighting against creation as he found it." (The Plague, p.116.)

No less emphatic is the NO to secular Utopianism, as it is embodied in the dominant political movements of our time: Communism and American Progressivism. The latter has recently received a sort of religious sanction from the "Death of God" theologians. They are concerned with establishing "a new mood of optimism in American culture This is a worldly optimism I am defending", writes William Hamilton (Radical Theology and the Death of God, pp.168-9). "It faces despair

not with the conviction that out of it God can bring hope, but with the conviction that the human condition which created it can be overcome, whether those conditions are poverty, discrimination, or mental illness". And climaxing his secular dithyramb, this polar antagonist of Sisyphus proclaims that the new optimism "faces death not with the hope of immortality, but with the human confidence that man may befriend death and live with it as a possibility always alongside".

X no: the very essence of life!

This brings us back to the sentence of finiteness ~~XXXXXXXX~~ which the cosmic forces^x have passed upon us, and to what the inevitability of Death does to our conjuration. Earlier I shunned the answer to the question whether the Universe truly perseveres in silent indifference or, by killing us all off, speaks with unmistakable malevolence. Now, if Hamilton is right and we can "befriend" Death, the Universe reveals itself even in the absence of "Dear" God as essentially benevolent!

To speak about these matters is so painfully difficult, not only because we approach the ultimate mystery of our existence but also because we cannot while living experience Death "from within". All our "knowledge" is vicarious: stemming from the "outside" experience of seeing others die, and from the anticipation of our own death. In this situation all affirmations are suspect, and contradictions in our speculations do not necessarily refute what is surmised.

One of these contradictions lies on the moral plane. Even Camus for whom Life is the ultimate value accepts sacrificial death - consenting to being murdered - especially when it is to

expiate murder we have inflicted on others, (The Rebel, p.249).

Dr. Rieux goes further. His imperative is not abstaining from taking the life of others, but "defending" it. But when asked: against whom, he can only confess: "I haven't a notion. Only I have never managed to get used to seeing people die" (The Plague, p.117). On the surface a meagre reason - subjective-psychological rather than objective-moral,- but we shall see that implied in it is all a man can responsibly state about his imperatives, without living beyond his experiential capital. Yet what is relevant in the present context, Death is for Camus never a "friend". Even for God, it might be better, says Dr. Rieux, "if we refuse to believe in Him and struggle with all our might against death" (117-8). And though it is permitted, in certain and ~~even~~/^{even} circumstances, demanded, to give one's own life, it always remains a "sacrifice".

From there it is a short step to where we can at least glimpse at Death from within: ^{an} anticipating our own death. There are reports of agnostics who all their life calmly lived with this anticipation, and who are said to have passed over the threshold in perfect serenity. This does not seem to be common experience. Even when the imagined act of dying does not strike terror, anticipation of the state of "non-being" makes most of us feel like standing over an unfathomable abyss.

These experiences are genuine and cannot be conjured away with rational or non-rational speculations. And yet there is another feeling tone, much less conscious but permeating every act we perform and every thought we think. It takes hold of us when we try to imagine that, like Homer's Sisyphus, we were to succeed

in putting Death in chains and in thus removing the limit from the "quantity" of our living days. Not only is such infinite being no more fathomable than is non-being, but we realize that, with finiteness gone, living has been reduced to mere endurance. There is no "hic and nunc" left, and our experiences have lost the poignant savor of temporality and thus of a meaningful present which bestows on them the modality of life. Far from being an intellectual construction this assent to my finiteness as the price of genuine living is rooted in my very center. But, and there is the rub, it by no means conquers the terror which the anticipation of non-being strikes in my heart - an inconsistency which I have long given up to reconcile. On the contrary, I would be suspicious if what we glimpse of non-life through a glass darkly were to fit smoothly into the pattern of life itself. *istad alt und satt a. Tager*

But I think, and ^{will} this I revert to the open question about the neutrality of the Universe, the very inconsistency of such ^{experiences} fundamental points to an answer. On one level Death strikes us indeed as the supreme ~~evil~~ evil, and temporality as the curse of creation. On another level it reveals itself as the one event which "orders" Life, and which cannot be imagined away from anything which the solitary Rebel affirms. We may cry out to the Universe for reconciliation, but it will not break its silence. Befriending Death is a relapse into sentimentalizing the aloofness of the cosmic forces, as abhorring Death is betrayal of Life - another unconquerable Dualism.

But it is high time for me to turn from the NO to the ~~YES~~ YES. What is there for solitary men to band together for? My

answer differs in a subtle but essential manner from that of Camus and his hero. Maurice Friedman, who fully identifies himself with this "Modern Job" puts his finger on the crucial spot when he writes : Camus dialogical (!) rebel Doctor Rieux, stands like Camus himself, for the meeting with concrete everyday reality, rather than for any particular ideology or point of view" (Problematic Rebel p. 437). This is true and, if I see it rightly, reveals at one and the same time the superiority and the inferiority of Camus' stand, as compared with typical movements ^{of} ~~and~~ political revolt. It is his greatness that he shuns abstractions and ~~unadulterated~~ unadulterated principles, but deals with the concrete as he encounters it from day to day. But when the problem of improving "society" is raised, he falls back on romantic visions of syndicalism - revolutionary trade unionism operating "from bottom to top" - or of the "country village where the living heart of things and of men" still beats. (The Rebel, pp 264-5) He harbors frank distrust of the trend of industrialism: "Industrial ~~xxx~~ society will only open the way to a new civilization by restoring to the worker the dignity of a creator" (p.241) The "social question", understood as a problem of ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ institutional reform rather than personal agape was never met head on by Camus; it remained a "limit" set to individual freedom by a trans-individual Nemesis.

The wisdom and compassion which effuse from Camus' writings must not be lost. Yet only anarchic illusion can fail to realize

that, as often as not, the attempt to meet the concrete here and now is frustrated by the inertia if not enmity of the institutional environment. Delicate as the proper balance between the individual and the collective is, and is bound to remain, as will presently be shown, the goal of the conjuration set to this human era is collective. And just because true goals are always concrete it is to discovery and invention on this front that the solitary men of this age must band together.

Can we define the feasible range of our conjuration? If Jesus had said: "YOU will always have ^{the} suffering with you", we would not want to contradict ~~him~~ him from the distance of 2,000 years. But we must contradict his prediction that we shall always have the poor with us. It was for the delineation of spheres of life ~~like~~ such as these that, many years ago, Max Brod pointed to the distinction between "avoidable" and

✓ "unavoidable" evil, incidentally relating the fight against avoidable evil to the fundamental teachings of Judaism. Indeed this is the ever valid prescription for what men are to band together, because it is a flexibly rule. And such flexibility cannot be dispensed with because what is unavoidable is historically not fixed once and for all. Mass poverty was an invincible enemy on the technological level of antiquity, as a life span of three score and ten is a limit which medical science and social hygiene have not yet ~~be~~ managed to break on the large scale. But today a decent standard of living is, at least in principle, within the reach of every society, however woefully most of them lag behind. And whether average man can live for a full century or more, is now a challenge to science, and not the verdict of inexorable fate.

✓ Placing these matters in the context of Man's existential status helps us to take the convulsions ^{of} ~~for~~ our age for what they are: symptoms of a historical mutation. At first ~~XXXX~~ sight this mutation appears as the product of modern science and technology. But in looking below the surface we begin to realize that scientific and technological progress are only the major weapons in a global struggle for material and spiritual Emancipation. This struggle ^{engulfs} West and East, rich and poor, power holders and subjects, ~~women~~ and children together with men, the traditional protagonists of history. And though ~~this~~ ^{This} struggles takes on many guises, they are all variants of the one aim of casting off the fetters of past: the tyrannical rule of a harsh nature, of often harsher human masters and, the topic

ghosts of Epicurus

of this letter, of the still harsher because unappealable verdict of transcendent Gods. This anyhow is the meaning I read in the unceasing political upheavels, domestic and international, in the process of world-wide economic development, in the so-called sexual revolution coupled with a new education, in the probing of the unconscious by science and art and, last but not least, in the growing indifference of the masses in the ^{West} ~~East~~ to organized religion, concomitant with the erosion of theology as exemplified in Buber's or Schweitzer's mysticism, Tillich's Neo-Pantheism, or the radical Immanentism of Bonhoeffer and his ~~an~~ disciples.

Western intellectuals can be grouped according to whether they are with or against this struggle for emancipation. Almost all "scientists" are with it, very few "humanists" are. Even many once open-minded critics of the past - from Schumpeter and Ortega y Gasset to Toynbee and T.S.Eliot - joined the opposition when

Tocqueville's prediction proved true that the new order of "equality" would threaten ^{some} ~~one~~ of the cultural values inherited from millenia of mass servitude. They ^{are} right in refusing blindly to ride the wave ^{of} the future. But skeptical withdrawal or weak-kneed return to the fold appears to me as a worse "trahison des clercs" than the one exposed ~~by~~ Benda during the communist honeymoon in the early twenties. This one deprives the struggle for emancipation of what it is most in need of: intellectual and moral guardians.

x you load your dice

These comments make it clear that my own stand is with that struggle ^{for Emancipation} and that I welcome the advances of science and technology which sustain the attack. This does not blind me to the dangerous strain which the very speed of "progress" and social transformation imposes on personality structure, human relations, social and political organization. I share the fear that, in its forward rush, the human race may actually destroy itself, by irresponsibly tampering with the genetic process, by ruthlessly misusing the awesome potentialities of the new chemistry and "manipulative" psychology, not to mention atomic and bacteriological warfare. But Pandora's box has been opened, and not only yesterday. It is another romantic delusion to indict the twentieth century for our contemporary predicaments. They have their roots in centuries back, and the so-called liberators of mankind * all share in the responsibility - from Hamurapi to Socrates, and Kant, from Wyckliff to Luther and Gandhi, from Cromwell to the signers of the Declaration of Independence and Karl Marx, from Copernicus to Darwin and Freud. There is no Arcadia to turn back to and, as I will argue below, if there were we ought to shun it. Certain ages in the past were more successful in concealing misery, cruelty and even bloodshed from the observer. But, in the face of the horrors our generation had to witness, I believe that no historical era was as conscious as is ours of the command that avoidable evil is to be fought.

Such emphatic affirmation of the collective tasks of the conjunctio can after all be misunderstood, as secular Utopianism.

So let me say once more that, though I am second to no "radical" theologian in endorsing the institutionalized attack on poverty *and* discrimination ~~and, within limits, also mental disease,~~ I know of aspects of the "human condition" which even moral effort at its most perfect cannot eradicate. Once again it is Death and the temporality not only of our persons but of our accomplishments, that throws a dark shadow of doubt over all our struggles and goals. And the forewarning of the entropic destiny of everything that displays order and form raises the spectre of universal meaninglessness.

This rather than the dangers evoked by our moral defects is the crucible of any conjuration: to know that we and our works will be destroyed, and yet ^{with hope} to "maintain our integrity". I know of no argument to support this existential paradox by which most of us live most of the time. Nor am I, or for that matter any one else, capable of deciphering the hidden meaning. And yet we live by the evidence that the "here and now" has a meaning which metaphysical or theological rationalization can only [?] obscure. Still, awareness of our true "limits" adds a sombre shade to the coloring of every experience. Or, as I said in my letter to Ernst Bloch: the melodies of our lives are not played in C-major. Even the clarion call which summons us to our conjuration rises over a thorough-bass which sounds in a minor key. In Bloch's own words: true optimism if it is to elude hybris is draped with crape.

But at this very point a formidable challenge arises. In ^{clinging} to ordinary experience, am I not artificially narrowing my focus, passing over evidences on which Judaeo-Christian Metaphysics and Religion have built their eschatological success stories? Do not the ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ revelations communicated through the medium of Grace assure us of the ultimate justification of our fragmentary existence and its fragmentary accomplishments? ^P Were these "revelations" really confined to the mystical experience of a "beyond", I would have to repeat what I said earlier about the truth value of all affirmations of a "Dear" God: They are unarguable and irrelevant for those who have not seen the vision or heard the voice. But this is just not so, and the religious agnostic meets with what to him are immanent experiences, which however seem to partake of the aura that envelops the intuitions of the "believer".

^P Judge for yourself when I relate to you such an experience. Last fall we took our grandchildren to a performance of Mozart's Figaro. During the first two acts I felt very tired and unable to listen with more than a detached interest. Now, as you will remember, in the third act the Countess and Suzanne conspire against the Count's philandering by contriving a billet doux which is to trick him into a rendez-vous leading to his final unmasking. The letter is composed before our eyes to the sound of a famous duet, the Countess dictating and Suzanne repeating what she writes. I have known the melody since my childhood and have heard ^{it} innumerable times. Anyhow knowing the opera practically by heart I did not expect anything "new" to happen. ²⁵ It did. While the duet was proceeding I found myself suddenly transposed to a level of emotion which no Prometheus

can "conquer", access to which cannot be manipulated, for which there is no open sesame.

⁻²⁻
We would miss the essence of such experiences were we to equate them with aesthetic intuitions. Not all music opens this door - Beethoven's rarely and even Mozart's g-minor symphony points to a different dimension. On the other hand, the smile of a child, the scent of a flower, the call of a bird, the sun setting over the Vermont hills or rising behind the snowy peaks of the Engadin - any event however sublime or trivial in itself can serve as vehicle of this emotion. Among the artistic occasions which opened this region of experience to me, I remember my first viewing of Giorgione's Venus, the sight of Concordia's Temple in Agrigento, or Orpheus' aria exalting transfigured nature in Gluck's opera (for obvious reasons I do not mention encounters with "religious" art.) However different among themselves, these particular media all convey a profound and noble message. The contrary seems true of the Letter Duet in Figaro. On the surface the literal meaning of the scene as enacted by the two ladies is nothing if not lighthearted. But we only need remember the nostalgic aria of the Countess, which precedes the duet, to grasp the darker undertones which are "aufgehoben" in what is taking place - the term understood in Hegel's meaning as "overcome and yet preserved". The same is true of another Mozart scene listening to which has more than once raised for me the magic curtain: the duet of the two ~~heroines~~ heroines in the first act of Così Fan Tutte, after their lovers took leave from them. There the plot is positively frivolous, since the men only pretend to go to battle; they plan to return presently in dis-

guise to test the faithfulness of their beloved. And yet the melody resounds the sweet sorrow that ~~in~~ every parting awakens.

Still, such allusions completely fail to give verbal expression to the content of these messages. It is of its essence that such content ⁻³⁻ cannot be conceptualized, though it can be sung, painted, danced, or "prehended" in the inscrutable sights and inarticulate sounds of Nature. Nothing is gained, but the integrity of the experience is violated, if the attempt is made to relate these "messages" to a transcendent "sender", especially if the "noise" of metaphysical and theological speculation is offered as a true reading. We cannot deny these experiences, but we must learn to live with their mystery.

More can be said about the mood in which the recipient finds ^{him} ~~it~~self. The most fitting word that occurs to me is SERENITY. This is what Schiller must have meant when he wrote: Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst. A strange unity of propinquity and distance, of participation and aloofness, beyond libido but also beyond agape because beyond striving and caring, filled with vital power but all energies flowing towards the receptive antennae - the opposite pole to the "earnest" mood of emitting energy in which the particeps conjurationis goes about his business.

And yet the conduits of "emitting" are not simply cut off from the conduits of "receiving." Experiencing consummate Serenity - my psychological ~~substitute~~ substitute for ontological Grace - is like spending a night in the depth of dreamless sleep. This does not by itself further our diurnal undertakings, but it "re-

charges our batteries" for their performance. In a similar manner we draw power of will and strength of purpose from an experience which is beyond our willing and serves no purpose. Moreover, in moving us into a dimension in which success and failure, fear and hope have no place, we touch for a fleeting moment the point where even temporality loses its sting: ~~a~~ fulfilled present.

Is the relationship mutual? If the rare instants of consummate Serenity give us strength for the days and years of our active efforts, can these efforts open the barriers that ordinarily block our entrance into the fulfilled present? As the Christian Doctrines of Good Works states it: they cannot. It is of the essence of these experiences that they be not contrived. I know nothing of the state of mind which certain Eastern practices of meditation, not to mention chemical short-cuts from opium to LSD, are said to produce. But I suspect that they all lack the feature of naturalness which attaches to the "spontaneous" experience. Though lighting up a region which lies ordinarily in darkness, it is a region in which we feel at home. What it reveals does not bear the mark of startling novelty but, like the images in Plato's anamnesis, of latent familiarity.

Because it is beyond the reach of the purest intention and noblest deed, our lives, singly and collectively, cannot be built on waiting for this gift. In this ~~the~~ Catholic moderation saw deeper than the extremism of Luther and Calvin. Good works - the tasks of the conjunctio - though not exhausting the range of human experience, are the daily bread of our existence. They are that which can be willed, and therefore is under the command of the Ought,

about which more will be said presently. It is essential to will what can be willed, even if all cannot be willed. In a striking parallel a profound witticism has it that Jesus asked us to love our neighbor, not: to like ²³him.

The Russian Orthodox Church knows the custom of the "faithless prayer". It concerns those who have temporarily fallen out of Grace. They are enjoined to continue praying even if their hearts are empty. This is not meant as a magic contrivance to restore faith, but as a way of keeping oneself prepared for the gift of faith if - not: when - it is offered. Perhaps in being serious about the human conjunction and its aim of improving the future, we do the best we can to remain open for the serene present. *stops here*

3. We are alone but we band together - only this can validate our existence. "In our daily trials, rebellion plays the same role as does the "cogito" in the category of thought: it is the first clue. But this clue lures the individual from his ~~solitude~~ solitude. Rebellion is the common ground on which every man bases his first values. I rebel - therefore we exist." (The Rebel, p. 28). In this passage Camus places his primary experience of Rebellion side by side with the Cartesian. By actually substituting my Credo - which anyhow is not identical with that of Camus - for Descartes', I go a step further. It is a step in the direction of your own thinking, as it has taken shape in your recent book. You deny the primacy of "cogito", that is, of pure consciousness, which you conceive as an abstraction from what is truly concrete and the bearer of the "dynamics of the real": "living force transformed into action "where inwardness actively transcends itself into the outward and continues itself ~~into~~

into it with its actions". There the ego exists "at once with itself (intensive) and in the midst of the world (extensive)"

But, and I am not sure whether you will follow me that far, what is to be validated on this level of ~~primary~~ primary experience is not a "sum" but a "sumus". In other words, the isolated self seems to me no less an abstraction from concrete reality than is pure consciousness, with which it is intimately related. This is not meant as a romantic hypostasis of the mind of the self into a "group mind" or of the individual body into a member of a mystical communal body - it refers to the content that is experienced by the intensive-extensive body in which the self exists. Whenever inwardness transcends itself by not only acting upon the outward but by also being acted upon from the outward, ^{other humans} others are present in our experience. *mostly - yes, but not always* X

Now it is essential to realize that, though this experience refutes the idea of a monadological isolation of the theoretical self, it does not as such establish a "we". At least in principle the world might meet us as pure resistance, frustrating rather than yielding to our self-transcending actions, as indeed it often does. It is a singular mode of interaction, of which the mother-child relation is probably the original pattern, that establishes the "we" - a mode to which the archetypical conjunctions dedicate themselves by a solemn oath. Thus only when and to the extent to which, it is "we" who band together in the fight ^{xx} against avoidable evil, and not merely a solitary "I" rebelling in the mode of Sisyphus, do we exist. X

→ what, when we have mastered it? (which is possible, since the evil is avoidable); do we cease to exist?

What is the nature of this we? How is it distinguished from

You probably mean: diminishable evil X

xx a Manichaean or Zoroastrian view

the I's of which it is composed? It certainly is neither a super-self nor a mere aggregate of the component selves. If I referred above to a singular process of interaction as the source of the we, I go now further by identifying such we with the individual selves in the process of spontaneous and ^dsolidary interaction. We are really back at the old story of the nature of universals, Abelard's solution to which is the answer to our problem. When asked about the nature of the community of Christ's disciples, he answered that neither was it the twelve disciples each taken singly in his natural state, nor a thirteenth ens over and above the living twelve, but it was these twelve when gathered together in the spirit of Christ.

It is of more than classificatory interest to have the right answer to this question. This answer must serve as the beacon, guiding and warning, for the contemporary struggle~~KK~~ of Emancipation to find its bearings between the Scylla of anarchy and the Charybdis of collectivist tyranny. What is at stake can be demonstrated on a typical example. Recently Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, the Head of the US Atomic Energy Commission, in an otherwise admirable survey of recent scientific and technological achievements and imminent breakthroughs, summed up by saying: "Today we have more freedom of choice than any of our ancestors ever had ... We have more freedom from ignorance, superstition and iron-clad tradition and, as a result, more freedom to change - to control and direct our future, our creative evolution..... I believe that we can be masters of our fate".

I am now not concerned with the Utopianism to which these words *give*

vent and which recognizes no intrinsic limit to what Man can do. Rather I ask: who are the "we" that have more freedom than their ancestors, that control "our" future and can be masters of "our" fate? There is only one realistic answer: the scientists and technicians and those who wield the power to apply these discoveries and inventions or to authorize the rest of us to make use of them. This is not meant to reopen the fundamental issues bound up with the organization of any large-scale society, or to raise doubt about the need in such societies for an administrative body of functionaries who plan and execute on behalf of others. Rather I wish to emphasize that, as a direct consequence of the modern scientific and technological revolution, the ancient puzzle of "quis custodiet ipsos custodes" has become much more complex.

Let us face ~~the~~ the fact that, all through history, freedom of individual decision-making has been safeguarded by the impotence of potential violators rather than by their good intentions. Administrative inefficiency, sparseness of communication, absence of an organized police force and, last but not least, rivalry among the powerholders themselves, lately institutionalized as constitutional checks and balances - these and, in the Christian era, the fear of Hell on the part of rulers, set limits to central control and abuses. Even during the "darker" ages such limits enforced by circumstances assured a fair scope for individual discretion. Conversely the danger of Totalitarian^{ism}/has been steadily increasing with the widening range of effective administration and communication within and beyond the borders of the national states. The spread of atomic technology, of automated production, of social

hygiene including population control, of electronic media of communication, ~~within and beyond the borders of the national states.~~ not to mention arms control and accelerated economic development, are bound to shift the emphasis even more strongly to centralized decision-making. I completely disregard any sinister intentions on the part of the holders of power - these growing assaults on individual freedom are the price for our security and rising standard of living. It has been aptly said ^{that} it will be much simpler to emancipate Man-kind than Man, which is indeed the stated aim of Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor, the most benevolent of dictators ever conceived.

There is danger that these very fashionable warnings are ^{mis}understood as a nostalgic plea for the return to the conditions of nineteenth century Europe and North America, as they present themselves in retrospect. Such a plea is false romanticism for two reasons. Very few people would be prepared to pay the price ~~KKK~~ for such return in terms of poverty, social insecurity, low life expectation and material ~~and spiritual~~ ² squalor. Moreover, even under the aspect of personal freedom that century offered promises rather than fulfilments. The significant exception is the intelligentsia whose members, both as professionals and as freelancers, enjoyed a degree of independence from collective pressure for which there is no parallel in any other era of history including classical Athens. This being the most if not the only articulate group in every society, it is small wonder that it now responds to any new encroachments upon its privileges with the passion with which vested interests are generally defended.

Many, though certainly not all, such encroachments are direct-

ly related to the changed position of the intelligētia in the social hierarchy. To apply a term of Mannheim's, up to the first World War the Western intelligētia was "unattached", not only because its members wanted it so, but also because the holders of political and economic power had no use for their services. This has drastically changed during the last generation, and is likely to change even more with the growing bureaucratization and scientific organization of all social functions. In the society of the future the role of the intellectual will be much closer to that of the medieval cleric - with consequences for his outlook and social responsibility which Matthew Arnold was one of the first to foresee. There is no immutable yardstick for what is the "best" relationship between individual freedom and group order, independent of the socio-technological framework in which a society operates. Not only must freedom possessed be guarded by eternal vigilance, but the very meaning of freedom to be achieved needs be discovered anew in every historical epoch.

I will come back to this problem on the solution of which the ultimate success of the struggle for world-wide Emancipation may well depend. ~~But~~ With increasing centralization of power as our inevitable fate, all I want to stress here is that, never less than today may we take the existence and preservation of a genuine "we" for granted. Though it is both the source and the goal of the conjuratio as earlier defined, it is not embodied in every social grouping, nor is all collective action in its service.

Do fallacies of thought undermine the certainty of the

Cartesian Ego? Hardly, since it is in the act of thinking that the Ego is supposed to come to itself. However, banding together for some arbitrary goal does not in equal measure constitute a "we". ~~SUCH INTERRELATIONSHIP~~ Only in banding together in the "right" manner for the "right" ^{purpose} does the ensuing collectivity find its validation as a "we". Such interrelationship is not one of "natural" Being but one of Ought.

~~July 28.~~

Note the date. Whereas the preceding pages were written down in an uninterrupted flow within 11 days - as if some gracious Countess dictated them to me - another week has now passed with nothing to show for. I did continue but got bogged down soon - why? There is an obvious reason why the "magic" of the experiment, so potent in the first phase, had to peter out. I did not notice it while I was at it, but the effort was considerable for an elderly gentleman. Still, I am afraid, there is a more serious reason which is connected with the substance of what I would like to put on paper (which concerns the place of the OUGHT in my view of the world): I feel much less sure of my ground. This came into the open in the argumentative mien I suddenly assumed, and which threatened to transform the letter into a "paper". Not only is this contrary to my intentions but being, quite unashamedly, a dilettant in these matters, scholarly guise does not fit me at all. All depends now whether I can regain the "light" tone and the lack of concern at uncovered flanks - else I had better give up.

July 29 - August 4

-35-

II. Being and Ought - Man the Hybrid.

retransmits
If it is true that the "we" relationship is not one of natural Being but one of Ought, it seems that I have crossed a critical boundary with my last remarks in Section I. So far I have claimed that everything said ~~so far~~ lies within the realm of "primary experience". Man confronting ^{a primary experience?} an alien Universe - his banding together with others to sustain an always precarious life over which ^{an interpretation, not a primary experience} an unappealable death sentence has been pronounced - indeed these are existential givens which can be read in the brute facts of experience. But now I have qualified the manner of our banding together, assigning to it the specific task of creating a "we", an interrelationship among the selves which in turn is subject to the conditions of spontaneity and solidarity. And in looking back, ~~even~~ even what I said about the struggle against avoidable evil and the historical form of universal Emancipation it assumes in our era, now appears as anything but a natural mutation: it reveals itself as a summons to modern Man which he can accept or refuse. Who summons? What are the precise terms of the call? What is its ground of validity? Can I read the answer to these questions also in facts of experience?

Alas, my existentialist friends are of little help to me at this point. They have recourse to a Decisonism which is aptly expressed in Wagner's Meistersinger when Walter Stolzing, trying to compose his Preislied, asks Hans Sachs: Wie fang ich nach der Regel an? and receives the answer: Ihr stellt sie selbst und folgt ihr dann! The inevitable result is "value relativism" - in principle as many rules as there are rule-givers, while the exclusive reliance

on a deciding "will" as the source of any OUGHT leaves the validity of that which is willed, to say the least, in suspense.

At first sight I seem to have adopted the same position in the last chapter of On Economic Knowledge when I refused to set any absolute standards for the determination of economic goals. In reality I adopted the position of scientific value relativism, which denies that values can be established as intersubjectively valid by discursive reasoning. Whether there is any other way of establishing them I did not discuss. As a matter of fact, this problem was very much in my mind at the time, and all my recent flirtations with moral and political philosophy can be traced to this origin. To that extent what I am going to say in the following pages fits into the context of the paper you have consented to prepare for that distant Conference, and it may stimulate you by at least raising your blood pressure.

When I now dare to stomp over ground where geniusses fear to tread, I want you to believe me, that I am aware of my foolhardiness, that I do not pretend to any originality in the face of a philosophical discourse which has been going on for more than 2000 years and, as I said before, that I hold no dogmatic convictions but am awkwardly groping toward the light. Though a number of issues will be touched upon, it is really one and only one proposition which I want to expound: that the Ought, and this includes its content - the Good - as well as its imperative mode, is indeed a fact of experience. Moreover, even the validity of both is rooted there. To lesson your shock let me add that I shall base my proposition - so often refuted and with such good reasons - on a particular understanding of the nature of experience. But it is true that what I am going to

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say, implicitly denies any ontological foundation of the Ought, as the term has been traditionally employed. In other words, I extend my "immanentist" view of the world also to the realm of values and norms, and yet I claim that I escape relativism.

Before presenting my case I had better admit from the outset that, ~~that~~, even if it should be true that "knowledge of the good" and its obligatory nature can be accommodated within the realm of existence without any appeal to a separate realm of "essences", such experiential monism cannot bridge the primary dualistic gap. Since only Man is subject to an Ought, of the content and imperative character of which he alone is aware, the split remains between Man and the rest of the Universe (which I will henceforth define as Nature with a capital N). Perhaps I should guard my rear by not dogmatically confining awareness of an Ought to the human species, but should grant its possible presence in other species dwelling in unknown regions of the Universe or, of greater relevance to me, make allowance for glimpses of such awareness in higher animals - I refer to my adventures with dogs and, of course, to lioness Elsa. It would not be surprising if, as is usual with borderlines, the one which separates Man from Nature were also fuzzy.

But wherever we draw the line, so long as we draw a line as we must, manlike creatures fraught with an Ought emerge, in the technical sense of the word, as a discontinuity in the process of Evolution. In stating this so bluntly , I place myself in opposition to speculations - ~~entertained by philosophers from Aristotle to Whitehead and Tillich~~ - about a potentia in a stone or a tree latently anticipating what Man manifestly poss-

not in Aristotle (now, to my knowledge, or Whitehead)

esses. I don't think that what ~~you~~ you say in your book about "inwardness" in living processes ^{occurring} below the level of consciousness necessarily falls in the same category, but caution is advisable. And Portmann, who detects such "inwardness" even in plants, goes ^{2 why?} certainly too far. Anyhow such speculations, which are bare of any empirical foundation, appear to me as blasphemies against the mystery of Emergence, a rationalistic crime which is not attenuated by the fact that it is ~~perpetrated~~ perpetuated in the name of "systematic" unity.

Thus my world remains split into two "sub-worlds": the human species aware of an Ought, and Nature which not only is indifferent but also beyond the reach of any imperative that would permit to judge it. On the contrary, we can now see that the very term "indifference" when applied to Nature has an anthropomorphic ring. Nature can be called indifferent only when seen in the light of Man's capability to "care". And yet, posing the Dualism in this simplistic manner as a clean-out dichotomy between Man and Nature glosses over a cardinal fact that constitutes Man as we know him. It is of the essence of Man that he is part of Nature, and I am not speaking of his body only. Or as I had better say: his Emergence from Nature has been fragmentary only, and what did emerge - let me call it Man's Humanity - has only imperfectly emancipated itself from sub-human bonds.

I am using again the term Emancipation, but now it points to fetters other than these in the breaking of which I see modern Man engaged. These, as I defined them earlier, are extern-

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al constraints imposed by his natural environment, his fellow men and false Gods. Now I am speaking of internal constraints which his hybrid structure - part Nature, part Human - places on his evolving into full Hum^unity.

If this is to make sense I must add two qualifications. Though my concern is with the moral dimension of what has emerged, I do not overlook that the Human has also other dimensions - rational, aesthetic, religious (as I understand it!) - which distinguish it qualitatively from the Sub-Human. But, in assigning here pride of place to the moral dimension, I do not think that I distort the true proportions. This is the dimension in which the course of Man's Evolution, if not his physical survival, will be decided, and thus also that of all ^{other} human qualities.

What change?
The second qualification is more important to me. In speaking of Evolution, or earlier of Mutation, I am only concerned with qualities of mind and body which real Man displays. This does not exclude that the relationships and dependencies of the elements which are fused in his hybrid structure are open to evolutionary change, and that, as I firmly believe, the very survival of the human race depends on such a change. But at this point I want to emphasize that what is "natural" in Man is not essentially in conflict with what is "human." As I shall presently explain, the "Human" in my sense of the term is identical with the Good to the realization of which the Ought summons ~~us~~ us. But the "us" so summoned and carrying out the summons includes the vital energies of our ^{natural} ~~rational~~ being. The Good remains a bloodless shadow of the imagination and the Ought an impotent whimper, unless both

are constantly nourished by these in themselves "neutral" forces which join Man to Nature at large. I shall argue below that the intrinsic indifference to Good or Evil, which these vital energies ~~XXXXX~~ within us share with the cosmic forces without, is the major obstacle to our achieving full Humanity, and is thus the target of the challenge of the Ought. But even if one day the Human in us were to win out making us pursue the good only and always "aus Neigung" - to quote Schiller's profound quip against Kant - what is "natural" in Man would still provide the power which alone can transform "Neigung" into "action".

the "Neigung" is itself a force of the natural - of Plato's eros in Agamemnon?

You may wonder why I waste time on what is little more than a platitude. The reason is that I want to stress the realism of all I am saying, dissociating myself explicitly from all images of a transfigured "New Being" as foretold by some of the Prophets, by Christian doctrine for the aeon following the Second Coming of Christ or, ~~xxx~~ with pseudo-scientific claims, by Teilhard for his Omega.

What I mean by Humanity has no chiliastic overtones nor must it wait for miraculous intervention. It is set to Man as he is as his supreme task even if, being Man, he is bound to fulfil it imperfectly only.

Let me now finally turn to my main topic: the nature of the Good and the content of the Ought. In fact, the essence of what I know about this I have already stated when speaking of a genuine "we" as a spontaneous solidary interrelationship. As I said then, I actually equate such ~~as~~ a "we" with the Good, seeing in it the fulfilment of Man's Humanity. C.S.Lewis, in a little book en-

Confusion: "vital" energies, directed toward life, are "good", insofar as life is a good - according to Camus (and you?) even "the supreme good" (p. 11): then they do not share the "intrinsic indifference" with the "cosmic forces without".

titled The Abolition of Man, has drawn up a list of the moral ideals which the great religious and philosophical ^{thinkers} have advanced over the millenia. Not only did he discover a striking coincidence, but the gist of what so coincides is precisely the "we" I am pointing to. This remark is not meant as an appeal to authority nor as expressing the belief that validation can be found in unanimity. But it makes the problem of value relativism appear less formidable, even if dissenting voices, from Ecclesiastes to Nietzsche, must not be suppressed.

Just because there is such wide agreement on fundamentals certain divergent nuances are worth noting. They will come into the open when I now comment in greater detail on the three attributes I have assigned to a genuine "we".

1) The "we" is an interrelationship. This is to express my conviction, already indicated in my reference to Abelard, that even in the most perfect association the selves are to preserve their individuality and are not to be dissolved in a "higher" totality. There my Western background comes into the open. It also makes me reject the Upanishadic maxim of Tat Twam Asi, which critics of modern individualism like to cite. Not only does this maxim proclaim a static identity rather than a dynamic coordination among the selves, but it traces such identity to another one, namely between the individual creatures and the universal Brahma. ~~Incidentally, I wonder whether Plato's myth of the lovers who seek each other as two separated parts striving for reunion, does not betray a similar belief in a superior universal absorbing all components.~~ *It is the union of two - quite different from Tat Twam Asi and from Plato's (Diotima's) conception of love.*

The true nature of the relationship seems to me perfectly expressed in the Biblical exhortation: Love your neighbor as yourself.

x not "Plato's", but in Plato: the speaker is Aristophanes the comedian, speaking after Eryximachus the physician (and after hiccupping and sneezing). Socrates' story is very different

I am at the moment not concerned with the meaning of "love" in this command, not an easy question to which I shall return below. What matters here is the "as yourself". It points, as it were, to a consanguinity of the selves without demanding the surrender of their selfhood. Though the selves are enjoined to overcome their separateness, the existential fact of such separateness is acknowledged. Consanguinity seems to be a fitting symbol for a relationship that binds the selves even irrespective of their forming a "we". It points to the umbilical cord which ties us physically to an ancestry to which innumerable others, known and mostly unknown to us, are equally tied, and with whom we share Man's fate as spoken of earlier.

2) If "interrelationship" among the selves rather than "isolation" or "identity" is to describe the structure of the "we", solidarity is to define its substance. Much would have to be added to make the meaning of this attribute of the "we" precise. My earlier stress on the integrity of the selves should guard me against any sentimental misinterpretation of solidarity as perpetual "togetherness" or defence of any status quo. Thoreau at Walden, alone and rebellious, struggled for the genuine "we" by escaping from, and denouncing, false associations. What I am doing in writing this letter is an act of solidarity, as is your empathetic and critical reading, and solidarity is thus established not only between you and me, but also between ~~but also between~~ each one of us and all those who grope for insight. *— which itself is a "value" beyond solidarity*

But it is difficult and perhaps impossible at this stage for any one to go beyond generalities and abstractions. Every era must discover its own pattern in which solidarity takes on concrete form in

accord with who is recognized as a "neighbor". It is often said that in the realm of morality the notion of progress has no meaning, because the idea of the Good is transhistorical, and Mankind at large is today as far from its realization as it ever was. This may be so~~l~~ in one sense, and yet a steady advance has been made in the widening of the range of solidarity by acknowledging ever new groups of living creatures "as ourselves". We have just entered the historical epoch in which such equality is to be accorded to the entire human species, and the discovery of the institutions, actions and attitudes compatible with this range of neighborhood is the concrete task of modern political Man and of the philosophy that is to guide him.

3). Interrelationship is the structure of the "we" - solidarity its substance - the "good" mode of realization is spontaneity. I should be surprised if you had any basic objections against what I have said so far. I can well imagine that we now come to a parting of the roads.

Implicitly I have already called attention to the three levels of experience in which the "we", equivalent with the Good, ~~material-~~materializes: a peculiar state in which the selves meet (a "macro" level, to use familiar terminology), peculiar actions which the selves perform in establishing and maintaining that state (a "micro" level), and a peculiar "mode" (also a "micro" phenomenon) in which these actions are carried out. It is this mode with which I am now concerned. In calling it "spontaneity" I clearly side with Schiller against Kant (though it will presently be shown that, speaking about different things, both could be, and in fact were, right.)

The alternative mode in which "good" actions can be performed is, of course, "duty consciousness" or obedience to an Ought. What is its significance? Let me make my position drastically clear. I side with those who see the consummation of the Good in not only "serving our friends" but in serving them "aus Neigung". (I have not found an equivalent word in English - possibly "sympathy" will do). The reason is that acting in this mood establishes not merely a good state through the performances of good actions, but that it reveals the actor himself as good. By this I mean that he is fully Human, that is, in perfect control of the vital forces that sustain his action. Under these conditions there is no room for an Ought. Or rather the content of the Ought which is nothing else but the good state realized by good action, is being accomplished independent of any imperative which issues from the Ought. However, and here lies Schiller's misunderstanding of Kant, spontaneity in "doing good" is a mode of action which itself is beyond human control, and Mankind would be badly off if its members had to wait for the uncertain "gift" of such spontaneity, in the meanwhile acting without guiding rule. It is at this point that the Ought takes over, commanding Man as it appears at first sight from without to do good "leider aus Pflichtgefuehl", to vary Schiller. Thus the presence of an Ought is both the symptom and the antidote of our shortcomings as Men, that is, of our hybrid structure. And the rigor with which the moral command asserts itself from/to case, measures the distance that separates the actor from full Humanity (as economic value or price measures the ~~XXXXXXXX~~ of our poverty). Obeying the command, that is, doing good does not make us good. But

wrong

this exactly was Kant's view!

not that

x Mustn't you, as a rational being, be able to check the validity of your Neigung against moral truth: is not that itself a moral duty - an imperative of our rational nature?

~~But~~ in consciously striving for the good state, we become the next best: just. And a just order, that is, an interrelationship in which solidarity is aimed at in obedience ~~to~~ the call of the Ought, is all that can be demanded from us, because it is all that is in our power to achieve.

I think that this view of the matter throws some light on the tedious debate about the relative rank of "Neigung" and "Pflicht" or, to use Tillich's antithesis, of Agape ~~or~~ and Justice. Were Agape or Neigung the universal mode of action, Mankind would indeed have attained the state of genuine "we" - the good state composed of good Men. But this is no goal to strive for. Neither Schiller nor Tillich seem to be aware that Neigung and Agape - the spirit that animated the participants in the Last Supper - are "gifts" and not products of the will. We must not be trapped by words, and the word "love" is easily such a trap. The witticism quoted earlier according to which Jesus asks us to love our neighbor, not to like him, speaks the truth. Love whenever commanded can only mean "doing good." And the command of the Old Testament referred to above: love your neighbor as yourself, can only enjoin us to be just in the sense of the Golden Rule. (What anyhow is the meaning of the Hebrew words?) In this sense we can, and should, love even our enemies. ¶ It is true that justice "remains an external act that can be performed with legal detachment or cool objectivity" (Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p.38), and it is also true that Agape "contains justice in itself as an unconditional element" (p.39) But Agape, namely "mutual participation and, by participation, union.... which is ultimately re-union"(p.39) cannot be the "ultimate moral

*but we would not be "we" anymore, not the relationship a genuine plural "we".
Something is missing in this interpretation*

*pp. 61 ff
Morality
Beyond*

principle" (p.39), if by moral principle we mean the imperative guiding our actions. Agape like Neigung is transmoral, that is, beyond that which is "aufgegeben".

The Good as a spontaneous and solidary interrelationship - the Ought summoning us to be just, that is, to work for the achievement of the good state - what can I mean when I assert that I derive these insights from experience? Obviously I cannot mean that the source of this "knowledge" is my encounter with others in the practice of ordinary life, or the detached observation of the social states and processes in which I am involved. Not that what I meet in such ordinary experience is all "bad", namely dissociation, conflict and coercion. I find that others are sometimes with me and at other times against me, as I myself fluctuate between amiability and hostility, spending most of my life in cool distance from my "neighbors".

But then, out of the blue, a flash occurs, a curtain rises and another scene is revealed. This level of experience is comparable to that which communicates to us the undecipherable messages that transpose us into the mood of Serenity. But this new message can be deciphered. It tells us that our neighbor truly is as we are ourselves, that what appeared to us before as different and a source of hot attraction or cold revulsion was really Maya, whose veil has been lifted revealing the neutral You as a brotherly Thou. And as Serenity is the mood in which the ineffable meaning hidden in trivial and sublime events is contemplated, so Agape is the mood in which the "we" as the Good is grasped in these moments of illumination. But if Serenity is

a timeless mood, arresting us passively in the fulfilled present^t, Agape releases all our energies for the perpetuation of the illuminated moment toward a fulfilled future.

From the anamnesis of this experience/^{springs} the Ought that grips us on the level of ordinary living. It asks us to do what we cannot help doing while in the state of illumination. Thus its command to act justly is not really heteronomous. It issues from the Human in us to our hybrid total. What is good in the self speaks to old Adam - this gives the imperative of the Ought its categorical character.

~~XX~~ So far so good. I have been describing experiences which, though ~~out~~ of the ordinary, are familiar to most ~~XX~~ men, even if the level of consciousness on which they arise seems to vary widely. But on what grounds am I entitled to ascribe validity to these experiences and not to the contradictory impressions of daily life? Even if carrying the strongest psychological evidence, why should I trust them to be messengers of the truth?

My answer, which will shock you, is: there is no other validation, though the possibility of "error" - it would be the most disastrous ~~EXIST~~ existential error - must be conceded. In other words, this is my "wager" on which I stake my moral all. I am not even embarrassed by this shortcut, because I think that it is easy to demonstrate that philosophical and theological ontologists, who claim safer grounds for their assertions, arrive in the end at the same impasse.

Fries, the "psychological" Kantian has found an apt formulation for the "dogma" on which every philosophical ontology rests: Man's confidence in his reason_x - Selbstvertrauen der

doing all and only that which promotes the good state of the genuine "we", we seem to be pursuing a positive goal, whereas fighting Avoidable Evil has a negative ring. Such fight seems to content itself, as it were, with eradicating the weeds, while the just Man appears to sow the seed from which the tree of life is to grow.

In reality this apparent contradiction is spurious, because all that Man can do, and needs to do, for "promoting the ^(good) state", is to fight Evil. What is "good" in that state, namely Man's Humanity, is beyond his doings. It mysterously emerged with Man himself in the process of Evolution, though adulterated with other elements; Man cannot and need not ~~xxx~~ create it. What he can do and what the moral imperative summons him to do is to liberate the "gold of Humanity" from the "dress of Nature" with which it forms an unstable amalgam. It has often been commented upon that moral precepts are ultimately negative. They are indeed so, and not only when we are enjoined not to kill, but also when we are asked to feed the hungry and to clothe the naked, to gladden the widow's heart and to champion the cause of the stranger. Even when the deeds themselves are positive, the imperative that ordains their performance is directed against the shortcomings of our hybrid structure_x - the "weakness of the flesh" - which saps the spontaneity of performance. Thus the Just Man is really a weedkiller who knows in his heart that good fruit will grow in a well ploughed field.

I must now explicate what I mean when I associate Evil with Nature, as it manifests itself in hybrid Man. I have guarded

What about striving for perfection, for excellence: the cruel discipline which it requires, the vegetalizing of inclinations and rights, the hierarchical discrimination...

! !
here my radical disagreement
4)

Marx 2

myself earlier against the misunderstanding that the Human, the ideally good Man, should be conceived as a "denatured" being. I should perhaps add that I also am light-years away from the classical Dualism between mind or soul and body, identifying the latter - the "prison of the soul"-with the seat, if not the source, of Evil. The real "split" runs right through the totality of the person; it divides that in us which "cares" - our "awakened" feeling and will and the bodily functions that serve them - from that in our psycho-physical totality which is "indifferent" and thus on the level of the subhuman cosmic forces. ~~For introspection spectra again~~

As you may remember, I argued already in my Bloch paper that indifference, a neutral attribute of the Universe at large, is the supreme Evil in Man, that "inertia of the heart" is morally worse than ill intent, - Eichmann (in Hannah Arendt's interpretation) as compared with Ilse Koch. The reason for this verdict does not lie in the social consequences of the respective evil acts - the Law punishes quite understandably criminal intent more severely than negligence - but in what it reveals about the offender.

At first sight the moral offenders - as is true of those who try to do good - form a continuum, betraying varying degrees of "Inhumanity", inversely with the lucidity with which the vision of the good is experienced, and ^{with} the strength of the imperative which the vision arouses. Even if we disregard all cases of psycho-somatic pathology as we should in moral evaluations, it appears that Men differ considerably in their capacity for these experiences. Where ^{then} they do so by nature or by nurture we could decide only if we knew more about "socio-psychological" causation, that is,

about the influence which the environment, personal and institutional, exerts on our capacity for perceiving the *good* and for *acting* in accord with what we perceive. Still, many findings of depth psychology and even a study such as Konrad Lorenz' Das sogenannte Boese suggest that ill intent, aggression, deceit and other offences against the "we" are really acts of resentment and responses to legitimate grievances. In a profound sense such offenders "know not what they do". Therefore they have not only a claim on our forgivingness but are a challenge to the moral state of society. Being the result of man-made conditions, the Evil they do is Avoidable Evil.

But now it is significant that the success of such redeeming moral action - mental cure and rehabilitation - seems largely to depend on the vital strength of the offender, that is, on these very energies which while morally uncontrolled cause the offending act. It is there that "inertia of the heart" reveals itself as the main obstacle. The history of religious conversion tells us of many great sinners who turned into saints. But we know of no Laodicean who died a prophet. The same psychological rule seems to govern the moral life of ordinary men. There is hope for Dmitry Karamazoff who burns his fuel in evil passion. But what else than self-destruction is left to Ivan or Stavrogin, not to mention Smerdjakoff, who sin "in cold blood"?

Good why is it?
It is not that the evil deeds committed in the mood of indifference are more hideous than the crimes of the conscious malfactor. But the callous offender is beyond redemption, because he stands at the other pole of full Humanity: in a state

he must have had his motive

A thoughtless "Mistakenly"

-52-

find the term. He is even nearer the zero point
ture as we know it. He anticipates in his being a state
Nature is said to reach in some indefinite ~~XXXXX~~ future:
immense entropy or dead equilibrium. In his sub-human world no
erative sounds any echo - even the Lord, as it is said, spits
him out. Camus' *Etranger* is a terrifying image of this marginal
Man.

Let me stop here, as it were, in the midst of it. Though
speaking as one who is involved rather than one who "observes",
I should like to think that ^{what} I have been stammering about touches
on what we all live by. There should be no reason why one should
bring it up from the depth, were it not that our instincts have
lost their naive self-assuredness while a new era of history waits
to be delivered by our efforts from the womb of a still enigmatic
present. The true problem is, of course, what all this amounts
to in terms of concrete action, personal and political. ~~problem~~
for which these remarks offer hardly a preamble. ~~I expect~~
~~for duty when the "hommes de bonne volonté" sit down to write the~~
~~book itself.~~

As always yours,

A

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of nature as we know it. He anticipates in his being a state
of Nature is said to reach in some indefinite ~~KUKUKU~~ future:
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~~for duty when the "hommes de bonne volonte"~~ sit down to write the
book itself.

As always yours,

Jones (Responsibility)

I. Background

1. 174-181 'bring'

2. 181-182 - repeat first commandment (should not return to him - turned to later part?)

II. Present

1. was the 'deliberate promise' of the child
176 will also label for Plato's time? And
then not all ethical systems elaborate, what
do not not include Responsibility? And
elaborate also for the 'pre-deliberate era'?

2. 173: the legal - moral: perhaps are more
than 'is put out' - they belong to the
'Second commandment' (182)

3. 177 - is 'bring forth' - enough to fire
'meaning' to later

4. 177 the 'ethical right' - punishment
Affirmation of life - should be said

UNITED HELP, INC.
44 East 23rd Street
New York, N.Y. 10010

Nehemiah Robinson Memorial Scholarship Fund

November 26, 1974

To: Members of the Scholarship Committee

From: Gabriele D. Schiff

Re.: Kagan, Georgette
895 West End Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10025
Born: 8/10/44 - New York, N.Y.

The application of this 30-year old girl came to us in the strangest way. Originally, her mother had written to our Scholarship Committee member, Mr. Saul Kagan (who is no relative of hers) for assistance. We then called her mother in. The case worker found that Mrs. Kagan had her own set of problems. In the course of the social work relationship the financial problems of the daughter were mentioned, and the daughter, Georgette, was referred to our Scholarship Committee.

KAGAN
Georgette Kahn was born in New York in 1944, eight months after her father's death. Her father was a well known scholar who graduated summa cum laude from the University of Brussels and was connected with outstanding institutions of higher learning in France. His fields were Social Science and Philosophy of History. He was very active in the underground movement, and when the Germans occupied France, he and his wife were forced to flee for racial and political reasons. They immigrated to this country in December of 1940. Shortly before his death he was appointed professor of European History at State University of Indiana, Bloomington, Indiana where he died of pneumonia. After Professor Kagan's death, Mrs. Kagan gave birth to their daughter. As she was left penniless, she was confronted with an endless struggle to keep herself and the child alive.

It soon became evident that Georgette had inherited her parents intellectual gifts. Mrs. Kagan, a talented linguist, made it by her work as translator and teacher of French possible for her daughter to attend the best schools. Georgette graduated from Hunter High School and obtained bachelor's and master's degrees from City College with highest possible grades. Her letters of recommendation leave no doubt about the fact that her professors consider her an outstanding scholar whose master's thesis on the attempt of post-war French intellectuals to make sense of their social and political roles and responsibilities will be published in a professional paper named "Telos!" There seems to be little doubt that Miss Kagan should teach at college level which she can do only with a Ph.D. degree. To achieve this, it will take her at least two more years. She tutors during the school year and works as a waitress during the summer months. The mother's income is about \$318 a month. She is 68 years old and certainly no help can be expected from her. Georgette took up a student loan of \$600 and expects to earn \$640 by tutoring during the spring semester. Her college-connected expenses run to approximately \$2,350. This leaves a deficit of about \$900 which she hopes to cover in part by work as a teaching adjunct.

I would recommend a loan of \$300 for the spring term and encourage the young lady to re-apply to us for the academic year starting in September 1975. There was also an application submitted to the Vogelstein Foundation that might be interested in this outstanding and charming young lady. I should add that I myself interviewed Miss Kagan and found her serious, goal-minded and struggling hard against tremendous odds.

10570	28.02.1832	Wirtshauspächter	Mayer	Rosenberg	Hannel	Ring	C
10580	24.09.1833	Kretschampächter	Mayer	Rosenberg	Hanna	Ring	C
10590	11.08.1835	Kretschampächter	Mayer	Rosenberg	Hannel	Ring	C
10600	28.05.1837	Kretschampächter	Mayer	Rosenberg	Hannel	Ring	C
10610	19.04.1839	Kretschampächter	Mayer	Rosenberg	Hannel	Ring	C
10620							
10630	15.02.1838	Tücherhändler	Berel	Rosenschein	Ida	Zadek	AT
10640							
10650	18.05.1823	Gutsbesitzer	H. Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10660	10.10.1824?	Gutsbesitzer	Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10670	05.04.1827	Gutsbesitzer	H. Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10680	01.01.1829	Gutsbesitzer	Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10690	11.12.1829	Gutsbesitzer	Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10700	08.06.1831	Gutsbesitzer	Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10710	25.01.1833?	Gutsbesitzer	Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10720	26.01.1835	Gutsbesitzer	Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10730	14.09.1836	Gutsbesitzer	Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10740	05.12.1837	Gutsbesitzer	Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10750	04.02.1839	Gutsbesitzer	Bernhard	Rosenthal	Friederike	Pleßner	B
10760							
10770	29.11.1840	Kretschampächter	Heimann Löbel	Rosenthal	Charlotte	Cohn	C
10780	09.08.1844	Handelsmann	Heimann Löbel	Rosenthal	Charlotte	Cohn	L
10790	13.05.1847	Kaufmann	Heimann Löbel	Rosenthal	Charlotte	Cohn	L
10800							
10810	03.01.1817	Arrendepächter	Abraham	Roth	Marianne	Ehrmann	H
10820	03.09.1818	Arrendator	Abraham	Roth	Marianne	Ehrmann	H
10830	09.03.1820?	Branntw.br.pä.	Abraham	Roth	Marianne	Ehrmann	H
10840							
10850	03.10.1814		Fabian	Roth	Dorel/Mareck	Augsbach	B
10860	19.01.1816	Kretschampächt.	Fabian	Roth	Dorel	Augsbach	B
10870	18.08.1817	Kretschampächt.	Fabian	Roth	Dorel	Augsbach	B
10880	23.01.1819?	Branntw.br.pä.h.	Fabian	Roth	Dorel	Augsbach	D
10890							
10900	27.05.1815	Schänker	Jacob	Roth	Rosel	Ehrmann	P
10910	29.05.1817?	Schänker	Jacob	Roth	Rosel	Ehrmann	T
10920	20.04.1819?	Kretschmer	Jacob	Roth	Rosel	Ehrmann	T
10930	03.03.1823	Pachtkretschmer	Jacob	Roth	Rosel	Ehrmann	T
10940	26.07.1825	Kretschmer	Jacob	Roth	Rosina?	Ehrmann	T
10950	10.06.1827?	Kretschmer	Jacob	Roth	Rosa	Ehrmann	T
10960							
10970	28.03.1815	Schänker	Hirschel	Sachs	Gütel	Siedner	W
10980							
10990	03.02.1812		Samuel	Sachs	Friederike	Steinitz	K
11000							
11010	23.05.1817	Inwohner	Jacob	Schaeftel	Zorel	Brenner	L
11020							
11030	17.05.1812		Isaak Kallmann	Schindler	Rachel	Kaiser	L
11040							
11050	16.01.1836	Inwohner	Jacob	Schindler	Rosel	Berger	K
11060	05.04.1840	Erz-Aufseher	Jacob	Schindler	Rosel	Berger	K
11070							
11080	21.12.1821	Fleischer	Jacob Schaeftel	Schindler	Sarel	Oppenheimer	L
11090	21.12.1821	Fleischer	Jacob Schaeftel	Schindler	Sarel	Oppenheimer	L
11100							
11110	29.11.1831	Lohnschänker	Joachim	Schindler	Dorel	Huldschiner	Z
11120							
11130	10.11.1820	Schuhmacher	Jonas	Schindler	Melene	Loewy	K
11140							
11150	17.06.1815		Kallmann Abraham	Schindler	Scheindel/Loebel	Wolf	
11160	15.06.1817	Inwohner	Kallmann Abraham	Schindler	Scheindel	Wolf	O
11170	13.07.1818	Fleischer	Kallmann Abraham	Schindler	Jeanette	Wolf	S
11180	12.03.1820?	Fleischer	Kallmann Abraham	Schindler	Jeanette	Wolf	S
11190							
11200	12.01.1826	Botenl.Tagelöhn.	Löbel	Schindler	Fanny	Feder	L
11210	13.01.1826	Botenl.Tagelöhn.	Löbel	Schindler	Fanny	Feder	L
11220	28.08.1831	Inwohner	Löbel	Schindler	Fane	Feder	L

