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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

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Saul K Padover

Psychological Warfare first gained currency during World War II and has been used since then, especially in connection with the "cold war." Essentially, the term covers the same ground as the older word "propaganda" and describes the current world-wide practice of using words, ideas and slogans as weapons against an opponent. The phrase "Psychological Warfare" has not gained universal acceptance. The British, for example, prefer to use the term "Political Warfare." The Russians and the Communists in general use the simple word "Propaganda" to describe their activities.

During the Presidential campaign of 1952, American Psychological Warfare activities came in for a good deal of attention. General Eisenhower devoted an important part of a speech to a criticism of the Truman Administration's Psychological Warfare program. In his speech at San Francisco, General Eisenhower said:

"In 'cold war' we do not use an arsenal of arms and armaments.

Rather we use all means short of war to lead men to believe in the values that will preserve peace and freedom. Our aim in 'cold war' is not the conquest of territory or subjugation by force. Our aim is more subtle, more pervasive, more complete."

General Eisenhower stressed the idea that effective Psychological Warfare involved more than the mere use of words. "Many people," he said, "think 'Psychological Warfare' means just the use of propaganda like the controversial Voice of America. Certainly, the use of propaganda...is an essential part of winning other people to your side. But propaganda is not the most important part of this struggle." He pointed out that the world-wide ideological struggle required a proper coordination between actions and words. He advocated a unified American strategy wherein all acts in the field of foreign policy would be united and coordinated for the achievement of carefully planned objectives. "Every significant act of Government," he said, "should be so timed and so directed at the principal target and so related to other governmental actions that it will produce the maximum effect."

Feeling that the Truman Administration had failed to coordinate its policy and had not been "able to grasp the full import of a psychological effort," General Eisenhower, after his election in November, 1952, took steps which he hoped would correct the situation. Early in January, 1953, ten days before his inauguration, he appointed W.C. Jackson to head a Commission of inquiry into America's Psychological

Warfare program. The Jackson Commission's report to the President is expected to lead to a reform in United States propaganda activities.

American Psychological Warfare practices and organizations remained fundamentally unchanged in 1952. The main propaganda activities continued, as theretofore, to be carried out by the Defense Department, the State Department, the Central Ingelligence Agency and, on a lesser scale, by the Mutual Security Administration.

Psychological Strategy Board. This Board, operating under the National Security Council, was charged with the task of coordinating the propaganda activities of the above-mentioned four agencies. Its director, appointed by President Truman in 1952 to succeed Dr. Raymond B.Allen, was Alan G.Kirk, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The other members of the Board consisted of General Walter Bedell Smith, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (and at present President Eisenhower's Under-Secretary of State); David K.E.Bruce, Under-Secretary of State; and William C.Foster, Deputy Director of the Department of Defense.

The Psychological Strategy Board suffered from three shortcomings. First, it had no power to order or direct any agency
to do what it considered necessary. It could only advise. Secondly,
it had neither a budget nor a staff with which to operate. Thirdly,
its component members occupied important administrative positions in
their respective departments and could not, therefore, give much time

or care to the Board. The members met with Admiral Kirk at lunch every Thursday, but there is no indication that anything decisive was accomplished thereby. Final decisions and actions remained, as always, with the four executive agencies acting more or less independently.

Office of International Information. As in previous years, so also in 1952 this Office (OII), a part of the Department of State, was the most active and important Psychological Warfare agency of the United States Government. It constituted, indeed, the biggest single division of the Department of State, employing nearly one-fourth of State's personnel (9,200 out of 38,800 employees) and using up about one-third of its budget. For fiscal 1953, Congress granted the Office of International Information \$96,173,255.

OII pursued its customary activities in 1952 along three main lines: -- those involving individuals, publications, and radio.

Educational Exchange. The OII's Educational Exchange program continued to be one of the largest and perhaps most ambitious undertakings of its kind ever attempted by any country. It involved the interchange of students, scholars, artists, businessmen, journalists and technicians between the United States and foreign countries. Of the 35,000 foreign students studying in the United States in 1952, 2,800 did so at the expense of the State Department. These U.S. Government-supported students came from 65 nations, the largest number of them from Germany. In 1952 there were 977 German students

in American colleges. Well over one thousand German non-students -- journalists, farmers, labor leaders -- also visited the United States in 1952. At the same time 31 American teachers and 133 leaders were sent to Germany. The total amount of money expended on this educational exchange program in 1952 was \$4,500,000 -- as against \$6,000,000 in 1951.

Publications. OII continued its publications program abroad, although on a somewhat reduced scale. Its two most successful publications, both in German, were Der Monat and Die Neue Zeitung. Der Monat, as the name implies, is a monthly of the type of the Atlantic or Harper's, containing highly intellectual and literary articles and making its main appeal to students and the intelligentsia in general. Among its contributors are some of Europe's foremost anti-Communist writers, such as Koestler and Silone. There is an underground route through which Der Monat is being smuggled into the Soviet zone of Germany. Die Neue Zeitung, subtitled "the American Newspaper for Germany," is a highly respected daily. Founded in 1945 soon after Hitler's defeat, Die Neue Zeitung has always frankly reflected American policy and opinion, and at the same time knew how to speak to Germans. Recently, the University of Muenster's Institute for the Science of Journalism reported that Die Neue Zeitung is the most frequently quoted daily newspaper in Germany.

One of the serious losses during 1952 has been Amerika, a Lifetype illustrated monthly magazine in the Russian language. It was, States publication permitted in the Soviet Union. Originally it had an eagerly-bought circulation of 50,000 but more and more Amerika displeased the Kremlin, which put every hindrance in the way of its circulation inside Russia. In December, 1952, the State Department suspended Amerika, as well as a number of other foreign publications, and thus the only printed American voice in the Soviet Union was unfortunately silenced.

Voice of America. The Voice continued its operations in 1952 without any serious alterations of program or organization over the previous year. Its budget was around \$41,000,000 and it broadcast, through its own transmitters and others leased abroad, in nearly 50 languages all over the world, including the tongues spoken by relatively obscure Soviet minorities. Nobody claimed any particular success for the Voice in 1952. It was subject to the same criticism as in preceding years, namely, lack of an integrated and inspiring program and an insufficient realization of the needs and ideas of its world-wide "target." The only innovation of the Voice was the setting up of a unit, with a budget of \$110,000, to work out a television program. It was estimated that there is a potential and growing audience of 12,500,000 television viewers in 17 foreign countries.

Korea. The U.S.Army's Psychological Warfare Section of the Far East Command waged its propaganda campaign on the Korean front mainly with leaflets, although radio appeals were not ignored.

Thirteen U.S. radio transmitters, often operating fourteen hours daily, were active on the Korean front. U.S. planes and artillery dropped more than 180,000,000 surrender and anti-morale leaflets over Chinese and North Korean troops. There were well over 1,000 different varieties of leaflets, hammering away at the basic theme that the Chinese and North Koreans were being used and sacrificed for purely Russian interests. The aim of this tactical offensive, in the words of Col.J. Woodall Greene, chief of the Psychological Warfare Section, was "to deteriorate Communist fighting ability and lower their morale."

The Communists reacted with the now-notorious charge that the U.S. had violated international law by using "Germ Warfare" in Korea. This accusation was taken up by Communist propaganda throughout the world, including the United Nations. Photographs purporting to show germ bombs, infected insects and bacteria, all supposedly of American origin, were published in the Chinese and other Communist newspapers. A Communist-appointed Commission of International Association of Democratic Lawyers spent 16 days (March 3 to 19, 1952) in Korea and came out with a "Report on War Crimes in Korea," accusing the U.S.of having used chemical weapons and of having committed "massacres, murders and other atrocities."

The free world, including the U.S.Government, vigorously denied the charges, rejecting them almost with contempt as typical Communist propaganda. It was pointed out that among the 8 members of the Commission there was not one single scientist and not an individual of any standing. Scientists of world reputer rejected the Communist

charges on obvious scientific-technical grounds -- among others, for example, that the photographs of the bacteria were fakes, that the insects shown in Communist pictures were harmless ones, and that the human flea (the supposed germ-bearing weapon) is rarely a disease carrier and can be reared in laboratories only with the utmost difficulty.

Soviet Psychological Warfare. Communist world-wide propaganda, directed from Moscow, was more active in 1952 than in 1951. Under the leadership of Peter Pospelov, a Marxist theoretician, the propaganda war, especially the "Hate America" campaign, was stepped up. The main instrument of Soviet propaganda continued to be Agitprop, the Agitation and Propaganda section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Agitprop is directly under the Polithure, which rules the Soviet Union and makes policy for Communism throughout the world.

Agitton and its satellites spent more than \$1,400,000,000 on propaganda in 1952. A little over half of that sum was expended on domestic propaganda, \$48,000,000 went for the training of propagandists and agitators, \$40,000,000 was spent on books and pamphlets, and the rest was somehow disbursed abroad. The training of Communist agitators and organizers continued on a large scale. It is estimated that in 1952 about 325,000 students were enrolled in Communist propaganda schools in the Soviet Union. In addition, three higher institutions gave special training to a select number of students. No fewer than 6,900 students were enrolled in the Academy of Social

Sciences and the Higher Party School, each giving three-year courses, and the Correspondence Department, conducting a nine-month course.

The same satellite countries, especially China, duplicated this extensive school system for the training of propagandists and agitators.

Abroad, the vast Communist propaganda apparatus operated with renewed vigor and efficiency. The Moscow radio continued its broadcasts in 38 languages; it was re-enforced by the transmitters of its satellites in China, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other captured nations. Soviet films were shown to millions of people in all parts of the world. Communist magazines, pamphlets and books kept pouring out in a steady stream in numerous languages. In crucial countries such as India, nearly 90% of the literate population bought and read wellprinted and low-priced Communist magazines like the weekly Soviet Union, the fortnightly New Times, the monthly Soviet Literature, and the bimonthly Soviet Woman. Lenin's Selected Works, a book of 600 well-printed and well-bound pages, could be bought for the equivalent of 40 cents in India. In Bombay one bookshop sold, in a period of 6 months, 30,000 copies of Stalin's biography, published by Moscow's Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. "Books on communism," one report quoted Books on democracy and from the free world, on the other hand, mmm were expensive and hard to obtain throughout Asia.

The main objective of this enormous flood of Communist propaganda was all over the globe in/not primarily to win converts or party members. It was rather, according to a report from Washington, "to persuade

people to think about problems as the Soviet Union would like them to, and to do things that will promote Soviet aims."

In 1952, the free world was still on the defensive in the face of the Soviet-Communist psychological offensive against it. London's operations (BBC and the British Council) were, as usual, confined mainly to information about Britain. The French (Radio-diffusion Française) pursued their customary foreign activities in the fields of culture and education. Radio Free Europe, a privately supported agency with headquarters in the U.S.but operating largely out of Munich, did effective work, but it was limited only to the satellites, such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

There are indications that, in 1953, the free world, especially the United States, will not only step up but invigorate its Psychological Warfare program. Secretary of State Dulles has expressed his conviction that an effective American Psychological Warfare strategy could stir up enough anti-Communist sentiment in the satellite countries to shake Soviet strength and help to throw Moscow on the defensive.