

# **An Analysis of Tokaimura Nuclear Criticality Accident: A systems approach**

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## **Abstract:**

Except for what are sometimes called ‘Act of God’, any problems arising at a nuclear plant originate in some way in human error [1]. The IAEA Report also concluded that the accident at the JCO nuclear fuel processing facility at Tokaimura seemed to have resulted primarily from human error and serious breaches of safety principles. However, unless there is a sufficient set of vulnerability causal factors and one or more triggering causal factors, neither an instance of human error nor a consequential event occurs. Based on their systemic analysis of the criticality accident the authors claim that its root cause was combination of (1) inadequate risk awareness by the top management and (2) “kaizen” (production improvement) drives. Famous traditional Japanese culture “kaizen,” an important determinant of the Japanese superior performance, had an adverse effect on the event.

## **Keywords:**

causal factor; criticality accident; human error; “kaizen”; nuclear plant; risk awareness; systemic analysis.

On September 30, 1999, a criticality accident occurred at a uranium processing plant operated by JCO Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as JCO) in Tokai village, Ibaraki Prefecture. A solution of enriched uranium in an amount several times more than the specified mass limit had been poured directly into a precipitation tank bypassing a dissolution tank and buffer column intended to avoid criticality. This action was in contravention of the legally approved criticality control measures. Three JCO plant workers were exposed to high levels of radiation in the accident. This has resulted in the death of two of the workers making this an unprecedented nuclear accident in Japan which has developed nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

This paper provides a partial root cause analysis of the event using a systems approach. Most of the information came from the Interim and Final Reports of the Nuclear Safety Commission Investigation Committee [2, 3]. The rest came from the IAEA Report [4] and other reports on the accident in newspapers and magazines.

## **1. An Overview of the Accident and its background**

### **1.1 Criticality event**

The criticality accident took place in the conversion building of the JCO uranium processing plant in Tokai village in Ibaraki Prefecture. JCO had obtained a license to use nuclear fuel material in this building in November 1980. Four years later, in 1984, the company was granted permission to alter this facility to the processing facility, which enabled it to produce uranyl liquid with an enrichment below 20%.

On the day of the accident, operations were being undertaken at the conversion building to produce uranyl nitrate solution with an enrichment of 18.8% (intermediate enrichment) and concentration below 380 gU/l, which was supposed to be used in “JOYO” a fast research reactor.

The operation to produce uranyl nitrate solution, which was performed by three JCO workers, started on September 29, 1999. The government-approved procedure required the workers to dissolve uranium powder with added nitric acid in a dissolution tank. Instead of this procedure, they dissolved uranium powder in a 10-liter stainless steel bucket. In violation of the operation manual as well as of an approved procedure, they seem to have fed seven batches of uranyl nitrate solution (work unit: about 16.6 kgU) into the precipitation tank which was designed to limit the mass to 1 batch (2.4kgU), using a 5-liter stainless steel bucket and a funnel.

As a consequence of these actions, the uranyl nitrate solution in the precipitation tank reached a criticality and alarms sounded at around 10:35 a.m. on September 30. This criticality consists of a very short period in the initial stage in which a large number of nuclear fission reactions took place and the later stage in which the fission reaction continued slowly for approximately twenty hours. At around 2:30 a.m. on October 1, the operation of draining cooling water running through the jacket pipes installed around the precipitation tank was initiated. At 6:15 a.m. on the same day, the criticality terminated. Later, a boric acid solution was injected. At 8:30 a.m. the end of criticality was eventually confirmed.

### **1.2 Background**

The approved nuclear fuel conversion procedure specified in an internal document involved the dissolution of uranium oxide powder in a dissolution tank, then its transfer to a pure uranyl nitrate solution buffer column for homogenization by nitrogen gas purge and mass control, followed by transfer to a precipitation tank which is surrounded by a water cooling jacket to remove excess heat generated by the exothermic chemical reaction. The prevention of criticality was based upon the general licensing requirements for mass and volume limitation, as well as upon the design of the process, including use of a column with a criticality-safe geometry as a buffer to control the amount of material transferred to the precipitation tank.

The work procedure was modified in 1996, without permission for the modification having been given by the regulatory authorities, to allow the dissolution of uranium oxide to be performed in stainless steel buckets. This new procedure had been followed several times before this accident occurred.

In addition, when the criticality event occurred, they were performing homogenization of uranium oxide by mechanical stirring in the precipitation tank instead of in the mass control equipment. This was done by pouring uranyl nitrate solution directly from the steel bucket into the precipitation tank. The tank was not designed with a geometry conducive to preventing criticality. This means of homogenization in the precipitation tank is not even



However, Attributing the causation of an event to personnel error, without deeper explanation, is of little or no use for correcting the causal factors or addressing the generic implications. Personnel error cannot be corrected, but its underlying causes may be corrected, if and only if, they are known.

Unless there is a sufficient set of vulnerability causal factors and one or more triggering causal factors, neither an instance of human error nor a consequential event occurs. A sufficient set of vulnerability causal factors is the set of circumstances that makes “an accident waiting to happen.” Without the sufficient set of vulnerability causal factors, the triggering causal factor does nothing. Without the triggering causal factor, the vulnerability causal factors just wait for the next opportunity [5].

### **3. A partial root cause analysis**

The author tried to identify the underlying causes of personnel error in the Tokaimura criticality accident. The first branch of inquiry is to identify those underlying causal factors that either set up the situation so that the personnel error was highly likely or triggered the personnel error. In most cases each of the vulnerability and triggering causal factors itself has causal factors. The other branch of the explanation of personnel error should deal with the inadequacy and /or non-existence of physical and administrative defenses (barriers) to personnel error.

#### **3.1 Underlying causes of personnel error**

##### **3.1.1 Vulnerability causal factors**

The development of a loop leading to accident in the figure 2 provided a sufficient set of vulnerability causal factors for the accident. There were two major causal factors behind it.

One was keen international price competition forcing JCO management to pursuit efficiency. The company had experienced financial problems due to international price competition. The sales decreased from 3.25 billion yen in 1991 to 1.72 billion yen in 1998. As a result JCO repeatedly took measures for management efficiency enhancement, including personnel reduction. Especially, the number of technical staffs was cut from 34 to 20.

Industrial organizations, including the nuclear industry, presently are facing a changing environment due to deregulation, an aggressive public opinion, and increasing commercial competition. Commercial success - sometimes even survival - in a competitive environment implies exploitation of the benefit from operating at the fringes of the usual, accepted practice. Closing in on and exploring these boundaries during critical situations necessarily imply the risk of crossing the limits of safe practices.

The other causal factor behind the loop was inadequate risk awareness by JCO top management, who are former executives or loaned officers of its parent company, Sumitomo Metal Mining Company Ltd that has had no other experience in nuclear business. Assuming that a nuclear criticality accident was impossible at the facility, top management had not learned any lesson from previous criticality accidents in other countries. There had been 21 accidents in nuclear fuel facilities in the past - seven in USA, one in UK, and 13 in Russia. Most of them occurred in 1950s and 60s, but one accident happened in Russia in 1997.

The reinforcing feedback loop of production improvement drives supplied a sufficient set of vulnerability causal factors (Fig. 1 & 3). The “kaizen” drives resulted in bypassing certain design features that were supposed to prevent criticalities but at the same time made operations slower and more expensive. The revised company operating manual was in violation of the original operating manual, which had been approved by licensing authorities.

“Kaizen” means ongoing improvement involving everyone - top management, managers, and workers. In business, the concept of “kaizen” is so deeply ingrained in the minds of both managers and workers in Japan that they often do not even realize that they are thinking “kaizen.”

JCO had previously conducted at least four “kaizen” drives and this ‘improvement’ was the seventh. Since all “kaizen” activities are expected to lead to increased customer satisfaction eventually, it was natural that emphasis of the “kaizen” drives at JCO had been on efficiency, cost reduction and quality improvement and not on safety.

The workers were supposed to take the initiative in “kaizen” drives and, in JCO, the manuals were often revised after the workers had changed the procedures. Management apparently condoned operating outside the company manuals and workers felt free to ‘improve’ production process without getting official approval by supervisors in advance. The famous Japanese tradition - “kaizen” drives by the workers with inadequate training let them finally cross the limits of safe practices.

### **3.1.2 Triggering causal factors**

Three workers called “special crew” dissolved sequentially about 2.4 kg uranium powder with 18.8 percent enrichment in the 10 liter stainless steel bucket with nitric and pure water to produce uranyl nitrate. The procedure of homogenization to uniform uranyl nitrate specified that the narrow storage column-tank should be used to control the process on a one-batch basis. Actually, however, the precipitation tank was used instead. As a result, about 16.6 kg of uranium (equivalent of six to seven batches) was poured into the tank. This was the triggering causal factor of the accident.

The following are some of the replies by the workers to the question why they conducted such a risky work:

- In the last two campaigns (in 1995 and 1996), as much as 16 kg of uranium was poured into the buffer tank for mixing and homogenization. And so, they considered there would be no problems if they pour the same amount of uranium into the precipitation tank (Fig. 1).
- The buffer tank was inconvenient for mixing and homogenizing uranium.
- Bad working condition made them want to finish the work as quickly as possible.
- They wanted to finish the dissolution work as early as possible because they planned to train new comers who would join the “special crew” in October from the first phase of the dissolution process.




Fig. 2 An overview of JCO accident




Fig. 3 A root cause analysis of JCO accident

### 3.2 Non-existing or inadequate defense (barriers)

Analysis of industrial accidents invariably conclude that some 80% of the cases are caused by human error and great effort is spent to improve safety by better training schemes, by safety campaigns motivating the work force to be safety conscious, and by improved work system design. However, low risk operation of modern, high hazard system normally depends on several lines of defenses against the effects of faults and errors. The analysis of recent major accidents has also shown that they are not caused by a stochastic coincidence of faults and human errors, but by a systemic erosion of the defense.

Defense, or barrier, in this article is any measure or device that does or is intended to reduce the probability or consequences of an event. There are four levels of defense of quality and safety [5].

1. The first level of defense is individual or work group,
2. The second level of defense is supervision or management,
3. The third level of defense is internal oversight, and
4. The fourth (last) level of defense is external oversight.

The first level of defense is the most important. As the level goes higher, depth of review decreases although objectivity, independence, breadth of perspective, and integration capacity increase. In addition, the first level is full-scope, on-line, and real-time defense whereas the fourth level is sample, off-line, and after-the fact defense.

In the usual defense-in depth situation the individual or work group itself is expected to find and correct the vast majority of work errors. Of the remaining undetected errors, management or supervision is expected to detect a majority. The few errors remaining are the ones internal oversight is to identify. If the effect of the error is there for the internal oversight to either find or overlook, then the defect has already passed through two layers of defense.

In the case of Tokaimura accident, all of these four levels of defense were either did not exist or inadequate (Fig. 2 & 3):

- The first and most important level of defense was inadequate - the workers had no adequate safety knowledge because workers received no training on the criticality hazards of their work. Self-assessment by plants is perceived to be a crucial capacity for safety assurance and continued improvement. Two important indicators of self-assessment capacity are the extent to which employees bring problems to management and management's openness to critical feedback [6]. However, We cannot expect workers to express safety concern unless they have adequate safety knowledge.
- Management and supervision, the second level of defense, was inadequate. There was apparently no involvement of management in the workplace. This facility had processed mostly low enrichment uranium and infrequently intermediate enrichment uranium. There was no change management safety analysis of the medium enrichment uranium change. At the time of the accident, the production batch was intermediate enrichment uranium. Actually, before the three workers started the operation on September 29, 1999, they asked an expert in the management if it was safe to homogenize solution by mechanical stirring in the precipitation tank (refer to Fig. 1). The expert replied it was safe apparently misunderstanding that they were going to process low enrichment uranium.
- The third level of defense, internal oversight, was ineffective. Management failed to establish proper technical management procedures for the preparation and revision of manuals and instruction. These include failure to require the approval of the safety management group chief and/or the chief technician of nuclear fuel. Furthermore, management was either ignorant or condoned operating outside licensed controls. The reorganization in 1992 weakened internal oversight. As a result, for instance, the safety

control manager concurrently served as the quality control manager. His emphasis was inevitably on quality control to satisfy customers. The safety committee lost jurisdiction over accident investigation.

- External oversight, the fourth and last level of defense was either non-existent or inadequate. There was no oversight by the Japanese nuclear industry, which was mainly concerned with nuclear power generation and paid almost no attention to nuclear fuel conversion. The Japanese government had licensed this facility under the assumption that a nuclear criticality accident was impossible at the facility. There were no ongoing or periodic government inspections to ensure that there was no deviation from the approved procedure. They also did not try to learn

### 3.3 Safety culture

Less than one month before Tokaimura accident at the 3rd International Conference on Human Factor Research in Nuclear Power Operation, Kazuo Sato, Chairman of Nuclear Safety Commission in Japan, proudly spoke, “Generally speaking, I believe that the level of Safety Culture in Japan is fairly high even as compared with those in other countries. Excellent performance so far demonstrated in Japanese nuclear power plants seems owing to adequate Safety Culture prevailing everywhere and everybody” [7]. At the same conference, Jiro Kondo, Chairman, Central Environmental Council and Vice Chairman, Atomic Industry Forum, proposed “Anzen-do,” a discipline for safety, as a contribution from the Japanese unique way of thinking. He said, “I would be happy if Japanese traditional culture would prove valuable for safe nuclear power. The Japanese nuclear industry has an operating performance of 40 years without any accident. The unique Japanese approach to safety may be useful as well for the Occidentals with cultures different from ours” [8]

Tokaimura accident disclosed that adequate Safety Culture was not prevailing everywhere and everybody. Apparently, these important persons in charge of nuclear safety in Japan believed that well educated and trained Japanese workers with “kaizen” mind had prevented nuclear accidents in Japan. Actually, contrary to Kondo’s belief, Japanese traditional culture did not only prove valuable for safe nuclear power, but also was a causal factor of the accident in the authors’ opinion.

The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety [9]. We may understand safety culture as that aspect of an organization culture through which all relevant actors treat risk and safety in nuclear installations [10].

International comparisons of production efficiency have suggested that “kaizen” culture may be an important determinant of some of the Japanese superior performance. “Kaizen” is closely associated with quality control. With its different systems of motivation and reward, “kaizen” is vital to the success of quality control circles.

Like many other Japanese companies, JCO was devoted to “kaizen” activities. However, the main purpose of the activities was to improve quality of products and attention to safety was limited to prevention of workers’ accidents in general not including nuclear safety. Encouragement of “kaizen” often results in organizational culture where improvement takes precedence over written manuals. In JCO, managers and workers made light of manuals and considered operating outside written controls to be acceptable. For instance in 1995, the Safety Committee of JCO investigated the actual procedures in operation and approved them as safe procedures with no criticality danger. In 1996, JCO revised its manuals confirming the actual procedures in the facility.



#### **4. Conclusion**

Based on their systemic analysis of the accident, the authors claim that its root cause was combination of (1) inadequate risk awareness by the top management and (2) “kaizen” (production improvement) drives. Famous traditional Japanese culture “kaizen” inadvertently brought about overconfidence in nuclear safety in Japan. Tokaimura accident made it clear that “kaizen” culture can be a fundamental causal factor of nuclear accident. The present circumstances now call for a shift in consciousness from the safety myth in nuclear power. The nuclear industry must attain efficiency and safety at the same time. To achieve this goal, Japanese have to humbly learn lessons from previous events and countermeasures in other countries to avoid nuclear accidents.

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