

III. INTERNATIONALE WEHRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG
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V. INTERNATIONALE WEHRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG IN MÜNCHEN
5th INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER
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10./11. Februar 1968

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5th INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER
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APPENDIX A

~~VI. INTERNATIONALE WEHRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG IN MÜNCHEN~~

6th INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER

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- Dr. SWIDBERT SCHNIPPENKÖTTER, *Ambassador, Foreign Office*
~~Botschafter~~
~~Auswärtiges Amt~~, Bonn
- FRANZ JOSEF SCHULZE, Brigadegeneral, *Deputy Minister*
~~Bundesverteidigungsministerium~~, Bonn
- HANS-BERNHARD GRAF SCHWEINITZ, ~~Regierungsrat~~
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- Dr. THEO SOMMER
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- * PROFESSOR HANS SPEIER
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- * TIMOTHY STANLEY, ~~Gesandter~~
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- ROLF STEINHAUS, ~~Kapitän zur See~~ (*Navy*) ~~Captain~~, *Deputy Minst*
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Dr. HANS STEINKOHL, ~~Bürgermeister~~ *Mayer, Munich*
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A JOHN TOWER, Senator
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A Dr. WOLFGANG WAGNER
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III. INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE-ENCOUNTER

NATO'S NUCLEAR PROBLEM

by Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg
MdB, Bonn

Munich, January 29 and 30, 1966

The Atlantic Alliance finds itself in a state of permanent crisis. While it would seem to me that there is universal consent on the necessity of a NATO reform, there is a very considerable divergence of opinion as to the proper methods and objectives. While one faction proposes to extend integration, the other aspires to an at least partial dis-integration. While one group believes in the possibility - indeed the necessity - of even extending the military commitment of the Alliance to other continents, the other even seeks to reduce the existing measure of joint political activity. While one camp supports a strategy of flexible response, the other subscribes to nuclear priority and calls for a rearmament and re-organisation of the Alliance along nuclear lines. The reasons of this crisis and of the resultant discussions in recent years are many and varied. I do not intend to discuss them here in detail - a short enumeration will suffice.

There are, first of all, reasons of a military and of a political nature. It would be vain to ask whether the military problems have produced the political ones or vice-versa. For there can be no doubt that the two categories of questions are interdependent and wholly inseparable.

But there are also factual changes threatening the continued existence of a NATO structure frozen into immobility ever since the end of the 1950's. The most important of them are the following:

- 1 ° The nuclear stalemate of the two leading world powers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.
- 2 ° The increasing - military and political - commitment of the U.S.A. on trans-oceanic continents.
- 3 ° The discontinuance of the Soviet policy of provoking critical situations in Europe marked by the end of the acute Berlin crisis.
- 4 ° The mounting hostility between Red China and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and a certain liberalisation and disintegration of the East European Bloc on the other.
- 5 ° The (relative) recovery of European strength.

However, the present discussions concerning the Atlantic Alliance are not only centering - or in part motivated by - objective reasons such as those listed above. There are also other arguments of allegedly great significance which, properly speaking, must be relegated to the sphere of pure theory or, even worse, wishful thinking. But within an alliance of democratic states, which because of their very nature are subject to the influence of public opinion, theoretical and emotive arguments may carry greater weight than the bare facts. This psychological law seems to be at work particularly when, for instance, American public opinion regards Red China as the most dangerous enemy of all, or when Americans and Europeans alike paint the reassuring picture of a change of heart in the Soviet Union and her growing readiness to cooperate.

No one will seriously doubt the possibility - or even historical probability - of an eventual moderation of the revolutionary and aggressive character of Soviet Communist policy. Nor can any one close his eyes to the fact that throughout the Communist-controlled parts of Europe - and even in the Soviet Union itself - the brutal methods of Lenin's and Stalin's reign of terror have been replaced by a comparatively more humane form of Communism. But what guarantee is there that this policy will not some day be at least partly revised or reversed? And who could deny that the present modifications of method have changed absolutely nothing about the fundamental, long-term objectives of Communist policy?

But let me cite an actual instance:

One might disagree as to whether another Berlin crisis is in the offing, but we all agree that such a development is possible and that therefore we must be prepared for it. Indeed, the very decomposition of the Communist camp, which we welcome for a variety of reasons, might actually induce Moscow to return to its policy of fomenting political unrest. For is not the practice of totalitarian regimes to rely on an aggressive foreign policy as a safety-value for the mounting pressure of internal discontent well established?

The international scene has witnessed many changes in recent years. But none of them affects the Atlantic Alliance as deeply as the shifting balance of power. Neither the recognizable present intentions of an enemy nor his presumable future plans furnish a dependable basis and guiding principle for the organization and measures of the Alliance. In

the absence of positive evidence that an adversary has once and for all relinquished his hostile intent, there is but one aspect which must determine our policy: the actual power of the potential enemy.

And this means - above all for the European NATO States and in particular for the Federal Republic - that the Atlantic Alliance has lost none of its importance and weight.

As a matter of fact, its position is far more critical now than it was during the first decade of its existence. For today NATO faces an incomparably stronger enemy who has pulled even with the leading power of the West and who, in the military sphere, has created a situation of almost equal "reciprocal nuclear deterrence", i.e. reciprocal paralysis.

The popular argument that this disquieting development has in no way disturbed the total balance of power between East and West is neither valid nor reassuring. I have no doubt - indeed, I am fully convinced - that an over-all comparison of the numerical strength of NATO and that of the so-called Warsaw Treaty Organisation will prove the great superiority of the West. But a mere enumeration of rockets, war-heads, divisions, planes and battleships fails to take into account three other basic elements of strategy which are as decisive as ever: the factors of space, distance and time.

When proper allowance is made for their effect on the balance of East and West, the safety of Europe will be clearly seen to rest only and solely on what has been called a "onesided balance". True, there is no balance of strength between the Euro-Asiatic power of the Soviet Union and the Atlantic power of the U.S.A. But it is equally incontestable that these two giants have struck a balance of deterrence. In the relations between the Soviet Union and Europe, however, we have neither a balance of strength nor one of nuclear deterrence. Somewhat pointedly one might say that the chance for peace in Europe depends on the Soviet Union's continued conviction that to defend Europe the American Government will not even shrink from the ultimate step and accept the risk of challenging the nuclear strength of the powerful Soviet Union.

As long as American troops remain stationed in Europe and hold the front against the Soviet Army, the USSR must fear that any military operation in this area might ultimately lead to a direct exchange of nuclear blows with the United States itself. However, the domestic situation might some day motivate the Soviet Government to adopt a more aggressive policy in the hope that a limited military operation in Europe will not sufficiently provoke the U.S.A. to unfold its whole strength and risk Soviet nuclear retaliation on the American continent.

This brings me to another point. We have admittedly no reason to fear that the American troops might be withdrawn from Europe in the near future - but what European government can guarantee that they will, so to speak, stay here forever? And above all, would the Europeans truly meet their political responsibility toward Europe if they were forever content with this "onesided balance", if they continued to accept the complete dependence of Europe on Atlantic safety guarantees, if they resigned themselves to the idea that Europe was inevitably fated to remain the object of the decisions of Non-European powers?

It is, as a matter of fact, in this onesided dependence of European safety on the nuclear reassurance of the U.S.A., that I see the main source of the NATO crisis. The quarrel about the French "Force de Frappe", the regrettable dispute about the more than unhappy MLF-project, the British indecision in nuclear matters, the suggestion of a world-wide "Non-Proliferation-Agreement", and many other developments must be seen against the back-ground of this "one-sided balance". For this uneasy equipoise does put the two super-powers into a stalemate but it also makes European safety a matter of faith: namely the faith that America will put European interests first and in an emergency refuse to be kept in a nuclear check.

Let me point out that, although I have been comparing military potentials and strategic possibilities, my main concern has all the while been with the political situation. For it appears to be an outstanding characteristic of the nuclear age that on the one hand the actual risk of a war between atomic powers - and, to a lesser degree, between their non-nuclear charges - has been reduced to a minimum, but that on the other hand, purely military considerations influence political decisions more than ever before because the latter are increasingly made under the impression of an immediate threat or a distant possibility of war.

Therefore the practically unchanged nuclear monopoly of America remains the basic element of NATO structure. And for the same reason America's political intention of maintaining and, if possible, institutionalising this monopoly, will remain the most decisive factor in all future plans for NATO. For the continued existence of this unrestricted monopoly would prevent all reforms which might shift the severally mentioned "one-sided balance" in the favor of Europe.

Not one of the responsible American suggestions made hitherto in reference to nuclear "partnership" or "joint command" would in fact have changed anything about the ultimate responsibility of the American government for the use of nuclear weapons. And - rebus sic stantibus - the American attitude is entirely understandable. After all, what principles should govern a possible consignment of nuclear weapons to the national control of an ally? Which partners of the Alliance would "deserve" such confidence, and which would not? How is an alliance to be effectively co-ordinated and controlled if a great number of its member states developed individual nuclear strategies - possibly with a built-in emergency exit?

But on the other hand it is also high time to discard the illusion that technicalities à la MLF or ANF might give the non-nuclear powers access to the atomic arsenal of others. Projects of this kind cannot ever be expected to change the present monopoly situation, they would only cause a lot of expense, a lot of confusion and a lot of unnecessary excitement. I deem it simply absurd to think that such methods could "force" the U.S.A. to use a "multilateral" nuclear weapon (under American veto) if it did not anyway and at the same moment intend to use its own nuclear weapons against the same targets.

An Atlantic "nuclear integration" is both a misleading concept and a wish-dream. It is misleading, because the term "integration" would inevitably have to mean the establishment of a new sovereignty on the part of the "integrated partners" - for the U.S.A. is firmly resolved to surrender not one jot of its own nuclear sovereignty. And it is a wish-dream because any such "integration" - possibly patterned on the MLF - would in practice amount to an institutionalisation of the existing monopolistic or hegemonial structure of NATO.

There is no instant or short-term cure for the unsatisfactory state of Europe's nuclear defense. But naturally this does not mean that German policy should abstain from trying to gain more influence on

the future shape of American nuclear strategy
the siting and selection of nuclear weapons
the choice of targets within the German sphere
of interests.

Nor is there any reason why the Federal Republic should not step forward with her own suggestions concerning the command over nuclear weapons already stationed in Europe. But the present situation does face German policy with one necessity about whose urgency I wish to leave no doubt: it must renounce to all efforts to gain a "physical share" in the nuclear weapons of others. For any such attempt would very gravely damage our political status in the whole world without in the least increasing our safety.

Moreover, any project such as MLF would inevitably prove a serious obstacle to the only, although distant, solution of NATO's nuclear crisis. For there is only one remedy for the present "one-sided balance": Europe must some day establish itself within the frame of NATO as a second nuclear power and partner of the United States. All other schemes, which allegedly aim at a so-called "Atlantic integration" and in truth serve to perpetuate the present monopolistic situation, would merely stand in the way of the future cooperation of the U.S.A. and a United Europe on the basis of equal partnership.

The same aspect must also determine the European attitude toward a possible accord between America and the Soviet Union in the question of a "Non-Proliferation-Agreement" for nuclear weapons. Europe would indeed be faced with a number of serious problems if the two leading nuclear powers reached an agreement of this sort and invited the NATO states to accede. For the signatures of the European states on such a document would make Europe for an indefinite time the political object of the non-European atomic giants.

Even if - as American policy would have it - this nuclear restriction allowed for the creation of a communal organisation similar to MLF, the result would remain the same: the "one-sided balance" with all its inherent dangers for Europe could never more be corrected. An insuperable obstacle would for all time prevent the establishment of a European nuclear power.

It is true that the draft of a "Non-Proliferation-Agreement" presented by the U.S.A. contained a provision which was interpreted by some as making allowance for the future creation of a common European nuclear power. In actual fact, however, this clause only opened the possibility of integrating the already existing nuclear potential - in a common organisation of European states. At the same time another provision in the same draft prohibited all other states to aid this organisation in the development of nuclear weapons. And this amounts to a ban on all joint efforts of the European states to build up a European nuclear power.

I have stated that in my opinion there is only one lasting solution for the problem of Europe's nuclear safety: and that is the creation of a common European nuclear power within the frame of NATO and thus in alliance with the United States. Let me underline once more that this is a long-term objective. Indeed, no one can with certainty predict that it will ever be achieved. But that a European nuclear power under European authority is a more realistic concept than any Atlantic nuclear power under Atlantic sovereignty could ever hope to be, is an equally incontestable truth.

I would suggest that in the present situation a wise German policy would be based on the frank avowal of the above-mentioned objectives, in a strong opposition to all measures likely to stand in their way, and in the energetic pursuit of the gradual preparation of the necessary political foundation. It was President Kennedy himself who inspired this concept when he spoke of the Atlantic partnership between the present world-power America and the future world-power Europe.

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III. INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE-ENCOUNTER

GLACIS AND HINTERLAND

THE DEFENSE OF GERMANY AND FRANCE

by André Beaufre, Général d'Armée

Munich, 29th and 30th January 1966

When a Frenchman has to discuss before a German audience the subject on which I was invited to speak, he finds himself in one of the most delicate situations imaginable. I might easily have felt tempted to extricate myself with the aid of some pleasant generalities, but my subject permits no evasion - it calls for clear and unequivocal answers. I am therefore faced with the necessity of discussing with complete frankness some very difficult and decisive aspects of the problem of Franco-German defense. I am fully confident that my German public will not resent this approach, but will rather appreciate my sincere endeavour to shed clear light on a question which has so decisive a bearing on the future of both our countries.

We all agree that the new geopolitical, strategic and technological situation has inevitably made national defense the common problem of Germany and France. This means that x the two countries will simply have to stand side by side whenever a threat to their common safety begins to take concrete shape. And yet their efforts to achieve common peace-time solutions are at present attended by great difficulties which can be traced back to the numerous inherent contradictions of German policy resulting from the situation created by the collapse of 1945. However, satisfactory solutions can be expected as soon as the Germans will have found an issue from their gravest dilemmas.

The New Strategic Situation

It is a truism that the technical development of new weapons since 1945 has radically changed the strategic situation. But as evident as this revolution may appear to be - its real significance and proportions are by no means universally understood and appreciated. Numerous (and sometimes even eminent) experts seem unable to free themselves from their World War II outlook and experience although the latter have been made largely obsolete by the changed dimensions and nature of strategy. The new dimensions, the new magnitude, result from the enormously increased velocity, reach and capacity of the weapons carriers. Twenty years after the end of World War II the planes fly ten times faster and much farther, the guided missiles speed a hundred times faster and cover even greater distances. In consequence, geographic entities of the size of France and - even more - of the Federal Republic have lost much of their erstwhile strategic

autonomy. By present-day standards warfare has acquired continental dimensions, and Europe - the smallest continent of all - is no more than a theater of operations.

But the strategy of the Federal Republic and of France has even more in common. For the average distance of 180 miles separating the French border from the Iron Curtain make the Federal Republic once more the glacis against the East which Germany had already been at the time of Charlemagne. The defense of France will therefore largely take place in Germany. But on the other hand the Federal Republic can neither defend herself nor deploy her forces unless she has access to the depth of the French and Belgian territories. For the purpose of gaining a sufficiently large basis of operations for the proper disposition of the available ground and air forces, the Federal Republic, France and Belgium will of necessity have to regard themselves as one single area.

This same military concept already forced itself upon us when Field Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny evolved the first strategic schemes for the defense organisation of the Brussels Treaty. It was quite evident to us that the Battle of Germany would decide the fate of France, and we also realized that we should at least have to gain the understanding and support of the German civilian population for the inevitable necessity of fighting on German soil. But a favourable reaction was only to be expected if the German people felt that it was going to be protected from invasion. And there was only one way to achieve this reassurance: to guarantee that Germany was going to be defended as far east as possible. This military principle, which since then has become known by the name of "forward defense", had been evolved by France even before the Bundeswehr was called into existence. Nothing but obsolete strategic concepts can account today for schemes which fail to recognise that France and Germany must adopt a common defense policy.

Nixt to the expansion of the basis of military operations a second factor must be taken into consideration whose significance is still frequently underrated or entirely ignored. I refer to the changed nature of strategy resulting not only from the development of nuclear weapons but, more recently, also from the extraordinary increase of their destructive force. While since 1945 the reach and speed of the weapons carriers have increased tenfold, their annihilating effect has multiplied a million times. This unheard-of technical break-through brought in its train revolutionary

innovations in many fields. The two world wars already manifested the growing complexity of an ever more powerful war machinery whose enormous capacity for destruction was out of all reasonable proportion with the political motives and purposes of the combatants. Numerous witnesses of World War I were already awed by this vast disproportion of cause and effect, and the second World War destroyed whatever doubts might still have remained on that score. Considering that meanwhile the threat of destruction has increased a millionfold, the horrors of a future war would be, to quote the expression of an American expert, simply "inconceivable". The idea that a new conflict might follow the same pattern as the last World War with only a great number of nuclear weapons added, is mere fantasy. The very existence and horrible cruelty of thermo-nuclear arms preclude all major military actions. Our strategy must therefore primarily aim at converting the deterrence through a classic system of national defense into the deterrence through a system of threatening nuclear retaliation. The fact that on both sides of the Iron Curtain there exist large arsenals of nuclear weapons some of which - as for instance the missiles-armed atomic submarines and the "hardened" underground carrier rockets are invulnerable and can therefore deal an annihilating counter-blow - fortunately imposes utmost prudence in the question of employing nuclear methods. In theory this would point to the necessity of a classic defense system permitting the repulsion of relatively small aggressions which would not justify a major nuclear reprisal. Yet the enormous and ever-present danger of ultimate escalation to an exchange of atomic blows has in practice completely hardened the various positions taken in Europe today. This rigid immobility makes it extremely improbable, if not altogether impossible, that anyone would deliberately provoke an armed conflict in Europe - and that no matter what the political situation. But of that later.

X All of these facts do not diminish the danger of an unintentional conflict, however. For many years the Americans harbored the apprehension that technical flaws or imprudent actions of the lower echelons might spontaneously trigger a war. This hypothesis can be safely dismissed today because the present safety-mechanisms preventing unintentional missile starts and the existence of invulnerable nuclear weapons systems rendering rash actions unnecessary, have put an end to these safety risks. Meanwhile the nuclear balance of power has been equalised to a point which makes us wonder under what circumstances - short of the defense of absolutely vital positions -

the threat of using atomic weapons is still credible. But this stalemate does not extend to the level of the conventional forces. The more one deterrence cancels the other, the greater the temptation to use conventional military methods in the eventuality of serious political complications beyond the Iron Curtain. A recurrence of something like the Hungarian up-heaval either in East Germany or elsewhere, and the repeated attempt of Soviet forces to re-establish the Communist order, would lead to an extremely serious crisis with possibly very grave political and military consequences. It is this sort of incident which at the moment presents the likeliest cause of a crisis in Europe. In this context it must be distinctly underscored that such situations do not measure up to the definition of military aggression which would justify the intercession of NATO. For incidents of this sort would not be taking place after the outbreak of a war but in times of peace for which the NATO commands have actually no combat orders. Besides, the sequence and interplay of the measures which constitute the system of deterrence represent by nature and definition a process which can fulfil its purpose only if it is set going in times of peace, i.e. before the use of military means. The Cuba crisis was an excellent example of this policy.

It is only a logical consequence that the system of national defense, which formerly consisted in military preparations for the eventuality of war, is now more and more shifting its emphasis on deterrence in times of peace. In critical moments the effectiveness of a national system of defense rests, in other words, on the successful manipulation of, and the convincing threat with the available political and military means.

The skilful presentation of political, military and material trumps in the decisive instants of a crisis calls for a psychological insight greatly different from the routine attitude towards conventional problems. And this new situation bears at best only a slight resemblance to the original concept of NATO embodying a strategy of defense against military aggression. The effective implementation of this new concept of nuclear deterrence on a supra-national level will probably encounter certain difficulties, for the national state still is at present the only concrete embodiment of sovereignty in times of peace.

The new magnitudes and the changed military situation leave no choice but to regard the national defense of the Federal Republik and of France as a common and inseparable task. The same factors also call for a reorganisation which extends beyond the military sphere and which does not look backwards but is conceived in the light of today's and tomorrow's necessities.

Political Disagreement

Unfortunately we are not only confronted with the difficult problems resulting from the revolutionary changes of strategy. We must also face the far more delicate questions ensuing in part from a conflict of interests which has merged in the past 20 years, and which are partly the consequence of the inherent contradiction of German policy which must be traced back to the German collapse in 1945. It is not exaggerated to say that there is an absolute contradiction between the agreement in matters of defense and the disagreement in our political objectives.

World politics have undergone considerable changes in the past ten years. The pressure which the USSR brought to bear on Central Europe by means of its large conventional forces and its expansive ideology has been replaced by an incontestable military balance thanks to NATO and the nuclear power of America. Simultaneously the interior evolution of the USSR has notably modified its political attitude towards the West. More recently the Cuba crisis demonstrated the impossibility of a nuclear conflict between Russia and America. These circumstances as well as the fact that its steadily growing force will make China the main source of international tensions in the years to come, have brought about a certain rapprochement between the USSR and the USA. It is true that this development is still slowed down by numerous obstacles on either side, but the tendency as such is too manifest to be any longer ignored.

In recognizance of the existing international situation, and after many years of continuous warfare in distant countries which terminated in the great crisis of decolonialisation, France has withdrawn to her own native soil. Since then she has built up her own nuclear deterrence and the core of a conventional military force, both of which are in full

harmony with the peaceful and defensive nature of French policy. At the same time France places full confidence in the progressive unification of Europe. Although Great Britain may still disagree in some important nuances, it fundamentally adopts an analogous attitude.

Germany, on the other hand, is dissatisfied with the present situation and therefore essentially remains an unsaturated country imposing a considerable burden on America's relations with the Soviet Union and making France fear for the future of Europe in spite of all France-German solidarity in matters of defense.

It is evident, of course, that Germany presents the far more complex problem, for the consequences of the collapse of 1945 inevitably involve the Federal Republic in numerous political dilemmas.

In the interest of her safety the Federal Republic at first saw herself forced to postpone her legitimate claims for reunification. She had to resign herself to a military - and above all nuclear - status inferior to that of her Allies. But she did so in the hope that the disadvantages of this situation might be remedied by a policy of integration which, while it might limit Germany's freedom of action, could still be expected to increase German influence within the Alliance, to lend emphasis to the American safety guarantee and to mitigate the unpleasant Burden of discrimination. And so the Federal Republik renounced to the very same nuclear weapons which now emerge as an indispensable component of modern defense. But the close relations with the USA, which is regarded as the principal supporter of German interests, did not prevent America from seeking to establish a certain detence with the Soviet Union. Nor is it any longer possible to calm down the ever louder voice of certain parts of German public opinion which clamors for reunification and even return to those eastern territories which belonged to Germany in 1937. But it is exactly these claims which confirm the suspicions of the Soviet Union and at the same time drive the Soviet satellites in East Europe back into Moscow's embrace.

This host of contradictory tendencies and effects adds up to an almost inextricable welter of complications which render the European situation extremely difficult and prevent a satisfactory political solution of the common defense problems of France and Germany. But no matter how difficult the situation may be - effective solutions must be found at all cost.

The Political Solutions

From the French point of view the concept of defense must not only be based on military considerations. Now that the nuclear balance of power has changed the political constellation so thoroughly that the possibility of a Soviet invasion can be practically dismissed for the moment, the questions of defense must be primarily regarded in their political aspects. But this goal will remain a mere vision unless (of course only by very gradual and prudent steps) some form of political agreement is achieved which will permit Europe to resume its traditional relations with the various countries of the East. A normalisation of this sort presupposes, however, a détente between East and West which, incidentally, forms at present one of the main objectives of both American and French policy.

The same political imperative forces Germany to make a final choice in the question of nuclear armament. Whatever legitimate expectations the Federal Republic may place in the eventual abolition of even the last trace of discrimination - for the moment it is simply inconceivable that the Germans should demand the physical possession of nuclear arms without simultaneously provoking the violent opposition of the Soviet Union and its satellites, a reaction which would be diametrically opposed to all hopes and efforts to reestablish Europe's and Germany's historical union.

It is undeniable that this interpretation seems to reflect not so much the necessities of German domestic policy but rather the interests of the foreign policy of France. But this point of view is nevertheless in complete accord with the necessity of placing the German problem into a more comprehensive logical context. One must also be mindful of the dangers inherent to the frequent declarations of Bonn that inaction is the only policy. Allegedly, any German option would amount to a voluntary concession and only weaken the European position when some day the status of Central Europe will be finally settled in a peace treaty. If Germany persists in these fateful contradictions it will inevitably delay the solution of its problems and incur the risk of disappointing in one way or another the false hopes of German public opinion. It is simply impossible to achieve at one and the same time two diametrically opposed objectives.

The Military Solutions

As soon as Germany has opted for the one or the other political alternative, it will be possible to devise effective military formulas which will not only safeguard the military safety of France and Germany within the Atlantic Pact but also furnish the basis of an adequate future European defense system.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has successfully established an extraordinarily powerful safety potential which no doubt has helped to protect West Europe and which at present constitutes a deterrence of the very first order. As already mentioned above, China's appearance on the international scene and the development of the Soviet-American relations on the one hand, and the nuclear and conventional dispositions of the West on the other, will certainly discourage any Soviet attack on the Federal Republic or Berlin.

Nevertheless it must be recognised that our defense system has its soft spots. The most evident and immediate weakness results from America's interpretation of deterrence. The United States is rather envisaging a containment of possible conflicts instead of their elimination through total deterrence. But for us Europeans even the smallest armed conflict on European territory would entail the gravest, even incalculable, consequences. It is quite true that the practical chances for such a conflict are exceedingly small, but in theory they do exist and so we must be prepared. The dire consequences of this contingency loom particularly large in German eyes, for the Federal Republic finds itself in the psychological situation of an out-post. Therefore we must do everything to bring about a re-orientation of American strategy in the direction of total nuclear deterrence which will confront a potential enemy with the inexorable certainty that nuclear aggression spells for him nuclear self-destruction. On this score Germany and France hold identical and complementary views: the presence of a number of tactical nuclear weapons in the front-lines will add substance to the threat of total retaliation. The same effect is achieved by the exceedingly decided stand of France which leaves no doubt that any Soviet attack will provoke a nuclear counterblast targetted on the territory of the Soviet Union.

The existing theoretical disagreements concerning the use of nuclear weapons underline the absolute necessity of evolving common concepts of nuclear strategy within the Atlantic Alliance. France has been insisting on the urgency of this problem for many years, although it is the United States which controls the overwhelming majority of the West's nuclear weapons.

France also demands that the Atlantic structure of command be somewhat revised in favour of the European NATO partners. Only common investigations and efforts will safeguard that the various wishes and requirements of each individual member country will be properly considered in the total strategy of the Alliance.

It must be remembered that the existing plans - subject to the directives of Council Decision MC 70 provides that in an emergency the Allies will be supplied with American nuclear war-heads - guarantee to the Federal Republic the protection of a fully developed nuclear weapons system. That, and a common defense strategy borne by the consent of all members, should surely satisfy German safety interests even if the Federal Republic does not possess any nuclear weapons of its own. Collective systems such as MLF would hardly make a noticeable contribution to the existing safety factor.

② The second weakness of NATO results from the changing strategy of deterrence and the fact that Europe faces a new situation in which a major Soviet invasion no longer constitutes the principal cause of potential conflict. While the original NATO conception is still based on this contingency, it does not provide for the new main problem, namely i.e. how spontaneous crises which might acquire more or less critical proportions in times of peace without amounting to deliberate full-scale aggression - can be kept under strict control. These new factors are far from rendering NATO obsolete, for the Alliance was from the outset conceived for an entirely different purpose, namely as an instrument of defense in case of real war. But the changed situation does essentially affect the options made by America's leading European partners in reference to Europe. The countries concerned must make allowance for the sudden emergence of localised critical situations and must devise methods to deal with them effectively and in the well-considered interest of the community. This contingency equally calls for joint studies and planning in which the Federal Republic and France will have an important part to play.

In this context it is by no means superfluous to state that suggestions to build up collective nuclear arms systems such as the MLF have no practical bearing on the type of critical situation described above. Their purpose is no more and no less than retaliation: in case of aggression they have to deal the "counter blow". Nor would the directives governing a collective order to fire permit any other use of such systems. From this follows the necessity of preparing and coordinating national counter measures with particular circumspection and thoroughness, for in most cases it will not be possible to pursue a rigid, pre-determined course of action. Common and extended studies of the various potential patterns of crisis, on the other hand, can confidently be expected to promote a genuine spirit of political and military cooperation and to deepen the awareness that agreement and partnership are among the principal foundations of a future Europe.

This common effort would initiate the first - and as yet purely intellectual and creative - phase of a European Defense Community of which we must hope that someday it will be realized.

Within our community the Federal Republic provides forces for the express purpose of defending a glacis or out-post which - if need be - would be reinforced by European and American complements. In view of the gradually emerging political evolution the importance of these forces would rather amount to a symbolic manifestation of solidarity than to an effective military contribution. But France and the Benelux Countries will provide not only the depth of space required for the German defense dispositions but also the indispensable second line of defense which might even be strengthened by full mobilisation should the nuclear stalemate lend new urgency to the threat of conventional war. The depth of these defense dispositions together with the French nuclear force provides the Continent with a very effective nuclear deterrence complementing for Europe the general effect of the vast nuclear strength of America.

But the nuclear potential of France has another important function: it alone furnished the basis on which the scientific, industrial and military applications of nuclear power could develop also on the European side of the Atlantic. These efforts, which for the time being are limited to a national scope, will fully bear fruit with the creation of a political European Authority which will coordinate and make accessible all findings to all members of the European Defense Community.

It is partly for this reason that France has so energetically opposed the "MLF" project. For this scheme would irrevocably have led to the formation of an Atlantic nuclear force. This would no doubt have prevented a future European nuclear force which may be hoped to form around the nucleus of the existing French and British nuclear forces.

A complete integration of the European Forces will only be possible once Europe has created the political authorities empowered to make the necessary large-scale strategic decisions. For in contrast to an illusion which is widely held in the Federal Republic, it is indispensable that the military instrument should be subjected to the unquestioned and effective control of a political body.

This does not, of course, preclude a number of intermediary steps: first of all one might start European discussions and studies concerning the prevention of such crises as I have mentioned above. Another rewarding subject would be the possible effects of nuclear strategy on European defense. France has for a long time been insisting on the necessity of such political and military contacts whose fundamentally peace-preserving purpose would be universally manifest once the political options have been made of which I spoke before.

A European agreement concerning the coordination of defense production might be another intermediary step of great consequence, particularly since the recent talks on France-Germany industrial collaboration have already prepared the ground. The simultaneous existence of competing weapons systems which is so typical for Europe and which induces our countries each to rely on its own (or even American) military equipment, a policy diametrically opposed to the vital necessities not only of weapons standardisation and effective common logistics, but also to the well-considered interests of our industries. The idea of creating common funds for military research and development would not only be another promising step in the desired direction but would moreover enable our most advanced European research centers to compete successfully with American scientists. Beyond their immediate significance these preliminary steps might also blaze the trail for a future political union.

Germany Must Choose

After many centuries of conflict France and Germany have at last found their common mission in Europe. Their geographic position, the complementary character of their economies and the military requirements - all of these factors combine to make joint defense efforts an absolute necessity. The fact that German soldiers on maneuver in France are so warmly welcomed by the French population proves that the French have instinctively read the signs of the times. And so one can confidently predict that, inspite of our present difficulties, the essential problems of Franco-German relations are about to be solved.

Such disagreements as still divide us today are of a political nature and a result of the fact that France unhesitatingly grants top-priority to the reunification of Europe, while Germany, caught up in its domestic dilemmas, still hesitates which way to choose. But sooner or later Germany must make its choice.

Permit me to express here my fervent hop that this option will not be long in materialising so that Franco-German solidarity may come to full fruition. In actual fact Germany does not have to choose between safety through NATO and reunification, between the possession of nuclear weapons and discrimination - nor is it confronted by the alternative of integration and nationalism. Our whole future depends on the clear recognition of the one and only way which will lead to reunification in a greater Europe whose larger and more generous political dimensions will make it easier to heal the scars left by World War II and the brutual division of 1945.

XI. INTERNATIONALE WEHRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG IN MÜNCHEN
11th INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE-ENCOUNTER IN MUNICH
11ième RENCONTRE INTERNATIONALE DE LA WEHRKUNDE A MUNICH

16./17. Februar 1974

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