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TRIP REPORT
HANS SPEIER

The following is a recorded talk given by Hans Speier on 4 March 1968:

This is going to be in the nature of a trip report covering a period from February 8 to 24 in Germany. I spent a few days in Munich, in Berlin, and in Bonn.

In Munich, just to give you the background, I talked to some leading person in the German intelligence service who is going to visit RAND in the next few days--General Keenitz is interested in information storage and retrieval for intelligence purposes, and the Air Force is sponsoring his trip. So I met him in preparation for this trip to RAND.

I also attended the Wehrkunde Conference which is a conference of some military analysts, politicians, from Germany, France, Great Britain, the United States, and some other NATO countries plus Austria and Switzerland. I went to the research institute that is under the direction of Dr. Klaus Riectter near Munich for a round-table conference, and I had a number of subsequent discussions in Munich with various Germans.

In Berlin I went to the U. S. Mission, to the technical universities, to the Free University, to the Senate, and I talked to a number of German and American journalists. I was fortunate to be there during the weekend when the big student demonstration against Vietnam took place, and I have yet to say about that later.

In Bonn, apart from the U.S. Embassy, I talked to a number of deputies in Parliament, a number of officials in the Foreign Office, and in the Defense Ministry, in the Press Office, and again with some defense analysts--specialists on foreign policy in the town.

Both the faushing and the flu cut short my schedule and made many changes necessary, although I neither participated in faushing nor the flu, but most of the people that I wanted to see seemed to be in the grips of either one--faushing or the flu.

Now what I want to do to day is I want to talk about six subjects that seem stand out in the impressions that I got on this short trip. Let me list them for you so that you know what's coming up. I'd like to say a word about the present German attitude atoward the nonproliferation treaty, a word about German Eastern policy, something about the British withdrawal from the possessions east of Suez, something about German attitude toward France and French policy toward Germany that transpired in the conversations, fifth, something about German attitude toward the United States and particularly Vietnam, and finally I'd like to conclude with a few observations on the German domestic political scene which I found very interesting.

Now before starting on this, let me say a word first about the Munich conference on which I will say about a fourth of my impressions are based. It differed from all preceding conferences that I attended (four of them) and that the American delegation was extremely large (and that was for the first time). I learned that it was due to the initiatives taken by the German Chancellory. They were interested in getting some German Senators and representatives, as well as Defense Department officials, to the meeting, and they succeeded in getting Senator John Tower from Texas and three Congressmen--Ray Hayes, John Brodemus, and Henry Roes to the meeting. In addition to that, the meeting was attended by Fred Wyle, Bill Kaufman from my suggestion (of course, I didn't know that Wyle would be there and I

thought it would be important ~~that~~ somebody could speak for the official McNamara policies toward Europe); Christopher Emmett, who is maybe known to some of you; Stephen ^{a Possony} ~~Personi~~; Timothy Stanley; the paper for the United States was read by Bernard Brodie; and myself. Now that is a pretty large list, I would say. And although some people like Bill Kaufmann said very little, and what he said was very polite, there were enough Americans there to listen and to speak occasionally. I talked to the organizer of the conference afterwards, and I asked him how on earth should these official American representatives react to the meeting, and he told me that the Congressmen and Senator Tower, in particular, who were sort representative of the loyal opposition opening the meeting as a man requiring respective dignity, not saying much and then keeping silent. By that the three Congressmen, in particular, had thanked the organizer of the conference quite profusely because they had not realized, they said, how uncertain the fate of the nonproliferation treaty is in Europe, and evidently they had not been quite correctly informed in Washington, or not fully enough informed, and coming back to Washington they would certainly make inquiries how come they, as U.S. Congressmen, were kept so ill-informed. So in this respect the initiative of the German Chancellory was highly successful because this was precisely what they wanted to accomplish and through the person of

Wittenburg, who was at the meeting and who made the main statement against the nonproliferation treaty. The other American representatives or the main lines taken by the American delegation were about as follows:

Brodie and a paper that was not too much brought up-to-date concerning recent NATO doctrine attacked the McNamara doctrine and the McNamara strategy and also the involvement in the war in Vietnam. Christopher Emmett and Congressman John Brodemus made toward the end of the meeting a rather pathetic and tearful plea for help on the advance of payment problem. Fred Wyle and

in a very short statement, Bill Kaufman lectured the Germans on the correct behavior of a minor ally, and Fred Wyle distributed a sheet of figures about relative strength--Western and Eastern fractional strength--to the German newspaper men which fell in the hands of a representative of the German Intelligence Agency who told me later that he considered these figures completely hoax.

Stephan Personi, of course, talked about the silent partners in the conversation, namely the technological revolution and weaponry that would take place and resurrect not only the Soviet menace but by possibly as early as 1969 a Soviet superiority in strategic weapons. And Timothy Stanley did not say very much--I forget precisely what he said. That was about it.

The British, of course, were preoccupied with their withdrawal from east of Suez, and there was a sensation at the meeting, namely a paper which was officially read but clandestinely circulated by a member of the British Intelligence and a member of the Conservative Party, who just blasted the position of the Wilson government so that Mr. Richards, the MP from the Labor Party, had a very rough time against something that was not really open on the table, and the man remained silent, although his paper was far better than by Richards--briefer and much better. I will give you a few quotations in a minute.

The main French speaker was General , and he was surprisingly weak this time. I have heard him on various occasions at these meetings. He was quite weak, giving sort of a minor, highly philosophical comment on the nature of coalitions in the support of the recent paper that is at present quite widely discussed in Europe on these three models of the future of Europe--the

, and corporation paper, prepared by the
--which was not itself discussed but it was sort
of in the back of minds of many people.

The Germans presented two papers. There was one from the CDU--a deputy whom I hadn't heard before by the name of Krauska, allegedly a calming man-- and one by a social democrat on security policy and disarmament, presenting some of the socialist views on armed control.

The central topic of the meeting was the alliance in the '70's, and there was a vain attempt every once in a while to project something into the future, but on the whole, it was really a voicing of current concern and whatever there was of the future was quite pitifully extrapolated from what is happening today. And that was the size of the futurology of the meeting.

Now so much for the general characterization of the meetings, and I know we'll get some flavor as I go to the individual points that I would like to discuss.

Let me start with the nonproliferation treaty. There were two main schools among the Germans represented. One by Dr. Hans Arnold, who is a personal, right-hand man of Willy Brandt in the Foreign Office, the designated for Ambassador of Yugoslavia with which Germany has just agreed on exchange of diplomatic relations. A few days before I left, something seems to have happened so that Arnold's appointment is still uncertain, but at the time the meeting took place everybody said he is the one who will go to Yugoslavia. So he spoke, as it were, for the foreign office and also for the social democrats, being close to Brandt and having joined the social democratic party some years ago during an election campaign in which either Adenauer

or attacked Willy Brandt for the fact that he was an illegitimate child. And Arnold, until then, was not a Socialist, just left the foreign office, went to the social democratic headquarters, and said, "I want to kind of joint, I can't stand the/politics involved." He became and close and trusted collaborator of Brandt. He spoke in favor of the ~~XXXXXX~~ MPT, that is, the current draft, saying I thought quite correctly, but during the last year a great number of improvements in the text have taken place, partly upon German insistence in negotiations in Washington, conducted on the German side by and his scientific advisor, , whom many of you know because he was here. S himself was one of the persons who had the flu this time and couldn't come. But I learned by inquiring that S himself holds the same view. He considers this is a major achievement on his part, which it is, having gotten the United States to agree to this improvement, so everybody on that side of the house seems satisfied with the MPT, detailing the improvements and enumerating them, pointing them out.

Then came Guttenburg, and he was seconded by Zimmerman, who is the chairman of the Defense Committee in Parliament, and by Yaeger who is the former Minister of Justice in the Erhardt government, also CSU men from the very up and by a number of people such as ~~Professor~~ to a lesser extent by Graver, that is the German Ambassador to NATO, and some journalists. So the ring that I'm going to ~~discuss~~ describe now, perhaps due to the location of the meeting in Munich, but much more strongly, more vocally represented than the honored line, which in German politics, of course, stronger than ~~was~~ appeared at the meeting. In fact, Arnold only had some dubious and qualified report from Theo Zummer among the Germans.

Now the main arguments that Güttenburg made were about as follows: Yes, there were some improvements but we now have a basis for discussion really between the Allies putting aside not the fact that a year of discussions has passed since Strauss and Adenauer talked about the treaty as another Yalta and super Versailles and so on. And he or somebody else referred to the fact that Holstein too had said it is a perpetuation of Yalta, even in its present form as a treaty; and he himself, Güttenburg, was a bit more cautious. He said there are three types of problems that need to be ironed out. One has to do with procedure. There has to be a conference to examine the disarmament of the super powers from time to time. This is not provided for in the treaty. There has to be a further discussion about the duration of the treaty--25 years as provided in the last draft is more than eternity. Then there must be also a procedure or clarification of the conditions that have to be met before the treaty will be enforced, particularly with respect to the number of ratifications required and the types of states whose ratification is required. The Germans, in particular, are always very anxious to point out that they and some other countries are more important than some of these new African republics, so let's not put them together in the same category. Outside the treaty text or treaty draft, there are furthermore secondly questions of verification. The question of verification has to be clarified further--the verification of the actual work that is being done with the reactors in the various countries. And this has to be clarified in such a manner as to make sure that the European energy market will not be completely dislocated before it even has created a nuclear energy market before it is created. This is what is really at stake. He said the control of five states, that is all Eurotron states but France, in Eurotron would be dangerous if these five

states were to be subjected to a double control, namely by Euratron on the one hand and the Vienna Agency on the other hand. The whole way in which this will be handled is not clarified. Furthermore, he said, the question of the interpretation of the treaty--which is by no means clear enough--there is the danger that verbal agreement is taken for a substantial consensus, particularly among the big powers whereas we, the Germans, do not know whether this will be really the case. And he referred back to the old standby of the Christian Democrats, namely the so-called Europe Clause, or European Clause, meaning that the treaty should have a provision permitting a unified Europe in the future to become a nuclear power. For example, if France and Britain were to bring in their nuclear arsenals and gave up the sovereignty as is our way in the future, but had significance to the Christian Democrats as _____, as a Social Democrat pushes aside and says let's not talk about something so far in the future. He again brought up the fact that after all at the beginning of the whole debate on MPT there was this article by Foster in Foreign Affairs in which he said the agreement with the Soviet Union is so important as to be well worth the price of any erosion of the European alliance. He unfortunately did make this statement in writing and it has been haunting us ever since. which Now you might add to this that all this statement/was ~~more~~ more moderate than the statement by Zimmerman, the CSU chairman of the Defense Committee, was made despite the fact that Guttenburg must have known, if anybody knows, I mean he is State Secretary to the Chancellor and extremely well informed on these matters, he must have known that in the negotiations in Washington on various occasions, Foster and his deputy were overruled by the President himself in favor of the German arguments. This happened I think two or three

times. And improvements were made. No recognition, except for a very brief statement, "Yes, it is very good, but..." and then came a the long list of grievances. No recognition of these improvements was made.

So ~~then~~ when he was through, another Social Democratic deputy asked immediately, "Mr. Chairman, did Rowen Guttenburg speak as a person or as a representative of the Chancellor?" And the chairman obliged by saying, "We all speak as persons. It's sort of anybody's guess how you do this, you see--how you divide yourselves, your various roles that you play."

The other Germans with whom I talked about this in trying to get just a feel at least as to what they ~~xxxxxx~~ viewed the seriousness of this issue in Germany. They said, "Yes, it is one of the three or four issues, and in foreign policy, the only issue, ~~the~~ the only issue in sight which can lead to a really very serious crisis in the Grand Coalition."

Now let me leave it at this, and if you want to come back to it, we can later. Let me turn to the issue of Eastern policy.

On Germany's Eastern policy, characterized since the formation of the Grand Coalition Government by efforts with the Eastern European countries. The view generally expressed was that ~~the~~ we must pursue a datant policy because everybody else does. The French do, the British are going to be much more active in this area now, and after all your President has said that he wants to build bridges, so why don't we go ahead? We must go ahead. At the same time it was realized that when the Germans begin to talk with the Russians, if there is any chance that the Germans will talk with the Russians, then a number of other countries get very nervous, particularly Washinton gets nervous. There was the stein memo, memorandum by the German Ambassador from Washington, warning Bonn that there were certain people ~~wh~~ in the State Department who took the strongest view of these attempts toward German-Russian direct negotiations, although officially it was always said, "I didn't read the memo myself, but I talked

unanimously first that it was more of the same anti-German propaganda that we had gotten before and secondly, and more interestingly, and more in line with my own interpretation, that it was an attempt to put the brake on Uhlbrecht, who after all, since the beginning of the new Eastern policy, has really made Communist policy in Eastern Europe with the Russians playing, as it were, the second fiddle and by now preventing the memorandum and threatening to talk with Bonn directly, they write the music, and Uhlbrecht has to play the second fiddle. This is, of course, more to their liking. Even _____ in the State Department thought that this was probably correct or at least a reasonable hypothesis--who knows what is _____ and what is _____. It, of course, also serves the old Soviet purpose of creating a schism ~~between the~~ in the Western alliance or as to the extent that it still exists. Note the _____ stein memo and of course it is also very unpopular with the French--that the Russians would talk with Bonn that is really more important than Paris rather than with Paris--and so on.

Wherever I went, another issue to which my attention was called to in a conversation, incidentally, in Munich on which I found quite an interesting question. To my great surprise, I found that virtually nobody claimed to be familiar with this situation. I said, "would it not be possible that the Russians are preparing the ground, or a sort of political ~~strategy~~, for discussion with the Germans and the Western Allies on the following subjects: There are three reactors in West Berlin: two research reactors and one reactor that is to produce nuclear energy. If you ~~are talking about the~~ Euratron controls the output of these reactors, it means that Russian implicitly recognize

West Berlin
that ~~that~~ is part of the Federal Republic. If the Vienna Agency, however, controls these reactors, it means an implicit recognition on the part of Bonn that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic. And that's really quite an interesting political problem, it seems to me, and a great deal of political hay can be made by playing up this situation. Now if this hunch is possibly correct, then, of course, the effort on the part of the Russians (a) to come to a talk with the Germans and (b) to suggest to them that the political presence of the Federal Republic in West Berlin ~~ought~~ ought to be diluted makes a great deal more political sense than it otherwise would. As I said, most people--including some pretty high officials in the Foreign Office--said, "We're speechless; we must study this." They are quite right--possibly an interesting issue. Only the American Embassy--the one person I talked to there--said "no, no, don't worry; this will not happen;" but he also said that the Russians are quite right in insisting that the Germans should dilute their presence in West Berlin--their political presence in West Berlin.

Point 3--the UK. As I mentioned, Ivar Richards, ~~the~~ Labor MP, presented a paper on the recent announcement that the British would vacate their positions east of Suez sooner than originally anticipated--I think in 2 1/2 years instead of 7 or something like this. He presented this (what else could he do?) as a matter that was absolutely necessary for economic reasons but this he soft-pedalled and he emphasized instead that this would make Britain a more European power and hence a more desirable member of the Common Market, or the European arrangement. He got very very little favorable response with this presentation from the Germans and some other British people who were there, British representatives, as I said, really

pathetically pleaded with the Germans, "Don't you at least recognize that now we are (at least much be said since we do this) that we are more European now not having shed these extra European interests." And the Germans didn't budget much--not much. But, ~~the~~ as I said, the really interesting thing was the paper by Colonel Waring, who was stationed in Portugal, and who spoke of the dismantling of British power to the level of a third-class power, he said, air power to be now compared poorly with Sweden, although Britain has 7 times the population as Sweden, and we will have less and less weight as a world power and the United States will have to look for another foreigner--who can that possibly be?--only Germany but nobody will like that. And, of course, the U.S. State Department created the power vacuum in the Middle East by its decolonialization policy--he's a very conservative man who takes his scotch in his bathtub every afternoon at 5 o'clock when he has a hot bath before going out to dinner, you see. He still is evidently quite angry about Suez, but he is ^{going} ~~wikking~~ to forgive us now because we might as the now more important presence of ~~x~~ saying something critical of the Labor policy has come up. Of course, he was supported also by a Conservative MP, so that the British, for the first time, presented a sort of ugly spectacle of almost a dog fight between Labor and Conservatives there at the meeting.

Let me just give you the flavor of the Waring Memorandum. I'll quote something from it:

The United States, which in 1947 had about 47 percent of the world's oil production, has now dropped to having only 15 percent do to the huge in the Middle East and North Africa over the past 20 years. However, America produces enough for her own consumption, since Venezuela has a certain surplus. Russia now produces from the new oilfields in Siberia, as well as from the old ones on the Black Sea and from Roumania, sufficient for her needs. Only Europe is virtually without oil. In 1966 the European consumption was 421 million

tons as against only 8 million tons actually produced in Europe. Of the 600 million odd tons which were produced in the Middle East and North Africa, only 60 million was required for domestic consumption in those countries, leaving 540 million tons for export to South Africa, to India, to Japan, to Australia, and above all, to Europe. The oil of the Middle East and of North Africa is the life blood of Europe, without which she cannot support her standard of living. She cannot maintain employment, and she cannot defense herself. The withdrawal of Britain and the rapidly increasing Russian presence in these areas will leave the oilfields in the Middle East and in North Africa undefended, and this is the prize that would give Russia control of Europe following the dictum that the road to the conquest of Europe lays through Africa.

He also had some figures which I cannot check that may be of some interest ~~xxxx~~ since the end of the Israeli war in June up to the end of December of last year, Russia has supplied over 1000 modern aircraft to the Arab countries--some 3 1/2 thousand armored vehicles--2000 guns--some 6000 trucks--and in all, military equipment to a value of nearly \$1,500 million, or double the estimated value of the war material lost by the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli war. In addition, there are at the present time some 25,000 Russians in the Arab countries, of which at least ~~50~~ 15,000 are military personnel. Russians bases will be established at Aden, Promperon Island, as they already are in ~~Alexandria~~ Iraq, in Cairo, in Alexandria, in Port Said, in Yemen, and in Syria. There can be no doubt that with British withdrawal from and Kuwait, Soviet and Egyptian pressure against the oil chieftains will be increased as it will shortly also against Iran. And so it went.

Now this was not discussed, but everybody knew it because about 20 or 25 copies of the paper were circulating and read at night so the effect that the British Labor man was nothing but wrath. ~~He~~ was very unhappy.

The French ~~xxxxxxx~~, as I said, was presented by Bauffer rather poorly, I thought. As an illustration, let me give you one instance. In general, I would say the German admiration for De Gaulle and for France that was very evident a year ago in Munich has very considerably sobered

down--very noticeably less pro-French--the Germans I talked to and that's not only ~~another thing~~ the Social Democrats but the CDU people. And in line with this, one speaker asked about the _____, which you may recall (not the last one, the one before that) ~~who~~ advocated an all-around defense concept indicating that the Soviet nuclear force was not only available in the event of a war with the Soviet Union but for other purposes as well. Somebody asked quite pointedly "who do you think General had in mind?" I didn't specify this--the Israelies, or Germans or the Americans or what. But what is the meaning of this statement?" To which Bauffer replied in great indignation, "It should be known to anybody who concerns himself in military affairs, that military means ~~that~~ can be used against any ~~kind~~ kind of an opponent. It's up to the political will of the political authorities ~~of~~ to decide against whom, and when, and to what extent the military establishment will be employed, or military means will be employed in the defense of the national interest. At the moment the hypothesis is the main danger is still the Soviet Union, although the danger has lessened considerably, but who knows who it could be in the ^{absolutely} future. This is the answer." There was/nothing political in this, it was ~~something~~ simply a commonsense statement among military analysts according to General Bauffer. Now it struck me a little bit like bit like a husband telling his wife at the breakfast table, "You know ~~what~~ it happens that couples get divorced." It's certainly true; it's a statement of fact. But the fact that he made the statement must have a meeting, and this was, of course, entirely shoved aside by Bauffer. And he got away with that, at least nobody pressed harder than the first speaker. ~~Now~~

Now I will not comment here on the/models~~XXX~~-- , , and corporation-- in detail except the thing that it has two interesting features in my mind. The last model, the corporation, which is maybe also the last time phase of what he is talking about, preceded by and possibly, advocates a four-power control taking the place of the alliance system--four-power control with a European security system in which a German/federation would be formed a la 1815 like the bundt.

Now that's feature number 1 which I find quite interesting but it didn't occur to these political powers that they are proposing not only something that the Communists have always proposed but that they are proposing a consideration of two political systems that are politically, socially, and economically as far apart you see. And so that the German Confederation in 1815 was after all formed of a ~~xxxxx~~ large number states, including small states, of a similar political interest, with an anti-revolutionary ideology among a common monarchical interest-- uniting ideology in other words--a common economic interest in a larger area and no social competition of any kind, social rivalry of any kind. So when it is sometimes said that Americans in making plans for Europe don't seem to be familiar enough with European sensitivities and European history, I think in this case it can be said of the French that they are simply disregarding some of the most elementary facts that any person would, with historical memory, recall.

That's point 1. Point 2, which is less comforting, from our point of view, is while it is likely that the Germans in discussing these plans with the French-- and they will be discuss^{ed}ing on a high level--will resist features like this one--like the one I have just mentioned--and will perhaps criticize. It is now a fact that the French have seized the initiative on the political organization of Europe. Neither one has anything comparable to this plan, nor has Washington,

not to mention the British. And it is for the first time, I think in the post war period that ~~they~~ there are no competing American conflicts available nor competing German conflicts available for the organization of Europe, if I am not mistaken. We haven't had any since 1958. And this plan is very clearly predicated on the burial of Atlanticism, on throwing the Americans out of Europe, of getting Europe organized, on a neutralistic basis inside central Europe shades of the Rapasky plan and so on, and substituting four-power control that exists in '45 over a neutralized Germany. It's a rather extraordinary plan. Now it will be changed, I suppose, but the fact remains that for all its inadequacies and its interesting features, the most important thing seems to me that political initiative on the future of Europe as conceived by France. (Hans, would they need discussion of the authorship of this document?) I can tell you about that; yes, there are a number of people apparently involved. There are already different versions now floating around, but it has been discussed ~~in Bonn~~ between ~~Bonn and this document briefly~~ Kuth, and allegedly Bonn agreed that it would serve as one of the papers for a discussion on the future of Europe. In Offenhausen they have ~~no~~ no less than 35 papers on Europe or in preparation, but not a single one has seen the light of day.

Now as to the fifth point, I have to rush a little. The United States. In general, I would say the attitude among the politicians, not only in Munich but also in Berlin and in Bonn and in the press on the whole struck me as more favorable towards the United States than a year ago which has to do with the shift in positions concerning France, which has deteriorated from the French point of view. The fact is that of course, except for the MPT, that an important issue, NATO was not discussed very much. The discussions on NATO had a strangely

semantic unsubstantial ring to them as to what the agreement really meant. But there wasn't much of a discussion which I had expected to be in the center of the discussion.

On Vietnam, when you talk with politicians, there is sort of polite silence in the Bundestadt. There hasn't been a debate on Vietnam, a large scale debate, but you sense what is going on when you look at the press and at the student demonstrations. I read, for example, that when Mayor Schutz was in this country (he came just as I was leaving)-I saw him in Washington briefly), he came to talk about the future of Berlin, economic future of Berlin, and he saw Rusk (this is in this group here and not to be broadcast). Rusk exclusively. They talked about a resolution of Social Democratic Party concerning Vietnam. Having criticized Vietnam, he was showing great agitation and allegedly disturb about the meaning of the anti-~~Vietnam~~ Vietnamese stance that the German Social Democrats were ~~xxx~~ taking on Vietnam, and here was Schutz, the Mayor of Berlin, couldn't talk about Berlin because the Secretary of State would talk about back-up support on our Vietnam policy.

Then you hear other things, some of them deeply disturbing, and I heard on extremely good authority (I will not give you the name though) that a very knowledgeable, a fastidious person, who in an international debate with Frenchmen, Englishmen in Paris, while I was there, said it would be interesting to see what happens in ~~Casson~~ ^{Khe Sanh}, if the Americans permit ~~Casson~~ ^{Khe Sanh} to become a Dienbienphu, sort of a defeat without using tactical nuclear weapons. I will take this as definite proof that we cannot rely on the Americans ever to use nuclear weapons in Europe. (Is this a French view or German view?--A German view).

But we must recall that in the 1967 Lunthaus election, they got 9 percent in Braeman, 7 percent in Lower Subsonia, 6.9 percent in Rhineland, and 5.8 percent in Schlewig-Holstein. Now they may increase--they have lots of money--and they may increase their strength in part, I think, as a backlash to the student riots to the left wing, extreme left wing. By the same token I consider it possible that some of the Nationalists/like Strauss or ^{leaders} knowing how the wind is blowing will try (sensing where it is coming from) to take it out of the sails of these radical movements and become more nationalistic themselves when the time comes.

I will say that the authorities at the moment (that means Minister of Justice, the Minister of the Interior, Parliament, and the Chancellor) seem to be quite incapable of dealing with this left wing opposition efficiently and effectively. You might say it doesn't have a class basis or a permanent social basis because students wish to have generational basis. In a few years they are out of school, other students come, the situation will have changed. That is right. Some of the leaders in ~~the~~ what is curiously also the SDS, as in this country, a radical student movement of a few years ago are now/^{already} considered to be a part of the establishment by the current students who are far more radical. Now how radical they are (just to give you a notion) is that this is the first page of a student newspaper of the Liberal Party./ Here it has instructions how to make a Molotov cocktail (comment: just like the NY review of books). And the films on the making of Molotov cocktails ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{have been} ^{student} shown in the/meetings of the Free University in Berlin. They chant, and they demonstrate, and they ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{command} at any time between 2000-5000 people in the city for a public demonstration. Berlin is a big demonstrating city.

As Ho Chi Minh. And their heroes are not the Russians because they are part of the establishment. You see they have compromised with their revolutionary tradition. (Doesn't this indicate that they are less important, really?) Maybe so, maybe so, ~~but they~~ I think I see you point. They are more than well, let me go on and describe it to you. Maybe they are of little importance. I was terribly impressed by the fact that when I went to the Technical University on Saturday (a week ago Saturday, as a matter of fact) and saw thousands of students milling around, listening to speeches from Pakistani delegates, Swedish delegates, French delegates, Black Power delegates from the United States, Belgian delegates, all bearing Viet Cong flags, waving them, wearing Viet Cong emblems, not calling for peace in Viet Nam but for more Viet Nams to defeat the United States, for the end of NATO, not for the end of the Warsaw Pact, against the Springer fellow, you know this best concern of West Germany not against the repressed monopoly of the East Germans, not a word about terror of the North Vietnamese but about germicide and immorality of the Americans in Vietnam and elsewhere in the cities and so on. And you have newspapers appearing in Germany saying, "Is the Viet Cong among us?" They have established their own universities, the so-called Critical University in which the gift horses and the methods of provocation, and these are attended not only by students but admittedly by a ^{very} small minority,

in this country about 1 percent. But also by assistance and some assistant professors and some theology professors like Bolwitzer and so on.

Socially, the recruitment comes from (as in this country) the upper middle classes. The people have money, many of them have second wives, some of them have studied in the United States. As far as intellectual interests are concerned, most of them come from the humanities and from Germanistics rather than from schools of dentistry or medicine. Here you have fixed career possibilities. So there are many similarities between the United States Radical Student Movement

and other Radical Student Movements, and these all have now been studied quite a bit . And the German Student Movement there are some differences.

Very important differences, I think. For one thing, the German Radical students are able by provocative techniques to rally behind them a very large mass of the students, and of the high school students, for a socially effective action. For example, ~~we~~ ^{they} have in Braeman succeeded through the high school students to have a strike against raising of the fees of the means of public conveyance, trolley cars, and so on. This was decided upon by the Senate of Braeman, By the action of these youngsters, the Senate found itself forced to reverse itself, and they reversed the raise in the rise in prices.

In Berlin at the time when I was there on that Saturday, the demonstration for the following Sunday was prohibited by the Senator for the Interior Noybois, and the addition was endorsed by the Mayor Schutz, whereupon a lawyer for these students went to the Administrative Court and asked for an Administrative Court order which came out on Saturday (tape change)

demonstrated afterwards. Secondly, before the prohibition of the demonstration was lifted, I personally have (and I have here in my possession) collected one of thousands of mimeographed sheets by the students saying that the order of the Senate has to be disobeyed. We will assemble so and so strong and meet in these streets at the following time. ~~should~~ Should the police intervene, we will assemble at this and this time near the American ~~Head~~ quarters and raid the American ~~Head~~ quarters, the American compound, and the American living quarters. Should the police use sticks, we will use sticks too. And they were out, and I saw these boys. They were like minors with these hard helmets. ~~So~~

So there was open defiance of the authority in Berlin. Now this is not only a phenomenon in Berlin. It happened in Frankfurt. Let me give you another illustration. When Schutz became mayor, he wanted to talk with the students because they are always interested in discussion. And he felt no repressive measures should be taken because if they are taken, then everybody cries about it. There is police brutality. So he met these students and while he was meeting them on the rostrum, some students behind him sneaked up, displaying a big placard saying don't talk to this . And some other students sneaked with a tape trying to put on his mouth which was really prevented just by a sheer alertness of some of his lieutenants. This is what they can , to finish a man--being made so ridiculous that he cannot exert any authority. But this was prevented.

Carl Schmidt, however, was a member of the cabinet and a very distinguished Social Democrat, almost 70 years old, Professor in Frankfurt, gave a talk, and Radical students of the SDS stormed in, used physical violence, tore one of his buttons off his jacket, and he just barely stopped them by saying, "This is the second time this has happened to me. The first time was in 1932, and they were Nazis."

They have invaded at Christmas time, in various places, churches, and stopped the sermons and service, and said we demand discussions on Vietnam. This happened to in Berlin. ~~Hexxxx~~ Somebody used force against him, and he started bleeding. He wiped the blood off his forehead, and put it on the faces of two sextons and said you are the ~~forssaken~~ satan's disciples-- devil's disciples, you see. This was reported in the press, and some liberal

preachers in Braeman, clergyman in Braeman, sent telegrams of sympathy to Deutchka and said indeed he had behaved like Christ, discussing matters of public interest with the Pharisees in church.

The Minister of Justice, when heard that one of the sermons by Professor Telika in Hamburg, who is also one of the preachers there, was threatened by the SDS because they wanted to talk about Vietnam instead of listening to the Sermon, gave the advice publicly the congregation should sing hymns which they did for a few hours in order to keep them under control. Whereas the president of the Military Academy in Hamburg decided that this officer has gone far enough and he sends some of his/cadets into the church to see to it that order would be maintained in the church, and he defended this.

You see, I give you just a few illustrations of the type of thing that happens with Deutchka also saying in November, "By February we will be ready to take action against the newspaper publisher," this fellow, and indeed the first glass windows were knocked in in February. Now they have developed new methods of provocation, trying to undermine authority of any kind--whether it is municipal authority or whether it is the university senate breaking down doors to faculty meetings and sitting down so that people can't leave, professors can't leave. (This happened in . I talked to one of the professors who was there) or throwing pudding at Vice President Humphrey when he is there. They are of course laughing because they thought it was a bomb that they were preparing, where in fact they were preparing some kind of pudding for him. Or throwing tomatoes. Then something does happen. The police once in a while may lose control. One student, like this fellow Orosok, has killed and then all the students in Germany are on the side of the student generation against the police brutality.

Schutz is a man who has only one arm. He lost one arm in the war. The radical students have publicly written in Berlin that he lost the arm because of ~~cowardice~~ cowardice in fighting brave partisans in and Italy. I mean trying to undermine his moral authority also in this regard. And so it goes.

I talked to some American observers there who are than I am although I know the Berlin situation. Very well, but I go there only very rarely and occasionally, and they go there more often. They said it reminds them quite a bit of the tactics used by the early Nazi movement. Now they are now Nazis. In fact, they present themselves quite hysterically as the Jews of the present age. They are being persecuted by the establishment, and the establishment has taken the position of assistance, as the Nazis called it, and they are the Jews. So they engage in a discussion on the total and of middle class woman, you see, The/population of Berlin is, of course, very much opposed to the students, particularly the workers--overwhelmingly so. Why don't you study or why don't you go back where you came from or something to that effect? So the student in utmost despair and quite hysterically says, "You can put me in the guards' chamber right away." This you see is the kind of mentality ~~you~~ you meet among all of them.

Now as to the finances, there was a public discussion in German parliament and the question was raised but not answered by the Minister of the Interior. There are investigations going on at present about the whole movement, and ~~one can know what will be found,~~ although one doesn't know the exact amount. But I know for a fact, for example, some of the money comes from one of the trade unions, radical trade union,

some money comes from Auchstein, who is the editor of Der Spiegel and a competitor of Springer, some money apparently comes from the well-to-do wives of some of the leaders, some are from the United States, some money comes from the East. Now, how much, I don't know. Nor do I know whether it will increase in size. It certainly has increased in radicalism. I mean, terrorism is far more pronounced than it was a year ago or two years ago or three years ago. Don't forget that the Social Student Union, I mean the SDS, was expelled from the party in 1961. This was, after all, only seven years ago, because at that time they demanded that Germany should recognize the

Alliance. Now this today is no longer a taboo subject. Practically everybody, every respectful politician says it's only a question of time and the will be recognized. But the terror, the action program, the provocation, the violence, and the unmanagability of the people, and the undermining of authority, this is new. Now if I am pressed for a diagnosis, which I hope I won't be, anyway, I would say the greatest danger is not this movement, but the greatest danger is the backlash to it. On the right. We are fortunate, by the way, for Rand, that we have a consultant in Berlin who is extremely well-informed about this matter and he wrote a bit about it. And he knows many of these people and has been very helpful. ~~in~~ He also knows a great deal about the attitudes of the population, the organizational form which is quite new in German radical politics. It's been an archial, cylindrical and movement rather than a Communist movement, and they read Mao and Markusa ~~in~~ ~~in~~ they ~~skxxxx~~ Greverra and so on rather than Marx. They are better read, by the way, than the American students, and they differ from the American left-wing radicals on the American campus in many important respects.

For one thing, they don't take dope.. It's no dope. No LSD yet. in these groups. There is no love-in--sit-in, go-in, everything, but no love-in. No hippy nonsense of this sort. Notice there is a feeling which is common among some of the hippies of this country that they are the first generation since Adam that

has rediscovered that there is such phenomenon as sex. In reaction to American puritanism, the sexual revolution, this is no filthy speech movement; this is all nonsense ~~xxxxx~~ in Germany; nothing of this sort exists. They have, of course I saw the program of the Critical University in Berlin, a course on sex and power there, but that's about the size of it. And they will occasionally compare some silly student who will say just as the Jews were persecuted by the Nazis so we are persecuted because we don't behave the way our landlady thinks when she thinks we should when we take a rented room. And referring to the fact that they want to take a girl out. But this has had so little difficulty in Europe and Germany included that there is not much room for sexual revolution. But you have a great deal of politicization and the action ~~program~~ program is highly political and ^{devilishly} ~~definitely~~ clever. ~~The~~ The one deputy after another in the German Bundestadt said, "We were not prepared for the new methods they are using. We were not prepared for every new method they are using." And they learned from the Dutch, they learned from the Cubans, and they learned from the Viet Cong the hope that the United States may perish in the process because for a while they ~~believed~~ viewed the United States as a country which represented to them something desirable, something democratic, and also they believed in the possibility of organizing Europe. Then for a while they believed in the meaningfulness of doing something against the Soviet Union in connection with the war in Berlin.

All this had been taken away from them: the cold war, the American purity, or the purity of the American image, And what they are left with is a great deal of bitterness and activity and wildness against authority at large. On this happy note, let me close.

QUESTIONS

Q How about the low country--Belgium, , etc. Are there any connections?

A Yes, there are connections. They have contacts with the so-called provosts
(HS) in Amsterdam, but there you see the Dutch Marines used against them, and they were just beaten up and this solved the problem.

Yes, they also have Belgium contacts--the student movements. is their great hero, by the way.

S The difference in the other countries, I think, lies in the weakness of the ~~federal~~ Federal Republic government. Or at least let's say the great fear in the government to request because of the image that that conjures up of mere association with something that they were trying to request.

(HS) That's very true. There's a police, there's state, there is a devil's power. But what makes this German left radicalism so outstanding is the unwillingness, the inability, unwillingness of the regime to respond to it. And that in turn, I think, has something to do with the past, and it has something to do with the sense that they have lost their pillars in the world in terms of the alliance, in terms America, and so forth. This in turn, I suppose, means some kind of an opening into which the radical right in Germany may be (NPD) in for. I expect to hear some day that the MPT will be offering its services to restore order somewhere.

(HS) Yes, it's also, you see, the authorities are really, to a large extent, discredited. I mean, you will, Lubke has to defend himself against some defendant of the Federal Republic against some allegations that are based on the logical expertise of somebody in New York, during the Nazi regime he did some documents having to do with the technologies. For the Nazis the Chancellor himself is also a former Nazi, not a very bad one, but one.

radical
However, the/students are mainly mad at people like Brandt and Weiner and ~~Shutz~~ Schutz, the socialist leaders, who they feel have betrayed the cause (a) beginning in '58 at the time of the Gutesburg Program and the Marxist ideology--the leftist ideology--was given up in favor of the General Party Program that would enable them to ~~become~~ join the government and (b) by the fact that they now have joined forces with the Christian Democrats in a Grand Coalition Government and let from a Nazi, so it's like a sect fighting the church much more vigorously than the heathens. And their resentment of Brandt and Weiner is far more intense among these youngsters than their resentment of a man like Lecours or Kissinger or the Chancellor.

Q When you mentioned before, did you mean that there was an extra parliamentary breakdown of order, not political fractionalization?

(HS) No, he meant political fractionalization. He thought that it might best talk about possibility of prohibiting the SDS, for having it underground unless the Communist party is prohibited at the moment. But there is talk at the same time about readmitting the Communist Party. Brandt talks about that, and there is opposition to prohibiting the SDS. And how can you prohibit a party that really ~~demands the command and~~ commands the respect of future of the youth.

Q Are there any good ~~seasons~~ recent figures on the percentage of total German students involved in some definable way this radicalism? I know ~~Spiegel~~ Der Spiegel had a series of articles.

(HS) I have. The figures that I have, they had up to 1 percent of the students organized the SDS and similar organizations, related organizations, but being able to command the loyalty of up to 60-70 percent is necessary in case

of the slightest -- they can make a case of the authorities have trespassed (like the Onazorg incident)--like the Onazorg incident or any student issue having to do with ~~the~~ this outdated belief or principle of hierarchy in the internal organization of the German university. The whole student body is behind them, and they are the ring leaders. They are the speakers, the leaders, the pushers.

S You're saying then that this is really different from Holland. That any attempt to use the Marines in effect would cause a much greater reaction. It wouldn't simply discourage them as in Holland.

(HS) I don't know. It has not been done.

S All right, then in only theory.

(HS) There was, when I was there, everybody I talked to was talking about the fact that tear gas would be used. There was no other way of doing it. Everybody was expecting tear gas to be used within 24 hours in the streets of Berlin, you see. And water would not be enough. And then the demonstration was permitted and nothing happened. In fact, the police were used to protect the demonstrators against the population. The policeman's lot is not an easy one.

Q What is the issue of passes from East Berlin? What the situation is.

(HS) Well, if you have a West German residence, you can get a pass at any time. If you have a Berlin residence, and only show that, you can't get across. Now that's a West Berliner. There are various reasons that you do it, but by having double residence and so on, but it's not easy.

Q What is the possibility of the major split of the STZ and the formation of the more radical purified Schumacher type and secondly, what would be the possibility ~~of~~ that this will channelize some of the students?

(HS) You might channelize it somewhat if there were such a split, to answer your second question. It might, and there are people who feel so. There are other social democrats who say that they hope very much that the TDU will be strong enough at the next election so that they, the SDT, can get out of the Grand Coalition, go back into opposition in order to prevent the split. I mean, it goes that far. Oh yes, there is discussion on this subject. You have to be very careful with whom you talk in evaluating this because many people were too . You know because of the subject one doesn't like to admit too readily, particularly to foreigners. But there is talk about it, no doubt. And there is also real danger--there are so many groups already left wing you see. There are the pacifists, there are the people excluded in '61, including Professor Fleishtyme, some of you may know from the political scientist. While he is considered by these students as another representative of the establishment because he his propessitism? is against violence although he is very critical and left the party, or was thrown out of the party, for his very good use. wrote
Gunther Gres, who/in public against Kissinger and against the Grand Coalition, is part of the establishment because at one time he campaigned for Willy Brandt. But there is a whole slew of people left wing of the official party line, to the left of the official party line.

S One thing that impresses me most is the continuous ability of the United States influence

Not directly, but perhaps indirectly. We have a social situation in this country which leads to student uprisings and hippydom and so forth. And it's also a political situation which leads to an inability to deal with a Negro revolution and a foreign policy which seems to give the minor country the power and political chance to deal with us as they please. This in combination with the technology which enables such images of the United States to penetrate into Germany almost instantaneously seems to me a very powerful sort of thing. It's a lesson in reverse in a way. But this isn't what I want to ask. I want to ask whether on the official level or with any means for inclination of using whatever relations they have with China as opposed to deal with the Russians and the Eastern European Countries and Eastern powers. And on the other official level, why the students weren't counting, or whether they were counting, Mao instead of Ho Chi Minh and with the Red Guard Movement rather than with the Viet Cong Movement and

(HS) Well, I am not sure that I can answer the last question in detail. It's a fact that Ho Chi Minh is perhaps merely because it lends itself to this beautiful HO HO Ho Chi Minh chant. I am not trying to be facetious. ~~It's~~ In the case of Ho Chi Minh, the Germans read; they know that Ho Chi Minh is for real. Most know there are Marxists still alive, ~~Bolsheviks~~ Bolsheviks still alive, who know more about Europe and about Asia than anybody else in the world.

Q What's Mao done to the imperialists lately?

(HS) Besides, you see, he stands for _____ and he is the opponent of this giant, the super-power, and he is showing us he is forcing us to be immoral. That is great merit. And his only morality ~~is~~ fades into insignificance because we are so much bigger. By the same token, Cuba is more important than East Germany or Russia. These people talk about the shop cots organization that you had at the end of the first world war ~~and xxxxxx~~ in Russia organizing popular plebicitarian organization of power. And they feel that this sort of thing is to be found in Cuba ~~xxx~~ rather than in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has become an establishment. Now perhaps they don't know so much about China. I don't really know what the answer to this is-- why it is just the small countries.

S It looks like you _____ need to the German super-radical societies.

(HS) No, no, no. Instead, it is an interesting ~~xxxxxx~~ question to answer: Why is that so?

Q There was a large demonstration in ~~xxxxxx~~ favor Vietnam, was there not, in Berlin? About the United States policy, a counter-demonstration.

(HS) There was a counter-demonstration. After. Called by the Mayor in response to the student demonstration that he had to admit on _____ and even in order to prove to the Americans ~~xxxxxxx~~ the occupation powers and loyalty of the cityers, you see; he called for this very big demonstration. The students then on the sidewalks started to heckle the demonstrators, telling them they were ordered there as they were in the Nazi period by the official authorities to demonstrate for the official cause, that anybody with a beard had to be careful not to show his face. And the police were to protect the

students from the violence of the mass demonstration. I think 25 people were in the hospital, and there was a great deal of brutality (you mean against the students?). Against the students, yes.

Q Was that demonstration -- did it use explicitly pro-U.S. slogans in Vietnam or generalized pro-American policies?

HS: Generalized pro-American policy as it's difficult for the United States in Vietnam. But the protective powers, and we couldn't have the freedom that we have in Berlin if it weren't for the Americans, etc. Which was ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxxx~~ the right line to take, and I think at the same time again some mishaps, freedom of anybody was not permitted to

Q: What's the attitude of the students toward East Germany? Do they say anything?

HS: Well, it used to be of concern to them as long as they were still ^{concerned} ~~upset~~ about the war. Some of these phobias of the students of the previous generation these were the ones of Dr. ^{which} these people from East Germany escaped. Organized an exhibition which travelled from city to city about the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis. But now East Germany has faded from their conscience, as it were, and it is ^{is} the United States and Bonn. And the place of re-revolutionary action of Vietnam is the U. S. cities. You get the most perverse kinds of situations. I happen to know from a personal letter which I got a few days ago that the representative of Black Power in Berlin stayed at the house of a survivor of one of the most prominent assassins in the 20 of July push against Hitler. Another member of the family of the 20 of July who is a pastor wanted to demonstrate against Vietnam and he thought youth should be supposed to demonstrate and found himself, to his dismay, by the manipulation of these radical students, marching behind the flag of the Viet Cong.

Q: What sort of a psychology is it? ...impress the thought that everyone has a past, somehow all these diverse attitudes...

HS: Yes, there are very wild stories that you hear occasionally, such as that some of the most active radical students come from well-to-do, relatively broken homes, whose father, having been in the SS...

Q: I've heard estimates to the effect that 50-60% of the NPD "the young generation"

HS: No, that's not so. In fact, the young generation in the last figures I saw is under-represented.

Q: It's growing however, they make a point of that.

HS: In the latest figures I have seen, maybe it has changed now, is that they are lower, that the percentage in the NPD is lower than the population at large.

In the younger age groups, up to 25 or so.

Many thanks on my part.