

The following lines are directed to all those, Americans of Austrian descent, Austrian newcomers to America and American friends of Austria, who showed their interest so far in the Austrian activities in general and in the "Austro-American Center" and the Austrian Section of the "American Committee on European Reconstruction" in particular.

When in July 1940 the A.C.E.R. was founded, consisting of three national sections, Austrians, Czechoslovaks and Poles, it was the first recognition of an Austrian group as an equal partner within an inter-allied frame. Although not all plans of the ACER could be materialized, two lines of activities still exist: the research group which was just sent out a "questionary" (drafted by Dr. Bjarne Braatoy of the Norwegian Mission), and the political discussions on European problems, introduced during the last term by the following lecturers: Mr. A. Laurin, Prof. R. Vambery, Mr. I. Modercin, Prof. E. Jaeckh, Prof. F.W. Foerster, Prof. J. Hromadka, Prof. O. Odložilik. Now we have shifted to the following topics (every Wednesday, from 5 - 7 o'clock, Friendship House, 1010 Park Avenue, at 85th Street) :

April 16	the German problem (Prof. Kurt von Fritz, Columbia)
April 23	the Spanish problem (Mr. J. Alvarez Del Vayo)
April 30	the Basque problem (Mr. Manuel de la Sota)
May 7	the Italian problem (Prof. Max Ascoli, New School)
May 14	the French problem (Mr. C.G. Paulding, Commonweal)
May 21	: Atlantic Europe
	May 28 : South Eastern Europe

Already in January 1939 the A.A.C. was founded by people coming from all political camps. Some months later the "Austrian-American League" was founded by people who had left the AAC. It was never our intention to display the spectacle of any competition between Austrians before the eyes of the Americans. While the AAL found its purpose in carrying through bigger performances, the AAC worked in smaller groups politically and scientifically. The foundation of the ACER was a proof that this was the right way for us. Certainly, there were political cleavages from the beginning of the separation. But they are not so strong to prevent any cooperation, as the joint letter to the NYTimes (March 16, 1941) has proved (signed by O. Kallir, Th. Putz, E.K. Winter and G. Zernatto).

The main difference among those Austrians in America, who stand for Austria, have always concerned the question of "Legitimism" which means the political loyalty to the "legitimate" Austrian-Hungarian pretender. The AAL, although having never pronounced itself monarchistic, nevertheless by having proved to work for that goal has convinced most of us that it is the representation of Austrian Legitimism in the United States. This assumption was only emphasized by its last meeting (March 28), where one of the young Habsburgs was among the speakers. In spite of the fact that some Americans do sponsor this movement, its representatives will certainly not be surprised to find the American public as not responding to a show, in which Austria and Habsburg are identified - for the sake of Habsburg, but at the cost of Austria.

In my opinion, the political activity of Legitimism, after Austria had collapsed on March 11, 1938, has been a serious mistake from the very start. After the war had begun, it became a true misfortune to the Austrian cause. Legitimism has been the main obstacle to the formation of an "Austrian National Council" either at Paris or London. If until today Austria is not represented among the Allies, this is mainly due to the inability of Legitimism to



cooperate with other groups. Although Legitimism may sentimentally appeal to a certain number of exiles, has no chance in the world of practical politics, because it will never find the approval of both Great Britain and the United States, whether still struggling for victory or already victorious, it will never be accepted by Czechoslovaks and Poles, who in their alliance with Great Britain are today the speakers for all the others, and last but not least the majority of the Austrian people will never consent to a form of state which would include the opportunity of new adventures and of a new mystical leadership. Those therefore who cling stubbornly to the idea of Legitimism, considering the Habsburgs a political, not a human question, stand in the way of the one thing called for -- full cooperation among all Austrians in exile as well as among all Central European nations living in the countries between Germany, Italy and Russia. Any political activity today for Austria can be based only on the strict refusal of all Habsburg experiments in the whole Danube region including Austria herself.

A good deal of the Austrian exiles in this country are former members of the Social Democratic Party. It is my conviction that the tradition of the SDP will still play a role, if a new Austria comes into being. Hence, any Austrian activity abroad has to be shaped in such a way that every loyal Social Democrat can participate. On the other hand, the remnants of the Greater German ideology among some former Social Democrats are as incompatible with the viewpoint of European reconstruction as are the Greater Austrian dreams of the Habsburgs. As an Austrian conservative, who always appreciated greatly the achievements of the Austrian labor movement, I am convinced that only that Austrian group has any chance to do anything for the future of Austria which remains open to Social Democrats ready for cooperation.

After the fall of Paris the responsibility of striving for a kind of Austrian coordination seemed to have shifted to London, where the "Austrian Office" (headed by the former Social Democrat representative H. Allina) has materialized the cooperation between Legitimists and Social Democrats, although under the auspices of the first. But having failed so far to clarify the issues by separating themselves distinctly from Legitimism, but keeping sufficiently open to the left, the Austrians at London have disappointed our hopes during the last year that they might be luckier than the Austrians at Paris. In America Austrian Legitimism has organized a "Free Austria Movement" in Canada (under the former Minister H. Rott) which is eager to establish an agency in this country. But what form this agency may ever get, such plans are doomed to failure, because nobody here will accept a merely monarchistic organization for an Austrian representation as such. Whether in opposition to or in correspondence with these plans, a recently founded group "Austrian Action" (under Count Ferdinand Czernin) wants "to perform a function similar to that of the France Forever organization" (NYTimes, April 2), which would mean to be the political frame of a military formation. But this idea, as good as it may be, turns futile without the background of an Austrian coordination on a larger scale. There is still time for it in this country, although in waiting for Paris and London we are indeed late enough, and although our pattern in this respect cannot be any Austrian organization in exile shaped by "haphazard Americans", but only an Austrian-American organization (modeled perhaps after the "Czechoslovak National Council of America") which is built up by Americans of Austrian descent for the sake of both America and Europe.

When Austria is unrepresented among the Allies, it is primarily because there is no united Austrian representation. The extremists on both wings have sabotaged it, while the moderate on both sides know precisely that the victory of the two English speaking empires will bring neither a socialistic nor a monarchistic Austria, but a democratic one. That is the responsibility we feel as a group of the middle, after having incorporated both rightists and leftists who know what is at stake. The intellectual and political forces in



exile are burdened with a great historic responsibility which cannot be shaken off by the comfortable evasion that the Austrian people itself will decide its future. If the Austrians in exile are unable to arrive at a common platform and representation concentrating the Austrian energies abroad politically and later on militarily, they will be guilty for having manoeuvred the Austrian cause anew into a corner and for having burdened again the Austrian people with a political mortgage which easily could be avoided, if the Austrians in exile would be up to their historic task.

What possibilities might be included into a failure to cope with this task, can be learned from an anonymous article "by a group of U.S. military experts" in "New Europe" (April 1941), for which the five editors bear the responsibility. "New Europe" was founded by that Polish group which organized the ACER with the Austrians and Czechoslovaks and which originally invited also some Austrians to state their views in the new review. In the article in question, speculative on "a federation of Eastern Europe", the partition of Austria is advocated. "The Austrian Tyrol is left to Germany or Italy", for "the federation boundary follows the general line of Salzburg-Villach", but, as the attached map does not forget to prove, without incorporating any Austria at all into its frame. If these are the troubles of anonymous "military experts" of whatever allied country in this hour of trial, they will not be surprised to find us clearly rallying against their fancies. Unfortunately, the partition of Austria by the anonymous authors is only a small part of the blunders they commit. I do not hesitate to say that the megalomania of articles like this make ridiculous and do impair tremendously any vision of European reconstruction in general.

Fully aware of the responsibility imposed upon all of us to stand for the integrity of Austria against everyone who wants to misuse Austria as an object of compensation, those Austrian energies cooperating in both the AAC and the ACER, so far primarily concerned with the intellectual foundation of the Austrian action in exile, have decided to go a step further and to invite the Austrians of all groups to participate in the preparation and creation of a joint Austrian representation in the United States. As a kind of first draft for an Austrian platform which could be the basis of this coordination, I propose that we all decide to stand:

- 1.) for Austria's self-determination, liberty and independence,
- 2.) for a democratic system of government, revitalized by the ideals of the English speaking world,
- 3.) for a social democracy, based on the cooperation of all classes,
- 4.) for a European Commonwealth of Nations, to which national sovereignty, including the form of state, is subordinated,
- 5.) for a world order, in which a new Austria will be among the partners of the English speaking empires.

Being in personal contact with many Austrians of all camps I take the responsibility to send out this appeal, asking every Austrian getting and reading it to be so kind to communicate with me as soon as possible by answering the following questions:

- 1.) Are you ready to accept in principle the four points of the Austrian platform and to stand for them publicly with your name?
- 2.) Do you want to cooperate with both the AAC and the ACER?
- 3.) Are you interested in building up a joint Austrian representation?
- 4.) Would you participate in a general Austrian meeting which is carried through for the sake of Austrian coordination?

New York, May 1, 1941.

Ernst Karl Winter.



For those who want to know, how I myself interpret the Austrian platform proposed above, I repeat the "ten points" which I have formulated in a Catholic paper (The Tablet, London, December 14, 1940):

- 1.) The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in contrast to both its own history and the interests of all its nations, had become since 1867 to a growing extent a satellite of Germany, as the ally of which Austria in the World War stood on the wrong front.
- 2.) Today, Austria is the virtual ally of Great Britain, and the task ahead is to awake all Austrians, at home and abroad, citizens of the allied countries, exiles or prisoners of war, to the full consciousness of the fact that Great Britain, morally allied with the United States, fights the second World War against the same center of destruction which had unchained the first World War and with which the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was allied.
- 3.) The Austrians must definitively decide for Austria, the country and people of six to eight million in the Eastern Alps, but against any Greater Austrian ideology, because Greater Austria is dead and will never return.
- 4.) The main task of reconstruction ahead is to organize the federative union of all the smaller nations of South Eastern Europe between Germany, Italy and Russia.
- 5.) The question of the Habsburgs concerns not only Austria, but all Succession States of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
- 6.) The constitution of a future Austria cannot be a mere restoration of any form of state existing before, constitutional monarchy, democratic republic or authoritarian state, but only a new creation, following as far as possible the pattern which, as we hope, will prove best in this war and will survive it, British-American democracy.
- 7.) The main war aim of the Austrian people is to regain its self-determination liberty and independence, to be liberated and free from Germany, including any German dominated or pro-German European scheme.
- 8.) The future European Commonwealth of Nations, for which Austria as an ally of Great Britain want to fight, must be based upon the national sovereignty of every single nation, big or small, upon regional blocks of those nations having identical interests (like the smaller nations of South Eastern Europe) and upon their equality and balance in a federative union.
- 9.) Neither the Austrian action in exile nor the future Austria can be based upon the exclusive ideology of traditionalism or revolutionarism, as included in the principles of Legitimism or Revolutionary Socialism, but only upon the idea of a "social democracy", conservative and progressive alike.
- 10.) The social policy of a future Austria has to be that of institutional cooperation between the two basic groups, labor and peasantry, throughout all levels of political organization, whatever group may be majority or minority here or there, based upon an economic policy which favours the equilibrium between agricultural and industrial production.

The following assays on the Austrian problem show the background of this viewpoint:

The Rise and Fall of Austrian Labor, Social Research 1939, VI. 316-340.  
Austria: Guilt and Virtue, Social Research 1940, VII. 480-495; 1941, VIII. 106-125.

Austria in exile, New Europe, No. 1 of December 1, 1940.

The Future of Austria, The Tablet, London, December 14, 1940.

Salvage for a Fourth Austria, Journal of Central European Affairs, 1941, 66-73.

Austrian Reconstruction (to be published next).



The Austro-American Center, the Austrian Section of the American Committee on European Reconstruction and Austrian Action have issued on June 21, 1941 the following statement which they communicated to Mr. Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State;

1. That they never have and never will recognise the occupation and annexation of Austria by Germany on March 11, 1938.
2. That they have with greatest satisfaction and gratitude taken note of the repeated declarations on the part of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State as regards Austria declarations which found expression in several American laws and regulations.
3. That the undersigned respectfully submit to the Government of the United States the request to summarize all these single acts by issuing a solemn declaration at a time which deems proper to the effect, that the Government of the United States does not recognise the occupation and annexation of Austria.
4. That they in full publicity put themselves at the disposal of the United States Government for any purpose for which the Government of the United States might want to call upon them.

(signed) Ferdinand Czernin  
Ernst Karl Winter

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#### AUSTRIA IN EXILE

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Many people believe that all the discussions among political exiles are nonsense from the very start. Whether the Austrians in exile would decide to stand for this or for that, they think, is meaningless, because the Austrian people at home experiencing an entirely different life, are developing in an entirely different direction. This is the comfortable conviction of those who have decided to wait, also with thinking, and to stand for nothing. In my opinion, this negative evaluation of what political exiles should and could do, implies a complete misunderstanding of the historic situation which is ours. After some years of German occupation the whole of Europe will be on the same level of intellectual exhaustion. There is little hope that the European peoples themselves after this ordeal will really know what they want, except to be freed from the German yoke. Thus in the age of Nazi slavery the function of any political emigration is greater than ever before. Living in this free



country, where the atmosphere of free discussion has not been suffocated, and being absorbed into the American way of life and thought by our own will, we political exiles of the wave of 1933/41 have a task which no earlier exiles had. After having become imbued with the spirit of this country, we have to use this unique opportunity of being together on the same soil, in order to become acquainted with each other, of whatever social group, religious creed or national stratum we are, and to settle among ourselves principally those European national and social problems which are the main cause of our being driven out from our native countries. Within this broader frame also the discussions of a single national group have their meaning. This is the more so the more intensive the intellectual life of such a national group in exile is. Owing to the marked individualism of the Austrians, the Austrian political emigration is a real focus of intellectual experiences and experiments. Consequently, our discussions may interest our fellow refugees of other groups as well as the Americans. From the viewpoint of the historian and sociologist registering scientifically all these experiences, there seems to be hardly any other problem more exciting than this spiritual re-birth of a nation which was lost, which in its masses at home is able to grumble and to hate, and certainly will explode at proper time, but which only in its intellectual and political energies in exile is able today already to prepare its future.

#### THE IDEA OF PARLIAMENTARISM.

The initiative of some members of the AACenter and the Austrian Section of the ACER in forming a preparatory committee for the establishment of an Austrian National Council in the United States has borne some fruit already. There is a principle which crystallizes more and more clearly, namely, that the Austrian co-ordination can be accomplished only under two conditions: if individual persons have the courage to stand up, to single out themselves from their previous ties, and then to group themselves again in new forms representing certain ideological sectors of Austrian political life. These attempts at forming an Austrian united front from the right to the left, undertaken and proposed by a group of the center, needs partners on the left. We may look at these crystallizing efforts with the cool eyes of the



experimenter now, but they will perhaps be regarded once as a decisive contribution to the re-birth of Austrian Parliamentarism in the widest sociological sense of this term: to the idea of political tolerance and cooperation, to the abandonment of metaphysical politics and party totalitarianism. If only we succeed in re-organizing the political groups of the Austrian political frame, it may greatly facilitate the future task of the Austrian people to revitalize the rules of the democratic game. The political groups in exile are not political parties, rather constitute intellectual nuclei for the reorganization of these indispensable parties, if and when the Austrian people will again become a politically organized body. As the last phase of independent Austria has been the authoritarian regime in which the sound idea of parliamentarism was lost, this intellectual re-birth is something which has to be performed, either by the political emigration on behalf of the Austrian people, or, if the emigration does not solve this problem, by the Austrian people itself, but then with superfluous loss of time.

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#### THE AUSTRIAN CENTER.

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Had there been, in 1933, an Austrian Center, or at least a left wing of Catholicism which could have dealt with the right wing of Socialism, Austria would never have collapsed. I remember an editorial of the Vienna "Arbeiter Zeitung" by the late Dr. Otto Bauer, after a group of Catholic writers had discussed the problem of the "new foundation" of Austria, in which he complained about the insignificance of the leftist Catholics in Austria and cited three of them, lonely among the vastness of reactionary anti-Marxists: Dr. Aurel Kolnai, Dr. Richard Redler and Dr. Ernst Karl Winter. It is a strange coincidence that these three persons, after many individual experience during the authoritarian regime and afterwards during their voluntary exile, have met again now in our Austro-American Center.

The main task of this group of the center which has never existed before in Austrian politics, would be to bring the right wing and the left wing together (which would be the ideal), or at least to be either the left partner of any cooperative right wing, or the right partner of any cooperative left wing. This might be in both instances only a provisional



function for the time being, as long as the true left or the true right is non-existent. In the ideal case of cooperation between the right and the left themselves, the center could be the initial "balancer", or if the right and the left would learn to balance out themselves, the center could be absorbed again into the two wings. This function would be the same for any Austrian action in exile as for any future Austrian parliamentarism which could be visualized, either based on two political wings according to the two party system in the English speaking world, or based on a three party system, if the balancing factor in the center should have a more lasting educational function.

Many people may ridicule such a political geometry and maintain that the time of both the right and the left is over. But I think that this view would be somehow semi-totalitarian and that one contribution to political reconstruction which the political exiles have to make will be this restitution of the nuclei of political parties, not for restoring the obsolete party metaphysics, but for educating politically towards tolerance and cooperation. In this view the two true social wings of Austria are labor and peasantry, and any substitutes for them in exile have to be aware that their political relevancy will depend on the reference to these social entities at home. If Austrian labor and peasantry learn to cooperate in a more profound way, as they did in 1918/19 for a few months, then the task of the center in its political meaning may be over, although it will stand permanently as an intellectual task, as long as there will be an Austria again above the social groups.

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#### THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT WING.

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There are many conservative energies in the Austrian political emigration, probably more than in Austria herself. There are Catholics, who feel conservative without being expressly monarchistic, and there are Monarchists or Legitimists, who are not necessarily Catholics. The main obligation of both creeds from the Austrian political viewpoint would not be so much to promote their metaphysical aims, Catholicism or Monarchism, but to understand themselves as trustees of the conservative elements at home, the bulk of which undoubtedly are the peasants, unrepresented in exile, although there will certainly be other conservatives, intellectuals or petty bourgeois,



besides. Some of the conservatives in exile, who felt the function of the center to be the predominant one, have already concentrated their efforts in our group of cooperation and understanding while others still feel themselves in the first place responsible for formulating the conservative ideology itself.

Our group of the center is greatly interested in having a partner on the right wing provided that it answers certain necessary demands indispensable from the viewpoint of the future Austrian reconstruction as such. First, there is the interest of all Austrian groups in having a common platform which would symbolize that an Austria, dear (to all parties and above mere party aspects) spiritually exists. Secondly, there is the great interest of all Austrians, whether they back or oppose Legitimism, in knowing exactly who stands for whom and who is dependent on whom. Thirdly, there is particularly our interest in having a kind of "constitutional right" which sincerely rejects experiments and adventures, but adapts its ideals to a democratic way of procedure, to the self-determination of the Austrian people, and to the universal European interest, to which national sovereignty, including the form of state, in future has to be subordinated. With a "constitutional right" abandoning the claim of totalitarianism, disguised as non-partisanship, and recognizing itself as a party creed among other creeds, our group of the middle is ready to cooperate for the sake of Austria.

#### THE AUSTRIAN LEFT WING.

As long as there would be only an Austrian center and an Austrian right wing but no Austrian left wing, any Austrian National Council in the United States would be a torso. Certainly, this would not dispense those who are ready for cooperation from going ahead. On the contrary, they have to proceed, although in such a way that the legitimate place for an Austrian left wing is reserved, and this left wing could be easily added at any time.

The leftists' error consists in being too comfortably assured that there can be neither any Austrian national representation in exile nor any Austrian reconstruction at home without them. This is certainly true, as far as Austrian labor itself is concerned, although it has still to be tested, how far the labor leaders in exile, if called by destiny to re-organize their



rank and file at home, may be in reality able to correspond with this chance. They overestimate probably what is left of the labor movement and they underestimate the state of anarchy out of which they would practically have to shape it anew. They will have, perhaps, to cope with a task easier than that of any other group, but their task will be difficult enough and they should recognize even now that it will be a task entirely different from the one they solved in the past. It will be rather a hard work to reawaken all the traditional values of the labor movement, to reorganize the trade unions, cooperatives, cultural organizations in that atmosphere of democracy in which the Social Democratic Party educated them, and it will be largely necessary to use new methods for this task. There will be certainly not the slightest chance merely to continue in a kind of "leftist legitimism" the thing that was stopped by history, not only by the authoritarian regime on February 12, 1934. Moreover, this work of reconstruction of the Austrian labor movement will not be achieved without the active cooperation of all the other social factors (primarily the peasants) which should be brought to appreciate the existence of the labor movement precisely from their conservative viewpoint, but will reach this goal only if there is a new understanding for conservative values on the part of the future Austrian labor party itself.

The Socialists refuse to cooperate with Legitimists, lest they should be compromised in the eyes of Austrian labor. They would perhaps cooperate with a group of the middle, if such a group would come more into relief to be <sup>a</sup> welcomed partner. Though this would mean the cooperation of two doubtless existing stratification of the Austrian people, it would still fail to constitute what I think necessary: the cooperation of all camps of the Austrian political emigration in the united front from the right to the left directed against the common foe. There may be more Legitimists in exile than at home. It does not matter, if they in exile display energies in favor of our common goal. If Russia and Great Britain cooperate against Hitler, the Austrian Socialists and Legitimists can do it as well. There is, however, one interest which the Socialists have in common with our group



of the center which is anti-Legitimistic: that those Monarchists who are political thinkers should be separated from agents, who act on orders; that the independent and constructive Monarchists should elaborate a program of constitutionalism, subordinating their peculiar interest to the self-determination of the Austrian people, to the formal procedure of democracy and to the interest of the European Commonwealth of Nations; in short, that the Austrian national representation in exile should be recognized as supreme national authority, to which any partisanship of any peculiar idea has to yield.

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#### AUSTRIAN ACTION.

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These were our motives for the cooperation with the group "Austrian Action" (under the chairmanship of Count Ferdinand Czernin) for the specific purpose indicated in the common letter to Mr. Sumner Welles. A meeting of members of all three organizations, AACenter, AALeague and AAction (June 18) decided to propose to all groups in question and to some leading single persons of the right and left four points to be issued and communicated to the Department of State in a united Austrian action. The result of this step was the final cooperation of AACenter and AAction, after the representatives of the AALeague declined cooperation as long as a single member of the AAction would participate. This standpoint seemed absurd to us, as the elimination of personal differences, an unpleasant though very real factor in politics, is part of the very meaning of a collaboration among distinct groups. Thus we must deplore that the AALeague (under the chairmanship of Dr. Otto Kallir) does not understand the situation.

The AAction, in my opinion, is a political group, so far unconscious of its political character and therefore ready to stress its non-political structure and aims. As compared with the AACenter, it is likewise a group of the middle professes a political program: anti-Legitimistic, stressing Austrian independence, a democratic system of government and "social democracy" (though not in the party sense), the AAction has no such program. In spite of this difference, we found it opportune to send a common letter to the Department of State, indicating that it should be possible to bring all Austrian fractions, political and personal, into the united front which is not only our common



interest, but also that of our closest friends and neighbors. In order to indicate this connection, the Austrian Section of the ACER, an organization in which Austrians cooperate with Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Poles and Yugoslavs, joined the common undertaking.

#### THE "AUSTRIAN COMMITTEE" CONNECTED WITH THE AALEAGUE.

On June 24 the annual assembly of the AALeague proclaimed the establishment of an "Austrian Committee" which consists of the following members:

Dr. Raoul Auernheimer, former president of the Austrian PEN club  
Professor Dietrich von Hildebrand, Fordham University  
Professor Erich Hulla, New School for Social Research  
Dr. Otto Kallir, chairman of the AALeague  
Dr. Franz Klein, editor of "The Voice of Austria"  
Professor Hermann Mark, Polytechnical Institute of Brooklyn  
Professor Otto Loewi, Nobel prize winner  
Professor Ludwig von Mises, formerly University of Vienna  
Rev. Johannes Oesterreicher, former director of the Paulus Werk, Vienna  
Professor Willibald Fleckl, Catholic University, Washington, D. C.  
Professor Richard Schüller, New School for Social Research  
Dr. Willi Schiann, former editor of the "Weltbühne"

This AC (under the chairmanship of Dr. Schüller) has submitted to the Department of State an address declaring themselves ready to be at the disposal of the United States Government in all matters "concerning Austria and the Austrians in the United States". Against this AC some objections have to be made in full publicity: 1.) The AC was prepared by the AALeague in secrecy without any invitation of those other Austrians who might have been interested in these efforts or who have announced to be working in the same direction. 2.) The AC styles itself "non-political" which is objectively untrue, although the majority of its members may be "non-political". But there is hardly any doubt that "informations" provided for the United States Government concerning Austria or the Austrians in this country, certainly involve something "political". 3.) The readiness of the AC to be at the disposal of the United States Government in all matters "concerning the Austrians in the United States" smacks of something which will certainly be protested against not only by those struck by this peculiar "service", but also by everyone who stands for full publicity in matters like these. 4.) There are too many openly confessed Legitimists in the AC, according to my personal experience at least 10 out of 12. 5.) The only member of the AC having a political record in exile which makes a thorough examination



possible, Dr. Klein, director of the "Austrian Office" in London, is editor of a new review "The Voice of Austria" which commits the typical blunder of the Legitimists to confuse postwar and prewar Austria.

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#### THE "PRO AUSTRIA COMMITTEE".

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Exactly the same is done, although much less dangerous, by the new "Pro Austria Committee" of the Legitimists proper (under the chairmanship of Dr. Alexander Hamilton Rice and backed Mr. Calvin Bullock) which under the honorary protectorate of two "archdukes of Austria-Hungary" invites to a tea dance "for British war relief work". As the inviting letter reveals, "the proceeds of the benefit will go for supplies and to assist the families of members of the newly organized Austrian Unit, composed of former citizens of Austria-Hungary, now fighting with the British forces in England, under the leadership of H.I.I. Archduke Robert of Austria-Hungary. Otto of Austria-Hungary, now on tour of the Austrian and Hungarian settlements in Western Canada, at the invitation of the Canadian government, has promised to return so as to be present, and Archduke Felix will make a brief talk".

The astonished Austrian in America will learn by this invitation that on "Austrian Unit" of "former citizens of Austria-Hungary", of which he never heard anything before, is fighting now with the British forces under the leadership of an "Austrian-Hungarian Archduke", and that the Canadian government invites "Otto of Austria-Hungary" to "inspect" the Austrian-Hungarian settlements in Canada, in short that something like the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy seems still to exist, recognized by Great Britain and the dominions, after it had disappeared for nearly a generation. But as the most conservative official of the Department of State probably will be afraid to learn that the "Austrian Committee" of the AA League is nothing else than a selected group of Legitimistic partisans, so the most conservative British official will certainly not believe that these ghosts of the "Pro Austria Committee" will kill a single Nazi soldier. But why then feed these ghosts?

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#### THE VOICE OF AUSTRIA.

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One of the leading figures of the "Austrian Committee" is Dr. Franz Klein, who belongs to the best political authors of the Austrian emigration and



with whom to cooperate would be an honor to me. Unfortunately, he is a Greater Austrian Legitimist. The only advantage is that he sticks clearly to this goal as a political thinker, while many others try to cover it by sentimental phrases. Dr. Klein sent me a letter for the Austrian Bulletin No. 3 in the United States of America which I answered by sending him an essay "A thousand years of Danubian Federalism" for the "Voice of Austria" (75) Riverside Drive, N.Y.C.).

Dr. Klein's ill-advised and historically misconceived primary idea is that the name of Austria correctly belongs to the Greater Austrian Empire until 1918, while our Austria of 1918/38 is only "the German part of the former Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy". Hence he addresses his paper not to the Austrians in our sense, but "the Voice of Austria wants to be heard and to be echoed by hundreds of thousands of Americans, be they of Slav, German, Magyar or Italian stock, whose cradle stood in the Danube Basin when it was still protected as a political entity by the walls of the Alps, the Sudeten, Carpathian and Bosnian mountains. They have preserved in their hearts the real meaning of the name of Austria". Doubtful whether this appeal may be answered by those apostrophized, I am sure that we would be completely unable to cooperate with Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Poles, and Yugoslavs, if we would arrogate to call up their co-nationals, instead of telling the Americans of Alpine Austrian descent, where to stand according to our experiences. It may develop that we Austrians speak one day to Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Poles and Yugoslavs, in this country, however, not of the Greater Austrian past and the legitimate monarchy, but of our common task ahead: the federalization of the Danube Basin by the democratic means of cooperation on an equal footing. If we want to reach this point, we have to understand the history and ideology of these other nations more profoundly than two anonymous collaborators of Dr. Klein in their essays (on the Czech historian Palacky and "the fate of the Czechs"). In the first essay Palacky's pro-Austrian statement of 1848 is cited with approval. "There will come a time", the author says, "when the Danubian peoples will heap garlands on Palacky's monument in Prague. With his prophetic far-sightedness he becomes an apostle of the future Europe". Yet Palacky did



not say only: "If the Austrian Monarchy did not exist, it would have to be created in the interest of Europe and humanity" (1848), but also: "We have existed before Austria and we shall exist after her" (1865). Why not look in the face of this typical evolution undergone by nearly every Czechoslovak political thinker from Palacky to Masaryk and which the latter called the necessary "de-Austrianization" of the Czechoslovak people? And why not clarify from the Austrian viewpoint, what the guilt has been on the part of the dynasty, the ruling aristocracy, the liberal bourgeoisie, that this ideologically most pro-Austrian people, the Czechoslovaks, became the most anti-Austrian one? By citing Palacky's word of 1848 and implicitly hinting that the Czechoslovak evolution towards "de-Austrianization" was an error, but simultaneously being silent on the historic mistakes Austria committed particularly since 1867, nothing will be done for the necessary Austrian-Czechoslovak understanding which is certainly the basic element of Danubian reconstruction.

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THE LETTER OF A LEGITIMIST.

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My dear Dr. Winter,

The abbreviated program you published in your Austrian Bulletin No. 2 showed me that we are marching towards the same goal. May I mention a few additional ideas which would perhaps allow us to have the same road or at least the opportunity of collaborating in the framework of a qualified conception? I think there are many important things to be done before we reach the point where we should agree to disagree.

1.) An attempt at the solution of our special Danubian question must start from the recognition that they are embedded in a much wider, European, nay, world problem. Therefore your expression "European Commonwealth" does not go far enough. We need more than the example of what you call "the ideas of the English-speaking nations", we need their perpetual cooperation. Unless these nations are firmly resolved to shoulder this time the responsibility which has always been the victor's share, they had better lay down arms at once. They must guarantee the maintenance of the new order to come, with the support of all those whose peace-mindedness can be trusted. The best instrument of that guarantee will be a new League of Nations, very



different from what we had under this name until 1938. No institution can provide "peaceful change" which is not strong enough to prevent change by force- the latter always being more promising to the discontent. The new League must be one to which it would be vital to belong and from which it would be fatal to be excluded.

2.) This super-national structure must be based on a firm foundation of regional sub-divisions, one of which might be called European Commonwealth though it must certainly include Great Britain. I wonder why you emphasize so vigorously Austria's "self-determination" and "independence". The German-speaking Austrians must, of course, enjoy as much of these two rights as any other community, but self-determination has been one of the most abused and destructive catch-words and independence may involve ideas quite incompatible with the order we are hoping for. What we need is a family of semi-sovereign, neither dependent, nor independent but interdependent nations. In 1919 the peace makers distributed new frontiers most generously without asking the receivers what use they would make of them. This blunder must not be repeated.

3.) We German-speaking Austrians in exile have a special privilege which distinguishes us from our Czech, Polish and other friends. If they discuss the future of Europe, they are bound to display the belief in the establishment of what they got in 1919. Only we who always felt to be the remnant of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and who have no government in exile, only we are free to express our doubt whether the structure of 1919 is not even more obsolete than that for the survival of which you and I fought on the Russian and Italian soil from 1914 until 1918. We German-speaking Austrians alone can express the opinion that the effect of Hitler's ice-breaking activities is not only misery and disaster but also a great opportunity for all those who want to make a better, a more lasting and safer order this time. Austria has always been an idea rather than a geographical name and we German-speaking Austrians have perhaps the proud vocation of forming the spiritual nucleus of a new Danubian community of various linguistic bodies which, like Switzerland, could set an example to the whole world. This sounds very optimistic but I trust that the Danubian tribes, reunited as they are under the same yoke, have



overcome all the petty resentments which play such a pernicious part among their self-styled representatives abroad.

After the Civil War in Vienna, February 1934, we both did our best to promote the reconciliation between the regime and the Socialist workers. You did it as Vienna's Vice-Burgomaster, as a lecturer and writer and mainly by collecting those Socialists who were conscious of national necessities without abandoning their party-convictions. I did it as a journalist and foreign correspondent who tried to strengthen the left wing of the regime, the Christian Trade Unionists, against the semi-Fascist Heimwehren. We both, labelled at the same moment as Communist and Fascist, were unsuccessful but it was worth trying. It is a strange coincidence that you, the Monarchist of a time in which this colour was out of fashion, are a Republican today whereas I who opposed you in those olden days, am now inclined to believe that the super-national state on the Danube will need a super-national head, in other words a strictly constitutional monarch. We could, if we would, postpone this discussion since we have to concentrate on the propaganda for the liberation of our compatriots at home. But the optimism without which I should be unable to do this work, is upheld by the hope that they in their despair are seeking refuge in exactly those traditional values which we threw away lightheartedly in 1919 only to be punished mercilessly for our lack of faith twenty years later.

A monarchism of this type can, of course, never be a party-creed. We may call it a conservative attitude and even this does not refer primarily to a special form of state. But the question of "right" or "left" should not be allowed to impede the common effort of all those who are qualified and sincere.

Yours

(signed) Dr. Franz Klein

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THE ANSWER OF AN ANTI-LEGITIMIST.

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1.) We Austrians should be able to revitalize Austrian democracy according to the ideas of the English speaking world, but this world itself would have to take over the task of policing the other half. However, taking into account realistically the inherited dislike of the English speaking world to police other peoples, we others should be eager to concentrate, as quickly as



it can be done, upon such a kind of reconstruction which would again police itself. Does anybody of sound political thought believe that such a scheme of federative cooperation in the Danube Basin would be facilitated by the Hapsburg Monarchy?

2.) If there shall be a good peace, a family of interdependent nations will certainly be the final result. But as any functioning administration of a democratic commonwealth can only be the result of democratic elections these semi-sovereignties fitted into a new world order can be basically-at least so far as the atmosphere, but also the final technique is concerned-only the result of self-determination, of plebiscites and elections within a democratic system of government, sealed by a judicial procedure. As the people conquered by the Nazis are striving for national liberty, shall we Austrians, because of the ambitions of the Hapsburg dynasty, be more sophisticated than the others by striving for interdependency?

3.) I think, the Austrians too, if they are politically minded and not ideological dreamers, can stick only to the legal continuity of March 11, 1938 as that date, when Germany conquered Austria. It is an error to believe that "the German-speaking Austrians" have any greater responsibility than others for the federative union of the Danubian nations. We have to break definitely with the Greater Austrian ideology of the past which burdened us with this responsibility for the sake of the Greater Austrian imperialism. On the contrary, we have to devote ourselves whole-heartedly to the task of reconstructing the union of the smaller nations living between Germany, Russia and Italy by displaying nothing else than our equal interest, equal responsibility and equal determination to do our best. It is the most fateful residuum of dynastical thinking in the minds of Austrians that they ambiguously speak of Austria confusing prewar and postwar Austria for the sake of dynastical ambitions.

4.) I judge the problem of the "form of state", monarchy or republic, according to political requirements rather than metaphysical ideals. Hence I always have been of the opinion that it was an error to destroy the prewar monarchy instead of reforming it, although the historic guilt of the dynasty and the



political necessity of the national movements in bringing about the Succession States made it politically inevitable. Thus I have not to repent what others "lightheartedly" have done. Moreover, I have been of the opinion that it might have provided a slight chance of preventing the Nazification of Austria if the Hapsburgs could have been integrated into the frame of the existing authoritarian state which could have been done without the restoration of the monarchy in the proper sense. But it was the movement of Legitimism itself which missed the grand chance of conservatism in general to be the champion of democracy and constitutionalism, as the Prussian and Bavarian conservatives had missed it before. Today, the Hapsburgs only aggravate the primary task of federative union among the Succession Nations which I still consider the true partners of reconstruction. No such remote question as the one, for instance, related to the possible future usefulness of a constitutional monarchy in keeping these nations solidly united in the face of a new threat of aggression can alter this fact. I am not sure whether such an imperial symbol of unity as the Hapsburgs have been will be necessary in the world of tomorrow, but rather sure that hardly any pretender of the 20th century, who not only has to preserve, but wants to regain a throne, will be able to display the abilities of a Rudolph of Hapsburg, Charles V. and Joseph II. together, which he obviously would have to display, if he were to be successful.

Thus I agree fully with the advice of an English Jesuit (given in the London Jesuit paper "The Tablet" of March 16, 1940): "We think it doubtful whether there can be any future for the Hapsburg dynasty. But if there is, it will come about as the restoration of Charles II, to the English throne in 1660 came about, not through the activity of exiles, but to resolve deadlocks. When the future of the Danube Valley becomes practical politics, scheme will be pitted against scheme, and the ideology of 1919 being today so discredited, it may happen that the only compromise on which agreement will be obtainable will be to restore the Hapsburgs as constitutional head and federal heads, permanent presidents of a new union. The Hapsburgs meantime should parade no ambition, and the head of the house should content himself with letting it be known that he would not decline if he were really wanted. He should show no sort of eagerness, and if he is a wise man he will feel none.



Any suggestion that the great memories of the Hapsburg dynasty are in the market, to be mobilized for use in conjunction with foreign capital, will weaken the one great asset of the house, its prestige and its long absence from responsibility for the present troubles".

As the Hapsburgs in person are acting in every detail contrary to this advice of someone friendly to them, as far as their human problems are concerned, they certainly will not feel surprised that the politically minded followers of their cause who however put Austria above Hapsburg are leaving in a constant stream the black and yellow ship of Legitimism which is something archaic, but does not represent any straight course leading into a constructive Central European future.

E.K.W.

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The preparatory committee for the establishment of an Austrian National Council in the United States recommends the following four points as an Austrian platform:

For Austria's self-determination, liberty and independence.  
For a democratic system of government, revitalized by the ideals of the English-speaking world.  
For a social democracy, based on the cooperation of all classes.  
For a European Commonwealth of Nations, to which national sovereignty, including the form of state, is subordinated.

Frank Harand, former Major of the Austrian Militia  
Dr. Aurel Kolnai, author  
Richard Krum, former Oberstleutnant of the Austrian Army  
Ernst Fisko, former editor-in-chief of "Neues Wiener Tagblatt" (Wochenausgabe)  
Dr. Richard Redler, formerly Press Department of the Austrian Foreign Office  
Dr. Ernst Weiwurm, Research Assistant in New York University  
Dr. Ernst Karl Winter, former Vice-Mayor of Vienna, professor of the New School for Social Research.

AUSTRO-AMERICAN CENTER 8 West 40 New York City Room 203

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THE FREE AUSTRIAN MOVEMENT

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Deeply impressed by the historic meeting of the heads of the two English-speaking nations and the Eight Points of their joint declaration, the undersigned consider it their duty to raise their voices again and to propose to their compatriots, Americans of Austrian descent and Austrian nationals in this country, to establish a united, efficient and coordinated FREE AUSTRIAN MOVEMENT in the United States, in order to mobilize all Austrian forces in the fight for Freedom.

Recalling the speeches of Prime Minister Winston Churchill (beginning with his first solemn declaration of November 11, 1939), and parallel pronouncements of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who frequently mentioned Austria as the first country to have lost its independence and to be restored by an Allied victory, we know that the Eight Points refer to all the conquered European nations from Austria to Greece.

Fully aware of the necessity of a united effort of the Americans of Austrian descent and the Austrian nationals in this country to safeguard the vital interests of the Austrian people in the service of Democracy, the undersigned have set up a coordinating committee which stands: For the inalienable right of the Austrian people "to choose the form of government under which they will live", "to see sovereign rights and self-government restored" and "to dwell in safety within their own boundaries". For a system of government which restores the Rights of Man, self-government in communities and territories, and a democratic constitution based upon Parliamentary representation. For a social legislation emanating from the cooperation of all classes which guarantees security and progress to the working people in town and country, and re-establishes their right of free coalition and collective bargaining. For an international order, from regional pacts to a world organization, in which national sovereignty is limited by voluntary agreements among the peoples concerned.

The Coordinating Committee appeals to all Austrian-American groups and organizations in the United States to join in the formation on the broadest non-partisan basis of an Austrian National Council in the United States.

New York - September 1st, 1941.

Austrian Action  
Ferdinand Czernin

Austro-American Center  
Ernst Karl Winter

Austrian Section of the  
American Committee on  
European Reconstruction  
Aurel Kolnai

Conservative Austrians  
Martin Fuchs

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AUSTRIA AND THE EIGHT POINTS

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From Austria to Greece everyone of the conquered nations has reason to be joyful about and grateful for the Eight Points agreed upon by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. They will be the banner of the smaller nations in years to come. They prove that the two most powerful nations of the world have fully understood the eternal value which the smaller nations represent for human civilization. They indicate the deep conviction of both the United States of America and the British Empire that their own power and grandeur depends upon the solemn recognition of national individuality, be it big or small. Nobody may be better able to testify than we Austrians that here exactly lies the most decisive point of difference between Anglo-American thought and German thought in all its variants.

This is the great identity between the Eight Points and the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson: both aim at the protection of the smaller nations against those who tell us that it is not worth while to protect them. Against the illusion fostered by ideologists in both countries, United States and Great Britain, with not a few political exiles from the bigger nations among them, that there will



9 11  
be a future without national sovereignty and without frontiers, the Eight Points emphasize the "sovereign rights" of all nations, including the right of "choosing the form of government" and including the right of "dwelling in safety within their own boundaries". This indicates the conservative character of the Eight Points which want to preserve or restore a status quo ante. Wilson's Fourteen Points also showed remarkable traces of conservatism, too often overlooked. Point X for instance said; "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." Wilson's conservatism had to yield later, when historic forces insisted upon the dissolution of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy. At that time the idea of self-determination, though not present in the Fourteen Points themselves, removed the checks and balances of conservatism. From this viewpoint it seems particularly useful that the Eight Points expressly maintain the idea of national sovereignty (as did already the Czechoslovak-Polish agreement of November 11th, 1940). For national sovereignty now means the protection of the smaller nations which may guarantee that their self-government is not degraded to "cultural autonomy" and their national wealth is not drawn away from the disposal of their political authorities. The 65 million Germans would be able to resign national sovereignty in a European Confederacy or Federal State, and would still profit from such a resignation. But the smaller nations cannot simply resign this vital right which is their main protection and they cannot afford to do that particularly in a community of big and small alike. If, however, these smaller nations will be able to combine their forces in creating a federative union of their own which would make them together as powerful as any big nation, then they will certainly have to delegate elements of their national sovereignty to that higher community they want to establish. Nevertheless, even in this most fortunate case they will delegate their rights voluntarily, pooling their forces together, but they will not be forced to resign what is theirs.

The scheme of conservatism which is recognized by the Eight Points silently has a "normal year" in mind, the status quo of which should be restored. Numerous utterances of Churchill and Roosevelt, Eden and Hull remove any doubt that this date of normality is January 1st, 1938. Otherwise, the Eight Points would apply to any peace with any post-Hitlerian German regime keeping its booty of German-speaking countries. Since Churchill's first solemn declaration of November 11th, 1939 there is no doubt that the British government has not only recognized Czechoslovakia and Poland in their pre-Munich or pre-war shape respectively, but would also be ready to restore an independent Austria in the frame of her frontiers of 1918/38, if the Austrians themselves, at home and in exile, might be up to this task. Unfortunately, the Austrians in exile did not keep pace with their chance, primarily because of the historic guilt of the official leadership of Austrian Legitimism which has outdone by this omission all the historic virtues it may have displayed in former times. When Winston Churchill in his last speech of August 24th mentioned the Austrians as the first victims of Nazi Germany, but initiated the list of countries to be restored with the Czechs, he was only consistent from the viewpoint of a government interested primarily in war efforts which the Austrians so far were unable to contribute. As Austrian war efforts, indispensable from the viewpoint of offensive strategy, can be set up only on the basis of political coordination of as many Austrian energies as possible, it will be the noise made by the Austrian Legitimists, nor the reluctance of the Austrian Socialists which will count in the long run, but the coordinating activities of the Austrian Center, numerically weak in exile perhaps, but spiritually strong by its contacts with the overwhelming feeling of the Austrian people at home. When Great Britain's war efforts turn into its offensive stage, these energies will count.

In conformity with their conservative character, the Eight Points emphasize the sovereign rights of the legal authorities. Those national sovereignties which legally existed before the first attack of Nazi Germany started, and those national frontiers which correspond to them, are not desired to be changed by the two English-speaking powers. Against the possible interpretation that the Eight Points are determined to favor as many plebiscites as possible, it is safe to presume that what they indicate is just the opposite. Let us have, for a moment, the useful vision of a post-Hitlerian Europe to be reorganized by Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia unanimously. If anyone might then want to modify legal frontiers and to challenge existing sovereignties, he would have against him established factors of power and the predominance of an ideology



contrary to that which once favored frontier rectifications under the heel of Nazi Germany. If for instance some fanatic groups of Nazified Austrians, or Sudeten Germans, or Corridor Germans, who would not be discouraged enough by the defeat of Nazi Germany, might want to support such a movement of separation from the status quo ante, they alone would have to start it against the existing powers determined by defeat and victory, and expressed in terms of defeated and victorious governments and armies. The Eight Points do not encourage movements for changes; on the contrary, they encourage the stability of sovereignties and frontiers. The movements for changes will be encouraged only by the historic contingency of victory. Consequently, if the Allies win the war and the Austrian, Czechoslovak and Polish governments knowing their aims stand firmly together, there will be no movement for separation among the Austrians, Sudeten Germans and Corridor Germans, while there may easily be plebiscite movements in the Adriatic Littoral in favor of Yugoslavia, in Southern Tyrol in favor of Austria, in Lusatia in favor of Czechoslovakia, in Silesia in favor of Czechoslovakia and Poland and in Eastern Prussia in favor of Poland and Lithuania. As long as Germany marched on historically, the world learned and spoke of the German-speaking minorities all over the world. But if Russia would once be among those to turn the wheel, it may easily be that the world learns to speak of the Slavonic peoples in Germany, the Serbs in Lusatia, the Czechoslovaks and Poles in Silesia, the Poles and Lithuanians in Eastern Prussia. There are millions of Janissaries in the ranks of the German people, many of them only superficially Germanized and therefore predestined to rediscover their inner being, if history changes its course.

Moreover, it will be the function of regional blocks to guarantee the status quo ante among their own partners. Hence there will be no plebiscites among the Czechs, Slovaks, Croats and Slovenes in Austria, as vice versa none among the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia and other German-speaking minorities within the boundaries of the other partners of a Danubian Block. As these confederates certainly will delegate elements of their national sovereignty to their superior community, they may also mutually drop the application of the right of self-determination concerning the national minorities within their neighbors' boundaries. But the partners of a confederacy might go another step forward. They might mutually drop the right "to choose the form of government" in favor of a constitutional scheme adopted in common. Under the abstract rule of free choice, the United States of America would never have been possible, nor would a Danubian Block be possible under such conditions. The homogeneity of the form of government is the main concrete of a federative union. If there would be no common structure of the form of government among confederates, there could be consequently no delegation of national sovereignty and no abandonment of the right of self-determination concerning the linguistic minorities. For the Danubian nations there is no other alternative: either the restoration of the Habsburgs in a Greater Austrian empire, or, if this is considered an anachronism, the identical democratic form of government for both the federative union and every single partner. While the first alternative would be dangerously close to the erection of a new idol of mystic leadership, immediately after that of Nazidom is crushed, the second alternative pre-supposes the voluntary renunciation of the, otherwise inalienable, right "to choose the form of government" on the part of all nations concerned in favor of a common system of government binding both the superior community and its single members.

Within the frame of the Eight Points, the regional organization of Europe in general and Danubian Europe in particular is the next consequence. This includes the reintegration of the Danubian nations into a stronger unity of their own than the one they have formed during the last decades, as well as the federalization of Germany into a looser unity than she has been since Bismarck. Within the Danubian Block, as envisaged by those Austrians who are conscious of their political differentiation from the Germans, there will be no absolute sovereignty, no frontier rectifications, no national plebiscites and no free choice of the form of government, although there should be a "plebiscitary democracy" confirming or correcting the government and its administration. On the other hand, if the federalization of Germany would proceed so favorably that Germany returns somehow to her function as internationalized German Federation, it might be wiser on the part of the victors to refrain from promoting the disintegration of Germany, in order to preserve her as a clearing-house of those local unities which the German peoples themselves



will have to carve out from the body of centralized Bismarckian-Hitlerian Germany, if they want to survive as a big cultural unity within a European Commonwealth, in which the smaller nations will have the lead.

August 15th, 1941.

E.K.W.

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#### THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF AUSTRIA

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The following items are the result of discussions going on for months within the frame of the Austro-American Center and the Austrian Section of the American Committee on European Reconstruction. They were formulated -prior to the publication of the Eight Points- under the personal responsibility of the undersigned author.

1. Military suppositions. In speaking of Austria we tacitly presuppose the complete defeat of Hitlerism through the concentrated efforts of Great Britain and her allies, including the indispensable cooperation of Russia and the United States. In any case of appeasing Hitler instead of crushing him, Austria would have no chance at all to regain her independence, but would certainly figure among the most obvious objects of compensation. Furthermore, if the collapse of Germany would be the consequence of revolutionary rather than military events, and there would be in fact a revolutionary overthrow of the Nazi regime (which seems very improbable), any German revolution, also a leftist one, might easily continue cherishing the idol of German national unity including the "Ostmark". Thus the national interest of Austria is that not only Russia but the English-speaking countries too should have an army on the European continent, or in other words, that the latter countries should definitely be converted to the offensive strategy, without which this war will not be won. Whether Russia will survive or not, the British will absolutely need an offensive strategy, in order either to win the war on their own account and consequently to organize the post-war world according to their own vision alone, or, under less favorable conditions, to share with Russia in both winning the war and organizing the peace. As no nation on earth will have a far-reaching influence on the shaping of the new world order after this war, unless it has contributed blood, tears and sweat, there is no doubt that the extent of these alone relevant sacrifices will constitute the moral weight which is to decide on the scales of history the problem of prevalence and supremacy among the competing types of civilization which are engaged in this life and death struggle.

2. The Armistice Period. Presupposing a victory of Great Britain and her allies, involving the presence of allied armies in Central Europe, the main interest of every Central European country would be the existence of the closest possible understanding between the Western democracies and Soviet Russia (if surviving), as well as the existence of the clearest and simplest possible plan of reconstruction (agreed upon at least by the two English-speaking empires, if Russia could not be brought into line). On whatever plan it may take place, the reconstruction of Central Europe will need some time, and from this viewpoint a certain delay in the definite peace settlement, an armistice period of several years, could be advisable. This period would be sufficient to lay the main foundations for the future peace in conformity with the outcome of the struggle and with the agreements concluded among the victors, while the peoples in question would have time enough to adapt themselves to the new conditions so that at the end of the period they would be prepared sufficiently for the legal conclusion of the peace treaty, which would require their formal participation on the basis of a spiritual reorganization achieved in the meantime. Subsequent plebiscites would certainly only confirm the settlements of the armistice period, while any abstract self-determination without such a period of education would be ruinous for Europe from the very start. The European peoples after years of German occupation will be in a psychological condition which excludes the immediate application of self-determination, also under international control, until their mental readjustment is secured. This means, in terms of the Austrian problem, that two political questions of a new Austria which we believe today, perhaps wrongly, to be the biggest ones, union with a democratic Germany or reunion with Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the one hand, Habsburg monarchy or democracy on the common European level on the other hand, would be decided during the armistice period by those who will be the victors and therefore alone responsible for the new European order to come. These decisions would



have to be confirmed later by the rules of "plebiscitary democracy". Only this would be the real fulfillment of national self-determination which cannot be the anarchic privilege of destroying the European order, established by the power and responsibility of the victors, but only the right to administer this order by democratic means, into which plebiscitary institutions should largely be included.

3. The Enforcement of Peace. The English-speaking empires will undoubtedly become aware of the fact that a policing function will be required from them for some time after peace is concluded. The more this additional period can be protracted the less danger there will be of a third catastrophe. This necessity of policing the world will have to be faced by the English-speaking powers under any circumstances. If Russia survives, these powers will be a necessary counterpoise to the then growing Russian influence and predominance in certain parts of Europe, and if Russia collapses, they will have to bear the whole weight of what otherwise would be, in part, Russia's task. Nevertheless, the military enforcement of a lasting peace by standing armies, powerful navies and efficient air arms, sustained by the English-speaking empires for a long time to come, will rather be of a transitory character and serve educational purposes. The phantasm of a "Pax Britannico-Americana" which would dominate the world by force is neither to England's nor to America's liking. Within the frame of the military forces of the English-speaking countries there are even now, and there will be more, allied groups (the Free French, Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, etc. armies), which later on will easily participate in policing their own countries and will finally take over this job by themselves, perhaps continuing to be incorporated into a common frame. Thus, the type of organization which today comprehends the allied units within the British army may acquire prominence in the future. By this statute the first steps may be accomplished to teach the European nations how to police themselves, without abandoning that unity which in itself is the best policing force.

4. The Austrian Contribution To Such A Settlement. From the Austrian viewpoint it would be extremely urgent to start an active Austrian cooperation in all matters concerning war, armistice and peace right now. Not unless the Austrians will have a similar national authority, government or national council as have the Czechoslovaks, Poles and Yugoslavs, an authority in charge of an Austrian military unit like the others, will it be possible to assign the administration of Austria to Austrian forces and the interior policing of Austria to an Austrian army and police at the same hour when the Czechoslovak, Polish and Yugoslav armies may be able to assume their functions in their respective countries. To contribute, as far as their powers go, to the accomplishment of this goal seems to be the great task of the Austrian political exiles. This task is certainly less difficult than that of the German political exiles, who would have to pretend to be the speakers of the post-Hitlerian shape of a 65 million empire, the very basis of which, after Hitler has used it as his starting-point, has become historically questionable. But the task of the Austrian political exiles, too, remains practically unsolvable as long as Great Britain herself has not chosen her Austrian ally similarly as she did in the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia. This omission, primarily due to the inability of the Austrians in exile to overcome their party difficulties, as Poles and Czechoslovaks have successfully done, has its supplementary cause in the fact that Great Britain so far did not accept the idea of offensive strategy, an indispensable part of which would be to take a stand in regard to such problems of the future. Hence, Austria remains for the time being spiritually abandoned to Germany. But as long as Austria is left to Germany, this war will not be won by Great Britain. It might turn out disastrously for the whole of Europe if Austria were to remain in the spiritual grasp of Germany down to the end of the war.

5. European Reconstruction along Regional Lines. It would be Utopian and would amount to a repetition of the mistakes made after the first World War if the vision of a future European order would rely exclusively upon the idea of a "European Confederacy", tending toward a "federal state", and eliminating "national sovereignty" or restricting it to mere "cultural autonomy". The United States can be neither copied nor surpassed by Europe. After all, the European peoples struggle for liberty today and they are expecting an order in which their national liberty would be better respected than in Hitler's. Certainly there will be a special European construction within the world-wide frame of a renewed League of Nations. But this European con-



struction has to be organized in such a way as to protect the liberty of those European nations which are the main bearers of European cultural values against potential aggressors. This protection will only be accomplished by an organization along regional lines, as any other type of organization would legalize anew the geographical, numerical and military superiority of the 65 million Germans in the heart of Europe and would only tempt their over-developed appetite for domination. While certain general European interests, political and economic, singled out from the whole, may find their special expression in general European organizations, if not in world organizations, the political and economic center of gravity of people's everyday life should lie in regional organizations, based upon the liberty and independence of their partner nations. These regional organizations or "blocks" would replace and modernize the former European great powers which through centuries had been the basic elements of the European family of nations, its civilization and its peace.

6. The Danubian Block. In this respect, Austria belongs organically, by force of geography and history, and in accordance with her economic and military interests, to the regional unity of the peoples living in the Center, the North East, the East and the South East of Central Europe which are characterized by the following features: They are overwhelmingly smaller peoples, or at least comparatively weak owing to geographical causes. They are traditionally exposed to aggression, symbolized by philosophies and dispositions present, although to a different degree, in the history and tradition of Germany, Italy and Russia. They are located between the Baltic Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Black Sea, where they have shaped a civilization of their own for a thousand and more years, as an element of which they have elaborated the technique of federative symbiosis in all periods of European history. The scope of this regional unity is clearly subdivided into three parts: the Danube Basin in the center, consisting of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, or in other words the triangle Vienna-Prague-Budapest; the Vistula Basin in the North East, consisting of Poland, the three Baltic countries and at least the Western Ukrainian or Ruthenian territory; and the Balkan Peninsula in the South East, consisting of the six Balkan countries. Although in strict terms it is inaccurate to speak of a Danubian Block, either so far as the Austrian-Czechoslovak-Hungarian triangle is concerned,--for Czechoslovakia in her center belongs to the Elbe system--, or so far as the regional unity as a whole is concerned,--the Vistula Basin being entirely separated from the Danube and only three of the Balkan countries having Danubian interests,--it seems nevertheless proper to label the regional unity between Baltic Sea and Black Sea briefly "the Danubian Block", as its political nucleus certainly is the Danube Basin.

7. The Frontiers of the Danubian Block. In terms of European power politics, the 30 million of the Danube Basin proper are no match at all for any of the aggressive neighbors, unless they be combined organically with the more than 30 million of the Vistula Basin and the more than 40 million of the Balkan Peninsula; whereas, on the other hand, these peoples taken together, numbering over 100 million, would doubtless be a powerful factor by themselves, capable of dealing with any neighbor on an equal footing. Moreover, the ties existing between Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia, or between Czechoslovakia and Poland, definitely exclude any idea of a mere Austrian-Czechoslovak-Hungarian combination. Hence, the Danubian Block will be a power of at least 100 million, or it will not be at all. The frontiers of this Danubian Block will primarily depend upon what scheme will be applied to post-war Germany. If the Danubian Block of smaller peoples is feasible, they would have no interest in any "dismemberment" of Germany, though perhaps some in her "federalization" which would transform the unitarian, centralized Bismarckian-Hitlerian Reich into a similar kind of federative union as the Danubian Block itself would be. The more this post-war Germany would be federalized the less rectifications of the frontiers of 1938 would be required. Taking into account the frontiers of those 13 states which existed between Germany, Italy and Russia in 1938, there would be, speaking in terms of the European order of yesterday, only two indispensable frontier rectifications: the extension of the so-called Polish Corridor into a broader Baltic base, or in other words the absorption of East and West Prussia, including Danzig, into the Polish-Lithuanian scheme, and the incorporation of the former Austrian Littoral on the Adriatic Sea, including Trieste, with its overwhelming Yugoslav population, into the Danube-Balkan scheme. In both cases the incorporation of the coastal



regions into their respective Polish-Lithuanian and Yugoslav hinterlands would be historically, economically and linguistically justifiable, provided that the two big ports, Danzig and Trieste, indispensably needed by the Danubian Block, but not vitally important for Germany or Italy, would be federalized for the interest of the Danubian Block as a whole. If the problem of the Ostelbian landowners and their big real estates in Eastern Prussia has been the most difficult one during the period between the two world wars, the methods practiced in the meantime by Hitler himself may prove completely adequate for dealing with this special matter. In a recent discussion between the premier of the Yugoslav government in exile and a former Italian foreign minister concerning Trieste the one overestimated the role which national aspirations may still play after this war, while the other obviously underestimated the consequence of Italy's partnership with Germany. All these considerations relative to frontiers are conceived in the spirit of the traditional power politics and they will have value as long only as these power politics prevail. If Europe is able to develop a new type of international organization, all these considerations may lose their meaning. But although frontier rectifications may have less importance in such a new set-up than in former times, nobody should cherish the illusion that the defeated nations will not have to face this problem at all. It is ridiculous when anti-Nazi German exiles believe to be strong enough to eliminate this problem by the minatory slogan: "If a second Versailles, then a third World War". If there will be a new Europe, in which not only a balance is held by regional blocks but the federative principle is applied also to Europe as such, then frontier rectifications, while involving a change in sovereignty, may not altogether eliminate the legal influence of the former sovereign upon the lost region. Practically, then, many cases of "condominia" may develop, cases of parallel and intersecting sovereignties, although it should not be forgotten that even in such cases there would have to be a supreme competence between these parallel and pluralistic sovereignties.

8. The Partners of the Danubian Block. The basic elements of the organization of any Danubian Block are the national unities: Austrians, Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Poles, Rumanians and Yugoslavs (to drop for the purpose of the following comparative analysis the other nations). Before the World War the natural partners of any reorganization of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, which has been the pre-war Danubian Block, were the historic unities: the Austrian hereditary lands, Bohemia, Hungary, Croatia, Transylvania and Galicia. At that time the more serious of the proposed schemes centered around the historic unities, but culminated in the envisaged creation of supplementary national unities, thus propounding for the first time the idea of a pluralism of interconnected sovereignties. The peace treaties of 1919 definitely destroyed the historic unities, although these had been to a large extent identical with economic unities, and substituted everywhere the national unities, in the shape of the so-called Succession States: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. These national unities of the Succession States did never represent an accomplishment of the abstract ideal embodied in the so-called "principle of nationality", according to which State and Nation should become identical and all "co-nationals" in the linguistic sense should share the "birth-right" of being entitled to gather into one political frame. On the contrary, every Succession State contained national minorities. Now Hitler has destroyed four of these Succession States, carving out from their bodies two new tribal units, Slovakia and Croatia, and he has turned another one, Hungary, back into its former supra-national existence embracing for the time being again large national minorities. On the other hand, the Czechoslovak, Polish and Yugoslav governments in exile still exist, and national councils of the other nations in question may follow sooner or later. Great Britain is allied with these governments in exile and although the British have not committed themselves so far as the details of former frontiers are concerned, this alliance means a recognition not only of governments and their armies, but also of their political claims to restore the unities they are representing. It means a complete miscalculation of this realistic policy of the British government when the Austrian Monarchists, ideologically cooperating with Hitler in this respect, recognize in their minds the tribal units of Slovakia and Croatia which rose with Hitler and will fall with him. The "national states" are certainly no absolute ideal; they require supplementary organizations. Nevertheless, particularly as regards the Czechoslovaks



and Yugoslavs, but also in case of the "de-Habsburgized" Austrians, they stand for basic political traditions of the Danube region, focused in national capitals, which are more suited to be the pivotal elements of re-integration in the Danube region than any other principle of organization may provide, least of all the artificial reviviscence of the tribal units at the hands of Hitler,--main function of which is to guarantee German hegemony, and not to promote federative symbiosis.

9. Danubian Federalism. Any union of the smaller Central European nations is possible only on a federative basis. The idea of hegemony, embodied by master nations or by ruling castes, Nordic or otherwise, has to be completely abandoned. Every single nation has to be organized first according to the federative principle either in a territorial federation like the Austrian Federal State consisting of nine federal lands, or in federations of tribes like Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. By a federative organization of this kind the particular problems of Slovakia or Croatia might be easily erased. Within the frame of the federative union of all these national unities it may happen that Slovakia within Czechoslovakia, or Croatia within Yugoslavia may enjoy a similar federative position as perhaps Tyrol within Austria, or Ruthenian Galicia within Poland, and this factor may result in a certain similarity of all these territories throughout the whole Danubian Block. There would be tribal units on an equal footing within the national unities and then the national unities could be supplemented by economic unities corresponding in many instances to the former historic unities. Within a federative system like the Danubian Block the idea of pluralism could be carried through and both types of sovereignties, national and economic, could be maintained in an interconnecting parallelism. Besides this horizontal parallelism of various types of sovereignties there would be in this federative set-up the vertical hierarchy of autonomies, or in terms of the Austrian constitutional tradition, of lands, countries and communities, all of them being corporations of public law entitled to participate in economy, as well as traditional nurseries of political life since centuries.

10. The Minority Problem of the Danubian Block. A similar scheme of federalism may be applied to the minority question. Not everyone of the "national states" will be interested in this problem in equal degree. Austria and Hungary are obviously more interested than the others, as the German-speaking minority is spread out all over the other countries of the entire region and the Hungarians could certainly never be re-united unless the empire of St. Stephen's crown were to be restored. There are Czechs in Vienna, Slovaks in Lower Austria, Croats in Burgenland, Slovenes in Styria and Carinthia, but they all together represent no problem at all as compared for instance with the Sudeten Germans in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. No doubt that any Austrian regime will be interested in the fate of the German-speaking peoples among Czechoslovaks, Hungarians, Poles, Rumanians and Yugoslavs, among them compact peasant population which certainly will survive. Frontier rectifications could not solve these problems. The transfer of the Burgenland from Hungary to Austria in 1921 was a solution in terms of that period which could have arranged in other ways also. Although we had better not reverse this solution again, it need not be applied to analogous cases like the Southern Moravian or Southern Bohemian Germans, who belonged to Czechoslovakia, or the Southern Styrian Germans, who belonged to Yugoslavia, until Hitler united them administratively with the "Ostmark". If the frontiers of the Danubian Block themselves as existing in 1938 need only some few rectifications, the national frontiers within the Danubian Block could be preserved or restored completely after the pattern of 1938; for within a federative union there would be better means of accomplishing the goal of national peace and minority protection than frontier rectifications. The principal method would, in the long run, consist of an educational system which were to embrace at least one neighbor tongue, culture and history. So, for instance, every Viennese would become familiar with Czechoslovak or Hungarian interests, every Styrian or Carinthian with Yugoslav interests. There would be furthermore complete national equality within the smaller unities in all common matters; for instance, the three Danubian nations, Austrians, Czechoslovaks and Hungarians, might seriously try to deal with each other on the same level of equality as do the three Swiss nations, as their grand historic mission would be to become the "Switzerland of the East". Only in exceptional cases should the method of enforced transplantation of minorities take place, this method being so much the less per-



manent means of solving the national problem within a federative union as the natural development of free movement would soon modify again the national demarcation. The crucial problem within the whole scope of the Danubian minority questions remains that of the Sudeten Germans, who are practically a dozen of smaller tribes gravitating either toward Prague and Vienna together, or toward a Greater German Reich behind the Danubian frontiers. A new Austrian-Czechoslovak union might have the consequence that those Sudeten Germans who would not be susceptible of ideological absorption into the Czechoslovak State could choose to gravitate toward Vienna again, where they had their particular opportunities in the past. Another grave minority problem, transcending the frontiers of the Danubian Block, but bearing upon its military existence as such, is Southern Tyrol. The military frontier of Italy on the Brenner Pass will be maintained, after this war, only if Italy is to be appeased before the collapse of Germany, but it will be abandoned in favor of a military frontier of the Danubian Block at the Southern edge of the Alps if Italy will share the fate of Germany down to the bitter end. Even in the first case, however, the interest of the Danubian Block in Southern Tyrol, although never as great as in Trieste, would be great enough to secure national autonomy for all the German-speaking, Yugoslav and Latin elements within the Italian boundaries in exchange for a similar statute in behalf of the Italian-speaking minorities of the Adriatic Littoral. Nevertheless, no abstract scheme of national autonomy which would guarantee national self-determination to every national minority should be envisaged even within the Danubian Block itself before the general peace settlement has proved a lasting one, before the new Danubian Block has assumed a firm unity of its own and, particularly, before Germany has given definite proof of becoming emancipated from the former tradition of national expansion. It is only within a completely stable political organization which would again have become a kind of Danubian Empire that this third category of sovereignties, the cultural-national or linguistic one, could be established without negative consequences. Otherwise, the German minorities within the Danubian Block, organized in national autonomous communities as "states within the state", could easily develop into new spearheads of aggression.

11. The Constitution of the Danubian Block. Any idea of reconstructing the new federative union of the Danubian peoples as a monarchy, even constitutional according to the British pattern, has to be abandoned from the very start. The European Monarchy is the last remnant of the historic fact that the "Nordic race" once ruled the whole of Europe. Where this Monarchy has already finished its historic track, it will not be restored, after the last trick of the "Nordics", Hitlerism, has been destroyed. The introduction of the Habsburg question into the Danube problem could not but aggravate the chance of federative union, as the Slavonic peoples have definitely broken with their former loyalty toward their Germanic masters. There is a gulf which cannot be bridged. This is the more true as the Habsburg Legitimists still refuse to understand the teachings of history in 1918 and 1938, and stick to the illusion that Slovakia and Croatia be symptoms of a roundabout return to the obsolete yesterday. By the national unities alone, represented by their governments in exile, can a federative union be shaped: not by tribal units, the very existence of which is apt only to support hegemonic interests, and to obstruct the application of equality, which presupposes numerically equal unities. According to the three subdivisions of the Danube-Vistula-Balkan Block, the task will be a different one. As far as Austria is concerned, the Austrian-Czechoslovak-Hungarian union can be organized on the basis of complete equality of the three nations, which are numerically, culturally and economically equal. They can decide to shape a common federal apparatus on the basis of their triangular symmetry, including a common supreme court, a common parliament and a common executive power which according to the Swiss model can very easily be a "collegium", perhaps the three confederated states. As long as the age of reconstruction prevails, a certain primacy of this executive power in all matters of the federative union may be advisable. The three armies, or rather national militias, based on peacetime draft, are to be organized on an identical level, but behind these militias there may be a professional common army, perhaps of the entire Danubian Block, preferably modelled after the British example. The educational system on all levels would have to be largely coordinated and interconnected, and particularly the universities would have to submit to an identical reform. The economic policy and social legislation should be



principally identical: the same monetary and banking system, parallel organizations of capital, labor and peasantry, a common tariff policy vis-a-vis the outsiders. This whole constitutional set-up may be materialized primarily within the frame of the single regional sub-division (except the professional army which would be the first common instrument of the block as such). The three regional sub-divisions will certainly have their peculiarities. In a second stage the attempt could be made to coordinate the three sub-divisions of the entire Danube-Vistula-Balkan Block, in which case the three sub-divisions again could be regarded as equal, so that a similar procedure might be adopted as with the Austrian-Czechoslovak-Hungarian union. Only if experiences of this kind, collected in regional unities, precede, would the federative organization of a European Commonwealth of Nations be feasible and result in something more than merely a new opportunity for German aggression to prepare the third Punic War.

September 1st, 1941.

E.K.W.

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THE LETTER OF AN AUSTRIAN CONSERVATIVE

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Dear Dr. Winter:

In the course of our discussions concerning the coordination of the work of various Austrian groups fighting for Austria's liberation, it has been asked what attitude those members of the Conservative Group who are not known as non-legitimists make towards the future form of government in Austria.

The answer to that question is as follows;

1. We consider it altogether irrelevant whether a member of our group be monarchist or republican, as far as the common fight, that is the fight for Austria's self-determination, is concerned.
2. As far as the future is concerned, we believe that the Austrian people themselves will have to decide their own form of government in a constitutional way without any pressure from within or from without. We reject any constitution forced upon the Austrian people, and that naturally applies to a monarchy as well.
3. The sovereign rights of national units as far as they affect the interests of other national units shall be subordinated by mutual and free decisions of all the peoples concerned to the higher interests of an enduring international order and international cooperation, particularly among the Danubian States.
4. We stand for the restitution of liberty and the independence of the Austrian people within the frontiers of March 11, 1938, and we are therefore opposed to any attempt at Danubian Reconstruction which does not take into consideration the complete political emancipation of all the so-called Successor States.

August 31st, 1941.

Dr. Martin Fuchs  
Former Press Attache of  
the Austrian Legation at  
Paris.

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