Bernard Guillemin

Curriculum

1917-1919, First writings (in French) while living in Switzerland.

1920..... "Acceptation du Vide", published in Belles Lettres, a French monthly (Paris), in the summer or autumn of 1921 (the date is subject to a failure of memory on the applicant's part).--A piece of juvenile despair, existentialist avant la lettre, and therefore no longer indicative of the applicant's outlook on life; but it can account for his command of French.

1924 or 1925, German translation of André Gide's La Symphonie Pastorale (Propyläen Verlag, Berlin, later reprinted in the German edition of Gide's complete works by Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart).

1924-1926, Regular contributions to Der Berliner Boersen Courier in all fields of literary journalism (editorials on cultural matters, literary criticism, essays on French literature, court reportages, etc.)

1925 or 1926, Co-author of Kaplan Fahsel's Gespraeche mit einem Gottlosen (Verlag Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau; at least three editions of 5000 copies each).--These dialogues between a believer and an agnostic were ghost-written by the applicant, with substantial contributions of his own; the particular brand of agnosticism which at the time of writing appealed to him is, however, no longer indicative of the applicant's intellectual inclinations.

1926-1929 Chief literary editor of Die Magdeburgische Zeitung (liberal); theater criticism, editorials, etc.

1928..... In Die Tat (German monthly; December issue; Verlag Diederichs, Jena) the essay Von der Ungleichen Fuerde der Dichterischen Gegenstaende -- a Jamesian subject treated in the Jamesian spirit at a time when the applicant did not know Henry James either as a novelist or as a critic.- The reason for the applicant's mentioning this essay is that it may be available in this country.

1929-1934 Frequent (and in 1933 more or less regular) contributions to Die Vossische Zeitung, Das Berliner Tageblatt, Das Tagebuch (weekly), and other liberal papers.

1933.....(summer or early in autumn) in Die Vossische Zeitung, under the title Die Unruhe des Herzens, an attempt in extremis to instil a salubrious dosis of dynamical universalism into German nationalism. This article was one of the longest of its kind ever printed by Die Vossische. Part of the writer's effort had consisted in tracing Hegel's logic back to Nikolaus von Cusa and to intimate that openness of mind, rather than a closed concept of nationalism, was in the tradition of the German spirit.

Bernard Guillemin, Statement II

1934....(summer or autumn of that year) Der Starnberger Brief in Die Frankfurter Zeitung, a last attempt to write between the lines.

1934-1944, Private studies in comparative literature; appropriation of the Yugoslavian, Russian, Spanish and Italian languages, while living in self-imposed exile in Yugoslavia.

1944-1946, Refugee-guest of the American Government in Fort Ontario (Oswego, N.Y.); first attempt to get hold of the English language.

1946-1947, Russian reader for the Committee to Frame a World Constitution sponsored by the University of Chicago. Author of three Committee documents:

- §105, Slavic approaches to Internationalism,
- §108, Russia and the Idea of Political Legality,
- §138, A Meeting Ground of Russia and the West in the Philosophy of Common Action of Nikolai Fedorov (1828-1903)

GIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT (12961)

GUILLEMIN, Bernard

February 1946

PERSONAL DATA

Address: Pendle Hill,
Wallingford, Pennsylvania
Birthplace: Neustadt-Haardt, Germany
Birthdate: 1898

TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE

Education

Attended 5 years public school; 4 years high school (Gymnasium with Latin and Greek) in Germany. 4 further years college in France (lycee, with Latin, modern languages and a year of philosophy). French Baccalaureat.

1917-19 Private studies in literature. Some attendance at lectures of Lausanne, Switzerland.

1919-20 Private studies of German at Mannheim, Germany.

Experience

1920-24 Did journalistic work for different papers published by Ullstein-Berlin. For two years editor in the Ullstein news-agency for French and Spanish paper which subscribed to the Ullstein-News-Service.

1924-26 Was free lance writer, translator (Andre Gide and Pierre Dominique) and contributor to several liberal newspapers of literary criticism mainly to Berliner Boersencurier.

1926-29 Was literary editor of the Magdeburgische Zeitung.

1929-34 Free lance writer and contributor to several liberal newspapers, chiefly Vossische Zeitung, Berliner Tageblatt, and Frankfurter Zeitung

1934-43 Voluntary exile in Yugoslavia. Private studies, translations and some teaching of languages. During the war collaborated with Yugoslavian Partisans.

1944 Translator and radio-speaker at the Allied broadcasting station at Bari (Southern Italy) for two months.

LANGUAGES

German and French, fluent.
English: Reading fluent; speaking and writing good.
Yugoslavian, speaking, reading and writing fluent.
Russian, Italian - fluent and extensive reading knowledge.
Spanish - good reading knowledge.

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Guillemin
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Committee to Frame a World Constitution

Document #108

RUSSIA AND WORLD FEDERALISM

PART II. RUSSIA AND THE IDEA OF POLITICAL LEGALITY*

*Part I, Document #105
distributed 11-12-46

Bernard Guillemin

RUSSIA AND THE IDEA OF POLITICAL LEGALITY

Russia and Liberalism

European Liberalism

If, on the emotional level of universal brotherhood, world federalism can be sure to find a response in the Russian soul, it does not seem, however, that as much responsiveness can be expected of Russia, if we are to identify federalism not with universalism but with liberalism and legalism.

A liberal of the most frequent European type is much like a gardener. Not only does he cultivate more than one set of plants, but he also willingly recognizes as legitimate the differing tastes of other gardeners, according to the French saying: It takes all sorts to make a world.

On the other hand, at least partly, Western liberalism draws its inspiration from a moderate agnosticism, from urban skepticism and tolerant curiosity, all of them stemming from European Humanism and Renaissance.

No Erasmus, no Montaigne to be Found in Russia

It is obvious that this kind of liberalism is utterly absent in Russia and cannot be supplied from any genuinely Russian sources. For there is no Erasmus or Montaigne to be found in Russian intellectual history, and the seeds of actual political freedom are almost absent from the Russian past: the illiberal and autocratic aspects are to such an extent predominant that they invited some kind of rationalization--which actually has been attempted by the Bolsheviks.

Greek art and literature with its fondness, at times, for looking at reality through aesthetic categories; Roman law with its analytical structure and its emphasis on individual property rights; medieval Scholasticism being, to some extent, an heir to both Greek philosophy and Roman legalism; Humanism and Renaissance stressing the secular aspects of life; Reformation and Counter-Reformation; liberal Protestantism, Kantian criticism, or outright indifferentism and unbelieving aloofness--none of these movements shaping the Western mind made any appreciable break into the isolated world of Slavism.

It is significant that after the fall of Constaninople most of the Greek scientists and scholars, in spite of the ecclesiastic connections existing between Byzantium and Russia, preferred to make their way to Western Europe rather than to Kiev or Moscow.

Liberties as a Form of Privilege

It is true that there existed certain evidences of liberty in old Russia: some kind of municipal freedom of the medieval type in cities like Novgorod, expressing itself in the elective veche (council); feudal liberties of the princes and boyars as against the Czar; constitutionalist trends chiefly within narrowly restricted

aristocratic circles all down the eighteenth and the nineteenth century; a limited rural self-government of the zemstvos and optshinas; a widespread urge toward spiritual liberty in the form of religious sectarianism; intellectual liberalism as manifested in individual writers (who usually were to become disappointed with liberalism at a later stage of their lives); and eventually bourgeois liberalism with capitalist leanings that was to win a shadowy power in the first months of the Provisional Government (1917) under the aegis of Miliukoff. But on the whole, as G. Fedotov explains in his article "Russia and Freedom" (The Review of Politics, January 1946): "The people did not need freedom, and what is more, feared it, for they saw in autocracy the best protection against encroachments of the lords."

The "Liberalism" of Catherine the Great

Czarist Russia came nearest to liberalism in the Western sense under Catherine the Great: Western ideas, through her personal influence, won a small foothold in the Russian Empire.

Catherine listened to the French Encyclopaedists, published in 1785 a charter of religious toleration, and officially supported the Mohammedan faith among the Turkish peoples of her empire. Paradoxically, her Book of Instructions, compiled from the works of Montesquieu, Beccaria and others, was interdicted in the France of Louis XV.

However, from the outset in Catherine's mind the element of "enlightened despotism" or authoritarian rationalism seems to have been stronger by far than the element of genuine liberalism. Frightened by the developments of the French Revolution, she soon became repentant and even went so far, on the request of the most conservative sections of the Polish nobility, as to suppress the relatively liberal Polish constitution of 1791 by military intervention. After that, the second partition of Poland took place in 1793.

Anti-Liberalism of Nineteenth Century Reaction

Pobedonoscev, the famous Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod, with Katkov and Leontiev the foremost theoretician of autocratic reaction, based his theory of autocracy on the pessimistic view that man is by nature bad and full of malice. However, as Masaryk pointed out, Pobedonoscev himself, although unwittingly, espouses the doctrine of economic materialism when he teaches that law is nothing but the formal fixation of the relationship created by life and by economic conditions.

Similarly, in Leontiev's view, God has cursed the world and the world is naught. Accordingly, absolute autocracy is the only true Christian state: the ruler must be a true image of the unloving God and the human masses must be held together with the mailed fist.

Logically or not, Leontiev, somewhat similar in that to the Roman Church, would rather accept socialism than liberalism, for socialism involves elements of discipline and organization. He even conceived that the Russian autocracy might enter into an alliance with socialism:

"When this happens," he said, "things will be made hot for many persons; then the Grand Inquisitor will be able to arise from the tomb and hold out his tongs to seize Dostoevski himself."

Socialism, not Liberalism, Becomes the Leading Ideology of the Nation

Of paramount importance for any proper understanding of Russian affairs is the fact that, in the second half of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century, socialism, and even Marxism, not democratic liberalism, more and more became the leading ideology of the nation.

As A. Schifrin points out in an article on F. Dan, the leader of the left-wing Mensheviks, what actually happened in Russia, in a way quite original and peculiar to that country, simply was that the concept of democracy became inseparably connected with the concept of socialism: ever since the days of Herzen and Tshernishevski the socialist idea had outright priority over the idea of democracy (Novi Put, the left-wing Menshevik magazine edited in New York, October 17,1946.) The same opinion is further developed in Dan's last publication, Proishozhdenje Bolshevisma, New York, 1946.

Indeed, even a comparatively moderate socialist like Mihailovski, long before the victory of Marxism, had expressed himself against liberalism and its "false doctrine of the necessity for free enterprise." On the other hand, as early as 1872, in his criticism of Marx's Capital, he had drawn attention to the possibility of a peculiar course of the Russian Revolution, going so far as to stress the advisability for Russia to overleap the bourgeois stage of the European evolution, before, in Russia too, the bourgeoisie was to entrench itself. Marx himself, eventually, seems to have acquiesced to this view. In his answer to Mihailovski he stated that he had not meant his law of evolution to be universally valid, but that under certain circumstances Russia, indeed, might be spared the bourgeois-capitalist stage.

Only after having lost faith in a popular uprising (following the assassination of Alexander II) Mihailovski advised a tactical alliance between socialists and liberals.

Thomas Masaryk's Embarrassments

The proportion of liberalism in Russian history.-- It is significant that Masaryk in his famous book on The Spirit of Russia, written before the first World War, gives to Russian liberalism a mere twenty out of more than one thousand pages, and what is more, half of these deal rather with liberalism in Europe. It would not seem fair, however, to say that 20:1000 is the true proportion of liberalism in Russian history.

Masaryk first describes liberalism in general as having degenerated from a humanitarian ideal to a doctrine of outright egoism and hedonism, culminating in the worshipping of the laissez-faire principle and in the apotheosis of the existing state with its protectionism and bourgeois imperialism. Having become, says Masaryk,

a mere cloak of the most improper interests, it finally leads to "the scoundrel's last refuge: patriotism."

"Open-minded liberals," so he goes on, "are no longer under any illusion concerning the decay of liberalism. . . . Being void of real content, liberalism tends increasingly to cling to formal principles. . . . The earlier aspiration for liberty is replaced by a political moderation which delights in accepting as freedom the fairly endurable measure of unfreedom that actually exists."

Painstaking search for liberalism quand meme.-- Nowhere, however, does Masaryk seem more embarrassed than in this small chapter of his book. After having described liberalism as a system of half-measures, afflicted with vagueness, weakened by lukewarmness, and irreversibly doomed to decay, nonetheless he attempts to refute Herzen's disappointed assertion that liberalism, being alien to the Russian mind, would not make itself at home in Russia.

To controvert Herzen, he gives Peter the Great, Catherine II, and Alexander I honorable mentions as "liberals" and stresses the fact that during the most illiberal regime of Nicolas I such writers as Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, and Gontsharov were "liberals." He further mentions such liberals as the philosophers Tchitcherin and Kavelin, the statesman Loris Melikov (whose innocuous constitutional project had been shelved after the assassination of Alexander II), the jurist Novgorodcev, author of The Crisis in the Contemporary Consciousness of Law (1909), and finally Miljukov, an excellent scholar whose most "practical" political idea was that the role of liberalism should be to "mediate" between the revolution and the governmental circles.

Liberal "fathers" and revolutionary "children."-- On the whole, Masaryk cannot deny that if Russian liberalism had some virtues prior to the second half of the last century, later on it lost its momentum. In the course of time liberalism either became socialism or degenerated into a Russian version of European Hamletism, exhibiting all the defects of liberalism at large: lukewarmness, indecision, inconsistency, dread of political initiative, and so on. Upon many questions of the first importance liberal opinion was divided: Tchitcherin was in favor of natural law, Marcmcev, President of the first Duma, in favor of historic law. In short, vitality and any temerity of outlook had receded from liberalism: society underwent a cleavage into liberal "fathers" and revolutionary "children."

Vain attempts to salvage liberalism.-- Exposing the "bourgeois" background and the element of "patience with the powers-that-be" in the liberal movement, radical socialism had succeeded in depreciating liberalism.

Many liberals--especially Novgorodcev--hoped for a rebirth of liberalism. The remedy, they contended, was to be found in the democratization and socialization of liberalism. Furthermore, Novgorodcev stressed the importance of education, above all of moral education.

Yet, Masaryk, years before the Bolshevik revolution, did not seem to place much faith in the future of Russian liberalism. "The Russians are extremely revolutionary, but not very democratic" is the striking

conclusion of one of the last chapters of his book. As events have shown, liberalism as a political movement in Russia proved to be nothing else than a weak link, neither fish nor fowl, between humanitarianism and radical socialism, a temporary moderator and mediator to be swallowed by Bolshevism.

An Optimistic Interpretation of the Role of Autocracy

However, it would seem erroneous to link Bolshevik absolutism in any way with Czarist absolutism of the Pobedonoscev type. Between Pobedonoscev and Lenin or Stalin there seems to be the same difference as between statics and dynamics, pessimism and optimism. Pobedonoscev's pessimistic view of the nature of man necessarily amounts to a skeptical quieta non movere and to a freezing of Russia within some kind of status quo. Quite to the contrary, absolutism and autocracy at the hands of the Bolsheviks, and within their optimistic interpretation of history, are taken, rightly or wrongly, to be powerful instruments of change.

The link between Czarist autocracy and Bolshevism is rather to be found in the writings of Nicolas Fedorov whose theory of autocracy is entirely optimistic in outlook and foundation. We shall revert to Fedorov more explicitly later on. This much, however, may be said in the present context: that autocracy, in Fedorov's view, is necessary as a means of fulfilling the meaning of history. According to Fedorov's optimistic interpretation the potentialities of man and the perspectives of history are boundless. The chief task of mankind is to lift history from the level of a mere "fact" or mechanical concatenation of "facts" to the level of a "project" or grand design, i.e., from the blindness of natural processes to conscious planning.

For any such undertaking the necessary prerequisite is a concerted effort of mankind under patriarchal-autocratic guidance. Individualist liberalism, in Fedorov's view, would amount to renouncing the grand scheme of corporate action. Individual freedom, therefore, does not seem to him desirable. On the contrary, bondage under autocratic rule may eventually prove a blessing, provided it is understood as the most practical instrument of common action in behalf of planned history.

Russia and Constitutionalism

Pravda and Starina

To the Russian mind law--pravda--never was an independent concept. Up to the present time pravda means both law and truth. Originally it could not be made, not even by the prince; it had to be found, and was practiced in connection with other values, moral or religious. The older it was, the more it was considered to be just. The current appellation for this socio-legal system, starina, simply means old times. Until the sixteenth century the Grand Dukes justified their decrees by reference to the starina. The mere will of a sovereign authority was not looked upon as the source of law. The prince was the mere executor of a previously existing customary law.

Groznost

It is characteristic that the prestige of popular or aristocatic freedom (freedom, however, along patriarchal lines) which might have been alive in the Russian mind after the middle ages, declined with the increasing bureaucratization and Europeanization of the country. Partly, at least, Russian autocracy followed the model of European absolutism.

A new concept of law was being propounded (e.g., by Ivan Peresvetov, a contemporary of Jean Bodin) with the person of the Czar as its sovereign source. The force, no longer founded upon religion, that is to secure for the power of the Czar a maximum of efficiency is groznost.

Groznost is the substantive corresponding to the adjective grozny. (Ivan the Terrible is called Ivan Grozny in Russian.) The opposite to groznost, sternness, is krotost, mildness. Mildness is said to weaken the ruler's regime by offering opportunities to his opponents, the feudal lords or boyars. The struggle against anarchical feudalism, on the contrary, demands a strengthening of the ruler's position.

Thus, the ruler is no longer bound by tradition or legal particularities of caste or place. At the same time the immutability of the law and its religious foundation are abrogated. The Czar becomes the creator of the law instead of being its servant. A maximum of efficiency in the framework of autocratic centralism is purchased at the cost of local or personal autonomy.

It may be added here that the interpretation of Ivan the Terrible as a positive figure in Russian history is by no means of Bolshevik invention. The same interpretation had already been propounded by numerous Russian scholars and novelists in the course of the last century.

A First Voice Against "Political Cannibalism"

However, the cruder aspects of despotism were not entirely overlooked. As early as the seventeenth century, isolated voices, among them the Croatian writer Krizhanich (a newcomer to Russia writing in a "pan-Slavic" language of his own invention) went so far as to deplore "legal primitivism" and "political cannibalism." He emphasized that unlimited power of the monarch is indispensable for a thoroughgoing reformation of the country, but that the virtues of a providential monarch are not necessarily to be expected from his successors. Therefore, valuable constitutional laws (dobrie ustavi) would be the best way to secure a lasting character for any kind of administrative and political improvements.

Numerous Constitutional "Drafts" and Proposals

Speranski, Novosiltsev, and Loris Melikov.-- In the subsequent course of Russian history elaborated constitutional drafts not infrequently were presented, but as a rule by individuals without any

backing by the masses of the Russian people. On the other hand, very partial pseudo-constitutional concessions were sometimes granted by the Czars themselves, among them a full-fledged, rather liberal constitution to Poland by Alexander I.

The most consistent effort in the direction of Russian constitutionalism seems to have been made under Alexander I by the statesman Speranski. Under the influence of Anglo-American and French political experience, Speranski (who was married to an English woman) elaborated different projects in order to introduce some kind of representative government in legislative matters. Speranski's ideas have been characterized as follows:

> According to the plan of Speranski the representative body, the state Duma, was to be composed of deputies indirectly elected by the population. Each township was to elect a Duma, each township Duma was to elect a delegate to a county Duma, each county Duma to a provincial Duma, and each provincial Duma to an imperial Duma. . . . Besides the creation of an imperial Duma, it was proposed to create an imperial Council. This bureaucratic organ would have as its chief function the coordination of the work of the various government organs (George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, pp. 142-143).

Lacking any organized following, Speranski, however, was powerless to win the wholehearted support of a vacillating Czar. Only the proposed State Council was brought into existence in 1810. The rest of the plan was not put into effect. A hundred years later, however, it served as the basis of the elective system of the Soviet Government.

Incidentally, Speranski was arrested and exiled shortly before the outbreak of the Franco-Russian War of 1812. According to Vernadsky his arrest "may be explained by the panicky fear of the ruling group in Russia that in him Napoleon had a man capable of organizing a revolution in Russia." Later on Speranski was to be rehabilitated. He was even appointed one of the judges in the trial of the Dekabrists.

Another constitutional project which was not put into practice was the plan of Novosiltsev. This plan, according to Vernadsky, provided for the creation of a federal state within the territories of the Russian Empire. The fundamental idea was the coordination of the original Russian Empire with the later accessions, particularly those which possessed local rights and characteristics, such as the Baltic provinces, and those which were in fact constitutional states, such as Finland and Poland. (The constitution granted to Poland by Alexander in 1815 was considered one of the most liberal of the time.) These border states were intended to become constituent parts of a federated empire.

To characterize the "constitution" drawn up in the eighties by the Minister of the Interior Loris Melikov (providing for Representative Committees to "advise" the State Council) it may suffice to point to the fact that under the reactionary regime of Loris Melikov Pobedonoscev was appointed chief procurator of the Holy Synod. Moreover, the ukaz calling for the implementation of Melikov's innocuous

concessions, already signed by Alexander II, was never published and was dropped after the latter's assassination.

The Dekabrists.-- Even the Dekabrist movement against Nicholas I, perhaps the best organized revolutionary movement until the rise of Marxism, does not seem to have had much popular backing. It was more of a plot than a popular upheaval. Its leaders were more or less isolated aristocrats, influenced as individuals by European constitutionalism.

Nonetheless, after their execution, the constitutional drafts left by Colonel Muraviev and Colonel Pestel seem to have been carefully studied, at the orders of the Czar, by his advisers. Muraviev's draft provided for a liberal monarchy along federal lines, guaranteeing rights to the individual, whereas Pestel's draft, known as Russkaja Pravda, provided for a centralized republic based on popular, almost socialist principles. A disciple of the French Jacobins rather than of the American Federalists, Pestel seems to have recognized the necessity of a powerful dictatorship in order to make the forthcoming revolution a success.

Lenin is said to have studied both drafts as Nicholas or his advisers had done before, but with more obvious results and manifestly with a strong preference for Pestel's ideas.

Scheinkonstitutionalismus.-- Eventually, constitutionalism as a popular demand, in spite of a widespread indifference and even suspiciousness toward constitutional ideas among socialists of the left, gathered strength during and after the Russo-Japanese War, at the time of the so-called first Russian revolution.

Czarism missed its best opportunity for survival; after some valuable concessions to liberal constitutionalism, it proved reluctant to go further and even retrogressed, taking back what it had conceded.

Such a shadow of constitutional life as was to survive has been branded by Max Weber as mere Scheinkonstitutionalismus. This shadow itself was undergoing a process of gradual self-cancellation. Its temporary revival during the first months after the February Revolution did not make anything more real out of it.

Russian Anarchism

Anarchism in its ultra-individualist version (Stirner, Nietzsche) or in its orgiastic degeneration (with d'Annunzio a tributary to European fascism) seems to be rather lacking in Russia. Nevertheless, Leontiev, because of his infatuation with aristocratism, is sometimes called the Russian Nietzsche, and solipsism, as the last refuge of despair, became an ingredient of the decadent movement in literature (Sologub, Andreev) shortly before the first World War.

Collectivist anarchism, however, was for a time powerful in Russia, not only for having produced such outstanding leaders as Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tsherkessov, all of them members of the Russian aristocracy, but also for having permeated, to an extent, the theory and practice of the terroristic revolutionary socialists (though Savinkov and others among this group at times seem to have behaved

individualistically).

Russian collectivist anarchism laid a much greater stress than socialism on the principle of federation: it can be fairly stated that in the anarchism of Bakunin and Kropotkin there is to be found the Russian version of European federalism as originated by Mazzini.

In optshina and mir Kropotkin discerns an early materialization of federalism. Prior to the Tartar dominion, he points out, Russia was not an absolute state but a federation of folk-communes; these folk-communes remained the asylum of popular rights and of the federative idea.

The program of "Hleb i Volja" ("Bread and Freedom"), the most influential of several anarchist associations in Czarist Russia, recognizes nothing but free groups whose unity is secured by a community of principles and aims. The grouping is effected solely by voluntary agreement. As in the United States anarchist communities of the experimental type were set up in Russia, too. The most famous was the colony of intellectuals at Krinica.

The last self-assertion of anarchism in Russia seems to have been the peasant upheaval of Makhnov in the Ukraine and the revolt of the sailors at Kronstadt, both ruthlessly repressed by the Bolsheviks.

Some Reasons for the Failure of Constitutionalism in Russia

Ignorance of the masses.-- The main reason for the failure of liberal constitutionalism seems to be that it had no appeal for the Russian masses. It had to wage a solitary fight against the heaviest odds; it was led by isolated individuals who for the most part were to acknowledge their domestic defeat by going into exile abroad. At the time of the Dekabrists, the anecdote was current that the average Russian thought constitutija to be the wife of Constantine, Czar Alexander's brother.

Order by kinship rather than legal order.-- As Haxthausen pointed out, the Russian cannot live without a strong family tie; if he has none, he invents one; if he has no father, he searches for and chooses one for himself: consequently, an emotional order by kinship, based on veneration and affection, stands in lieu of a strictly legal or constitutional order. Up to our time, patriarchalism, even though in changing forms, seems to be an inveterate and self-perpetuating pattern.

Innate reluctance.-- In all quarters of Russian thinking, from conservatism to anarchism, we are to meet almost innate contempt for liberalism and constitutionalism. The Slavophile Aksakov, in his repudiation of Europe, went so far as to see there nothing but slavery: the constitutional European state with its legal guarantees is for him merely a proof that in Europe peoples and rulers lack mutual trust. Pisarev, the Westernizer, compared the liberal with the cow which wished to play the part of a cavalry charger. Its conservative opponents looked upon liberalism with no less contempt. Dostoevski represented the devil as a "liberal gentleman" and Solovev

in his last apocalyptic work, War, Progress, and the End of History, was to picture Antichrist as a progressive and liberal. Mendelejev, a distinguished chemist and spokesman of the industrial plutocracy, simply looked upon constitutionalism as superfluous. Most vehemently the anarchists expressed themselves against any attempt to establish a Russian constitution. Bakunin wrote in 1848: "We need something very different from a constitution. We need storm and life, a world that is lawless and consequently free."

Socialist suspiciousness.-- To the anarchists liberalism and constitutionalism simply do not mean true freedom. To the socialists, on the other hand, a successful constitutional movement would mean a strengthening of the bourgeois class. Mihailovski, as early as the last quarter of the nineteenth century, had predicted that the Russian revolution would have an exclusive social character. In his view, the Russians "did not want a constitution for this would merely impose a new yoke upon the people." The left-wing Mensheviks, today, are prone to recognize that their preference for constitutional and legal methods and their failure to cooperate with the Bolsheviks in the days of the October Revolution led properly to the "political tragedy" of Menshevism.

Anti-Aristotelian trend in Russian thinking.-- Many Russian scholars contend that Russians have no faculty for understanding legal ideas at all. G. Fedotov, in an article directed against Berdjajev's recently expressed "Sovietophilia," puts it this way:

> In contradistinction to Aristotle, Russian thinking has a tendency to underestimate form; to the Russian mind the concept of form means something unsubstantial, external, and empty. This terminological use of the concept of form seems to be illegitimate and to reflect the weakness of the formal element in Russian culture (in Za Svobodu, the "non-periodical magazine" of the New York group of the Russian Revolutionary Socialists, September 1946).

It cannot be denied, however, that Russia has produced many outstanding jurists. Even her contribution to the development of international law is far from negligible. Speaking of the permanent court of arbitration set up at the conference of the Hague in accordance with the famous rescript of the Czar in 1898, an American scholar pointed out recently: "It's important from the standpoint of Russian pride to say that it was from the Russian idea that this came about" (N. M. Butler, New York Times, October 20, 1946).

Constitutional Developments in Soviet Russia

Constitutional developments in Soviet Russia are outside the range of this paper. To ascertain the theoretical value of the Soviet constitution and the degree of its practical implementation would require a particular study. This much, however, may be said: that in all events its educational value and legal potentialities can hardly be denied. The carrying of the revolution into lawful channels and the general legalization of political life seem to be a long way on the road toward a political normality sui generis.

On the other hand, for the first time in history Russia has come into closer contact with countries where liberalism in the form of constitutional legalism, to a considerable extent, has succeeded. Russian criticism as applied to conditions in Europe, where, on the basis of a narrow provincialism, constitutional liberalism turned out to be a farce, does not seem to be applicable to the same extent to the United States. Americanism seems to hold out unwithered promises. All depends upon its further evolution. In all events its possible influence and impact on Soviet Russia cannot simply be discounted: all Russian eyes are fixed on America as American eyes on Russia.

Russian Despair--Last Hope: the Czar

Salvation from Above

The amorphousness, backwardness, and numbness of the Russian masses account for much of the ever-recurrent pessimism which has led so many Russians to anti-liberalism in theory and practice. There always was in Russia a trememdous scope for despair, and some of the most outstanding individuals in their radical disappointment came to place their last hope for a thoroughgoing change in the personal intervention of the Czar. Numerous writers, both from the left and the right, have addressed more or less elaborated suggestions to the autocrat of all the Russias, prompting him to realize reforms in one sense or another: salvation, in short, was expected from above.

Bakunin's "Czarist" Temptation

The poet Zhukovski, a scandalized eyewitness of the February Revolution in Paris, in a letter to the heir to the throne whose tutor he had been, expressed the hope that, once in power, his pupil would keep Russia remote from the European plague, isolating her from the infection by building a Chinese wall.

However, the best example is Bakunin himself. He had always thought that Russia needed "a strong dictatorial power which concerns itself exclusively with the elevation and the enlightenment of the masses, a power which is free in tendency and in spirit but without parliamentary form, a power which prints books of a free content without introducing the freedom of the press . . . ." Ultimately he went even farther than that: in his famous confession to the Czar he seems, as a last resort, to have expected the Czar himself to carry out his revolutionary plans.

Herzen, who in his last years had become very close to what would be called today existentialist pessimism, seems to have cherished similar aspirations. And as early as 1848 Tshernishevski, a radical with socialist leanings, had asked himself whether an absolute monarchy was not preferable to a bourgeois republic and more to the advantage of the peasants and workers. In France similar illusions were entertained in some quarters regarding Bonapartism.

Positive Achievements of Czarism

That attitude was far from being as futile or unreasonable as it may seem now. Actually, some of the most positive achievements in past Russian history had been performed from above. The fact is not specifically Russian but it deserves to be mentioned.

Mythically, if not historically, the several Slavic tribes, despairing to achieve concord on their own account, had been united by a strong ruler, Rurik, called upon from abroad. The Tartar yoke had been overthrown by the patient efforts of the Grand Duke of Muskovy, gathering together the Russian lands. The feudalism of the boyars had been broken by Ivan the Terrible. The modernization and Europeanization of Russia initially had been the work of one man: Peter the Great. Enlightened despots like Catherine II had followed in his tracks. Victory over Napoleon and a first pattern of supra-national organization in the shape of the Holy Alliance had been secured by Alexander I. Eventually, the liberation of the serfs had been accomplished by Alexander II against a strong opposition of indifference or vested interests.

Lenin and Stalin as Continuers of Czarist Tradition

Was it so unreasonable indeed to expect salvation from an all-powerful Czar taking the lead of the historical process? Indeed, in a country as big as Russia, which lacked a numerous and educated middle class, men like Dostoevski and Nicolas Fedorov could, without being inconsistent, cherish similar hopes. Historical events have, in a sense, vindicated their expectations. Democratic liberalism in the Western sense was given a chance between March and November 1917. The Russian masses were offered political freedom (which they had never enjoyed before) without social and economic equality (which they more urgently longed for). The offer was rejected. A new Czar was to arise: Lenin.

Some observers contend that the rule of political liberalism, when moderately successful, is a product and a privilege of wealthy, highly developed societies. At the peak of an unprecedented crisis, within the poverty-stricken, centrifugal infinitudes of the Russian space, what was most needed, they say, was integral efficiency. In their opinion there was no time for academic or literary expatiations along liberal lines. In fact, a consistent even though one-sided body of doctrine and an organized group of strong men were at hand to steer Russia away from both anarchy and couter-revolution. Obervers friendly to the Bolsheviks seem to believe that a regime of the black hundreds or a status of colonial exploitation thereby have been avoided. The problem of how long liberalism has thus been postponed in Russia seems to belong to the domain of prophecy. All that can be said is that Bolshevism, at least theoretically, is not averse to freedom. The establishment of freedom, in the mind of the Bolsheviks, rather seems to be a question of timeliness and popular maturity.

Old patterns are slow to die: the Stalin purge of 1936-37 seems to have been partly directed against "Bolshevik fiefs and satrapies" for the sake of centralist efficiency. In a sense, the purge was a

reduplication of Ivan the Terrible's performance against the feudal lords.

Autocracy and World Federalism

Fortunately, liberal regimes all over the world do not seem to be necessary prerequisites to world government or world federalism. In the long run liberalism, when defined as rugged individualism, may prove to be no less attached to the attributes of "sovereignty" than Soviet absolutism with its more efficient handling of public opinion.

To convert to world federalism more or less liberal states you have to convince thousands of individual leaders, the bulk of the great party membership, and millions of single citizens. With Russia the problem appears simpler: you have but to convince ten men, perhaps one man. If Stalin is convinced, the whole of Soviet Russia is likely to share in his conviction.

(Part III to follow)

Distributed
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Bernard Guillemin

20 Remsen Street
Brooklyn 2,N.Y.

October 21,1949

Dear Mrs. Canby:

I am afraid I left behind me a number of misunderstandings. It's all my fault, of course. I am feeling tired from overwork. I failed even to do so much as to make plain the difference between group teaching (which I never practiced) and individual tutoring (which I did in Yugoslavia).

Thank you for not having taken seriously my joke that I too am an invalid of the first world war. Yet did it occur to you that my joke, maybe, was but a veiled anachronism? In fact, I earnestly fear I could with more than a mere semblance of truth temporarily declare myself a light casualty of my English campaign.

The English language is an objective too well entrenched--~~xfmxk~~ a fortress nearly impregnable at my age and in my circumstances. I had come to see you after a setback, in a pause between two assaults, not knowing how further to conduct the siege. Instead of asking for your strategic and tactical advice, from fatigue I allowed myself to get entangled in side issues.

I wonder whether you fully realize how a man feels who has to deal, not with a foreign language as just another medium of current communication, but with at least three highly differentiated levels of one identical language (to murder; to do away with; to take for a ride, or: to conquer; to whip; to lick to a frazzle); with a second foreign language into the bargain; whose peace of mind is at the mercy of the correct use of an English preposition; and who begins to realize that the major difficulty of English springs from the paradox that to a large extent it is foreign even to the natives themselves, few of whom speak it well. As often as not I was the only person trying to speak English amidst people wonderfully fluent in slang. Wherever I look, I discover more enemies than friends of the English language, and hardly a model. Against so many odds--no wonder that I am under occasional spells of battle fatigue.

Such was the state in which I found myself when I came to see you. It is true, no sooner had I spoken than your admirable promptness to act in the right direction showed me your firm grasp of my problem. I am confident you fully understood that, in spite of battle fatigue, I want to carry on. However, I am not so sure my lack of concentration in unfamiliar surroundings allowed me to make a strong enough case of the conditions under which solely my goal is attainable, if attainable at all.

In an odd way I realized the possibility of a double misunderstanding when Mrs. Lindemann, having only my sinful vanity as a weak opponent to her velocity of judgment, went all the way toward gratifying my secret wish to avoid teaching French. I fully and gladly accept her verdict. I feel safer, however, in substituting my reasons

for hers. While it is true that my French might have suffered from the invasion of and cohabitation with English, such a state of affairs could easily be remedied by a statute limiting the rights of the conqueror. Only, this I do not want to do, and therefore I am not interested in applying the remedy. Since I left Oswego my studied policy has been to play down my knowledge of French. It was one of my contributions to becoming an American.

Thus, I believe Mrs. Lindemann did the right thing in eliminating the French possibility. She eliminated something I was glad to see eliminated. The wet blanket she threw on me I consider to be a felicity. Unfortunately, it was exactly the opposite with you. You eliminated for no doubt good reasons something I was anxious not to see eliminated. I felt distressed at your debarring me from writing literary criticism in America although I feel able to tell good from bad books in at least four languages. Unlike my French, my critical faculties have not suffered from the invasion of English. However, I do not want to appeal your verdict. I know it would be realistic even were I an native American writer. I only want you to reconsider what probably are its underlying general assumptions. And this might be the right place to state my basic views as accurately as I am able to.

In the first place, I am not basically obsessed with the material emergency which I may soon have to face. There are temporary alleviations to it of which you mentioned several. Nor is Fyodorov my basic problem; even Fyodorov is secondary. My basic and strategic problem is that, having no children upon whom to transfer my expectations of personal happiness, I decidedly want to become, right now and all by myself, a second or third generation American at least on the level of language. I exceedingly hate to feel crippled. I am ready to work hard for another couple of years, for another lustrum, or if needs be for the next decade. I do not expect to write great English prose, but I do want to write English as idiomatically and independently from editorial help as any moderately gifted native writer. I shall be satisfied with writing indistinguishably from the bulk of my American colleagues; I shall not feel satisfied with less. Should I ultimately fail, the reward will have to be looked for in the pleasant vicissitudes of the effort, one of which was my meeting you. I shall regret nothing.

In view of the fact that I could more easily return to Germany and relax in the German language, this statement would sound foolish if I left it unqualified. I shall regret nothing, on the condition, that is, that I shall no longer have to waste any particle of my time doing things which bear no relation whatsoever to my overriding purpose of becoming, at least linguistically, a third generation American. At this stage of my life I have--and most distressingly so--to make the most avariciously rational use of the years which are left me. For a long period of time I do not think I can afford to write or speak French or German in America. Either France or Germany would be by far a better place for doing so. Instead, I have to give exclusive preference to the English language, building up a reservoir of workmanship, competence and skill against the day when I hope I shall find a real chance to use them. I am glad my lengthy but indispensable research on Fyodorov in Russian is over. What remains to be done most happily will be in the English medium.

I do not know yet whether my English as it is at present will be judged good enough for translation purposes of the kind required in Washington. Nor do I believe that a more satisfactory command of your language can be had at the price of a comparatively small supplementary effort on my part. I am sure, however, that translations into English would provide me with a discipline in perfect keeping with my basic purpose. The Washington job, or something equivalent, would be excellent indeed. If this opportunity eludes me, and nothing comparable should turn up in time, I shall feel tempted to decide in favor of my return to Europe. I feel an anticipation of grief and even anguish at the prospect of having to end my love affair with the English language--but can you expect me to run after her in odd ~~pk~~ places where there is no chance for my catching so much as the flavor of her?

Cordially yours,

Bernard Guillemin

Bernard Guillemin

Opinion on Mr. Bernard Guillemin's

samples of English prose.

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Mr. Canby read the two samples of Mr. Guillemin's English prose carefully, and the following is his opinion, of course, open to any question :

From the viewpoint of words and grammar, even though minor imperfections occur, both samples show a thorough grasp of the English language. But the scholarly achievement thus evident is not enough as yet to make a good English style. Mr. Guillemin uses too many long and elaborate words for our language, which is so closely attached to Anglo-Saxon brevity, and, correspondignly, the construction of sentences is too intricate and heavy for good reading. Mr. Canby suggests that if Mr. Guillemin wishes to use his English prose as it is, for an article or book in a field where he is expert, his mastery of English is certainly adequate for setting forth the facts. But if he is seeking literary expressiveness which would make him read as a literary author in America, there is a good deal of adaption to the best American taste yet to be done. It is difficult to judge from two samples, and much depends on just what Mr. Guillemin wants to be, and do, as a writer.

Certainly, Mr. Guillemin's ideas are individual and vital, and his material, with its psychological trend, is really interesting. The two samples if used as essays would be suitable for the serious Reviews. If a book were in question, for example, an expansion of the theme of exile, it would be difficult to get it published, as usual with intellectual writing, but the attempt would remain well worthwhile... From the point of view of making a living as a writer Mr. Guillemin's work does not offer much hope except on a basis of part time work of other kinds. However, quite evidently, and judging also by his fine testimonials, Mr. Guillemin is an experienced author, and will know how to make his own decisions.

We suggest that Mr. Guillemin sees Mr. Goldberg of The Commentary, 425 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y., referring, if he wishes, to Mr. Miller, or to the Canbys, taking with him his essay on exile, in German. This magazine orders articles, has a high standard, and pays well. Also, if Mr. Guillemin at any time wishes to have a general talk on literary matters in our office, he will be most welcome.