

# Chronic Workload Problems in Computer Security Incident Response Teams

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# Computer security incidents

Low-priority incidents

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- Such as port scans, spam, fake email, and other nuisances
- Nevertheless, a significant challenge owing to their large volume
- Dynamics: quite accurately described as exponentially growing
- Essential point: Cannot be matched by staff increase and CSIRTfunding
- High-priority incidents
  - Such as attacks on net infrastructure, serious new worms, viruses, botnets, sniffers, account compromisers, etc
  - Low volume, but very serious
  - Dynamics: basically oscillatory

# CSIRTs

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- Computer Security Incidence Response Teams (CSIRTs/CERTs) provide one or more services:
  - incident analysis
  - incident response on site, support & coordination
  - nowadays increasing emphasis on proactive services
- Chronic situation for CSIRTs since their inception in 1988
  - CSIRTs are underfunded, understaffed
  - CSIRT staff is overworked
- Worsening situation for CSIRTs in recent years
  - Increasing volume of (mainly low-priority) incidents, automation and speed of new attack tools give CSIRT staff less and less time to react
  - Instabilities in high-priority security incident reports from the constituency (internal sites) and affected external sites



- Problems to retain the CSIRT constituency ( $\rightarrow$  funding problems)
- See posters # 1193 and 1212

## Low-priority incidents



- Overwhelming increase in the rate of low-priority incidents
  - The workload increases accordingly
  - Human resources cannot keep pace

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# Modeling process

- Close collaboration with one of the oldest and largest "coordinating" CSIRTs
- Initial research questions
  - What factors limit the effectiveness of the incident response service in the CSIRT
  - What policies can improve the effectiveness of the incident response service in the CSIRT?
  - What constitutes effective incident response in the CSIRT?
- The management and staff of the CSIRT participated in 5 face-to-face working sessions of 1 4 days over a 1  $\frac{1}{2}$  year period:
  - Eliciting of mental, written and numerical information, incl. reference behavior modes
  - Review of model structure
  - Model verification, validation & policy testing

### Reference behavior modes



Idealized reference behavior derived from time series data and from interviews with CSIRT management and staff

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# Policy structure diagram



#### Base run



- -Rate of handling incidents automatically: incident/dy
- -Rate of automatic incident reports: incident/dy
- Fraction of incidents handled: %



- Rate of automatic incident reports
- Rate of handling incidents automatically



- Actual productivity: incident/person/dy
- -Maximum handling capability: incident/person/dy
- -Fraction of automatic reports handled automatically: %



- Resources allocated to automation development: person

-Capacity for automatic handling: %

# Policy analysis scenarios

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- Fixed resource split: The CSIRT separates the workforce into two fixed workgroups instead of using it as a shared resource between tool development and incident response
- •Only automation: The CSIRT only offers automatic response
- Maintain manual handling: The CSIRT refuses to change the service scope and only provides manual handling



# Policy runs



Base case.CSIRT.Incident Handling.Fraction of incidents handled

—Fixed resource split.CSIRT.Incident Handling.Fraction of incidents handled

—Only automation.CSIRT.Incident Handling.Fraction of incidents handled

—Maintain manual handling.CSIRT.Incident Handling.Fraction of incidents handled



----Maintain manual handling.CSIRT.Resource allocation.Resources allocated to automation development



# Thank you!