Online Content

1. Salge, Markus, "Lessons from the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident for the Design of Organizational Improvement Initiatives"

Type:
Document
Date Created:
2005 July 17-2005 July 21
Collection:
System Dynamic Society Records
Collecting Area:
University Archives
Collection ID:
ua435
Parent Record(s):
23d738ba88f8333bc39725f9cb5bd0b8, 3c582e6f5cf305ef0030c7471b499022, and cc5bb0ac12a5b68b26b1583548898dae
Thumbnail Path Ss:
/downloads/1831d2749?file=thumbnail
System Modified Dtsi:
2020-01-02T19:35:20Z
Description:
This paper analyzes the design and functionality of the nuclear reactor, and the human failures on on-line operations, which had led to the accident at the Chernobyl power plant, In April 26, 1986. The paper finds that the combination of the Chernobyl-reactor characteristics and “freak infringements” of safety rules did cause the accident. The former aspect is due to the process of graphite-moderated uranium fission, which tends to increase in reactivity in the case of a malfunction or faulty operation. The latter is caused by the effect that infringements which did not cause accidents in the past lead to more violation of safety rules in the future. Transferred to organizational improvement programs, a corporation has to redesign its structure in the vein that failures cannot spread quickly (i.e. loosely coupled system elements), and to generate an atmosphere in order to encourage and utilize the full benefits of employees’ participation.