Online Content

1. Barlas, Yaman with Stanley Carpenter, "A Fundamental Philosophy of Science Question and Validation of System Dynamic Models"

Type:
Document
Date Created:
1987
Collection:
System Dynamic Society Records
Collecting Area:
University Archives
Collection ID:
ua435
Parent Record(s):
23d738ba88f8333bc39725f9cb5bd0b8, 83d7d84d4a906b77a877f50ccddf0ccd, and ef456d2a6c943c510d5169405dfd9416
Thumbnail Path Ss:
/downloads/0k225v00p?file=thumbnail
System Modified Dtsi:
2020-01-02T18:40:55Z
Description:
System Dynamic models, being causal simulation models, are in this sense very much like scientific theories. Hence, there is a relationship between validation of such models and verification of scientific theories. In evaluating System Dynamics models, we naturally apply our implicit “norms of scientific inquiry”. Most criticisms of such models hold that System Dynamics does not employ formal “objective”, quantitative model validation procedures. We show through a historical review of Philosophy of Science, that this type of criticism presupposes the logical-empiricist philosophy of science. This philosophy assumes that knowledge is entirely “objective representation” of reality, and that theory justification can be entirely objective, formal, “atomistic” process. According to the more recent “relativist” philosophy of science, on the other hand, knowledge is not “entirely objective Truth”, but it is relative to a given culture, epoch, and worldview. Theories can not be verified (falsified) by entirely formal, reductionist, “confrontational” methods. Completely objective (theory-free) observation is impossible. The act of observing itself requires an assumed theory. Theory justification is therefore a semi-formal, holistic, social, “conversational” process.We discover that these two opposing philosophies of science correspond to two opposing philosophies of model validation. Most critics of System Dynamics seem to assume the traditional empiricist philosophy of science, whereas System Dynamicists mostly agree with the recent relativist philosophy on the question of model validity. We show that these philosophical results do have practical implications for both the System Dynamicists and their critics. Finally, having shown that the relativist philosophy is consistent with System Dynamics practice, we emphasize that such a philosophy of model validity should not lead to a total rejection of formal quantitative tools of model validation. On the contrary, we argue that such tools, appropriately chosen, are most useful when interpreted with the relativist philosophical perspective.