Casey-Sophia Issue, 1987-1991

Joseph E&. Persico
F.0. Box 108
Albany, N.Y. 12260

prod /6 ‘9&7

Mrs. William J. Casey
Glenwoood Rd.

Rosslyn Harbor

Manhasset, L.T., N.Y. L1IOSo

Dear Sophia:

Just & guick mote to let you know first, how much I
appreciate your decision to help me write Bill’s life. I know
you made the dchoice from among several good writers, so I am
deeply touched.

Also, I want to let you kno®@ that my agent is currently in

negotiations with the publisAiping houses interested in the
project. This should be resdvilved fairly soon. And then I will

get started. L

I Will let you know when the above is completed and I look
forward to our getting together soon afterward.

Again, thanks for your confidence in me.

Sincerely

P.S. IT am also in contact with the Viking Press trying to get
that photograph of Bill that you asked me about.


Joseph EF. Fersico
BF, 0, Box 1O8
Albany, N.Y. LES4o

December 246, 19°97
Dear Soohia,

Tam weiting to let you know where I stand on my project to
weite Bill*s life. I am delighted that of the publishers
interested, I received the most attractive offer from Viking.
First of all, Viking is a highly respected publishing house.
Secondly, they published, Fiercing The Reich. So I am
comfortable with them. Incidentally, I have spoken to them about
the photo you want from that book of Bill as a young Navy
afficer. They will try to track it down. It may take time.

As for my getting started, here is the current situation. As
T mentioned to you before, I have been finishing up & biography
of Edward RR. Murrow. I thought I was pretty much done, but the
publishers want me to add additional material that is going toa
take more time. This will mot affect the ycompletion of my book
an Bill. I am on a three year contract with Viking to complete
the Casey biography. And I always meet, conteact deadlines.
The book will come out on time, The Murr Situation jush means
s0mne changes im scheduling my work. /

My immediate plan is to wrap uu
spending a few months in a p
can*h take these upstate win anymore). Po will leave about
the first of the year and shaw be caming back in a couple of
manths. T will be in touch with you in advance, because I hope
that we can then have some lang talks that are essential. I
Bapecially wank to mak me arrangements for seeing Bill's
papers. ALL at your co Nience, Of Course.

the Murrow book while
that we rentoim Mexico. (1

Toam looking forward to getting started on what I know will

be & fascinating project -- since I am weiting about a
imating man. And again, I thank you for the confidence you
laced in me. Also please pass along to Owen my gratitude
for his offer to help me along the way as well.

IT wish you, Bernadette and Owen the best in this camming
Year. And you will be hearing from me from time to time to
update my situation.

Sincerely,.
BS. Should you want to write or reach me for any reason, my
address in Mexico is: Apda, 3
San Miguel de Allende ZY7ooO

Sto. Mexico

Telephone: O11 SE 465 Boigs4


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Joseph E Fersico

wee Heritage Rd
Guilderland, NY 12084

March 27 1990

Mere William J Casey
Glenwood Red
Roslyn Harbor NY 1Li576

Dear Sophia,

One of the problems the biographer faces is in trying to
capture what a man was like in the early periods of his
manhood. This is especially difficult when the writer, as in my
case, only knew his subject in the latter stages of his life. OF
course, the reminiscences of friends and family help. But these
memories are influenced by the passage of years. IT was very
fortunate. You allowed me to read Bill’s letters written to
you, to George and Bernadette, when he was a college student, in
hig early working years and during the War. Thus, I had the
opportunity to hear Bill himsel¢ speak of those years. That

material was invaluable. I than

IT am writing now to ask you oe & quote from some of
those letters. This is jane nen peer Lt what Bill says in the
letters he wrote you while he was student and later, what he
wrote to his brother George gust x ore Pearl Harbor and what he
wrote to Bernadette from Lonton during the War all show a
Sensitive, @loquent, spiritual ill Casey, a dimension that I
think has not come through t® the public. And I want to present
that dimension. There are al other documents in Bill’s own
words that I would like to quote from directly, Such as the
report he wrote in 1985 summing the operation he lead to put
American agents into German,

If I don’t use the actwial quotes, then I have to paraphrase
and the distinctive i duality of Bill’s voice is lost and
that is also a loss for my reader. Do you Suppose you might
write to me by May 3, letting me know if I may quote from these

papers? I will be most grateful and it will make for a better
book.

Tam still in Mexico and will be here until about early
June, but our home post office will forward your letter to me.

Hope this letter finds you well and that Spring comes soon

ta Mayknoll. And, will you please gay hello to Bernadette and
Owen for me,

Sincerely,



|
|
|

= Ts¢e LA Lawrinite AS.
777 hea Japp

ARs or.


lt John M. Poindexter feels that he has
been made to bear a disproportionate
share of the guilt for the Iran-contra fi-
asco, he can hardly be blamed. Of the
four main characters in the drama, he
has been judged the most harshly —
guilty on ail five counts. The chief prob-
lem his trial presents is not whether he
did anything wrong—he did—but
whether it is fair to single him out in a
system of wrongdoing and punish him
the most for the wrongs of the system.

The four main characters were Robert
M. McFarlane, the former national secu-
rity adviser; Poindexter, his successor:
Oliver L. North, their immediate subor-
dinate and “operations officer”; and for-
mer President Ronald Reagan, who set
the policy for them. The main testimony
at the Poindexter trial came from North
and Reagan, so that our chief interest is
in how they revealed themselves in their
testimony. Nevertheless, we know a
great deal about McFarlane’s and
Poindexter’s roles from the extensive
documentation, the Tower Board’s re-
port in February 1987, the Congres-
sional hearings from May to August
1987, and the North trial in 1989,

Of all these sources, the Poindexter
trial has the least to offer. The charges
were framed most narrowly in order to
make a conviction more easily obtain-
able. Of the tive counts, one accused
him of conspiring to mislead Congress,
two of obstructing Congressional in-
quiries, and two of making false state-
ments to lawmakers. In effect, they
Were variations On a single theme—mis-
leading or misinforming Congress. This
is a serious malfeasance but it is only a
small part of the larger story.

All the prosecutions have been simi-
lar. McFarlane and North faced virtu-
ally the same charges as Poindexter.
McFarlane pleaded guilty in March
1987 to four counts of withholding in-
formation from Congress and was con-
victed of only misdemeanors. North re-
fused to plead guilty to anything and as
a result was indicted on twelve counts.
He was convicted on only three fel-
onies—obstruction of Congress, de-
stroying official documents, and accept-
ing an illegal gift of a security fence at
his house. None of the convictions
touched on the essential nature of the
Iran-contra affairs. Both McFarlane and
North got off with fines, probation, and

ommunity service.

\ "he efforts of Judge Harold H.

ne to hold the counsel on both
anay the Poindexter trial to the
as Ian ‘ere not entirely successful, as
The coi-which the trial added some
scholarly ‘delights to our knowledge
incomparasira affairs. In substance,
superb ceeds -ontributed little to it.
glamourous

—RogerTory Pe
“ing in the press did
“ . allthatapopt ° ae
book should be, thé? What was new
edgeable and intelligeeo known. For
pictures sensitive, cod that the chief
delight in themselves. K. Webb, had
Record
cloth $39.50 / paper $bm a reluc-
fied that

tear un

Theodore Draper

a crucial document signed by the
President that depicted the missile
shipments to Iran as an arms-for-
hostages exchange.'

The document was the Finding of De-
cember 7, 1985, which President Reagan
had signed in an effort to give legiti-
macy to CIA participation in the deliy-
ery of TOW missiles to Iran in Novem-
ber 1985. That Poindexter had torn up
this Finding was an old story, Poindex-
ter himself had testified at the Congres-
sional hearing on July 15, 1987:

And I, frankly, didn’t see any need
for it at the time. I thought it was po-

icy that Poindexter carried out. On the
one hand, Poindexter’s position made
him most responsible for what had gone
on day after day and week after week in
the Iran-contra affairs throughout the
key year of 1986. He was the only one in
the chain of command above North who
either authorized or permitted North to
carry on his activities in behalf of the
contras and in deals with Iran.

On the other hand, Poindexter was
charged with none of this at his trial.
The tran-contra affairs were not on
trial. Poindexter was tried on‘ five
counts that were only indirectly related
to them. Moreover, the counts were not

litically embarrassing. And so | de-
cided to tear it up, and [ tore it up,
put it in the burn basket behind my
desk. I can’t recall, but I believe that
Colonel North was there in the office,
but Lam a little fuzzy on that point?

North’s testimony about the same
scene contributed nothing more to it.
Daily newspaper reporting could not do
justice to the immense background of
material, now well over 50,000 pages,
necessary to put the latest tidbits in per-
spective. Whatever else may be said
about it, the Poindexter trial was not
notable for its revelations.

2.

It is also questionable whether this kind
of trial is the best way to judge the pol-

‘The New York Times, April 8, 1990.
‘Testimony of John M. Poindexter,

n. 20

based on what Poindexter actually did.
They were based on what he knew—but
did not reveal to members of Congress.
For example, there was no charge that
the diversion was a crime or even
wrong; the charge was that Poindexter
committed a crime by concealing his
knowledge of it. Neither was the viola-
tion of the Boland Amendment nor the
arms-for-hostages deals an issue.

To prove its case, the prosecution
chose a very limited number of inci-
dents that provided evidence of con-
cealment and obstruction. They were so
limited that one incident—the Hawk
missile shipment in November 1985—
appears in four of the six counts. No
doubt many newspaper readers and
television viewers thought that Poindex-
ter’s conviction was a condemnation of
the Iran-contra policies. It was nothing
of the sort. Poindexter’s malfeasances —
what he did or did not tell Congress—
were only indirectly related to the poli-

iow Not to Deal with the
x Iran-Contra Crimes

cies. The policies themselves were ruled
off-limits.”

aus get a real sense of what the trial
was about, it is necessary to look more
closely at the substance of the charges.
The events on which they were based
were few.

In 1985, then National Security Ad-
visér McFarlane received inquiries
about North’s activities in behalf of the
contras from the Congressional intelli-
gence “oversight” committees. Their
oversight had been so negligible that
they had learned of his activities from
newspaper reports. Both Poindexter
and North opposed telling the commit-
tees anything but McFarlane preferred
a more conciliatory approach. McFar-
lane and North subsequently confessed
that they had concocted replies that
were lies to the committees.

In June 1986, almost a year later, the
committees again read newspaper re-
ports about North’s activities and again
sent inquiries, this time to Poindexter as
MecFarlane’s successor. North still ada-
mantly opposed telling the committees
anything, but now Poindexter was more
conciliatory. In his reply, Poindexter
took the peculiar course of hiding be-
hind McFarlane’s duplicitous denials of
the year before. In an almost insultingly
brief letter, Poindexter merely said that
McFarlane had “made it clear that the
actions of the National Security Council
staff” had fully complied with the letter
and spirit of. ihe law.' fa effect, Poindex-
ter gave assurances that what McFar-
lane had said in 1985 was still true.

The prosecution argued that Poindex-
ter had known better and had been
guilty of deliberate deception and con-
cealment. The defense pleaded that
Poindexter had not really known what
had happened in 1985 and could not be
held responsible for his predecessor’s
lies. Ignorance was Poindexter’s first
line of defense.

Poindexter was again caught up in a
McFarlane-North imbroglio in the
matter of the celebrated “horror
story”— the ill-fated shipment of
Hawk missiles to Iran in November
1985 by a CIA “proprietary” aircraft,
which, as it turned out, delivered the
wrong missiles. North’s cover story
had metamorphosed the missiles into
oil-drilling parts. In a meeting in
Poindexter’s office on November 20,
1986, a year later, North still tried to
pul the cover story into a chronology
of events that was being prepared for
the next day’s Congressional testi-
mony by CIA Director William J.
‘Judge Harold H. Greene, instructed
the jury in the Poindexter trial: “It is
important that you understand that be-
fore you are specific, particular criminal
charges, as distinguished from broad
policy or political disputes. And so your
verdict will resolve only the five crimi-
nal charges that are alleged in the in-
dictment. What that necessarily means
is that you are not to decide the merits
of some of the broader issues men-
tioned in the course of this trial.” In-
structions to the jury, Poindexter trial,
pp. 20-21.

‘Poindexter testimony, Joint Hearings,
Exhibit IMP-14, p. 447


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Casey and a Congressional briefing by
Poindexter. —

At the Congressional hearings, Poin-
dexter had admitted that “I was aware
that the chronologies were inaccurate.”°
He also claimed that he did not know
what was accurate, but that did not stop
him from telling the committees on
November 21 what he knew was inaccu-
rate. In effect, Poindexter was again in
trouble about something that had hap-
pened in November 1985, had not been
revealed by him to Congress in Novem-
ber 1986, and was now charged against
him in March 1990.°

Lis charge makes one acutely aware
of the difference between a prosecuto-
rial and a historical approach. The evi-
dence clearly shows that North had kept
Poindexter informed in November 19835.
In one such message, North had advised
Poindexter that Hawk missiles, not oil-
drilling equipment, were being sent to
Iran.’ The prosecution, however,
claimed that Poindexter “was the man
supervising and directing” the opera-
tion.” The prosecution even alleged that
Poindexter “was the man in charge of
this country because Mr. McFarlane was
over in Europe with the President, so
this is the man in charge.”

McFarlane was in Europe, in easy
communication with North; McFarlane,
not Poindexter, called North from
Geneva and told him to assist the Is-
raclis in getting the missiles to Iran; and
Poindexter was certainly not the man
“in charge of this country.” Those were
hectic days and North was going full
blast on his own but informing Poindex-
ter of his plans and actions. There is no
evidence that Poindexter, who had not
previously been concerned with the Iran

‘Poindexter testimony, Congressional
Hearings, p. 108.

“Virtually the entire government case
rested on the November 1985 shipment
of arms and not on the subsequent ship-
ments. As Webb explained: “No one is
suggesting that John Poindexter lied to
Congress about any of these shipments
in 1986. It’s only the November 1985
Hawk missile shipment that the indict-
ment alleges that there is [sic] lies and
false statements and obstruction going
on about that shipment in November of
1986.” Transcript of Poindexter trial,
p. 3164.

"North to Poindexter, November 20,
1985, in Joint Hearings, Part HI, Ap-
pendixes to Parts I and I, Exhibit OLN-
43, pp. 257-258.

“Dan K. Webb, Poindexter trial, pp,

3166-3167. Another apocryphal report »

in The Washington Post, April 8, 1990,
stated: “North testified that Poindexter
supervised the 1985 shipment of US
arms to Iran, even though Poindexter
had told Congress that he did not learn
about the shipment until two months
after it occurred.” North repeatedly
testified that he had taken orders from
McFarlane, who was still his superior,
by telephone. The following exchange
took place:

Question: During all the time that
you were doing all of this, Admiral
Poindexter was not assisting you
in carrying out this mission, was
he? He was not working on it
side by side with you that weekend,
was he?

North: | don’t recall the Admiral
being on the phone with me, as
you asked before, but I did keep
the Admiral apprised as to what I
was doing. (Congressional Hear-
ings, p. 1360)

Ao tan 1p } . TIS eounsel

Poaindeyvtar treal no 341

ae ee

affair, was now supervising and direct-
ing the operation. On the other hand,
the defense went so far as to contend
that Poindexter was “not involved in
that operation” at. all.’° In short, the
prosecution claimed too much and the
defense admitted too little.

Another example of prosecutorial
zeal dealt with the diversion of Iranian
funds to the ‘contras. In the Congres-
sional hearings, North had testified that
the idea had come from the Israeli emis-
sary, Amiram Nir, and the Iranian go-
between, Manucher Ghorbanifar. Be-
fore carrying it out, North had
presented it to Poindexter, who testified
that he had “personally approved it.”
North testified both in the Congres-
sional hearings and in Poindexter’s trial
that Poindexter had approved the

“No one is charging that John Poindex-
ter committed any crime just because .
there was a diversion,” Webb told the
jury. “The crime that is charged is that
the diversion is evidence that he clearly
was aware that we were assisting the
contras ”—which he had denied in reply
to the Congressional inquiry.'*

Tye prosecution’s case was largely in-
direct or made by implication, as in an-
other count. On August 6, 1986, North
was questioned by the House Intel-
ligence Committee. Before the session,
North had allegedly told Poindexter
that he did “not think that this will be a
very good idea because we will have to
reveal things that 1 cannot reveal.”
Poindexter again decided to be concilia-
tory and told North to meet with the

diversion when North had presented it
to him.

But the prosecution was not satisfied
merely with Poindexter’s approval. In-
stead, the prosecution seemed to want
to make Poindexter jointly responsible
for the idea. Webb told the jury that

“North sat down with Poindexter and -

discussed with him an idea, which is:
Let’s overcharge the Iranians.... Then
we'll divert some of the residual money
off to the contras.”"* This dramatization
made it appear that North had thought
of the diversion only when he talked to
Poindexter about it. Webb also assured
the jury that “the diversion was the
main way that the contras were being
assisted in 1986.”" In fact, the “main
way” had been money contributed by
Saudi Arabia, with an assist from Presi-
dent Reagan himself.

Here again, the very nature of the
trial excluded any real confrontation
with the substantive issue of the diver-
sion, It was not on trial. Even Poindex-
ter’s deliberate decision—if we can be-
lieve him—not to tell President Reagan

about it was not on trial. Only what

Poindexter’s knowledge of the diversion
implied about other things was on trial.

Richard W. Beckler, Poindexter trial,

p. 3228.

"Poindexter testimony, Congressional

Hearings, p. 36.
Webb, Poindexter trial, p. 3155.

Dibiahh: Doin davrNsr trial n 2162

committee with the words, “You can
handle it, you can take care of it”—or
something similar.’

As North had feared, he was asked
questions about his assistance to the
contras--and admittedly lied about it.
North had done so well that Poindexter,
who was vacationing at the time, later
received reports that North had handled
the committee to its entire satisfaction.
On his return to Washington, Poindex-
ter sent North a two-word message:
“Well done.”

Had Poindexter told North to lie?
North said that he did not go into the
room with the intention of lying but had
been forced to lie in order not “to re-
veal things that I cannot reveal.” Yet
Poindexter had been forewarned by
North that he was not going to reveal
the truth, if he were asked about some
things by the committee. At the Con-
gressional hearings, North had testified:
“He [Poindexter] did not specifically go
down and say, ‘Ollie, lie to the commit-
tee.’ | told him what I had said after-
wards, and he sent me a note saying
‘well done.’ ”!°

This tangle of events resulted in a
typical argument. Webb told the
Poindexter jury:

“Webb, Poindexter trial, p. 3163.

North testimony, Poindexter trial, pp.
1031-1033.

North testimony, Congressional Hear-
inoc ty TRI


He [North] deceived, he ob-
structed, he did everything he could
to make certain that Congress did
not find out what he was doing. He
was there because the defendant on
trial in this case, as his commander,
sent him there to do that.!”

Poindexter’s counsel, Richard W. Beck-
ler, countered with:

Oliver North testified that he never
told Poindexter that he was going
to lie when he went into that meet-
ing. How could he have said he was
going to lie when he didn’t even
know what questions were going to
be asked?"

Whereupon, on final rebuttal, another
government counsel, Howard Pearl,
reiterated:

North knew what Admiral Poin-
dexter wanted him to do and that
was to lie,...so there is no way that
this man [Poindexter] expected him
[North] to tell the truth or wanted
him to tell the truth, and that is why
in the end he congratulated him for
not telling the truth.”

In effect, Poindexter was in this case
not charged with lying; he was charged
with aiding and abetting North’s lies. If
Poindexter had thought that North
could get through questioning by the
committee without lying, he had been
guilty of woefully bad judgement. Had
Poindexter deliberately sent North out
to He or had he trusted too much in
North’s virtuosity at fending off incon-
venient questions? The most that could
be said in Poindexter’s behalf was that
he did not know what North would say.

Indeed, Beckler’s chief defense was
Poindexter’s alleged ignorance. The
jury evidently could not believe that
someone in Poindexter’s position was so
ignorant about so many things.

>;

Since Poindexter did not testify at his
trial, littke more was revealed of him
than had been known previously. He re-
mains a dour, remote, self-enclosed fig-
ure. But the testimony of North and
Reagan was self-revelatory. They could
not speak at length without giving away
something about themselves.

For North, it was the third time on
the stand, beginning with the Congres-
sional hearings in 1987. In that perfor-
mance, he had been bold, blustering,
even bullying. He made no apologies,
gave no excuses. Most dramatic was his
willingness to “take the hit,” sacrifice
himself in behalf of his commander in
chief. He was North the true believer.

A somewhat different North ap-
peared at his own trial in early 1989, He
was far more humble, more repentant.
When he tried to explain why he had
lied in his replies to the Congressional
inquiries, he wavered between express-
ing contrition and holding on to a shred
of self-respect. North said:

1 am not proud of this.... The fact
is, I didn’t think it was unlawful. I
didn’t think it was right, but I did
not think it was against the law.
North was asked: “But you knew it was
wrong?” He answered: “I have just ad-
mitted that. I didn’t think it was right.
Therefore, it must be wrong.”

"Webb, Poindexter trial, p. 3144.
‘Beckler, Poindexter trial, p. 3261.
“Pearl, Poindexter trial, pp. 3307-3308,

*North testimony, North trial. p. 7431.

North got off lightly, because his
lawyer, Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr., had
successtully made Reagan the chief
culprit of the Iran-contra affairs. Gone
was North’s previously protective, self-
abasing attitude toward the former
president—*if the Commander in Chief
tells this lieutenant colonel to go stand
in a corner and sit on his head, I will do
so.” Sullivan hammered away at Rea-
gan’s responsibility and virtually turned
North’s trial into Reagan’s trial. The
jury fell for Sullivan’s strategy and ac-
quitted North on nine of the twelve
counts. North was lucky in his counsel.
Sullivan was far superior to Beckler,
who was a bumbling interrogator and
frequently irritated Judge Greene.

At Poindexter’s trial, a third North
emerged. Far from being proud or hum-
ble, he was now vindictive. Time after
time he shifted the blame to someone
else —generally McFarlane. It was Me-
Farlane who had lied to Congress, Mc-
Farlane who had caused the chronology
to mislead. North’s other whipping boy
was Israel. He had used this tactic be-
fore but never so blatantly. Why were
the Iranians overcharged? Because the
Israelis wanted to keep the prices high.”
Why did North lic about the oil-drilling
parts as late as November 20, 1986, only
five days before the scandal had
erupted? Because it was part of the
Israeli cover story.” North neglected
to mention that he had begun to get rid
of the Israelis as soon as he had made
contact with the so-called Second
Channel—a young Iranian officer who
took the place of Manucher Ghorbani-

far’s Iranian intermediaries in dealings -

with North, He also did not explain why
he was the prisoner of an Israeli cover
story and could not at that late date
have told the truth within his own gov-
ernment despite it.

Poor Ollie! The heroic centurion,
whom North had evoked at the Con-
gressional hearings, had become the
helpless victim of circumstances.

4.

Reagan’s behavior at the Poindexter
trial presents different problems. The
main problem is the relationship be-
tween the Reagan who gave a televised
deposition at the Poindexter trial and
the Reagan who was the chief magis-
trate of the Republic in the course of
the lran-contra affairs. Only about five
years separated the two. If they were
more or less the same man in possession
of more or less the same wits, one won-
ders how the country had survived with
such a leader.

In considering Reagan the president,
two misconceptions need to be avoided.
One is that his personality was all of a
piece. It is entirely conceivable that
Reagan was utterly incapable of putting
his mind on some things and intensely
interested in other things. If we can be-
lieve his first budget director, David A.
Stockman, economics was beyond his
range, even if he was able to pronounce
the panaceas of the supply-side doc-
irine. On the other hand, Reagan was
almost consumed by his passion for the
hostages and the contras. On these is-
sues, the evidence shows that he made
the main political decisions and that he
tolerated no opposition. It was only on
the Iran deals that he disregarded the.

“North testimony, Poindexter trial, pp.
1372-1373.

“North testimony, Poindexter trial, pp.
1198. 1571

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why it ended so abruptly.

Incisive, illuminating, and
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advice of both his secretary of state and
secretary of defense, who rarely agreed
on anything. When it is considered that
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Wein-
berger was his closest friend in the cabi-
net, an intimate associate from his Cali-
fornia days and the most consistent
opponent of his Iran policy, Reagan’s
decision to break with him on this issue
could not have been taken lightly.

The other pitfall is to assume that
Reagan carried through from policy to
action even in those cases which en-
gaged his mind and emotions. His ener-
gies were limited; he was accustomed to
performing, not managing; he was con-
stantly cosseted by his staff and espe-
cially by his wife, who well knew his
limitations. Even in his favorite pro-
grams, he made do by giving general di-
rections and. letting his subordinates
carry them out as best they could, In
one respect, he was an easy man to
work for, because he demanded little; in
another respect, he was hard to work
for, because he put so much responsibil-
ity on those who served him.

At the Poindexter trial, Reagan was
for once unprotected. No script had
been written for him; no director or
chief of staff arranged his entrances and
exits. He seemed to go in and out of lu-
cidity. He must have been lucid when he
declared of the Iran-contra affairs: “It
was a covert action that was taken at my
behest.” But sometimes he seemed
hopelessly confused and he mixed up
one phase of the Iran deals with
another.

For example, he said that the Iran af-
fair had started when “a group of indi-
viduals, citizens of Iran, journeyed to a
third country” and “wanted to discuss
with us better relations” between Iran
and the United States. [Translation:
Manucher Ghorbanifar, the Iranian
exile, and Adnan Khashoggi, the Saudi
entrepreneur now on trial in New York,
first made contact with Israelis in the
summer of 1935. They were free-lance
speculators, not “citizens of Iran.”]
Reagan went on: “And so, a delegation
of ours—lI believe it was all from the
National Security Council—journeyed
to that same country to meet with these
people.” [Translation: In May 1986, a
year later, McFarlane led a delegation
that was not all from the NSC or its staff,
and it went to Tehran, not Israel.]

Much of Reagan’s deposition was of
this sort; it would require an extended
commentary to separate the fact from
fiction in his testimony. Either he did
not remember at all, or he dimly re-
membered a jumbled version of what
had been told him, or perhaps he was
acting a part for which he had been
coached. Sometimes he gave one an-
swer and quickly contradicted himself.
A typical case occurred when the sub-
ject of the arms-for-hostages deals came
up. First, he insisted that the deals had
been made with “private citizens” who
were [ranians, with “no involvement of
the government of iran in this at all.”
Whereupon he was reminded that the
Finding had provided for dealing with
the government of Iran. Reagan quickly
changed his mind: “Well, yes, through
the government which is taking steps to
facilitate the release.”*

On the seemingly all-important mat-
ter of the famous diversion, Reagan’s
memory apparently deserted him alto-

“Reagan deposition, Poindexter trial,
p. 9.
“Reagan deposition, Poindexter trial,

i

gether. As far as we know from the
record so far, Reagan had first learned
about the diversion from his attorney-
general, Edwin Meese III, on November
24, 1986, soon after Meese had obtained
confirmation of it from Poindexter and
North. Meese testified about his meet-
ing with Reagan:

I then related in more detail .to
the President, and also added
what I had just learned from Ad-
miral Poindexter about his knowl-
edge and participation {in the
diversion].

Chief of Staff Regan was present and
confirmed that Meese had told Reagan
about North’s admission to Meese “that
he had diverted some of these funds to
the Nicaraguan Contras.”* In the cli-

fact that a diversion had actually oc-
curred,” Reagan answered, “Yes.”
How are we to explain this extraordi-
nary aberration? Had the Reagan of 1990
so deteriorated in less than five years that
he could remember nothing about the di-
version—for which, however, he said he
could “not escape responsibility” in a
speech on March 4, 1987, following the
release of the Tower Board report? Had
Reagan always been fuzzy about what
had been going on around him? It might
be easier to understand if one believed
that Reagan was faking at the Poindexter
trail, but he seemed altogether genuine in
his avowal of utter ignorance of the very
scandal that had brought on the greatest
crisis of his administration. One would
have had to know Reagan intimately
for at least the past five or ten years to

Oe oD

mactic press conference on November
25, 1986, at which Meese first reported
on the Iran-contra affairs, Meese spoke
publicly of the “diversion.””’

Yet in his deposition at the Poindex-
ter trial, Reagan made the astounding
statement that “to this day, I don’t have
any information or knowledge that...
there was a diversion.... I, to this day,
do not recall ever hearing that there was
a diversion.”* He said that he did not
even know that the report of the Tower
Board in February 1987 had referred to
the diversion. As if he had never read
the report, he said that he now heard
about its reference to the diversion for
the first time.” When he was asked
whether “this [was] the first time in this
courtroom that you came to realize in

*Meese testimony, Congressional Hear-
ings, p. 255.

*Donald T, Regan, For the Record
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988),
p. 38.

"The Washington Post, November 26,
1986 (text of the press conference).
“Reagan deposition, Poindexter trial,
pp. 156, 240.

*Reagan deposition, Poindexter trial,

bo, oe

ii

make any sense of _ this
amnesia.”

Finally, one of Reagan’s protestations
was peculiarly doubie-edged, though he
did not seem to realize it. He repeated
again and again that he had always in-
structed Poindexter and others to stay
“within the law.” Reagan felt it neces-
sary to say: “I emphasized that at every
time.” Does it not seem odd that a
president should say that he had told
the leading officials of his administra-
tion that they should remember to stay
“within the law,” as if he could not take
it for granted that they were going to do
so as a matter of course?

For what it was worth, Reagan’s de-
position told far more about Reagan

apparent

“Reagan deposition, Poindexter trial,

p. 289.

In his forthcoming book, Fighting for

Peace (Warner, 1990), former Secretary
of Defense Caspar Weinberger says that
Reagan’s memory was “phenomenal,”
when he was governor of California (p.
11). If so, Reagan’s deposition seems, at
least, to represent a phenomenal deteri-
oration. But did it start when he was
still president?

*Reagan deposition, Poindexter trial,

i

than about Poindexter. It also told far
more about the Reagan of 1990 than the
Reagan of five or ten years earlier.

5:

The trials of North and Poindexter
made it appear that the fault was with
individuals, not with the system of
which they were a part. By Washington
standards, they were charged with
venial sins. If every top official were
punished for not telling the truth to
Congress unless forced to do so, the
government would come to a halt.

Another case of concealment and ob-
struction, which has drawn little atten-
tion, shows how flagrant the practice
was. On October 5, 1986, a cargo plane
carrying arms and ammunition belong-
ing to the North-Secord operation in be-
half of the contras was shot down in
northern Nicaragua. Only one member
of the crew, Eugene Hasenfus, survived
and was captured. The incident was al-
most immediately reported to Vice-
President’s Bush’s assistant for national
security affairs, Colonel Samuel J. Wat-
son IIf, who was the first to learn about
it, and soon afterward it was reported to
North, North later testitied:

The flight happened to have been
paid for by General Secord’s op-
eration, the airplane was paid for
by his operation. Those were not
US Government moneys, but
those were certainly his activities,
and I was the US Government
connection.”

Ss control quickly went into ac-
tion. On October 7, Secretary of State
George Shultz said that the plane had
been “hired by private people” who “had
no connection with the US Government
at all.” On October 8, President Reagan
also denied that there had been any US
government connection with the flight
and compared the efforts to arm the con-
tras to those of the “Abraham Lincoln
Brigade” in the Spanish Civil War—a
strange allusion to a Communist-orga-
nized and led force for a devoutly anti-
Communist president.”

It later came out that Elliott Abrams,
the assistant secretary of state for inter-
American affairs, had been the source
of Shultz’s misleading information.
Abrams testified that he had assured
Shultz that no government official had
been “engaged in facilitating this flight
or paying for it or directing it or any-
thing like that.””°

Abrams stepped forward as the chiet
government spokesman on the incident.
His chief defect was that he grossly over-
estimated his own cleverness. On the
Evans-Novak television program on Oc-
tober 11, he seesawed between practiced
evasion and outright deception. He even
had the effrontery to blame Congress
tor the death of the two US pilots. On
October 10 he gave the same perfor-
mance for the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and on October 14 for the
House Intelligence Committee.

The House committee was treated to
this kind of testimony:

Abrams: | will say that no American
Intelligence or Defense or any other

“North testimony, Congressional Hear-
ings, p. 182.
“The Washington Post, October 8, 1986.

»* The New York Times, October 9, 1986.
The Abraham Lincoln outfit was a bat-
talion, not a brigade.

Hearimes npn 65.

kind of government officials was en-
gaged in facilitating this flight or
paying for it or — directing
it or anything like that, there is
no US Government involvement, no
government involvement, including

. . 37
anybody in the embassies overseas.”

Later, at the Congressional hearings,
Abrams declared that this and similar
statements were “completely honest
and completely wrong.” The question
of his honesty mainly turned on whether
he had asked North about the latter’s
connection with the flight and whether
North had denied having had any in-
volvement. This is how Abrams ex-
plained why he had allegedly not known
what North was doing:

Question: Sir, let me go back to my
question. If you did not ask Colonel
North in so many words, “Ollie,
were you involved with this flight?”
“Ollie, did you know who paid for
this flight?” If you didn’t ask him
any of those questions in so many
words, it was because you decided
not to ask him any such question,
isn’t that correct?

Abrams: Sure. That’s logically
correct.”

Abrams was accompanied to the com-
mittee hearing by two high CIA officials,
Clair George, the deputy director of oper-
ations, and Alan Fiers, the chief of the
Latin American Task Force. Both later
testified that they had known Abrams’s
statements to be misleading but had re-
trained from saying anything. George said
that he had been thinking, “Excuse me,
Elliott, but maybe you are the only guy
in town that hasn’t heard this news.””
Abrams, however, had heard enough
to ask North to take care of getting the
bodies of the two pilots home and to raise
money to pay for the service.”!

An even more flagrant case of
Abrams’s misrepresentations occurred
at hearings of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence on November 25
and December 8, 1986. Abrams had
previously met in London with the for-
eign minister of Brunei to get a contri-
bution of $10 million for the Nicaraguan
contras—a handout that went awry in
the most farcical episode of the entire
affair.” On November 25, the very day
of the Reagan-Meese press conference,
Abrams told the committee:

We don’t engage —I mean the State
Department’s function in this had
not been to raise money, other than
to try to raise it from Congress.”

Soon afterward, Abrams realized that
his testimony might get him into trou-
ble. He spoke to a member of Senator

‘Abrams testimony, Congressional
Hearings, p. 65.
‘Abrams testimony, Congressional
Hearings, p. 65.
* Abrams testimony, Congressional

Hearings, p. 67.

“Clair George testimony, Congres-
sional Hearings, p. 220; see also Alan
Fiers testimony, pp. 147, 1506.

“North testimony, Congressional Hear-
ings, pp.158, 182.

“Abrams went to North to put the
money in a secret account in Switzer-
land; North’s secretary, Fawn Hall,
typed the wrong number of the account
on a card, which Abrams gave to the
Brunei foreign minister; Abrams des-
perately tried to locate the money for
weeks and finally gave up the effort.

SAbrams testimony Congressional

Hearings. Exhibit EA-30. 0.

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The Romantics
and Us

Essays on Literature and Culture
Gene W. Ruoff, editor

This volume brings together thirteen
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Bill Bradley’s staff about his desire to
clarify his previous testimony, and the
committee held another meeting on De-
cember 8 for him, At this meeting, the
senators were in no mood to be trifled
with. The Iran-contra affairs had be-
came a national scandal and enough in-
formation had come out publicly to
make the Congressional oversight
committees realize that they had been
systematically duped and deceived.
Instead of quickly coming to the point,
Abrams first tried to doubletalk his way
out of his predicament. Abrams’s spar-
ring with committee members finally
brought an outburst from Senator
Thomas FP. Eagleton of Missouri:

Senator Eagleton: Page 15 fof the
November 25 transcript]. We’re
not, you know, we’re not in the
fundraising business. No one intim-
idated that out of you. That was
your answer.

Abrams: Senator, 1 can always
say to you that lam —

Eagleton: Youwre not in the
fundraising business. Today | asked
were you at any time in the
fundraising business.

Abrams: We made one solicita-
tion to a foreign government.

Eagleton: Were you then in the
fundraising business?

Abrams: 1 would say we were in
the fundraising business. I take
your point.

Eagleton: Take my point? Under
oath, my friend, that’s perjury. Had
you been under oath that’s perjury.

Abrams: Well, I don’t agree with
that.

Eagleton: That’s slammer time.

Abrams: {| don’t agree with that,
Senator.

Eagleton: Oh, Elliott, you’re too
damn smart not to know —

Abrams: {| think that the —

Eagleton: We're not in the fund-
raising business. You were in the
fundraising business, you and Ollie.
You were opening accounts, you
had account cards, you had two ac-
counts and didn’t know which ac-
count they were going to put it into.

Abrams: You've heard my testi-
mony.

Eagleton: Vvye heard it, and |
want to puke.”

Abrams was guilty of misleading
Congress in both the Hasenfus and
Brunei cases but he did not suffer any
penalty for his misconduct. Secretary
Shultz even came to his defense as “a
very able, energetic fine person;...the

“Abrams testimony, Congressional
Hearings, Exhibit EA-30, pp. 700-701.

country needs people like that;...he is
good, really good.” With this standard
of forgiveness it is hard to see how any-
one should have been punished for de-
ceiving Congress in the Iran-contra
affairs.

nce is a difference between McFar-
lane, North, Abrams, and Poindexter.
The first three finally admitted that they
had lied and, under pressure of their
own consciences or the consequences of
the law, expressed some form of contri-
tion. McFarlane was the most remorse-
ful, North and Abrams far less so.
Poindexter has been faithful to the
bitter end to a different code of
conduct—no excuses, no regrets. He
rather than North threw himself in front
of his commander in chief and took the
spears,

Poindexter’s trial is probably the last
important inquest on the lran-contra af-
fairs. Like its predecessors, it was an ex-
ercise in public relations more than a se-
rious examination of the forces that
brought about the breach of trust on the
highest level of government. At a time
of the Reagan administration’s greatest
crises, the independent counsel was ap-
pointed to stave off a potential threat of
impeachment and to appease public dis-
may. Once launched, the legal process
took on a life of its own and became ex-
cessively “legal” in order to get convic-
tions on any grounds that could stand
up in a court.

The Reaganite system of government
should have been on trial. A few strate-
gically placed insiders, under cover of
the presidency, seized control of two
critical policies and carried out a
juntalike operation with no accounta-
bility or oversight. If it had not been for
the press, Congress would have been
blissfully ignorant of what went on,
and even when Congress made in-
quiries, it was easily hoodwinked. The
concealment from and obstruction of
Congress were serious offenses; but
they were secondary to the main of-
fenses against responsible constitutional
government—offenses that were part of
the operations themselves.

As matters stand, the main issues—
such as the resort to private and foreign
sources to circumvent the constitutional
requirement of Congressional fund-
ing—have not been resolved. They are
difficult, if not impossible, to bring into
a court of law; they are political prob-
lems for which political answers must be
found, To some extent, the substitution
of narrow legal charges for broad politi-
cal considerations has deflected atten-
tion from the main issues. For this
reason, We must continue to live with
the specter of the Iran-contra affairs. J

“George Shultz testimony, Congres-
sional Hearings p. 94.

 acienanetie conection eines

BULLDOG
NEWS

4208 University Way, N.E., Seattle, WA 98105 (206) 632-NEWS


NEW YORK, SATURDAY, JANUARY 6, 1990

50 cents beyond 75 miles from New York Cit

Noriega as Defendant May Expose U.S. Secrets

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
with JEFF GERTH

Special io The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5 — Even
as the Bush Administration cele-
brates its success in capturing
Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, in-
telligence experts have turned
their attention to the question of
how much damage or embarrass-
ment General Noriega can cause
the United States in his new role as
criminal defendant.

Government officials and out-
side analysts agree that the Gov-
ernment has reason to worry about
public statements and legal
maneuvers by Panama’s former
jeader because of his longtime par-
ticipation in American intelligence
operations.

Mr. Noriega’s ties to American
intelligence date to the 1950’s,
when he first began informing on
fellow students at a military acad-

emy, said a Government official,

who spoke on the condition of ano-
nymity, as did most of the sources
for this article.

‘He Can Expose a Lov’

The official said Mr. Noriega be-
came a full-fledged intelligence
source for United States Army In-
telligence in the 1960’s as he rose
rapidly through the ranks of the
Panama National Guard.

Former intelligence officials

said he maintained those connec-
tions for decades in Panama, the
communications and financial
crossroads of Latin America, from
which intelligence services of the
East and West set up elaborate
eavesdropping operations and ran
agents throughout the region.

“He can make us look terribly
meddlesome,” one former Central
Intelligence Agency official said
Thursday. ‘‘He can expose a lot of
activities, people and places. At a

_ minimum, it will be embarrassing

and difficult. This sort of case is
bad enough when there’s nothing
there. It’s doubly bad if, as in this
case, there is.”’

‘Nir, Noriega Shreds Nothing’

American officials said that with
his own network of spies and wire-
taps and his close links to Cuban in-

telligence, General Noriega had
probably been able to assemble a -

detailed picture of American cov-
ert operations.

These officials said his knowl-
edge undoubtedly extended beyond

“Associated Press
Gen, Manuel Antonio Noriega

lot.”

the activities in which Panama
Was invited to assist. But no one
can yet say whether the general
managed to stash. documents or
tapes in safe deposit boxes for use
as an insurance policy against
Washington, =~
“Oliver North did all the shred-
ding,’ Ray Takiff, a lawyer who
has represented General Noriega,
told The Miami Herald, speaking
of the former White House adviser.
“Mr. Noriega shreds nothing.

‘That’s the indication around here.” -

A former Army intelligence offi-
cial said some potentially embar- —

-rassing data may not be in the

files. The officer recalled that
when General Noriega became a
valuable source for the Army on
Cuba, intelligence officers began
omitting from the files the data
they obtained about his connec-
tions to drug traffickers. :

‘They Would Slant it’ .
“They would color it, you know,”’

’ the officer said. ‘They would slant

it in order to protect him. In order
io Keep a solid operation like that
going, they were willing to do a

This raises the possiblity of a
Kind of double jeopardy for the
Government. General. Noriega

could use his knowledge to direct
his lawyers to subpoena sensitive

Government documents. Or he
could make extravagant claims in
interviews about his contacts over
the years with American leaders,
including President Bush and Wil-

liam J. Casey, the former Director

of Central Intelligence.
General Noriega’s lawyers have

Continued on Page 9, Column 1


- Intelligence Operations

Noriega as Defendant Could Seek Documents Exposing Many U.S. Secrets

Continued From Page 1

already made it clear that they intend
to subpoena United States Government
documents, setting the stage for a pos-
sible defense in which the former
Panamanian leader would portray his
contacts with American political and
intelligence officials as implicit author-
ization for his activities.

Bush Administration officials ac-
knowledge that they are still combing
the Government documents stemming
from General Noriega’s decades of
dealing with the United States.

Mr. Bush said last week that he was |

not afraid of what General Noriega
might say. “‘] think that’s history, and I
think that the main thing is that he
should be tried, brought to justice,” Mr.
Bush said. ‘“You know, he may get into
the release of some confidentia! docu-
ments that he may try to blindside the
whole justice process; -but the system
works, so I wouldn’t worry about that.”

He repeated some of those views at
his news conference today.

The Crucial Areas

Embarrassing
Connections

tionship with American intelligence
suggests several potential areas of em-

barrassment for the Bush Administra-

tion and several potential pieces of evi-
dence he could use to bolster a claim
that his activities were well known to
the American authorities, and thus offi-
cially sanctioned.

Both Democratic and Republican
Administrations decided that the costs
of severing relations with General
Noriega were outweighed by his value
to the intelligence agencies. In 1977, for
example, the Carter Administration

played down General Noriega’s drug’

activity and his role in espionage
against the United States to win rati-
fication of the Panama Canal Treaty,
said former Carter Administration of-
ficials. Sie eae
GAmerican intelligence agencies
‘amassed extensive information about
General Noriega’s drug activities in
the decade before he was indicted. A

Central Intelligence Agency audit pre-

pared in 1988, several months after
charges were brought against the gen-
eral in Florida, concluded that other
Government agencies had received
ample warning about the Panamanian
leader’s involvement in the drug trade,
said a senior Administration official.

~-@At the time when the Federal in-

dictments of General Noriega charge

that he was conspiring to smuggle 1.4 |

million pounds of marijuana into the
United States, he was working closely
with Federal drug agencies, including
the Drug Enforcement Administration,

on efforts to arrest drug smugglers.
General Noriega made public the let-
ters of praise he received from the

dealings with the D.E.A. has not been
disclosed.

@Mr. Casey, who was the Director of
Central Intelligence for most of Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan’s tenure, met at
least half a dozen times with General
Noriega, both in Panama and at Mr.
Casey’s office in Langley, Va. In 1983,
General Noriega set up an operation to
train rebels fighting the Sandinista
Government in Nicaragua. In’ Novem-
ber 1985, Mr. Casey was dispatched to
warn General Noriega against further
drug dealing, but failed to do so, ac-
cording to the 1988 Senate testimony of
Francis J. McNeil, who was a former
senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Intelligence and Research.

Mr. North met General Noriega se-
cretly in London in 1986 and accepted
his offer to have people undertake
sabotage operations in Nicaragua, ac-
cording to court documents. Mr. Nerth
rejected General Noriega’s suggestion
that he have people assassinate the en-
tire Jeadership of the Sandinista Gov-
ernment.

tended that the relationship with Gen-
eral Noriega was one of necessity, not
adrniration. But they said public disclo-

; ; ‘ is ~ sure of what American agencies toler-
A review of General Noriega’s rela- | " ; bigot

ated in the name of national security
could prove embarrassing. pic

“We didn’t fall in love with Tony
Noriega, he was a commodity,” said
one former official. ‘When you develop
assets you have to take guys with warts

when you deal with dirt they

know
where the dirt is.”’ 2

The Alliance

Foresight Becomes
Loss to U.S.

General Noriega first began provid-

jing information to the United States in

the late 1950’s, while a student at a mili-
tary academy in Peru.

agency's head shortly after he was.
charged, but the complete story of his’

American intelligence officials con-

and you take guys with warts because |

4

who has been a longtime participant in American intelligence opera-
tions, could damage or embarrass the United States. Last August be-
neath a mural depicting a malevolent American eagle, he castigated the
United States for causing problems in Latin America.

mid-1960’s. For intelligence officers
from the United States Army and later
the Central Intelligence Agency, the
young Noriega was an ideal catch. One
of the brighter officers in the Panama-
nian National Guard, he was regarded
asa future military leader, a judgment
that proved accurate in 1970 when he

| became head of his country’s military

intelligence.

By the time President Richard M.
Nixon was in office, questions had al-
ready risen about _ then-Lieutenant
Colonel Noriega’s drug dealing. A
drug-enforcement official thought the

problem was so serious he suggested

The relationship deepened in the |

assassination of the colonel as a possi-

ble option, according to a Senate intelli-
gence Committee report. The proposa!
was presented in 1972 to John E. Inger-
soll, then director of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs. Mr. Inge-
soll rejected the option. :

Throughout the 1970’s, the United
States used its electronic eavesdrop-
ping posts in Panama to keep close
track of corrupt activities in that na-

tion and to intercept communications |

from other nations in the region. In
1976, when Mr. Bush was its director,
the C.I.A. discovered that Noriega had
recri ted several United States Army

sergeants involved in the eavesdrop-
ping as spies.

| Officials at the National Security
Agency, which operates electronic sur-
veillance, were aghast. Some sus-
pected that General Noriega had pro-
vided to his intelligence associates in
Cuba a list of every telephone number
monitored by American intelligence.

Projection Is Rejected

Some senior intelligence officials
argued for a fundamental change in the
close relationship between United
States Army inteliigence and General
Noriega, a proposal that was not adopt-
ed. 3

Lew Allen Jr., the head of the Na-
tional Security Agency at the time,
went to Mr. Bush, in Mr. Bush’s ca-
pacity of overseer of the entire United
States intelligence community, seeking
his support for prosecuting the ser-
geants, said Bobby Ray Inman, Mr. Al-
len’s successor as head of N.S.A. Mr.
Bush declined, saying that while he
sympathized, the decision was outside
his jurisdiction, Mr. Inman said. The
sergeants were never procecuted.

In the wake of the 1977 Panama
Canal negotiations, Colonel Noriega’s
activities became an issue for Con-
gress. Senator Birch Bayh, the Indiana

Democrat and chairman of the Intelli- |

gence Committee, was asked in 1978 in
a closed session of the Senate whether
Colonel Noriega was a drug trafficker.

Senator Bayh, in a remark later en-
tered in the Congressional Record,
said: “I do not think we have enough

_evidence, the kind of thing on which you

could bring an indictment against him

in this country, But you are asking me,

as one colleague to another, from what
I have read and sensed in these docu-
ments, there is just a tremendous
amount of smoke there, so far as this

. Guard official is concerned.”

Nonetheless, relations with Colonel
Noriega continued as he achieved in-
creasing prominence in Panama and
he effectively became head of state.
The C.1LA. paid money into the coun-
try’s treasury for joint operations, and
American officials have always sus-

pected that General Noriega took his)

personal cut.

Crossroads for Global Trade

General Noriega’s growing political
power coincided with Panama’s emer-
gence as a crossroads for global trade
and diplomacy. In the late 1970’s and
early 1980’s Panama established itself
as a financial center, offering secrecy
for banking transactions and Panama-
nian registered companies.

As a result, Panama became a focal
point for money laundering, legal and
illegal trade and espionage. Among
those who took advantage of the liberal
environment for corporate secrecy
were such disparate interests as Israel,
the Palestine Liberation Organization
and the Soviet Union, intelligence offi-
cials said. Eastern bloc countries set
up dummy companies to obtain West-
ern technology and the C.1A. set up its
own corporate entities to cover its
operations. :

All this made General Noreiga an
even more important resource for the
United States and gave him greater op-
portunities to play off foreign powers
against each other. He simultaneously
maintained -close ties with many op-
posed interests, including Cuba’s Fidei
Castro and the United States. In 1983,
the C.LA. used General Noriega to
relay a message urging Mr. Castro to
order his troops to surrender in the lat-
ter stages of the American invasion of
Grenada, a former official saids

The Rebel Angie

Helping Hand
In Nicaragua

Panamanian secrecy proved attrac-
tive for the private Nicaraguan contra
supply network operated by Mr. North,
the former staff member on the Na-
tional Security Counci}!, who was con-
victed of criminal charges in connec-
tion with aiding the contras at a time it
was ferbidden by Congress. Several! of
the companies used in the effort to pro-
vide arms and weapons to the United
States-supported Nicaraguan rebels
were registered in Panama. In what
may have been a coincidence, the legal
work was handled by an attorney who
had ties to General Noriega. ‘

Mr. North was eager to solicit Gen-
eral Noriega’s help for the coniras and
met with him in London, according to a
court document filed in the prosecution
of Mr. North. An investigator on the
Congressional Iran-contra committee
said that Mr. North transmitted mes-
sages to General Noriega through a
courier who lived in Florida. ae

‘The court document said that Gen-
eral Noriega offered in 1986 to assassi-
nate Nicaragua’s political leadership.
On orders from the national security
adviser at the time, John M. Poindex-
ter, Mr. North declined. But he did ac-
cept the Panamanian Jeader’s plan to
have peopie undertake covert bombing
missions inside Nicaragua. Mr. North
was dismissed before these could be
carried out. Tee ee pec

Several Congressional investigators
said they believed they had incomplete
information about Mr. North’s relation:
ship with Mr. Noriega. One investiga-
tor said that as late as 1986, Mr. North
went to the Jack Lawn, the head of the '
Drug Enforcement Administrtion, with -
an offer to intercede with General’
Noriega about his drug trafficking. Mr.
Lawn rejected the offer.

Mr. North’s lawyers did not return a
telephone call seeking comment. :

Aformer C.1.A. official said that Gen-

eral Noriega may atiribute to Mr
Casey or Mr. von implicit or explicit
authorization for his ing:
Mr. Casey died in 1987 and is believed
by Government and Congressional offi-
cials to have engaged in a host of deais
for which no C.I.A. documentation was
Jeft. The same officials also believe:
that Mr. North had a willingness to
strike off-the-books deais with unsa-
vory characters.” é

Not all the potentially embarrassing
information about Genera! Noriega
and the United States involves drugs or
matters of state.

One former official, asked to recall -
unfavorable incidents that might sur-
face in the case against the former
Panamanian Jeader, cited the story of
an elaborate movie projection system _
requested by Mr. Noreiga for intelli- -
gence purposes. The official said the ~
system, financed by the Pentagon, was

be

actually used to screen pornographic
movies. i

sphere as well — and J share his deep per-
sonal interest in seeing that the countries of
this hemisphere pul! together on behalf of
democracy and economic freedom. J know

the yearnings of my fellow leaders in this _

hemisphere, leaders in Latin America, and I
believe they will support the new Govern-
ment of Panama, and they will support the
United States as we work together in this
hemisphere.

I've asked the Vice President, Dan Quayle,
to visit a number of these Latin American
countries within the next several weeks, to
personally deliver this message. I view this
as very, very important diplomacy and I am
determined not to negleci the democracies in.
this hemisphere. Some have felt that we were
so infatuated with the change in Eastern Eu-
rope that we were in a process of neglecting
this hemisphere and that is not the case. And
the Quayle trip, in my view, will help. -

_l have been undertaking consultations di-
rectly with leaders since I’ve been President.
I will resume that, as I said, and the Vice
President will be in a position to explain very
clearly not only U.S. policy but our aspira-
tions for — for Panama and indeed for this
entire hemisphere.

So that’s where we are, and I'l! be glad to
take a few questions. Is it Helen first?

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Possible Deal on Charges

Q. You said that the Government is nat
seeking any kindof adeal—— |

A. Yeah. — :

Q. —— concerning Noriega. Does that
mean that you are irrevocably ruling out any
reducing of charges, increasing of charges?
And also since the indictment runs from ’8i
to 86 and you had many contacts, apparent-
ly, with Panama during that period, were you
ever aware of any drug activities on the part

"of Noriega?

A. On the first part of the question, there’s
no such plan. The man’s entitled to do what-
ever is, is granted him under our law. So
there isn’t any such plan.

Secondly, | have made some statements
along, in reply te your second question, so
punch it in the computer and Ill have nothing

more toe say about it because 1 do not want,

even inadvertently, to prejudice this case.
But my actions are in my view totally unre-
lated. Yeah, Tom.

U.S. Peacekeeping Force

Q. Mr. President, with General Noriega out
of Panama and safely in custody in this coun-
try, it seems like you might have a difficult

"choice in deciding how to maintain order in

Panama. Do you envision keeping a U.S. mili-
tary peacekeeping force there beyond the

usual contingent of 12,000 troops or would you

like to see the Panamanian Defense Forces
reconstituted? 4
A. One, I’d like to see their police forces,
whatever emerges, reconstituted. Two, we
wili get our forces that went in out as soon as

possible. Three — I will just say this because .

your question obviously understand this, but
to those listeners out there — Southcom has
had a force there and that force, under the
treaty, will remain there. But the answer is

we want go get those additional, augmented, -

forces out as soon as possible. And we will.

Secrecy on Missions to China

Q. Mr. President, I'd like to try to follow up
a question. Mr. President, of all the questions
you were asked when you were here last

will be conducted in secrecy auu 1 nuuw yuu
don’t like it. Your business is to get every-
thing out in the open, and my business is to
conduct the foreign affairs of this country in
the way I think I was elected to, and for the
most part that will be in the open.

But this move into Panama was held in se-
crecy and I think the American people under-
stand that. My move to send people to China
was controversial. Some think that the best
way to make change for human rights in
China is isolation. Don’t talk to them. Try to
punish them by excommunication. i don’t
feel that way. And so I asked these people to
go forward and I don’t think Jim Baker
would ever deliberately misiead somebody

~ and so I] will stand with him.

Q. Sir, 1 believe he indicated that he felt he
had to do that and that he knew what he was
doing, that he had to do it. | wondered how
you —— :

A. Ask him about it. I had to support my
Secretary of State. Yeah, Lesley?

Prejudicing the Noriega Case

Q. You talk about your concern about
prejudicing the case, but as you well know,
you have called Noriega a thug, and other
people in the Administration have gone fur-
ther; you said he’s poisoning our children;
haven't you already done that and ——

A. Well, I think I’ve heard all kine of char-
acterizations of him in the press, columnists,
even commentators. Presidents, members of
the United States Congress. He is not in cus-
tody. Time for rhetoric is over. Time for an-
swering hypothetical] questions that might

prejudice the trial is over. Now 1] would go

back, Lesley, to help you.on that to Water-
gate, where there were hearings. Hearings
held. Charges made. Over and over again.
Editorials written and voiced, and yet the
people received a fair trial. So I am con-
vinced that our system of justice is so fair
that the person will get a fair trial. But I can
tell you from my standpoint, | am going to
bend over backwards and not answer hypo-

thetical questions or not do anything that _

might prejudice that. Yeah? © :
Q. | have a follow-up. I want to actually fol-

low up on Helen. .

_ A. No, that’s a separate question.

Noriega’s Trial Righis

_Q. Reducing our charges. Are you saying
that if he wants to go for that, if he wants to
try to go for reducing of charges, that we will
entertain ——

A. No, I’m not saying that. I’m saying he
has a right to do what he wants, and then jet
the legal process determine how that should
work out. :

Q. You’re not ruling it out?

A. Well, I’m not ruling it in. I’m just saying

“he’s got his rights, and we ought not to stand
up here and try to define narrowly what they
are. Yes, and then John, and then we'll start
moving into the back.

Relations With Latin America

Q. Mr. President, based on your opening re-
marks, and your comments about the Vice
President's trip, it would indicate that you're
concerned about relations with Latin Amer-
ica. Has the actions we've taken set it back?

A. Te some degree 1 am concerned, be-

cause ] am well aware of how our friends |

south of our border, including my friend
President Salinas, look at the use of Amer-
ican force anywhere. So I’m concerned about
it, I think it’s something that's correctable,

Vea meal avwany YUU Lom ulal we ft CUNLI
uing old American policies that have upset
the people of Latin America?

A. Well, to the degree, if there is that per-
ception, then it’s up to me and the Secretary.
And in this instance, the Vice President’s trip
takes on enormous importance to convince
the people of the truth, and that is that we are
not reverting to just, you know, a willful —
what's the word I'm groping for here ~ the
use of force that has no rationale, But when it
comes to the protection of American life,
please, our friends south of the border, under-
stand this President is going to protect it.

I'll tell you one thing that’s helped on this,
to the degree there is a problem at all, and
that is the way the Panamanian democracy
is now starting to move forward, the certi-
fication of the three people who had been de-
prived of their right to hold office by the
previous regime. That’s been of enormous
help. And then I think the other thing is the
reception, the public reception in Panama for
our action. It has been overwhelming, over-
whelming.

Political Reactions on Panama

Q. On that, Sir, Lee Atwater, the chairman
of the R.N.C., says Panama is a political jack-
pot for you and it will wipe out the disen-
chantment, for example, with the way you
handled China. Without saying that’s why
you went into Panama {unintelligible}, it is a
political jackpot. ee

A. Well, Jesse Jackson doesn’t think sc. He
talked to my wife. And so, you know, there’s
differences of spinions on that. But this isn't,
1 didn’t do something for a political reason.
That’s not the reason I do that. I did it te pro-

tect American life. A President’s called on to

take certain action. We're not going in to try
to furbish a political image. That’s ridiculous.

Q. 1 haven’t said that, though. Have you
now neutralized the Democrats on foreign
policy? Is this the last time George Mitchel)
can ever accuse you of having a timid foreign
policy? . ore
A. Knowing George, he'll find a reason;
he’ll find a way. And that’s his job. | mean,
jock, we're going into an election year. But
this, this — I want to try if I can to separate
~ the response has been — he’s been sup-
portive of this. Let’s give the man credit. But
I don’t think it’s laid to rest or put off bounds
any criticism of the President by a Demo-
cratic opposition, if that’s the question. No.
Absolutely not. : eae

Yeah, Frank. And then back there. And
then you’re third.

Disposition of U.S. Troops
Q. Mr. President, Go you anticipate that the :

combat troops, the bulk of the additional
combat troops sent into Panama will indeed
be out by the end of this month, as some Ad-

ministration officials have said? And second- -

ly, and more broadly, do you now see an ex-
panded role for the American’ military in
small regional issues like this one or in more
particularly in the war against’ drugs since
there was a strong drug connection to this
operation? :

A. No, 1 see no — well — I see no parallel
between the situation here, where American

_ Jives were at stake and you had an indicted

person who'd usurped power and declared
war against the United States, | don’t think
you can draw a parallel between that unique

Situation and then other countries. And what —

was the other part of it?
Q The bit about when you see America,
these additional combat troops, able to come

mn

come to us. I think one of tne great tnings that
happened to us is —- you know, under the
Shanghai Communiqué and prior to that — is
‘the fact that we had a kind of contact, and
they began to see — began to facilitate — our
contact helped facilitate the changes and the
reforms that have taken place. So I want to
see those go forward again. But I — is that re-
sponsive? I can’t remember —

Q. Let me ask you specifically, are we close
to a resolution on the issue of the dissidents?

A. 1 don’t know the answer to that, I don’t
know the answer to that. They're — they
know my position, and it is one of adherence
to human rights, | might add. The thing I ob-
ject to about this whole one is the assigning of
motives to the other person. You can question
the tactics but I refuse to let my political crit-
ics get me down in terms of they understand
human rights and I don’t. 1 want to see,
through the contacis that we've made,
change that can be manifested in several
ways, Now there has been some. The Voice of
America, for example, now permitted some-
body to go — is now, you know, they have a
person permitted to go there: been a reitera-
tion of sale of missiles, which we — are very
much in our — I think in the interest of peace
in the world. So there's been progress, and
hopefully — 1 would like to hope that there
would be more.

Encouragement to Gorbachev
Q. Mr. President, as you know, Mikhail

_ Gorbachev has been visiting the Baltics in his

country to deal with the growing independ-
ence or autonomy movement there. Have you

encouraged him to allow those movements to.

continue or do you consider that
an internal affair?

A. Weill, he’s got his own internal affairs
but he knows of our advocacy of peaceful
change and to the man’s credit, he has been
the big advocate of peaceful change. He’s
‘been the advocate of reform. | mean, vou’ve

jally

~suuws. Way — Craig.

Latin View of t’ e Invasion

Q. Do you think that the Latin leaders have
been hypersensitive to fae — given the fact
that in back channels apparently they’ve

_ been supportive of the invasion. Can you say

if that is correct? And then also because of
that, do you think they’ve been hypersensi-
tive in their — in their public statements
about U.S. force in the region?

A. llike to feel that given the way the situa-
tion’s resolved, there is more support than
has manifested itself in votes at the United
Nations or in public, public statements. The

_ Vice President’s trip will help on this. My

got to link it, Jerry, to Eastern Europe to |

some degree, and | realize and we can dis-
cuss this, that the preblems are different, but
give the credit that — I don’t think any of us,
a year ago from this day would have given, in
‘terms of Soviet adherence to — Gorbachev’s

adherence to change, given the dynamic up-—

‘heaval in Eastern Europe. ,

He’s facing problems inside the borders of
the Soviet Union. The Baltics, recently this
other one, and he is — keeps reiterating his
conviction about peaceful change. So I sup-
port that. That we did have an opportunity to
discuss, in bread philosophical terms, this
question at Malta.

Q. As a result of that, is that not going to af-
fect him?

A. Well I’m certainly not buying into the

-hypothesis that there will — and I hope thai

he will — if this approach that he has taken,
for which we give credit, will prevail.

Siaying of Nunin Nicaragua

Q. Yes, Mr. President, several times today
you made reference to the U.S. right and in-
deed your obligation to protect American
lives. Today an American nun is being buried
here in the United States, even the Catholic

“ order. she represented here in Nicaragua

claims that she was killed by contra forces.
A. They did say that? I'd heard ——

Q. Representatives of that group say the _

contra forces have been known to operate in
that area using those tactics and perhaps
they didn’t recognize the pickup truck that

they were driving in. What do we know about.

who njay have killed those nuns? And what

own consultations will help decide, you know,
give me a clearer answer to your, to your
guestion. But 1, 1, ] am absolutely convinced,
given whai happened, and the reason why it
happened, that if there is damage, I can re-
pair it, we can repair it. The State Depart-

‘ment and whoever else is involved can, can

repair it.
Q. Da you see as hypersensitive their reac-

tion so far? :

A. Weil, | think predictably so.
Q. Mr. President --—~
A. This is the last one — way in the back.

Sovereignty and Drug War

Q. Mr. President, some countries, [un-
clear] President Endara of Panama [un-
clear] feels that their sovereignty might be
violated if the United States pursues drug
dealers in their countries. And there has been
some change in laws that can, you know, can
be reasonable, that they are worried about
these. In the sense thai the C.LA., the F.B.1.
going in and going through to apprehend peo-
ple outside the United States territory.

A. And so the question is what?

Q. Does these — do these countries have

reason to be worried that the President of

Panama might serve as ——
A. Oh -- Panama was, was more than that.
Panama had clearly other ingredients that

‘

caused American action. It wasn’t a simple

case of going after a person who had been in-
dicted for — for narcotics. Even though he
had the abortion of democracy but you also
had this — this threat to the lives of Amer-
icans.

CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Let me do something in conclusion that
may be a little risky, and it’s a housekeeping
detail. And it relates mainly to television.

i got a lot of mail after the last press con-
ference. E :

Thad some calls. :

Because when I was speaking here in this
room, juxtaposed against my frivolous com-

‘ments at the time were some —a split-screen

technique that showed American lives — the
bodies of dead soldiers in the caskets — of
dead Soldiers coming home.

And all I would respectfully reguest that if
the urgency of the moment is such that that
technique is going to be used, if | could be told
about it and we'll stop the proceedings. Or it,
it’s something less traumatic. : re

But that one — } could understand why the

‘viewers were, were concerned about this.

They thought their President, at .a solemn
moment like that, didn't give a damn.

Andi do. ! do. | feel itso strongly. So please
help me with that if you would. Thank you ali
very much. (

Plans for Bush Visit te Panama

Q. Sir, will you go to Panama?
A. We don’t have immediate plans.




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EAX TO: DAN FRANK YIRKING 212-366 Ube

HePE LOVAND LEGAL STAPF CAN PF riEw

Dear Sophia THIS REFORE Wwe MEET 23 30 THURS PAY,

I have been thinking for some time about how to respond to
your letter to me dated July 10. As you told me in our
telephone conversation just before you wrote, you wanted me to
send you the galleys of my biography of Bill before the book
went to press so that you could make sure I got it right.
Later, my publishers at Viking informed me that you had called
asking for the galleys from them so that you could correct
them. And then in your letter to me you discussed why you had
chosen me "to write this story of Bill Casey’s life "

I am saddened by what seems an unfortunate lack of
understanding between us. I am deeply grateful to you for the
help you gave me in writing Bill’s life, your granting me access
to his papers, your giving me unlimited interview time and other
kindnesses too numerous to list here. I could not have written
the kind of book I wrote without this cooperation on your part.
Again, let me say how grateful I am. But, you must understand
that you did not choose me to write Bill’s life. What you did
Primarily was to grant me access to Bill’s papers and otherwise
provide me with valued assistance. The decision to write the
book was made by me and my publisher. The book would have been
written anyway, but not as well, without your help. As you will
recall, we never discussed any arrangement whereby your
cooperation depended on my allowing you or anyone else to read
and clear the manuscript before it was published. Had such a
condition been raised, I could not have accepted it.

It is enormously important to me that my biographies be
considered independent works. To submit a book to a member of
the subject’s family to make sure the author "got it right"
or "to correct it" is not customary in publishing. That kind
of outside influence compromises a book’s worth. Such a book
would not be taken seriously by the very people that you want to
think well of Bill. I got to know Bill Casey rather well. I
knew of his love of books and his respect for independent
Writing and scholarship. I can’t imagine Bill wanting to read a
book that did not present an independent outlook.

I have written other biographies and I have never made
arrangements before for prior clearance. My widely praised
biography of Edward R. Murrow was written with the same
cooperation from Mrs. Murrow that you extended to me. She did
not ask to read the manuscript in advance; nor would I have
agreed to do so.

I am disappointed by your lack confidence in me. I am so
saddened that you think I wrote the book "to destroy him
(Bill)." You later go on to write that you have reason to
believe that I have "not been forthright and honest about
William J. Casey’s life and works." I don’t believe it is
possible for anyone to draw such a conclusion about a book they
have not read. I have trouble imagining Bill Casey doing that.

\DRAFT


~2~

I dealt personally with Bill and wrote extensively about him in
my earlier book, Piercing The Reich. He never asked to correct
the book or make sure I got it right. He knew that that is not
how reputable authors and journalists work. Reviews of my other
biographies of Nelson Rockefeller and Ed Murrow number over

100. The point made again and again in these reviews is that
the author has shown himself to be fair-minded and has written a
balanced work. That is the same judgment they will come to
about this biography of Bill.

I initiated that meeting on July 9 with you, your daughter
Bernadette and Owen so that I could thank you personally for
your cooperation, let you know the status of the book and give
you some sense of the kind of book I had written. It is, in my
judgment, an honest portrait of a complex, accomplished,
controversial and fascinating human being. I told you what
would be true of any biography worthy of the name -- that you
would not agree with or like every word in it. But, on the
whole, it is highly sympathetic. I went to you that day, not
out of any obligation. I did not have to come out to Long
Island. I could just as easily have let things slide until the
book came out. But I went to you in advance out of a sense of
consideration. I am still not sorry that I showed you that
courtesy, just disappointed at your reaction.

Throughout this project, I have come to like and admire both
Bernadette and Owen. Because I respect their judgment, I have
taken the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to them.

From my conversations with them, I think they understand how
authors operate and that Bill Casey was likely to get fairer
treatment at my hands than he would have received from most
authors and the news media, which, as you must know, were never
very sympathetic towards Bill.

I have written a book that is honest, fair and I think well
done. I stand behind it. And I am proud of it. I think the
best way to put my feelings is that I could look Bill Casey
straight in the eye, hand him this book and happily accept his
verdict of my account of his life.

I am upset that our relationship appears to have struck this
unhappy note. I hope, after reading this letter, that you will
better understand my feelings and my position. In any case, I
remain grateful that you helped me, because your aid enabled me
to write a much fuller and warmer story of this remarkable man.
I thought that was what we all wanted.

Sincerely,

| DRAET


August 2 1990
Dear Sophia,

I have been thinking for some time about how to respond to
your letter to me dated July 10. As you told me in our
telephone conversation just before you wrote, you wanted me to
send you the galleys of my biography of Bill before the book
went to press so that you could make sure I got it right.
Later, my publishers at Viking informed me that you had called
asking for the galleys from them so that you could correct
them. And then in your letter to me you discussed why you had
chosen me "to write this story of Bill Casey’s life "

I am saddened by what seems an unfortunate lack of
understanding between us. I am deeply grateful to you for the
help you gave me in writing Bill’s biography, your granting me
access to his papers, your giving me unlimited interview time
and other kindnesses too numerous to list here. Again, let me
say how grateful I am. But, you must understand that you did
not choose me to write Bill’s life. What you did was grant me
access to Bill’s papers and otherwise provide me with valued
assistance. The decision to write the book was made by me and
my publisher. The book would have been written anyway, but not
as well, without your help. As you will recall, we never
discussed any arrangement whereby your cooperation depended on
my allowing you or anyone else to read and clear the manuscript
before it was published. Had such a condition been raised, I
could not have accepted it.

It is important to me that my biographies be known as
independent works. To submit a book to a member of the
sub ject’s family to make sure the author "got it right" or
"to correct it" is not customary in publishing. That kind of
outside influence compromises a book’s worth. Such a book would
not be taken seriously by the very people that you want to think
well of Bill. I got to know Bill Casey rather well. I knew of
his love of books and his respect for independent writing and
scholarship. I can’t imagine Bill wanting to read a book that
did not present an independent outlook. I have written other
biographies and I have never made arrangements before for prior
clearance. My widely praised biography of Edward R. Murrow was
written with the same cooperation from Mrs. Murrow that you
extended to me. She did not ask to read the manuscript in
advance; nor would I have agreed to do so.

I am disappointed that you think I wrote the book "to

destroy him (Bill)." You later go on to write that you have
reason to believe that I have "not been forthright and honest
about William J. Casey’s life and works." I don’t know how

anyone can draw such a conclusion about a book they have not
read. I have trouble imagining Bill Casey doing that.


Joseph E. Persico

222 Heritage Road Guilderland, NY 12084 (518) 452-5429


September 20 1990

Mrs William J Casey
Glenwoood Rd
Rosslyn Harbor NY 11576

Dear Sophia,

I am sending you a copy of the Casey biography which the
publisher just gave me. I am sending another copy to Bernadette
and Owen.

I can only repeat here what I have said beofre. I hope you
Wil read the book carefully and completely. I belive you will
then find it a fine portrait of the husband of whom you are so
justifiably proud.

I am enclosing the first review of the book. It appeared in
Kirkus Review, which is an important publication in the book
business. Kirkus goes to all book stores to help them decide
which books they will carry. I expect subsequent reviews to be
in the same favorable vein.

I have received the kind invitation to attend the Casey
scholarship dinner in Washington. I wish I could make it, but
at this point, it looks like a bad date for me.

Once again, my deep gratitude to you for all you did to help
me write the best book I could write.

Sincerely,

fo 3
fi
f Fs

c.
ee

a

Mr and Mrs Owen Smith
1300 Ridge Road
Laurel Hollow NY 11791

Dear Bernadette and Owen,
Enclosed you will find a copy of my biography of William J
Casey, which the publisher just sent me. I have, of course,

also sent a copy to Sophia.

I hope and I believe that you will also find this book an
honest portrait of a remarkable man. I have taken the liberty

Kirkus goes out to the book stores in advance to help them know

what books to order. I expect that the subsequent reviews are
going to be in the same favorable vein.

In the course of my writing this book, you were generous
with your memories, your time and you helped me in countless
ways. I am forever grateful.

Sincerely,