GOVERNMENT BY
LITMUS TEST:
George Bush, iD evi
The Far Right | “«<:.
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and Abortion 7 ae
People For the American Way
Reprinted with permission of Universal Press Syndicate. All rights reserved.
Overview
In his inaugural address to the nation, President George Bush confronted a variety of pressing
concerns, including the budget deficit, drugs and foreign policy. His only reference to abortion was
indirect and in passing. Yet in his first year in office, few issues have had a more powerful and far-
reaching effect on Administration policy and personnel decisions.
Ironically, while Ronald Reagan was considered doctrinaire and Bush pragmatic, abortion has
had an even greater impact in Bush's White House than in Reagan's, driving decisions on issues only
remotely related. The President's willingness to let abortion dictate so much of his agenda has creat-
ed a “litmus-test” presidency.
One year into the Bush era, abortion has proved to be a pivotal issue for this Administration.
A brief survey of the year's events illustrates how Bush administration policies have been determined
by this single issue:
° Dr. Louis Sullivan, Bush's choice for Secretary of Health and Human Services, was
forced to go before anti-abortion rights groups and legislators and recant his alleged support for abor-
ton rights. Sullivan was confirmed, but the Far Right forced virulently anti-abortion rights deputies
on him.
¢ With anti-choice activists installed in nearly all top positions at Health and Human Servic-
es (HHS), the Department is impeding progress in crucial medical research by banning federal funds
for programs that depend on fetal tissue.
¢ Candidates for virtually any job touching remotely on abortion can expect to be grilled by
the Right for their views on the issue -- even medical professionals under consideration for nonpoliti-
cal research jobs, or nominees for legal services.
¢ The Justice Department, through the Solicitor General's office, has filed amicus briefs
asking the Supreme Court to overturn the Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion, even though the
states bringing these cases have not asked the Court to overturn Roe.
¢ The President himself has vetoed four major spending bills because of provisions for
funding of some abortions. In one case, the foreign aid bill, no federal money would have been used
to finance or even promote abortions. In all cases, the President held up vast sums of money for pro-
grams important to his domestic and foreign policy goals because of a handful of abortion-related
provisions the right wing considered abhorrent. His veto of the District of Columbia appropriations
bill demonstrated that he would not even allow District residents to use their own tax dollars to fi-
nance abortions for poor women.
Perhaps equally alarming, the abortion issue has served as a wedge enabling the Far Right to
exert tremendous influence on Bush administration decisions -- even decisions unrelated to abortion.
The result has been not only to shore up the President's anti-abortion credentials; the Right has used
the Administration's eagerness to placate it on abortion to influence policy on other "lifestyle" issues:
* A brochure on condom use to prevent AIDS was blocked on the grounds that it did not
adequately stress the importance of abstinence and monogamy,
¢ A survey of Americans’ sexual habits considered vital to any AIDS education effort was
similarly held up by HHS; and
* A widely praised HHS report focusing on suicide by homosexual youth was disavowed
by Secretary Sullivan under pressure from Rep. William Dannemeyer (R-CA), a vocal opponent of
gay rights.
The consequences of these acts are clear and far-reaching. These incidents indicate not so
much a secret "conspiracy" by the Right to wield power disproportionate to its numbers, but rather a
case of the Administration bending to extremist pressures for the sake of political expediency. By
placating the Right on this and other social issues, the White House has -- at least for now -- silenced
a restive, possibly divisive faction within its party. But in doing so, it has become a far more ideolog-
ical Administration than its public statements and image-making would have us believe.
Largely because of the Administration's abortion policy, the Right has been pleased with the
President's first year. The President's actions have been applauded by anti-choice groups, and his
abortion policies have received high marks from evangelical and New Right leaders. Even Conserva-
tive Caucus president Howard Phillips, a fierce critic of Bush over the years, said that "as long as
he's okay on abortion issues, there will not be any challenge to his leadership." (1)
In his failed 1980 presidential campaign, George Bush was a pro-choice candidate, and used
his support of abortion to distinguish himself from Ronald Reagan. But his position took a U-turn
when Reagan began to consider him as a possible vice-presidential candidate. While many observers
viewed this change as a political ploy to quell the right wing of the Republican Party, Bush now
claims strong moral objections to abortion. In 1984 he said, "There has been -- I have to make a con-
fession -- an evolution in my position." (2) It was an evolution that has since served him well in Re-
publican Party politics.
Representative Les AuCoin (D-OR) has said that President Bush made a "Faustian political
bargain” with the Right on abortion. (3) He may have bought peace with the Right. But as this re-
port asks, at what price to the American people?
The Right Staffs a Department
During the 1988 campaign, George Bush took pains to assure his supporters in the pro-life
movement that, if elected, he would give them what they wanted, namely, a resolute abortion oppo-
nent in the Secretary's job at the Department of Health and Human Services. (1) Once elected, Bush
transition officials offered the movement further assurances to this effect, and Bush himself told a
gathering of evangelicals at the White House that they would "be pleased with my decisions." (2)
Even before George Bush took the oath of office, abortion became a defining issue of his
presidency. In December 1988, reports began to circulate that the President-elect would appoint Dr.
Louis Sullivan, a friend of Barbara Bush's, as his Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS).
According to an Atlanta newspaper covering the story, Dr. Sullivan said in an interview that he sup-
ported a woman's right to an abortion.
Overnight, outraged anti-abortion groups rallied to keep Sullivan out of office. Organizations
such as the Ad Hoc Committee in Defense of Life and the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC)
pledged to obstruct the proposed appointment through their ties to conservative Republican senators.
It fell to White House Chief of Staff John Sununu to salvage the Sullivan nomination. A
meeting was quickly arranged for Sullivan and three anti-choice legislators: Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-
UT), and Reps. Vin Weber (R-MN) and Christopher Smith (R-NJ). An official from the NRLC,
Kay James, sat in. At the meeting, on December 21, 1988, Sullivan declared his opposition to abor-
tion and his support for the proposed Human Life Amendment outlawing abortion. (3) The next
month, White House officials arranged another meeting with Sullivan, this time with the Senate Re-
publican leadership and other anti-abortion legislators present, chief among them Sen. Gordon Hum-
phrey (R-NH). (4) Again Sullivan restated his opposition to abortion. Although not entirely placat-
ed, the congressional Right withdrew its opposition and the nomination was allowed to stand.
Sullivan, like Bush before him, had vacillated too much on abortion for the Right to be fully-
comfortable with him. In the span of a month, Sullivan had been quoted as supporting abortion
rights, then opposing them, except in cases of rape, incest or risks to the pregnant woman's life.
Whereas before he had opposed the Human Life Amendment, now he supported it.
For the Right to exercise any kind of control over Sullivan, they had to be confident that his
top deputies at HHS were solid in their opposition to abortion. As part of a reported quid pro quo,
Sununu arranged a group of HHS appointees to satisfy their requirements. Sullivan acquiesced. (5)
Former Office of Personnel Management Director Constance Horner would go to HHS as Undersec-
retary; Dr. James Mason, formerly the head of the Centers for Disease Control, would become As-
sistant Secretary for Health; and Kay James, Publicity Affairs Director for NRLC, would become As-
sistant Secretary for Public Affairs. Senator Humphrey called Mason an "outstanding" choice, while
Douglas Johnson of NRLC said he was "comfortable" with Horner and Mason, adding, "They are
certainly people we've worked well with in the past." (6)
According to Fred Barnes of The New Republic, Sullivan dragged his feet on these arranged
appointments, which Bush transition officials had promised Senator Humphrey were “all but as-
sured.” Sununu then forced these names upon Sullivan just a few days after the inauguration. (7)
Completing the package was a series of other appointments to HHS endorsed by the anti-choice
movement: Mary Gall as Assistant Secretary for Human Development Services; Nabers Cabaniss as
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs; and Patrick Fagan, from Paul Weyrich's Free
Congress Foundation, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Social Services Policy. (8) The controver-
sy over Sullivan's appointment had therefore enabled the Right to score a major victory in securing
control of top policy-making jobs at HHS just months into the new Administration. In a portent of
things to come, Sununu had engineered a deal that worked to the Right's satisfaction. (9)
Many of these appointees came to office with controversial backgrounds. Kay James was the
chief public relations officer at NRLC and joined in interviewing Sullivan in December when his
nomination was in jeopardy; now she was forced upon him as his assistant.
Gall had served previously as head of President Reagan's adoption task force, which was
founded expressly for the political purpose of providing "an alternative" to abortion. The adoption
task force members included right-wing activists Gary Bauer, formerly Reagan's domestic policy ad-
visor, and Richard Abell, now an assistant attorney general in the Bush Justice Department. (10)
Cabaniss began her career as a staffer for Sens. Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Jeremiah Denton
(R-AL). As Sullivan's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs, she was allowed to contin-
ue in the same post where two years earlier she had drafted the much criticized Title X regulations
barring federally funded family planning programs from providing abortion information, counseling,
or referrals. Describing her views as "strongly pro-life," she said at the time, "My goal is to do
everything in my power to get abortion out of Title X." (11) These regulations are still on the
books, although legal challenges have made them presently unenforceable; meanwhile Cabaniss is
still charged with administering the $140 million Title X program. In a previous job at HHS, as Di-
rector of the Office of Adolescent Pregnancy Programs, Cabaniss was head of the "chastity program"
which provided no federal funding for birth control services but instead promoted sexual abstinence
among pregnant and parenting teenagers.
Of the top people picked for HHS by the White House, Dr. James Mason was perceived at
the time to be the least controversial. A noted opponent of abortion, Dr. Mason came to the Assistant
Secretary's job with strong research and administrative credentials; for five years he had run the Cen-
ters for Disease Control (CDC), one of the world's premier medical research institutions. Recent
findings by a House subcommittee suggest, however, that the agency's research was compromised
during these years because of the politicization of the abortion issue. Doctors and officials at CDC un-
der Mason testified to the House Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee
that anti-abortion officials had censored and otherwise delayed scientific reports on abortion for politi-
cal reasons. More than five years ago, CDC stopped its practice of reporting studies that unfavorably
compared the mortality rates of women who carried their pregnancies to term with those who had
abortions, thereby deliberately concealing the fact that women are less likely to die from abortion than
childbirth. (12)
Some of the most revealing testimony on Mason's CDC tenure came from the former director
of the Abortion Surveillance Branch, Dr. David Grimes. In an interview with People For the Ameri-
can Way, Grimes cited other evidence supporting his belief that Mason's views on abortion colored
his judgment on medical issues. For example, Grimes told of a doctor whose alleged "pro-choice"
views led White House aides during the Reagan administration to demand the doctor's transfer, and
he was demoted to a position at another department of CDC dealing with sexually transmitted diseas-
es. Asa condition for the transfer, Mason reportedly worked out an agreement with the doctor's new
supervisor prohibiting him from writing any more articles on abortion. (13) Grimes, who is pro-
choice, also noted that he was invited back after leaving CDC to address a conference on AIDS. Ma-
son rescinded the invitation. (14) Thus, in many ways, the politics at Mason's Centers for Disease
Control were a precursor of the politics of Health and Human Services under Sullivan.
The White House apparently denied each of Sullivan's personal choices for high-level jobs at
the department, an event one policy expert familiar with HHS characterized as "almost without prece-
dent" for a Cabinet member. (15)
In one case, Sununu worked actively with the Far Right to undermine one of Sullivan's
choices. Robert Fulton was Sullivan's choice to head the Family Support Administration, the na-
tion's top welfare job. A Republican with many years' experience in welfare issues, Fulton was a
top aide to Oklahoma Governor Henry Bellmon (R), a close friend of the President's. The National
Right to Life Committee, however, declared its opposition to Fulton, on the grounds that as Director
of the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, he had tolerated a state hospital policy of denying
medical care to newborn infants with the spina bifida disorder, some of whom had consequently
died. These deaths had occurred before Fulton took office, and he had promptly halted the practice.
But his explanations were rejected by the anti-abortion movement, which enlisted prominent conser-
vative senators in the fight against his nomination. Six senators -- Gordon Humphrey (R-NH), Wil-
liam Armstrong (R-CO), Dan Coats (R-IN), Phil Gramm (R-TX), Jesse Helms (R-NC), and Steve
Symms (R-ID) -- signed a letter to the President opposing the nomination.
At first, Sullivan refused to abandon his candidate. But in June, four months after his name
first appeared as a candidate, Fulton withdrew, apparently out of consideration for the embattled Dr.
Sullivan. “It was to limit the damage to him," Fulton wrote in a piece published in The Washington
Post. (16)
In the same article, entitled "Caving In To the Right," Fulton outlined how a three-cornered
process had thwarted his nomination. At the first corner he placed the single-issue pressure groups,
like NRLC, who through their contacts managed to nail down the second corner of the triangle,
namely those senators willing to oppose the nomination. The third and final corner was the White
House, particularly John Sununu, whom Fulton characterized as "far to the right of the Republican
mainstream ... with a substantial network of right-wing ‘transition’ staff and other insiders."
Fulton charted how Sununu's staff gave Sullivan little to no help in supporting his candidacy
before the anti-choice movement. For his part, Sununu refused to meet with Fulton or return his tele-
phone calls. In another instance, revealed by Fulton in an interview with People For the American
Way, Sununu's staff actively sabotaged his nomination. At the White House's urging, Fulton had
agreed to meet with representatives from NRLC and members from the staffs of Sens. Helms and
Humphrey, although he considered this proposed meeting an unorthodox case of the Administration
bending to pressure groups. At the meeting, he discovered to his astonishment that NRLC had a
copy of his resume. He had sent out only two copies, one to HHS, the other to Margaret Garikes,
the Deputy Associate Director of Presidential Personnel. He believes Garikes passed his resume on
to NRLC, suggesting further White House collusion with the Right. When on an earlier occasion he
met with Garikes, it became clear to him from her questions that she had been lobbied by the anti-
choice movement, and her mind was made up: she wanted to talk not about welfare policy, but about
spina bifida and abortion. (17)
[— Fulton's blackballing by the White House lent further credence to reports of Administration
litmus-testing that emerged last autumn. Another victim of the conservative pressure groups was one
of their own, former Rep. Caldwell Butler (R-VA), with a lifetime American Conservative Union rat-
ing of 83 percent. Butler was slated to head the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). Like HHS, con-
trol at LSC was another top priority for the Right, which sought to disband or reform LSC for its in-
volvement in issues like voter registration, redistricting, and class-action suits. The Right has
accused the LSC of being "anti-family” and pro-abortion. When Butler's name came up, Sununu de-
cided once again that an Administration candidate should be interviewed by outside pressure
groups. (18)
At the meeting, Far Right leaders Paul Weyrich, David Keene, Brent Bozell III, Richard Vi-
guerie and Howard Phillips grilled Butler on his views on reforming LSC. Also on their list of ques-
tions: abortion. When Butler, an opponent of abortion, replied that he thought a pregnant woman
was entitled to receive advice on her legal right to an abortion, his interviewers enlisted sympathetic
Members of Congress to tell the White House that Butler was an unacceptable choice for LSC. The
Administration abandoned him. Ironically, while Bush has met with many right-wing leaders during
his time in office, he has refused to meet with Viguerie and Phillips. Now they were being granted
what amounted to veto power over a White House nominee. (19)
Butler's experience, combined with Fulton's, suggests the remarkable case of the White
House Chief of Staff's office abetting right-wing pressure groups seeking to block intended nomina-
tions. Fulton writes:
Looking back on this experience, I can see that jettisoning my nomination was a small price
for the White House to pay in keeping peace with some of the extremists who are, for the mo-
ment, in the President's corner. I think, however, there are danger signals... This tilt to the
right may persist for some time, if only because the immediate fallout from disappointed mod-
erates is less than the deafening roar from hard-righters when they don't get their way.
With the Fulton nomination defeated, the Right's ascendancy at HHS was virtually complete,
although several important jobs remained vacant. Sununu had put together a team of key officials
around Sullivan who would remain steadfast to the demands of the anti-choice lobby. A precedent
had been set for litmus-testing: candidates for future jobs at HHS -- indeed any job touching on abor-
tion -- could expect to face the severe scrutiny of the anti-abortion movement.
In his ill-fated interview with the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Louis Sullivan spoke of
his fears should the federal government become involved in abortion, which he characterized as "such
a divisive, emotional issue with such polarization on both sides." He worried, "that the department
not become impaled on this issue, because there are so many other concerns that are important." (20)
As the early case of Robert Fulton demonstrated, and others would later confirm, Dr. Sulli-
van's concerns were right on the mark.
10
The Politics of Health and Human Services
In the fall of 1989, three months after the Fulton issue had blown over, evidence began to
mount that abortion foes at HHS were not just influencing personnel decisions, but were dictating
matters of policy -- even on issues only marginally related to abortion. On these issues, Dr. Sulli-
van's silence was particularly noticeable. The new point man on these questions was Dr. James Ma-
son, the third-ranking official at HHS, and a vocal opponent of abortion.
Litmus Testing
The flap over Sullivan's appointment in December 1988 confirmed the use of litmus tests for
political appointments to HHS. But a report in Science magazine revealed that the abortion litmus test
was being applied to candidates for medical research jobs as well. Seeking to fill the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) director's job, a White House aide had called a candidate on the short list,
Washington University Chancellor Dr. William Danforth, with just two questions: "What are your
views on abortion?" and "What are your views on fetal research?" Danforth's reported answer: "If
that is all you want to know, I'm not your man." (1)
At the same time the Administration was considering candidates for the Surgeon General's job
vacated by C. Everett Koop. When it named its pick, Dr. Antonia Novello, news articles revealed
that she too had been grilled at length by White House officials for her views on abortion and had
passed their test. Dr. Burton Lee, a friend of the President's and his personal physician, had initially
been considered a leading candidate for the job, but Lee evidently removed his name from considera-
tion because his views on abortion were irreconcilable with the Administration's. (2)
News of this "litmus-testing” for medical jobs created a furor in the medical community. "I
find it abhorrent that people would be picked for their preconceived views, and not for their expertise
alone," said Dr. Myron Genel, an associate dean at the Yale School of Medicine. "We just have to
11
hope that [they] will be able to separate their private views from their public responsibilities." Har-
vard Medical School Dean Dr. Daniel Tosteson expressed fear that politicization of NIH would result
in the United States losing its undisputed preeminence in biomedical research. (3)
A New York Times story quoted an unnamed senior official at NIH who mentioned the un-
precedented nature of the White House's method. "Political opinions have not been considered on
these jobs in the past.... These are jobs where the primary attention should be on science." Even un-
der President Reagan, the NIH directorship had remained largely free from political pressures. A
1982 article in The Washington Post quoted then-director Dr. James Wyngaarden as backing freedom
of choice on abortion, a view markedly at odds with the Reagan administration's. (4) Far from be-
ing forced to step down or retract his statements, Wyngaarden stayed at NIH until last summer, when
he was removed from his post by Sullivan.
The scientific community's concern over litmus-testing eventually forced the department to re-
spond. In an interview with The New York Times on October 20, Mason agreed that the Administra-
tion should focus on candidates’ scientific qualifications, but added that the President had a right to
ask of his choices whichever questions he liked. Admitting that some questions were politically sen-
Sitive -- like abortion -- Mason said that these issues should be the concern only of the upper echelons
of the department, for consideration by himself and Sullivan. At a speech to the Association of
American Medical Colleges one week later, Sullivan largely repeated his Assistant Secretary's state-
ment, adding that he had met with White House officials, who agreed that litmus tests for research
jobs were unnecessary. (5)
Despite these reassurances, the damage had already been done. Offended by the Administra-
‘ tion's political tests, several highly qualified candidates removed themselves from consideration for
crucial jobs directing research and other important programs at NIH and the Centers for Disease Con-
trol; the CDC job was only filled in January 1990. (6)
Still more important, there are suggestions that the fallout over hiring based on politics and
12
not science has created a severe crisis of confidence within the health community, many of whose
members express fears for their independence. "The verbal reassurances of Administration officials
make no difference," said the chairman of the new National AIDS Commission, Dr. June Osborn.
“You have to be able to know that your best scientific judgments are what matter and what this coun-
try needs. But everybody now knows that these [hiring] decisions are not made with science in
mind.” (7)
Fetal Tissue and IVF Research
In March 1988 the Reagan administration issued a temporary ban on federal funds for re-
search in fetal tissue transplants. Preliminary research on fetal tissue found it to have unique regenera-
tive qualities that make it a potentially invaluable tool in the treatment of Parkinson's disease, dia-
betes, and possibly Alzheimer's and Huntington's disease, among others. (8) The ban imposed by
HHS specified that no federal funds could be directed to programs that transplanted tissue from abort-
ed fetuses into disease victims. Anti-choice activists have voiced opposition to such research on the
grounds that it encourages women to have abortions.
To address this and other ethical issues, two panels of independent experts were convened by
NIH in 1988 to devise new research guidelines. They suggested that fetal tissue research be allowed
to continue, with two provisos: payment for tissue would be prohibited, and donors would be pre-
vented from designating which patients could receive their tissue. Apparently satisfied with the pro-
posed new regulations, the official who had announced the ban, Assistant Secretary Dr. Robert Win-
dom, declared in early January 1989 that he was prepared to drop it. (9) The final decision,
however, was left to the incoming Bush administration.
At his first meeting with abortion foes in December 1988, Sullivan disagreed with his inter-
viewers on only one point -- as a doctor, he was opposed to limiting research, even research on fetal
tissue. (10) But when it came time to decide whether the moratorium should remain in force, the
13
Secretary deferred to Assistant Secretary Mason, indicating that he would allow his subordinate to
make the final decision. (11) In a November 1989 decision widely acclaimed by the Right, Mason
announced a continuation of the moratorium, overruling the two panels that had overwhelmingly rec-
ommended lifting the ban. Calling fetal tissue research "unacceptable public policy," Assistant Secre-
tary Mason argued that "you would create a situation where you're trading off the important lives of
people who are suffering from diabetes, Parkinson's, or other diseases for this unborn baby with his
or her rights as well." (12)
The reaction from the medical community was swift. The president of the American Academy
of Pediatrics likened Mason's decision to something from "the Middle Ages," while former chief ethi-
cist at NIH, Dr. John Fletcher, called the affair "an outright suppression of scientific research and
public debate." Fletcher placed the HHS decision squarely in the realm of politics, saying "the Gov-
ernment is just a party in the conflict, and is trying to control the agenda and have its own conclu-
sions." (13) The research director of the American Paralysis Association, Margaret Brown, wrote,
"the outrageousness of the Administration's position needs to be kept in mind by all families whose
hopes for their loved ones are lessened by this action, which so little values the hopes of the living for
better lives." (14)
While the ban regulated only the use of federal funds, the effects of Mason's decision are seri-
ous even for privately financed research. Said Florence Haseltine, an official at the National Institute
of Child Health and Human Development, "Banning federal funds will shut this field down.... It
will become a marginal area outside of the mainstream of science where intuition and guesses will be
allowed to overshadow good scientific principles and common sense." (15)
Another area of research reduced to "a second-class level of science" by ideological pressures
in the Reagan and Bush administrations is in vitro fertilization (IVF). Designed to help infertile
couples have children, IVF is opposed by the Far Right, on grounds that during the procedure some
embryos are inevitably destroyed or discarded. The federal government under Reagan refused to
14
fund IVF, with the result, as one expert says, "There are no standards, and nobody knows how best
to do it." (16) Columnist Charles Krauthammer puts it more bluntly: "There is no good research.
Practitioners are operating in the dark. Patients are being willy-nilly experimented on but in so unsys-
tematic a way that their suffering is wasted. All for the sake of maintaining an appearance of clean
hands." (17) The Bush administration is continuing past policy by refusing to take up the question
of funding IVF research.
More important, the Administration refuses to consider reviving the Ethics Advisory Board
(EAB). Without such a board in place within the Secretary's office, there is no formal mechanism for
reviewing IVF and other controversial areas of biomedical research, which also means no federal
funds can be designated or released for these programs. The last EAB was disbanded in 1980 and
has since not been allowed to reconvene, in violation of HHS regulations mandating its existence.
Medical professionals see ideological motivations for this neglect: anti-choice activists express fear
that such a board of independent experts would approve funding research in areas such as fetal tissue
and IVF.
In a December 1989 report, the House Committee on Government Operations called for the
formation of a new EAB (six anti-choice committee members dissented). So far, Secretary Sullivan,
in violation of his department's own regulations, has refused to act on the advice of medical experts
by reestablishing the Board, an omission the Committee deemed "an embarrassment" to the depart-
ment and the Public Health Service. (18)
In the case of fetal tissue research, as in the litmus testing for key positions, Sullivan's silence
was particularly significant. On the fetal tissue ban, Mason made both the decision and the announce-
ment observers had expected would come from the Secretary himself. Sullivan later maintained that
the decision had been his all along. (19) Yet as recently as December 1988, he had voiced support
for resuming HHS funding, saying, "We have a number of medical advances that have occurred as a
result of research with fetal tissue that have benefited the lives of many people.” (20) There was no
15
mention of this being an abortion issue. Eleven months later, his views were quite different: "[it is]
clear that this department in particular should not be funding activities which encourage or promote
abortions." (21)
With even the Secretary toeing the line, the Far Right appears to have won the battle for HHS
it thought it had nearly lost when Sullivan's name first came up for selection just over a year ago.
The Right and "Lifestyle" Issues
While not all abortion opponents come from the political Right, the Right has successfully
used the issue of abortion to gain entry into the Administration's corridors of power. With their base
in the White House secure because of abortion, they have been able to influence Administration poli-
cy on the lifestyle and related "family" issues high on the Right's agenda.
Kay James came to the HHS Public Affairs office from NRLC. At her confirmation hearings
she stressed bipartisanship on health issues, and said she hoped to establish her leadership in areas
such as drug abuse and AIDS education. (22) Yet she has single-handedly undermined a crucial part
of AIDS education by blocking the publication of a brochure on condom use, sending it back to the
Food and Drug Administration for "further review." Health officials, among them former Surgeon
General C. Everett Koop, consider the booklet a vital part of protecting people from the spread of
AIDS, and therefore fully consistent with the aims of the Public Health Service. Designed for nation-
wide distribution, the pamphlet contained precise, accurate information on how to use condoms to
prevent disease.
But according to the news accounts, James considered the pamphlet unacceptable because it
failed to stress that abstinence and monogamy are the best defenses against AIDS. In this, she was
talking the language of the Right -- and, indeed, frustrated health officials charge James with ideolog-
ical motivations for her actions, according to The Washington Post. Said one "senior federal health
official" referring to the scope of the AIDS crisis in the wake of James's decision, "We have a major
16
battle on our hands. And we are fighting with at least one arm tied behind our back." (23)
In at least two other areas, politically motivated decisions favoring the Right's agenda have
been made, with potentially serious repercussions.
For more than a year the Department had worked on a survey that would examine the sexual
habits of thousands of Americans. The so-called "sex survey" was considered by health experts to be
a vital part of the planning process to any AIDS education and prevention effort. But right-wing al-
lies in the Administration and Congress, Rep. William Dannemeyer chief among them, opposed it on
the grounds that the survey questions were intrusive and offensive. Religious Right groups, includ-
ing the Rev. Donald Wildmon's American Family Association, also campaigned against it.
Pressure exerted first on OMB Director Richard Darman and later on Sullivan resulted in de-
lays and censorship of certain questions, compromising the collection of essential scientific data.
(24) In a letter to Sullivan last April, Darman urged him to review the study carefully and consider
"whether the inevitable controversy that would be associated with this proposed study -- as currently
drafted -- would advance the interest we share." (25) Saying he had problems "with the tone and
content of the questions,” Sullivan directed the study back to the agency which had formulated it,
where several questions were deleted. In June, an advisory committee pronounced both the study
and its questions a sensitive and necessary approach to fighting AIDS. (26) The survey's questions
were "appropriate and unbiased,” it said, "respecting individual privacy, confidentiality and meeting
the highest scientific standards." Already much-delayed and censored, the study was scheduled to ar-
rive eventually at the desk of James Mason, when in August the House Appropriations Committee di-
rected the Public Health Service not to continue with the study. (27)
Last summer HHS released a widely praised report on youth suicide, with a section examin-
ing the pressing problem of suicide by homosexual youths. The report documented with great care
the extraordinary vulnerability of gay youth and urged that they be treated with sympathy and protect-
ed from discrimination and abuse. Representative Dannemeyer expressed outrage at the recommen-
17
dations and sent letters to the President and to Mason at HHS denouncing the Department for its
abandonment of "traditional family values." (28) In his letter to Mason, Dannemeyer wrote, "The
last thing these [homosexual] individuals need is a perception of accommodation from the Bush ad-
ministration." (29) Responding for the Department, Sullivan capitulated to Dannemeyer, writing,
...the views expressed in the paper entitled 'Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide’ do not in
any way represent my personal beliefs or the policy of this department... Indeed, I am strong-
ly committed to advancing traditional family values. Federal policies must be crafted with
great care so as to strengthen rather than undermine the institution of the family. In my opin-
~ jon, the views expressed in the paper run contrary to that aim. (30)
As the nation's leading health care official, Sullivan's response was extraordinary. Once
again, the Administration was willing to renounce responsible health research to pacify the Right.
18
The Campaign to Overturn Roe v. Wade
In November 1988, under Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, the government joined the
state of Missouri in the Webster case and urged the Supreme Court to overturn Roe. The incoming
Administration, with the holdover Attorney General, maintained its involvement in Webster, and in
February filed an amicus brief in the case attacking Roe. In the brief, the 1973 Supreme Court deci-
sion was blamed for creating deep national divisions, and Roe was called "an unworkable framework
... not firmly grounded in the Constitution." The brief continued by saying that Roe was based on
“two crucial but highly problematic premises": that a woman has a fundamental constitutional right to
an abortion, and that states do not have "a compelling interest in protecting prenatal human life" from
moment of conception. (1)
The vehemence with which the Justice Department pursued its campaign against Roe -- and
the highly inflammatory language employed in its brief -- resulted in an unusual public protest at the
Department in April: 248 career lawyers signed a petition denouncing Thornburgh's efforts to over-
turn Roe. One lawyer said the protest reflected a widespread belief "that the Justice Department had
departed from its traditional impartial commitment to the integrity of the American legal system and
has instead started to play partisan politics." She continued: "It was difficult for us to discover any
motive other than that they just wanted to identify the Department with the political agenda of the Far
Right.” (2)
In a September interview, Thornburgh went so far as to liken Roe to the infamous Dred Scott
decision: "There is a wonderful quote from Lincoln on the Dred Scott case. He said, "We think the
decision is erroneous. We know the Court that made it has often overruled its own decisions, and we
shall do what we can to overrule this.’ This fairly describes the Justice Department's position in Roe
v. Wade." (3)
The Department renewed its effort to overturn Roe in the 1989-90 Court term, using two
19
parental notification cases as vehicles. In this, the Department exceeded even the wishes of the states
involved (Ohio and Minnesota), who argue that their cases fall within the Roe framework. Neither
state has asked the Court to overturn Roe. In a brief for the government on the Minnesota case, filed
in mid-October, Solicitor General Kenneth Starr wrote, "There is simply no credible foundation for
the proposition that abortion is a fundamental right. We continue to believe Roe was wrongly decid-
ed and should be overruled." (4) The Administration then called upon the Court to uphold the restric-
tive Minnesota law requiring minors to notify both biological parents before undergoing an abortion.
Yet as recently as late September, according to press accounts, the Solicitor General's office
considered a more restrained brief, one that refrained from calling for the overturn of Roe. (5) But
evidently in response to Far Right concerns, the Administration's eventual brief accommodated the
Far Right position.
The Administration's brief in the Minnesota case also seems to endorse a Far Right view of
the family. Many Far Right leaders invoke their favorite code words -- "traditional family values" --
to support Minnesota's law requiring that both parents be notified before an abortion, even in cases
where the family is not united. The Solicitor General took that same tack, writing in his brief, "In the
typical situation,” a girl's parents will have "cared for their daughter from her birth, and they will be
deeply, lovingly concerned about her well-being." For this reason, even in the face of evidence that
fully 50 percent of Minnesota teenagers seeking abortions come from single-family homes, the Jus-
tice Department rejects even a "judicial bypass" mechanism for minors and supports not just notifica-
tion but giving both parents veto power over their teenage daughters.
Another recent incident demonstrates the degree to which the Bush Justice Department has de-
parted from its traditional legal duties to entertain other aspects of the Right's ‘family’ agenda. Thorn-
burgh last October issued a memorandum to all Justice Department employees urging that they con-
sider adoption for their families. "Each year nearly 25,000 American babies are given life and the
chance to be loved when their mothers choose adoption over abortion or unwanted parenthood," he
20
wrote. (6) Complaints arose that the Administration was politicizing adoption by tying it to the abor-
tion controversy. John Sturdivant, President of the American Federation of Government Employees,
offered a response. Calling Thornburgh's memo "outrageous," he said, "Here is the federal govern-
ment as an employer trying to impose its political philosophy about what should be a very private and
personal choice." (7)
21
George Bush's Vetoes
Much of the anti-choice activity of the Administration has been in the form of presidential ve-
toes. In his one year in office, Bush has rejected four bills containing ‘unacceptable’ abortion lan-
guage -- all in one month in the fall of 1989.
The Labor-HHS Veto
The first of the President's vetoes was a $156.7 billion bill funding the Departments of Labor,
Education, and Health and Human Services for the 1990 fiscal year. This bill, vetoed October 21,
would have provided federal funding for abortions for poor women in cases of rape, incest, and en-
dangerment to the woman's life. The President said he objected to the first two of these clauses, fa-
voring funding only to save the woman's life.
Presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater has declared that Bush's views on abortion are
“based on his firm moral beliefs, and they are not subject to change." (1) But he admitted that the
President's opposition to the Labor-HHS bill stemmed not from moral but "practical objections": the
Administration was concerned that women would claim to be rape or incest victims to qualify for fed-
eral funds for abortions. (2)
According to newspaper reports, Bush was looking for ways to back down from the resolute
stand he had taken against the Labor-HHS bill, hoping to soften his position without alienating his
anti-choice constituency. "I'm not looking for any conflict over this," he said. The White House
went to work on appeasing the Right. But last-minute negotiations with anti-abortion members of
Congress on ways to avoid a veto broke down. Said a White House aide, "There was no way to
tinker with [it] that would have gotten us out of the box." (3) Once again, the White House had evi-
dently backed down in the face of pressure from the Right. In the view of The New York Times,
“Mr. Bush seems to place greater value on [the Right's] tranquility than on the peace of mind of
22
cruelly abused women who are too poor to afford wholly legal medical help." (4)
The D.C. Appropriations Vetoes
The President vetoed the $4 billion District of Columbia appropriations bill not once but
twice, signing the bill only after Congress had drafted abortion language acceptable to the anti-choice
lobby. At issue was whether funds raised by a democratically elected local legislature could be used
to finance a constitutionally guaranteed right, under local law. The first bill authorized the use of fed-
eral funds to pay for abortions in cases of rape or incest and allowed the District to spend its own lo-
cally raised revenue for Medicaid abortions. The President vetoed the bill on October 27.
In its second attempt, Congress deleted the provision on federal funds (except when the wom-
an's life was endangered), but retained the District's right to spend its locally raised funds. Bush ve-
toed this second bill on November 20. Ironically, until 1988, even Ronald Reagan had signed bills
that did not prevent the District from using its local funds on abortion. (5)
Bush's vetoes held up monies directed to programs he says he supports: AIDS education, in-
creased police protection, and the war on drugs. Only by passing an emergency third spending bill
was Congress able to get these sums released to the District before adjourning -- with the proviso,
forced upon it by the President, that no funds, federal or local, could go for abortions except to save a
pregnant woman's life.
Family Planning and the Foreign Aid Veto
The fourth of the President's "abortion" vetoes concerned a bill that did not even authorize
funds for abortion. Attached to the $14.6 billion foreign aid bill that Bush vetoed on November 19
was a $15 million appropriation (less than one-tenth of one percent of the total) for the United Na-
tions Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) to support its family planning programs. Anti-choice
activists charge that UNFPA allegedly "co-manages” a coercive population program in China, where
23
forced abortion has occurred -- a concern expressed by the President in his veto message. In fact,
however, UNFPA pays for no abortions in China and supports only contraceptive production and re-
search, maternal and child health programs, and the training of demographers.
To accommodate the Right's objections, Congress included in the bill precise language for-
bidding the use of U.S. funds in China or for any abortion-related service elsewhere. The funds
would have been kept in a separate account, audited constantly, and any misuse would require that
they be fully refunded. Not even these provisos were acceptable to the Right, which denounced them
as “accounting tricks." On November 19, Bush vetoed a bill containing funding for some of his most
cherished foreign policy objectives -- billions of dollars for Israel, Egypt, and emergency assistance
to Poland and Hungary. A Washington Post editorial examined the consequences of the President's
act -- to international family planning alone:
It will reduce the amount of money available for birth control programs in 120 poor coun-
tries.... Now no American money will go to the international effort in [Africa]. Maternal and
child health programs in Latin America, birth control education in Asia and efforts to improve
the status of women in the Middle East will all be shortchanged. So will research on contra-
ceptives, training programs in demographics and information sharing among the poorest na-
tions. And instead of the rate of abortions worldwide being reduced, there is a very real pos-
sibility that it will rise in the absence of effective contraceptive programs. (6)
As a Member of Congress and later as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Bush was
a noted advocate of international approaches to family planning and, in particular, a supporter of the
UNFPA. In the foreword to a 1972 book, World Population Crisis: The United States Response, he
wrote:
The United Nations population program, including the Fund and specialized agencies, stands
today at the threshold of international impact.... One fact is clear. In a world of nearly 40 bil-
lion people, with some 150 independent governments, myriad races, religions, tribes and
other organizations, major world problems like population and environmental protection will
have to be handled by large and complex organizations representing many nations and many
different points of view. (7)
Quite apart from Bush's veto of the foreign aid bill, his Administration's policy has under-
mined family planning programs in other crucial ways. In 1984, President Reagan announced that
24
the United States would deny funds to any overseas non-governmental organization that used even
non-U.S. funds for abortion services, counselling, or referral -- the so-called "Mexico City" policy.
The Bush administration pledged to continue this policy, and consequently has denied U.S. funds to
programs administered in developing countries by such groups as the International Planned Parent-
hood Federation. In testimony given last September to a House subcommittee, an administrator from
the Agency for International Development (AID) said, "Even where [abortion] is legal, it is controver-
sial. The Administration has acted to make the United States position on this issue unmistakably clear
in the international community." (8)
The outcome of the Administration's intransigence on the issue of population control is clear.
By denying money for the U.N. Fund, and by continuing the Mexico City policy, the President is
abandoning his country's leadership role in international family planning. Yet the President still feels
he can state, as he did in his veto message, "my strong support for international family planning pro-
grams, and my view that the United States should support such efforts." (9)
25
Conclusion
In his 1988 campaign for the presidency, George Bush said that while he opposed abortion,
he did not believe the issue should be a "litmus test" by which to measure a politician. As President,
he has campaigned for pro-choice Senate candidates and said that "we have room" in the Republican
Party for people who both oppose and support abortion rights.
Yet the President's kinder, gentler rhetoric on abortion bears little relation to Administration
policies. Even decisions and staff unrelated to the issue are held hostage by it. Contrary to the Presi-
dent's assertions, abortion policy is indeed a litmus test for the Bush administration, and there is no
—_
room in key positions for those who support the right to choice.
—__
The President and his supporters in the anti-choice movement claim to place the sanctity of
human life above all else. But their adherence to this principle is, in effect, jeopardizing human lives
by undermining life-saving medical research, damaging domestic and international family planning
programs, and delaying funds for law enforcement, drug prevention and other essential services.
The Administration's uncompromising approach to abortion issues is unhealthy for our poli-
tics and society. History shows that democratic government is enriched when political leaders ex-
pand rights and accommodate the many views of the American people; it is damaged when officials
and policies are forced to comply with a narrow and extreme ideological agenda. Unfortunately, to
the detriment of millions of Americans, the Bush administration has decided not to heed the lessons
of history and has chosen instead to pursue the politics of reproductive McCarthyism.
The Administration can certainly change its ways and align its policies with the best traditions
of our democracy. For example, it can free the medical profession from the grip of anti-choice ideo-
logues by reestablishing an Ethics Advisory Board at the Department of Health and Human Services
to address the legal, ethical, and scientific aspects of federal research projects focused on reproductive
biology and lifestyle issues. The White House can also end the suppression of research that does not
26
fit its narrow views on abortion and lifestyle issues. And it can show real political courage by deny-
ing the Right control over sensitive and important programs dealing with AIDS, contraception, and
family planning.
People For the American Way disagrees with the President's position on abortion. We sup-
port each woman's right to make her own reproductive choices. But in spite of our differences, we
believe the President shares our deep commitment to a democracy strong enough to tolerate moral
pluralism and resilient enough to accommodate divergent views on even the most personal of issues.
As the President said to the nation in his inaugural address, "I yearn for a greater tolerance, an easy-
goingness about each other's attitudes and way of life." We hope and trust that the Administration
will keep this yearning in mind when it next considers issues related to the constitutional right to
choose an abortion.
27
Overview
1 Shribman, D., "G.O.P., facing choice between party's principles and political realities, agonizes
over abortion," TheWall Street Journal, December 5, 1989.
2 Quoted in the vice presidential candidates’ debate, October 11, 1984.
3 Quoted in the Congressional Record, House debates, November 20, 1989, (Vol. 135, No. 165),
p.I 9206.
The Right Staffs a Department
1 Barnes, F., "Tar Baby," The New Republic, February 13, 1989.
2 McQueen, M. and Murray, A., "Bush names 2 Ex-Members...,"._ Wall Street Journal, December
21,1988; Evans, R. and Novak, R., "George Bush's Abortion Crisis," TheWashington Post,
December 23, 1988; "Bush meets evangelicals," Charisma & Christian Life, January 1989.
3 Barnes, op. cit.
4 "Senate offers its hand to cabinet nominees," Congressional Quarterly, January 28, 1989.
5 Rich, S. and Hoffman, D., "Bush defends HHS designee...," The Washington Post,
January 25, 1989.
6 Ibid.; Congressional Quarterly, op cit.
7 Barnes, op cit.
8 "Sullivan's flip-flops raise doubts," Human Events, February 4, 1989
9 Ibid.
10 "Reagan names adoption group," The New York Times, August 25, 1987.
11 Archibald, G. and Bayer, A., "Anti-abortion war renewed by Reagan," TheWashington Times,
July 31, 1987; Bayer, "New rules would ban abortion information," TheWashington Times, Au
gust 24,1987; Bayer, "U.S. family planning head in eye of new-rules storm," TheWashington
Times, August 26, 1987; "The future of federal family-planning programs," (interview).
Christianity Today, October 16, 1987.
Cabanis's remark actually mistates the issue: Title X funds have never paid for abortions.
12 Report of the House Committee on Government Operations, "The federal role in determining the
medical and psychological impact of abortion on women," December 11, 1989, pp. 18-19.
13 PFAW telephone interview with Dr. David Grimes, December 14, 1989.
28
oa ake ee ae ae aa hl.
-- 7
14 Ibid.; also Committee report, pp. 18-19.
15 PFAW telephone interview, October 26, 1989 (subject requests anonymity).
16 The Washington Post, July 23, 1989.
17 PFAW telephone interview with Robert Fulton, October 30, 1989.
18 one J., "Conservatives wielding influence in White House," Los Angeles Times, October 7,
1989.
19 "LSC reform coalition wins major battle," Human Events, September 30, 1989; Nelson, op cit.;
Klein, G.,"Candidate for Legal Services dumped," TheWashington Times, October 10, 1989;
Broder, D.S., "Weak knees at the White House," TheWashington Post, October 11, 1989.
20 Reported in Archibald, G., "Bush's likely pick for HHS sparks row over abortion," The
Washington Times,December 20, 1988.
The Politics of Health and Human Services
1 Culliton, B.J. “Abortion: Litmus test for NIH director," Science, October 6, 1989.
2 Hilts, P.J. "President picks Hispanic woman...," The New York Times, October 18, 1989; Spec-
ter, M. "Woman picked as surgeon general," TheWashington Post, October 18, 1989.
3 Both quoted in Hilts, "Ideological test for federal jobs worries doctors," The New York Times,
October 22, 1989.
4 Russell, C. "New NIH head backs ‘freedom of choice’ on abortion," The Washington Post, May
12, 1982.
5 Hilts, "Ideological...,"; Hilts, "Ideological tests are ruled out in filling U.S. science positions,"
The New York Times, October 30, 1989.
6 Specter, op cit.; Brown, K.H. "U.S. to continue ban on funding for fetal tissue," TheWall Street
Journal, November 2, 1989.
7 Specter, "HHS likely to keep fetal-tissue research ban,"
8 c.f. remarks by Dr. Robert Baumiller, director of the Division of Genetics at Georgetown
University, in Rosenthal, H.F., Los Angeles Times, December 17, 1989.
9 Hilts, "Abortion debate clouds research in fetal tissue," New York Times, October 16, 1989,
Johnson, O. "Key official to push for extension of ban on U.S. funds for fetal tissue research,"
Los Angeles Times, November 2, 1989.
! 10 Barnes, F. "Tar baby," The New Republic, February 13, 1989.
29
as i aaah is ha So sas i a
4. ~~
11 Hilts, "Citing abortion, U.S. extends ban on grants for fetal tissue work," The New York
Times, | November 2, 1989.
12 Johnson, op cit.
Kathleen Masters of Concerned Women for America, a Religious Right group, expressed her de-
light that the moratorium would remain in force. Douglas Johnson of NRLC also praised the
decision, mischaracterizing the issue as one where "society would [otherwise] require millions of
dead human fetuses to provide spare parts," Price, J. "Fetal tissue ban backed by official."
The Washington Times, November 2, 1989; Specter, "HHS will extend ban on fetal tissue,"
The Washington Post, November 2, 1989
13 Hilts, "Citing... "; “Abortion debate..."
14 Letter to the editor, The New York Times, December 7, 1989.
15 Specter, "HHS will..."
16 Ibid.
17 "Political malpractice," The Washington Post, November 10, 1989.
18 Report of the House Committee on Government Operations, "Infertility in America: Why is the
federal government ignoring a major health problem?," December 1, 1989, p. 29.
19 Lacayo, R. “Pro-choice? Get lost," TIME, December 4, 1989.
20 Reported in Archibald, G., “Bush's likely pick for HHS sparks row over abortion," The
Washington Times, December 20, 1988.
21 Rovner, J., "Abortion continues to shape Hill plans, Bush policies," Congressional Quarterly,
November 4, 1989, p. 2953.
22 “Special Report: The Decision Makers," National Journal, June 10, 1989, p. 1466.
23 All in Specter, M., "HHS aide blocks publication of pamphlet on condom use," The Washington
Post, October 7, 1989.
24 Kosterlitz, J., "Mixed review for planned sex survey," National Journal, J uly 1, 1989,
pp. 1700-1.
25 Letter to Dr. Louis Sullivan, April 6, 1989.
26 "Secretary of Health ordering a revision of U.S. sex survey," The New York Times, April 8,
1989;Kosterlitz, p. 1700.
27 Kosterlitz, p. 1701; "Sex survey is dealt a setback," The New York Times, July 26, 1989;
Specter,M., "Funds for sex survey blocked by House panel," The Washington Post, July 26,
1989.
30
28 Story reported by Jn These Times, October 18-24, 1989; November 15-21, 1989.
29 Letter to Dr. James Mason, August 9, 1989.
30 Letter to Rep. William Dannemeyer, October 13, 1989.
The Campaign to Overturn Roe v. Wade
1 All in Kamen, A. and Marcus, R., "U.S. again urges Court to overturn abortion ruling," The
Washington Post, February 24, 1989.
2 “Justice petitioners hit abortion stand," TheWashington Times, April 5, 1989; Quotations from
Wines,M., "Justice Department lawyers assail anti-abortion effort," The New York Times,
March 26, 1989.
3 "Inter alia," Family, Law and Democracy Report, Free Congress Foundation, October 1989.
4 Greenhouse, L., "Abortion: A new round,” TheNew York Times, November 24, 1989.
5 Marcus, "U.S. may forgo request for abortion review," The Washington Post, September 21,
1989.
6 Marcus, "Justice Department urges workers to adopt," The Washington Post, November 3, 1989.
7 Ibid.
George Bush's Veteos
1 Dowd, M., "G.O.P. Congresswomen hopeful after Bush meeting on abortion," The New York
Times, November 15, 1989.
2 Murray, F.J., "Bush's views on abortion clarified by White House," TheWashington Times,
October17, 1989.
As recently as 1980, Bush had supported federal funding for abortions for rape and incest victims.
3 McQueen, M., "Bush's vacillating statements on abortion issue lead to criticism of President from
both sides," TheWall Street Journal, October 25, 1989; Dowd, "Bush tells Congress of intent to
veto measure on abortion," The New York Times, October 18, 1989.
4 "Abortion and the real George Bush," (editorial) October 18, 1989.
5 According to Chief of Staff, John Sununu, President Bush would have vetoed even an omnibus
spending bill for the entire federal government had it contained unacceptable language on federal
funding of abortion, something Ronald Reagan never did or threatened. (Eaton, W.J., "Senate
31
defies foreign aid bill veto," Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1989; Barnes, F., "Fearless
Leader," The New Republic, November 27, 1989.) This never came to pass because Congress
passed 13 separate appropriations bills in 1989 rather than one continuing resolution.
6 "No money for the Population Fund," November 21, 1989
7 Author, Phyllis Piotrow.
8 Testimony of Richard Bissell, Assistant Administrator of AID, to the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, Subcommittee on International Operations, September 21, 1989.
9 Text in Congressional Quarterly, November 25, 1989, p. 3266.
32
