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What Is Our Plan In Afghanistan?
By mickielynn on 2009-05-31 09:02:23
Sometimes it takes a dramatic, true-life story to focus our attention fully on the rich details of time, place and context in
which it takes place. Such a story has been written by former journalist, Sarah Chayes in her riveting book, The punishment
of virtue: inside Afghanistan after the Taliban describing the time that she spent in Afghanistan from 2002 through the
summer of 2005.
This rich and complex tale revolves around a potentially unifying figure. Akrem Khakrezwal, the loyal, insightful, patriotic,
community building, Chief of Police of Kandahar. The book ends soon after his tragic assassination (via a remote controlled
Claymore mine) in June of 2005, after he had become police chief of Kabul.
Here are some highlights of the reporting and historical information provided in this 350+ page book. Observations that
raise questions about just how the US is proceeding in Afghanistan.
During 2002 and early 2003, the United States government had a brief opportunity to take advantage of the absence of the
Taliban to work within Afghan society. We could have assisted in creating secure villages and cities and funding and
implementing culturally appropriate aid and reconstruction. Instead US military and political officers allowed themselves to
become entangled with regional warlords, after actively assisting in their return to positions of power.
In the Pashtun language, the warlords were known as topak salaran or “gun lords.” To the Afghan people they were known
as perpetrators of violence, tribal and family favoritism, corruption, and strife.
At the same time the US chose Hamid Karzai, who seemed to have great promise as a unifying presidential figure. Afghans
waited for him to unite the country and bring some form of universal benefits, Instead Karzai governed through two loya
jirgas and one election without ever confronting the topak salaran or the Pakistani intelligence agents working through them
to foment violence and encourage chaos and corruption.
Some of the most glaring US military and political errors included allowing the local warlords and their militias to “help”
guard the perimeters of US bases. In those positions of power they became drug runners and “gatekeepers” with exclusive
access. Lacking Afghan language speakers, the US military relied exclusively on these same warlords to provide translators,
thereby cutting off uncensored communication with other tribal groups or elders who might have wisdom and connections to
local communities. The warlords also provided vehicles and equipment at exorbitant prices. They supplied workmen from
their own groups, while charging kickback fees to others who needed work.
Within their own tight knit group of deputies and regional officers they included and worked with Pakistani intelligence
agents from the ISI. This was at a time when Pakistan allowed the Taliban to live and work freely in Quetta and other cities
near the Afghan border.
Early on there were skillful and dedicated military personnel leading the US troops in Afghanistan. They were greatly
limited by a single-minded mandate from Washington: “Find the enemy and kill them!” Soon afterwards they were drawn
away to the war in Iraq. Instead of having enough leaders and seasoned troops who understood the local situation(s), officers
were rotated out, leaving new officers scrambling to make sense of the local geography and customs. Trained troops weren’t
replaced by the “B’ team or even the “C” team. Inexperienced recruits were brought in to replace troops and resources
diverted to Iraq.
As the corrupt militia leaders became more entrenched they often stole money intended for aid projects and used it for their
own personal and family enrichment. In examining the behavior of one of these warlords, who at one point rose to a
ministerial position, it became clear that while he was Governor of Kandahar he allowed the Taliban to cross the border into
Afghanistan where they killed foreign aid workers and even US troops.
Analysis of Pakistan’s motives for supporting the violence of the Taliban in Afghanistan (while occasionally handing over a
token member of Al Qaeda to placate the United States) basically came down to two factors. Huge financial benefits that the
Pakistani military and the dictator, President Pervez Musharraf received from the continuing need to engage Pakistan to fight
the “war on terror.” And prevention of the formation of a strong, independent Afghan civil government with a unified
population on Pakistan’s northern border.
Do these conditions still exist as we gear up to bring more troops and resources to Afghanistan? We really don’t know but it
seems vitally important to find out and to make a plan that takes this very recent history into consideration. It’s also clear
that we’re now dealing with both Pakistan and Afghanistan as we craft a realistic strategy to try to bring peace and security
to the region.
There is a new government in Pakistan with a weak and not very popular President who has a history of corruption. Trying
to “please” the United States and to eliminate the Taliban from the Swat Valley this government has been willing to create a
large scale humanitarian crisis including the displacement of 2.5 million people. On Tuesday, May 26, 2009 Human Rights
Watch called on the Pakistani military to lift its curfew in the Swat Valley where they were battling the Taliban. A
spokesperson said, “The government cannot allow the local population to remain trapped without food, clean water, and
medicine as a tactic to defeat the Taliban.” More than 2.4 million people have fled the region this month, while up to
200,000 civilians remain trapped inside the conflict zone. Is this the kind of “help” that we want and need?
Here’s where we stand legislatively: On May 14, 2009 the House voted overwhelmingly (with 60 “no” votes) to approve the
2009 supplemental funding bill that included over $77 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Representative Barbara
Lee added a provision to the funding bill that prohibited permanent US military bases in Afghanistan. The Senate version
was approved on May 21 by a vote of 86 to 3). In early June there will be a conference to resolve differences and leading to
a final joint resolution.
Representative Jim McGovern introduced a bill, H.R. 2404, that would require the Secretary of Defense to report to
Congress by December 31, 2009 “outlining the United States exit strategy for United States military forces in Afghanistan
participating in Operation Enduring Freedom.” This bill currently has 82 co-sponsors in the House.
Floor discussion leading up to the House vote revealed significant opposition to continued war in Afghanistan.
Appropriations Committee Chairman David Obey expressed considerable doubts about the success of the administration's
strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He said that he would not support funding for the administration's current policy for
more than one year. Recommendations proposed by House Progressive caucus members included a ban on Predator drone
bombing attacks; use of the additional U.S. troops for training, not combat; moving funding from military operations to
development aid; and active support of political dialogue among the many Afghan factions.
I would go one step further to say that as part of any “exit strategy” for our engagement in Afghanistan we first need to step
back and take a look at our current goals to create a workable plan. This would include examining how we choose our
partners within Afghan society, and taking a realistic look at how to achieve lasting peace rather than a brief, cosmetic result
that benefits no one.
