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Catching Up
By lindamuralidharan on 2009-09-14 14:25:00
Despite good ongoing discussions following my recent post on Afghanistan, I am going to again write about my exploring
the situation there on a day by day basis.
For example, I have been following the on-the-ground reporting by the crew of CNN's Anderson Cooper 360, and Anderson
Cooper himself.
Many of the dispatches have focused on efforts by some of our most skilled American military forces to "pacify" the
countryside and villages in Helmand Province. The soldiers are essentially engaged in nation building ( by their own
reports). They describe the dangerous task of going along roads subject to IED's and ambushes to speak individually with
villagers and village leaders. Often it is a case of the Taliban forces disappearing in the daylight and then returning to
engage in activities in or near the villages at night. The soldiers present themselves as peacekeepers who will be around for
a while to keep the villagers safe, and then they urge the villagers to begin supporting the central government as opposed to
the Taliban. The soldiers are in the process of strengthening the local tribal governing structures and at the same time
developing the concept of local control functioning under a central government umbrella. Of course, that central
government is now headed by Karzai.
The soldiers describe the villagers as being noncommittal as they do not know if Americans will be there to protect them
over time in case they pick the wrong side, whichever that might turn out to be. The film crews and other in-the-field
reporters show a lot of the countryside and describe how small a portion of the country can be "held" by allied troops with
present forces. Much of the commentary indicates that, coupled with the slowly developing Afghan police and army, it
would take a long time and a huge increase in troops for the allied forces to make the country effectively governable by a
regime approved of by the US.
I experience cognitive dissonance at the idea that we can say a central government can effectively run the country when we
have such an immense task in front of us. How really long and how huge an "occupying force" would this require? How
do we ask the people to support a government that has proven ineffective even in some areas of governance over which they
have had control, which is known to be corrupt in particularly counterproductive ways, and which has made common cause
with the very warlords the Afghan people have rejected in the past?
How can either we or the people trust a leader whom we handpicked in the first place over the objections of the Loya Jirga
that was convened to pick a national leader right about the time we invaded? How can we trust that we are wise to support a
person who has so many charges of election fraud aimed at him? The soldiers who are quoted by the TV crew also wonder
if they are selling a pig-in-a-poke while clearly wishing to do right by the people and trying to follow orders, orders that
seem to them to be at least better than shooting at civilians.
In a limited circumstance, say in a fully functioning nation somewhere with a breakaway state or region racked by thugs and
secessionist violence, I think the policy described on Anderson Cooper 360 could be a good one. Show the locals that the
government has their best interests at heart, settle in for the long haul, and than patiently convert the population to the side of
national unity with whatever concessions to local control are suitable in that particular context. This would be the function
of the existing national government, not some foreign force.
In Afghanistan we have the problem that nobody actually knows how long the US is going to commit to staying. Whether
for political or military reasons, the US might pull out in two years. For traditional Afghan freedom fighters that is a mere
second in time. The Taliban could just as likely melt into the hills if they find less village support, and emerge after the
international groups leave and Afghanistan is returned to the international back burner. Then we add in a couple of issues
mentioned above plus one I rarely hear discussed. The above issues include a real uncertainty about how helpful, secure,
effective, or "democratic" the Karzai people would be. They are bad enough with the US looking over their shoulders.
What would the condition of the people be like when he is "on his own"? Would he himself even survive in power if
various warlords decide again that they want to take their cuts of the pie by force?
Then there is another worrying factor that is little discussed. In effect, the state of Afghanistan has been a partial client state
of differing foreign countries and movements for a long time. Sometimes England paid off segments of ruling cliques and
tribal configurations. Sometimes the US has sent aid, as has the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan. There are some signs in
the midst of all this, that some of the population has become dependent on something we might call "hand outs". The longer
we stay involved and promise this and that, the longer the indigenous habits of hard work and self-sufficiency atrophy.
Furthermore, we have listed on this site before at least two books that explain that some of the non-governmental aid
delivery systems have failed Afghanistan despite the expenditure of vast sums of money. Finding ways to channel some
genuine assistance to the people while allowing for their own problem solving skills to come to the fore is such a big
challenge in itself, it deserves as much attention as diplomacy.
The two books I refer to are The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban, by Sarah Chayes, and Kabul in
Winter, by Ann Jones.
In the end, I believe that trying to conquer a heretofore unconquerable country, especially considering the vast required
resources the American people might or might not be willing to expend, is not only likely to fail but also a big distraction
from the viable solutions that we need to focus on.
