Karen Nelson Moore -
To me, it is inconceivable that the
majority denies Taylor the relief that the Supreme Court accorded to Batson and
Griffith. With the weight of history on my shoulders, I cannot stand idly by
while the majority bakes new law from scratch to justify Taylor’s
unconstitutional trial and execution.
COLE, J
Victor Taylor’s trial was marred by two paradigmatic constitutional violations.
First, the prosecutor struck members of the jury venire on the basis of their
race and admitted to doing so. Second, the trial court allowed the introduction
of an accomplice statement without cross-examination in direct violation of the
Confrontation Clause. The Kentucky Supreme Court had multiple opportunities to
right the errors of Taylor’s trial and failed to do so. Because our court fails
to rectify these egregious constitutional violations,
I respectfully dissent.
The heart of Batson’s holding is that a prosecutor cannot strike jurors on
account of their race. Here, the prosecutor admitted to doing just that. A
determination that the prosecutor’s actions did not violate Batson can be
nothing other than a patently unreasonable application of Batson itself.
Twenty years ago, when the Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed Taylor’s
constitutional claims, Justice Keller made a prediction in his dissent that
should ring true to this day. “The egregious and palpable nature of this
constitutional violation [me: the right to confront witnesses] virtually
guarantees that a future reviewing court will grant Taylor a new trial. . . .
When a future court grants Taylor a new trial, today's majority opinion's
‘legacy’ will be only further evidentiary staleness.” Taylor II, 63 S.W.3d at
170. Twenty years later, this court still refuses to recognize the egregious and
palpable nature of the constitutional violations in Victor Taylor’s trial.
I respectfully dissent.
GRIFFIN
In my view, Taylor established a prima facie case of purposeful race
discrimination in the selection of his jury. And No. 14-6508 Taylor v. Jordan
Page 39 because the prosecutor failed “to come forward with a neutral
explanation for challenging black jurors,” Batson mandates that we grant habeas
relief. 476 U.S. at 97, 100. I would reverse the
district court’s denial of Taylor’s § 2254 petition and therefore respectfully
dissent.
Victor Taylor was prosecuted in Jefferson County, Kentucky, by the same
prosecutor’s office as James Batson. Both African American defendants alleged
that their prosecutor unconstitutionally struck jurors because of their race.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Batson’s case provides a strict procedure to
combat individual and institutional invidious racial discrimination in the
selection of juries. That process was not followed in Taylor’s case.
Because this case presents the identical constitutional violation that occurred
in Batson, I would reverse the denial of Taylor’s § 2254 petition and grant
conditional habeas relief. I therefore respectfully dissent.
HELEN N. WHITE
Further, a defendant should not be expected to utilize his limited peremptory
strikes to rebalance a jury that has been racially manipulated by the
prosecutor. Where the prosecutor excludes jurors based on race, the defendant’s
constitutional rights are violated, and it is the role of the courts, not
defense counsel to remedy that violation. “[T]he Batson Court did not accept the
argument that race-based peremptories are permissible because both the
prosecution and defense could employ them in any individual case and in essence
balance things out.” Flowers v.
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2242 (2019).
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
