THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37 + ILLINOIS
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
February 29, 1952
Mr. Otto Kirchheimer
2801 Beech Bank Road
Silver Spring, Maryland
Dear Kirchheimer:
Many thanks for your interesting letter of February 19. Needless to
say that I appreciate both your and your colleague's comments.
As concerns point (a) of your colleague's comments, I have made that
point myself in the report. It is, of course, obvious that Four Power Control
acts as a Western check upon the Soviet Union and vice versa, and therefore
both sides are enxious to maintain it. It is also true that Four Power
Control stabilizes the situation in Austria. Yet it stabilizes it only by
the fact of control and not through creating the political, economic, and
social conditions for long-run stability. Quite to the contrary, in large
measure it destroys the possibility for such conditions to develop.
(b) It seems to me that the situation of the Austrian government is
considerably worse with the most valuable enterprises of the Eastern Zone
being integrated into the Soviet economic system. This is not simply a ques-
tion of the payment for goods, but of the drainage of raw materials and
finished products from the Austrian economy, which must compensate for that
drainage with increased taxation, imports, and United States aid.
(c) This is in accordance with what I have said in the report; see
pages 6 ff., especially page 7.
(a) and (f) I am aware of the contradictory interpretation of what
has been going on in the Russian Zone. We are all guessing in this respect.
Yet there is much external and implicit evidence to support my point of view.
That the Austrien Communists would start anything on their own in the hope
of dragging in the Soviet authorities, I would not believe for a moment.
(e) The Soviet Union could avoid the incidents mentioned by me only
if we were resolved to yield to an accomplished fact. This seems very un-
likely.
As concerns your own comments, I, too, have referred to the lack of
patriotism which could have neutralized the opposition between the two
parties and made possible a common identification of all Austrians with an
entity transcending their identification with their respective parties, In-
steed for most Austrians their respective parties have become their nation
to which they owe unqualified allegiance. The remedy must correspond to
eutye
the disease; that is to say, common objectives, interests, and experiences
(of which the common opposition to the Soviet Union and Communism is an out-
standing example) must be developed which will create loyalties transcending
the loyalties to the respective parties. Whether or not this is possible
can only be determined by actual experience. To deny a priori that possi-
bility {s tantamount to denying the viebility of Austria as a state and to
Sdyonetey bone kind of Anschluss.
Past failures of United States intervention of this kind are no argu-
ment against future attempts in this direction, provided we grant that the
United States has a vitel interest in th€& The United States has learned
fast in other respects, and I see no reason why it should not learn in this
vital area, which, as you realize, is not at all limited to Austria.
I share your belief that there is urgent need for an assessment of
United States policies of intervention since 1945. I have been pleying with
the idea for some time. We have taken a first step in investigating the actual
application of the principle of non-intervention throughout American history,
finding, of course, that we have intervened whenever we thought it was in the
national interest to do so, and have invoked the principle of non-intervention
only as an excuse when we decided on other grounds to refrein from action.
As concerns the recent past, there are obviously three areas of investiga-
tion: intervention by way of occupation of former enemy countries, inter-
vention by way of economic assistance, and intervention by way of military
assistance. I am not sure there is a possibility of dealing adequately with
political intervention proper in view of the inaccessibility of the. relevant
documents.
I hope very much that I shall have the opportunity of discussing this
problem with you on my next visit to Washington, which probably will take place
in the middle of April.
With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,
Hans J a ae
HJM: pm.
