nau WW
i tag us Pere oH .
western
An evaluation of political trends in our days faces a curtous
obstacle, The indubitable economic success of western regimes
9
{yywhich to some degree most social classes participate stands out
quite sharply against the quasi-permanent intellectual crisis which
has become a dominant theme of {he critig “Or those soctotieay
Here the riddle offered by the contemporary west-Gorman society
is even sharper than that of its French counterpart. In France
the non-economic crisis phenomena ate all-pervasive BigukRingxkive
extending to the functioning of the state apparatus and its political
leadership. Germany in this century had never had such a wellfunctioning
governmental machinery with few and inconsequential political
groups even trying to kaxex put up roadblocks, ‘vhat then is the
basis of the somber picture which the present German
Lite ra t@ibhe Hud and the Hnzensberger, the iret’
ane painting of the state of the fatherland.
For our purposes it seems best to differentiate betwoen
two facets of this criticism which in the German considerations”
might often fuse and overlap.To some extent, this criticism is
only a vartant of the- general complaint against, advanced industrial
society: materialism secoularisatiion; all the difficultios experienced
domesticate
by the average person to Muskaml commercial civilization into
a sorvant rather than the master of thoir existence, the allpervasive
phenomenon of privatisation, both companion and consequence of the
vanishing of gloar-dut Localization of political responsibility,
&
are not partionlarly gommagno to ‘eran society. What then about
the loss of ee How meaningful is the disappearance
of a unified YVotrian national state in an era of rapid transformation
of national states into subunits of vaster systems, Put just here
Qe
lace’
Ma vi
enters aaredditd onal challenge and novelty~ The praking up of
national can with th two parts becomeing sub- units of contending
power systems, In the western two-thirds economic success on the
basis of more or less traditional social arrangements havo given
domes
some sort of legitimacy not only to the political arrangements
put also to the accompanying integration enéadeavorg into a larger
wostern European framework; in the remaining parts the doprivations
Pie Gtsloce tions connected wif e putting up of a new socials c
tab “unto Ain. phew nun. Wreppnat- € ceimusrbeer
een mic and ideological Be ase not only widened po eavages
between rulers and muted put have also comm rere
the junior partnership of their state in the eastern block, This
state of affairs determines both the domestic and the inter German
policy of the eastern and the western state, Politics in oagtern
pertls bo sep oC ~
1L more of Papbisipated reactions
Germany consist of reactions and st
to official programs. In western Germany this present frame of
politics sxex has narrowed down equally drastically permissible
w plpol.tey alternatives.The realm of domestic politics is reduced
LOnfeowiTSieg CVE Mgronteon, frevbry LIM, ¢
vale to minor vapinetone fife organd ae ac angemant.ef 41 He, dare (oh oe_—
ne wennfi como gl
baba . f ,
tiles, hand any serious YéTscussion of German politics has become .neeessartly
ambivalent. It must be built on acceptance of the major western
societa_premises as tho basis of prosent existence and propperity
put at the same time such a discussion cannot fai lhoticang the "
chose relationship between depravation of a unified national
existence and present soci@-political arrangements. From this
state of affairs the greatest variety of conclusions may be drawn:
OE:
to mention only the fr obiitien: one may look at the inter-CGerma
Cons eguey Cee
relations and the division of Germany simply as a of eastern
policy, and look at 1t as a majority-legitimacy contest with despotic
tyranny holping to confirm an everything or nothing approach
11 hee
dl tl bo
phuchee
= Welem .
there would be eithor apf need for yGerman major concessions nor for any ae
Be
dle Ne fest We fe phe
or ~fasea ToMoultural criticism of western emptiness, tt may lead 2%,
to acknowledgement of responsibility for the historical sequence which
lod to the present state of affairs,mutual guilt forthe degree ofprosent
estrangment ,with the provisional character of the Sonn establiahment
emphasised as a pointof dpearture for endless soul sema@ching and
reiteration of the desire’ &® mutually acceptable solutions .
What do these vari, fous giscusglonbol nurs moan in Crenmtaciaseedegn policy tern
Vb behest [Ge 8 COMP Go fee fo“ry adfemartves Of Feegin pdt CCR6 bah he Cle Ue. ephatran,
Each German ‘poltoy either nogatively or positively is at the same tfine
a policy concerning means and ways for reunification.Few private individual]
wowld,no offical personage could ahandon the contention that their policy
at the same time serves the goal of reunification,iven the adherents of
what 1s often dubbed as the Yarolinglan empire concept,namely continuing
and emphatic integration of Western Germany with Western “urope hold
open some saving devices for future,evon if indefinite rounification
possibilities,It is the charactoristics of their devices that none of
them depends on any kind of positive action from the West German die,
Whether it 1s the USSR involvmont with the Chinese which makes them seek
a reasonable understanding with the main power on thelr Westem Front or
in the same voin USSR preparedness to renderto Poland their Eastern terri
tories,allowing Poland to accomodatr Germany in the Wést,in neither case
tion in the forsecable futube,All what 1s necded is firmness in Hast-West
German relations,cont nuation of the Hallstein doctrine with its daloulate
impossibility to get ‘nto a morepositive relation to any of the Rastern
states,inflexible standing in rogard to Boerlin-possibly sar because it is
expandable within this scheme of things~ Fras HR words astaoyanly a kind |
of reunification doctrine in reverse.Its purely negative,demarcationist, |
attentiste attitpude towards reunifiaction may much petter be described
as & accompaniment, though 1t mightbe left pen whether it is a neces: .ry
accompaniment to a clear cut opti for Germany's Jeadorsipfunctl on in a
UVa bpAit/m,
ae phe
Oba. Met
\s
4 juny pel
' q
Western “uropean association,Jaspers 959Vhad had the intellectual
courage to draw from this concept shme clear-cut conclusions as to
the impossibility and undesirabiltiy of reestablashinghtepat ern
of a Bismarck Reich,wacognising the new dividing line which separate
Germany/ and only , somewaht illogically inmy estimate from his own
premises, insisitng of the necd and ‘duty of rendoring the East Ger-
mans political and cutaral fre dom within the context of their
new politicalr : elaxionth ine fnette ras outcome of a future EAST-
West equilibrium the conclusionsof Jaspers will be validated,as
they possibly might be,in the Yotes,if the smoke of themany ihter-
connected security issues will hawe Dhearce one way or another,T
do not pmofess to know, Taht the acti ons, Semon also the slogans
of many a German bureaucrat and politician.can best or at least
most consistently be interpreted this way, will admit gladly.
But there aro other political al ternatives why netd/ MCte, Ay
7
day, to establish a theory of. cultural norms as a more adequate
basis than the existing one for a system of punishment. In
[Max-Erent! Mayer's seminar Franz Neumann utilized for the
first time the critical instruments he had learned to handle
when studying Hegel, Marx, and Karl Renner om EPS cont
book on institutions of private law had become the foremost
text of the new generation of socialist lawyers -- to :
criticize the thought processes of his professor of criminal
law. From these seminars emerged his Ph.D. thesis on
criminal sanctions.
By the time he had finished law school, Germany was
in the throes of inflation, and {chene-foLlowed~the-on
made Gia rut aud andy Sy eunsion
mand.
-~ondy—excunsLlon-ef Franz Neumann. nto the field ‘of business.
Thereafter whatever business contacts he had were restricted
dw de ehtane Wary
to those of a lawyer, an author, or a somewhat reluctant
A
administrator of real estate for the Institute for Social
uhtele
Research thethe fest joined dt in the mid-thirties, and.
“of-en~seadembetarm, If in 1922 he thought his business deals
would spare him the need to turn to the law or at least see
him financially through law-clerking, he was conn Sey op
such illusions, But thenrare gift of self-criticism, which
he possessed in abundance, helped him to look at his business
veneare: ' in his later Ds ole 40, a trictly jocular fashion.
Aw thie Meyt bite ate he. eles face tux He)
Wht--e-.c-Lenkda hasoo-poauonin ERE law courts of
the Frankfurt area, fi _
noulines
2
at’ best a tedious procedure, he was
amply rewarded by the fact that this letter Frankfurt period
gave him a chance eT vaalies soabick with Hugo
Sinzheimer, for whom and with whom he worked throughout this
period. Sinzheimer was a politician, a lawyer and professor,
and the Gnitltox) os a scientific body of German labor law.
But he was more than that; he had Bemetrow) the elements of
an artist in him, and did not fail to impress his personality
on viboonoaeene came under his spell. His name has gone down in
political cared as the chief architect of the [attempt~to
but-p-tha pine structure of economic democracy, wicth~the—
whaeitdy Qativintocl £5 CO eR
ein--o€..comnpeting—suecessfulry jects the emerging Soviet system
for the loyalty of the wonking class and at the same time
beting.cinong~erough to enforce and guarantee the cooperation
of the employers with the moderate union elements, But it
would not be just to judge the man after the historically
fateful failure of this attempt. Sinzheimer's lasting merit
lies in his erecting a body of labor law which espoused the
moral claims of labor in its relation to property and in his
formulating the legal concepts which merged this body of new
doctrine with the traditional structure of legal institutions.
It is within this framework, elaborated by Sinzheimer,
that Neumann's own professional work progressed during the
years of the Weimar Republic. Neumann always presex ed a
feeling of jabtding gratitude toward his teacher, Tee"d dedicated
SE dredkdete dose ‘bast book prem in te Weimar period -- on freedom
of coalition and the basic law. His ever-ready criticism of
people and institutions never touched the person of his teacher.
But even at this early juncture in his career, Neumann's
dine BO Raks abe patted
own style of thinking was tomcomexexinemt the diammetrical
Opposite to that of his teacher. Sinzheimer, with all his
Onrdttnaterae Sf Dua A
[sensitivity toy the new social and ideological currents, and
° \ his alginate ty bagel the oe remained
throughout his life an inveterate romantic.
could sencesely asset the ae st
constitutional Zed, as labgaetonels y form a transitdonal
gher social fotmesand the
eo
take it upon itself to bar such a
For example, h
stage if a society aepinin
constitution.should pert
felicitous deyg Spment .
: : eumann, on the other hand, from the very
begbnning of his career excelled in critical analysis, in
cutting with superb facility through the most elaborate
intellectual structures and equating them with social and Ow A
political realities. When he turned to creating abaatsives,
staustuses) of his own, these gifts may have led him at times
to premature generalizations which did violence to the
complexities of a given historical situation. But they
served him admirably in a period such as the late twenties,
when many of the illusions held by his elders were beginning
to wear thin.
Neumann was Separated wy WE ear age difference from
‘hose. leading Socialist ustarieeetiaue Make’ Paul Levi, Rudolf
sotischica, or Rudolf Hilferding, who had come to assume
was something of an anomaly in the otherwise unruffled waters
"of German academic life. It was the one place where promising
young savants, ideologists peddling their spurious theories, ad
practicing politicians with a knack for journalism, like
the present Bundspresident Heuss rubbed shoulders with
ponderous and scheming bureaucrats, academically trained
trade union officials like Berlin's present Lord Mayor Suhr,
and up»andecoming young lawyers like Neumann. If there ever
was a universe of discourse in the class and status ridden
Weimar Republic, it was in the halls of this unusual institue
tion. It is known to.all of you that Franz Neumann spent a
good part of his time and energy during the last few years
both here in New York and in Berlin, to make this institution
again a going concern. .
While tehtef professional a i406 until 1932 he
concentratedmainly on labor law and related fields of ine
dustrial organization, he also gained #@#® experience as an
Spemored hea datadt a0
administrative judge, as the Berlin SPD [had him/ appointed a
member of the Beziksauschuss, the local administrative court.
Albe worsening political situation, rather than his own
predilections, cast him] the summer of 103% in the role of
a political lawyer proper. Until then both the SPD and the
Socialist unions had’ figured w= albeit at heavy cost =» among
the dwindling forces of law and order. With the coup d'etat
of Herr von Papen, they were 6stracized, ejected from their
10
tions for which the author of Behemoth justly became renowned
in the forties,
Yet there existed a deeper continuity between the German
labor lawyer and the author of Behemoth; the most interesting
and at the same time the most controversial part of his penetrating
and unique analysis of the political, social and economic structure
of Nazi Gerflany was his conclusion that the Nazi state had
neither a coherent theory nor could be called oe ocak: but rather
Lovely, he 4
consisted of four separate totalitarian bodies, tits ALCOiedaoAG.
_to-tnede own precepts and communicating wh Tat He rege Ogt Boe estos
hoc. azpangemerts. Now, I think it can easily be shown from
what we have learned since the end of the wary and Frang Neumann
Yeould have been the first to acknowledge it -~ that the person
of the leader exercised an unchecked and pernicious, but still
very effective, monopoly of final decision, which is traditionally
referred to as sovereignty if exercised within the framework of
a territorial organization. Nevertheless, if the state is con-
sidered as a rational organization of power operating within the
framework of a body of general rules, Neumann's usage has some
overriding justification. In this sense the Third Reich cannot
be styled as a state. And if there is a unifying theme in the
—verkous writings of Franz Neumann, it is the concept of rationalcty
state as a yardstick for the acceptability of a political order,
In Weimar days this rational organization, embracing the power
of final political decision was considered by him as the necessary
vehidle of historical progress. Yet it was the decision of the
13
interpretations a very likely occurrence, even if he had never
gone through Sinzheimer's school nor had found in the legal
writings of Karl Renner a model to his own liking. It is there-
fore more interesting to dwell on what parts of the Marxist
concepts became foumauive elements in his own interpretations
rather than on fact itself. Franz Neumann lived ak a time and
fp pottnmilecs te stiedy dm
in societies which offered unsurpassed possibitities..fon -tmacing
the interrelation of poperty patterns and political institutions,
and also, as his own trade-union~sponsored endeavors for a reform
of German cartel legislation showed, to participate actively in
ue process of transformation. In this realm he owed much to
Marx'g critique of Hegel's philosophy of law with wZicinciisive
treatment of property relations in bourgeois society. The Marx
n
‘of the Civil War in France, when~hésnudged.aLittle nearer—to-
destructive and utopian qualities, left no trace in Neumann's
thinking; and one of the most impressive accounts in his
Behemoth remains the denuniation of the essentially nihilist
character of Mussolini's thinking. The state o today and the
state of tomorrow were for him a continuum ee to the same
deformations. Had he been asked to define his own function in
regard to both he might have answered, had he taken himself
more seriously, that a merciless analysis of the institutions
of today might obviate some mts pitfalls for the institutions
one & Keatr, WO
of tomorrow. Ang was note last transformation Shounced by
him in 1950 -- the one which would spell the end of what he
called the Glassic relationship between economics and politics --
14
the heresy of the heresies? I refer to the supposition that
political power might finally emancipate itself from its economic
roots and itself become the basis for the acquisition of economic
power -~ a thesis against which, incidentally, his own Behemoth
might furnish some interesting counter arguments.
But those poragrinationgs of his inquisitive mind cannot
wht hy otonsanr®
be considered out of the context of a double-pronged shange, 10
his way of dealing with problems: on the one hand, the more he
read and studied -- and he was a voracious reader -- the more
persistent became his feeling about the paucity of our actual
knowledge of the societal process. Hence arose his impatient
and urgent demand quickly to extend our knowledge of what really
happens, because -- "in this respect rejoiniag his intellectual
forebears, biit without any trace of their doctrinal certainty --
real freedom comes only through our understanding of the
historical process, The second aspect of this change was a
deepening scepticism with respect not only to presentiy avail-
‘able unaceeely the true meaning of institutions but
also to the efficacy of any and all constitutional devices in
our age, vinligeee oe ye a separation of powers, transplantation
of democratic political institutions via occupation powers,
constitutional safeguards of the right of the individual, or
the supposedly¢centralising effect of federalism,
Yet in this mood of deepening pessimism, Franz Neumann
did not compromise any of the major tenets of his intellectual. >
LLfep while he accepted the political alientation of man as
A
4
. 15
largely inevitable, he insisted ever more strongly on the
primerdial role of the rational state organization against all
encroachments J jymether “ti Gecupattenes eG peed pte
substitute ene e AGE oetive responsibility4/ not us
to speak of totalitarianism proper. And in this sense his j
voice, rising in a disturbed and disturbing century, joins the
illustrous ranks of all those for whom the rational organization
of human society remains a permanent, yet always imperiled task.
12
Such German policies have been adversely commented upon by a
small group of German professional and academic leaders last
Novenber, thelr memo sent to the “ederal government carries
among others the signatures of the German Nobell prize wimer,
|
the physicist Helsenberg, the Direstor General of the biggest
German Radio Station v«Biamarek and the erstwhile president
of what corresponds to the Council of Learned Socleties Raiser.
Neither has the situation been eased by Soviet tactias of
pulling the threat of the Ulpricht skeleton out of the aloset
4f only to put it back in the box at regular intervals. :
Both US and Soviet initiative towards a limited understanding
have been hampered by two sets of exaggerated fears. The United|
States which shares without doubt major responsibility for
German policies has abstained from taking necessary initiative
for fear of extreme German reactions evoking what we might
call the phantom of a switch of alliances. Soviet Russia, if
not busy dangling before West German eyes the ocean of markets
available in the east, evokes the equally unrealistic specter
of free wheeling German military might. Yet, the USSR is fully
aware of the narrow Limits set to independent military action
by a secondary power and she also knows how unlikely such
action has become in the present day social and psychological
olimate of Western Germany.
A durable peace in central Europe may be on the agenda for
generations. Meanwhile an uneasy status quo might profitably
be translated into provisional arrangements, As to the frame
of mind which should preside over the elaboration of such
arrangements, let me conclude with a quoye: it is taken from
a recent statement drawn up with the idea to be read from the
pulpite of protestant churches in both East and Weat Germany:
A fow years ag bare Levj, the author of "Christ stopped at Hboli"
ratd his firet visit to Germany. He cane pack to his Roman home
with his ming full of images of nental /landscapes rather than with
production theures or momorable utterances of industrial, political
or rettitarty’ tyeoonse These images ave often diffuse and ambiguous.
They are saiden without a sad or remotely dsiquieting note.
Having poamed time and again through the divided oity of Rerlin,
he eventually comes up with a curious dream image, He finds himself
transposed into 4 area valley with a huge meadow completely covered
by a huge flock of pakientiy feeding sheep of identical colour and
shape. Though alt athe, they ave kept in two separate flocks by
bears and wolves who glare flercely at each other, He asks the
shepherd for the veason for this division and they show the
questioner brandnarica apparently identifying different owners,
Yet, on closer indpection, these marks, though of an ominous and
repugnant type, are in reality all alike. Pressed to find a more
\
satisfactory answer, the shepherd knew no better than to fall back
on the Emperor's order, ,
is Cente banat history just a wierd sequence of accidental
and meaning, jess happenings, culminating in a giant industrial
civilization with its human material reduced to puppwek robots,
puppets, dregs ~ all, as the poet conveys, with an empty
heart? If Cari.o Levi is right, should not his reproach go
to industrial society at large, rather than to tts partioular
German sample? Have Germany's chrome-plated baba,its neon«
lighted streets, its teaming factories and bustling people,
bent on getting the mostest the fastest, not for better or
worse be coule; representatived of weatern civilization at large?
(4
For Levy, then, the division of the German sheep is
essentially meaningless. Yet in his reasoning the fact that this
separation antiikiiey tears asunder a nation recedes behind
another observation. po nad ll the separation becomes artificial
because these German sheep are all showing signs of the same
affliction: An empty heart. This observation might have much
to recommend itself. But is this Germany's affliction or of the
industrial society's at large? Have not Germany's chrome plated
bars, its neon lighted streets, its teeming factories, its
bustling people bent on getting the mostest the fastest, become
representative of industrial clvilization at large? There exists
then a certain justification for looking at the events of the
thirties--Germany's severe economic crisis and the gon omitant
Rely tol he
political upheaval~-the fAbackground against whichAthe separation
Vda Lyi ling con Hi ONS
‘of the German sic eels seen @s nothing unique. ae meee
happened dhvovuave, insctive tniiualetieomtid, Yet if emptiness cf
the heart--alienation as we might call it--is a common condition
of ee, ng strial civilization, way —
are the changes where lle the impediments of reuniting the flock?
political upheaval - the historical backgraund against which the Third Reich
A tie anon edi of the German flock in the forties must be seen, ag nothing
unique. Given similar conditions it might have happened elsewhere. Yet if
emptiness of the heart ~~ alienation as we call it ~ is a common condition of
industrial civilization, why then single out Germany for pflugishmert’
etemalizing its partition. What then are the chances, where lies impediments
of reuniting the flock? Fi
an 2
i
Viewed in this light the German GOfea and 401es mark the
interruption of social and economic growth by a non-representatt
and unique constellation of severe economic erieisa and concom
mittant political upheavals. To come back, for a mement, to
Meyité Pooks of sheep, representing the divided Hast and West
Germdnies, all that seems to be necessary is to join the
artithetally separated flocka, Wheve are the difficulties?
What ave the chances for such an operation? Must we, as Levi
seems to, imply, start a general hunt for all bears and wolvess
or is there a speotally cbnoxious sort roaming around -n Germany
In order to understand the German problem,letsa looks at the dole
At the end of the war Germany's future looked bleak indeed.
The oountiy lay prostrate, both morally and economically,
There were foreign occupiers, many of them resolved to make up
for thetr loeses, and all apparently unidormly bent to eradicate
the evil of Hitlerism from German state and soolety. There were
many millions of refugees from easternand southeastern Eyrope
andespectally the territories now in the hands of the Rusafans,
Poles and Czechs, They streamed into a country whose resources
had been sucked dry by a war which, at least in tts last stages,
had been fought on German territory. Recriminations between
refugees and natives were compunded by the hatred between the
former followers of Hitler and his victims, Then came the
experience of de-Nazification, Undertaken with the intention
of cleansing the body politic from the poison of Hitlerism,
yet, carried out on an unrealistic and much too grandiose
scale, especially in the American zone of oceoupation, it was
destined to alliadd from the outset,
|
But, as the blame could be put on the broad shoulders of the
Americans it,ourlously enough , created a bond of unity
between. a&k Germans from all walks of life, with the most varied
political background.
Yeanwhile, the political scene had started to shift,
Interallied unity had broken down and the outlines of the
new West~Hast cleavage, symbolized by the &kuxk Berlin
blockade of 1948-49, had become clearly visible, West Germany,
soon to ba united under a common German administration, saw
the decisive energence of a fruitful division of labor
between the Americans, quickly changing from occupiers to
protectors, responsible for seoukity and over-all policy,
and the Germans, able to devote their full energy to tasks
og reconstruction, Major poltoy decisions remained in America n
hands. This protected those engaged in rebuilding the “erman
political structure against having their workd undermined
py a new nationalist onslaught which had proved so fatefull
to thely Welmar predecessors in the 2016s, Then somes the
equally American-born currency reform of 1948, It 1s this
event, rather than the defeat of Hitler in 1945, which forms
the great divide in the mind of every German, between the
bad days of Hitler and the early occupation regime, and the
steady road to the so-called Wirtachaftswunder. In ordering
the currenoy reform the American authorities had left one
cardinal issue to the Germanst the Geman authorities could
have Bidhar daivingeneita for those people who had born heavy
bomb damage and especially the refugees, as a starting point
for a radical equalization of social and property structure,
i
amounting to some sort of sharing the poverty. Or, they could
as they did, defer indemnity problems till later,
and let everybody start from whatever position he found
himself in,ine arly summer 1948,
Hindsight seems to provide a certain justification
for the fitful) and fatefull deotsion to rebuild the economy,
fres from restrictions and egalitarian notions, The combination
of promuiums for hard work, know-how and established property
relations achtoved the desired result, speedy reconstruction
and eventually prosperity. By pushing the millions of
newoomers mercilessly into vigorous participation in the
serambie for eking out, what in the beginning 401ea was
a meager livelihood, most of them were quickly integrated
into the budding west German society, Until the wall went up
three and a half million east Germans followed the same
road towards speedy integration into the West “erman economy.
They took to the only effective vote remaining to then
under the Ulbricht regime: they voted with their feet. Thus,
furnishing the West German economy with a unique reservoiy
of veadihy available labor.
Now, a decade later, the West German experiment seems
to have fully justified the expectations of its Joint
Amerigan and German architects, By all known standards
West Germany is one of the nost prosperous countries of
Europe and of the world at large. Under these cireumstances
it will surprise no one that the record of the main architect
of the new Germany, Konrad Adenauer, has kept up pretty well
in the public mind, After almost 15 years in office
Adenavuer's popularity curve 4n January 1962, though somewhat
down from the 57 high of 75%, showed 64 % quite satisfied
with his performance.
ry
You will realize that 13 years is exactly the time span allotted
to the Wahmar regime, with its xk ever-changing cabinets
and one year more than Hitler's thousand year Reich.
No wonder, that public orators and pollsters are apt to compare
Adenauer with Bismarok, Thia comparison 18 instructive mainly
because of the fundamental divergenoies., To put it bluntly,
Adenauer's domestic record ie emphatically better than that
of hia 19th century predecessor. When the "tron chane@llos"
a mere youngster of 76, was forced from the political scene
in 1890 he had failed in his major domestic projects, le was
as little able to subdue the Catholic Church as he was to
deatroy the Soolal Yemooratic Party. Neither by temperament
nor byd esign was he capable or willing to broaden the state
structure suffiotlently and give the great majority of people
& true share in tho alnews of government. Adenauer, while by
no means without autocratio traita, ie closely tied to, and
forms part of a democratic party machine, As any other
successful polittican he sounds out, listens to, and te tuxhks
koxn strongly influenced by a network of interest organizations,
Opinions about his willingness to satisfy the one or the other
group will vary, Judging from popular reaction among tha
agricultural population, he is still their alletime favorite,
By the way, many people think that either the bankers or the
industrialists, or the Catholie Church should have less
influence in the councils of government; and incidentally,
the fact that 42 % ef the populayion has no opinion at all
regarding the influence of jewish groups, ghows, that
antisemitieanm does not play a significant part in present day
German popular consciousness.
6
Given the present political Climate of western Garmany
Mp, Wibytoht's attempt to inifiitvate end subvert the weet
German establishment belong decidedly among his least
successful investments, At any rate, the aplinter party
whieh the Communists supported sub rosa 4n the October 1962
Weat German election and which van on & straight pacifist
platform drew exactly 1,9 % of the vote. '
The Communist problem leads us straight to the
foreign policy field. First a ground vule; In present day
Germany foreign polley Jasues oan be less easily separated
from domestic problems than anywhere else. Due to the
division of Germany and the two regimes etsablished on its
national territory, interpGerman issues constantly overlap
with purely domestic concerms. Major political battles
are fought in terms of western democracy againat Oommaunist
vule. Tis constellation makes 1b easy to perceive why
Chancellor Adenaver had no hance to match Biemarck's
record reedtabliswing German unity in the 20th century >
Bismavok operated in a multi-state European systems
Lb consisted of units of comparable size and strength, each
of them able to make independent foreign polley and military
decisions. Adenauer operates within a hierarchically ordered
world-wide state systems the freedom of action of all units
except the super powers, remains atrietly limited. There is,
however, one point of legitimate odmparison: today, as 100
years ago, opinions might seriously differ on what would
form a desirable unit for a German state, Bismarck opted
for what in his day was known as "Little Germany" =
Given ‘the present climate of opinion in western Germany, Mr.Ulbricht's
iuxmxkmankxknxintkikeakionxandxaub version
%
he dismissed the idea of uniting the Germans of Prussta
and the South German states with those living under the
Hapsburg crown, What are todays views on the territorial
shape and the type of government of Germany? There is one area
of near unaninimity. Most Germans whether living east or west,
consider a severe modification of the oppressive and
unrepresentative Ulbricht regime as a legitimate and immutable
xkax goal. Whether Germany should again be brought together
as a state unit, 1s another question. West German official
utterances and various semi»-offielal study groups drawing up
blueprints for future reference assume, as a matter of course,
that the political and soolal regime which has done so well
in Weat Germany will eventually be introduced in one form
or another inks the region now under My, Ulbricht's rule.
Yet, Interestingly enough, a number of intellectuals have
challenged this premise, Like everybody else, they firmly
uphold the claim for Rast Germany's freedom from. oppression,
But they veject, as politically unfeasible and morally
unjustified, the veestablishment of &he derman empire within
the frontiers of either the Bismarck or even the Weimar state.
They foresee the possibility of a continuation of m two
separate state units, possibly belonging to two different
systems of alliances, Whether the second solution of two
permanent, move or less demooratic Germanies, mal, ntaining
tolerable relations with each other is more than @ pipe dream,
is hard to say at the present juncture. <That the reunification
of Germany, western style, would raise difficult, albeit not
insuperable problems 15 easy to see: First, there looms the
large question of how an all German union would affect
the fortunes of Ra western Europe?
8
Should the European union, now in the slow process of
eatablishment, eventually embrace a reunited Germany?
How would the “ederal Kepublio's western partnerg, Italy
and France today, England tomorrow feact, when faced with
a 70 million unit? Of course, there is one possible argument
trying to smooth over such difficulties: the oloser the
integration of Europe will become, the less relevant the
sige and the strength of the individual participant. However,
given the many uncertainties as to the constitutional form
the European ia eventually to take, thie matter of size
does not seem all that unimportant. Think only of General de
Gaulle's drive to substitute the Europe of the Fatherlands
for an integrated Europe. At any vate, HEnglend and France,
wile giving lip service to German unity when Atplomatioally
required, show little enthusiasm for lts realisation.
Now the lukewarm attitude of the western states towards the
goal of German unity might possibly be overcome by abundant
Amerioan guarantees, But the concerted hostility of Germany's
easter neighbors poses more formidable diffleulties.
Could such fears which the resurgentve of a unified western-style
Germany would raise be banned? What would be the impact, if a
united Germany would give a aolemn promise to recognize the
Oder-Neisse line, provisionally recognized at Potsdam, as
Germany's permanent frontier? As you know, @ truncated
western Germany so far has sorupulously avoided the slightest
move in this direction, for understandable reasons of
demestioe and international tactics, while the east German
government has made a great show of vracogniging the immutability
of this so-called peace frontier.
And, overshadowing everything else, how would the USSR feel
about the reestablishment of a united Germany?
This opens up the entire range of the so-called Rappallo
problems, Bhe likelihood and possibilities of closer relations
between the USSR and Germany. First let us become quite clear
about the meaning and the limits of the historical parallel
of 1923. At that time the USSR and the Weimar Republic reached
a limited agreement on settling some differences, by the same
token they enhanced both partners! bargaining position with
third powers. This device netted Germany a number of tactical
advantages. But, nevertheless, throughout the 2018, the deep
Gleavage between their respective social regimes prevented any
attempt at converting a certain parallelism of interests into
amore far reachinf joint action. It needed the Ribbentrop «
Stalin pact on Poland's partition to effect such purely
temporary collaboration between opposite brands of totalitaria-
nism. The far-reaching results are known to all of us under
the name of Second World War.
Today, the USSR le a hegemonial power in her own right.
The * ederal Republic is an important secondary power, operating
within the protective orbit of the other hegemonial power,
the US. It 18 rather obvious that Soviet maaan aout interest
to loosen the ties between the Federal Republic and the United
States, It 1s at least possible that she will be willing to
pay a high price, even going as far as agreeing to the
reunification of Germany. Yet this price would only be proferrec
tn order to enhance the security and the power of the USSR.
+t 18 unlikely that thie goal could be reached 1f a Germany
of over 70 million people would remain in a position of
exercising an option between the blocks.
forertdinctihilhice
10
In the last analysis there exists only one device which in
the mind of the USSR will protect it against the risks auerts
in German unification, A drastic change in the German social
system excluding the chance for further German switches,
But what might appear as a necessary price of reunification
to Soviet Russia, would appear as an exorbitant price to the
overwhelming majority of all Germans. They never considered
reunification a question of alternatives between social syabe
put thought only in terms of westernstyle unity.
Chancellor Adenauer's policies fit into this pattern.
Mostly concerned with cementing German relations with the
western powers, he also uncompromisingly upholds German
claims to westernstyle reunification, possibay even in the
1937 frontier, In his mind the dual policy of western inte-
gration and toughness towards the east would produce such
unity in freedom, As a tactical device for internal con-
sumption, this position is fully understandablg Tt may
even be conceded that the Chancellor's favorite speculation
as to a possible impact of a widening rift between Soviet
Russia and China on Germany's position has a however small
element of realityy Would such a rift, as the Chancellor is
fond of thihking, lead to the USSR's agreeing to some sort
of western-style German unity? Would such a concession,from
the Russian viewpoint, not just compound the risk of a
potentially hostile China on her eastern border, with that
of a strong Germany with unsatisfied national claims on the
western confines of her block, Is it not more realistic to
assume that a Chinese-Russian rift might, as we are seeing
already now, intensify the USSR's sear&éh for ways and means
to cement the present status -quo on the Elbe?
lL
What does all that mean for the present xkmkexw highly unsatis-
factory state of affairs with lts intermittent political
warfare, pressure on the Berlin lifelines and the sharpening
of oppression in Hast Germany. If a permanent settlement is
not yet in sight, can at least a basis for a limited agreement
be found? There are areas where accomodation spells defeat,
others, where it is a neutral device to continue a form of
coexistence, Among the first I would count: guarehteed acoem
to @ West Berlin establishment, remaining outside Soviet contro]
As important: continued active pursuit of greater freedom
for the East German population without necessarily raising
the specter of a change of sovereignty and alliances,
In the areas of possible eompromise LT would ineludesthe form
in which cognizance is taken of the existence of the Hast
German regime. In our century many teehniques have been develo
ped to acknowledge the existence of a state organization
without necess rily becoming one of its well-wishers,
West-German industrialists have worked out a whole body of
rationalizations why to continue thelr presence at the
Leipzig fair, why not show the same inventiveness in the busi-
ness of political forms? Into t hesecond category belongs also
greater flexibility as to the future relations between West
Germany, Poland and Caechoslovakla, The same area of possible
compromise includes agreement, tacit or open, to keep atomic
weapons, in contrast to carriers of such weapons, out of the
hands of West and Hast Germans alike, Official West German
reticence about relations with and guarantees for Poland
and at best contradictory statements on German desires for
divect Nato, meaning German access to nuclear weapons have
not been helpful.
we!
The US proposals regarding attempts to work out a mutually acceptabld
compromige on Berlin seem to embrace four points. T am starting
with the one which ls least immediately concerned with the DDR
recognition situation, Proposed US » USSR agreement not to give
divest access to nuclear weapons to either west or east Germany,
(we leave open, for the moment, whether this agreement would be for-
mulated in a way toe xclude such Sniteamun bien oobes third parties)
Such an agreement would be a clarification of US polloy which, while |
oscillating showed a certain, by no means olear~cut,tendency in that
diveotion, The USSR seems to have evinced interest in such an
agreement not only in regard to West Germany but also in a wider
thivd party formulationy this might facllitate tte Internal block
arguments; keeping such weapons out of the hands of China may be
made to appear ae necessary quid pro quo for keeping the sane
weapons out of west German Hands, therewith mininiging any threat
of an Increasing west Serman hold over US polley.
To what extent would such an agresment involve a German sacri-|
flee? West Germm y's offiotal position ih regard to acquisition
of nuclear weapons for Nath = read Germany ~ has been shifting
back and forth, The argument for pressing the United States 4in
this direction has rested on the point that indepndent access would
release west Germany a questionable veliance on American ;
willingness to retaliate via atomie weapons for USSR attacks on
either Berlin or West Germany, The army minister Strauss has
veoently, but not very consistently, rejected auch a German claim
for nuclear weapons but his subordinates and more or less official
Journalists have still kept to the old line of demanding such
access, It may well be that Germm y only raised the issue in order
to got a more aatiafactory solution in regard to the problem of
German partiotpation and consultation in regard to the use of US
nuclear weapons stationed in Germany.The socalled official opposi~»
tion, the SPD, while underplaying the leaue is not very intent
on getting nuclear weapons, but, more important, 8 prestigious
opinion leaders from the academie and the church world, have,
in November, come out flatly against Independent German nuclear
weapons in a memo advessed to the government which meanwhile has
been published, Given this situation, the west German government
sannot strongly object to the abovenentioned type of USSR US agree~
ment.
ALL the other points involve dreotly @ome measure of
recognition for the government of the DDR.
1) a projeoted nonwaggression pact between Nato and the Warsaw pact
ntions could possibly be interpreted as formaliging informal west
German de@larations that it will not use foree to change the
present territorial status, <nasmuch as the USSR and the DDR
now regard the wall in Berlin as a state boundary, such 4 non~
PCC ee hires
aggression agreement would involve a defacto aguasi
optt he split
of Berlin, Inoluding the present means of separation, 1.@. the wall,
West “ermany wight want to minimize the value of ich a deloarabion
by arguing that the Weat German government has a number of times
declared unilaterally not te want to use ferce to change the present
ukukamst status; therefore such an agreement would involve nothing
new. However, psychologically, such an agreement would baie tur al
he
involve an element of stabilization and yp ecognition for OF
.
This 18 especially true if the agreement deus not kneniwixe
is net put into effect by unilatevalpestavation of the parties
concerned, bub would involve exchange and deposition of instruments.
|
4
Be
Moveover it 18 quite possible that the USSR wouldwant to ehlarge
on such an agreement by including indirect aggression via propaganda
Tn this oase it py] want to make a oommiasion to be set up(see below
the arbiter a This might valse major diffileulties.
2)Mixed commissions to discuss trade and other matters. This would
yaise relations between west Germany and the DDR to some kind of
de facto recognition level. It would be likely to involve both
intersonal trade agreements as well as the handling of various
still exteting common services ( water, electricity) as well ag
contacts ) criminal police); while 1t would neither Increase nov
navrow down the scope of such contacts, it would give then wider
significance through raleing them from the atrictly administrative
to the governmental level,
8)Of all points the one of most Linmedlate importance le that of the
shape and form of the Mocess to Berlin Gathortty. Hitherto air traffi
was excluded from any form of DDR control andwas only aubjeat to
Rugeslan attempts a
combined Allied USSR flight safety controls the enlargement of such
ve
safeby controls to traffic controls hay so fay been suscessfully
fought by the western powers, If atr flights as projected, are
included under the traffie controls, no means of independent
acoees to Berlin would vemain, On the other hand, any attempt
at interference with such braffie would fall under the jJurisdisebiion
of the new authority. Pull east German partielpation in sueh control
would not only enhance the DDy a olaim but would give
the DUR also direct influence on 188 decisions, For this very
reason Ltomstebe Woot Herning ha Codeaeae to keep both the DDR
and the West “erman government from acquiring full membership status
in such an authority, granting them only, « as had already been
when
done inGeneva conferences » technical adviser status, However,
ib is very problemabio, whether the USSR could agree tos uch
down-grading, ‘thenefore there will probably be a US attempts to
solve the Lasue vy putting the decisive role into noutpal hands.
This, however, wight Whaler the authority from the outset, in as
much as noubrala, when the: going, gots rough, might evince a tendency
to withdraw thedt services.
Queries: a) why should the USSR after 5 1/2 years of propaganda
and dtploma tie pressure on the Berlin issue, be willing to be
satiefied with ‘arrangements short of fullefledged Berlin control
whieh , moreover, af least on paper, will lead to arrangements
whiah safengydid free aoogas’ SS eiriia, remaining outelde thely
control, The, short answer to that is, that the USSR will certainly
try to enlarge on; the proposals in the direction of frea clty status,
withdrawal of western alited troups or alternative introduction
of Russian troyps tnte west Berlin, as well as already wentioned
above yoeseatien of! +) opagandagdnto RRNKARMWaMEkA NOn-aggresaion
agreements. However fs eeqme likely that the USSR will enter an
agreement even if nt ee satisfaction on major points,
/
USSR motivation for such an agreement, in the opinion
|
of some, would peat, on the cynieal view that, in asmuch as the
USSR and the DOR, by physioal controls they oan always after a time
wk renew pressure, miLtiply incidenta and paralyze the authority's
Wi
activities. —
1
More aap cheney main Russian goal 1s not the taking
over of Berlin on oheral expansion into the weet, bub gradual
reaognition of the phesent atatueequo on itaw estern frontier by
the western ewes f tabilization of the position of the DDR
«Be
satellite is part of this program.
Suoh goals inolude two sets of objeatives: 1)west Berlin
rust be reduced to the point where 1% ¢an no longer interfere with
life in East dermanyya necessary step was the ~ very bolated «
construction of the wall, preventing depopulation of the DDR
2) Optional steps are reduction of propaganda influence emanating ~
from weet Berlin, This yay partly be reached by preventing
maximally inter-clty-traffie; destroying continued Rias broadcast s
useful bub not Important, as west German proadoasting stations
would anyhow ‘take over, Main Berlin objective therefore alpeady
obtained by construction of wall with everything else being techincal
byeplay.
2)Agreewents on renunelation of force (se obtainable with prohibition
of propaganda olause) | Aecuniea commissions and Berlin/Aooess
authority are very tepertant to the usta nesamevfhe very fact
mcamitinnnsnnnresi
of these arrangements involves in itself a measure of de facto
recognition of the DDR, this de facto recognition, exactly as
the hia es up be the wall, will have a stabiliging influence on
the a the Russians te dlamies Ulbricht inthe foreseeable
future, only Liberaltzing the regime, ea iyte, tniase
ite viability, and therewith enhance AOR es res quo, raleing 1t
to « pore gncinttave even Gel & MPR La Coneebece Ctra f Rite ri,,
yf tee fix ef &4 HCE ‘ai hee?y
Wost German attitudes: at first, the weet Germana seems
& out- the papiasty
bo have legitimate; -eonplaints with which the USA asked for
west Germarfooments on ita proposals, These procedural questions
aside, bhe much phopaghized officlalreasons for the west German
opposition are not the veal ones. Uffielally west German reticence
reste on the 11ke iphood! that any concessions will evode Berlin's
f
“Ge
position, This however 19 not likely, even if the USSR would weleh
on the agreement in the foreseeable future, kaa Weat Berlin would
at worst have bought additional time. West Germany's r eal opposition
reats on the fact that any aecord nevessariily is a sort of way sta«
thon, cementing the status quo and eternaliging Germany |s aplit.
However, the west German government 1s somehow caught between two
contradictory requirementas alit cannot refuse its agreement to
any move safeguarding, If only on 4 temporary basis the status
of Berling b) it has to 4 yotd impression of being willing to
formalize the division of Germany, it 1s therefore unlikely that
west Germany will obstruct an agreement, but it will try to keep
concessions in ve de facto recognition a bave minimum. As there
is new a firm cartel between the government and the opposition
in vegard to forelen policy ( only the small ooaybion partner,
the FDP shows sometimes some maverioak tendencies before being
promptly ealled to order by big brother ODM) there 1s no domestic
diffieulty to put an agreement through. Moreover, any too vocal.
opposition bys vefugee organizations( m yhow more interested in
Polish border and diplomatic representation Lasues not touched upon
in the agreement) is counterbalanced by already mentioned academte
groups who propagalzerecognition of facts o f late in foreign polley.
If the agreement should, 1m the foreseeable future, lead to
a certagin Polish type development in the DDR, publie opinion
will nov only tolerate, but actively support the agreement,
oo
and ae “ysted
Ip 1052 the Successful Dulles-Eisenhower campaign inggeinofficially
peas onened by an article of Mr, Dulles in Life Magazine entitled: A Bolicy
of Boldness, In this artucle “rv. Dulles advocated the abandonment of
the negative policy of containment and the adoption of new policies
leading to the liberation of the captive people dominated by the USSR,
As the popular response to this new departure, fully endorsed by Candid
date Hisenhower in August 1952, was a mixed one Ehers soon appeared
the first of the increasing number of glosses and qualifications for
which future generations of diplomatic apprentives might best remember
Ke usively, take
place (by “peaceful means. Neither this disclaimer nor the metic
the incumbent “ecretary of State: Iiberation must ¢
etoncsencononnte esreren wa
jous
palance between the Internationalist's viewpoints of liberal republi-
canism and the poltey of national retrenchment of the Taft variety of
Xepublicanism aol by Candidate Eisenhower in his campaign speeches
seems to have decisively affected the election sieesie. +f any specific
foreign policy statements did have a clear cut effect on the outcome
of the 1952 campaign, then it was’ Candidate Hisenhower's "I shall go to
Korea" and the express promise to bring the Korean war, to a just, speedy
and hon@rable conclusion, Itwas the prospect of General Eisenhower
y
as both the purveyor and the garantor of peace which. turned out to be
the mostdecisive campaign assotk.
The opening shot in the 1956 campaign in the foreign affair
Theo Wd 8
field is again contained in a Life Magazine article, Half canpaign style
biography and hero worship, half the authorized words of the master him
self, leading up gpa mromenanenton ty so effective handshake at
the doorstep of the/*resbyterian Church, showing Mr, Dulles not as a
passive recipient of # God's blessings, but as a confidence exuding
~2-
morale builder. In the general commotion over xxxxikies the incumbent
Secretary of State's exasperating ways of expressing himself one
fact seems to have been overlookeds Whatever his unfemtunate penchant
for mixing cynisism, moral rectitude and pérsuit of the nation's interns
est, the famous statement about the ability to get to ono ea of war
without getting into t4#6 war as a necessary art,as well as theoften
7
overlooked preceding sentence speaking of "selective retaliation"
against targets reasonably related to the area of senesaion with the
emphasis that the aggressor does not have to tocss much more but just
Hen
something more pes an advance over the 1952 campaign, They incorponats
its: experiences, In his own whird way\ Me. Dulles bakes care to fuss
the two currents which during the previous campaign often remained
atsjointand aoHEMRare LORY: the promise of dynamic action and the prior
as
rity of maintaining the peace. You dont want the other fellow topget a
way with murder and allow him to keep the initia
AO Of lfiende fe hag faite
time,| peace, meaning continuation of present US life habits and relative
but at the same tin
security from interference , hould not be aisturbed “herefore
oe
you threaten the other fellow with some, however not the ultimate
wn
consequences ... massive retaliation, you remember, has boon mrasnmrs,..
the object of another of the Dulles glosses/and you arrive at not too
unfavorable a settlement. 1 [ses is one, however small, kernel of truth
in Mp, Dulles theorenés. The emphasis is on the element of risk involv
ved in any action. However, around this admission ranks a number of
ond’ 15 fey
major distortions, ng’ insistérice that there is some way to control
; es:
the risk by carefully meas suring the amount of- vio
wo TN hk ea
apply aad qneny what has alread r been wae discussed by the See
oaty ine complex
Carayrg |
interaction Kebwedir Chinese, Russian,Koresn, Indochinese, French and, Ame |
|
|
nen ‘i
you are to
&
retary's political opponents, tte peoultér way
rican interests and the uneasy and essentially unstable compromises
“he
ifort be a candidate and it is questionable whether another “epubli
~3-
resulting from their clash,to Mr, Dulles contnetghtactions/ Tims aps
Dulles campaign opener, keyed to overcome the fear that peace might gia
crumble if the United States take/wisks implying military action,
has not been a very fortunate Cae start. liter his tales start |
FEEL
itunthbanetT-pe tirat the opinion w becom. bre “irre ees
BAA fost “y
san spirit should lead,. renouncing/,discussion of foreign policy subjects
f
that by-parti
except in terms of meaningless generalities wishows-aryrvattompt to anal
Ly-se~oun—setrheetron “rom a purely tactical viewpoint this might be an
Lad
Eee ty Hig} ‘4
pe a candidate. This would give the Repiblicans-a possibiT! to rely
on Mr, Eiswnhower's reputation as a peace prosident Put, 2 Kisenhowe]
, Aloe
ean candidate could nun, on Mr, His enhower | 8 peace reputation slones
- Se Deegan l fs AAS x
Anyhow, even W ren Peet ‘assumption the “emocratic party would
have all interest to stress the objective factos of the situation
which determine American Fore ety policy, rather than the more or lesa f
C
fortuitous personal elements. [esp vyetiade spirit in foreign policy, tims
to my mind, means maximum suppression of purely pressure group viewpeda
points; whether tadea~-boinberestexas. ezonomic groups, national
minont ties or religious groups, and concentration on discussing ithe
, gop fr tose a f AR
policy choices open to the United States under the Aeon, near TEENSe
ces. Lf the parties want to fulfill their political function,
bipartisan policy cannot bejbantbemount to suppression of
at soussion of fry pola eMearahyre,
-hesuts to discuss tne foreign policy issues is the more clearcut
op Bt Oa
as thee Peon ae at present utterly. confused how to cope with the
contradictions inherent in the present situations “Phere is first the
ee ; |
dusgxkmxdkzensa vast majority's deep and ingrained hatred of communism,
ite desire to do away-with its tyrannical dictatorship, hence its willin)
ness to listen to the appeals of liberation movement) ite satisfaction
over our ability to “hold the fort in Burope, its magnanimous support
j of all Free-Europe-type organizations, its deep concern with every new
| inroad which the communists ame nak See in ‘Asta one willingness to
OCH 4b
| Whe,
| vr, Dulles "84 tobns
|
\
Bimal P
hold the line in-fofmosa or even Quemoy, xu Chodsian feeling of satis
faction over each, new pact which the indefatigable 4
Brrr
At, ay
nikeglates Dring ‘eheran, oe mas or (@rectni. But thore is also, at
Near A
the same time and of the sane pompes the growing knowledge of the
pyadically changed conditions of modern warfare, the quick succession
|
: of stupendous new weapons, the atomic, the nydrogend bomb, with the
_— ?
\ intercontinental missile Gene horizon, md fhe question arises in the
)
minds of these people: whats the use of clinging to ovr bastions here
and there if the war might anyhow be f ought under strategic concepts
which make the present modus opsrande. moaningless; and even worse,
ae ecg 6b aatbY 0. immer ae
possibly increasing the danger because thea multiply ‘the ‘Local occasion
where o conflagration might startan ~related thought is coming Py
why i : what is the use of war, if our physicists assure us that our traditio
we’) ‘ jen cree
nal concepts of peace and war a_ro meaningless and that, after the next
war the conditions of Jife will have more similarity vith those of
a tribal society nal Pret-need to-ve-o woifea 1956. =
) This contradiction between the-preparedness to fight the advance of
communism and if possible to liberate its VEStinE ene the voice of
tevhnological reason coungelling the maximal avoidance .of modern
t warfls the real dilewna which faces the voter of 1956 nee 1s assured
i hot
: oy sat ieies to ask the politician * How d® you propose to/solve this a
AeA? SOG omsthout wanting to be undulg harsh with the incumbent “eovetary
7 ; Mo vile mir ge
of State, we must admit, though he is very conscious of 46, nis. formula
ft
|
|
5
are pal designed facing it.His predecessor Acheson,given to mors coherent
thinking, in his recent book has givent the weight of bis authority to an ans- :
| wer,which is becoming quite fashionalbe these daysithe concept of the Limited|
| war None of the major powers would utilise any of the new fangled weapons,but
would stick to let,us say,the military technique of 44.The recent glosses of
| the inewnbent secretary of state om his massive retaliation concept as well
as the recent utterances of one or two of yesteryearts phanners,General Ridgl
; way and former asssitbant secretary Nitze are all nudging closer to the inter
mediate version of graduation in atomic warfare.The version would use atomic
weapons for limit4d objectives,thus trying to combine tradtiond warfare wit ¥
some measure of atomic warfare giving us something between 1945 and 1956 style
| ;
: Tet us for a moment examine the most favorab e assumptionsstrictly limited
warfare Dean Ache seon has evoked the period between the 50 Years war and the
(French revolution,when the Huripesan people,if they aia not attain an enforced
ace,were careful not to let get war out of hand,But to what extent does this
' parallel hold? These policy makers had something more in common than the fears
of the repetition of the excesses and devastations of the So Years War.They li-
i ved thtir lives under mutually acceptabe forms of social organisati on,they woy
shipped common gods,rationnalism and detsm, and all fed on Voltaire.Modern dic«
tatorship utilises the threat of encirclement to coment its tyranny at home ,
| Modern emocracy,atleast in its gsrrieon state varb ty,which we are rapidly ap-+
iproaching, hae not particularly developed the art of accomodation eith r.Mobeovel
feven if in the 17&18 centuries for reasons of population cotrol and husbanding
leconomLe strenghh armies were kepb rather small,did not their m sters relent-
‘sssly thry to improve their military techniques and utlise improvements as spe-
edi} as they became availeble Moreover are we in the 20 century stillable to
| switen our alletances. as rapidly and with any concomitant loo of face as the
| Buropeand ezbinets of the 18?
;
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