"The extension of national citizenship to the lower classes: a comparative perspective" (with Stein Rokkan, 1962

f t devrlais

SR draft May 1962.

By
Reinhard BENDIX and Stein ROXKKAN
University of California The Chr. Michelsen Institute

Berkeley | Bergen

This paper foouses on one part-prdsess in the deveiopmant oF-
unifvio’t nation-states the extension of «.wange.4F citizenship rights

to economically, socially and culturally dependent subjects within the

mbes population, T.H. MARSHALL made this the central theme in

| kou-ctote nie pathbreaking study of Citizenship and Social Class.) He concentrated

teste Ketio. 6, «ff qt) herp.

his discussion on Zeveloonédnts:in Creat Britaint our aim is to explore

-péabibilittes of compar ig the % teste ension of rights across a

Sen far etl, - tera hk, ‘ThAs Apel BER

number of nationstates and to develop g@meral "models" for eonbtoliations-

1. bod
poliet on \the ext ion of different sets of rights. ie Seis beiet-

represents only one step in @ series of writings on, sii developmentd 2)

1) cambridge, the University Press, 1950) pps 1-85.

2) ene paper is & direct sequel to two articles by Reinhard BENDIX
"Social Stratification and the Political Commmity “Arche eure de sociole 1,
1960 181-210 and "The Lower Classes and the Democratic Revolution",
Industrial Relations 1 (1) 1961: 91-116. A sociological approach to the
extension of political rights to the "lower classes" (tenants, manual
workers and others in positions of economic dependence) and to women
has been outlined by Stein ROKKAN in "Maes Suffrage, Secrete Voting and
Political Participation". Arche eure de sociol. 2 (1) 1961s 132152,
of. also S. ROKKAN & H. VALEN "The Mobilisation of the Periphery".
Acta sociol. 6 (1-2) 1962: 1116158. :


and will, it is hoped, be followed up 1stey in greater detail.

E f ional citizenshi
T.H. MARSHALL distinguished three basic elements of national citizenship?
~ civil rights such as “liberty of the person, freedom of speech,
thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts,
and the right to justice";
~ political rights such the franchise and the right of access to
public office;
~ social rights ranging from "the right to a modicum of economic
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social
heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the
standards prevailing in the society."

To these three elements of citizenship corresponded four sets of
public institutions: ee

the courts for the protection of thememtended civil rights and-fer /
Where CU Lae OL eh i of on or. bela. Thy

th-dhacethoatghte. the less articulate

members of the national community};

the representative bodies for national . er bo spose 2. and local decision~
making) waretuss ios & The rap bd duns etc COE. lotet [pebl C Chr ces

the social services to ensure some minimum of protection against
poverty, sickness and other misfortunesy ci ct ss

the schools to implement the right accorded all members of the

community to receive at leat the basic elements of an education.

All established nation-states can look back on longer or shorter
histories of legislatiye actions and administrative decisions to broaden
the bases of such institutions, and to ensure greater equality of access from
different atyets of subjects within the territory. For each set of institutions

it kg ot dekat eoretiosaie possible to establish comparative chronologies

of formal decisions t extend nage Mi ee ie tae ed the traditio epally

These ¢& nO 2¢

privileged ,ar

of the national political oneatr« fre compilation of Such comparative
chronologies and time series ‘ “not only of ae to historianst they provide

wO-9 &
a useful _pointofdeparture- for sociological

work ja the growth of nation-states of different political structure in the
modern worlds Political sociologists have so far tended to study the entry


into politics of farmers, workers and minority groups primarily as resultants
of changes in economic conditions, of incipient industrielisation, of rapid
[Sut [euch ‘Guauniie tases ti uot ba Dodeseven pA BE jpocpunt for differen
ces in the pelitical reactions of the lower strata. The oF
Pad economic growth tené-evergwheve—-te bring about sone “social mobi tivation" 3)
of the dependent and peripheral strata of the pomman’ ty » but these movements
will not necessarily find political outleter the responses of the courtier
strate wii vary in direction and intensity within-all er ig -¢
prteinabivhy and Aye policies edepted-aathe petggsion ¢ etsisonshity rights
on of ott

Saas ec ee ee ae
Ay xanplg! Norway Sweden both organised universal compulsory

education weiiStn-aittance-ef the dooisive wate, oi industrialisation and
on that count could be said to be well prepared for the subsequent entry
_ of the lower o siagies os into polities. | ts
But af the timing of the the decisions to extend political rights
cvatit, ou) Msgounted heavily in determining the strategies and ideologies of the working
Glass movementse In Norway, the franchise was extended in a quick succession
of steps, well before the industrial breakthrough and without any extensive
mobilisation of working class organisations in the fight for political citizen
shipe In Sweden, the fight for manhood suffrage and equal votes went ro oo
pari.pacsu with industrial growth and brought about a broad, if temporary,
@lliiance of a variety of groups so far kept outside the established channels
of, dosisionanking, the lower middle classes and the poorer farmers as well
es manus] workers. This _ Aitterence , in site stmhihe 42. the extensions of
political rights } , the cholog of strategy of the
working clasa parties in the two selntrlie. When the industrial breakthrough
aided a rapid flew of recruits to the Norwegian labouremovement, it was no
longer necessary to entity alliances to fight for rights of representation and
the movement was set free to fellow ite own, tenporarily very radical, courses
In Sweden the alliance with the Liberals helped to “domesticate” the Sogial
Democrats very soon after the introduction of manhood suffrage and the rapid
accession to responsible Cabinet positiona atrenethene? the tiea between the

working class and the established palitical

3)
This is the term introduced by Karl DEUTSCH “Social Mobilisation and

Politioal Development" Amore Pole Sole Reve 85 (3) 19611 493-5140

us oO fig a MO ee Oe ee se reader ay ee

cou ( aie a iD Ag (Ort. CUSR), [r jee a4 peace,


system. 4)

In general terme, the +itrahg-qf decisions to extend particular rights
must be asyessed in te national context, “eh ee einen of the concurrent
process of change in the sociceeconomic structure: a decision to extend suffr
at time t may have very different implications if the decisive increase in
the secondary labour force occurred in the poriod t ~ 1 or in the periods
S+lort +t In these terms Great Britain was a + - 1 case, Sweden
roughly a + case, Norway a t+ + 1 case and, say, India a t + 2 case.

Such analyses may be carried out for each set of extended rights
singly or for several sets considered jointly. In fact, the great merit
of T.H. MARSHALL's analysis of the British developments was that it sought
out a pattern in several disparate processes of changes and discussed the
constellations of policies toward the dependent strata within a unifying
sociological perspective. In this paper we shall not attempt to deal
with the full range of rights discussed in MARSHALL's study. We shall
concentrate our comparisons on the sequences of decisions which proved
of most immediate relevance for lower~class mevenents seeking to enter
the political arena: decisions on the right #f form #f associations, on

the franchise, and on the secrecy of the vote, on the right to receive
primary education without pay. In terms of MARSHALL's distinction the
first is a civil right, the next two political rights, the fourth a social
right. In terms of the areas of activity for which they are primarily

relevant, we might, however, call the right of association an economic 1.
avk tl, right to an education cultural right: this is the terminology we shall
stick to in the following. :

Steel

omnis point was first set out by the Norwegian historian Edvard BULL in
"Die Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung in der drei skandinavischen Lindern”

RUS T
£. Goschs de Sos. u terbew, 10, 1921-22: 329-361, of. D. Bamkew.”
"Scandinavia" in S. NEUMANN eds M Pol Parties. Chicago, Univ.

of Chicago Press, 1956. For comments on subsequent developments, sec

Ulf TORGERSEN "The Grend towards Political Consensus: the Case of Norway¥
R

Acta sociol.s. 6 (1#2), 1962. 159171. 3


policies toward the dependent strata.

Each chronology of decision to extend rights may be analyzed as the
outcome of a series of strategical moves and counter-moves, pressures and
counter=-pressures, temporayy bargains and delaying manoeuvres. It is
easy to get lost in the details of these sequences and therefore the more
important to develop exploratory "models" s?orstéljationg of policies toward
dependent strata in each society.

Decisions to ee ge ef rights beyond the confines”
of the traditionally privileged may be prompted by a variety of motives:

- by the needs experienced by an established elite (a monarch,
an autocratic ruler, a central administrative apparatus) for allies against
an encroaching counter-elite (local pouvoirs intermédiaires, a feudal
nobility, a capitalist or industrialist class)

- by nationalist or militarist conceptions of a unified nation
ensuring total mobilization of its resources (here: the argument that
universal conscription had to be balanced against a series of citizenship

rights, of. the Swedish slogan "one man, one vote, one gon" V7 ous fs whoberk
frcatust ef Tis bags Ge ee P rite, Stet tircat Hand) rity jeud werk Boe. 7)

by fears of lower class revolt and hopes of a peaceful settlement

of class conflicts (Soniel Pasifigma),

~ through gradual and reluctant acceptance of a series of faits
accomplis,

~- by equdilitarian convictions
~ by identification with the "oppressed classes"
~- by beliefs in the “historic mission" of the working classes

~ by corporatist and berufstndiiche conceptions of the need for
formal representation of all status groups within the body politic.


In seeking some order in such complex tam les of motives, arguments and
strategies it may prove useful to organize the data within a series of
"models of dominant constellations of actual or contemplated policies toward
the dependent strata. We have found it enlightning in our exploratory work to
focus on three basic models of policy in the face of the emerging lower classes!

Mic
@® plebiscitarian model positing the establishing of direct relationships
between the central organs of the nationestate and each member of the
community, whether adult, adolescent or chilakw, and the consequent suppres=

sion of all pouvoirs intermédiaires, whether feudal-local or associational,

@ pluralist model positing the principle of national citizenship for
all accountable adults without criminal records but at the same time permitting
the development of organizations and other intermediary pewers in a "free
membership market"

& corporatist model positing the principle of national citizenship
but channeling 211 representation and most services through status-specific
and functional associations based on compulsory membership and incorporated
Within the overeall apparatus of netional government.

In the schema set out below we have tried to spell out the typical
policies within each of these "models" in three areas! economic rights,

political rights and cultural rights.


P citariant

policies for
a) lower-class

subjects

b) classe
distinct

associations

Pluralist!
policies for
@) lowerecless

subjects

>») class
distinct

associations

~~

Corporatist:
policies for
a) lower-class

subjects

b) class=
distinct

associations

Economic rights

permit individual
upward mobility;
ensure social
security without
union interferencej

rohibit unions
Loi Le Chapelier)

ensure freedom
to join unions
but also pro-
tection for non=
unionized;

ensure freedom of
unionization in
“open market"

enforee union
membership

incorporate

unions in govern=
mental administrae
tive structure

Political rights

introduce univer=
sal and equal
suffrage, but
mainiy to ensure
legitimacy of
regime;

prohibit class
parties

introduce tniver=
sal suffrage and
safeguard secrecy
of vote}

ensure freedom
of party
formation

enforce obligae
tory vote

organize funce
tional represen-
tation by branch
of economy

Cultural rights

introduce com
pulsory national
education

discourage denomi~
national schools.

allow parents
freedom to choose
school by denomi~
nation

permit denomina-
tional schools.

compulsory
education but
within culture-
specific schools}

incorporate —
denomanational
schools in state
system.

The srucial characteristic of each model can be generated from a orosse-
Classification of dilemmas of policy in the face of two avenues of access to the
al system: individual access or access through class-distinct or culture~
ciations ions or or gatio A crude four-fold table may
help to set out the relationships between these models’ 5)

Sami Glassification resembles on some points the scheme set out by William
KORNHAUSER in The Politics of Mass S$ ty. london, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1960, Ch. 2, but focuses on the process of entry into politics rather on the
resultant structures of each polity. For an interesting reformulation of the
KORNHAUSER scheme in terms of data on political divisions in Finland, see
Erik ALLARDT. "Community Activity, Leisure Use and Social Structure”. Acta.
Sociol. 6(1-2) 1962: 67-82.


Access via classedistinct associations

Enforced
Prohibited or permitted
Prohibited Traditional Sorporatist
Individwal
access
from the Sa, on
lower classes
Permitted Plebiscitari Pluralist
or encouraged

No national pequence of decisions fit exactly into any one of these
"idealetype"™ models. None of them have prvailed completely in any system but
most systems have in one phase or another had elements of each of them in the
eurrent constellations of policy positions and enacted policies. Modern
political systems are invariably "multiestructured" and cannot be analyzed at all
levels in terms of one single model.” To analyze this multiplicity of structures,
however, we have to proceed through such simplified models of policy directions.
The task is to assess for each nation and for each sequence of decision the
strength of each model both in the struggle between established and emergent .
elites and in terms of the compromises reached. We cannot go far in this

6) On this point see G, AIMOND. "“Introductiont a Functional Approach to
Comparative Politics" in GA. AIMOND and J.S. COLEMAN eds. The Politics of
the Developing Areas. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 2025,
algo S. ROKKAN op.,cit. ppe 135—137-


direction but we hope to be able to illustrate the possibilities of this
line of approach through discussion of developments toward the universaliza~

tion of rights in three sets of relationships! economic, political and
cultural. .

(Rest of paper to follow in July:

Boonomice rights and the freedom of association.

f chise the crecy of the vote.

the nation-state. )


THE EXTENSION OF NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP TO THE LOWER CLASSES:

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Dy
Reinhard EFendix Stein Rokkan
University of California and The Chr. Michelsen Institute
Berkeley Bergen

Introduction

This paper focuses on the extension of national citizenship to
economically, socially, end culturally dependent subjects within the
territorial population of developing uation-stetes. 1. H. Marshall made
this the central theme in his pathbreaking study of Citizenship ami Social

Cless.? He concentrated his discussion on Great Britain; our aim is to
compare the extension of rights across a number of Western European
netionestates and to develop some bench-mark "models" for this purpose.
No detailed documentation is attempted here: our peper represents one
step in a series of writings on the politics of national development and

will, it is hoped, be folloved up in greater @etat1.-

1. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1950), pp. 1-85.

2. The paper is a direct sequel to two articles by Reinhard Bendix
"Social Stratification and the Political Community," Arch. eur. de sociol.,
Vol. 1, No. 2 (1960), pp. 181-210 and "The Lower Classes and the Democra-
tic Revolution," Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1961), pp. 91-116.

A sociological approach to the extension of political rights to the "lower
classes" (tenents, manuel workers, and others in positions of economic depen-
dence) and to women hes been outlined by Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage,
Secret Voting and Political Participation," Arch eur. de sociol., Vol. 2,
No. 1 (1961), pp. 132-152; ef. also S. Rokken and H. Valen, "The Mobiliza-
ation of the Periphery," Acta Sociol., Vol. 6, No.s 1-2 (1962), pp. 113-158.


fe

Codification of equal citizenskip rights for all territorial
subjects constitute core elements in the process of nation-building.
Theoretically, such sequences of enactments might be collated and
compared across: all Gocumented nation-states. In practice, such glebal
comparisons are fraught with great difficulties and might easily lead
estrey. In this first attempt we have confined ourselves to one crucial
area, oF the world: Western Euxvope. The rationale for this choice is
very Simple: the developments in these polities all started out from a
common background ami can be enelyzed in basically the same categories.
By the eighteenth century all the societies of Western Europe were esS8ene
tially organized by estates.+
groups, corporations, anf orders rather then to individual subjects and

Rights and Liberties were extended to

representation in judiciel ani legislative bodies was channeled through

traditionally privileged estates. Within this social framework, no
immediate rights were accorded to subjects in positions of economic |
depenmtence, tenants, journey-men, vorkers, servente: they Were at best
classified unfer the household of their master and were represented through
him and his estate. The twin revolutions of the West, the political and

the industrial, broke up this system and led to the recognition of immediate

1. See the comprehensive comparative enalysis of these European
estate-societies in R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). An earlier comparative
treatment worth consulting is Otto Hintse, "Typolegie der stlndischen

Verfassungen des Abendlaniies," Staat und Verfas (Vol. 1 of Gesamnelte
Abhanillungen; Gbttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 120-39.


Oe

3-

citizen rights for these "lower orders."' the French Revolution set the
two basic mogeis for this process of integration into the naticnel
community: on the one hand the idea of a "fourth estate” as another

order of functional representation, end on the other the idea of the

equalization of all rights before the sovereign nation-state and the

abolition of all pouvoirs intermédiaries.” the Industrial Revolution

increased the size anf accentuated the strategic importance of the "lover
orders" and mede accommodations between these two models of the modern
political commmity increasingly urgent. These strains preduced highly
Givergent sequences of enactments and codifications from country to
couutry, but the besic themes remained the same. The traditions of the
Stindestaat give a unique tone to these national developments and set

Western Europe clearly apart from the rest of the world.

1. Our subsequent formulations will emphasize the clessificatory
sense in which we propose to use the term "lower classes." We leave open
the question which sections of the “lower classes" develop = capacity for
concerted action and under vhat circumstances. Though in some measure a
response to protest or the result of anticipating protest, the extension
of citizenship cecurred with reference to broaily and abstractly defined
groups like ell adults over 21, or women or adults having specified pro-
perty holdings, fulfilling certain residence requirements, ete. Such groups
encompass all those persons who have few poss¢ssions, low income, little
prestige and who because of these disabilities are conventionally under-
stood to “belong” to the lower classes. But the reference here is to the
lerger, Classificatery group of all those (including the “lower classes")
who were excluded from any direct or indirect. participation in the politi- |
cal decision-meking of the commmity.

2. These two models have been analyzed in terms of the @istinction
between the representative and the plebiscitarian principle by Ernst Fraenkel,
Die Repraesentative uni die Plebiszitacre Komponente im Demokratischen |
Verfassungssteat (Hert 219-220 of Recht uni Staat; Tibingen: J-C.B. Mehr,
1958). “The ideology of plebiscitarianism is documented in J. L. Talmon, The
Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).

3. So mech so that the historian Otto Hintze denies the indigenous
development of constitutionalism anywhere else. See his "Weltgeschichtliche
Vorbedingungen der Repraesentativverfassung,” in Staat und Verfasaung, pp. 140-85.

ee een em I


By confining our comparisons to the experiences of the Western

European polities, we do not only accentuate the uniformities of that
framevork: we also exclude from consideration the sequences of nation-
building characteristic of other areas of the world. We can only suggest
wnat some of these other patterns are. Im the case of the European
frontier-settlements in North America, Australie, end New Zeeland immi-
grants were relatively free to select from their Evropean legacies those
elements which would provide the foundation of these new politics] comuni-
ties... Fquality of citizenship was institutionalized quite early, not only
because of the social an? religious backgramd of the immigrants, but also
because the indigenous populations were smail enough to be suppressed or
segregated. Where, es in the United States, the slave-trade ani the demand
for imaigrant-lebor on @ large scale subsequently introduced ethnically or
racially distinct groups into the body politic, the result was equality

of citizenship for the dominant majority of the populetion at the expense
not enly of the social ani economic but also the legal and political status
of these subordinated anid oppressed groups. Still in this setting there

is at present more prospect of a substantial equality of citizenship for
the vhole population then is the case in the frontier settlements of

South Africa and of several Latin American countries, where the native
population is in the majority while equality of citizenship among the
settlers has turned into a hereditary privilege of the dominant ethnic
minority.” Stil] another development of citizenship appears to characterize

1. We have reference here to Latin American countries like Pern,
Paraguay andl Bolivia, where between 40 and 65 per cent of the population
remains ethnically and linguistically distinct. Even so, there is much

/footnote contimes next page/


the "new nations," in which national citizenship is extended to the lower

classes following « successful revolution or the establishment of intepen-
dence from colonial rule. In these cases @ minority of Western-educated
leaders typically begins with the preclamation of comprehensive rights
followed by campaigns of mass-mobilization. The aim is to break down
existing ties of kinship and community in order to enlist the masses in
the nation-building effort -- ani the rights of citizenship may then be
aifficult to distinguish from the duty of mass-participation. In these
eases political institutions are used to effect the social and economic
trensformation of the country in contrast to Western Europe where such
transformations had already undermined absolutism and the estate structure
of society when the attempt vas mede to accommodate the rising third and
fourth estates in a reordered political structure. It is important to
mention this contrast, for it serves to remind us that the conception of

political change as depenient upon prior social and economic changes is a

direct by-product of Western-European history.*

Eleuents in National Citizenship

T. H. Marshall distinguished three basic elements of national
citizenship:

(fcotnote contitmed from preceding page)

more ethnic and cultural integration in these countries than is the case in
South Africa with its 76 per cent native populetion. In this connection we
would call attention to the article by Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert,
"Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America,"

Journal of Sociology, TI (1961), pp. 62-81, where a developmental
typology for ail Latin American countries is proposed.

1. For an elaboration of this point cf. R. Bendix, "Social Strati-
fication and the Political Coummity." .

LU Cl


- civil rights such as "liberty ef person, freedom of speech,

thought and faith, the right to own property ané te conclude
valid contracts, end the right to justice";
- political rights such as the franchise and the right of aacans
| ta public office; |
- Sociel rights ranging from "the right to a modicum of economic
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the
social heritage end to live the life of a civilized being
according to the stenderds prevailing in the society.”
Four sets of public institutions correspond to these three elements
of citizenship:
the courts, for the safeguarding of civil rights and, specifi-
eally, for the protection of ail rights extended to the less
articulate members of the national commmity;
the local and national representative bodies as avenues of

aecess to participation in public decision-making and legislation;

the social services, to ensure some minimm of protection

against poverty, sickness, and other misfortumes, and the schools,

to make it possible for 211 menbers of the commun! ty to receive

at least the basic elements of an education. |

fhe nature of these rights of citizenship mst be discussed briefly

before we can turn to our comparative enalysis of how they were extended
in the several countries of Western Europe. Modern citizenship emerged
with the establishment of equal rights under the lew sc that the individual
was free to conclude valid contracts, to acquire, and dispose of, property.
This legal equality of citizenship was advanced by unflermining the legal


protection of inherited privileges. fach man now possessed the right to
act aS en indepeniient unit; however, the law only defined his legal
eapacity, it was silent on his ability to use it. In eddition, civil
rights were extended to illegitimate children, foreigners, and Jews;

the principle of legal equality helped to eliminate hereditary servitule,
equalize the status of husband ani wife, circumseribe the extent of
parental power, facilitate divorce, and legalize civil marriage.!
Accordingly, the extensions of civil rights benefited several inarticulate
sections of the population, a fact which gave a positive libertarian
meaning to the legal recognition of individuality.

Still, this gain of legal equality stood side by side with the

| fact of social andi economic inequality. Tocqueville and others pointed

outs that in me@ieval seciety many dependent persons had been protected
in come measure against the harshness of life by custom and paternal
benevolence » albeit at the price of personal subservience. The nev
freedom of the wage-comtract quickly destroyed vhatever protection of

= For & time at least, no new protections were

thet kind had existed.
instituted in place of the old; hence class prejudice and economic inequal-

ities readily excluded the vast majority of the lover class from the

1. Cf. R. H. Graveson, Status in the Common Lew (London: The

‘Athlone Press, 1953), pp. 14-32. For detalis of these legal developments

in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and France see J. W. Hedemann, Die
Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im 19. Jehrhundert (Berlin: Carl Heymanns
Verlag, 1910 end 1935), two vols. A brie? survey of the background end
extent of these developments in Europe is contained in Hans Thieme, Das
Naturrecht und die europaeische Privatrechtsgeschichte (Basel: Halbing
& Lichtenhahn, 1954). A more extended treatment is contained in Franz
Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (Goettingen: Vandenhoeck &

2. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage
Books, 1954), it, Bp. 187-90.


8.

enjoyment of their legal rights. The right of the individual to assert

ani defen’ his basic civil freedoms "on terms of equality with others and
by due process of law" was formal in the sense that legal powers were
guaranteed in the absence of public opinion and legal efforts which would
buttress the individual's capacity to use these powers in his om interest.
As Anton Menger observed in 1899: "Our codes of private law do not contedn
®& Single clause vhich assigns to the infividual even such goods anid services

88 are indispensable to the maintenance of his existence.”= In this sense

the equality of citizenship and the inequalities of social class developed
together. oe

This juxtapesition of legal equality and social ani economic
inequalities inspired the great debates over national policies which
characterize the developing political commmities of nineteenth century
Europe. These debates turned as the types and Gegrees of inequality or
insecurity that should be considered intolerable and the methods that
should be used to alleviate them. ‘The spokesmen of a consistent laissez-
faire position sought to ansyver this question within the framework of
formal civil rights; having won legal recognition for the exercise of

"individual rights, they insisted that te be legitimate the government

must abide by the rule of law. It wes consistent with this position that

in mest European countries the first Factory Acts sought to protect women

and chiléren, presumably a policy not simply of humenitarienism but of
safeguarding those who at the time could not he considered citizens in

1. Anton Menger, The Right to the Whole Product of Labor (London:
Macmilian and Ce. 1899), pp. Jatt,


the sense of legal equality.” in terms of this criterion ei11 adult males

vere eltitens wno had the power to engage in the economic struggle and
were, therefore, by definition capable of taking care of thenselves;
acterdingly they were excluded from any legitimate claim to protection.

in this way formally guaranteed rights benefitted the fortunate ani more
Pitfully those who vere legally defined es unequal, while the Whole burden
of rapid economic change fell upon the "leboring poor" and thus provided

@ basis for agitation at an early tim.

This agitation vas bound to he political from the hegimning. One
of the earliest results of the legislative protection of freedom of con-
tract was the legislative prohibition of trede wmions. And where legisla-
tive means were used both to protect the individual's freedom of contract
ani deny the lawer classes the rights needed to avail themselves of the
game freedom (i.e., the right of association), the attacks upon inequality
necessarily broadened. Equality was no longer sought through freedom of
eontract alone, but through the esteblishment of social and political
rights es well. The nation-states of Western Europe can look back on:

1. Ideological equalitarianism as well as an interest in breaking
down femilial restrictions upon the freedom af economic action were pre-e
sumably the reason why protection was first extenied to these most inarti-
culate sections of the “lower class." For a critical analysis of the _
German Civil Cede of 1888 exclusively in terms of the economic interests
its provisions would serve see Anton Menger, Das birgerliche Reeht_und
die besitzlosen Volksklessen (Tibingen: H. Laupp’sche Buchhandiung,
1905). the book was originally published in 1890. This perspective
omits the self-sustaining interest in formal legelity which was the vork
of legal professionals and which led to the prolonged conflict between
legal positivism end the doctrine of natural law. Cf. in this respect
the analysis of Max Weber, Law in Economy and Society (trenslated and
edited by Max Rheinstein aud &. A. Shiis; Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1954), pp. 284-321. See alsa the illusinating discussion of this
point in Fr. Darmstaedter, Die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Rechtsstaates
(Heidelberg: Cari Winters Universi taetsbuchhuandiung, 1930), pp. 52-68.


longer or shorter histories of legislative actions ani administrative

decisions vaich have increased the equality of subjects from the different
strate of the population in terus of their legal capacity end their legal
status.” For each nation-state and for each set of institutions one can
pinpoint chronologies cf the public measures taken and trat2 the sequences
of pressures and counterepressures, bargains and maneuvers behing each
extension of rights beyond the strata of the trafiitionally privileged.
However, the extension of various rights to the lower classes else consti-
tute a patterned development characteristic of each country and such
patterned develoments of the several European countries constitute in
turn the still larger transformation from the estate-societies of the
eighteenth to the welfare-stete of the twentieth centuries.

A comparative study of the extension of citizenship te the lover
elasses will inevitably appear abstract if it be juxtaposed with the speci-
fic development of each country. For while the chronologies of legislative
enactments can be specific enough, they only provide us with en index of
the major steps by which the civic incorporation of the lower claases wes
(or was not) accomplishe’. Moreover, such chronologies only reveal how
the issue of the civic position of the lover classes was resolved in each

country, but not how that issue was faced ani whet policy-alternatives were

1. When all sult citizens are equal before the law and free to
cast their vote, the exercise of these rights depends upon a person's
ability and willingness to use the legal powers to which he is entitied.
On the other hand, the legal status of the citizens involves rights and
duties uhich cannot be voluntarily changed without intervention by the
State. A Giscussion of the conceptual distinction between capacity as
"the legal power of doing” end status as “the legal state of being” is
containeé in Graveson, op. cit., pp. 55-57. -


under consideration. Though this egain has its unique aspect for each

country, a comparative study of several European countries also shows
that the maber of alternative policies wae limited. We shall construct
models of the major alternative policies towards the extension of citizen-
ship and such models can provide us with benchmarks for sn analysis of
changing political structures.

The intrinsic Limitations of the comparative approach deo not
invalidate the attemmt made here. We shall see that the extension of
citizenship te the lower classes has in fact been a genuinely comparable
precess in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe, albeit one that
encompasses unique developments in the countries considered. Each step
om the vay would be illuminated by a fuller consideration of pressures
and counter=pressures than we can give here. But it is also true that

the steps towarés an extension of citizenship proved irreversable once

they hed been taken. Thus, the cumulative legislative enactments merking

this process of extension appear a good bit more significant than when we
look at any one of them and note the considerable degree to uhich legal
enactments are Genied or violated in practice. An often ill-understocd
"yealisn emphasizes this recurrent discrepancy between enactment and
implementation. But this approach is more appropriate in the short run
than for a long-run consideration of historical trends such as we under-
teke in this study.

A comparative analysis of 811 the richts discussed in Marshall's
study would encompass the sequences of decisions by which the nation-
states of the West developed from the estate-societies of the eighteenth

cemtury to the fully developed welfare-states of the twentieth. Our purpose


in the present paper is more limited. We shall focus attention on only

one important aspect of this overall transformation: the entry of the

lower classes into the arena of national politics. Accordingly ve shall

emphasize those policies of most immediate relevance for lower-class
movements seeking to enter national polities.* We shall first consider

gecisions on the right to form associations and on the right to receive

a minimm of formel education: the decisions on these rights get the

stage for the entry of the lower classes and conditioned the strategies

ami activities of lower-class movements once they were formally allowed
to take part in politics. We shall then analyze in some detail similari-
ties and differences in the sequence of decisions on the actual rights

of participation: in this section ve shall be concerned primarily with
the stages in the extension of the franchise and the provisions for the
secrecy of the vote. Finally, we shell suggest a typology of policy-

alternatives for the three sets of rights mentioned above. The extension
of these rights is illustretive of what we have called the civic incor-
poration of the lower classes.

A Basic Civil Right: The Right of Association and Combination

T. H. Mershell stetes that civil rights were essential to = compe-
titive market economy in that "they gave to each man, as part of his
infividusl status, the power to engage as an independent wmit in the

1. By so doing we shall be concerned only incidentally with the

initial and the terminal phases in this process of change: the breakup
of estate-societies through the extension of civil rights and the final

codification end implementation of welfare rights in our modern, "mass-
consumption” societies.


U3.

economic struggle. nde This emphasis on the indepenient individual assumed.
that the pergons of whom the lew took cognizance prossessed the seans to
protect themselves. Ta effect, the law accorded civil rights to those who
owned property or had assured sources of income. All others steod con-
demned by their failure in the economic struggle according to the prevailing
views of the early nineteenth century. The abstract principle of equality
underlying the legal and ideological recognition of the independent indivi-

dual was often the direct cause of greatly accentuated inequalities. In
the present context the most relevant illustration of this consequence was
the law's insistence that the wage-contract was a contract between equals ’
thet employer and worker were equally capable to safeguard their interests.
On the basis of this formal legal equality, workers in many European

countries were denied the right to combine for the sake of bargaining
with their employers. | |

However, this denial of the right to combine raised conceptual
aifficulties from the beginning, as Gid ite later legal recognition. Civil.
rights referred not only to the rights of property ami contract, but also
to freedom of speech, thought, ant faith which incinded the freedom to join
with others in the pursuit of legitimate private ends. Accordingly, the

right of association vas an accepted legal principle by the end of the
eighteenth century, when several European countries (Freuce, Engleni,
Belgium, Netherlands) decided to prohibit the workers’ right to combine

on the ground that conditions of work mist be fixed for each worker by

1. Harshall, op. cit., p- 33. Our italics.


ik.

agreements freely arrived at between individual end individual.? such
legel prohibitions were distinguished, however, from the right to form
religious or political associations, at any rate in the sense thet asso-
clations not specifically prohibited by law were legal. Accordingly,
enactments singled out workmen of various descriptions by special regula-
tions in order to "uphold" the principle of formal equality before the
Law. | | |

This distinction between association and coubination was not made
in all countries, however, and to understand this contrast we must recall
the traditional approach to the master-servant relationship which was
Similar in many Eurcpean countries. Statutory enactments had been used
to reéguiate the relations between masters anid servants and to control the
tendency of masters and journeymen to combine in the interest of raising
prices or wages. Such reguletion increased in importance as guild organi-

zations declined, though govermmental regulations were often made ineffec-

tive by the new problems arising from a quickening economic development.

Efforts to cope with these new problems coulé take several forms.

The goverment could attempt to use an extension of the tradi-
tional devices. ‘This approach hed prevailed for a time in Englend but
then had given way to the distinction between associations which were

allowed and workers’ combinations which were prohibited. However, in the

‘Scandinavian countries and in Switzerland the traditional policies proved

1. Cf. statement by Le Chapelier, author of the French act prohi-
biting trade unions of July 1791, as quoted in International Labour Office,
Freedom of Association (ILO Studies and Reports, Series A, No. 28; London:
P. S. King & Son, 1926), p.- 11. Further references to this five-volume
work will be given in the form ILO Report, No. ..., pp. ...


15.

more successful, perhaps in part because these remained predominantly
agricultural countries. wntil well into the nineteenth century. Moreover,
the breakdown of the "estate society" wes followed by a remarksble proli-
feration of religious, cultural, economic, emi political associations

end, except for a few cases of violent conflicts » governments did little
or nothing either to restrict or to legalize these activities. To be
sure, there were differences here also in the various efforts to cope with
| the mounting unruliness of journeymen and agricultural workers. Still,
mone of these countries went as far as England ned in enacting special
prohibiteory legislation designed to stamp out rather than curb combinations
of workingmen, perhaps because in this traditional setting with its
estate-ideology such a prohibition would have violated the widely accepted
right of association.

However, such reservations did not prevail in Gexmany end Austria,
where the conventional absolutist controls over journeymen's associations
were extended by the end of the elghticenth century to a general prohibi-
tion of all "seeret assemblies" as in the Prussian Civil Code of 179%.

This general prohibition was directed prinofpally against Free Masons ani
other early forms of queasi-political organizations, which were springing
up in response to the ideas and events of the French Revolution, but such
legislation was used incidentally against workingmen’s combinations as
well. A specific prohibition of the latter occurred in Germany only in
the 1840's, although in Austria it had occurred already in 1803. This

absolutist approach may be considered together with policies in other

countries which hed much the same general effect on workingmen's combina-

tions. In countries guch as Italy and Spain restrictions of associational


activity were themselves traditional and local ani hardly required specific

legislative enactmenta to ensure their implementation. In France, on the
other hend, the Jacobin tradition of Girect state-citizens relations led

to the promulgation of the famous Loi Le Chepelier in 1791 and this ten-

dency to restrain all associational pouvoirs intermé@iaires was further

strengthened through the Nepoleonie traditions of plebiscitarian rule.
There vas thus uo want of evidence during the nineteenth century concerning
the close affinity between absolution end plebiscitarian rule. |

Finally, im England, the early invidious distinction between associa
tions and combinations proved difficult to maintain in the long run. for
the right of association permitted political agitation through which the
prohibition of trade unions could be opposed, and although the Repeal Act
of 182h was not effective, its early passage is, nevertheless, symptomatic .
of the considerable flexibility which characterized the administrative
hangling of industrial disputes. Though prosecution of vorkingnen’s
combinations was frequently harsh, such instances need to be belanced
ageinst others in which violations went unpunished because employers would
not lodge complaints and magistrates vould not act in the absence of a
complaint. + |

It appears then that the statutory regulation of master-servant
relations and of journcymen's associations was a European-wide legacy of |
the Middle Ages. When the deeline of the guilé-system together with the

increasing pace of economic develomaent suggested the need for new measures,

1. For details ef. the documents collected by A. Aspinall, ed.,
The Early English Trade Unions (London: Batchworth Press, 1949), passim.


the several Western-Eurepean countries responded with three-broadiy

distinguishable types of policies. ‘The Scandinavian and Swiss type
continued the traditional organization of crafts into the modern periad,
preserving the right of association at the same time that mester-servant
relations as well as journeymen’s associations were regulated by statute.
‘With the guickening of economic development, these countries extended
such regulations to cope with the nev problems. This variant represents
in modified fomn the medieval concept of liberty as a privilege to which
the different estates of the polity are entitled, a concept vhich
eertainly included a statutory reenforcement of existing arrangements.
The second, absolutist type is exemplifieR by the Prussian prohibition
first ef journeymen's associations, then of ell secret assemblies and
finally of the newly formed vorkingmen' % combinations in keeping with
the policy of enlightened ebsolutisn vhich seeks to regulate all

phases of social and economie life. This type represents the major break
with the tradition of liberty as a corporate privilege in the sense that

the king destroys all privileges of the pouvoirs internédiaires, rs
destruction, however, which could be just as tncrondtiqetng unfer plebisci-
terian auspices. Finally, the liberal policy extaplified by England went
from the earlier ‘regulation of guilds and the master-servant relationship

to @ policy which combined the specific prohibition of workingmen's com-
binations with the preservation of the right of association in other respects.
Thus, Liberaliem with ite invidious distinction between association and
combination represents a half-way mark between the preservation of the right
of association es this vas understood in the pre-modern social structure

of Europe, and the complete denial ef the right of association which was an


18.

cuigrovth of absolutist and plebiscitarian opposition to the independent
powers of estates anti corporations.

it is not surprising to find that countries of the first type are
characterized by relatively insignificant histories of repression, vhile
countries of the other two types suppressed vorkingwen' & combinations by
outright prohibition or severe statutory regulations for pericds ranging
from 75 to 120 years. One cen compare countries in terms of this interval
between the first decisive measures taken to repress tendencies towards
workingmen's combinations ani the final decision to accept trate unicns.
In the case of Demmark, for example, that interval comprised 49 years,
in England 76 years, and in Prussia/Cermany either 105 or 124 years,
depending on whether one considers 1899 or 1918 as the date most appro-
priate for the legal recognition of trafe unions. But the dating of such
intervais is problematic. The early acts of repression inevitably blurred
the distinction between a mere extension of traditional regulations and
@ novel and harsher prohibition waich singled out the newly developing
working class for special treatment. Similarly, it is difficult to date
the finel legalization of trade unions precisely, since in most cases
such legalization eccurred gradually. But despite these difficulties of
quentificetion, it is apparent that an examination of legislative measures
aliows us to formulate ea rough, threefold typology of the manner in which
the different polities ected with regard to the extension of the right of
association to the lower classes.

We tura now from a consideration of different types of policy
concerning the right to combine es such to a more substantive issue raised

by the organization of trade unions, once these are legally permitted.


19.

Among the large sumer ef such issues ve focus ettenticn on trade unions
as an example of corporate organization in the developing nation-states

of Western Europe. That trade unions or other combinations of that kini
would perpetuate, or reestablish, corporate principles was recognized
eerily." In his argument against mrtusal benefit societies Le Chapelier
gave striking expression to this view in his 1791 speech to the Consti-

tuent Assembly to which reference was made earlier:

Tae bodies in question have the avowed object of procuring
relief for workers in the same occupation who fall sick or
become unemployed. But let there be no mistake about this.
It is for the nation an@ for public officials on its behalf
to supply work to those who need it for their livelthood and
to suecour the sick.... It should not be permissible for
citizens in certain occupations to meet together in defence
of their pretended comion interests. There must be no more
guilés in the State, but only the individual interest of each

‘ citizen and the general interest. No one shall be allowed to
arouse in any citizen any kind of intermediate interest and
to separate him from the public weel through the medium of
corporate interests.=

This radically plebiscitarian position which would not tolerate the organi-
gation ef any "intermediate interest," proved to be difficult to maintain
consistentiy. For the individualistic tendencies of the economic sphere,
which were in part responsible for this position, were likewise respon-
sible for legal developments which undermined it. A growing exchange
economy with its rapid Giversification of transactions gave rise to the
question how the legal significance of every action could be determined

unambiguously. This question was answered by the device of attributing

i. We do not go into the question of the continuity or discontinuity
between medieval and modern corporations, 2 problem treated at length in
the writings of Figgis, Glerke, Maitlend, end others. _

2. Quoted in ILO Report, No. 29, p. 89.


legal personality to organizations like business firms and hence by
separating the legal spheres of the stockholders and officials from the
legal sphere of the organization itsere.* The device of incorporation
which established the separate legal liability of the organization and
thus limited the liability of its individual members or agents, was 2
most important breach in the strictly plebiscitarian position. Though
"limited liebility"” was denounced at the time as an infringement of indivi-~
dual responsibility, the massive interests served by this new device soon
overcame an objection based on the concept of obligation. In retrospect
it is easy to see that incorporation was the first step towards a limita~-
tion of thet radical inéividualism which was expressed both through the
strictly formel equality before the lew and the plebiscitarian intelerance
of "intermediate interests."

Mershell has stated that in the field of civil rights “the move-
ment has been. . mot from the representation of commmities to that of
individuals /as in the history of parliament/, but from the representa-
tion of inflividusis to that of commnities."@ From an individualistic
standpoint the device of incorporation and the related principle of limited
liability makes it possible for en economic enterprise to take risks and
maximize economic essets on bebalf and for the benefit of individual share-
holders. Through its officials the enterprise thus performs a representa-
tive function in the sense that it makes decisions and assumes responsibilities

1. Max Weber, Lew in Economy anf Society (translated and edited by
Mex Rheinstein anf BE. A. Shils; Cambridge: Harvaré University Press, 195%),
pp. 156-57 ff. The editors have added references to the extensive litera-
ture in this field.

2. Marshall, op. cit., p. ‘4.


for the collectivity of its investors, though that collectivity is fre-

quently composea of other corporate groups as well as of individuals.
Through much of the nincteeath century this representative function of
the corporation was confined to economic goals. Hovever, such concepts
as "corporate trusteeship,"” the development of public reletions, end
direct political participation by many large corporations suggest that
in recent decades this earlier restriction has been abandoned -- a
development whose significance for citizenship still. needs to be explored.
These considerations provide useful background for en under-
standing of the special position of trede unions. As Marshall bas pointed
out, trade unions: |
»eeGid not seek or obtain incerporation. They can, there-
fore, exercise vitel civil rights collectively on behalf of
their mexbers without formal collective responsibility, while
the infividual responsibility of workers in relation to con-
tract is largely wenforceable....1
If we take the prohibition or severe restriction of combinations as our
starting-point, then trade umions also exemplify the movement of civil
rights from the representation of individuals to that of commmities.
This collective representation of the econcwie interests of the members
arose from the inability of the workers to safeguard their interests
individually. ‘But the civil right which eventually permitted the workers
to combine, altered the formal equality before the law, as the device of
incorporation had done in another manzer. Trade unions and hence the
civil rights which legalized trade unions were employed to raise the

economic status of their members. Ey eollective action workers sought to

1. Ibid., p. 43. The following discussion is based on Marshall's
analysis on pp. 43-kh, but our emphasis differs somewhet.


attain that level of economic revard to which they felt entitled, though

in practice they felt entitled to vhatever level their capacity to organize
and bargain ensbled them to obtain. But these practical achievements of
trade union organization hed a fer-reaching affect upon the status of
workers es citizens. For through trade unions and collective bargaining
the right to combine was used to agsert "basic claims to the elements of
social justice."* tn this way the extension of citizenship to the lower
classes was given the very epectal meaning thet as citizens the members of
these classes were entitled to a certain stenfard of well-being, in return
for which they were only obliged to discharge the ordinary duties of citi-
zenship. Theve is, therefore, a fundamental discrepancy between claims
ani responsibilities, if the workers’ right to combine is considered in
its bearing on citizenship.

The legalization of trade unions is an instance of enabling legis- .
lation. It permitted members of the lower classes to organize for the
purpose of bargaining collectively and thus to obtain an equality of
bargaining pover which @ previously imposed, formal legal equelity had
denied them. But to achieve this end it became necessary, as we saw, to
discriminate in favor of "conbinations" by allowing them legal exemptions
without which the disadvantaged groups would have been unable to organize
effectively. In other words, civil rights are used here as an instrument
enabling the lower classes specifically to participate more effectively
than would otherwise be the case in the economic end political struggle
over the distribution of the national incom. |

1. Ibid., p. kh.


23.

However,many members of the lower classes either would not avail
themselves of the opportunities afforded them by the law or were prevented
from doing so by the exclusivist or neo-corporatist devites of established

trade unions. Hence, these legal opportunities have in effect turned into

privileges avedleble to individuals who qualify by being willing ani able
to organize in order to advance their economic interests. Such privileges
have been buttressed, in turn, by @ whole series of legal, extra-legal,
and iliegal devices to make union-membership obligatory or to make
nonuembership very costly. That the right to combine continues to be

a “privilege of those organized in trade unions" is, in a sense, @ measure
of the weakness of corporatist tendencies in modern Western societies,
since the same right more generally applied would mean the mewibership of
every adult in an organization representative of his occupation. But the
right toe combine has, on the other hand, given rise to a "eorporatist
enclave.” The very effectiveness of exclusivist practices by trade urions
makes membership obligatory, however beneficial it may be, ané it is
often related to the failure of drives for new members. In this wey the
right to conbine can be used to enforce claims to a disproportionately
high share of income and benefits at the expense of the unorganized and
the consumers. This exceptional position of some trate unions hes not
altered the principle that civil rights are permissive rather than oblige-
tory, though it may be said to have infringed won it. This enduring
permissiveness of civil rights needs special emphasis because of its
intrinsie importance. Im the present context it should be noted also
because of the contrast with the second element of citizenship, social

rights, to which we now turn.


A Basic Social Right: The Right to an Elementary Education

‘Im one sense, the right to en elementary education is similar to
the “right to combine.” As long es masses of the population are deprived
even of ele nentery education, access to edxicational facilities appears as
a precondition without which ell other rights under the lav remain of no
avail to the uneducated. To provide the rudiments of education to the
illiterate thus appears as an act of liberation. Nonetheless, social rights
are distinctive in that they do not usually permit the Individual to decide
whether or not to avail himself of thelr advantages. Like the legislative
regulation of vorking conditions for women and children, dompalecry insurance
against industriel accidents and similer welfare measures, the right to an
elementary education is indistinguishable from the duty to attend school.
In all Western societies elementary education has become a duty of citizen-
ship, perheps the earliest exemple of a prescribed minimm level of living
enforced by all the povers of the modern state. Two attributes of elemen-
tary education make it into an element of citizenship: the goverment has
authority over it and the parents of all children in a certain age-group
(usually from 6 to 10 or 12) are required by law to see to it that their
children attenii school.

Secial rights as an attribute of citizenship ( such as the right

to an elementary education with its associated duty of attendance) may
be considered benefits which compensate the infividual for his consent
to be go@med unfer the rules and by the agents of his national political
commaity.+ It is certainly importent to note the element of agreement

i. This formulation is indebted to the perceptive analysis by
Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic (New York: Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1960), Chapter II.


or consensus which is at the reot of rights anid duties that pertain to all

eitizens. But in doing so in the present context we should emphasize that

the rights and duties which all citizens share automatically posit a
direct relationship between the central organs of the nation-state and

each member of the commmity, whether efult, adolescent, or child, and the

consequent suppression of all pouvoirs intermédiaires, eat least es far as

these social rights are concerned. Earlier in this discussion we referred
te the plebiscitarian principle according to which es citizens all adults

in the emerging nation-states possessed equal rights before the sovereign
nation-state, such as the right of participation in the decision-making
processes of goverment. Now, in turning to a consideration of social
rights, we find another principle of equality, the obligatory participa-
tion of each eligible individual in the services provided by the state.

It is som¢uhat avkward to use the term “plebiecitarian" for this second
principle as well, yet there is a femily-resemblance between participation
in decision-making anil cbligatory school-attendance. Im the fully developed
welfare-state the people as voters have decided to provide the services

in which the people as citizens are then obliged to participate. To be
sure, the right to vote is permissive in contrast to the benefits of
gchool attendance which are obligatory. But we would emphasize that both
are principles of equality which esteblish a direct relationship between
the central organs of the uation-state and each member of the commmity,

and this direct relationship is the specific meaning of national citizenship.

1. See page 3 above.


| association and the right to combine. Though these civil rights are in

26.

It may he useful to reiterate the major distinctions at this point.
There is first the distinction between en indirect and a direct relation
bet¥een the nation-state ani the citizen. We have discussed the indirect

relationship in the preceding section in connection with the rights to

principle available to all alike, in practice they are claimed by clesses
of persons vho share certain sociel anf economic attributes. This
practice is in part responsible for the continued importance of group-
representation even after the earlier, medieval principle of privileged
jurisdictions has been replaced by equality before the law. In now

turning to the direct relationship hetween the nation-state and the

citizen we consider social rights before we turn to the discussion of

political rights, in part because the principle of obligation incumbent

on all citizens developed alongside with, and often indeed preceded, the
principle of political rights. Perhaps the reason for this is the simple
one, that the extension of the franchise wmequivocally destroys privilege
and enlarges the active participation of the people in public affairs,
while the extension of sociel rights with its emphasis upon obligation

may leave privilege intact end broadens the duties ani benefits of the

. people without necessarily encouraging their social mobilization.

There is clear indication, at any rate, that on the Continent the
principle of an elementary education for the lower classes emerged as a
by-product of enlightened absolutism. In Denmark, for example, Frederick
IV established elementary schools on his ones “omaine as early as 1721 and
provided them with sufficient resources and a permanently employed teaching
staff. Attempts to follow through with this policy felled, because the


27.

landed proprietors evadeii their responsibility for the employment and
remmeration of teachers by imposing charges for teacher-salaries on

the peasants who could 111 afford them. Follewing the principal measures
alleviating the obligations imposed on the peasants (1787-88), Frederick
VI proceeded to esteblish a new organization of elementary schools which
has remained the basis of national education since 181k.

This Danish development may be compared with the corresponding
development in Prussia vhich suggests some of the problems encountered
where not only conservatism but the special mixture of absolutism and
nationalism became evident in the program of a system of umtional educa-

tion. The profomdly conservative purpose of this program is not in

Goubt. In 1737, a basic Prussian school law was issued with the commen-

tary that it had grieved the king to see youth living and growing up in
darkness thus suffering damage both temporally an@ to their eternal souls.
On this ceccasion the King donated a sum to facilitate the employment of
capable teachers, ani for several decades thereafter the Prussian kings
and their officials sought to promote the scheme on the basis of auch
incidental eppropristions. By 1763 a full-fledged ordinance was issued
regulating school affairs for the entire monarchy and including provisions
for disciplinary measures ageinst teachers who neglected their duties, thus

at least envisaging a regular edministration of the schools. At the same

time efforts were made to alleviate the teacher-shortage by earmarking

speciel funds for this purpose, though these measures from above encountered

difficulties below both in the reluctance of parents to send their children
toe scheol and of local bodies to assume their share of the financial respon-
sibility. By the end of the century, in 1794, the schools (together with


28.

the universities) were. declared institutions of the State, and in the
ensuing years the hole system of nationel education became paxt of the
national liberation movement agaiust Nepoleon. Although some officials
hed publicly expressed their doubts concerning the usefulness of literacy
for the ordinary man, military defeat and patriotic enthusiasm generally |
removed such doubts. Numerous official declarations demanded that ell
subjects without exception should be provided with useful knowledge; |
time and egain reference was made to a pational education whose object
it was to raise the moral, religious, and patriotic spirit of the people.” |
In all probability national education became acceptable to the conserva-

tive rulers in Prussie on the ground that it provided a vehicle for

instilling loyalty for king and country in the masses of the population.
If under these special conditions even ultra-conservatives found a
national system of elementary education acceptable, it is well to remenber |
that in the field of military recruitment the same effort to mobilize the
people in the wars of liberation led to great controversies and provoked
& a strong reaction once the immediate danger vas passed.” Thus,

aa NS a Cea aot hy NE Lata

enlightened absolutism may be considered the reluctant or equivocal
pioneer of extending social rights to the people. I% could enéorse the
principle that nothing showld intervene between the king and his people

and hence that the king ovt of his own free will distributes benefits

1. ‘The preceding two paragraphs are based on A. Petersilie, Das
Offentliche Unterrichtswesen (Vol. ITI of Hand- und tehrbuch der staats-
wissenscharten; Leipzig: C. L. Hirschfeld, 1897), I, pp. 203-4, 158-66
and passin.

2.For details see the excellent study by Gerhard Ritter, Staats-
kunst und Kriegshandwerk (Mimchen: R. Olderbourg, 1959), I, Chapters
4 end 5.


29.

among them. But absolutism naturally insisted that the people were the
king's subjects and rejected the idea of national citizenship and hence
of rights and duties derived from, ani owed to, the abstract concept of
the nation-state.*

This, however, was the basic idea of liberalism. The contrast
is at once political an@ religious. In Prussia the ministers of the
church could easily be recruited inte the teaching profession because

ministers as well as teachers were under the supervision of the govern-

ment and ultimately subject to the sovereign authority of the king.

Indeed, teaching had generally been in the hantis of the clergy throughout
Europe. But where, as in France, the Catholic clergy was under an
authority separate from that of the state, the establishment of a national
system of education and hence of a direct reletionship between each
citizen amd the government became incompatible vith the existing system.
In his Essai d'éducation nationale, published in 1763, Le Cheloteis

opposed the eleray's control of education by deman@ing that the teaching
or letters ani science should be in the hands of a secular profession.

1. The significance of absolutist regimes for elementary education
yaried, of course, with the prevailing religious beliefs of the country.
In Austria, elementary education was orSenized by the govermment as early
as 1805, with the clergy ecting as the supervisory agent of the stete.

In Catholic countries with less religious unity than Austria such an
approach did not prove possible; in France, for example, the traditional
Catholie claim te superintend education was challenged in the 1760's
with the suppression of the Jesuits an®@ the endorsement of a naticnally
organized system of lay-education. (See below.) Again, in countries with
Protestant stete churches (Prussie, Denmark, Norway, and Sveden) little
or no conflict developed as the unity of church and state in the person
of the monarch allowed for the ultimate authority of government over
elementary eGuceation, with ministers of the church acting in this field
as agents of the monarch or (leter) of a Ministry for educational and
ecclesiastical affairs.


30.

After observing that distinguished men of letters are laymen rather than
Cleries, and that "idle priests" overrun the cities while the country is
deprived of clergy, Le Chalotais continues:

To teach letters and sciences, we must have persons who
make of them a profession. ‘The clergy camnot take it in bed
part that we shoulé not, generally speaking, include eccle-
Biastics in this class. I am not so unjust as to excliie
them from it. I acknowledge with pleasure that there ere
several...who are very learned end very capeble of teaching
veces But I protest against the exclusion of laymen. I claim

_ the right to demand for the Netion an education that will

depend woon the Stete alone; because it belongs essentially

to it, because every mation has an inaliensble and impre-

scriptible right to instruct its members, and finally because

the children of the State should be educated by members of

the State.+
The statement parallels the plebiscitarian principle emmcisted by Le.
Chadelier which we quoted earlier.= Where Le Chapelier had argued |
against mutual benefit societies on the groumi that no "intermediate
interest" should be allowed to separate any citizen from the "public weal
through the medium of corporate interests," La Chelotais here echoes the
same igea in his argument against the clergy. There must be ea profession
of teachers which is entirely at the disposel of the State, in order to
implement a program of instruction in vhich nothing intervenes between
the "children of the State" and the teachers who are servants of the
State. |

At a later time the principle of a national system of elementary

education also became acceptable to the emerging industrial workforce.

1. See La Chalotais "Essay on National Education,” in F. de la
Fontainerie, e@., French Liberalism and Education in the ee
Century (New York: MeGraw-HilIT Book Company, 1932), pp. 52-53.

2. See above p. 19.


3i.

Among laborers the desire to become eduented was strong, partly to better
their chances in life, partly to see to it that workers' children had a
better chance than their parents, ami partly in order to give additional
weight to the political claims mde on behalf of the working class. If
this Gesire led to voluntary efforts to provide educational facilities for
workers, as it did notably in England and Germany, such action was largely
@ response to the fact that no | other Pacilities were available to then.
Once these facilities became available, voluntary efforts in the field of
workers' education declined (though they did not cease), presumably another
indication of the relative weakness of corporatist tendencies. It is
probable, therefore , that systems of national education developed as widely
as they did, because the demand for elementary education cut across the
spectrum of political beliefs. After all, it was susteined by such diver-
gent arguments as thet the people's inherent unruliness necessitated
introduction in the fundamentals of religion and loyalty to king and church,
that the nation-state demanded a citizenry educated by organs of the state,
and that the masses of the people vho helped to create the vealth of the
country should share in the amenities of civilization.

Compulsory elementary education became a major controversial issue,
nevertheless, where governmental authority in this field came into conflict
with organized religion. Traditionally, the Catholic Church regarded

teaching as one of its inherent povers with the work of instruction being
conducted by the religious orders. In this view the corporate principle

WAS paramount in the sense that the Church administered man's “spiritual

estate" and in this field possessed the exclusive right and duty of

representation. We saw that in France this principle >


32.

was challenged during the eighteenth centuty with the result that conflict
over clerical or lay-control of education has lasted to this day: Such
conflicts have persisted in countries where the population is divided into
sharply antagonistic religious groupings. That is to say, a national
system of elementary education as a basic social right of all eitizens

end hence, in this educational field, a direct relationship between each
citixen end the nation-state, has been opposed, wherever the Church
or/veligious denominations have insisted upon interposing. their own,
uncontrolled educational facilities between their adherents and the State.
fhus, countries like England, Belgium, end the Netherlands have been the
scene of protracted struggles over the question, whether or under what
conditions the national government should be permitted to give assistance
er to exercise authority in the field of elementary education. In England,
for exemple, voluntary contributious in aid of education amounted, in 1858,
to double the amount of support provided by the goverment, though it is
true thet since 1870 a new system of State schools hes grown up alongside
those based on voluntary contributions. Still, both methods of control
and of finance refiect until well into the modern period a system of
state-measures in aid of local and voluntary efforts, so thet elements of
the corporate principle have been preserved despite the steady growth or
a national system of education.? Perhaps the most outstanding example of

the corporate or representative principle in the field of education is

1. See the historical sketch of the English educational development
in Ernest Barker, The pavelopment . of Public Services in Western Evrope (New
York: Oxford University Press, 194%), pp. 85-93 end the comparative account
by Robert Ulich, The Education of Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1961), passim. | |


33-

provided by Holland with its three separate school systems: one Catholic,
one Calvinist, and one seculear-humanist. ‘The significant fact here is
thet all three systems are financed by the government and ali three are
pased on the principle of obligatory attendance, thus neatly conbining
the plebiscitarian principle in the field of finance with the representa-
tive principle in the organizational and substantive control over the

educational process.


5

Ju ie ;

pleco wae ty ae! BATSONAL CUPIZENEHTP TO THE LOWER CLASSES;
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

‘
: by.
Pay F

Reinhard Bendix = isa Stein Rokkan
University of California The Chr. Michelsen Institute

Berkeley .- Silas Pe : Bergen

’ Introduction

This paper focuses on the extension of national citizenship to
economically, socially, and eulturelly dependant subjects. within the

territoriel population of developing nation-states. . H. Marshall maie

this the central theme in his pathbreaking study of citizenship end, foetal
ciess,? He. concentrated his discussion on Great Britein; our ein is to

compare the extension of ‘rights eeross a muniber of Western European

3 nation-states and to develop some bench-mark "models" for this purpose.

We detailed documentation is ettempted here: our paper represents oue

step in a serios of vritings on the politics of national development and

will, it is hoped, be followed Paes in greater actai1.?

1. (contrtage: The University Press, 1950), pp. 1-85.

2. The paper is a direct sequel +6. two articles by Reivhard Bendix,
"Social Stratification and the Political Commmnity,"” Arch. eur. de socicl.,

Vol. 1, No. 2 (1960), pp. 181-210 and "The Lower Classes end the Democra-
tie Revolution,” Industriel Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1961), PP. O1-116. —
A& sociological approach to the extension of political rights to the "lover

classes" (tenants, mamuel workers, and others in positions of economic

_ dependence) and to women has been outlined by Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage,

Secret Voting and Political Participation,” Arch eur. de sociol., Vol. 2,
No. 1 (1961), pp. 132-152; ef. also S. Rokkan amd H. Valen, “the Mobilisa-
58 of the Periphery," Acta Sociol., Vol. 5, Nos. 1-2 (1962), pp. it
1


| In a modern political commmity national citizenship is e status
as condition of public concern, which most persons assume by virtue of
their birth and continue to enjoy throughout life, provided they do not
forfeit the rights and obligations pertaining to that status by acts
signifying their allegionee to e foreign state. The concept "citizenship"
stands for equality, since in their status as @ citizen all edults of a
modern political cormunity are alike in certain respects. National
cltizenship could not exist in this sense as long as most criteria of
social differentiation were synonyms for inequalities of political or.
public rights as well. Exelusion of people from the direet exercise of
public rights ws, on, a legal implication of thet social and economic
disabilities. ‘The tegi tinny of this exelusion came to be questioned ,
only when the religious idea of an equality of believers under God was
‘gredually superseted by 0 secular {deal of equality. Following the
Féin: Revolution this: tranefdraktien is the climate of opinion was
reflected ‘in lower-class protests Which turned earlier types of protest.
into demands for en equality of citizenship in the national political
commmity.>— In response to these Senands , in efforts to forestall then
or make then politically {nnecucus,.- certain public rights and obligations
have been extent’ to persons who have few possessions, low ineome, itysie
prestige ana who because of these disabilities are here: eeerppocmicres as
belonging to the “lower classes.”* —

3. Cf. Cf. Bendix, “The Lower Classes and the 'Demoeretic Revolution,"
Op. cit., pp. 96-100, 105-113 for en analysis of this change in the types of
protest.

4, Our formation emphasizes the classificatory sense in which we
propose to use the term and thus leaves open the question which sections of
/ footnote continues next page/

- Our comparisons with regard to the extenetiia: of citizenship will |
be confined to several countries of Western Burope. AenerUneny we shall
employ categories that are sppropriate to: certain fetes of Eur pean
- civilization end that cannot be applied elsewhere without further serutiny.
| Following the Frenct revolution most: Western-European countries undervent :
. ‘process of seinalay agitation demanding the extenaion of rights to the

: "lower —- some perern of resistance to this agitation by the
privileged or established. sections of the population, end the eventual
eecomnodatiion ‘through a new definition rights end duties on a national
level. This overall pattern presupposes the existence of a pervasive

earlier sattert; the estate-societies of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. _ ‘Under this | earlier pattern, _group-representation was so well

developed that nineteenth-century agitation for an cchantine of citizen-
ship was frequently couched in demands for a civie recognition of the

fourth estate. ‘Yet this prine tpis of xepreoenees te specifically of the |
"lover orders” which hed been excluded from political particiyetion

; heretofore, had to compete from the bests with the RISE eeerees es

principle according to which all adultes in the euerging nation-state were |
equal ex hence as citizens possessed an equal right of participation 2
the decision-making processes of government.’ ‘The earlier system, the

(Footnote & cont.) the lower classes so defined develop a capacity for
concerted action, and under what circumstences. This emphasis is appro-
priate here, because the extension of citizenship ~~ while in some measure
| response to protest or the result of anticipating protest -- occurred
with reference to broadly and abstractly defined, i.e. classificatory
groups like all adultes over 21, or women, or adults a specified pro-

perty holdings, etc.

«= 5. These brie? sentences can do no oe than suggest the. histerical
and tay tastowes eonlitions of European societies. Comprehensive treatment
/footnete contirmes next pege/


agitation against: ite tnoqualtties in terne of these two coupeting prime

. ; ciples, and the eventual, secomodation of the lower classes ina system

Ss of national citizenship are characteristic outgrowths: of European history,

| ‘#9 much co thet the Gorm historian Obio Hintze dentes the inliyeneus -
a development of. consti tutienalion anywhere else. e. 3
Ta a@ comparative study such as the one sketched below it is s tnportant as

ee so to remain awexe of the ‘framework within which compari sons and contrasts:
PS are etteupted. yy confining, ouréelves. to the “Mfeotern-Buropeun experience
we will not only eecontuate the: untforuttios. of that Premevors; but also

exelute other patterns af nation-building. We can only suggest what some
of these other ‘patterns are. ; in the case of the Buropean frontier-settie-

nents in Horth verte, justrelie, and New Zeslant immigrents were rele~
tively free to seleet ‘from their European legacies those elenente Waich

would provide the ‘foundation of these new political commmities. | Equality

, enoba 5 cout.) of these problems 4s piitiense in severel recent publi- aes.

gations. Cf. the striking, synthesizing enalysis of estate-societics in

_ the late eighteenth century by R. R.. Palmer, The of the Democratic
fae 1959). ‘The distinction —

between the representative end the plebiscitarian principle is doi
end. elaborated = Ernst ees. Bis. Die. Beppassestetive und die Plebiszitacre

Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University

| Tucbingen: J. 6. BS tee > 1955). ‘the influence “of the “estate~_

ideoloey” usdér social protest in the nineteenth century is exemplified sa |

the study by Asa Briggs, "The Lenguage of 'Class' in Early Nineteenth
Century England," in Asa Briggs amd John Saville, eds., Essay aan
History in Memo of G. D. H. Cole (London: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 43-
‘Of plebiecitiarianiem is documented in J. L. ‘falmon, The
Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 107.

6. See his . ‘Weltgeschichtliche Vertaseug fi der Repraesentativ-
verfassung,” in Otto Hintze, Steat und Ve Vol. I of Gesemmelte —

 Abhundlungen zur Al inen | eee 3 Goettingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 1 Ms DP. 0-85. wes ee

sh, eget AE, si Sig nee pone Se Ae sty PeS SiS ae, Bi ate


i Se

oy

of citizenship was institutionalized quite early, not only beciese of the
social and religious background of the immigrants, but also because the
indigenous populations were small enough to be suppressed or segregated.
Where, as in the United States, the slave-trade and the endl ee rv

inmmigrant-labor on a large scale subsequently introduced ethnically or

racially distinct groups into the body politte, the result was equality
of citizenship for the dominant majority of the poodiution at the expense
not only of the social and economic but also the legal and political
status of these subordinated and oppressed groups. L tn this setting there
is at present more prospect of a substantial equality of eltizenship for 7

the vhole population than is the case in the frontier settlements of

Aaron emis ite

South Africa and of several latin American countries > where ‘the native

population is te the majority while ey. of citizenship anong the

settlers has turned into a hereditary privilege of the continent ethnic
minority. 7 stl. enother development of eitizenship bik totacsis to charac-
terize the “pew nations," in which nations ettizenshtp is cihendot to

the Lower classes rere @ successful revolution or the establishment,

é of independence frou colonial rule. In these cases a uinority of Western-

educated leaders typieally tenthe with the Sail eetten of couprehenaive
rights Followed by campeigns of maae-nobilization. The ain is to break
down otinttie ties of kinship and hae cumin in order to enlist the masses
in the nation-building effort : oe end the rights of ei tisemaip may then
be aiPeteult to distinguish from ‘the duty of mass-participation. G2 tk

7. There is, of course, e great diversity of conditions among these
countries which such bo tef statements cannot be expected to characterize.
We are merely attempting to set off the distinguishing features of the
material to be analyzed below. |


_ these cases political institutions are used to effect the social and

| economic transformtion of the country in contrast to Western Europe
Where such transformations hed already undermined absolutiem and the
estate structure of society when the attempt was made to accomodate the
rising third and fourth estates in a reordered political structure. Tt
ts Iuportant to mention this contrast, for it serves to remind us that
the conception of political change as Aebiadeak upon prior social and

economic changes is a direct by-product of Western-Duropean eiuters.” : ae ,

| Elements in National Citizenship ce
| i E. mraght yb gee he ures basic a, we national
ine citizenship: Tee, ee f ;

~ civil rights ‘pial, as *taperty | of gaxton, freedom of speech,
| - thought and faith, the right to own property end to conclude —
valid contracts, ond the right to justice’; Ss i
~ pol Litical rights such as the franchise and the right of access . Ae
te public office; — | ;
- social rights ranging from ' ids whale’ Neidio ok aoscuunlh , 3
 weltare ent semrtty to the right to share to the full in the = *
| as social heritage and to Live the life of a civilized being . | ie
according to the stendanis prevailing in the society. C |
Four sets of public institutions correspond to these three elements —
of citizenship: |

the eourts, for the safeguarding of civil rights and, specifically, :

a “Por an eilaborakion of this em cf. R. Bendix, "Social Strati-
fication we the Political Community," Op. cit.


a

for the protection of all rights extended to the less articulate

menbers of the national commnity;

the local and national representative bodics as avenues of

access to participation ahs public decision-meking and legislation;
the social services, to ensure some minimum of protection

pee ae poverty, sickness, ent other wisfortunes, and the schools,
to make it possible for ell weubers of the commmity to receive

at least the basic elements of an education.

The nature of these rights of citizenship must be discussed briefly
before we can turn to our comparative analysis of how they were extenied
in the several countries of Western Europe. Modern citizenship emerged
with the estebListuent of equal rights pares the law.so that the indivi-
dual was free to conclude valid vusnigitanierg to eapeire, and dispose of,
property. ius the French Declaration of the Rights of Non end of the :

Citizen states:
“Liberty consists ‘i dete beehhdng that ies tk Wa
others; thus, the only Limits to the natural rights of any
man are those which guarantee the same rights to the other
ps of society. Tpeee limits can only be fixed ~
Liberty 80 defined navies the equality of eltizenship by ‘iidhirned alla the
legal protection of inherited privileges. Citizenship was extended in

the sense that each men now possessed the right to act as an independent

9. In conneetion with this distinction between the natural man
and the eitizen during the nineteenth century ef. Loewith's analysis of
the problem of bourgeois society in the writings of Rousseau, Hegel,

Marx, Stirner, Kierkegaard, Cortes, Proudhon, Toequeville, Sorel and
Nietzsche in Karl loewith, Von Hegel zu Nietasche (Zuerieh: Europe
Verlag, 1941), pp. 255-63.


_- Athlone Press, 1953), vp. 14-32.
ved Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and France sce J. W. Hedemam,. Die

unit; however, the law only defined his legal capacity, it was silent

on his sbility to use it. In addition, civil rights were extended to
‘illegttimate children, foreigners and Jews; the principle of legal
‘equality helped to eliminate hereditary servitude, equalize the status

of husbend and wife, cireuseribe the extent of parental pover, facili-
ate divorce, and Legalize civil marriage. Accordingly, the extension —
of eivil rights benefited geveral. inarticulate sections of the anil elbenn,
& ede which gave a positive libertarian meaning to the legal recognition

_of individuality.

“Still, this gain of legal oqueltty by several sections of the
“lower classes” ‘stood side by side with the fact that only the. soctaliy

% prominent end the economically successful were able to take ‘advantage of |

the opportunities made aveilable. by lew. Toaquerille and others pointed

i out that in medieval society many dependent persons hed been protected
: in some neasure against the harshness of life by custom and paternal
: benevolence, albeit at the price of personal subservience. ‘Pne new
me freeden of the wage-contrect quickly destroyed vhatever protection SF:
that kind haf existed. For a the at least, no new protections were

instituted in place of the old; henee class prejudice and economic an, sara
ties readily excluded the vast majority of the lower class from the enjoyment

‘lo. ce. R H. ieaoenia: Status in the Common Law (London: ‘The
6e legal developments

sehritte. des Zivilrechts im

. Jaaviwndert (Berlin: Carl Heymanne
5), two vols. A

lef survey of the background and

extent of these dovelopeents in Europe is contained in Hans Thiene, Das

Naturrecht und — ische Privatrechtsgeschichte (Basel: Halbing
& dcktenhain, 1954). ra treatment 18 containcd in Franz
Wieacker, Privatrechts chichte der Newzeit ( Goettingen: Vastentionsk &s

Ruprecht, 1952), esp. 197-Ci6 end passin.

die ane “3 tli tn a Desorter in fnerica (New York: vintage
books, 1954), Il, pp- “2 :


9.

of their legal rights. The right of the individual to assert end defend
: ‘hie diese civil freedoms “on terms of equality with others and by duc

process of Lew" was formal in the sense that legal powers were guarenteed
in ‘the absence of ‘public opinion and Legal efforts which would buttress
the individual's capacity to use these povers in his own interest. As
Akon Menger observed in 1899: "Our eiles of tetvate law do ‘uct contain
® single cleuse which essigns to the individual even such goods and
services as are Indispensable to the maintenance of his existence. wl2

in this: sense the equality of cee? and the inequalities of social
cless developed tegather.

| Tais juxtaposition of legal equality and social end economic
inequalities Aneyize the great debates over national policies which
characterize ‘the beveteping political communities of nineteenth century
Europe. Apnea, debates turned on the types and degrees of inequality sud
insecurity thet Should be considered intolerable and the methods that wots
stiould be used to alleviate thie, ‘the byokesuma of a consistent i | q
: iniuees-taire position sougnt to answer this queation within the | 4 .
frameworks of formel civil rights; having won legal recognition for
the exercise of individual rights, they insisted thet to be legitimate
the government mast abide by the iit of law. It was consistent with
thia position that in most European countries the first Factory Acts
sought to protect women and children, presumably a policy not simply

of humaniterienion but of safeguarding those who at the time could not |

12, Anton Menger, The Right to the Whole Product of Labor (Lonfon:

Mecmillen and Co., 1899), pp. 3


10.

be considered citizens in the sense of Legal equality.» In terms of
this criterion all adult males vere citizens who had the power to engage
in the economic struggle and were, therefore, by definition capable of
talking ¢ cere of themselves; accordingly they were exeluied fron any.
Legitimate Wisin to protection. In this wey formally guaranteed rights
‘benefitted the fortunate ond more fitfully those vho were legally defined
as unequal, while the vaole burden of rapid economic change fell upon .
the "laboring poor” and. thus provided a basis for agitation at an early
time. ; Rh
| “Mato agitation vas bound to be political from the begiming. Parag

of the earliest results of the legislative protection of freedon of 7
tontrant Was the ‘Legislative prohibition of trade unigtis: And han
“legislative means vere used both to protect the individual's freedon of

contract ant deny the lover classes the rigito necded to avail thensclves a
of ‘the same freedou (ives, the. sight of association), the attacks ‘upon
* adelaty necessarily broadened. - Bquality vas no longer sought through
freedom of coutract Ses but. rou the establishment of.  eocial and

oi “wa. Ideological Seat iviaaiibied as well as an interest in Oe Ne .
down familial restrictions upon ‘the freedom of economic ection were pre-—

suuably the reason vhy protection was first extended to these most. inarti- — :

culate sections of the “lower class." For a critical analysis of the
German Civil Code of 1888 exclusively in terms of the economic interests |
its provisions would serve see Anton Menger, Des blirgerliche Recht und
besitzlosen Volksklassen (Tibingen: H. Leupp'sche Buchhandlung,

: : published in 1890. This perspective
quits the self-sustaining interest. in formal legality which was the work
of legal professionals and which led to the prolonged conflict between _
legal positivism and the doctrine of asset law. Cf. in this respect —

_ the analysis in Max Weber, Lew in Economy and Society (translated and
edited by Max Rheinstein and E. A. & hils; Cambridge: Harvard University

Press, 1954), pp. 284-321. See also the illuminating diseussion of this
int in Fr. Darmstaedter, Die Grenzen der Wirksamkeit des Rechtsstaatcs
Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitactsbucihuandiung, 1930), pp. 50-08.


li.

political rights as well. In a private communication, Professor Marshall
has emphasized the conceptual distinction among these rights:

Civil rights and social rights differ in my scheme of
concepts in that the former are abstract and the latter
concrete. ‘The former recognize capacities which may be
used by the individual in making his own way in a@ compe~
titive social system, the latter provide the substance of

enjoyment of certain benefits, such as income, education
or medical care, by means not governed by the market
mechanism or by competition.

And with reference to the extension of these rights in England, Marshall
states, further: 7

Civil rights, in England, developed into the basis of
citizenship in two stages - first by abolishing slavery

and serfdom, and then by abolishing the institutionalized
Estate System. The progress of political rights can also
be divided into two stages - the first leading to respon-
sible as distinct from arbitrary government, and the second
to fully representative government. Two further points
should be noted. Civil and political rights are means to an
end. Civil rights provide the means for entering the battle
of life in an individualistic society in which each man's
position depends, in theory, on his own efforts. Political
rights provide the means for rational collective action

to shape the society according to the wishes of that sec-
tion of it which shares in political power. In England,

and in Western society generally, civil rights did not
produce the end product of a generally accepted level of
welfare, and political rights did not remedy this defect
until they were distributed widely enough to give repre-

sentative as well as responsible gover nt,

It is clear that in Western societies this process has led to the develop-
ment of a welfare-state with markedly similar features. The following.
' eiethokian represents an attempt $6 ktuly the varying policies through

which the lower classes were enabled to enter the body politic of the
Mhbtevndmaropens nation-states. First, we shall examine the extension

of civic and social rights to the lover classes. Our object is to under-
stand something of the economic anid ‘aetinceh conditions of the lower classes,
considered from a policy-standpoint, before we turn to their enfranchisenent

as the precondition of political citizenship, properly so-called.

Types of Comparisons :
| | The established nation-states of Western Burope can look back on

longer or shorter histories of legislative actions and edministrative |
decisions which have increased the equality of subjects from the different

strata of the population in terms of their legal capacity and their legal

status."

For each nation-state and for each set of institutions one can
pinpoint chronologies ef the public measures taken and trace the sequences
of pressures and counter-pressures, bargains and maneuvers behind each 3 | i
extension of rights beyond the strata of the traditionally privileged. 4
However, the extension of various rights to the lover Glasses also consti-
tute a patterned development characteristic of each country end such
patterned developments of the severel European countries constitute in
turn the still larger transformation from the estate-societies of the

| eighteenth to the welfare-state of the twentieth centuries.

One of the cheracteristic features of this transformation in Burope
is the fact thet the English development shoved to the less developed
countries the “image of their own future" end that consequently these
countries were in a position toe anticipate by legislative GCLAS the

» goctal end political problens ivich appecired tobe inétéent 40 rapid

14, ‘hen all adult citizens are equal before the law and free to
cast their vote, the exercise of these rights depends upon a person's
ability end willingness to use the legal powers to which he is entitled.
On the other hand, the legal status of the citizens involves rights and
duties which cannot be voluntarily changed without intervention by the
State. A discussion of the conceptual distinction between capacity as
“the legal power of doing” and status as "the legal state of being” is
contained in Graveson, op. cit., pp. 55-57-


1Se

economic change.’? ‘thus, the extension of netionel citizenship to the
“lower classes, as defined ebove, vas a response not only to the emerging
contingencies at home but also to the contingencies which leading politi-
clans could anticipate on the basis of observations made ebroad. And
vhile England provided a denonstration of vhat eould be expected con-
cerning the problems of en industrial society, we may be justified in
considering this "@emonstration effect” together with the common histori-
gad background of the several European countries as the empirical founde-
tion for the transformation which these countries have undergone.

Tdeally, the eim is to analyze constellations of policies toward
: the dependent strate snd to study the. Sequences of extensions for the :
different rights conj¢ ointiy. The great merit of Mershell's analysis of
British developments was that ‘it sought out a pattern in several distinct

coe processes of change end aiseussed this interdependence of policies within

a unifying sociological perspective. ‘Comparisons seroes a serics of such

3 developments will not only alert the scholar to the distinctiveness of

each national constellation but also help to underscore the besic simi-~.

lerities in the dilemes faced by the “established” strata of each

coumanity in deciding on policies toward the groups traditionally kept

in states of dependence. Decisions on one set of rights heve explicit or | i
implicit consequences for decision on others and the willingness or

15. In his preface to Capital Kerl Marx wrote: "The country that
is more developed industrially » to the less developed, the image
of its own future.” See Karl Marx, ital, (New York: ‘The Modern Library,
1936), p- 13. But for Marx this uneven lopment of the several Buro-
pean countries was a relatively minor variation on & common process, —
nomely the overall determination of social change ty the organization of ©

—


Ls.

unwillingness of the decision-makers to see and act on interdependencies

5 tell us a great deal about the prevalent velue system and the balance of

forces in each society. Analyses of such interdependeneies ean rarely
‘bo restricted to the mere chronologies of decisions: the actual and poten- |
‘ial reactions of the new strata will effect the balance of pressures on
; dectaton-naters and the direction of these gres-roote reactions will
essentially depend on the level of mobilizetion reached through earlier
extensions of rights and trong the procosees of chmge attendant on
econonle growth. i | |
Te te castest to dmoistiate this for politicel rights. In France
suffrage was extenlod to peasants and wor'sers long befure the decisive — ‘
efforts to universalize primary education: suffrage was the first right
accorded these strata and essentially served plebiseiterian purposes. tn
workers itil the majority of then had enjoyed basie educational rights
- and even benefitted from some governmental enetat sceurity Measures.
; ae The sociologist confronted with ouch differences in the timing of
governmental measures will not only ask questions ebout the value systens

and the processes of structural change in each society, but also about the
consequences of such constellations for the subsequent integration of the
_hew strata into the national political community: the direction ani inten-

sity of the responses of the energing strata will depend on the levels of
mobilization alreaiy reached and these are not only functions of autonomous
processes of econonte growth but also reflect earlier govermmental deci-

“gions and measures to extend legal rights.
Political sociologists have so far tended to study the entry into


15.

polities of farmers, workers, and minority groups primarily as resultants
of changes in economic conditions, of incipient industrialization, of rapid
urbanization. But in themselves such socioeconomic factors do net account
for differences in the political reactions of the lower strata. ‘The eerly
waves of economic growth bring about some "social mobilization" »° of the
dependent and peripheral strata of the commmity, but these movements |
will not necessarily find political outlets. Rather the responses of the
emerging strata vary in @irection and intensity and the policies adopted
on the extension of citizenship rights are of primary importence in
defining the alternatives for politicel action. :

An exemple: Norway and Sweden both organized universal compulsory
education well in advance of the decisive waves of industrialization and
on thet count could be said to be well prepared for the subsequent entry
of lower classes inte politics. There were inporteart differences, hovever,

in the timing of the decisions to extend political rights end these dif-
ferences counted heavily in determining the strategies and ideologies of
the working class movements. In Norway, the franchise was extended in a

"quick suecession of steps, well before the industriel breakthrough and
without any extensive mobilization or working class organizations in the
fight for political citizenship. In Sweden, the fight for menhood suffrage
and equal votes took a longer time. It went on pari pessu with industrial
growth and brought about a broad, if temporary, alliance of a variety of
groups so far kept outside the established channels of decision-making,

16. This is the term introdueed by Karl Deutsch in Nationalism and

Sociel Commmication (New York: Wiley, 1953), p. 100 and passim, end deve-
loped in greater Statistical detail in "Social Mobilisation and Political
Pevetcpmenty’ faerteen Political Seience Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (1961),

PRe ~51 °


16.

the lower middle classes end the poorer farmers as vell es the manual
vorkers. This difference in the timing of the extensions of political
" pights found direct reflection in the choices of strategy of the working
class parties in the two countries, . When the industrial bre :

phaed 6 pes Fine @ Healen ts the Bendis Sane ee, | it was

ne longer necessary to enter alliances to fight for rights of representa-

‘tion end the movenent vas set free to follov its om, temporarily very | :

radical, ‘course. In Sweden the alliance with the Liberals helpei to :

“domesticate” the Social Democrats very soon efter the introduction of ;

manhood suffrage ond the repid accession te responsible Cabinet positions see :

strengthened the ties between the working class and the estebliched poli- a

teal eysten. 7 |
Another well~lnown exemple is provided by the after-effects of

Bismarck's attempt to undermine the growing influence of the German Social-

| Democratic perty. In this attempt the prohibition of that party wes

coubined vith the enactuent ef social rights in the flela of secident and :

sickness insurance. This legal exclusion created o second class eitizen- _

ship for the lover classes to which the Social Democrats respanded not

only by en ideologicel radicalism which further alienated them from the

society but by the creation of e working-class culture which reenforeed

that alienation with positive values of its om. ‘These developments imparted

ba Se Soe ae sida jigkck: aut: Cilebicdek Sik be tee: Bibwantes “atobenten teed

Bull in "Die Entwicklung der Arbeiterbevegung in den drei skandinavischen

- Lindern," Are. f. Gesch, ds Soc. u. Arbeiterbew., Yol. 10 (1921-22), pp. _
329-361, cf. D. hustow, Scandinavia, reeset Ts ed., Modern Political Ae
zaxtiee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956). For comments on R iP
en ap Ning te see Ulf Torgersen, "The Trend toward Political | Ni

the Case of Tlorway ," Acta Sociol., Vol. 6 Nos. 1-2 (1962), ts y


i7.

a high degree of suspicion to the relations between German upper-class

conservatives and German ‘ workers and their political leaders, a pattern

which was still rePlected, for example, in the defensive nationalicm of

the Social Deuocrats in the years following World ‘ier 11,28
: | A couperat:tve study of the extension of cltizenship to the lower

classes will anova waley appear abstract in comparison with the specific ;
patterns of development that are suggested by these examples. lot all us
the rights discussed in Mershsll's study ere equally important for our 3
purposes, but by considering nly some of them we give relatively Little
; etinnkien te the complexities of each country's development. This is also
the result of our endeavor to appronch the subject comparatively. For
while the chronologies of legislative enactments can be specific enough
for each country, they only provide us with an index of the major steps
by which the civic incorporation of the lower classes was (or wes not)
accomplished. And while ve attempt to supplement these machosngiee Foy
several Barepeen, countries with models of “ae tinjor alternative policies
towards the extension of citizenship such mdels ‘Gan Oty peovide bereh~
"marks for en enalysis of changing political re

| These Limitations do not invalidate the attempt made here, Ve chall |
see that the extension of citizenship to the lower classes has in fact been Hd

@ gemuinely compareble —_— in nineteenth end twentieth wumiesied Burope,

18. ‘the veanipicel of ‘Bismarck! ¢ policy ie analysed dn. Wolter \
Vogel, Bismarci's paces teptere! heres. Entstehung : aS. 2

doy Zale ig: Wosteruamm ering BE
reaictdens is Vmany ak Si yertteniar the tidaitamiic of k wusttinas
class subculture are analyzed in d»tall in the forthcoming study by
Guenther Roth, The Socie) Demerets in Reperint Sezoany, (Yee York: ‘The

Eeduinster ee je


¢ z % :
:
aoe.
a? @

: ‘eybelt one that enceupasdas unique develomonts in the countries emis.
dered. "Bach step on the vay vould be A1luminated by a fuller considera

* $ion of pressures and, counter-pressures than we ean give here. But it is

| enactments maricing this process of extension aypoer a good bit more

also true that the steps towards an extension of ‘eitizenship proved irre~
versable, once they hed been ‘taken. Thus - the cumulative legislative

- significant than when we leok at any one ef them and note the considerable
pees to which legal Snnctmente are denied or violated a practice. An
‘often ilisumderstood ' ‘realism’  enphasizes this Saedeiick @iscrepancy
between enactment and implementation. ; But this approach may be more
appropriate ‘tn. the shortnmn than in the long-run ‘eonsideration of ~—.
historical Srenefermatdote ‘such es we undertake is this study.

In what follows we Limit, ourselves to the: sequence of decisions
whieh eens of the nost hhancdiate relevance ‘for lower-class movements
seeking to enter the political arens. Sedteienk on the right to form 3

associations end on the right to receive a sainivama of formal education
without pay will be considered first, because these rights are illustra.
tive of the conditions enabling the: Jove classes to organize as well a5

of the qualifications with which they seek entry into the polity. We

2 os shell then turn to e consideration of the franchise and the secrecy of

the vote vote which are more directly related to the political participation
Of the lower classes. In terms of Mershall's distinction the first is 2
civil right, though of a particular kind as ve shall note presently. ‘The
second is a sociel and the next two are political rights. The extension

of these rights is illustrative of what may be called the e!vil incorpora~

tion of the lower classes.


19.

A Basic Civil Right: The Right of Association and Combination

T. H. Marshall states that civil rights were essential to a compe-
titive market economy in that "they gave to each man, as part of his |

individual status, the power to engage as an independent unit in the
$Y 19

economic struggle. This emphasis on the independent individual assumed
‘that the persons of whom the law took cognizance possessed the means to
protect themselves. In effect, the law accorded civil rights to those who
owned property or had assured sources of income. All others stood condemned
by their failure in the economic struggle according to the prevailing views
of the carly nineteenth century. The abstract principle of equality under-

lying the legal and ideological recognition of the independent individual

was often the direct cause of greatly accentuated inequalities. In the
present context the te relevant {1 lustration of this consequence was the
law's insistence that the wage-contract was a contract between equals,
that employer and worker were equally capable to safeguard their interests.
On the basis of this formal legal equality, eine in many European

countries were denied the right to combine for the sake of bargaining with

their employers.

However, this denial of the right to combine raised conceptual
difficulties from the beginning, as did its Later Legal recognition. Civil
rights referred not only to the rights of property and contract, but also
to freedom of speech, thought and faith which included the freedom to join
with others in the waeult of esitinate private me? Accordingly, the

right of association was an accepted legal principle by the end of the |

19. Marshall, op. cit., p. 33. Our italics.


eighteenth century, when several European countries (France, England,

Belgium, Netherlands) decided to prohibit the workers' right to combine
on the ground that conditions of work must be fixed for each worker by
agreements freely arrived at between individual and individual.-° In the
words of the English Combination Act of 1799:
ALL contracts made between any journeyman, manufacturers
or other workmen for obtaining any advance of wages, lessening
or altering their or any of their usual hours or time of |
working or for preventing or hindering any person or persons
from employing whomsoever he, she, or they shall think proper
to employ in his, her, or their business, or for controlling
any person or persons carrying on any manufacture, trade, or
business, in the conduct or management thereof, shall be
illegal.2l
- Such legal prohibitions were distinguished, however, from the right to form
religious or political associations, at any rate in the sense that associa-
tions not specifically prohibited by law were legal. Accordingly, enact-
ments singled out workmen of various descriptions by special regulations
in order to "uphold" the principle 6f formal equality before the law.
‘This distinction between association and combination was not made
in all countries, however, and to understand this contrast we must recall
the traditional approach to the master-servant relationship which was
Similar in many European countries. Statutory enactments had been used to
regulate the relations between masters and servants and to control the
tendeney of masters and journeymen to combine in the interest of raising

prices or wages. Such regulation increased in importance as guild organizations

20. Statement by Le Chapelier, author of the French act prohibiting
trade unions of July 1791, as quoted in International Labour Office, Free-
dom of Association (ILO Studies and Reports, Series A, No. 28; London: P. S.
King & Son, 1928), p. 11. Further references to this five-volume work will

be given in the form ILO Report No...., pp..+-

21. Quoted in ILO Report, No. 29, p. 7.


al.

declined, though governmental regulations were often made ineffective by
the new problems nents from a ay 88 economic development. Efforts
to cope with these new problems ‘ola take several forms. The government
could attempt to use the traditions! devices in an effort to cope with
the new problems. This approach had prevailed for a time in England but
then had given way to the distinction between associations which were
allowed and workers' combinations which were prohibited. In the
Scandinavian countries and in Switzerland the traditional policies proved
to be more ascidian perhaps in part because these remained predominantly
agricultural countries until well into the nineteenth century. To be sure,
there were differences here also: Norway retained a delatively well-
working traditional system of A aes relations, while Denmark,
Sweden and Switzerland resorted for several decades to special measures
in order to cope with the esc og werslinees of journeymen and agricul-
| tural workers. Still, none of these countries went as far as England
had in enacting special prohibitory legislation designed to stamp out
‘rather than curb combinations of workingmen, perhaps because in this
treditional setting of an épidbecakataly gank a prohibition would have
violated the widely accepted right of association. However, such reser-
vations did not prevail in Germany and Austria, where the conventional
absolutist controls over journeymen's associations were extended by the
end of the eighteenth century to a general prohibition of all "secret
assemblies," as a the Prussian Civil Code of 1794. This inimbvas prohi-
bition was directed principally against Free Masons and other early forms
of quasi-political organizations, which were springing up in response to

the ideas and events of the French revolution, but such legislation was


“used incidentally against work:ingmen' s combinations as well. A specific
prohibition of the latter occurred in Germany only in the 1840's, although
in Austria it had occurred already in 1803.

It appears ane that the statutory regulation of master-servant
relations: and of journeymen's associations was a European-wide legacy of
the Middle Ages, When the decline of the guild-system together with the
increasing pace of economic development suggested the need for new measures,
the several Western-European countries responded with three-broadly distin-
guishable types of policies, The Scandinavian and Swiss type continued
the traditional organization of crafts into the modern period, preserving
te vide of association at the same time that master-servant relations
aa well as journeymen' s associations were regulated by statute. With the
quickening of economic development, these countries extended such regulations
to cope with the new problems, This variant represents in modified form
the medieval concept of liberty as a privilege ” which the different
estates of the polity are entitled, a concept which certainly included a
statutory reenforcement of existing arrangements. The second, absolutist
type is exemplifies by ane Prussian prohibition first of journeymen's
associations, then of all secret assenblies and, finally of the newly
formed ‘Wovkdingnen! e: combinations in keeping with the policy of enlightened
absolutism which seeks to regulate all phases of social and economic life.
This type wbieageute the major break with the tradition of liberty as a
corporate privilege in the sense that the king destroys all privileges of

the pouvoirs intermédiaires. Finally, the liberal policy exemplified by

_ France and England went from the earlier regulation of guilds and the

master~-servant relationship to a policy which combined the specific


a3+

prohibition of workingmen's combinations with the preservation of the right
of association in other respects. Thus, liberalism with its Spies
distinction between association and combination represents a half-way
mark bebween the preservation of the right of association as this was
understood in the pre-modern social structure of Sree » end the complete
denial of the right of association which was an outgrowth of absolutist
opposition to the independent powers of estates and corporations. Tt is
not surprising i — that the countries of the first type are charac-
terized by pelatitely insignificant historics of repression, while
countries of the other two types suppressed vorkingnen' s combinations

by outright prohibition or severe statutory regulations for periods
ranging from 75 to 120 years.

It may be useful to illustrate these wise ae by a tabulation
of legislative measures in Denmark, England, and Prussia/Germany which
exemplify each country's transition from the earlier absolutist regulations
to the final recognition of Saisddopihinnns ae

[fasert table about here] —

One may exemine this tabulation solely in terms of the interval
between the first decisive measure taken to repress tendencies towards
workingen! conbinations and the final decision to accept trade-unions.

In the case of Denmark that interval comprised hO years, in maetens 76.
years and in Prussie/Gemmany either 105, or 124 yeers, depending on whether
one considers 1899 or 1918 as the date most appropriate for the legal
recognition oF trade unions. The dating of these intervals is problematic.
The early acts of repression inevitably blurred the distinction between e- |

mere extension of traditional regulations and, a novel and harsher promis

bition which singled out the newly developing working class for special ,


Country Year
Denmark 1681
1780
1800

-18h9

2h.

legislation Pertaining to the Right of Combination

in Three European Countries

Title

Ordinance

Cabinet Order

Ordinance

Constitution,
Articles 87,88

Objectives, Means

Masters and journeymen are prohibited from holding
meetings or concluding agreements with a view to

fixing prices or wages

Limitation of the formation of societies and asso-
clations

Prohibition of any form of joint action on the part
of journeymen, as well as of individual or joint
breaches of contract. Severe penalties for action

_ in restraint of trade. Unequal prosecution of
masters and journeymen. Proclamation of complete
- individual freedom of contract

Recognition of the rights of association and assembly,
including the right of combination

England 1562

1799

1800

182k

Artifices,
Labourers
and Appren-
tices Aet

Combination
Act .

Combination
Act

Repeal Act

Justices of the Peace empowered to fix wages for

each locality, under supervision of central authority,
so as to "yield unto.the hired person, both in
scarcity...and in plenty, a convenient proportion of

wages"

"All contracts made between any journeyman, manu-
fecturers or other workmen for obtaining any advance
of wages, lessening or altering their or any of

their usual hours or time of working or for preventing
or hindering any person or persons from employing
whomsoever he, she, or they shall think proper to
employ in his, her, or their business, or for con-
trolling any person or persons carrying on any manu-
facture, trade, or business, in the conduct or manage-
ment thereof, shall be illegal.”

Amendment concerning arbitration
Repeal of the 1799 and 1800 Acts. Exemption of

combined workmen from prosecution for criminal
conspiracy under common law


as,

Table (cont. )

Year Title Objectives, Means
England 1825 Removal, of exemption of combined workmen from prose-
(cont. ) cution for criminal conspiracy under common law. More-
over, imprisonment for violence, threats or intimida-
tion, molestation or obstruction for the purpose of
forcing a person to leave his work, forcing or inducing
a person to belong to a trade union or observe a trade
union rule, or forcing an employer to alter his manner
of conducting business, or to limit the number of his
employees
1859 Molestation Limitation of 1825 Act. Practically not effective
ee of Workmen ete mae ae
webs ae a ne
1867 Master and. Repeal of certain sections of the Master and Servants
Servant Act Acts, especially criminal prosecution of breach of
contract —
1871 Trade Union Definition of "trade union." Removal of illegality
. Act attached to them at common law consequent on their
purposes being in restraint of trade. Registration.
Removal of direct enforcement of agreements by court
action
1871 Criminal Law Repeal of 1825 Act and of “Molestation of Workmen
- Amendment Act Act" (1859), new formulation of "personal violence,"
"threat," "molestation," "obstruction and criminal
prosecution thereof."
1875 Conspiracy and Repeal of Criminal Law Amendment Act (1871), explicit
Protection of authorization of peaceful picketing, actions of com-
Property Act _binations are to be judged by standards applying to
the actions of individuals. Criminal prosecution of
cértain forms of violence and intimidation.
1875 Employers and Repeal of Master and Servant Act (1867), recognition
Worlkmen Act of employers and employees as equal parties to a
civil contract.
Prussia/ 1731 Imperial Declaring all existing fraternities and journeymen's
Germany . Statute associations dissolved. Local authorities are

instructed not to permit any meetings or associations
of journeymen in the future.


Year

1789

1794

1840

i8h5

1848

1850

1854

1854

1860

1860

1869

1878

1886

Title

Edict
(Prussia)

Prussian
Civil Code

Federal

Decree

Prussian
Industrial
Code, sec-
tions 181-84

Prussian
Regulations

Federal Coun-
cil Decree

Prussian
Act

Prussian
Mine Act

General Mines

Act (Prussia)

Industrial Code .

(North German

Confederation) ,

sections 152,
153%

Anti-socialist

Law

Puttkammer
Edikt

Table (cont. )

Objectives » Means

Prohibition of all secret assemblies and organizations.

ee Se ee See See”

Prohibition of combination; severe punishment of
offences resulting from combimtions (agreements,
boycotts, seditious proclamations, etc.)

Prohibitions of associations of workers unless sanc-
tioned by the police. Prohibitions of employees’ and
of employers’ agreements in restraint of trade, breach
of contract. Introduction of severe penalties.

Temporary abrogation of the restrictions on combina~-
tions.

- Severe restrictions on the rights of association

(including prohibition of combination of associations).

Dissolution of all existing workers’ unions and fra-

> | ternities which ees Socialist and Communist aims.

Extension of the seen to servants, agricultural
merece end ships! crews.

Prohibition of conbination among miners and foundry

‘workers. —

Maintenance of 1860 ae i NR

Granting of freedom of combination (152). Special
prosecution of compulsion, threats, etc. in support
of combination, but not in opposition to combination

Dissolution of (socialist-oriented as well as other)
trade unions.

Local law enforcement agencies are to deal resolutely
border line cases relating to section 153, industrial
code (compulsion, threats, etc.) upon receipt of
injury claims.


Year

Title

Expiration of
Anti-Socialist
Law

Imperial
Associations
Act

Imperiel. —
Associations
Act, section

ay Ye |

Auxiliary —
Service Act

Repeal Act

Declaration of —

the Council of
People's
Commissars -

Table (cont. )

Objectives, Means

Extension of legal protection to trade unions.

Regulation of the right to form associations. Sub-
jection of trade unions to the restrictions of the
act.

Provision that trade unions would not be treated as
political associations.

Provision for cooperation between employers' and
employees' organizations in relation to the objectives
of the act

" Revokation of section 153 of the Industrial Code.

"(The right to form associations and the right of
assembly are subject to no restriction, not even in
regard to civil servants and State workers."


28.

tedatucth. Similarly, it is. difficult to date the final legalization of
trade unions precisely, since in most ‘eiuaa abba legalization occurred
gradually, But despite these difficulties it is apparent that an examina-
‘tion of legislative measures gives an insight into the difficulties
experienced in the different polities with regard to the civic incorpora-
tion of the lower classes, In the Scandinavian countries the breakdown

of the "estate society" was followed by a remarkable proliferation of
religious, cultural, economic, and political associations and, except for
a few cases of violent conflicts, govermnents did little or nothing either
to restrict or to legalize these activities. At the other extreme, in
countries such fe Italy and Spain restrictions of associational activity
were traditional and local and hardly required specific enastennte by
national legislatures. In France, the Jacobin tradition of direct state-

citizen relations led to the promulgation of the famous Loi Le Chapelier in

1791 and this tendency to restrain all associational pouvoirs intermédiaires
was further ieatnniod through the Napoleonic traditions of plebisci-

tarian rule. In Prussia and the Wilhelminian Reich similar tendencies

were at work and produced a series of strict regulations of working class

organizations. In England, finally, the early invidious distinction between
associations and combinations proved difficult to maintain in the long run.
For the right of association permitted political agitation through which

the prohibition of combinations could be opposed, and although the Repeal

Act of 1824 was not effective its early passage is, nevertheless, sympto-

matic of the considerable flexibility which characterized the administra-

tive handling of industrial disputes.“~

ee 22. Cf. the documents collected by A. Aspinall, ed., The Early
_ English Trade Unions (London: Batchworth Press, 1949), passim.


29.

We turn now from a consideration of different types of policy
concerning the right to combine as such to a more substantive issue raised
by the organization of trade unions, once these are legally permitted.
Among the large number of such issues we focus attention on trade unions

as an example of corporate organization in the developing nation-states

of Western Europe. That trade unions or other combinations of that

kind would perpetuate, or reestablish, corporate principles was recognized
early. In his argument against mutual benefit societies Le Chatelier gave
striking expression to this view in his 1791 speech to the Constituent
nelly to which reference was made earlier:

The bodies in question have the avowed object of procuring
relief for workers in the same occupation who fall sick or
become unemployed. But let there be no mistake about this.
It is for the nation and for public officials on its behalf
to supply work to those who need it for their livelihood and
to succour the sick.... It should not be permissible for
citizens in certain occupations to meet together in defence
of their pretended common interests. There must be no more
guilds in the State, but only the individual interest of each
citizen and the general interest. No one shall be allowed
to arouse in any eitizen any kind of intermediate interest and
to separate him from the public weal through the medium of
sorperate interests.23

“This radically plebisciterian yor tion which would not tolerate the organi-
genton of any "intermediate intérest," proved to be difficult to maintain
consistently. For the individualistic tendencies of the economic sphere,
which were in part responsible for this position, were likewise respon-~
sible for legal developments which undermined it. A growing exchange
economy with its rapid diversification of transactions gave rise to the

question how the legal significance of every action could be determined

23. Quoted in ILO Report, No. 29, p. 89.


30.

unambiguously. This question was answered by the device of attributing
legal personality to organizations like business firms and hence by
separating the legal spheres of the stockholders and officials from the
legal sphere of the organization itselr.** The device of incorporation
which established the separate legal liability of the organization and
_ thus limited the liability of its individual members or agents, was a
most important breach in the strictly plebiscitarian position. Though
"Limited liability" was denounced at the time as an infringement of indivi-
dual responsibility, the nannies interests served by this new device soon
overcame an objection based on the concept of obligation. In retrospect
it is easy to see that incorporation was the first step towards a limita-
tise ef Oias redical individualism which was expressed both through the
strictly formal equality before the law and the plebiscitarian intolerance
of antneittin interests." :

Marshall has stated that in the field of civil rights "the move-
ment has been. . snot from the reprébentation or committer to that of
individuals ins in the history of parliament], but from the representa-

tion of individuals to that of commmittes."="

From an individualistic
standpoint the device of! {ncérporatiion and the pelated svinetsle of limited
liability mele it possible for an economic enterprise to take risks and
maximize economic assets on behalf and for the benefit of individual share-
holders. vane: its officials the enterprise thus performs a representa-

tive function in the sensé that it makes decisions and assumes responsibilities

2h. Max Weber, Law in Economy and Society (translated and edited by
Mex Rheinstein and E. A. patie) Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954),

pp. 156-57.
25. Marshall, op. cit., p. 4h.


31.

for the collectivity of its investors, though that collectivity is fre-

quently composed of other corporate groups as well as of individuals.

Dipiiah mach of the nineteenth century this representative function of

the corporation was confined to economic goals. However, such concepts

8s “corporate trusteeship,” the development of public relations, and

direct political participation by many large corporations suggest that

in recent decades this earlier restriction has been abandoned -- a

development whose significance for citizenship still needs to be explored.
These considerations provide the necessary background for an under-

‘standing of the special position of trade unions. As Marshall has pointed

out, trade unions

-. did not seek or obtain incorporation. They can, therefore,
exercise vital civil rights collectively on behalf of their men-
bers without formal collective responsibility, while the indivi-
dual responsibility of workers in relation to contract is largely
unenforceable...-

If we take the prohibition or severe restriction of combinations as our
starting-point, then trade unions also exeuerity tne movement of civil
rights from the representation of individuals to that of commmities.
This collective representation of the wonomic interests of the members
arose from the inability of the workers to safeguard their interests
individually. But the civil right which eventually permitted tee ohitiaws
to combine, altered the fornal. equality before the law, as the device of

peor poratlgn hed done in another manner. Trade unions and hence the

 etwil rights which legelized trade unions were employed to raise the

economic status of their ener. By SeFiactive action workers sought to

"i. Thid. svg the following discussion is based on Marshall's
analysis on pp. 43-44, but our emphasis differs somewhat.


32.

attain that level of economic reward to vhich they felt entitled, though
in practice they felt entitled te whatever level their capacity to organize
end bargain enabled them to obtain. But these practical achievements of
trade union organization had a far-reaching effect upon the status of
workers as citizens. For through trede unions and collective bargaining
the right to coubine was used to assert "basic claims to the elements of
social justice."-" In this way the extensice of citizenship to the lover
classes wes given the very special meaning that as citizens the members of
these classes were entitied to a certain stendard of well-being, in ica
for which they vere only obliged to discharge the ordinary duties of citizen-
ship. ‘Thus, the collective representation of workers' interests through
trade unions establishes the special claim of limited groups that are defined
vy their economic disadvantages and their capacity to organize, while the |
menbers of these groups assume no special duties which correspond te that
claim, but merely share with all others the duties of citizenship. ‘there
is, PNATATENS, a fundamental discrepancy Valine éleine and responsibilities,
4 the workers' right to combine is considered in ite bearing on citizen-
chip. ‘This discrepancy may explain the one recurrent theme of social
agitation during the nineteenth contury, the idea of labor as the collec-
tive source of the nation's wealth and hence lebor's’’ ‘right to the whole
produce of labor.” Though the evidence for this idea (as traced by Anton
Menger) is largely derived fron ngliek cok Continental sécialist writers,
" it is not. far-fetched to suppose that the paste idea of these writers

| eppiaied to the lower classes severally. Ag d. A. Hobson put itt

27. Toid. , pe hh,

33.

The significance of the labor movement will continue
to be misunderstood so long as it is regarded as a mere
demand for a larger quantity of wages and of leisure,
important as these objects are. The real demand of labor
is at once more radical and more human. It is a demand
that labor shall no longer be bought and sold as a dead
commodity subject to the fluctuations of Demand and
Supply on the market, but that its remmeration shall
be regulated on the basis of the human needs of a family
living in a civilized society.

The legalization of trade unions is an instance of enabling legis-
lation. It permitted members of the lower classes to organize for the
purpose of bargaining collectively and thus to obtain an equality of
bargaining power which a previously imposed, formal legal equality had
denied then. But to achieve this end it became necessary, as we saw, to
discriminate in favor of “combinations” by allowing them legal exemptions
without which the disadvantaged groups would have been unable to organize
effectively. In other words, civil rights ere used here as an instrument
enabling the lower clesses specifically to participate more effectively
than would otherwise be the case in the monomic and political struggle
. Over the distribution of the national income. It is to be noted, hovever,
that many members of the lower classes either would not or could not avail
themselves of the opportunities afforded them by the law. Hence, these
opportunities heve in effect been privileges available to individuals
who qualify by being willing and able to organize in order to advance
their economic interests. ‘That the right to combine contimes to be a
“privilege of those organized in trade unions” is, in @ sense, a measure

of the weakness of corporetist tendencies in modern Western societies,

1914), p. 190 and passin.

Beye os
¥


3h,

sinee ties same right more generally applied would mean the membership of
every adult in an organization representative of his occupation. So far,
such tendencies have been curbed by the principle thet civil rights are |
permissive, rather than obligatory, and this despite the exceptional
position of trade umions we have noted. This permissiveness mst be
noted especially as we now turn to the second element of citizenship,
social rights.

A Basic Social Right: the right to an clementary education ©

In one sense, the right to an elementary education is similar to
‘the “right to combine.” Ae long as masses of the population are deprived
even of elementary education, access to educational facilities iepenss As
& precondition without which all other rights under the law remain of no
avail to the uneducated. @o provide the rudiments of education to the
illiterate thus appears as an act of liberation. Nonetheless, social
rights are distinctive in that they do not wsundly permit the individual
to decide whether or not to avail himeclf of their advantages. Like the
legislative regulation of working conditions for vomen and children,
compulsory insurance against industriel accidents and similar velfare
measures, the right to an elementary education is indistinguishsble frou
the duty to attend school. In all Western societies elementary education
has become a duty of citizenship, perhaps the earliest example of a
preseribed minimm level of living enforced by all the powers of the
moder state. Two attributes of elementary education make it into an
element of citizenship: the government has euthority over it and the

parents of all children in a certein age-group (usually from 6 to 10 or 12)


> a

are required ty law to see to it. that their children attend school.
Social rights as an attribute of citizenship (such as the right
to an elementary education with its associated duty of attendance) may
be considered benefits which compensate the individual for his consent
to be governed under the rules and by the agents of his national politi-
cal community.” rt is certainly important to note the element of agrec-
ment or consensus which is at ‘the root of rights and duties that pertain
to all citizens alike. But in doing so in the present coateat we Should
emphasize that the rights end duties. which ll citizens share autem
tdeally posit ea direct soiestoensy between, the central organs of the
nation-state end each inouibex or SS. community, whether adult, adolescent,
or child, end the consequent sapeonthie: of ell pouvoirs internediaixes,

at least as fer as these social rights are concerned. Earlier in this
@iscussion we referred to the plebisettartan principle according to which |

as citizens all adults in the emerging nation-states possessed, en equal
right of partieipation in the docision-naking processes of governuent..3°
Now, in turning to a consideration of social rights, we find another
principle of equality, the obligatory partieipetion af each eligible
individual in the services provided by the state. It is obviously avisward
to use the term "plebisettarian’ for this eecond principle as well, since
the term in its literal sense refers to participation in governmental ,
decicion-ueiking. Yet there is a enone between participation.

29, This formation is indebted to the perceptive analysis by
Joseph Tussmen, at peers ion and the Body Politic (New York: Oxford
University Press, Chapter il. ts |

30. See page 3 above,


ye

in decision-making oni obligatory school-attendance. In the fully
developed welfare-state the people as voters have decided to provide

the services in which the people as citizens are then obliged to parti-
eipete. To be sure, the right to vote is permissive in contrast to the
benefits of school attendance which ere obligatory. But we would empha-
size that both are principles of equality which establish a direct
relationship between the central organs of the nation-state and each
menber of the commmity, end this direct relationship is the specific
meaning of national citizenship. :

: Tt mey be useful to reiterate the desee distinctions at this point.
There ts first the distinction between an indirect and a direct reletion
between the netion-state and the citizen. We have diseussed the indirect
relationship in the preceding section in comection with the right to
association ani the right to combine. Though these civil rights are in
principle evailable to all alike, in practice chey are claimed by classes

of persons who possess certain economic and social attributes in common.

Tais practice is in part responsible for the contimued importance of group-
representation even after the earlier, medieval principle of privileged _

; jurisdictions has been replaced by equality before the law. In now '
- turning to the Qirect relationship between the nation-state ani the

eitizen we consider social rights before we turn to the @iseussion of

poli litical rights, in part because the principle of obligation incumbent —

on ell citizens aeveloped alongside with, end often indeed preceded, the

principle of political rights. Fornae the reason for this is the simple

one, thet the extension of the franchise mequivocelly destroys privilege

and enlarges the active participation of the people in public effairs,


37.

while the extension of social rights with its emphasis upon obligation
may leave privilege intact and breadens the duties and benefits of the
people without necesserily encouraging their social mobilization. |

There is clear indication, at any rate, that on the Continent the
principle of en clementery education for the lower classes emerged as e
by-product of enlightened absolutism. In Denmark, for example, Fredericit
IV established elementary schools on his own domains as early os 1721 and
provided them with sufficient resources ond e permanently employed teaching
staff. Attempts to follow through with this policy failed, because the
Lanied proprietors evaded their responsibility for the employment and
remmeretion of tonchers vy imposing charges for teacher~-selarics on
servile peasants who could 411 afford them. ‘A century lnter Frederick VI
“not only emancipated the serfs but algo established a new organization of
7 elenentary schools in 1814 which remained the basis of national education
since that time. |

‘This Danish develoyuent nay be compared with the 2 corresponting

development in Prussia seugeoo\s-nowe-Of the greblews-eutoumteral where
not only conservatism but the special mixture of absolutism and nationalism

became evident in the program of a system of national edueation. “The
profoundly conservative purpose of this program is not in doubt. In
1737, a basic Prussian school law was issued with the comentary thet
ie ik prions the king $0°s60.¥Guth Lieing end pieine ee tk decinien
thus suffering damage both temporally and to their eternal souls. On
this oceasion the king donated a sum to facilitete the employment of ©
eepable teachers, and for several decades thereafter the Prussien kings
and their officials sought to promote the scheme on the basis of such


38.

incidental approprietions. By 1763 a full-fledged oviiinanse was issued
regulating school affairs for the wiktiog monarchy and including provisions
for disciplinary measures against teachers who neglected their dutics, |
thus et least envisaging a regular administration of the schools. At |

the same time efforts were made to alleviate the teacher-shortage by
cormarking special funis for this purpose, though these measures from

above encountered difficulties below both in the reluctance of parents

to seni their children to scheol and of local bodies to ssasum their share
of the financial responsibility. By the end of the century, in 1794, the
schools ‘(sogether with the universities) were declared institutions of the
State, and in the ensuing years the Whole ayaten of national education
became part of the national Liberation movenent — vepnemm Although
sone officials had publiely expressed their doubts concerning the useful-
ness of literacy for the ordinary man, militery defeat and patriotic
enthusiasm generally removed such. doubts. Tumerous officiel declara-

tions demented that all qubjects: without exception should be provided with
wetul, maoaledge 3 tine and ogein veference wes nade to a national educe-
‘tion whose object it was to: ‘raise ‘the aorel, religious, end patriotic:

spirit of the people. 31

In all probability national education beenme
aceepteble to the conservative rulers in Prussie on the ground thet at
provided a vehicle for instilling Loyalty for Ring and country in the
masses of the population. if under these speeial conditions even ultre-

conservatives found a nationel ayeten ‘of elementary education ecceptable,

ie _ $l. The preceding two ceuuitsiiiien are based on A. Petersilic, Das
Offentliche Unterrichtswesen (Vol. III of Hand- und Lehrbuch der Staata-
wissenseheften; Leipzig: ¢. L. Hirschfeld, 1897), I, pp. 203-4, 158.66
end passin. ; it


39-

it is well to remember that in the field of military recruitment the same
effort to mobilize the people in the wars of liberation led to great
controversies and provoked a very strong reaction once the immediate
danger was passed.” Thus, enlightened absolutism may be considered the
reluctant or equivocal pioneer of extending social rights to the people.
It could endorse the principle that nothing should intervene between the
king and his watinti and hence that tie ing out of his own free will
distribute benefits among them. But absolution naturally inedated that
the people were the king's subjects and wejodtedthe idea of tational
citizenship and hence of rights and duties derived from, and owed to, the
ebetract coneept of the nation-state.

This, however, was the basic idee of Liberalien. The contrast
is at once political and religious. in Prussia the ministers of the
church could easily be recruited into the teaching profession because
uinisters ‘a well as teachers were unter the supervision of the govern-
ment and ultimately subject to the sovereign authority of the king.
Indeed, teaching hea generally been tn the hends of the clergy throughout
Europe. Bub where, as in France. the Catholic clergy vas under an
ects separate. from that of: the state, the establishment: of a nacional
system of education and hence of & direct relationship between eseh citizen
and the government became incompatible with the existing system. In his
Essay on Net lonal Uducation, published tn 1763, La chatolats oppoved the
clergy's control of education by démanding that ‘the teaching of letters |

32. Por details see the excellent study by Gerhard Ritter, Staats-
kunst und Kriegshendwerk (Mimchen: R. Olderbourg, 1959), I, Chapters u

e


and science should be in the hends of e seeular profession. After observing
that distinguished men of letters ere laymen rether than clerics, and that
"idle priests” overrun the chties While the country is deprived of clergy,
Le Chatoleis contimies: |
2 fo teach Letters and seiences, ve must have persons who
make of them a profession. ‘The clergy cannot take it in bed
pert that we should not, generally speaking, include eccle-
Siastics in this class. I am not so unjust as to exclude
them from it. I acknowledge with pleasure that there are
several...who are very learned and very capable of teaching
-++. But I protest against the exclusion of laymen. I claim
the right to demand for the Nation an education that will
depend upon the State alone; because it belongs essentially
to it, because every netion"es an inalienable and impre~
scriptible right to instruct its mewbers, and finally because
the children of the State should be educated by members of
the State.33
The statement parallels the plebiseitarian principle emuneiated by Le
chatelier which we quoted - earlier.” Where Le Chatelier had ergued against
mutual benefit societies on the ground that no “intermediate interest”
should be allowed to separate any citizen from the "public weal through the
mediun of corporate interests," La Chalotais here echoes the same idea in
his argument ageinst the clergy. There must be a profession of teachers
vnich is entirely at the disposal of the State, in order to implement a
program or instruction in which nothing intervenes between the ° children
of the State” and the teachers who are servants of the State.
At a later time the principle of a national system of elementary

education also becane acceptable to the emerging industrial vork-foree.

33. Quoted from La Chalotais' essay reprinted in F. de la
Fontainerle, ed., French Liberalism and Pducation in the Eighteenth
Century (New Yori: NeGrew-H111 Book azine 1532), pp. 52-53.

3h. See above De 29,


wi.

Among laborers the desire to become educated was strong, partly to better
their chances in life, partly to see to it that workers' children had a
better chance than their parents, and partly in order to give additional
weight to the political claims made on behalf of the working class. if
this desire led to voluntary efforts to provide educational facilities for
workers, as it did notably in England a Germany, such pavnel was largely
a response to the fact that no other facilities were available to them.
Onee these fiiett4 thadhevene avaliable, voluntary efforts in the field of .
workers' education declined (though they did not cease), presumably another
indication of the relative weakness of corporatist tendencies. It is
probable, therefore, thet systems of national education developed as widely
as they did, because the demand for elementary education cut sions the
spectrum of political beliefs. After all, it was sustained by such diver-
gent arguments as that the peoples' inherent unmruliness necessitated
introduction in the fundamentals of religion and loyalty to king and church,
that the nation-state demanded a citizenry educated by organs of the state,
and that the masses of the people who helped to create the wealth of the
country should share in the amenities of civilization.

Compulsory elementary education became a major controversial issue,
nevertheless, when governmental authority in this Piela eame into conflict
with organized religion. Traditionally, the Catholic Church regarded |
teaching as one of its inherent powers with the work of instruction being
conducted by the religious ilies: In France this principle was challenged
in the 1760's with the suppression of the Jesuit order and the endorsement

of a nationally organized system of lay-education, the starting-point of a


conflict over education which has lasted to this aay.>” In Austria, however,
the same principle prevailed without challenge under the aegis of absolutist
rule with the result that elementary education was organized by the govern- |
ment as early as 1605 with the cleray acting as the supervisory agent of
the state. Again, in the countries with Protestant state churehes eet oe
Denmaris, Tlorway and Sweden) Little « or no conflict developed as the unity of
church and state in the peice of the aichentel allowed for the ultimate
authority of government over elementary education, with the clergy acting
ta this field as agents of ‘Sion monarch or (ater) of a Ministry of educe-

; tional and ecclesiastical affairs. ‘Such unity of political and. religious
control over elementary education could not exist; on the other hand, where
church and state were more or less separate and the population divided into
entagonistic wide cehinled groupings. Thus, countries like England, the
Netherlands, Belgium, France and to some extent Germany after 1871 have
been the scene of protracted struggles over the conditions under which the
national goverument should be permitted to exercise authority in the field
of elementary education. That is to say, ea national system of elementary
education as a basic social right of all eitivens end hence, in this educa-
tional field, a direct relationship between each citizen and the nation-
state has been opposed, wherever the several Churches or religious denomina~-
tions have insisted upon interposing their own, uncontrolled educational

facilities between their edherents and the State.

35. See the account in Ernest Barker, The Devel nt of Public
Services in Western Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1544),
pp. (9-03, amd Robert , The Faucation of Nations (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1961), Chapter S's 2


Payer for work session I Bid,

"Citizenship and Political Authority" BENDIX+ROKKAN
Fifth World Congress of Sociology "The extension
Washington, 1962. of national

| citizenship...."

The extension of national citizenship (SR version July, 1962)

to the lower classes:

a comparative perspective

By
Reinhard BENDIX and Stein ROKKAN
University of California The Chr. Michelsen Institute
Berkeley Bergen

This pepor focuses on the extension of a range of citizenship rights
to economically, socially and culturally dependent subjects within the
territorial population of developing nation-states, T,H, MARSHALL mado
this the central theme in his pathbreaking study of Citizenship and Social

Class. 1) He concentrated his discussion on Great Britain: our aim is to
compare the extension of rights across a number of nation-states and to develop
some bench=marks "models" for this purpose, No detailed documentation is
attempted heres our paper represents one step in a series of writings on

the politics of national development 2) and will, it is hoped, be followed

1)

Cambridge, the University Press, 1950, pp. 1-55.
2) The paper is a direct sequel to two articles by Reinhard BENDIX
"Social Stratification and the Political Community" Arch. eur, de
sociol. 1 (2), 1960: 181-210 and "The Lower Classes and the Democratic
Revolution", Industrial Relations 1 (1) 1961: 91-116, A sociological

approach to the extension of political rights to the "lower classes"

(tenants, manual workers and others in positions of economic dependence )
and to women has been outlined by Stein ROKKAN in "Mass Suffrage,

Secret Voting and Political Participation", Arch, cur, de sociol. 2 (1)
19612 132-152, cf. also S, ROKKAN & H, VALEN "The Mobilization of the
Periphery". Acta sociol. 6 (1-2) 1962: 111-158,


up in greater detail.

Elements in national citizenship.

T.H. MARSHALL distinguished three basic elements of national

citizenship:

- civil rights such as "liberty of person, freedom of speech,
thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude

valid contracts, and the right to justice";

~ political rights such as the franchise and the right of access

to public office;

- social rights ranging from "the right to a modicum of economic
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the
social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being

according to the standards prevailing in the society."

To these three clements of citizenship corresponded four sets of

public institutions:

the courts, for the safeguarding of civil rights and, specifically,
for the protection of all rights extended to the less articulate members

of the national community;

the local and the national representative bodies as avenues of

access to participation in public decision-making and legislation;

the social services,to ensure some minimum of protection against

poverty, sickness and other misfortunes, and the schools, to implement the right
accorded all members of the community to receive at least the basic

clements of an education,

All established nation-states can look back on longer or shorter
histories of legislative actions and administrative decisions to broaden the
bases of such institutions and to ensure greater equality of access from
the different stata of subjects within their territory. For cach nation-
state and for each set of institutions the historian can pinpoint the
chronologies of the public measures taken and trace the sequences of moves
and counter=moves, pressures and counter=pressures, bargains and manoeuvres
behind each extension of rights beyond the strata of the traditionally
privileged, The sociologist is strongly tempted to set beside each other 4
series of such historical accounts and to compare developments, both across

nation-states and across sets of institutions,


Types of comparisons.

For each set of institutions the sociologist would ideally want to

have access to three sets of time-series data:

comparative chronologies of governmental decisions to extend the

given rights;

comparative statistics of the actual uses made of these rights

within the new strata brought within the pale of the national community;

and comparative data on the recruitment of decision-makers from

the new strata within cach set of institutions.
These distinctions make most immediate sense in comparisons of

extensions of political rights, but they can also be shown be of relevance

when comparing other processes of democratization. In comparing develop-
ments towards democracy we can distinguish three successive, although often

clearly overlapping, phases: the formal integration phase oulminati@ng in

the promulgation of universal suffrage for all accountable adults without

severe criminal records, the mobilization phase through which the strata and

categories of subjects last to be enfranchized are persuaded to make uso

of their rights, and the activation phase through which citizers. in these

3)

strata and categories actually enter into competition for public office,

For the rights to social services and to education the actual enactments

are generally much less important than the subsequent administrative efforts
to develop the sorresponding institutions. Here chronologies of formal
decisions tell us less than statistics for the percentages of the potential
population actually covered in each periods this would correspond to the
"mobilization" data for political rights. For civil rights the data of
relevance for comparative analysis will clearly differ markedly from
category to category: court decision will frequently count more than legis-
lative actions and the statistics for the actual uses made of the given
rights are not casily assembied, However, for the one civil right which

concems us immediately in this paper,the freedom of association, the

possibility of comparative analysis resemble those for the suffrage: we
can not only establish comparative chronologies for decisive governmental

measures to restrict or to broaden the scope of associational activities,

3) For an attempt to set out data for cach of the phases for one country
see ROKKAN and VALEN, op, cit,


we can also, at least for some categories such as unions, follow the growth
of membership figures over time and establish rates of"associational
mobilization"

To get anywhere in such comparisons we shall clearly have to
start out with data for each set of institutions singly. 4) The aim,

however, is to analyze constellations of policies toward the dopendont strata

and to study the sequences of extensions for the different rights conjointly.

The great merit of MARSHALL's analysis of British developments was that it
sought out a pattorn in several distinct processes of change and discussed
this interdependence of policies within a unifying socioligical perspective,
Comparisons across a series of such developments will not only alert the
scholar to the distinctiveness of cach national constellation but also
help to underscore the basic similarities in the dilemmas faced by the
"established" strata of each community in deciding on policies toward the
groups traditionally kept in states of dependence, Decisions on one set
of rights have explicit or implicit consequences for decision on others
and the willingness or unwillingness of the decision-makers to see and act on
interdependencies tell us a great deal about the prevalent value system and
the balance of forces in each society. Analysus of such interdependencies
can rarely be restricted to the mere chronologies of decisions: the
actual and potential reactions of the new strata will affect the balance of
pressures on decision-makers and the direction of these grass-roots reactions
will essentially depend on the level of mobilization reached through earlier
extensions of rights and through the processes of change attendant on
economic growth.

It is again easiest to demonstrate this for political rights. In
France suffrage was extended to peasants and workers long before the deci-
sive efforts to universalize primary education: suffrage was the first right
accorded these strata and essentially served plebiscitarian purposes, In
Britain and Sweden, by contrast, equal suffrage was not granted to all
workers until the majority of them had enjoyed basic cducational rights
and even benefitted from some governmental social security measures,

The sociologist confronted with such differences in the timing
of governmental measures will not only ask questions about the value systems

4)
This was the procedure chosenin ROKKAN's first article, op,cit,: he set

up a "comparative chronology of suffrage sxtensions" to highlight simila-
rities and constrasts in the timing of decisions to widen the franchise,

to equalize votes and to introduce the secret ballot.


and the processes of structural change in each socicty but also about the

consequences of such constellations for the sobsoquent integration of the

new strata into the national political community: the direction and

intensity of the responses of the emerging strata will depend on the lovels

of mobilization already reached and these aro not only functions of automomous
processes of cconomic growth but also reflect carlier governmental decisions
and measures to extend legal rights,

Political sociologists have so far tended to study the entry into
politics of farmers, workers and minority groups primarily as resultants of
changes in cconomic conditions, of incipiont industrialization, of rapid
urbanization. But in themselves such socio-oconomic factors do not account
for differences in the political reactions of the lower strata, The early
waves of economic growth bring about some "social mobilization" 5) of the
dependent and peripheral strata of the community, but these movements will
not necessarily find political outlets, Rathor tho responses of the
emerging strata vary in direction and intensity and the policies adopted
on the extension of citizenship rights are of primary importance in defining

the alternatives for political action,

fn examples Norway and Sweden both organized universal compulsory
education well in advance of the decisive waves of industrialization and
on that count could be said to be well prepared for the subsequent entry
of lower classes into politics, There were important differences, however,
in the timing of the decisions to extend political rights and these diffe-~
rences counted heavily in determining the strategics and ideologies of the
working class movoments, In Norway, the franchise was extended in a quick
succesSion of steps, well before the industrial breakthrough and without
any extensive mobilization or working class organizations in the fight
for political citizenship. In Sweden, the fight for manhood suffrage and

equal votes took longer time, It went on pari passu with industrial growth

and brought about a broad, if temporary, alliance of a variety of groups
so far kept outside the established ohanncls of decision-making, the lower
middle classes and the poorer farmers as woll as the manual workers, This

difference in tho timing of the extensions of political rights found direct

onis is the term introduced by Karl DEUTSCH in Nationalism and Social

Communication (lew Yorke Wiley, 1953), pe loo and passim, and devcloped in

croaterstatistical detail in "Social Mobilization and Political Develop=
ment" Amer. Pol. Sci, Rov, 85 (3) 1961: 493-514,


reflection in the choices of strategy of the working class parties in the

two countries. When the industrial breakthrough added a rapid flow of
recruits to the Norwegian labour movement, it weno longer necessary to
enter alliances to fight for rights of representation and the movement was
set free to follow its own, temporarily very radical, course. In Sweden
the alliance with the Liberals helped to "domesticatc" the Social Democrats
very soon after the introduction of manhood suffrage and the rapid accession
to responsible Cabinet positions strengthened the ties between the working
class and the established political system,

Chronologies for extensions of suffrage and other rights may
clearly be expressed both in absolute time and in terms of some measure
of economic growth: perhaps the most appropriate measure would be the per=
cent of lower=-glass subjects already "socially mobilized" according to take
criteria suggested by DEUTSCH. We cannot go into the statistical intricacies
of such analyses in this paper: we are less coneerned in this context with
methodology of comparison, more with the development of a sociological
perspective on these intricate interrelations between economic growth,
governmental policies and lower-class reactions,

Not all the rights discussed in MARSHALL's study are equally
important within this perspective. We shall therefore limit ourselves
to the sequence of decisions which proved of the most immediate relevance
for lower-class movements seeking to enter the political arena: decisions

on the right to form associations, on the franchise and on the secrecy of

the vote, on the right to receive a minimum of formal cducation without

pay. In terms of MARSHALL's distinction the first is a civil right, the

next two political rights, the fourth a social right, In terms of the areas

of activity for which they are primarily relevant, we might, however, call
the right of association an economic right and the right to an education a

cultural right: this is the terminology we shall stick to in the following.

6)

This point was first set out by the Norwegian historian Edvard BULL in
"Die Entwicklung der Arbeiterbewegung in dor drei skandinavischen Landern"
Arc. £, Gesch, d. Soc. ue. Arbeiterbew, 10, 1921-22: 329-361, cf. D,.RUSTOW.
"Scandinavia" in S, NEUMANN ed.: Modern Political Parties, Chicago, Univ.

of Chicago Press, 1956. For comments on subsequent developments, see
Ulf TORGERSEN "The Trend towards Political Concensus: the Case of Norway".
Acta _sociol. 6 (1-2), 1962+ 159-171.


7)

A basic economic right: the right of association and combination. 7

The nation-states of the West have differed markedly in their policies

toward associations and "combinations" of dependont subjects secking to

strengthen their bargaining positions in their dealings with their cconomic

superiors,

decisions on such combinations for a few of the European countr

In Table I we have given rude chronologies of

governmental

ics. To high-

light tho decisivedifferences in the measures taken by cach political commity

in coping with omerging working class, we have concentrated on two crucial

points in cach sequcnee: the dato of the initial prohibition of workors'

combinations and the date of the final legalization
prohibition of combinations or workers can be dated
the legalization of such combinations often cannot,

gradual reducticn of restrictions.

of unions,

While the

more or less unequivocally,
since it came about through 2

In these cases we have chosen the legis-

lative cnactments which guaranteed the special legal position of trade unions

BOSt generously, because that makes them most comparable to those cases where
& 3 p

the right to combine was never revoked or where it was legalized completely

in a single enactment,

Table Is Comparative Chronologies

for Decisions to Prohibit

and to Legalize Trade Unions in Selected

European Countries. 7)

Year of Yoar of Period of
prohibition legislazion repression:
years
Pluralist countries
with insignificant
histories of
represseion
Norway never never none
Sweden never never none
‘ Denmark 1800 1849 Ag
Switzerland 1803 1848 A5
Pluralist countries
with longer historics
of repression.
Netherlands 1811 1886 75
Belgium 1810 1921 lil
Great Britain 1799—1800 1906 106
"Plebiscitarian!!
countries
France 1791-1803 1884 81-93
Prussia—Germany 1794 1918 124
"Corporatist" countrics
Austria 1768 1870 102
Italy traditional 1900 -
Spain traditional 1909 -

This compilation is primarily derived from International Labour Office, Freedom of
Association. London, P.S. King & Son, 1927-30, vols. 1-5. (ILO Studies and Reports

se rs. 28-32 ) °


The length of the interval between the first decisive measure taken

to repress tendencies toward organized activity and the final decision to
accept the unions provides a crude measure of the cxtent of the difficulties
experienced in the different polities in integrating the emerging lower
classes in the system, In the Scandinavian countrics the breakdown of the
"ostate society" was followed by a remarkable proliferation of religious,
cultural, economic and political associatiors and, except for a fow cases of
violent conflicts, governments did little or nothing cither to restrict or
to legilize these activities. At the other extreme, in countries such as
Italy and Spain restrictions of associational activity were traditional and
local and hardly required specific enactments by national legislatures.

In France, the Jacobin tradition of direct state-citizen relations led to

the promulgation of the famous Loi Le Chapelicr in 1791 and this tendency

to restrain all associational pouvoirs intermédiaires was further strengthened

through the Napoleonic traditions of plebiscitarian rule, In Prussia and
the Wilhelmine Reich similar tendencies were at work and produced a series
of strict regulations of working class-organizations. It is important to
note that tho countrics with the longest histories of repression have also

been the countries most likcly to develop corportist schemes once the unions

had been legally acceptedslogalization could calisy led to full incorpora-
tion in the machinery of the state. We find these tendencies most marked
in Austria, Italy and Spain but very similar trends have also been observed

in Belgium and the Netherlands,

Political rights: the franchise and the seoret vote.

The debates over the right to combine in wage bargaining was in the
majority of the countries tied in closely with debates over the right to

vote, to take part in the election of representatives in decision-making

bodies, In all Western countries we find a movement toward free unionization

parallelling @ movement toward national political citizenship through the

universalization of the suffrage, Thore wore important differences, however,

in the timing of the steps taken in extending the two sets of rights and
these differences proved important in setting the stage for working-class
politics,

The development toward universal suffrage got under way with the

break-up of the anciens régimes of representation through estates. Under

these systems only economically independent heads of households could take
part in public life and elect officals to represent their particular status
groups: in most countries the nobility, the clergy and the privileged

bourgeoisie of incorporated cities, in the Nordic countries also the


independent farmers, With the French Revolution came the idea of national

assemblies of representatives without explicit tics to the traditional

estates and this opened up possibilities for a broadening of the popular
bases of government, Theo law of 11 August, 1792, went so far as to give
the franohise to all French males over 21 who were not servants, paupers

or vagabonds and the Constitution of 1793 did not even exclude paupers

if they had resided more than six months in the canton. The Restoration

did not bring back representation by cstates: instead the régime censitaire

in fact introduced an abstract monetary criterion which cut decisively across
the carlicr criteria of ascribed status.

A new plase in the development opened up with the Revolution of 1848
and the rapid spread of movements for representetive democracy throughout
most of Burope. Napoleon III demonstrated the possibilities of plebisci-
tarian rulc and more and more of the leaders of the cstablished clites
became torn between their fears of the consequonces of rapid extensions
of the suffrage to the lower classes and their fascination with the pcesi-
bilities of a strengthening of the powers of the nation-state through
the mobilization of the working class in its service. 8) These conflicts
of strategy produced a great variety of transitional compromises in the
different countries: the starting points for these developments were the

provisions of the Standesstaat and the post-revolutionary régine oensitaire

and the end=points in the sequence were the promulgations of universal
adult suffrageybut the steps taken and the paths chosen from the one point
to the other varied markedly from system te system and reflected basic

9)

differences in dominant values and in the character of each social structure,

Bae, H, GOLLWITZER, "Der CHsarismus Napoleons III im Widerhall der

6ffentlichen Meinung Deutschlands", Hist, Zs. 173, 1952: 23-76. Ina
number of countries the demands for universal manhood suffrage became
intimately tied in with the necd for universal conscription, cf. the
Swedish slogan "one man, ove vote, one gun" discussed most recently in
Nils BLVANDER Harald Hj#rne och konservatismen. Stockholm, Almqvist och
Wiksell, 1961, pp. 159-161.

9)

The details of these developments have been set out in such compendia

as Georg MEYER, Igs parlamentarische Wahlrecht. Berlin, Haering, 1901,

and Karl BRAUNIAS, Das parlamentaristhe Wahlrecht vol II. Berlin,

de Gruyter, 1932. These are on the whole remarkably accurate as far as they
go, but need to be corrected, particularly for some of the smaller countries,
and supplemented, particularly with statistics for the size and structure

of electorates.

A usoful review of the arguments in the debate over the extension of suffrage
is H.H, ZWAGER, De motivering van het algemeen Kiesrecht in Buropa,
Groningen, Wolters, 1958,


10

We may conveniently distinguish five major sets of criteria used in

limiting the franchise during this transitional period:

1) traditional estate criteria: restriction of franchise to heads of
households within each of the established status groups es defined
by law;

2) régime censitaire: restrictions based on the valuoc of land or

capital or on the amounts of yearly texes on property and/or

income 3

3) régime capacitaire: restrictions by criteria of litcracy, formal
educational or appointment to high public office;

4) household responsibility criteria: restrictions to heads of house-=-

holds occupying own dwellings of a minimum given volume or lodged
in premises for a given minimum rent}

5) residence critcria: restrictions to citizens registered as residents

either in the local community, the constituency or the national

territory for a given minimum of months or years.

The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 provides a good example of an early

compromise between estate criteria, property criteria and the principe

capacitaire, The franchise was given to four categories of citizens: two
of these, the burghers of incorporated cities and the farmers (freeholders
and leaseholders) corresponded to the old estates, a third, applicable
only in cities and towns, was defined by ownership of real estate of a
given minimum value and the fourth was simply made up of all officials

of the national government, This system gave ea clear numerical majority
to the farmers but the interest of the burghers and the officials were
judiciously protected through inequalities in the distribution of mandates
between urban and rural constituencies, In countrics with significant
feudal heritages the principle of estate representation was generally
preserved through bicaoneral systems, Perhaps the most intricate of the
compromises devised was the Austrian of 18673 the division of the Urwihler

into four Kurien was in part based on traditional estates but also intro-

duced a corporatist element through the provisions for representation through

Chambers of Commerce and the Professions, When the pressures for electoral reform

became too strong in the 1890s, a compromise was again found through the

introduction of an allgemeino Wahlerklasse open to all men over 24, but

this class was simply added to the four already there, Such complex

solutions were clearly doomed to failure, however, and were soon discarded,


|
11

The rise of commercial and industrial capitalism favoured the spread

of the régime censitaire, The ideological basis was Benjamin CONSTANT's

argument that the affairs of the national community must be left to those
with "real stakes" in it through the posession of land or through invest-

ments in business, The principo capacitaire was essentially an extension

of this principle: the franchise was accorded to those who had direct

interest in the maintenance of the polity through their investments in professional
skill as well as in land, in trade or industry. The implicit notion was

that only such citizens could form rational judgements of the policies

to be pursued by the government, A Norwegian authority on eonstitutional

law linked the two elements together in this statement: "suffrage ... should

be reserved to the citizens who had judgement enough to understand who

would prove the best representatives and independence enough to stick to

10)

social and cultural, independence was central in the arguments for the

his conviction in this matter", This emphasis on economic, but also
9

régime censitairo and its offshoots. Subjects in positions of personal

dependence on the master of the household were excluded even in the most
extreme of the electoral laws of the French Revolution. A number of
otherwise very radical suffrage extensions drew the line at domestic
servants: thus the Danish Constitution of 1849. The British "householder"
and "lodger" franchise was based on similar concerms to exclude adults in
| positions of immediate personal dependence, The simplest argument against
votes for servants was clearly that it would multiply by n the numbers of
votes under the control of the master of the houschold, 11)
The emergence and growth of a class of wage eamors outside the immediate

household of the employer raised new problems of delimitation. In the

10) a, ASCHEHOUG, Norges nuverende Statsforfatning, Christiania, Aschehoug,

1875, vol. I p. 280,

ll onis, of course, was what actually happoned when universal suffrage was

introduced in countries with large agricultural estates run by an
authoritsrian elite such as Prussia, For a parallel with conditions in
the similarly structured rural areas of Brazil, see the chapter by
Emilio WILLEMS in Arnold ROSE cd. The Institutions of Advanced Socicties,
Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958, p. 5523 "The mein functions
of suffrage was that of preserving the existing power structure.

Within the traditional pattern, suffrage added opportunities for dis-
playing and reinforcing feudal loyalty. At the same time, it reinforced
and legalized the political status of the landowner",


12

established socio-economic terminology their status was one of dependence
but it would not so casily be argued that they would invariably follow
their employers politically. The crucial battles in the development
toward universal suffrage concerned the status of these emorging strata
within the national polity. A great varicty of transitional compromises
wore debated and several were actually tried out. The basic strategy

was to underscore the structural differentiations within the wage-carning

strata. Somc varieties of régime censitaire in fact admitted the better

paid wage workers, particularly if they had houses of their own.

The householder and lodger franchise in Britain similarly served to
integrate the better-off working class within the system and to keep
out only the "real proletariat", the migratory and the marginal workers
without established local tics. Even after the disappearence of all
economic qualifications for suffrage the retention of residence require-

ments has served similar funotions: those restrictions wore, for obvious

reasons, most stubbornly adhered to in the provisions for local elections,

Another important set of stratagems in this battle to control the
onrush of mass democracy were the institutions of weighted suffrage and

plural votes. The crudest examples were no doubt the Austrian Kurien

and the Prussian three-class system: universal suffrage w granted but
the woights of the votes given to the lower classes were infinitesimal
by comparison with those of the established landed or financial clite,
The most innocuous system of plural voting was perhaps the British
provision for extra votes for university graduates and for owners of
business premises in different constituencics, Sociologically the

most interesting was the Belgian system of plural voting devised in 1893:
universal manhood suffrage was introduced but extra votes were given

not only on capagitaire criteria, but also to peres de famille upon

reaching the respectable age of 35. The basic motive, clearly, was to

underscore structural differentiations within the lower strata and to

12)
A special tax census taken in Norway in 1876 indicated that more than

one quarter of the male workers who were on the tax rolis were
enfranchized under the system adopted in 1814: by contrast only 3%
of the workers in the rural areas had been given the vote, cf.
Statistisk Centralbyreau ser. C. No. 14, 1877, pp. 340-41.


exclude from the system the elements least committed to the established

social order.

Closely related to these sets of stratagoms was the stubborn resistance
to changes in the delimitation of constituencics. Rapid urbanization produced
glaring inequalities of vote weights even under conditions of formally
equal universal suffrage. The injustices of the Prussian districting
provisions were the object of acrimoncous debate for decades, The extreme
solution adopted in the Weimar Republic, the establishment of a unitary PR system
for the entire Reich, no doubt gave every voter the same abstract chance to
influence the distribution of seats, but at the same brought to the fore
the inherert difficulties of such standardization across localities of
different structure,

The entry of the lower classes into the political arena also raised

a series of problems for the administration of clections. Sociologically

the most interesting issue was the safeguarding of the independence of

the individual clectoral decision, The defenders of the estate traditions

and the régime censitaire argued that economically dependent subjects could

not be expected to form independent political judgements and would, if
onfranchized, corrupt the system through the sale of votes and through
violent intimidation, Corrupt practices were of course widespread in
many countries long before the extension of the suffrage but the enfran-
chisement of large sections of the lower classes generally provided

added incentives to reforms in the administration and control of elections.

A central problem in this debate focussed on the secret allot, 23)

The traditional notion was that the vote was a public act and only to
be entrusted to men who could openly stand by their opinions, <n this

both Conservatives and Altliberale agreed, The infamous Prussian system

of oral voting was defended in these terms but was clearly maintained for
>)

so long because it proved such an casy way of controlling the votes of tho

14)

Landarbeiter, The secret ballot essentially appealed to the literate

13)

For further details see ROKKAN op.cit. A recent one=nntion account of

the development of standards for the control of elections is Cornelius
O'LEARY, The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Hlcoctions. 1865-1911.
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962,

14)

For a recent detailed account see Th. NIPPHRDEY, Die Organisation der
deutschen Parteien vor 1918, Dtisseldorf, Droste, 1961, Kap, V.


14

urban mentality: it fitted in as another clement in the anonymous, privatized
culture of the city so admirably described by a sociologist such as SIMMEL.
The decisive factor, however, was the emergence of the lower class vote as a
factor in national politics and the neod to neutralize the threatening
working-class organizations: the provisions for secrecy not only isolated the
dependent workers from his superiors but also from his peers, It is very
different given the state of the clectoral statistics, to determine with
any exactitude the effects of secrecy on the actual behaviour of workers at
the polls, but it scems inherently likely, given a minimum amount of cross-=
class communications, that secrecy helped to reduce the likelihood of a
polarization of politics in class terms: the contrast between the develop-=
ments in Britain and Prussia certainly point in that direction, but the
complexity of the contextual factors make direct comparisons highly proble-
matic,

The emergence of strong trade unions pari passu with the electoral

mobilization of the cnfranchized working class accentuated this problem

of visibility vs. privacy in the expression of political loyalties, The
provisions for secret voting made it possible for the inarticulate rank-
and-file to escape the pressures of the unions and at the same time put the
onus of political visibility on the actives within the working class movement.
In sociological terms we may say that the established national "system" opened
up channels for the expression of secret loyalty while making it a necessity
for its "deviants" to declare themselves openly. Some Socialist parties
tricd to reverse the tables by establishing intimate organizational ties

with the trade unions and imposing political levies on their members,
irrespective of their actual preferences, Tho controversy over "contracting~
in" vs. "contracting~-out" in the British labour movement can bo intorpreted
as the cxact counterpart of the controversy over open vs. secret voting

in the total system: the Labour party wanted to put the onus of visibility

on its own "deviants", the trade union members who did not want to vote

for the party:while the Conservatives and Liberals wanted the inarticulate
masses to stay out of political commitments and to put the onus of visibility

15)

on the Socialist militants.

15)

For details on this controversy see Martin HARRISON, Trade Unions and
the Lebour Party Since 1945. London, Allen & Unwin, 1960, Ch. 1, We
are indebted to Robert McKENZIN for alerting us to this parallel,


15

The right to be educated and the imposition of unified national education:

a central dilemma in nation-building,

The legalization of trade unions and the extension of the franchize are
instances of cnabling legislation which removed previously existing
barriers and may be censidered two privileges which compensate the
individual for his censent to be governed under the rules and by the

6)

that community these privileges are available to qualified individuals if

agents of his national political community. + From the standpoint of

they wish to make use of them, The permissiveness of such economic and

political rights must be noted especially, as we turn now to the third

element of citizenship, social rishts. : To be sure, in one
sense social rights are similar to economic and political rights. As
long as masses of the population are deprived even of elementary
education, access to educational facilities appears as the pre-condition
without which all other rights under the law renain of no avail to the
uneducated, To provide the rudiments of cducation to the illiterate
appears as an act of liberation as docs the legislative regulation of
working conditions for women and children, compulsory insurance against
industrial accidents, and other welfare measures. Nonetheless, social
rights are distinctive in that they do not usually permit the individual
to decide whether or not to avail himself of their advantages,

In all Western societies elementary education has become a duty of
citizenship, perhaps the earliest example of a prescribed minimum level
of living enforced by all the powers of the modern state. Two attributes
of clementary education make it into an element of citizenship that the natioe
nal govornment authority has over it and that the parents of all children
in a certain age-group (usually from 6 to 10 cr 12) are required by law
to see to it that their children attend school. Those features of
elementary education were introduced for the most part during the last
decades of the 19th century, in part because national governments were
financially and administratively unable to implement such a program at
an earlier time, Considerable disoretion was left in the hands of the
clergy and local officals, and exceptions are made to this day in the

case of parochial schools even in those countries where a national system

16)

This formulation is indebted to the perceptive analysis of Joseph
TUSSMAN, Obligation and _ the Body Politic (New Yorks Oxford University
Press, 1960), Cpt. II.


16

of clementary education is fully established,

Still, the principle of compulsory clomontary education emerged
much carlicr as an outgrowth of both benevolent despotism and liberal

nationalism, At a later time the principle was also acceptable to the emerging

industrial work-forcec, Among laborers the desire to become cducated was
strong, partly to better one's chances in life, partly to see to it that
a worker's children had a better chance than their parents, and partly to
give additional weight to the political claims made on behalf of the working
class. If this desire led to voluntary efforts to provide educational
facilities for workers, as it did notably in England and Germany, such
action was largely a response to the fact that no other facilities were
available to them, Accordingly, it is probable that the demand for an
elementary cducation available to all cut across the spectrum of political
bolicfs, After all, it could be sustained by such divergent arguments as that
the people's inherent unruliness necessitated introduction in the fundamentals
of religion and loyalty to king and state, or that the masses of the people
should share in the amentics of civilization.

Compulsory elementary education became a major controversial issue
nevertheless, whenever governmental authority in this field came into
conflict with organized religion, Traditionally, the Catholic Church
regarded tcaching as one of its inherent powers with the work of instruction
being conducted by the religious orders. In France this principle was challenged
in the 1760's with the suppression of the Jesuit order and the endorsement
of a nationally organized system of lay-cducation, the starting-point of a

17)

conflict over education which hes lasted to this day. In Austria,
however, the same priciple prevailed without challenge under the acgis of
absolutist rule with the result that clemontary cducation was organized by
the government as early as 1805 with the clergy acting as the supervisory
agent of the state, Again, in the countries with Protestant state churches
(Prussia, Denmark, Norway and Sweden) little or no cdiflict developed as the
unity of church and state in the person of the monarch allowed for the
ultimate authority of government over clementary education, with the

clergy acting in this ficld as agents of the monarch or (later) of a Ministry

17)

See the sccount in tirnest Barker, The Development of Public Services

in Western Burope (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 79-83, and
Robert ULICH, The Education of Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1961), Cpt. VI.


of educational and ceclosiastical affairs.

religious control over clementary education could not exist,

Such unity of political and

on the other

hand, where church and state were more or less scparate and the population
divided in to antagnistic religious groupings. Thus, countries like England,
the Netherlands, Belgium and to some cxtent Germany after 1871 as woll as the
United States have been the scene of protracted struggles over the conditions
under which the national government should be permitted to exercise authotiry

in the field of elementary education.

It is possible to supplement these qualitative considerations oy
a comparative tabulation of the schoolepcpulation as a consistently increasing

proportion of each age-group since in recent decades most Western countries have

considered clementary
have kept a record of
While the figures for
for the later period,

mation of the rate at

education a matter of national concern and accordingly
school attendance: this wo have +ried in Table II.
earlicr yoars are inevitably less reliable than thos
the table provides us with a reasonably good approxi-

which sheoll attendance has become an element of

citizenship.

Wo have witnessed in recont yoars e groat deal of research on the
relationship between investments in primary education and initial cconomic
growth. It is tompting to undertake similar analyses of the interrelations
between the growth of public education and the develipment of mass democracy.
We cannot go into statistical complexitics here, but only note a few striking
relationships.

If we look back at our crude classifieation of Western Suropean

countrics we find the following patterns:

Trade union repression? School cnvolvments over 80,03 Manhood suffrage:

Insignificant All carly, c. 1870 All early except
Sweden
Longer? pluralist all late akin} hee (Bag m
votes until 1919)
Longer: plebiscitarian Prussia: carly Prussia: early
France: late but uncqual

France: carly
and equal
Longer: corporatist Austria: carly All late
Italy: late
Spain: late

18) cog especially UNESCO,

World Illiteracy at Mid-Century. Paris, Unesco, 1955,
ppe 172-187: a discussion of the relationships between increases in rates of
enrolment, movement away from agriculture and increases in per capita income

for 2 number of countrics, The analysis singles cout Denmark, Norway, Sweden,

Prussia and Switzerland as countrics where illiteracy disappeared before the
change-over from peasant agriculture to urban industrialism,
NATIONS.

cf, also UNIT-iD
Report on the World Social Situation. New York, 1961, page 46.


18

Tho nation-states which proved most ready to accept workers’ organizations
all devoloped their national education services carly. The "pluralist"
countries with longer histories of repression also tock longer to develop
their schools: they were all culturally and religiously divided and conse=
quently experienced considerable interal strife over the nationalization of
oducation, Of the countries classificd as "plebiscitarian" and "corporetists"
two , Prussia and Austria, were pioneers in the development of cducation while

the others lagged far behind, Clearly the existence of a national educational

systom docs not count as much in setting the stage for policies toward the

lower classes as the content and character of the system.

Similar problems arise in the enalysis of the parallels between the
development of national education and the extension of the suffrage. In the
countries which we have classificd as predominantly "pluralist", high enrol-
ment figures were everywhore reached before the final institutionalization of
universal and cqual suffrage. The situation differed in the "plebiscitarian"
and "corporatist" countries. In Prussia manhood suffrage came very early,

but the odious Dreiklassenwahlrecht was not given up until after the defeat

in 1918, France developed its educational services much later than Prussia
but led the world in extending the suffrage to all adult mon. TAINE, in his
famous pamphict of 1872, 19) reckoned that 39% of the French clectorate were
still illiterate and showed how the universelization of the suffrage in his
country had its basis in universal conscription rather than in universal
education. Conscription and national education may both serve the purposes

of the centralized nation-state and help tc weed out pouvoirs intermédiaires.

Tt is not cnough, in such comparisons as these, to establish time series for
levels of onrolmont: what would be much more conlightening would be comparative

statistics on the recruitment of teachers and comparable data on the character

of their training, their role in the community and their political activities.
Suffice it here to call attention to these opportunities for detailed

comparative research,

19)

Du suffrage universel ct de la maniére de voter, Paris, Hachette, 1872, p.22.


Similarities and differences in national developments: concluding notes.

We have given a rough and sometimes most cavalier summary of a
series of complex national developments over more than a century and a

half, Our aim has been twofcld: to highlight important differences between

groups of countries in the timing and character of the decisions taken to
extend a series of citizen rights to lower-class subjects, and to analyze

the essential similarities in the solutions finally reached in each country.

We have stressed the similarities in the background of these diverse national
developments: the assault against the inherited inequalities of the estate
society and the intensification of social conflicts under the subsequent
régime of formal equality under the law. We have shown how different
nation-states, some perhaps too quickly, others very slowly, tried to give
conercte reality to this new equality by conferring to the economically
dependent strata the capacity to defend their rights and to articulate

their demands, and we have singled out as the three most important measures
taken in this process the legalization of collective bargaining, the uni-~
versalization of voting rights and the provision of a basic education for all.
From the vantage=-point of the present we might summarize the development

as a whole adapting Sir Henry MAINE's famous statement to these new conditions:

Starting as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society
in which all the relations of persons arise from the free agreement of
individuals, we seem to have stoadily moved towards a phase of social
order in which social, political and economic inequalities that affect
the legal capacity of individuals have become of sufficient public
concern so as to lead to a corrective redistribution of the rights and
duties of citizenship by means of legislation.
By this redistribution the modern welfare state secks to guarantee
what} is politically accepted as the level of social and economical well=—boing
below which no citizen of the country need fall or should not be allowed to
fall. And this fact, however.complex it would be to establish it empirically,
presents the modern social scientist with one of his most baffling problems,
For the existence of a politically accepted minimum level of living
in all welfare states is on a par with a good many other features in which
modern societies are alike, 11 these societies have governments with a
complex administrative apparatus and a national jurisdictionj all are
characterized by a "public sector" which subjects to regulation those
aspects of society which are affected by a "public interest" and these
increase in number; all possess a highly claborated technology and struc

turally comparable industrial organizations in which this technology is

appliedj all have educational institutions designed to train the professional

personne] needed in government, industry and sciontific work, These and

rolated common features reveal that by virtue of technology, the national
sovercignity of their governments, the concentration of pcople in urban areas,
the bureaucratic form of organization - and national citizenship, modern
societies are very similar, If in the 19th century social scicntists faeed
the difficult task of so defining their concepts that the great diversity

of social life would become amenable to systematic analysis, they scom
confronted today with societies in which the uniformitics that permit
generalizations are the product of social change itsclf. Some 19th century
thinkers like Alexis de Tocqueville or Jacob Burckhardt looked upon the
prospective development of modern socicty with deep apprehensions today's
social scicntists scem to view the uniformities of modern socicties as
confirming their goneralizations, heirs to the vision of Saint-Simon and
Marx who saw in industrial organization and the class structure the unifying
element of modern civilization,

But these essential similarities must not make us forget the deep=
seated differences resulting from contrasting geographicel, historical and
cultural constellations in cach nation-state, Our brief summary of steps
and measures taken in ostablishing cach set of rights will have helped to
underscore important contrasts in valuc orientations between countrics and
also givon some bascs for further explorations of the implications of these
differences for the current functioning of cach political system,

It is essential that we recognize that citizenship rights were not
just granted to the lower classes for reasons of charity. Decisions to
extend rights beyond the confines of the traditionally privileged were prompted
by a varicty of motives, often contrasting and at odds with cach othors

-~ by the necds oxperienced by an cstablished oclite (a monarch, an

autocratic ruler, a central administrative apparatus ) for allies against

an cneroaching counter=-clite: local pouvois internédiaires, a feudal mobility,

a capitalist or industrialist class;

- by nationalist or militarist conceptions of a unified nation ensuring

total mobilization of its resources,

-~ by fears of lower class revolt and hopes of a peaceful settlement

of class conflicts (Sogialpezifismus ),.

~ through gradual and reluctant acceptance of a serios of faitsaaccnplis,

- by equalitarian convictions

- by identification with the "oppressed classes"


~ by belicfs in the "historic mission" of the working classes

- by corporatist and berufatindliche conceptions of the need for

formal representation of all status groups within the body politic.

The historian may bo content to record these varieties of motives,
arguments and strategies and leave it at that. Tho sociologist is tempted
to seek some order in the tangles and to try out some "models" of dominant
constcllations of actual or contemplated policies, We have already suggested,
at diffcrent points in our discussion, a differentiation between "plebisci-
tarian", "pluralist" and "corporatists" policy models, We shall conclude

our exploration with a brief presentation of these models,

The first is a plebiscitarian modelj this posits the establishemt
of direct rolationships betweon the contral organs of the nation-state and
each member of the community, whether adult, adolescent or child, and the

consequent suppression of all pouvoirs intermédiaires, whether feudal-local

or associational,

The second is a pluralist model; this points the principle of national

citizenship for all accountable adults without criminal records but at the same
time permits the development of organizations and other intermediary yowers

in a'froee membership market!)

And the third is a corporatist model positing the principle of national

citizenship but channeling all ropresentation and most services through
status-specific and functional associations baged on compulsory membership

and incorporated within tho overall apparatus of national government,

In the schema set out below we have tried to spell out the typical
policies within each of these "models" in three areas discussod in this

papers economic rights, political rights and cultural rights,


‘Plebiscitarian:

policics for

a) lower-class

subiccts

b) class=
distinct
associations

Economic rights

permit individual
upward mobility;
ensure social
security without
union interference;

prohibit unions
(Loi Le Chapelicr)

Pluralist:

policies for

a) lower-class
subjects

bd alass
distinoet
associations

Corporatist:

policies for

a) lower-class

subjects

b) class=
distinct
associations

ensure freedom
to join unions
but also protec-
tion for non-
unionized;

ensure freedom of
unionization in
"open market"

enforce union
membership

incorporate

unions in govern=
mental administra
tive structure

Political rights

introduce universal
and equal suffrage,
but mainly to ensure
legitimacy of regime;

prohibit class
parties

introduce universal
suffrage and safe-
guard secrecy of
vote;

ensure freedom of
party formation

enforce obligatory
vote

organize functio-
nal representstion
by branch of economy

22

Cultural rights

introduce compul=
sory national
education

discourage denomi-
national schools.

allow parents
freedom to choose
school by denomi-
nation

permit denomina=
tional schools,

compulsory
education but
within culture=
specific schools;

incorporate
denominational
schools in state
system,

The crucial characteristic of cach model can be generated from a cross=

classification of dilemmas of policy in the face of two avenucs of access to the

national systems

individual access,

distinct associations, unions or organizations.

or access through class-distinct or culture=

help to set out the relationships between these models;

20)

20)

A crude four-fold table may

This classification resembles on some points the scheme set out by William

KORNHAUSER in The Politics of Mass Society. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul,

1960, Ch. 2, but focuses on the process of entry into politics rather on the
resultant structures of cach polity. For an interesting reformulation of the
KORNHAUSER scheme in terms of data on political divisions in Finland, see

Brik ALLARDT,

Acta. Sociol. 6(1-2) 1962: 67-82,

"Community Activity, Leisure Use and Social Structure",

23 |

Access via class-distinct associations

Enforced
Prohibited or permitted
Prohibited Traditional Corporatist
Individual
access
from the
lower classes
Permitted Plebiscitarian Pluralist
or encouraged

No national sequence of decisions fit exactly into any one of these
"ideal—type" models. France has come closest to the plebiscitarian model at
several points in its history, the Scandinavian countries have the longest

and perhaps most consistent history of pluralist policies, and Austria seems

A

w2

to have come closest to the corporatist model .=
” None of the models, however, have prevailed completely in
any system, Modern political systems are invariably "multi-structured" and
cannot be analyzed at all levels in terms of onc single model, To analyze
this multiplicity of structures, however, we have to proceed through such
Simplified models of policy directions, The task is to assess for cach nation
and for each sequence of decision the strength of cach model both in the
struggle between established and emergent olites and in terms of the compro=
mises reached, We hope in our further work to carry out detailed comparisons
of such processes and to assess the consequences of the contrasting policy
sequences for the mobilization and activation of the lower classes and the

dependent citizens in national politics.

eocoe8

TABLE IIL:

1820 - 1950

SCHOOL ENROLMENTS FOR 10 COUNTRIES

1820

/30

/ 40

/50

/60

/70

/80

/90

1900

/10

/20

/30

/ 40

De

Iingland & Wales
(% 10-11 yr. olds in grant-
aided schools)
(% 5-14 yr. olds in grant-—
aided schools

France
A .
(% 5-14 yr. olds in schools)

Netherlands

(% 5-14 yr. olds primary
schools)

Prussia
(% 7-14 yr. olds in "Official
Volkschulen"')
Germany
(Reich & Fed. Republic &
West Berlin)

Austria
(%5-13 yr. olds attending
schools)

Thad 12 yre olds in primary
schools)
(% 5-13 yr. olds in primary
schools)

86

19

58

52

op)

32

96

15

28

5e

74

65

92

29

37

61

82

87

40

69

98

45

92

90

AT

86

86

7O

92

94

52

Co
\O

71

61

92

oT

14

92

85

69

87

85

70

TT

95

70

70

99

88

74


TABLE II continued:

SCHOOL ENROLMENTS FOR 10 COUNTRIES

1820 — 1950

1820

/60

/80

/90

1900

/10

/30

/ 40

/50

10,

Sweden
7% 9-15 yr. olds
(% 7-14 yr. olds

Norway
(% 7-15 yr. olds
instruction)

Russia

(% 7-14 yr. olds
schools)

(% 5-14 ys. olds
schools)

% 5-13 yr. olds

public schools)
(% 5+17 yr. olds
public eschools)

in schools
in school

receiving

in secular

in secular

enrolled in

enrolled in

76

oo)
Be

91

65

90

83

16

69

89

91

91

23

83

92

19
78

88

89

72

84
81

87

91

89

54
85

34

35
83


Table II: School Enrolments for 10 Countries
1880 — 1950

Bases and Sources
1. Series: 1862/63, 1868/69, 1878-79, 1888/89; Board of Bducetion, Statistics

of Public Education in England and Wales, 1903, 1904, 1905(London: HMSO,
1905) pp. iv-sl.

1900, 1913, 1920, 1930; Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract for The
United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1935), V. 78, pp. 50.51.

1938, 19503; Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistic
(London: HMSO, 1957), No. 94, p. 87.

eo Computed from Inst, Nat, de la Statistique, Annueire Statistique de la
Frence. 1957, 2nd Parties, pp. 1l, 23.

3. Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, De Ontwikkeling van het Onderwijs in
Nederland (Utrecht: Uitgeversmaatschappij W. de Haan NoVey 1951), pe Ol.

4. Series: 1825, 1831, 1843; H. Barnard, National Education in Europe,
2nd ed., (Hartford: F.B, Perkins, 1854), p.90.

1861, 1881; E, Lavasseur, L'Enseignement Primaire dans Les Pays Civiles
(Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1897), pp. 102-103, 110.

1871, 1891, 19013 W. Lexis, ed., Das Unterrichtswesen im Deutschen Reich
(Berlin: A, Asher, 1904), Band III, p.10,

1911: Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band 438,

1930/34, 1940/44, 1950/53; computed from UNESCO, World Survey of
Education II (Paris: 1958), p. 619.

5. Series: 1538; H, Barnard, op. cit., p. 338
1865, 1871, 1880, 1890; B, Lavasseur, op. cit., pe 158,
1900/01, 1910; Statesman's Yearbook 1913 (London: Mcmillan, 1913),
1930/34, 1935/37, 1950/54; computed from, UNUSCO, op, cite, p. 126.

6. Computed from, Ist, Centrale di Statistica, Sommario di Statistiche
Storiche Italiane 1861-1955, PPe 40, 76.

7. Series: 1850, 1860, 18703; BE. de Lavalette, L'Instruction du Peuple
(Paris: Librairie Hachettc, 1872), p. 293.

1880 to 19503 UNESCO, World Illiteracy at Mid-Century, Dp. 185.

8, Ibid. , De 1736

9. Series 1880, 1694, 1911; 4. Rashin, The Population of Russia for 100 Years
(in Russian), (Moscows 1957), pe 318.

1918; N. Hans, "Comparative Study of Buropean Education,"
Yearbook of Education, 1936, p. 115.

1930/34, 1940, 1950/54; World Survey of Education II, p.

10, UNESCO, World [lliteracy at Mid-Century, p. 169.

11, U.S., Office of Education, Biennial Survey of lducation, 1953/54, Ch. I,


Paper for,work session I R-.

"Citizenship and Political Authority" BENDIX-ROKKAN
Fifth World Congress of Sociology "The extension
Washington, 1962 | of national

citizenship...."

The extension of national citizenship

to the lower classes:

a comparative perspective

By
Reinhard BENDIX and Stein ROXKAN
University of California The Chr. Michelsen Institute
Berkeley Bergen

This paper focuses on the extension of a range of citizenship
rights to economically, socially and culturally dependent subjects
within the territoriai population of developing nation-states. T. H,
MARSHALL made this the central theme in his pathbreaking study of

a . a : ave . ; ;
Citizenship and Social Class. He concentrated his discussion on

Great Britain: our aim is to compare the extension of rights across
& number of nation-states and to develop some bench-mark "models" for
this purpose. No detailed documentation is attempted here: our vaper

represents one step in a series of writings on the politics of national

1. Cambridge, the University Press, 1950, pp. 1-85.

. 5 er . - : .
development and will, it is hoped, be followed up in greater detail.

Blements in national citizenship.

T. H. MARSHALL distinguished three basic elements of national
citizenship:
- civil rights such as "liberty of person, freedom of speech,
thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude

valid contracts, and the right to justice";

- political rights such as the franchise and the right of access

to public office;

- social rights ranging from "the right to a modicum of economic
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the
social neritage and to live the life of a civilized being
according to the standards prevailing in the society."

To these three elements of citizenship corresponded four sets of

public institutions:

the courts, for the safeguarding of civil rights and, specifically,

| for the protection of all rights extendcd to the less articulate members

of the national community;

access to particination in public decision-making and legislation;

1. ‘the paper is a direct sequel to two articles by Reinhard BENDIX,
"Social Stratification and the Political Community" Arch. eur. de sociol.
1 (2), i960: 181-210 and "The Lower Classes and the Democratic Revolution,"
Industrial Reletions 1 (1) 1961: 91-116. A sociological approach to the
extension ot political rights to the "lower classes" (tenants, menual
workers and others in positions of economic dependence) and to women has
been outlined by Stein ROKKAN in “Mass Suffrage, Secret Voting and Political
Participation.” Arch eur. @e sociol. 2 (1) 1961: 132-152, cf. also
S. ROKKAN & H. VALEN, “The Mobilization of the Periphery." Acta sociol.
6 (1-2) 1962: 111-158.

the Local and the natiorna.i representative bodies as avenues of
|
|
|


the social services, to ensure some minimum of protection against

poverty, sickness and other misfortunes, and the schools, to implement
the right accorded all members of the community to receive at least the
basic elements of an education.

All established nation-states can Look back on longer or shorter
histories of legislative ections and administrative decisions to broacen
the bases of such institutions and to ensure greater equality of access
frou tac different strata of subjects within their territory. Zor each
nation-state and for each set of institutions the historian can pinpoint
chronologies of the public measures taken anc trace the sequences of moves
and counter-moves, peasures and counter-pressures, bargains and manoeuvres
behind each extension of rights beyond the strata of the traditionally
privileged. The sociologist is strongly tempted to set beside each other

@ series of such historical accounts and to compare developments, both

neross netion-states and across sets of institutions.

Types of comparisons.

For each set of institutions the sociologist would idcally want to
have access to three sets of time-scrics data:

comparative chronologies of governmental decisions to extend the

given rights;

comparative statisties of the actual uses made of these rights

within the new strata brought within the pale of the national community;

and comparative data on the recruitment of decision-makers from

the new strata within each set of institutions.
These distinctions make most immediate sense in comparisons of

extensions of political rights, but they can also be shown to be of


relevance when comparing other processes of democratization. In comparing
developments towards democr we can distinguish three successive,

aithough often clearly overlapping, phases: the formal intesration phase

culminating in the promulgation of universal suffrage for all accountable

adults without severe criminal records, the mobilization phase through

which the strata and categories of subjects lest to be enfranchized are

persuaded to make use of their rights, and the activation phase through

which citizens in these strata and categories actually enter lato competi-

1
tion for public office.” For the rights to sccial services and to education

the actual enactments are generally much less important than the subse-
quent administrative efforts to develop the corresponding institutions.
Here chronologies of formal decisions tell us less than statistics for
the percenteges of the potential populetion actually covered in ea
period: this would correspond to the “mobilization” data for political
rights. For civil rights the data of relevance for comparative analysis
will clearly differ markedly from eategory to category: court decision
will frequently count more than legislative actions and the statistics
for vthe actval uses made of the given rights are not easily assembled.
However, for the one civil right which concerns us immediatcly in this

:

paper, the freedom of association, the possibility of comparctive analysis

escmbles those for the suffrage: we cannot only establish comparative
chronologies for decisive governmental measures to restrict or to broa
the scope cf associational activities, we can also, at least for some

categories such as unions, follow the growth of membership figures over

i. For an attempt to sect out data for each of the pheses for one
country sec ROKKAN and VALEN, op. cit.


time and establish rates of “essocietional mobilization."
To gct anywhere in such comparisons we si@ll clearly have to start
7
out with data for each set of institutions singly.” The aim, however,

is to analyze constellations of policies toward tne dependent strata and

to study the sequences of extensions for the different rights conjointly.

The great merit of MARSHALL's analysis of British develooments was that
Lt sought out a pattern in several Cistinct processes of change and dis-
cussed this interdependence of policies within a unifying sociological
perspective. Comparisons across a sevies of such developments will not
only alert the scholar to the distinetiveress of each national constella-
tiou but also help to underscore the basic similarities in the dilemmes

" strata of cach community in deciding on policies

faced by the “established
toward the groups traditionally kept in states of dependence. Decisions

On one set of rights have explicit or implicit consequences for decision
Oi Others end the willingness or unwillingness of the decision-makers

to see and act on interdependcncies tell us a great deal about the preva-
Lent value system and the balance of forces in each society. Analyses

of such interdependencies can rarely be restricted to the mere chronologies
of cecisions: the actual and potential reactions of the new strata will
affect the balance of pressures on decision-makers aud the direction of
these grass-roots reactions will cssentially depend on the level of

wobiliaation reached through earlicr cxtensions of rights and through

the processes of change attendant on cconomie growth.

4, This was the procedure chosen in ROKKAN's first article, op. cit.:
he sct up a “comparative chronology of suffrage extensions" to highlight
similarities and contrasts in the timing of decisions to widen the
franchise, to equalize votes and to introduce the secret ballot.


It is again easiest to demonstrate this for political rights.

In france suffrage was extended vo peasants and workers long before the

accisive efforts to universalize primary education: suffrage was the
first right accorded these strate and cssentially served plebiscitarian

purposes. In britain and Sweden, by contrast, equal suffrage was not

J

granted to ali workers until the majority of them had enjoyed basic
eaucationai rights and cven benefitted from some governmentsi social
security measures
The sociologist confronted with such differences in the timing
of governmental measures will not only ask questions about the value
systems and the processes of structural change in each society but also

about the consequences of such constellations for the subsequent inte-

greactica of the new strata into the national nolitical community: the

direction and intensity of the responses of the emerging strata will

depend on the levels of mobilization already reached and these are now

only functicns of autonomous processes of economic growth but also

reflect earlier governmental dccisions and measures to extend legal rights.
Political sociologists have so far tended to study the entry int

politics of farmers, workevs and minority groups primarily as resultants

of changes in economic conditions, of incipient industrialization, of

rapid urbanization. But in themselves such socio-economic factors do

not account for differences in the political reactions of the lower strata.

. . +5 ; . _— i"
The early waves of economic growth bring about some "social mobilization"

of the dependent and perivheral strata of the community, but these movements

1. This is the term introduced by Kari DEUTSCH in Nationalism -
and Social Communication (New York: Wiley, 1953), p. 100 and passim,
and developed in greater statistical detail in "Social Mobilization and
Political Development," Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 85 (3) 1961: 493-514.


will not necessarily find political outlets. Rather the responses of

waren nee

the cherging strata vary in direction and intensity and the pnolicies
S J “
adopted on the extension of citizenship rights are of primary importance

in defining the alternatives for political action.

An cxnample: Norway and Sweden both organized universal compulsory
eaucation vell in advance of the decisive waves of industrializetion and
on that count could be said to be well prepared for the subsequent entry
lower classes into politics. There were important differences, however,
iu the timing of the decisions to oxtend political rights and these

7

differences counted heavily in determining the strategies and idcolezgies

R

of the working class movements. In Norway, the franchise was extended
in 2 quick succession of steps, weil before the industrial breakthrough
and without any extensive mobilization or working class organizations in

the fight for political citizenship. In Sweden, the fight for manhood

suffrage and equal votes took 2 longer time. It went on pari nassu with

industrial growth and brought about a broad, if temporary, alliance of

a variety of groups so far kept outside the established channels of
decision-making, the lower middle classes and the poorer farmers as well
as the manual workers. This difference in the timing of the extensions
or political rights found direct reflection in the choices of strategy
of the working class parties in the two countrics. When the industrial
breakthrough added a rapid flow of recruits to the Norwegian labour
movenent, it was no longer necessary to enter alliances to fight for
rights of representation and the movement was set free to follow its
own, temporarily very vadical, couvse. n Sweden the alliance with the

Liberals helped to "domesticate” the Social Democrats very soon after

the introduction of manhood suffrage and the rapid accession to responsible

Cabinet positions strengthened the ties between the working class and
the established political system.

Chronologies for extensions of suffrage and other rights may
clearly be expressed both in absolute time and in terms of some measure
of economic growth: perhaps the most appropriate measure would be the
per cenv or lower-cinss subjects alreacy "socially mobilized" according
vo the criteria suggested by DEUTSCH. We cannot go into the statistical
intricacies of such analyses in this paper: we are less concerned in
this context with methodology of comparison, more with the development
of a sociological persnective on these intricate interrelations between
economic growth, governmental policies and lower-class reactions.

Not all the rights ciscussed in MARSHALL's study are equally
important within this perspective. We shall therefore limit ourselves
to the sequence of decisions which proved of the most immediate relevance

4

for lcwer-class movements seeking to erter the political arena: decisions

on the right to form associations, on the franchise and on the secrecy

of the vote, on the right to receive a minimm of formal education with-

out pay. In terms of MARSHALL's distinction the first is a civil right,
the next two political rights, the fourth e social right. In terms of

ohe arcas of activity for which they are primarily relevant, we might,

however, call the right of association an economic right and the rigat

i. This point was first set out by the Norwegian historian Edvard
BULL in "Die Entwicklung der Arbeitcrbewegung in den drei shandinavischen
Landern" Arc. f. Gesch. d. Soc. u. Arbeiterbew. 10, 1921-22: 329-361,
cf. D. RUSTOW. "Scandinavia" in S. NEUMANN ed.: Modern Political Partics.
Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956. For comments on subsequent develop-
ments, sec Ulf TORGERSEN, "The Tren@ toward Political Consensus: the
Case of Norway." Acta sociol. 6 (1-2), 1962: 159-171.


to an education a cultural right: this is the terminology we shall stick

to in the following.

A basic economic right: the right of associatior. and combinstion.

The nation-states of the West have differed markedly in their
policies toward associatious and "combinations" of dependent subjects
sceking to strengthen their bargaining positions in their Gealings with
theiy cconomic superiors. In Table i we have given rough chronologies
of governmental decisions on such combinations for a few of the European
countries. To highlight the decisive differences in the meacures taken
by cach political community in coping with emerging working class, we
have concenvtraved on two crucial points in each sequence: the date of
the initial prohibition of workers' combinations and the date of the
final legalization of unions. While the prohibition of combinations
of workers can be dated more or less unequivocally, tne legalization of
such combinations often cannot, since it came about through a gradual
reduction of restrictions. In these cases we have chosen the legislative
enactments which guarantced the special legal position of trade unions
most generously, because that makes them most comparable to those cases
wnere the right to combine was never revoked or where it was legalized

completely in a single enactment.

(Table I on next page)


ole I: Comparetive Chronologies for Decisions to Prohibit

and to Legalize Trade Unions in Selected
Euronean Countries.+

Year of Year of Period of
orchibition legalization repression:
years
Piuralist countries
with insignificant
histories oz
repression
Norway never never none
Sweden never never none
Denmark 1800 1849 hg
Switzerland 1803 1643 5
Pluralist countries
With longer histories
of repression
Netherlands 1d11 1886 75
Belgium 1810 1921 Lil
reat Britain 1799~1800 1906 106
"Plebiscitarian"
countries
France 1791-1803 1384 81-9
Prussio-Germony 1794 1918 Leh
"Corporatist"” countries
Austria 1768 1870 102
Italy reditional 1G00 -
Spain traditional L9GO9 -

The length of the interval between the first decisive measure
taken to repress tendencies towarc organized activity and the final
decision to accept the unions provides a crude measure of the extcnt

of the difficulties experienced in the differcnt politics in integrating

l. his compilation is primarily derived from International
Iabour Office. Freedom of Association. London, P. S. King & Son,
1927-30, vols. 1-5. (ILO Studies and Reports Ser. 28-32.)


the emerging lower classes in the system. In the Scandinavian countries

the breakdown of the "estate society" was followed by a remarkable

roliferation of religious, cultural, economic and political associa-

br

4

tions and, except for a few cases of violent conflicts, governments
Gid little or nothing either to restrict or to legalize these activities.

At the othcr extreme, in countries such as Italy and Spain restrictions

f associational activity were traditional and local and hardly required
specific enactments by national legislatures. In Franec, the Jacobin

tradivion cf direct state-citizen relations led to the promlgation of

the famous Loi Le Chanelier in 1791 and this tendency to restrein all

: : * . , ae * 7 }
associational pouvoirs intermediaires was further strengthened through

the Napoleonic traditions of plebiscitarian rule. In Prussia and the
Wilhelminian Reich similar tendencies were at work and produced a series

—— 4
of strict regulations of working class-organizations. It is important

to note that the countrics with the longest historics of repression

have also been the countries most likely to develop corporatist schemes

once the unions had becn legally accepted: legalization could easily
lead to full incorporation in the machinery of the state. We find
these tendencics most marked in Austria, Italy and Snain but very

similar trends have also been observecé in Belgium and the Netherlands.

. >

Political rights: the franchise and the secret vote.

The debates over the right to combine in wage bargaining was in
the majority of the countries tied in closciy with dcbates over the
right to vote, to take part in the clection of representatives in
Gcecision-mking bodies. In oll Western countries we find a movement

toward free unionization parallelling a movement toward national


political citizenshio through the universalization of the suffrage.
There were important differences, however, in the timing of the steps
taxen in extending the two sets of rights and these differences proved
important in setting the stage for working-class politics.

The develonment toward universal suffrage got under way with the

7
‘break-up of the anciens regimes of representation through estates. Under

taecse systems only economically indepencent heads of houscholds could
take part in public life and clect officinalis to represent their particular

stetus groups: in most countries the nobility, the clergy and the
Rv ?

ss

civileged bourgeoisie of incorporated cities, in the Nordic countries
iso the independent farmers. With the French Revolution came the idea

of national assemblies of representatives without explicit ties to the

pees Pt SLICE
Sey ae ae |

| traditional estates and this opencd up possibilities for a prcadening
L oe the popular bases of government. The law of 1 AUZUEL, ars: 2» went

so far 2s to give the franchisc to ali French males over ia “who were not

servants, p@upers or vagabonds ana the Constitution of (2793 Mata not
even cxeiude pauvers if they had resided more than six months in the
canton. Tao{ Restoration] aid not bring back representation by estates:

4
instecad she regime censitaire introduced .n abstract monetary criterion

———

which cut decisively across the carlier criteria of ascribed status.
A new phase in the development opened up with the Revolution of

(1888Jena the rapid spread of movements for representative democracy
throughout most of Europe. [Napoleon III demonstrated the possibilities

~~
of plebiscitarian ruld and more and more of the Leaders of the cstablished

clites became torn between their fears of the consequences of rapid

extensions of the suffrage to the lower classes and their fascination

with the possibilities of a strengthening of the powers of the nation-

.
service.

state through the mobilization oF the vorking class in its

a

These conflicts of strategy produced a great variety of transitional
compromises in the different countrics: | the starting points for these

ee

developments were the provisions of the Standestaat and the post-

revolutionary regime cengitaire and the en@-points in the sequence were

the proailgeations of universal adult surtrage| but the steps taken and
the paths chosen from the one point to the other varied markedly from

system to system and reflected basic differcncees in dominant values

MO

and in the character of each social structure.
We may conveniently distinguish five major sets of criteria used
in limiting the franchise during this transitional period:

1) traditional estate criteria: restriction of franchise to heads

of houscholds within cach of the established status groups

as dcfined by law;

1. Cf. H. GOLLWITZER. “Der Cisarismus Napoleons III im Widerhall

der offentlichen Meinung Deutschlands." Hist. Zs. 173, 1952: 23-76.

In a number of countries the demands for universal manhood suffrage be-
ome intimatciy tied in with the need for universal conuseription. Cf.

the Swedish slogan “one man, one votc, one gun" discussed most recently
in Nils ELVANDER, Harald Hjarne och konservatismen. Stockholm, Almgvist
och Wiksell, 1961, pp. 159-161. With rcgard to Germany the most scholarly
analysis cf the conscription issue is contained in Gerhard RITTER,
Staatskunst und Krieghandwerk,

e. The details of these devclopments have been set out in such
conpendia as Georg MEYER, Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht. Berlin,
Hnering, 1901, and Karl BRAUNIAS, Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht, vol. II.
Berlin, de Gruyter, 1932. These are on the whole remarkably accurate
as far as they go, but need to be corrected, particularly for some of
the smaller countries, and supplemented, particularly with statistics
for the size and structure of electorates.

A useful review of the arguments in the dcbate over the extension
of suffrage is H. H. ZWAGER, De motivering van het algemcen Kiesrecht
in Buropa. Groningen, Wolters, 1956,


¢ * * * 2 *
2) regime censitaire: restrictions based on the value of land or

capital or on the amounts of yearly taxes on property and/or
income ;

s . . ' J > . J 2
3) regime capacitaire: vestrictions by criteria of Literacy,

formal educational or appointment to high public office;

4) houschold responsibility criteria: restrictions to heads of
Pp

households occupying own dwellings of a minimum given volume
or icdged in premises for a given minimum rent;

5) residence criteria: vrestrictions to citizens registered as

residents either in the lecal community, the constituency

or the national territory for a given minimum of months or

The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 provides a good example of an
carly compromise between estate criteria, property criteria and the

orincipe capaciteire. The franchise vas given to four categories of

citizens: two of these, the burghers of incorporated cities and the

fermers (frecholéers and leaseholders) corresponded to the old estates,

Pe od

a third, applicable only in cities and towns, was defined by ownership

of real estate of 2 given minimum value and the fourth wes simply made
up of all officials of the national. government. This system pave a

clear numerical majority to the farmers but the interest of the burghers

the Gistribution of mardates between urban and rural constituencies.
In countries with significant feudal heritages the principle of estate
represcntation was generally preserved through bicameral systeus.

Perheps the most intricate of the compromises devised was the Austrian

15.

an

of 1367: the division of the Urwihler into four Kuricn was in part

based on traditional estates but also introduced a corporatist clement

through the provisions ror representation through Chambers of Commerce
and the Professions. When the pressures for electoral reform became

too svtrong in the 1890s, a compromise was again found through the

hierklasse open to all men over 24, but

iN

introduction of an allgemeine W

this class was simply added to the four already there. Such complex
solutions were clearly doomed to failure, however, and were soon discarded.
The rise oi commercial and industrial capitalism favourec the

a L 7 : * : = : : a s +
spread of the regime censitaire. The ideological basis was Benjamin

CONSTANT's argument that the affairs of the national community must be
left to those with "real stakes" in it through the possession of land

or through investments in business. The principe capacitaire was

essentially an extension of this principle: the franchise was accorded
to those who had direct interest in the maintenance of the polity
through their investments in professional skill as well as in land, in
trade or industry. The implicit notion was that only such citizens
could form rational judgements of the policies to be pursued by the
government. A Norwegian authority on constitutional law linked the

two clements together in this statement: (“suerrage.. shoule be

reserved to the citizens who had judgement enough to understand who

would prove the best representatives and independence enough to stick

—
to his conviction in this necter."" ( This cmphasis on cconomic, but also

1. T. H. ASCHEHOUG, Norges nuvecrende Statsforfatning. Christiania,

Aschehoug, 1875, vol. I, p. 200.


social and cultural, independence was central in the arguments for the

regine censitaire and its offshoots. Subjects in positions of personal

Gependence on the master of tne househoid were excluded even in the
most oxtreme of the clectoral laws of the French Revolution. <A number
of otherwise very radical suffrage extensions drew the line at domestic

servants: thus the Danish Constitution of 1849. The British "householder"

its

and “lodger" franchise was based on similar concerns to exclude adults
in positions of immediate personal dependence. The simplest argument

aginst votes for servants was clearly that it would multiply by n the

ce L
nunbers of votes under the control of the master of the householc.

—

| The emergence end growth of 4 cle “$s of wage earners outside the

te.

jumediate | househol +a of the cuployer raise new problems of delimitation, |
In the established socio-economic terminology their status was one of
dcpendence but it would not so casily be argued that they would invariably
follow their cmployers politically. The crucial battles in the develop-
ment toward universal suffrage concerned the status of these emerging
strata within the national polity. A great varicty of transitional

compromises were cebatec and several were actually triec out. The

basic strategy was to underscore the structural cifferentiations within

l. This, of course, was what actually happened when universal
suffrage was introcuced in countries with large agricultural cstates
run'by an authoritarian elite such as Prussia. For a paralici with
conditions in the similarly structured rural areas of Brazil, sce the
chapter by Emilio WILLEMS in Arnold ROSE ed. The Institutions of
Advanced Societies. Minneapolis, Univ. o* Minnesota Press, 195d,
pe 552: “Tae main functions of suffrage was that of preserving the
existing power structure. Within the traditional pattern, suifrage
adaed opportunities for displaying and reinforcing feudal loyalty. At
the same time, it reinforced and icgalized the political status of the
lando Wner. tt


* > s J 7 2 > : 4
the wage-carning strata. Souwe varieties of régime censitaire in fact

om. The householder and lodger franchise in Britain similarly;

served to integrate the better-off working class within the system and

to keep out only the "real proletariat," the migratory and the marginal

workers without established local ties. Even after the disappearance

of A211 economic qualifications for suffrage the retention of residence

vequirements has served similar functions: these restrictions were,

ror cbvious reasons, most stubbornly adhered to in the provisions for |
\

loeni elections. —

[another important set of strategems in this battle to control the

onruch of mass democracy were the institutions of weighted suffrage and

piural votes./ The crudest exemples were no Coubt the Austrian Kurien
-"j

anc the Prussian three-class system: universal suffrage was granted

but the weights of the votes given to the lower classes were infinitesimal
by comparison with those of the establisned landed or financial elite.

The most innocuous system of plural voting was perhaps the British
provision for extra votes for university sraduates and for owners of
business premises in different constituencies. Sociologically the

most interesting was the Belgian sistem of plural voting devised in

1893: universal manhood suffrage was introduced but extra votes were

given not only on capacitaire criteria, but also to péres de famille

1. A special tax census taken in Norway in 1876 indicated that
more than one quarter of the male workers who were on the tex rolls were
cnfranchized under the system adopted in 1814: by contrast only 3% of
the workers in the rurel areas had been given the vote, ef. Statistisk
Centralburcau scr. C No. 14, 1877, pp. 340-41.

18.

upon reaching the respectable age of 35. The bisic motive, clearly,
was to underscore structural differcntiations within the lower strata
ana to exclude from the system the clements least committed to the
established social order.

Closcly related to these sets of stratagems was the stubborn
resistance to changes in the delimitation cf constitucnecics. Rapid
urbanization produced glaring inequclities of vote weights even under
conditions of formally equal universal suffrage. The injustices of the
Prussian districting provisions were the object of acrimonecous Cebate
for decades, The extreme solution adopte? in the Weimar Republic, the
establishment of a unitary PR system for the entire Reich, ao doubt
gave every voter the same abstract chance to influence the distribution
of seats, but at the same brought to the fore the inhorent difficulties
of such standardization across localities of different structure,

| the entry of the lower classes into the political arena also

raisec a series of problems for the administration of elsetiors. )
Sociologically the most interesting issue was the sefcguarding cf the

independence of the individual electoral decision. The defenders of

the estate traditions and the régime ccensitaire argue’? that economically

dependent subjects could not be exyected to form incependent political
judgements and would, if enfranchized, corrupt the system through the
saic of votes and through violent intimidation. Corrupt practices
were of course widesprcad in many countries long before the extension
or the suffrage but the enfranchisement of large sections of the Lower
classes generally provided added incentives to reforms ia the adminis-

tration and control of elections. <A central problem in this debate

1,
focussed on the secret ballot.

The traditional notion was that the vote was a public act and
L -

only to be entrusted to men who could openly stand by their opinions.

—!

POT aoe

In this both Conservatives and Altliberale agreed. The infamous Prussian

systen of oral voting was defended in these terms but was clearly moin-

tained for so long because it proved such an vasy way of controlling
wy

the votes of the Lendarbcitcer. The secret ballot essentially avpealed

to th: literate urban mentality: it fitted in as another clement in

the anonymous, privatized culture of the city so admirably ceseribed

by 2 sociologist such as SIMMEL. }The decisive factor, however, was the
i

emcrgence of the lower class vote as a rfactor in national politics
ana the necd to neutrelice the threatening working-class organizations:
the provisions for secrecy uot oniy isoiated the dependent worker from

his superiors but also fro nis peers| It is very difficult, given the
state of clectoral statistics, to determine with any exactitude the
effects oF secrecy on the actual behaviour of workers at the polls.

But itv seems inherently likely, given a minimum anount of cross-class
communications, that secrecy helped to reduce a polarization of politics
in class terns. The contrast between the developments in Britain and

Prussia certainly point in that direction, but the comolexity of the

contextual factors make Cirect comparisons highly problematic.

—

i. For further details see ROKKAN, op. cit. A recent one-nation
account of the Cevclopment of standards for the control of elections
is Cornelius O'LEARY. The Hlimination of Corrupt Practices in British
Elections. 1868-1911. Oxford, Ciarendon Press, 1902,

@. For a recent detailed account see Th. NIPPERDEY. Die
Orgenication der deutschen Partcien vor 1918. MDisselidorf, Droste,
TAR ie t
JO, hEDe Ve


The cmergence of strong trade unions pari passu with the clectoral

movilization of the enfranchizea working class accentuated this problem
of visibility vs. privacy in the expression of political loyalties.
E: provisions for secret voting unde it possible for the inarticulate
rauk-and-file to escape the pressures of the unions and at the same
time out the onus of political visibility on the actives within the
working class movement. In sociolegicalL terms we may say that the
estabiished national "system" opened up channels for the seeret expression
of loyalty while making it a necessity for its "deviants" to ceclere
themselves openly. | Some Socialist partics tried to turn the tables by
esvablishing intimate organizational ties with the trade unions and
imposing political levies on their members, irrespective of their
actual preferences. The controversy over “contracting-in" vs.
"contrecting-out" in the British labour movement can be interpreted

as the exact countervart of the controversy over open vs, sccret voting
in the total system. The Labour party wanted to put the onus of

tt

risibility on its own "deviants," the trade union members who aid not

want to vote for the party; Couscrvatives and Liberals, on tne other
hanc, wanted the inarticulate masscs to be free of political commitments,

1
while putting the onus of visibility on the Socialist militants.

The right to be educated and the imposition of unificd national cducation:
a central dilemma in nation-building.

The legalization of trade unions and the extension of the franchize

1. For details on this controversy see Martin HARRISON, Trade
Unions anc the Labour Party Since 1945. London, Allen & Unwin, 1960,
Ch. 1. We are indebted to Robert McKENZIE for alerting us to this
rallel.


are instances of enabling legislatioa which removed previously existing

barriers and may be considered two privileges which compensate the
individual for his consent to be governed uncer tne rules and by the
ageuts of his national political. community .~ From the stancpoint of
that community these privileges are available to qualified individuals
if they wish to make use of thom. The permissiveness of such economic

and political rights must be noted especially, as we turn now to the

third element of citizenship, social rights. To be sure, in one sense
social rights are similar to economic and polivical rignts. As long

as masses of the population are ceprived cven of clementary education,
access to educational facilities appears as the pre-condition without
Which all other rights under the law remain of no avail to the uncducated.
To provide the rudiments of ecucation to the illiterate apnears as an
act of liberation as does the legislative reguiation of working condi-
vions for women ana children, compulsory insurance against industrial
accidents, and other welfare measures, Nonetheless, social rights are
distinctive in that they do not usually permit the individual to Cecide
whether or not to avail himselt of their advantages.

In all Western societies clicmentary education has become a duty
of citizenship, perhaps the earliest example of a preseribec winimun
level of Living enforced by all the powers of the modern state. ‘Two
attributes of clementary education make it into an element of citizen-
ship: the government has authority over it and the parents of all
children in a certain age-group (usually from 6 to 10 or 12) are

reguired by law to see to it that their children attend school.

1. This formulation is indebted to the perceptive analysis of
Joseph TUSSMAN, Obligation and the Body Politic (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1960), Cpt. II.


These features of elementary education were introduced for the
mest part curing the last decades of the 19th century, in part because
nation.l governments were financially and administratively unable to
implement such a program at an earlier time. Considerable discretion
was left in the hands of the clergy and locel officials, and exceptions
are mace to this day in the case of parochial schools even in those

countries where a national system of clementary education is fully

Still, the vrincivle of compulsory elementary education emerged

much earlier as an outgrowth o2 both, benevolent despotism ant liberal
nationalism. The first may be illustrated by the basic Prussian school

law of 1737, called Principia regulativa. This was issued with the

comuentary that it had grieved the king to see youth living anc growing
up in darkness thus suffering damage both temporally and to their
eternal souls, and thet accordingly he had donated a major sum to

4 . 4 , L
facilitate the employment or canabdle teachers. +

€&--—~~ The sccond is evident in a comuent of LA CHALOTAIS in his Essay

on National Education, published in 1763, in which he opposed the clergy's

control of cducation by demanding that the teaching of letters and
science should be in the hands of a secular profession.

I claim the right to demand for the Nation an education
that will depend upon the State alonc: because it belongs
essentially to it, because every nation has an inaliennblc
and imprescriptiople right to instruct its members, and
finally because the children of the State should be educated
by members of the State .<

lL. For this and comparable examples cf. A. PETERSILIE, Das
Offentliche Unterrichtswesen (Leipzig: C. L. Hirschfeld, 1897), I,
160 and passin.

e. Quoted frou LA CHATOLAIS' Essay reprinted in F. de la
FONTAINERIE, cd. French Liberalism and Hauection in the Eightcenth
Century (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1932), p. 53.


2 3.

At a later time the principle also became acceptable to the emerging
industrial work-force. Among laborers the desire to become educated
was strong, partly to better one's chances in life, partly to see to
it that a worker's children had a better chance than their parents,
end partly to give additional weight to the political claims made on
behalf of the working class. If this desire led to voluntary cfforts
to provide caucational facilities for workers, as it did notably in
England and Germany, such action was largely 2 response to the fact
that no other facilities were available to them. Accordingly. it is
probable that the demand for an clementary education available to all
cuv across the spectrum of political beliefs. After ali, it could be
sustained by such Civergent arguments as that the people's inherent

unruliness necessitated introduction in the fundanentals of rcligion

end loyaity to king and state, or that the masses of the people should
Jv 7

share in the amenities ov civilization.

Compulsory elementary education became a major controversial

issue, nevertheless, whenever governmental authority in this field came

into confiict with organized religion. Tracitionally, the Catholic
Church regarded teaching as cne of its inherent powers with the work
of instruction being conducted by the religious orders. In France

t

By

is principle was challenged in the 1760's with the suppression of

the Jesuit order and the endorsement of a nationally organized system

of iny-education, the starting-point of a conflict over education which

7 ia] } s L be x2 2 $ :
has lasted to this day. In Austria, however, the same principle

1. See the account in Ernest BARKER, The Development cf Public

Sezvices in Western Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944),
pp. 79-83, and Robert ULICH, The Education of Nations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1961), Cpt. VI.


prevailed without challenge under the aegis of absolutist xule with the

resuls that elementary education was organized by the government as
early es 1805 with the clergy acting as the supervisory agent of the
state. Again, in the countries with Protestant state churches (Prussia,
Denmark, Norway and Sweden) little or no conflict developed as the
unity of church anc state in the person of the monarch allowed for the
ustimate authority of government over elementary education, with the
clergy acting in this field as agents of the monarch or (later) of a
Ministry of educational and ecclesiastical affairs. Such unity of
political and religious control over elementary education could not
exist, on the other hand, where church and state were more or less
separate and the nopuiation divided into antagonistic religious groupings.
Thus, countries like England, the Netherlands, Belgium, to some extent
Germany after 1871, as well as the United States have been the scene
of protracted struggles over the conditions uncer which the national
government should be permitted to exercise authority in the field of
elementary education.

It is possible to supplement these qualitative considerations by
& comparative tebulation of the school-population as a consistently
lucreasing pronortion of each age-grouvn since in recent decades most
Western countries have considered elementary education a matter of
national concern and accordingly have kept a record of school attendance:

7

this we have tried in Table II.” While the figures for earlier years

are inevitably less reliable than those for the later veriod, the table

1. We are indebted to Mr. Waiter Phillips, Department of Sociology,
University of California, Berkeley, for his compilation of this table.


Oe

provides us with a reasonably good approximetion of the rate at which
schoo. avtendance has become an element cf citizenship.

In recent years considevable research has been done on the
réelationshin between investments in primary education and initial
economic growta.* It is tempting to undertake similar analyses cf the
interrelations vetween the growth of public education and the cevelop-
ment of mass cemocracy. We cannot go into statistical complexities
here, but only note a few striking relationships.

If we look back at our cruce classification or Western European

countries we find the following pattern:

Trade union repression: School. enrollments over ©O4%: Manhood suffrage:
Insignificant All early, c. 1870 All early except
sweden
Norway
Sweden
Denmark

Switzerland

Longer: pluralist All late All late (Belgium

: early but plural

Netherlands votes until 1919)
Belgiur

Longer: plebiscitarian Prussia: early Prussia: early
France: late but unequal
France France: early
Prussia-Germany and equal
Longer: corporatist Austria: early All late
Italy: iate
Austria Spain: late
Italy
Spain

lL. See cspecially UNESCO. World Illiteracy at Mid-Century,
Paris, Unesco, 1955, pp. 172-187: a discussion of the relationships
between increases in rates of enrollment, movement away from agriculture
and increases in per capita income for a number of countries. The

(Footnote continued on next page)


The nation-states which proved most ready to accept workers'

organizations all developed their national education services early.

The "“plurelist” countries with longer histories of repression also tooxk

longer +%to develop their schools: they were all culturally and religiously

divided and consequently experienced considerable internal strife over

the natioraiization of education. Of the countries classified as
"plepiscitarian” and "corporatists" two, Prussia and Austria, were

pioneers in the development of education while the others lagsed far

behind. However, the existence oF a national educational sysvem does

not count as much in setting the stage for policies toward tie lower

classes as the content and character of the svstem.

Similar problems arise with regard to the parallels between the
development of national education and the extensicn of the suffrage.

In the countries which we have classified as vredominantly ' pluralist,’

7
4

high enrollment figures were everywhere reached before the final
institutionalization of universal and equal suffrage. The situation
differed in the "plebiscitarian" and “corporatist" countries. In Prussia

manhood suffrage came very early, but the odious Dreiklassenwahlrecht

was not given uv until after the defeat in 1918. France developed its

eduetional services much later than Prussia but led the world in extending

(Footnote 1 continued from preceding page)
analysis singles out Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Prussia aud Switzerland as
countries wnere illiteracy disappeared before the change-over from peasant
agriculture to urban industrialism, cf. also UNITED NATIONS. Report on
the World Social Situation, New York, 1961, page 46. The most comprehensive
treatment seems to be Friedrich EDDING, Die Ausgaben fuer Schulen und
Hochschulen im Wachstum der Wirtschaft (Kiel: Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft,
Universitaet Kiel, 1957), 2 vols.


27.

the suffrage to all adult men. ‘TAINE, in his famous pamphlet of 1872, 7
reexoned. that 39% of the French electorate were still illiterate and
showed how the universalization of the suffrage in his country had its
basis in universal conscription rather than in universal education.
Conscription and national education may both serve the purposes of the

. - . : co 4 ca] s > _£ ws 2.
centralizea nation-stave and heip to weed out pouvoirs intermediaires.

It is not enough, in comparisons such as these, to establish time series |
for levels of enrollment; equally or more enlightening would be comparative

svatistics on the recruitment of teachers, comparable data on the character

of vheir training, their role in the community and their political

activities. More important yet would be a comparative political history

of the cevelopment of mass-education and cf conscription in relation to

the issues of extending the franchise which we have discussed earlier.

Similarities and differences in national developments: concluding notes.

We have given a rough and sometimes most cavalier summary of a
series of complex national developments over more than a century and a

half. Our aim has been twofold: to highlight important differences

between groups of countries in the timing and character of the decisions
taken to extend @ series of citizen rights to lower-class subjects, and

to analyze the essential similarities in the solutions finally reached

in each country. We have stressed the similarities in the background
of these diverse national developments: the assault against the inherited

inequalities of the estate society by establishing a formal equality

1. Du suffrage universal et de la maniére de voter, Paris,
Hachette, lLO72, p. de.


under the Jaw. We have shown now different nation-states, some perhaps

too quickly, others very slowly, tried to give concrete reality to this
new equality by conferring to the economically Cependent strata the
capacivy vo defend their rights and to articulate their aemanis. In
this development we have singled out as three important landmarks the
legalization of collective bargaining, the universalization of voting
vignts ana the provision of a basic education for all. it is weli to
remenoer that civil rights were also extended to illegitimate children,
forcigners and Jews and that the principle of legal equality nelped to
eliminate hereditary servitude, equalize the status of husband and wife,
circumscribe the extent of narental oower, facilitate divorce and
legalize civil narviage.* Taken together, all of these cevelopments
benefited the most inarticulate sections of the population by eliminating
the disabilities from which they nad sufvered previously. The three
aevelopmeuts we have singled out have had, in addition, the imporvant
funetion of conferring upon the “lower classes" the capacity "to defend
and assert /their/ rights on terms of equality with others" (Marshall).
Accordingly, the legal and that means formal recognition of individuality
has been superseded in turn by cfforts to make sure that the most dis-
advantaged sections of the population can aiso enjoy the rights they
possess. From the vantage-point of the present we might summarize the
development as a whole by freely adapting Sir Henry MAINE's famous

statement to these new conditions:

l. Cf. R. H. Graveson, Status in the Common Law (London: The
Athlone Press, 1953), 14-32. Details of these legal developments on
the Continent are traced in J. W. Hedemann, Die Fortschritte des
Zivilrechts im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1910
and 1935), 2 vols.


29.

Starting as from one terminus of history, from a condition
of society in which all the relations of persons arise from
the free agreement of individuals, we seem to have steadily
movec towards a phase of social order in which social,
political and economic inequalities that affect the legal
capacity of individuals have become of sufficient public
concern so as to lead to @ corrective redistribution of the
rights and duties of citizenshin by means of legisiaticn.

By this redistribution the modern welfare state seeks to guarantee what
is politically accepted as the level of social and economical well-being
below wiich no citizen of the country need fall or should not be allowed
to fall. And this fact, however conplex it would be to establish it
empirically, presents the modern social scientist with one of his most

barfling problems.

For the existence of a politically accepted minimum level of living

in all velfare states is on a par with a good many other features in
which modern societies are alike. ES these societies have governments
with a complex administrative apparatus and a national jurisdiction; all
ave characterized by a "public sector" which subjects to regulation those
aspects of society which are affected by a "public interest" and those
increase in number; all possess a highly elaborated technology and
structurally comparable industrial organizations in which this technolozy
Ls appiied; all have educational institutions designed to train the
professional personnel needed in government, industry and scientific
work. These and related common features reveal that by virtue of
technology, the national sovereignity of their governments, the con-
centration of people in urban areas, the bureaucratic form of organi-
zation -- and national citizenship, modern societies are very similar.

If in the 19th century social scientists faced the difficult task of

so defining their concepts that the great diversity of social life would


become amenable to systematic analysis, they seem confronted today with

societies in which the uniformities that vermit generalizations are the
product of social change itself. Some 19%h cenvury tainkers like Alexis
de Tocqueville or Jacob Burekhardt looked upon the prospective development
of modern society with deep apprehension. Toda:'s social scientists
seem to view the uniformities of modern societies as confirming their
scneralizatious, heirs to the vision of Saint-Sinion and Marx who saw in
industriel organization and the class structure the unifying element of
modern civilization.

Yet, easy visibility may make these similarities appear more
important than they are. | At anv rate, our discussion suggests another,
if less visible "similarity," the underlying unity of European civilization.
For in analyzing the extension of national citizenship to the lower
classes we have operated, tacitly, with the assumption that following
the French revolution many if not most European countries have undergone
a process of popular agitation demanding that extension of rights, some
pattern of resistance to this agitation by the privileged or established
sections of the population, and an eventual accommodation through a new
definition of rights and duties on a netional level. ‘This overall

patvern presupposes the existence of a pervasive earlier pattern, the

“

®

estate-societies of the 17th and 18th centuries, in which the idea and
the practice of group-representation wes so well developed that 19th-
cenuury protests against this earlier system were couched in demands

: : 2. 2 3 - ‘ i
for a civic recognition of the fourth estate.

i. Cf. the striking, synthetic analysis of the estate-societies
of the late 18th century by R. R. PALMER, The Age of the Democratic
Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).


But both the earlier system, the agitation against its inequalities

and the eventual accomodation of the lower classes in a system of
national citizenship are characteristically European, so much so that
the German historian, Otto HINTZE, categorically denies the indigenous
7
existence of revresentative institutions anywhere else.” In a com-
parative stucy such as the one sketched here it is important to remain
aware of the framework within which comperisons (and contrasts) are
made. We were bound to accentuate the uniformities of that framework
in & discussion which was confined to the European experience, and which
therefore did not attempt to deal with the extension of citizenship
to the lower classes in the process of building a nation from the top

Cown as we witness it in many "developing" countries today.

vi

But these significant simileritics among the several European
countries must not make us forget the douep-seated Citferences even
within Eurone which have resulted from contrasting geographical,
historical and cultural constellations in each nation-state. Our brief
summary of steps and measures taken in establishing each set of rights
should help to underscore important contrasts in value oricntations

becween countries and also give sone basis for exploring the implications

of these differences for the current functioning of each political

t is essential that we recognize that citizenship rights were
not just granted to the lower classes for reasons of charity. Decisions

to extend rights beyond the confines of the traditionally privileged

1. See Otto HINTZE, "Woltgeschichtliche Vorbedingungen der
Repracschiativverfassung," Historische Zeitschrift, Vol. 143 (1930),
7 -k7
- e


were prompted by a variety of motives, often contrasting and at odds

with each: ovher:
~ by the needs experienced by an established elite (a monarch,

an autocratic ruler, a central administrative apparatus) for allies

against an encroaching counter-elite: local nouvois inverwédiaives,

e, feudel nobility, a capitalist or industrialist class:

- by fears of lower class revolt and hopes of a peaceful

seutlement of class conflicts (Sozialpazifisims),

- through gradual and reluctant acceptance oF a series of faits

ee ee

- by equelitarian convictions
- by identification with the
- by beliefs in the "historic mission" cf the working classes

- by corporatist and berufst&ndliche conceptions of the need for

formal representation of all status groups within the body politic.
The nistorian may be content to record these varieties of movives,

arguments and strategies and leave it at that. The sociologist is

i! !

tempted to seek some order in the tangles and to try out some “models
of douinant constellations of actual cr contemplated policies. We have
already suggested, at different points in our discussion, a differentia-
tion between "viebiscitarian,"” "pluralist" and "corporatists" policy
models. We shall conclude our exploration with a brief presentation

or these models.

The first is a plebiscitarian model; this posits the establishment

of direct relationships between the central organs of the nation-state

and each member of the community, whether adult, adolescent or child,


° Ad s * a > . 5
and the consequent suppression cf all pouvoirs intermediaives, whether

feudal-lLocal or associational.

The second is a pluralist model; this points to the principle of

national citizenship for ell accountable adults without criminal
records but at the same time permits the development of orgenizavions
and other interuediary powers ina "free membership market."

Ana the third is a corporatist model positing the principle of

national citizenship but channeling all representation and most services
through status-specific and functional associations based or compulsory
ucmbership and incorporated within the over-all apparatus of national
government.

In the schema set out below we have tried to spell out the typical
policies within each of thesc "models" in three areas discussed in this

paper: economic rights, political rights and cultural rights.


Plebiseitarinn:

policies for

a) lower-class
subjects

b) class-
istinet
associations

Plurelist:

policies for

a) lower-class
subjects

ne

b) class
distinct
associations

Corporatist:

policies for

a) lower-class
subjects

bd) class-
distinct
associations

Economic rights

permit individual
upward mobility;
ensure social
security without

union interference;

prohibit unions
(Loi Le Chapelier)

ensure freedom
to join unions
but also protec-
tion for non-
unionized;

ensure freecom of
unionization in
“open market"

enforce union
membersuip

incorporate

unions in govern-
mental administra-
tive structure

Political rights

iatroduce universal
and equal suffrage,
but mainly to ensure
legitimacy of regime;

prohibit class
parties

introduce universal

suffrage and safe-

guard secrecy of
Vote 5

ensure freedom of
party formation

enforce obligatory

vote

organize Punction-
al representation

by branch of economy

34.

Culturel rights

introduce compul-
sory national
education

discourage denomi-
national schools.

allow rents
freedom to choose
school by denomi-
nation

permit denomina-
tional schools.

compulsory
education but
within culture-
specific schools;

incorporate
cenominational
schools in state
system.

The crucial characteristic of each model can be generated from a

cross-classification of dilemmas of policy in the face of two avenues of

access to the national system:

individual access, or access through

class-distinct or culture-distinct associations, unions or organizations.


Access via class~-distiact associations

. Enforced
Prohibited or permitted
Prohibited Traditionel Corporatist
Individual
ACCESS
from the
lower classes
Permitted Plebiscitarian Pluralist
or encouraged

No national sequence of decisions fits cxactly into any one of
these “ideal-type" models. France, for example, has come closest to
the plebiscitarian model at several points in hex history; the Scandinavian
countries have the longest and perhaps most consistent history of
pluralist policies; and Austria seems to have come closest to the
corporatist model. But each of these models contains alternative

principles of organization, as is suggested by Ernst FRAENKEL in his

emphasis upon the representative and the plebiscitarian component in

1. This classification resembles on some points the schene set
out by William KORNHAUSER in The Politics of Mass Socicty. London,

Routledge & Kegal Paul, 1960, Ch. 2, but focuses on the process of
catry into politics rather than on the resultant structures of cach
polity. For an interesting reformulation of the KORNHAUSER scheme in
terms of data on political divisions in Finland, see Erik ALLARDT.
"Community Activity, Leisure Use and Social Structure." Acta Sociol.
6 (1-2) 1962: 67-82.


26.

every constitutional state involving mwass-participation. Modern political

systems are "multi-structurea" and may have to be: analyzed with the aid
of several models at different levels, although such analysis may have
to proceed through such simplified models of policy-direction cs we have
discussed. The task is to assess for cach nation and for cach sequence
of decisions the strength of each model (and the pattern of alternatives
inherent in cach model), as this is revealed in the struggle between
established and emergent elites and in the compromises reached between
them. We hooc in our further work to carry out detailed comparisons

of such processes and to assess the consequences of the contrasting
policy seguences for the mobilization and activation of the lower

classes and the cependent citizens in national politics.

seeve

i. See Ernst FRAENKEL, Die Repraesentative und dic Plebiszitaere
Komponente im Demokratischen Verfassungsstaat (Heft 219-220 of Recht

und Staat; Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1956).


TABLE II: SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS FOR 10 COUNTRIES

1820 ~ 1950

37.

1820 | /304 /40} /'50; /60} /70} /80) /90} 1900

/10

/20

/40

/50

1. England & Wales
(% 10-11 yr. olds in grant-
aided schools) 32] 52 61 69
(% 5-14 yr. olds in grant-
aided schools 83

2. France
(% 51h yr. olds in schools) 501 66! 7h] Bel 83 86

3. Netherlands
(% 5-14 yr. olds primary ;
schools) 55} 61] 65) 63] 65; 66

4. Prussia
(% 7-14 yr. olds in "Official
Volkschulen" ) 86{ 98} ‘79 96] 92! 92) 98] 92
Germany,”
(Reich & Fed. Republic &
West Berlin)

5. Austria
(% 5-13 yx. olds attending
schools) 56 75| 59) 87) 86] 90

ON

Italy
(% 6-12 yr. olds in primary
schools) 28 37) hol ksi hy
(% 5-13 yr. olds in primary
schools)

89

13

fl

61

87

87

85

82

Tf

95

rie

70

99

88

TH


38.

TAPLE II continued:

SCHOOL ENROLLMENTS FOR LO COUNTRIES

1820 - 1950

1820

/30

{ho

/50

/

60

/70

/80

/90

1900

/10

/20

/30

/40

LO.

Sweden

(% 9-15 yr. olds
{% 7-Lh yr. olds

Norway

(% 7-15 yr. olds
instruction)

Russia

4 7-14 yr. olds
schools)
(% 5-14 yr. olds

U.S.A.
(% 5-13 yr. olds

public schools)
(% 5-17 yr. olds
public schools)

in schools)
in school)

receiving

in secular

in secular

enrolled in

enrolled in

&9

8}:

91

90

83

89

fe

90

23

7h
73

83

92

50

19
78

89

{2

8h
81

91.

8h

&

85
§3


Table IT: School Enrollments for 10 Countries
1880 - 1950

Bases and Sources

1.

LO.

ll.

Series: 1862/63, 1868/69, 1878-79, 1888/89; Board of Education, Statistics
of Public Education in England and Wales, 1903, 1904, 1905 (London: HMSO,
1905) » Pp. iv-sl.

1900, 1913, 1920, 1930: Poard of Trade, Statistical Abstract for The
United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1935), V. 78 pp. 50,51.

1933, 1950; Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics
(London: HMSO, 1957), No. 94, p. 87.

Computed from Inst. Nat. de la Statistique, Annuaire Statistique de la
France. 1957, end Parties, pp. 11, 23.

Central Bureau voor de Statistiek, De Ontwikkeling van het Onderwijs in
Nederland (Utrecht: Uitgeversmaetschappij W. de Haan N.V., 1951), p. 51.

Series: 1825, 1831, 1843; H. Barnard, National Education in Europe,
end ed., (Hartford: F.B. Perkins, 1854), p. 90.

1861, 1881; E. Lavasseur, L'Enseignement Primaire dans Les Pays Civiles
(Paris: Berger-Levreult, 1897), pp. 102-103, 110.

1871, 1891, 1901; W. Lexis, ed., Das Unterrichtswesen in Deutschen Reich
(Berlin: A. Asher, 1904), Band III, p. 10.

1911: Statistisches Reichsamt, Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band 138,
p. 4.
1930/34, 1940/h4, 1950/53; computed from UNESCO, World Survey of
Education II (Paris: 1958), p. 619.

Series: 1838; H. Barnard, op. cit., p. 338.
1865, 1871, 1880, 1890: E. Lavasseur, op. cit., p. 158.

1900/01, 1910; Statesman's Yearbook 1913 (London: Macmillan, 1913).

1930/34, 1935/37, 1950754; computed from UNESCO, op. cit., p. 126.

Computed from Ist. Centrale di Statistica, Sommario di Statistiche
Storiche Italiane 1861-1955, pp. 40, 76.

Series: 1850, 1860, 1870; E. de Lavalette, L'Instruction du Peuple
(Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1872), p. 293.
1880 to 1950; UNESCO, World Tlliteracy at Mid-Century, p. 185.

Ibid., p. 173.

Series 1880, 1894, 1911; A. Rashin, The Population of Russia for 100 Years
(in Russian), (Moscow: 1957), p. 315.

1918; N. Hans, "Comparative Study of European Education,"
Yearbook of Education, 1936, p. 115.

1930/34, 1040, 1950/54; World Survey of Education II, p.

UNESCO, World Illiteracy at Mid-Century, p. 169.

U.S., Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education, 1953/54, ch. I.


:
4

tsa/cps/62/2
25 April 1962.

all contributors of papers at the sessions on Political Sociology
at the Fifth World Congress

Froms the Secretary of the Committee on Political Sociology, The

to

Chr. Michelsen Institute, Kalvedalsve 12, Bergene

Final programme for CPS sessions at the Fifth World Congress
of Sociology.

The first papers have now been received but there are still many
comes PLEASE CHECK THE REVISED LIST CAREFULLY AND SEND ME CORREC~

TIONS AND SPECIFICATIONS BY RETURN OF POST, TI have to have a final list

ready by mid-May. Will all those who have not indicated the exact title

of

their paper please do so right away? Further, will all those pro-=-

pos

ed as discussants please check that they can actually undertake such

tasks (possibility of conflict with parallel sessions) and confirm that
they are prepared to serve? All discussants will receive papers as soon

as

they are available. All authors are asked to send copies of papers

directly to the proposed discussants! see the attached address list.

I again remind you of the provisions for the despatch of 500

copies of each paper to Washington during July (see 1sA/cPs/61/5.)

The Secretary-General of the ISA now announces that the staff in

Louvain will run off the 500 copies if the text is sent them on stencils
during Mayt to fit their machines authors must then use A»B. Dick Super
Mimeotype stencil noe 2560.

Revised mauungs table for the CPS sessions in Washington?

CITIZMISHIP AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY,

Three Work Sessionss

I.

Monde 3 Septe Dome

The Entry into Politics of ikLew Groups.
Re BENDIX and S, ROKKAN. "The extension of national citizenship to
the lower classes! a comparative perspective".

Perry H. HOWARD "New Groups in Louisiana Politics",
Daniel LERNER on the politics of the stati and traditional regions

of Central and Mediterranian Europe.
Robert McKENZIE on the "Tory working man",
Chairmans R. ARON,
Rapporteur: R. GIROD.

Proposed Discussants? P i
G. GERMANI, W. KORNHAUSER, J. LINZ, T.H. MARSHALL.


“II, Tuesday 4. Septe deme

Problems of Political Modernization in Developing Countries.

Ge BLANKSTEIN on Latin America,
P. MERCIER on We Africa.
Le. PYE on S. - E. Asiae

P. WORSLEY on "Bureaucracy and decolonization", —

Chairman: S.N. EISENSTADT,
Rapporteurs E. de DAMPIERRE,
Proposed Discussants: D. APTER, R. BENDIX, J.S, COLEMAN, I. WALLERSTEIN,

IIl. Tuesday 4 Septe PeMe
Monolithic vs» Competitive Politics in the Early Stages of Developments

D. APTER on African developments.

G. GERMANI on Latin America.

R. GIROD "Systéme censitaire et parti unique”,

Re LUKIC "Sociological Bases of OneewParty vs, MultiwParty Systems",

Chairmans S.M. LIPSET.

Rapporteur: Erik ALLARDT,

Proposed Discussantst Re. ARON, GeE.G, CATLIN, R, DAHRENDORF,
S.N. BISENSTADT, J, WIATR,


Ie

II.

SESSIONS ORGANIZED DIRECTLY BY THE COMMITTEE.

Friday 7 Septe aeme
The Social and Cultural Bases of Political Cleavage.

M. ABRAMS "The Political Division of the British Middle Class",

Re ALFORD "Class-Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems"

Ee. ALLARDT "Factors explaining Variations in Strength and Changes of
Strength of Political Radicalism".

M. DOGAN "Bases régionaux et sociaux des clivages politiques en

France et en Italie".

Juan LINZ "The cleavage structure of W. German politics".
J. WIATR "Conflict and Consensus in a Socialist Society".

Chairman: O. STAMMER.
Rapporteur: S. ROKKAN.
Proposed Discussants: Heinz EULAU, R. MAYNTZ, R.T. McKENZIE, P. ROSSI.

Friday 7 Septe pDeme
The Sociological Study of Political Groups in Developing Countries.

James S. COLEMAN "The process of political socialization in developing
countries".
Morris JANOWITZ "The role of the military in the process of political
development".
Dankwart RUSTOW "The process of Political Mobilization in Turkey".
I, WALLERSTEIN on ethnic groups in W. African politics.

Chairmant Gino GERMANI,

Rapporteur: J. LINZ.

Proposed Discussantst Eric de DAMPIERRE, S.M. LIPSET, Je MAQUET,
D, MARWICK, P. MERCIER.

Namo

REVISED LIST OF ADDRESSES

Dr. Mark ABRAMS

Prof.

Profe

Profe

Prof.

Prof.

Prof.

Prof.

Prof.

James

Prof.

R,. ALFORD

E. ALLARDT

DeE. APTER

Re. ARON

Re. BENDIX

G, BLANKENSTEIN

G.E.G. CATLIN

S. COLEMAN

R. DAHRENDORF

M. Eric deDAMPIERRE

OF PARTICIPANTS IN
CPS SESSIONS

Address

Research Services Ltde;s
110 St. Martin's Lane,
London WeC.2-e, Mngland.
Survey Research Labe,

905 University Ave,
Madison 5, Wisc.
Sociologiska Institutet,
Helsingfors Universitet,
Helsingfors, Finland.
Depte of Political Science,
University of California,
Berkeley 4; Calif.

34 quai de Passyy

Paris 16°, France.

Depte of Sociology,
University of California,
Berkele 3 Calif.

Depte of Political
Science,

North Western Univezsity,
Evanston, Ill.

4, Whitehall Court,
London S.Wel.

African Studies Center,
University of California.
Los Angeles 24, Calif.

Eberhard—Karls
Universitat,
Tibingen.

Ecole Pratique des
Hautes Etudes,

20 rue de la Baume,

°°
Paris 8, France.

Functions

Authe,y

Authe,y
Rappe,
Authes

Discey
Authes

Chairms ,
DiscCesy
Authes

Disces

Authe,

DiscCe,;

Discey

Aath ..

Discey

Rappey
Disce,

Frie

Frie

Tues

Fri-

Tue e

Tuee
Mone
Mts

Mone

Tue o

Tue e

Tuee

Tue e

Pri -

Tue e

Tue e

Frie

AeMe

AeMe

Pome

aes

AoMe

PelMe
GeMe
peoMe
PeMs

AeMe

AeMNe

PeMe

AeMe

MoM.

PeMe

AeMo

PeoMe

Name

M. Mattei DOGAN

Prof.
S.N. EISENSTADT

Prof. Heinz EULAU

Prof. Gino GERMANI

Prof. Roger GIROD

Prof. PeH. HOWARD

Profe M. JANOWITZ

Prof.

W. KORNHAUSER

Prof. Daniel LERNER

Prof. Juan LINZ

Address

Centre d'Etudes
Sociologiquesy
82 rue Cardinet,

Paris 17°, France e

Depte of Sociology,

Hebrew University;

Jerusalem, Israel.

Dept. of Political Science,
Stanford University,
Stanford, Calif.

Depte of Sociology;
University of
Buenos Aires,
Florida 656,

Buenos Aires, Argentina.

University of Genéve,
Genéve, Switzerland.
Dept. of Sociology,
Louisiana State
University,

New Orleans, Lae
Graduate School of

Business,

University of Chicago,
Chicago 37, Ill.

Dept. of Sociology,
University of California,
Berkeley 4, Calif.

Dept. of Economics and
Social Science,
M.oI.T.,

Cambridge 39,Mass.

Dept. of Sociology,
Columbia University,
New York 27, NeY.

Functions

Authe ?

Chairme r)

Disce 9

Disce 9

Disce 3
Authe 9

Chairm.,

Rappes
Auth e939
Auth 69

Auth e,

Discey

Authe,

Disce 9
Auth. 7)
Rappey

Fri GaMe

TueGe AeMe

Tuee PeMe

Frie GeMe

Mone Pole
Tu@s PeMe

Frie PeMe

Mone PDeMe
Tue e PeMes

Mone PDeMe

Frie PeMe

Mone PeMe

Mone PeMe

‘lone Delle
Frie GeMe

Frie PeMe

Name

Prof. S.M. LIPSET

Dr. R. LUKIC

Prof. Jacques MAQUET

Prof. THe MARSHALL.

Prof. Dwaine MARVICK

Dre Renate MAYNTZ

Dre ReT. McKENZIE

Dre Paul MERCIER

Prof. Luci.n PYE

Profe Peter ROSSI

Prof. De RUSTOW

Prof.e Otto STAMMER

Address

Depte of Sociology,
University of California,
Berkeley Ay Calif.
Faculty of Law,
University of Belgrade,
Swoborska 17,

Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

227 chaussée de Ixelles,
Brussels 5, Belgium.

6 Drosier Road,
Cambridge, England.

Depte of Politioal Science,
University of California,
Los Angeles 2h, Calif.
Savignyplatz 1-8,

Berlin=-Charlottenburg 2.6

London School of Economics
and Political Science,
Houghton strey

Aldwych,

London W.C.1l, London.

6 rue JeE. Voisombert;

Issy-les-Moulineaux (Seine),

Francee

Depte of Economics

and Social Science,
M.oI.T.

Cambridge.39,; Masse
NORC, 5720 Woodlawm Aves,
Chicago 37, Ill.

The Brookings Institution,

1775 Massachusett Ave. NeWey

Washington 6; D.C.
Institut fttr politische

Wissenschaft,
ll Gelfertstrasse,

Berlin—iahlem, Germany.

Functions

Chairme,

Disce;

Authe,

DisCey

Disce,

Disces

Discey

Authe,
Disce,

Authes

Disceys

Authe,

Disce,y

Authey

Chairme,

Tuee

Fri.

Tues

Frie

Mone

Frie

Prie

Mone
Frie

Tues

Frie

Tuee

Fri.

Frie

Fri.

PeMe

PeMe

PeMs

PeMe

PeMe

PeMe

Bele

PeMe

AeMe

AeMe

PeMe

AeMe

AeMe

PpeMe

GBeMe

Name

Prof. I. WALLERSTEIN

Prof. Jerzy WIATR

Dr. P. WORSLEY

Address

Dept. of Sociology;
Columbia University,
New York 27, N.Y.
Danacha 2,

Warsaw 59, Poland.
Dept. of Sociology,

The University,
Hull, England.

Functions

Discs,
Auth. 5

Dise 69
Auth. ’
Auth,

Tiree AeMe
Fri. DeMe

Tue PeMe
Frie Qeme

TuGe GeMe

) fi
jf \ a
kK \? | ) Isa/oPs/62/4

——

Tos: all participants in the sessions on Political Sociology at the
Fifth World Congress in Washington
From: the Secretary of the ISA Committee on Political Sociology,
- The Chr, Michelsen Institute, Kalvedalsv, 12, BERGEN, Norway.

Res Last-minute changes in programme.

The programme circulated in doc. ISA/CPS/62/2 on 25 April
proved over-optimistic on several points and has now been revised through
consultations with the Chairman of the CPS, Professor LIPSET, and with
the responsible officers of the sessions.

The principal revision concerns the sessions on Friday 7th September,
As reported in doc. ISA/CPS/62/3, we were invited by the APSA Programme

Committce to make the Friday morning session a joint one between political

scientists and political sociologists, We accepted this invitation but later
found that the programme set up for the session would take t°o long to get through.
It was first proposed that the session be split into two parallel sessions,

one at the APSA headquarters at the Meyflower Hotel, the other at the IgA

headquarters at the Shoreham, This would have had the unfortunate

| consequence of dividing our Committee Members in two groups and we quickly

found an alternative solution: we proposed to arrange two consecutive

sessions on the "Political Cleavage'' theme, one in the morning, the other

in the afternoon, This meant cancelling the original Friday afternoon

session on "Political Groups in Developing Countries": we found this justified
bocausc several of those who had promised papers for that session proved unable to
attend. The authors and discussants definitely lined up for that session

have accordingly been transferred to one or the other of the Tuesday sessions
dealing With problems of development.

\

Final manning table for the CPS sessions in Washington;

CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY,

Three Work Sessions:

I, Mond, 3 Sept.,2.30 - 5230 Dem.
The Entry into Politics of New Groups.
R, BENDIX and S, ROKKAN, "The extension of political citizenship to

Pa ie tpg

: the lower classes: a comparative perspective",
Perry H, HOWARD. "New Groups in Louisiana Politics",

ee ee ee Ee, Se ET Se I Ae ee oe Nee ET Ee Te EE Le ee Se Ee ne cree eee Oe Ee


_\ Daniel LERNER on the politics of the backward regions of Central and
Mediterranean Europe,

Robert McKENZIE, "The Tory working man",

(3,4, ZAMOSHKIN, "The development of personal citizen initiative in

Soviet society",

Chairman: R, ARON,
Rapporteur: R, GIROD,
 Provare’ Discussants: G. GERMANI, W. KORNHAUSER J, LINZ, T.H, MARSHALL,

II, Tuesday 4 Sept.,9.15 - 12.15.

Problems of Political Modernization in Developing Countries,

G, BLANKSTEN on Latin America,
P, MERCIER on W, Africa.
L. PYR. "Political Socialization and National Development in 8.8, Asia",
/ FX. SUTTON. "Fitness for Self-Government and Development in Modern
Africa",
J, WALLERSTEIN, "Class, Tribe and Party in W, African Politics",
Pp, WORSLEY. "Democracy from the Top: Bureaucracy and Decolonization

in Sashatchewan",

Chariman: S,N, SISENSTADT,
Rapporteur: HE, de DAMPIDRRE,
Propered Discussants: D, APTER, R, BENDIX, S,M, LIPSET, D, MARVICK,

III, Tuesday 4 Sept., 2.30 — 5,30 p.m.

Monolithic vs. Competitive Politics in the Early Stages of Development,

D, APTER on African developments.
T, diTELLA, "Monolithic ideologies in Competitive party systems: the
Latin American case.
R, GIROD. "Reflexions sociologiques sur 1'évolution du régime censitaire
en Burope au 19éme siécle",
GE. GLEZORUAN, "Ways of establishing political integration and socio=
political unity in Soviet sooiety",
D, RUSTOW on Turkey,

Chairman: 5,M, LIPSET,

Rapporteurs Erik ALLARDT,

Propared Discussants: R, ARON, G.E,.G, CATLIN, R, DAHRENDOR,
S,N, BISENSTADT, J, WIATR,


IV.

Ve

SESSIONS ORGANIZED DIRECTLY BY THE COMMITTER,

Friday 7 Sept., 9,30 —- 12,30 at the Mayflower Hotel: joint session

with the American Political Science Associations.

The Social and Cultural Bases of Political Cleavages: I

R, ALFORD: "Class-Voting in the Anglo-American Political Systems"

E, ALLARDT, "Factors explaining Variations in Strength and Changes
of Strength of Political Radicalism",

J, WIATR, "Conflict and Consensus in a Socialist Society".

Chairman: S,M, LIPSET,
Rapporteur: Juan LINZ,
Propared Discussants: Heinz BULAU, R, MAYNTZ, R.T, McKI™ZIE.

Friday 7 Sept., 3.00 - 6.00 p.m. at the Shoreham Hotel.

The Social and Cultural Bases of Political Cleavage: II,

M, ABRAMS, "The Political Division of the British Middle Class".
M. DOGAN, "Bases sociales des clivages politiques en France et en Italie".

Juan LINZ, "The cleavage structure of W, German politics".

Chairman: O, STAMMER,
Rapporteur: S, ROKKAN,
Propared Discussants: P, LUDZ, R, MAYNTZ, P, ROSSI,

BUSINESS MEETING
OF CPS MEMBERS.

Several members have told me they cannot attend a meeting on
Monday evening. I am therefore proposing that we convene our business

meeting on Tuesday the 4th at 8.15 p.m at the Shoreham. A special

room is being booked for this, We need a couple of hours to go over
various suggestions for future activities. A major item of business
will concern plans for a CPS seminar to be held in the spring of 1964
in Finland: UNESCO is likely to provide the basic funds fer this if

we can draw up a plan for a series of papers which might be fitted

together into a CPS publication.


Name

Dr, Mark ABRAMS

Prof, R, ALFORD

Prof. BE, ALLARDT

Prof. D.i, APTER

Prof. R, ARON

Prof, R, BENDIX

Prof, G. BLANKSTEN

Prof. G.B.G, CATLIN

Prof. R. DAHRENDORF

M. Eric de DAMPIERRE

REVISED LIST OF ADDRESSES

OF PARTICIPANTS IN
CPS SESSIONS:
corrected July, 1962.

Address

Research Services Ltd.,
110 St. Martin's Lane,
London W.C.2. 9 England,

Survey Research Lab.,
905 University Ave,
Madison 5, Wisc.

Sociologiska Institutet,
Helsingfors Universitet,

Helsingfors, Finland,

Dept. of Political Science,
University of California,
Berkeley 4, Calif,

34 quai de Passy,

Paris 16°, France,

Dept. of Sociology,
University of California,
Berkeley 4, Calif.

Dept. of Political
Science,

Northwestern University,

Evanston, Ill,

4, Whitehall Court,
London S.W.s1., England,

Bberhard-Karls Universit&t,

Tibingen.

Heole Pratiquée des
Hautes Htudesy
20 rue de la Baume,

fe)
Paris 8°, France,

Functions

Auth., Fri.
Auth.e, Fri.
Rappe, Tue,
Auth, ’ Fri,
Disc. ’ Tue,
Auth., Tue.
Chairm,, Mon.
Discs, Tue.
Auth., Mon,
Disc, Tue,
Auth, r) Tue,

PeM,

BeM,

Discs, Tu@e DoMe

Disc., Tues PeMe

RapDe ’

Tue.

Bele


Name

Prof. Torcuato diTELLA

M, Mattei DOGAN

Prof,
S.N. BISENSTADT

Prof. Heinz BULAU

Prof. Gino GERMANI

Professor Roger GIROD

Prof, G3, GLOZERMAN

Prof. P.H, HOWARD

Prof. W. KORNHAUSER

Prof. Daniel LERNER

Prof, Juan LINZ

Address

Dept. of Sociclogy,
University of Buenos Aires,
Florida 650,

Buenos Aires, Argentina,

Centre d'itudes
Sociologiques (CNRS),
82 rue Cardinct,

Paris 17°, France,

Dept. of Sociology,
Hebrew University,

Jerusalem, Israel.

Dept. of Political Science,
Stanford University,
Stanford, Calif,

Dept. of Sociology,
University of Buenos Aires,
Florida 656,

Buenos Aires, Argentina,

University of Genéve,

Genéve, Switzerland,

Academy of Sciences,

Moscow.

Dept. of Sociology,
Louisiana State University,

Now Orleans, La,

Dept. of Sociology,
University of California,
Borkeley 4, -‘2f.

Dept. of Economics and
Social Science,
M.I.T.,

Cambridge 39, Mass,

Dept. of Sociology,
Columbia University,
New York 27, N.Y.

Functions

Auth, 9 Tue,
Auth., Fri.
Chairm,, Tue,
Disc., Tue.
Disc. ¥ Fri,
Disc., Mon,
RaDDey Mon.
Auth, 9 Tue,
Auth. Tue,
Auth., Mon,
Disc., Mon,
Authe, Mon.
Disc., Mon,
RapPPey Fri,

Authe,

Fri,

PeMe

PeM,

Be Me

PeMe

PeMs

PeMe
PeM,

peMe

poem,

DeM,

DeMe

PeMe
QBelle

PeMe


Prof.

Prof,

Prof.

Prof.

5.M, LIPSET

Peter LUDZ

T.H, MARSHALL

Dwaine MARVICK

Dr. Renate MAYNTZ

Dr. RT. McKENZIE

Dr, Paul MERCIER

Prof.

Prof.

Prof,

a ee ee TS Ce a eT

Lucian PYE

Peter ROSST

D. RUSTOW

Otto STAMMER

Address

Dept. of Sociology,
University of California,
Berkeloy 4, Calif,

Institut ftir politische
Wissenschaft,
Gelfertstrasse ll,
Berlin-Dahlem, W. Germany.

6 Drosier Road,
Cambridge, Ingland,.

Dept. of Political Science,
University of California,
Los Angeles 24, Calif,

Savignyplatz 7-8,
Berlin=-Charlottenburg 2,

London School of Economics
and Political Science,
Houghton stre,

Aldwych,

London W.C,1, England.

6 rue J,0, Voisambert,

Issy-les-Moulineaux (Seine),

France.

Dept. of HZconomics
and Social Science,
M,I.T.

Cambridge 39, Mass.

NORC, 5720 Woodlawn Ave.,

Chicago 37, Ill.

The Brookings Institution,

1775 Massachusett Ave., N.W.,

Washington 6, D.C,

Institut f'%r politische
Wissenschaft,
Gelfertstrasse ll,

Berlin-Dahlem, W, Germany.

Functions

Chairm,,
Disc.,

Chairm,

Discey

Disce,

Disce,

Disc.,

Authe,
Disce,

Authe,

Auth.,

Disce,

Authe,

Chairm.,

Tue,
Tue.
Fri.

Fri,

Mone

Tue,

Fri.

Mon,

Fri.

Tue,

Tue,

Fri.

Tue,

Fri.

PeM,

&eM,

‘a.m,

PpeMe

peM,

Qe Me

DPeMe

PeMe

Qe Me

BeMe

&.M,

PeMe

PeMe

PeMe


Name

Dr. F.X, SUTTON

Prof, A. ULAM

Prof. I. WALLERSTEIN

Prof, Jerzy WIATR

Dr. P, WORSLEY

Dr, JA, ZAMOSHKIN,

Address

The Ford Foundation,
477 Madison Ave.,
New York 22, N.Y.

Dept. of Government,
Harvard University,
Cambridge 38, Mass,

Dept, of Sociology,
Columbia University,
New York 27, N.Y.

Banacha 2,

Warsaw 59, Poland,

Dept. of Sociology,
The University,

Academy of Sciences,

Moscow,

Functions

Auth.,

Disce,

Auth. 9

Disce,
Auth, 9

Auth, ,

Auth.,

Tue,

Fri.

Tuc.

Tue.

Fri,

Tue.

Mon,

AeMe

&.Me

Pele