THe T_O# NA&ZIsig IN CENTRAL EUROPE.
VEL PEN
The growth of Nazism outside of the old heich is much more
g then the devebpment in Germany proper, When Hitler came
to powei in 1952, the Nazis had so skillfully concealed their real
goals that nobody knew what the future had in store. The overwhelming
majority of the Nazi voters had hed no intention-other than to give a
new party & chance: they liked their radical and frequently not quite
unfoGnded denounciztion of: the political sét-up, and they had no idea
that the government would mean the end of the Republic, and later on,
the second worlc war.
astonish
But in 1938, everyoody knew or had at least the opportunity
of knowing what Nazism meant. Nevertheless, the Nazis were stronger
then Spe ha oe brome tite. Bim Stoncér then in Germany itselt -
in spite of the attempts of the various Central—surcpeen governments
to spppress their activities, In Austria, they had no majority, but
they formed not less 1 one third of the populavion, and since the
rest was hopelessly divieed between socialists and conservatives,
monarchists and democrats, fascists and liberals, they were by far the
strongest single perty. pudetenlaiud, they had even &@ clear-cuir
jority although the puity which represented their ideas in that district,
the so-called home Front, disclaimed until the fall of 38 its true identity
with Nazism,
This resi
1t was due to the peculiar historical situstion in which
the German population in Central Europe found itself after the first world
wor, but even more so to the skillfuil propaganda which combined the highest
idealism with practical economic realism and the lowest appeal to mass
emotion, This propagandu took into account sll the three sides of human
néture: the faith of the cultural elite; the interests of the average man;
and the impulses of the mob. This combination proved so successfull that
it my deserve some attention even outside of the German orbit.
Let us first consider the historical situation. Central Lurope
-had been united with the.rest of Germany in the Holy Roman } and
later in the German Federation set up <fter the poleonic + he
connection hed been rather loose for the last Z20C years, But the fact
alone that the Habsburgs who ruled over Central Lurope were the titular
head of the Empire, gave it a strong sentimental force, When Dismerk
succeeded in 1866 to exclide the Habsburg monarchy from the new German
empire, this solution wes deeply lamented by practically all the Germans
outside of the boundary of the new eich, Although the Habsburg monarchy
prospered and altuough the Germans mid 4 leading role in its political
life - a role resented by the other nationalities -, ev were dissatisfied
and a considerable party advocated the regurn to the Empire in spite of
the economic and political sacrifices such « policy would have. brought
eboute
The world war gave this policy an unsought actuality. The peace
treaties disscvyed the Habsburg monarchy: an achievement of dubious political
wisdom, but inavoidable because of the i ility of its rulets to come to
an understanding with the full dozen of nationelities of which it was
composed, But the peace treaties failed to draw the only possible con-
chusion, namely to let the Germen parts of the monarchy unite with the
German Reich, The representatives of Austria and Sudetenland voted un-
animously for this union even before the peace treaties were signed,
namely immediately after the armistice in November 1918. It is easy to
my
1
Nn
i)
understana that the Allies were reluctant to allow Germany to increase in
size and population as a result of @ lost war, But Hever vheless: their
policy to the contrary s short-sighted. The pac i
have had 4 moderating influence on German politics - up to soe, anti-
democratic parties had played no role in Austria while the Nazis were
extremély strong in Germany as late buck as the Munich Putsch of 1923,
in addition, this eééitien would have been a consolation for the deeply
wounded German pride, It would heve ‘brew ent about a real unification of
the German people, and it would heve been impossible to attack the peace
tfeaties - to which this result would have been due - in the vicious menner
which became one of the most efficient Nazi weapons.
But it was not enough that Austria had to promise not to join
Germany without the consent of the League of lations, and that Sudetenland
was ogeupled by Cavch troops and incorporated into the new Czech republic.
Both in political ar nic respects, the life of the Germans in
Central Etrope bec ole, In Sudet tenland, the Czechs took their
revenge for the disregard in which they had been held by the Germans by
using a subtile technique of discrimination within the law, by forbidding
the public use of the German languege in districts with a beech majority
and foreing the use of the Czech language even in purely Germn se ctions,-
by levying taxes which hit the German population mich more than the Czech,
by. expropriating German property under slight excuses: in short, by using
those means which the Nazis have meanwhile ~braught to perfection themselves.
Cf course, they never went as far as to jail innocent. persons, or to
evict them from their homes, to depiive them of their civil rights or to
drive them in exile, It is true that the persecuted German under Czech
or Folish rule had imcomerably more liberty and security than the victorious
German under the ect regime, But at that time, the Germans did not know
thie, and Epey. bad Bogs ree. ons for jwenting 3p overtimow phe KoLcign rade.
In Austria, there was of course no foreign domination since the
popuZation was exclusively Germen, But the economic conditions were much
worse than in the other Central European states, Vienne, the capital which
contained 30pe, of the entire population of t state, had been the political,
commercial, and finanwiel center of Eastern Surope, and the loss of this
position meant the ruin of the mjobity of its enterprises. Asy attempt to
bring about an economic co- operation between the new smell states failed
because of the ultra-nationalism of the liberated natiomlities. In 1930,
G ny Austria proposed a customs union which might have saved ai least
the Austrian export industry which etme more than one quarter of the
entire industrial output. But this scheme was defeated by the French who
fraid of German recovery, in spite of the truly democratic
time. The great depression of 1931 was a direct
t% is interesting to note ee the goa
with the crash of the Credit
Dey and amr ead fron | there to ¢
were still af
government in power et th
result of this Aa
tarted in Ausirig,
Central : Sur Open De
i ng Copbcr ve ts majority on
tely tionalistie group which mm ored the union with Germany
ithout Ding. “exact; Nazistic. 3 But the sogiclists were jhe. strongest
ny shift from the ‘egiee waee = TO eo zie woudl
that the docialists would ye to form the government. Now the Austrian
socialists were true Larxists, by no means communists, They were in
power in the city government of Vienna, and their record was on the whole
excellent. Bt the propertied classes and the Catholic church were deadly
enemies of Marxism in any form, On the other hand, the shift to Nezism
was obviously inevitable at the next elecyions since the Nazis began to
use their well-imewn propaganda tactics in Austria as soon 4s they had
come into power in Sareea Ys The then Chancellor, Dollfi USS, Saw only one
way out of this dilemm: a dictatorship of his own. This dictatorship
cammot “be compared wi ith the Nazi government since its pi pose was to
preserve rather than to infringe the liberty of the peoble. In fact,
xcept in the rougher “treatment of the outspoken Seer anere opposition,
the dictatorial character of the government was hardly felt until ios4,
But the fact of the dictatorship alone lessened the moral 7 estige or
the government: the liberais, the strongest ideelogical enemies of
Nezism, could hardly become enthusiastic about even 4 ald dictatorship.
As to the socialists, they knew very well that the fate under Dollfuss
was much better than under Nazism, and they would have been .willing to
come to terms with him. But here another power enters the picture: Dollfuss
depended in his foreign policy entirely on his allience with ltely and
Hungary. In both countries, f ascist and semi-fascist governments were in
power and they wanted he smsh epciali sm even more than Nazism. So
Dollfuss was induced to turn ageinst the socialists, to provoke the
uprising of February ies4, and efter having shelled the Viennese workers
into submission, to dissolve the socialist party, the trade unions, and
even the wonderful charitable and social organizatiogis the socialists had
built w doing so, Dollfuss annihilated as self his strongest allies
against Nazisn.
The Nazis saw their oppo:
nd, five months after the
February shooting, mur dened Dollfuss and sterted | an uprising of their
own. It w the internal Nazi orga: e easily smished
by the ,polzee, and Ttely @ hreatened to give nilitery help to Austria in
ase of a German attack, Dollfuss' successor, the scholarly, sincere end
typically Austrian & ischnigg, tried to correct the evil Dollfu eon had
done, ie got rid of his fascist supporters, the so-called home-guards
ich had | become & Hence alike the Nazis, and he tried to reconcile the
socialists. Hevsudtecded in March 1968, When Eltler saw that the Austrian
government was coming to terms with the socialists, he Cevided to act,
ené having secured the Italian neutrality, he invaded Austria twh days
before the plebiscite scheduled by Schuschnigg was to take place. She
In Sudeteniané the story is simpler than that. Here the democratic
leaders of the Germans had wied for 20 years to get political parity,
The Czechs went as fer as to concede two or three ministerial posts to
Germen parliament ns but they refused to grant.the so-called cultural
grew, When Austria was taken by the Nazis, the
mi Ritery position of Czecho- Slovekia became almost impossible in case of
a@ conflict Now Beneseh was willing to grant to the Germans
what they had asked before. But it was too leie: Eitier ageih dia not
the Sudeten Germans themselves time to decide whether or not they
might be satisfied with autonomy, he asked for the complete cession of
the German territory, and egeim the world knows the outcome.
This historical sketch shows that in the last end the Nazis had
to resolt to sixple violence in oruer to spread their rlale over other
countries, “ut they would not have b been abie to do so without strong
reactions from within and without, end the victims of aggression would
have been muchbetter able to défend themselves, if the propaganda had
'
ay
f
not peved.the wav for the aggression,
This propaganda could mke use.of the real grievances of the
German population. It could evoke the old dream of the unity ofvthe
entire Germen people, = gal for which Germany had fought the Napoleonic
wars and the revolution of 1848, and which had enablei Bismarck to win
the sipport for his militaristic schemes, In addition, they could
display the banner of lberty against foreign oppressors in Sudetenland,
ugeinst a reactionaby dictatorship in Austria Finally, thev could point
out that democratic mezns had faiied to remedy the evil and to bring
@ just solugion, It was easy for them to minimize the real gains, for
instence for the Germans: in Czechoslovakia, and to exaggerate their
suifering, it was even easier to let the peophe forget how mild all these
injustices were as compared to those inflicted by the Nazi themselves.
if evefi impartial observers are able to talk for instance of Bitish
rule in India or Africa, and the Nazi rule in Austrie, Bohemia, apd
Germany itseif as of compareble qualities, it is cliear°# propaganda
emong Germans could distort the real aspect of guilt ene
Licht
So tie Nezis Vere abte to for —power Unter the slggen-sf
aS ery democrat, memei;unity,geusvice, ITesaom, and they
5 2
patty with supreme irony the Liberty-hoverent,—
These idéalistic battlecries were supplemented by some wery
tie economic slogans, The Nazis were able to promise thé well-to-do
the—miick & protection égainst the threat of socialism, Just as the
conservatives in Austria and#the supporters cf fascism ig Be wepe,
entirely willing to abandon democracy when the Bexooratie tend “seemed
to bring about the danger of a sociélistic majority, so many well-to-do
menufecturers in @entral Ekurope thought that Hitler would be & better
protector of their property than ea parliameritary majority. The Nezis
w.cde use of this idea by exagge ing the socialisidyi menace, and their
greatest claim for fame was the delivery of Centrel Lurope fiom the
red danger, At the same time, oc la: & pey so 1 sed
cosoperetion: =
Oz DOT ora ime: wakee
e-nuniverot ecigm observers; The other day I heard in an otherwise
very good SAREE codes the opinion that Beefs is less mierialistic
than Genocrecy. , yhoeger has winessed the behgvior of the Nazis in Austria
end has trida to Checa the most impudent private “expropriations" in fava
of high and petty party officials, will doubt this lack of economic
interests. But it is true thet the party was always able to shift to
the left if tactical conditions seemed to require it, and that the
socialism which still forms part of the official party mame, was sometimes
used for more than 2 fassade. For economic Z@é¢dé reasons did not impress
merely the well-to-do. The people themselves wanted one thing abpve all:
the end of the memace of unemployment. The Nazis did achieve this end,
it is true, they simply put the unemployed to work, unproductive tin the
strict economie sense, mamely on rearmament, and paid them no more in
reel goods than their former unemployment benefituhad been, But they
had grasped the important truth that most people don't ask for their
real wages and the productivity of their labor, If they sre Rola shat
their work is important for the comminity, and they receive @ = wage,
they might grumble, -but they are not wiiling to jeopardize their jobs by
revolting as they will do if unemployment lets them despair of their
econciie situation, This i an economic, but rather a
psychologic one, But it was true statesmnship, and it shows the ty
of the Nazi leeders that they alone were able to produce it, Even their |
close imitators, the Italians, were not able to deal with the unempl6yment
1
or
1
any more than the democracies,
Neither idealism nor economic reayons in themsel
the success of the party if it was not for their mastery
psychology. Here the Jewish questiong enters the field. fT
assumed that anti-semitism is always connected th fasci
mistake: tke Fascists managed to get slong wi hout it. £or
theiSudeten-German Nazi party even 4 tted dews to their
spring of 1938, The reason was that in Ttaly there was no
semitism because there were pracfically no sews, and in Su
hetred for the Czechs was sufficient to keep es "soul of
% ing, without the fuel of anti-semitism, In Germany, 2:
bo
was used for many reasons, Hecause of the prominence of U
the economic and scientific life of the mtion, anti-semi
rampant for decades, eepecia lly am One. the smelier trades
professions, that ig eS groups which were
ves pee: crbiain
in handling m
+4 is erequently
sm, This is a
lé years, end
renk up to the
popular anti-
detenland the ‘
the people"
nti-semitism
he Jews in
tism had been
people and the
the first followers
of Nazism, Second. asily represented | ne typical
for 4 its~6r BESS ee poebh sone Bee
Tena UGne be promised spoils at their hoot
saat | er iene ae > Fideety, dy infleming the people
vity one could make kind of rehears
sccasions. table is the importance of the “Sewish question,
az for more serious
first pointed out
by Rauschning, that the mtural aversion of modern enna ageinst killing
ng, the result of some centur ‘ies of humanist
ue German people ready for
£ the pogr
iy for giving
and plunderi
be overcome in order to Be
var, if the party leaders 4.
oncentration camps to occur,
hol days but for preparing them for
re were bette ar mH v
case of war. The <2 r
ussia, 2 Qe wither aay
4 a
b
g
3
[er
Des
a
4
ce
483
wo
Eeepect than the
to the sa purpose in ean be sure
be consider ed & Trotakyist the next cay the average
notito fear th he would be treated as a dew, This sense
expla ins why the’ PP0tést; against these going-on were so
2
“g
and his sense of disgust was alleviated to 4 certain expe
of relief,
how did the propaganda
Nazis captured the youth,
the largest extent, and in addition the fact that unemplo.
among young people, If a youngster cannot get employment
will turn without discret: oO anyone who Promises hin w
got hold of the civil service, Here again they could
of modern pol
actions, Wwescnot checked any more by these parlementarians
Ths Petes cripple the governments they wanted to combat
hen by the use of murder, arson and blackmail, to h
poleeede sl Baugh ter and tor
ght expect feem-e-pecpte-of-such = hich-cultere: the Germ
Sect was glad tne + someone was being treated wirse than he was
training, had to
the second world
oms and the
the mob & homan
re in
Trotzkyists used
whether he will ~~
German needed
£ security
ch feebler than
anti-
mt by a feeling
oceed on these lines? first of all, the
here they could use their idealistic ideas to
yment was largest
for years, he
ock, Then they
point to the corruption
ics and to the advaniage fex-the ci ivil strvice if their
« in te Way,
more easily
they resorted
i 1 extreme cases, Thirdly, they inveded the same political field they wanted
to destroy by clever playing off one party against tae.sthe., They always
managed to find & "common enemy" against which they cor
Pir st of all, of course, com munism, Zverybody
uld allign the athéere,
who tried to oppose depriving
the hated commmists of civil ri ghts | wes branded as a communist hi ane
and thereby silenced. Then the moderate socialists, simpl.
ety by subst
rxism" for oem Especisliyrtire destruction -oftk
After the leftists
es were &n easy pre,
egoieli ot
tHE Ene.
re bis sogea,o?
ye sspéecially
a@ =
in Austria, the Nazis succeeded to some extent in getting the workers
to avenge themseives for their grievances under the emer government,
and directing their hayed for Nazism against the Catholic church which
had sup ppobted the Schuschnigg dictatorship more than seemed to be com-
patible with Ate spiritusl mission.
te
is development teach anything to the rest of the world?
it demonstrates that even a philosophy of brute force, se
as is ies HSS aheiay cannot succeed without the help of
jocclistic. end economic arsumenis. Secondly that it dées not strike
t the clear sky: only vwlere” people had lost confidence in democracy
because flong-crawn political and economic grievances, were the Kazis able
to make headway. Anong these g@ievences, apart from mtionmal questions
which were rather peculiar to Centra ue ones HS, est important are
unemployment of the youn and _ Exveen es <td Soa See tce, Thirdly,
7 cuarth rigs
ot : Sette Te UC ae 5G wimg byt he 1
ENE eet finite ane Nes Tee esses ae HaS—exposéd
Cy Of the “doctrikte that Sr ther the Negis~a “aré-the CSuST rot VU
communism or theg communists the savigr: re ceom JeAESe. there is only one
eee wey Fa cous ialiterignsim: Péspectetor ule warée veleee which bad heen
toteliterians thers
nS es, unity, liberty and justice.
33
PAGE TEN
Speaker Relates
How Fascism Has
Hatred As Creed
“When youth realizes the true
value of faith, love and courage,
youth. will readily see’ the hypo-
erisy- of -Fascism,”.-said Professor
nbert Furth, head. of ‘the
science department of
Lincoln University, Tuesday night
to the ‘members of the” Young
Republican Club. of Kennett!1
Square and Southéastern Chester
County. ‘The meeting. was. held
at the Kennett: Squaré Golf and.
, Country -Club-and -was: well-at~
tended. .Thomas B. Worrall,
president, presided at the -busi-
ness. meeting,
Professor Furth discussed in, de-
tail: hpw: Fascism “had ~ appealed
to the youth of several European
countries, and failed to show a
distinction between: » ‘Nazism,
Fascism and Communism, as the
latter is known in Russia, except
for some minor. differences iin-
img eof
* politic:
‘The. spéaker, a former. officer
of; the Austrian. army, «declared
Fascism taught a perverted’ sys-
~ tem of values, first to. kill one’s
eens then to il BO
[eal enemies, and finally to. ce
‘quer: nations: which . had been
mamed as enemies. In turning the
searchlight of truth on Fascism,
the instructor stated’ that: it em-
fbodied hatred in every knowh
form,. and combined. action with
colorful ceremonies to appeal: to
the:younger. people.
“Whenever. wwe teach ‘the youth
of the world that life is worth
living and that. youth hasan op-
portunity of achieving happiness
as the past. generations ‘have
known it, then people will. prefer
2 stead of |"
We. ‘must also-¢on-
Struct: a ‘system of sound values.
T believe “it is cowardly”, to {tell
youth: to: cease running. for a.
yay, tain goal, but Fascisin take:
Saslest. way,” -Professor-Furth’ de- |
elated, “The speaker’ concerned
himself solely withthe youth |
angle of the Fascist: movement.
‘The: next meeting of the organi-
zation will-be early in. June, when
James T. Tingle «and. A, .Duer.
‘Pierce will provide the entertain-
ment.
Pesan hen ae
In Copyright