The problem of disarmament is considered here in relation to the question:
What is the best and most feasible way (a) to minimize the danger of the outbreak of
@ nuclear war during the transitionsi period which sevarates mankind from the etable
final situation of permanent veace, and (b) to accelerate the aporoach to this ultimate
solution. The probability of nuclear wer occurring before the final stable state is
reached, is vroportional to the vroduct of its probability oe any given time, times
the length of time mankind will be exnosed to the danger? more vrecisely, to the ti
" "
©
integral of this probability from now to eternity
Two different answers to the vroblem of maximalization of mankind’ s
chance for avoidance of the nuclear catastrophy keve been suggested: these 7
anewers are (a) maximum deterrence and (b) pertted disarmement,
(a) The first solution is the "Amster-Shervin" formila (Bulletin of
«ALS, May 1956), It has not many outenoken theoretical vrononents, but is the =
q unadmitted = besis of the actual military nolicy of the United States as well
as of other mjor nations. It postuletes that the mazimum security of continued
peace can be achieved by maximum deterrent threat, making whet the chemists would
call the factivation varrier" of aseression as high as nossible. It is suggested
i. by the proponents of this theory that the eonbdination of vractically indefensible
| economy and population with a practicahly indestructible retaliatory power of the
a iwo major world ey ee universal and vractically vermanant veace.
z= However, while it can be argued, with considerable conviction, that for
any given short veriod of time, the existence of 8 mesd mum eavacity for mutual
destruction by twe potential enemies orovides the greatest vossibie guarantee
that none of them will make a deliberate (or cereless) steo leading to war, it
is certainly not true that the danger of such a chain of events can be reduced
| at ea
by any extent of — zero - particularly, in the absence of a neat div= ee ers
——— > SS ee, = = —— ~~ = = = —_— — —s = ~ — —- = SS SS SS eee e = "s ee = a —— :. So: = — = 2s + —— a
————— = é oa se, oa a a SS =e : =
t ision of the world tetween two camms, and the existence of precrrer nations not
entirely under the control of one or the other of the min edversarics. Therefore,
if the state of mitual iakeeeendians would have to be considered as indefinite in
aration, /integrated probability that it would sconer or leter end in the outbreak
of . war would approach unity. The desirability cf the deterrent state denends
therefore on the likelihocd that 2 prolonged state of metastable equilibrium ean
he utilized for the gradual emergence of a permenent system of veace ~ an inte-
grated world community in which war will become an impossibility. “his harmonie
community will have to emerge from a ricidly divided world like & buiterfly emerges
from & seemingly lifeless wupe. This does not seem to be a likely outcome of
@ prolonged state of international fear and distrust, with sustained vr-parations
for instantaneous mitual destruction Zoing on without resnite.
(bo) The second alternative is to seek the maximum integrated vro ebility
of survivel in the relexation of the deterrent threat and of the assceilated yo— |
litical tension = through gradual | —oesttey disarmament. It must be admitted
(i) thet under the conditions of a contimed division of the world into sovereign
and politically warring fractions, such a disarmament is likely to increase rnther
than decrease the momentary vrobability of a thoughtless action which can pos-
sibly lead to war, and (2) that such a war - even if 1% should begin as @ non-
nuclear one = will probably aevelov into a nuclear conflict. These two admissiors
are almost inescanable in objective evaluation of the vrobablu effeets of vartial
eee ae eee) ee ee ee ee ee So ea ee ce ee a re. ee a
disarmament. Nevertheless, the disarmament solution can not be rejected without
may
considering the fact that it SechrkRty-teo provide a more congenial background
4 for the gradual evolvpént of a anes, stable structure of veace, It is by no meang -
certain that such will be the actual develovnment, and the vossibility of a nuclear
ecatastrovhy will remain high fer a considerable length of time; in fect, it may
even srow as disarmament oroagresses; + Mevertheless, chences for successful annroach a
e
a
¢
te the finel stable state will be meh better in a nartially disarmed and
°
politically relaxed world, than under the conditions of maximum mutual deterrence.
in other words, the momentary danger may be higsher, wut the time—inteerated danger
Ad CnTence
lower, than in the Amster-Sherwin G6lution,
It is clear from the shove that the want disarmament solution is desirable
oniv if it is used as a politice-nilitary background for anoroaching, with maximum
possible sveed, the ultimate state cf stable world veace. Its increased momentary
risk of war can be justified only by a shortening of the veriod durtue which this
risk will versist,
kt is submitted here that this is the only context in which werttel disarmament
can be considered as desirable by 2 groun which anvroaches the world situation with
the attitude of scientists.
Stouving nuclear weavone tests; stonoing the vroduction of fissionable materials
for military courvoses; instituting aerial survey to detect warlike vreparations or
iliicit atomic activities =< all these stevs can helo the advance towards ultimate
peace in two ways: (1) &f preverly exploited by divlomacy, they can lead to relaxation
in the reletions between antagonistic netions, and (2) they can offer the vossibility
for the esteblishment and actual trying out of various mechanisms of interns tional
control, thus establishing vrecedents and verfecting bluevrints for the ultimate
creation of & world-wide peace organization capable of effectively enforcing the
disarmament of every gevarate nation or groun of nations.
*his is, however, not the context in which disarmament is most often viewed
by the vublic ovinion and the volitical leadership of major nations, Rather,
atomic disarmament is considered lonzingly as a mechanism to reverse the recent course
of history and te return to the inre-atomic® state of international relations, in
which sovereien states have enjoyed freedom of movement in the world arenas, which
included gsultima ratio regis, a resort te war <- without the suidgidal imolications
eG oy ‘
of @ pucleer war. Plans to limit wars to non-atomic, or to “tactical® atomic weann Bo.
or réstrict the use of atomic weavons by a declared strategy of "graduated" deterrence,
are ouigrowths of the same desire to be able to carry over, into the age of nuclear
technology, the traditiohs of national sovereignty in the choice between veace and
war -- @ tradition on which international relations have been based all through
history. ‘if gradual disarmament will be attemoted in this "reactionary" svirit,
with each step being considered as restoring in vart the "freedom of action" of
sovereign states (rather than as creating better conditions for vermanent abolition
of this freedom), disarmament will merely increase the vrobability of an ultimate
catastrophy of an all-out nuclear wer,
{i
The first period of international etomie enerzy control negotiations in the
United Nations Atomte Energy Gommittee, in 1946-1948 (when these negotiations borged
down), constituted an attemt to eliminate atomic weeavons from ail national peacetime
arsenals commictely, with foolproof controls. At that time, the impression of
Hiroshima and Nagaski =-- of two bombs that nad ended a sabes lati war =-- was fresh,
Got
and it seem ° noesession of even a few atomic bombs (by a nation in an otherwise
y
atomically disarmed world, would give this nation‘ @ means to coerce and terrorize
oe
ail other nations. The United States leadershiv, in monovolistic vossession of a
small number of A~bombs, had at thet time the irrational, but psycholosicelly
understandable, belief in having ea vermenent bargaining advantage and was reluctant
to sekl this advantage for anything lees than a comletely air-tight system of
international control, The American and other festern technical exverts, agreeing
with the Soviet exnerts that such a control is Lechnically feasible, vroclaimed |
(in the Lilenthal-Onpenheimer-Acheeron plan, known in the UN as the Baruch Plan’ ,
é
end iater, in the mich more elaborate "UN AEC Majority Plan® of September 8, 1947),
that nothing short of international menepeltetie oewnershiv, or at least ef an
"in trust” manncement of the whole atomic eneray enternrise in the world )°Y a
UN bse! could vrovide adequate guarantees against clandestine atomic activities,
| inst any divicsiea
as att as /eeubetien of? a fraction of legitimate vroduction of fissionable materials,
4
to the line of weapons.
Bie 9 . py ‘
ae, ee a
SS
*
Certain groups of scientists went even further and SMe siees
—
ineauibled
3]
4
+
- that only & vor) é-wide moratorium on large-scale —" tion of fissicnable material,
even for peacetime uses, youl ereate 2 <scimmacemams pond whieh a UN control pedlanaien Ay once
yfould aa _— that not a single A—boms weit mace in seeret anywhere in the
worlde | = \ ; |
The Soviet Union, when it finally vroduced, on dune 11, 1947, a specific
eounter-vroposal for the controlled abolition of atomic armamcnts, rejected the
Snternational ownership or management plan as an eattemot to ercete a canitalist-
dominated world atonie trust. It also rejected ps "reactionary" } the moratorium
oe eee oe ee ee eee ee ae - 7 53 = :
5 a gf CO dy a Sees Wg eee ee ee is
: é Knut eae ee “:
| are eA cat eee
1 yet,
plan& (although 1% agreed -~- at least for a time -- to the ideas of national quotes
i ee See ee
for the production of fissionable mterials). Instead, the UEOR proposed a system
of international insnection of declared national atomic energy activities, couvled
with sveciel mechanisms for the investigation of eusvectes eclendestine facilities. \
Gontrary to what the vudlic opinion in the West is accustomed te believe, the USSR . ;
went mich further at thet time then on any later occasion (including the oresent
London negotiations), $n offering UN insvectors the necesstiy right of ingress in )
and egress cut =, their country and of free aecess to all elomie energy vlente wi thin |
4¢. The insvection (at first characterized by the USSR as ‘meriodic”™, but later
admitted to be “contimous”), wes to be ruled by UN agency m jority vote and not
subject to veto (whieh was, however, to be yeteained in the adovtion of punitive
neasures against violators, which the USSR insisted should be the prerogative }
a | of the UN Security Council). |
3 : : | | X¢ 48 imvcortent to realize that the ultimete breakdawn cf UN eatemic energy
q | control negotiations in 1948 was due, poh to Western insistencs on adequate inevection,
3 and Soriet reluctance to admit any inspection of atomic facilities in their eountry, |
j vat te the beiif of the West thet no cuteide inspection -- in tact, nething short of
4 nonepolistic internstional operation =~ will suffices and Sevi:t refusal to concede . s
f ss fugr econtrel measures beyond continuous insvestion. | |
No technical development since 1948, and no officiel or unofficiel reamrai si
of the conclusions of the technical experts of 1945-47, whe concluded that external
inspection cannot assure complete prevention of illegal atomfe srms production hea
————
o
}
taken place since 1948, On the other hand, the development of thermonuclear weanons
which permits to multiply, by a factor of several hundreds if not thousands, the
explosive vower of every vound of fissionable material, has mde th votentlal danger
*
of every ounce of clandestinely produced plutonium (oer U285) corresvordingly greater.
Yet, in the now proceeding international discarmanent nesotiations, we vear land this
tine, from the Vestern negotiators) suggestions that further vreduction of atomic WEANOBS
}
sould -- and should<sbe stopped by an international agreement,"suovorted oy adequate
controls”, New technical studies, on which this American prenesal ir baecd, have never
been reieased for publication, or even as mich as officially sumerized, Yois ie
in sharp contrast with the corresponding studies in US and the UN, which have provided te
{
basis for the ‘Ut me jority plan of 1947, The investigations by the so-called "task fored
’
of the Stassen office, have remained classified as “top secret® -—- a situation which |
makes it extremely difficult for any independent group to eralusta the feasibild ty and.
reliability of the now proposed atomic disarmament stevs. (The came 4 tuation prevails
incidentally, also in the field of atomic weavons teste, where the basic question of
discoverability of tests by remote monitoring -—~ or of the minimum neede |
|
néear-distance monitoring -- has never been officially illuminated, and renalas a mw tter
of conjecture: an extremely uneati sfac tory a~ and unjustifiable — blackout of
res
information essential for the formetion of netional yolscies. )
of the fissionable "detonator” materia’ .
fi
:
:
:
|
1
"nuclear vlenty" —- with mass vroduction of uranium and plutonium setting under way in
an increasing number of countries, it should be easier to detect the iilegaz vroductit n
and concealment of fissionable materials sufficient for the raking of a number of
nuclear weanons, than has been the case under the vast conditions of "nuclear searei ty
.
—= pln belt anal % ae eee ee se eee ee ee oe ee a,
with which the UN Atomic Energy Commission has been confronted in 1946-48, Rather,
it is safe to assume that this task is now more difficult then 11 seemed then, and wi i
become increasingly difficult as time goes on. it is therefore chyious that vrovosals
to stop the production of nuclear weanons with "adequate controls", if the provosals
are inteded to be taken seriously, now must be based on a philosovh: different |
rs
~~
from that in which atomic weapons control vrevosals have been considered in the
|
now closed ere, Such vrovosals sannot be seriously aimed at a foolvreof, esrtain prevyer
tion of the vroduction of even a small number of new nuclear weavons by any nation.
Rather, they can address themselves only to s much less ambitious aim, to ston the mai:
flow of atomic weanons nreduction =- of their vroduction "by the thousands®, while
Closing the eyes to the possibility of a small trickle of suck weapons continuing here :
and there.
Be ae The reason why even an imperfest control may now amesr desirable to the West
eam
-—*
is not difficult te fathom: 4t 4s the existence of a large s!ocknile of nuclear |
explosives and finished weapons in at least two countries -- the US and the USSR, Ag |
pointed out repeatedly by scientists, and conceded by Americay government spokesmen,
precise verification of such stockpiles as prerequisite for their controlled liqua dation, J
af =)
is technically impossible, Wo means can be proposed to discovor the existence of —
|
stockpiles by methods other than denunciation and direct searcii, Because of their
3 Smell volume, they are easily concealed, and the West can harbor no illusions that it will
ever be able to rely on the absence of concealed reserves of nicleayr weanons in the |
od ae
POE, CA ene ae eae aS ir ’
7 ey eae eal Py ee er ey eee oP ele oe) ee ee
uy
Soviet camps no will the Soviet Union ever be absolutely certain that no hidden nuclear,
: ous:
qi Se
}
_ Weapons reserves remain in existence in the West (although the risk of discovery wili
ee ‘be ereater in a country where the movement of people is frecr, the ease of communication
|
239 ne ‘ } : , |
4°) Ce tied : 2 : 5 i -_ : ‘ . ees i
“ a 1 7 x - , 7 2 i oie
a
_ &
7
ors
-
\
sreater, and the control of the state over the ¢. 7 °
ty
As)
Q
feo
jut
pelo
cy
feto
®
&
[xt
=}
sy
re)
of nuclear —- m
wel] m— probably
as
never be sure that their
vetentinl enemies do not own a secret stoe
koile of atomic and thermonuclear weanons, which
é
may go inte the hundreds if not thousands, Under these condi tions,
|
they may fee] that
& trickle of illici¢ production — & few dozen bombs a year -- which can escape ; |
inspection, will not te decisive,
not in word ~-— not at nuclear weapons, vat merely
at slowing down the headlong race of mass production ef such weavons. |
|
|
ies for the vroduetion of fiesionable materialg —~
Sevannah, Portsmouth in the US,
I
“end their equivalents in the USSR -
i
(perhans,
These nations -~ France,
Cerminy, Janan, ete. om Will probably violently protest continuous exclusion from the
"a tonic WeSpons club": tut, in the Leng run,
di sadventagseoua o The
: 2 (eh
nuclear physicists, against Western Cermany aiming to acquire Ste own vroduction
oe
facilities and stockniles of nuclear weanonso. The “freedom of action” of a t
nation on the international scene, which has become associated, in the minds of MANY ¢
with the possession of an arsenal of atonie weavons ({2 warticular, after the collape
of the Anglo-French Sueg expedition under the threat of Soviet atomic retaliation),
end which has made the production of Britein's own thermonuclear bembs appear a
matter of vitel interest to the present British government, is provably not real
(not even in the eese of Great Britain); @ nation of the size of France or Western Gera
many is not likely to acquire such freedom even if it were to possess its own
atomic weapons. fo belfeve otherwise vould mean to trensfer preatomic concepts inte an
entirely different atomle world,
constitutional unity =- is being tried out now in the integration of Eurove via the
rv
In the first wart of this naper, the desirability of partial disarmament’
wae related to the nossibie reduction of the time vi:Cugcc. ef the probability of
the outbreak of a miclear war, from now to the time of the establishment of a ;
permanently effective mechan sm for the maintenance of peace. 1% is in this light,
rather than that of an a nriori attachment to the idea of disarmament , that the
questions of the atomic weapons centrol negotiations should be considered.
in the first period, 1946-48, when the aim to effectively remove gil) atomic
weapons from the fece of the earth, desvite its division inte ecometinge states,
stili seemed feasible, | the authors of the Acheson-Lili enthal-Ovpenheimer vlan
heped that if this elimination is achieved by positive means -- the lutegration of
the atomic power developments all ever the world under a single agency =-- rather than
by negative means of {nterne tional policing, this nay become a vrototyne for aradual —
. iv
Chspopigndif fusion of nations into 2 single community -= e functional’ aporoach to
world unity more promising than expectation of a nolitical treaty establishing a
world federation, or gradual endowment of the United Nations with the functions of a |
4
world government. (It will be noted that the same idea -- functional unity before
es
|
Iron-Steel Commnity, Furaton and Genmon Market.) However, this long-range aim of tle
Some. plen received - "stab-in-the-back*® from America iteelf when Mr, Baruch introd
the provision for “condisn punishment’? of viclators of atomic control by veto-free
vote in the UN, In the eyes of enemies of the "Baruch plen,*® this vrovision acquired — —
and still retains -=- the central position, demonstrating that the ultimate intent of
the vlen was te coerce rather than to cooperate.
While the question of sanctions has dominated the criticiem of the Baruch
plan from the Soviet and Soviet-influenced side, the question of insvection has
acquired the central role in the thinking of those more symathetic to the plan,
while the aim of cooperation was wished inte the vackeround in beth cases -—- ag if
>
13 K
= ™N
!
, - . Pad
A meee
the plan was intended to operate indefinitely under the conditions of mistrust and
hostility between vabhanel The American leadership did little if anything to draw tie
sie a as iar
the attention of the world to the constructive aspect of the original vlan, and to
er
the fact that no international control of atomic weavons can survive, in the long
run, in a static divided world, tut can become meaningful only in the context of a |
)
dynamie world, moving towards integration.
The Lisenhower atome-for-verce vrovesal ef December, 1953, and the just
ratified UN Atomic Agency convention which develoved from it, ean be considered as
perhaps the first political step revealing at least a dim realization of the necessity
te establish a world community of interest in the atomic energy field es foundation. |
for ultinmnte effective elimination of atomic armaments. This was achieved, hovever, |
a
|
at the cost of eliminating any direct relation between eneniinn 9° cooperation in ¢ .
Ady
atomic power develovment and atomic disarmament, foreseen in the &™) vlan.
We new iin vroposals for the functional integration of the world have _
come from either the West or the Zest since the Atoms-foer-Peace vrovesal. . What is
missing, is a strong conviction of resoonsible political leaders (and of the brorder |
groups which provide the fundamental philosophy of the national nolicies of the
respective countries) —— euch an integration is an inescapable precondition for
the survival of mankind in the seientific age, and that no negative volicies, be it
in the form of partial disarmament, or in that of international pelice controls, can
provide an adequate substitute,
While only the dimmest awarenegss of the necessity of world integration can be
discerned on the political level, a very decisive -- and probably irreversible ~~
development towards the rigidity of mitual deterrence systems hee occurred 4n the
military plane ¢,, a1] nations. Mest outspoken in this respect has been the vroclamation
of the new military policy by Great Britain. The limited national resources of
Bri tain are from now on eommd, tted to the develoument and maintenance of a deterrent
atrategic potential with only little -- end gradually decreasing -- effort vei ng
. Ps |
ry : s *
| (y
VF A; /
i ok : oa
~ 7
contemplated in the field of conventional military vower. . m |
While the economic necessity is less stringent in the U5, which (in theory |
at least) could afford the maintenance of bath an effective strategic deterrent
miclear vover and a more or less conventional movils armed establishment, there is
no doubt that the trend of the last years has been towards increasing the first one
and reducing the second, While it is difficult to jadge what 1s havvening in the
Soviet Union, it is quite Likely that ns too, the necessity to utilize the
14m3ted human and economic resources for nonmilitary vurvoses, favors strongly the
inererased emuhesis of leng-range strategic deterrent power. Lf this is a correct
evaluation, it means that whatever partial disarmament egreements can be reached in
the foreseeable future, these are least likely to affect decisively the cavaci ty | |
of the major nations to threaten each other with nuclear devastation as a means to
mintain a peace besed on deterrence. What may be achieved, however, and is in the
—
interest not only of the major tut even of the minor povers which may thus be vermanent-
ly prevented from acquiring atomic armaments of their own -~ is to slow down the headlag
raee towards more numerous end more destructive nuclear weavones and to stabilige the
1
deterrent threat at anvroximately its present level. This could mean a certain
relaxation of the acute world tension, wnich in turn could be used to vrees for the |
no n>
functional integration of the world. This freezing of the deterrent threat end
relazation of tensions ‘co to be on the minds of the negotiators in the London
disarmament conference. The author of this paper believes that the main function
of scientists in this situation is to urge the public ovinion and the governmente | |
everywhere to realize that not only pertial, but even comvlete nuclear disarmament, |
(which fer mrely technical reasons is highly unlikely under the conditions of
)
& tom c pienty) eannot undo what the sefentific revolution of the last twenty years |
has wrought -- provided every major sovereign nation in the world for all future time
| !
with the actual or potential capacity te inflict comlete destruction on manici nd. |
it follews that only a gradual organic integration of mankind into a single community
| |
can eliminate the threat which will otherwise hang forever over mankind divided into
.
| ;
cilia tive or inimical factions,
fi Ea ———
If our concern is with reducing to a minima the momentary danger of a |
nuclear war, while creating at the same time the most faverable conditions for the |
organic integration of the world, we cannot simply urge the removal of the
"activation barrier” of deterrence, Rather, these barriers should be kept at a level
:
sufficiently high to permanently discourage direct or indirect agression’s but the |
arms race should not be permitted to get out of hand, to become @ national obsession
and en aim in itself, but should be slowed down or even reversed to vermit relaxation
of unvermmiicnal iension and abatement of fear. Thies ts a very complex problem of
statecraft and military policy. The evolution ef a prover progrem and the nomilar
understanding of its vurvose ~- so different from that of traditional military and
foreign policies of nations -~ ig made extremely difficult, if not impossible, by the
secrecy with which the relevant technical developments and volicy decisions are now
surrounded, ‘it is the epinion of the euthor that scientists in all countries should
strive to orient CMRAER TOD, Som to clarify the situation for the pudlic opinion by
urging their own governments to release sufficient information. In its absence, they
must use their own informed guesses to analyze the problems and ta develop tentative
answers -~- rather than simoly follow the natural tendencies of all men ef good will,
ls |
supporting all possible disarmament +) pessibvle comoromises between
mejor nations,
Ags an examvle of the comolexity of the situation, the following dilemm may be
submitted. The deterrence weanons wr excellence are lerge thermonuclear weanons,
delivered by long-ranze planes or missiles, As mentioned before, it is unlikely that ‘|
disarmament will decisively reduce the capacity of major nations for this kind of +.
deterrence. However, it has been vointed out by many that the deterrent threet if
such weavons may become illusory if they are the only ones availats, In “eecussing
14 a | tON
the avoveal of the German nuclear vhysici sts again etomie rearmament of Vestern | |
Germany, sca “Getrescken argued that strategic nuclear deterrents will be
discounted by a future 2x -ess0r whenever ths ebject of aggression will be
of no vital impertence to the deterrent power. He will presume -- jerhaps
wrongly and then with catastrophic consequences -= that an attemt to change by
force the political system or international status of a country somewhere in Asia ox
— eet = = on oe
Sa ee ee a ia ae
Africa will not be considered by the porulation and political leaders of the major
world pewers in Burope or America as justifying the risk of an exchange of blows by the
strategic daverrent forces. Once the deterrent proves a bluff in one ease, it will be
|
so regarded in the next one, and go on -= until e@ tragic miscalculation vlunges the |
world into a nuclear war. - |
The weual conclusion from this consideration is that the Veet (and, by anal ogy
.
eiso the Soviet block) cannot afford te give un weanons of lesser scope than the |
strategic nuclear bombs, It is argued, for examole, that the conventional military
units of the HATO Alliance mist remain at @ level which would make them a defensive force
in themselves, and not merely a trip wire to unleash strategic nuclear werfare, Yet,
nuclear tests that such tests should not be altogether stopped because they may lead
to the development of small nuclear weanone without radicactive fall-out, cannot be
Gleniseed out of hand, Rather, what is needed {8 to Rive the nations of the world
the er to examine the validity of such claims, and to wut the whole testing | ~
program uncer the effective control of wmiblic
hands of small groups of
opinion. -- instead of leaving it in the |
individuals with vested interest in unrestricted continustion —
—— |). el ee ee ee ee eo ae
Na
15
of their programs. It is not unlikely thet such an open examination will lead te
the conelusion that a contribubion of continued testing of nuclear weavons to the |
improvement of a balanced deterrent power ig much more nrovlematical then its |
obvious contribution to the acceleration of the arms race and ezacerhation of the |
feelings of the vast majority of the world vovulation. However, a truly rational
answer to this question eennot be given withoyt elose analysis =<- which the secrecy
now parround finds matter makes very difficult, even for scientists most inclined
te look at the matter in an. objective and. re WEY > . |
To sum ups
(1) Disarmament must be considered as part of the problem of minimizing
the integrated danger of nuclear war in the foreseeable future. |
(2) In the early period of UN AEC negotiations, under conditions of nuclear
scarcity, totel elimination of atomic weapons was @ feasible aim, and, if |
successful, could have provided the most favorable background for the evolutica |
(Of a permanently effective world peace structure,
(3) Under the conditions of nuclear plenty, total elimination of atomic
weapons hes become en unrealistic aim and disarmament has to be considered as
a delicate problem of statecrafts retaining the deterrent barrier of stone
armaments at a minimum effective level, and at the same time, slowing down or
reversing the arms race, toe create most faverable psychological and economic
preconditions for the development of world-wide control end functional integraticn
projects aiming at | the establishment of permanently effective world — structures,
(4) The problem of nuclear weapons tests must be considered in the light of
the seme two aims = maintaining the deterrent barrier at the lowest and most
sil-arcund effective level, and reducing the tensions gemerated by the unrestricted —
ar@s Fase,
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(5) The secrecy surrounding the technical and political aspects of the
arms race makes an intelligent analysis of the problem of disarmament extrenely
difficult and endangers both the development of rational public policies in
this field and the acceptance of rational solutions by the public opinicn.
Proposal for the Establishment of an
International Center of Scientists
Concerned with the Impact of Science
on Public Affairs
Submitted to the Pugwash Conference by E. Rabinowitch
The problems to which the conference can address itself
are partly of immediate, and partly of long-range
significance,
The present scientific revolution--in particular, man's
newly acquired mastery of nuclear forces<-has led not
) only to acute dangers which must be met, but also to a
need for permanent changes in human society,
Both the immediate and--even more so--the long-range
problems are, to a considerable extent, determined by
scientific and technological progress, with which
scientists are more thoroughly acquainted than other
groups of society and whose future developments they
can best anticipate, Therefore, a more active parti-
Cipation of scientists in public affairs than has been
customary in the mst, is needed,
However, this participation can be fully justified only
if, in facing the implications of the scientific revo~
lution, for human society, scientists will attempt to
remain true to their tradition of approaching the
problems in the spirit of unprejuciced, factual inquiry.
It is submitted that such an analysis leads to the con-
Clusion that in the future, any significant segment
of mankind in possession of traditionally recognized
rights of national sovereignty--which include the
right to arm itself--will be able to acquire weapons
sufficient for the annihilation of every other segment,
or even of the whole of mankind. By acquiring weapons,
it will.be able either to impose its will on other
parts of mankind, or to force them to acquire similar
weapons to answer the threat with a counter threat.
The only objectively satisfactory way out of this
dangerous and--in the long run~-intolerable situation,
is a reorganization of human society into an effective
world community which wuld make it impossible for
any of its parts to exercise unrestricted sovereignity
in the field of armaments,
ysuch a community of mankind will be stable only if
1% 1S. based on the awareness by mankind of its unity
of interests in the scientific age, and the development
of : ; international ethics and loyalty similar to those
which now assure the internal stability of individual
nations,
(More )
Proposal Submitted by
i. Rabinowitch ~ Pugwash, July 1957 “2
It is submitted that the above statements are not ex~
pressions of a political credo, but factual descriptions
of a situation brought about by the scientific revolution.
Two tasks impose themselves upon scientists of the world
in face of this situation, (1) How to accelerate the
approcah of mankind to the ultimate, stable situation;
and, (2) How to minimize the danger of the catastrophe
of nuclear war during the--inevitably extended~-period
before this stable state is reached.
In the face of imminent dangers, there is a great pres-
sure to concentrate our attention entirely on today's
problems, such as those posed by the nuclear weapons
tests, The following paper is based on the premise
that an equally important contrilution would be to
stimulate the long-range advance © menkind towards a
system which will permanently eiiminave the dangerous
discrepancy between the facts of the scientific revo-
lution, and the traditional forms cf social and poli-
tical organization of mankind.
This is an educational task, and it is submitted here
that the present conference couid be a step towards the
beginning of a wrld-wide, long-range effort aiming at
educating mankind to tie full realization of the dm gers
and potentialities of the scientific era,
Tt is further submitted that scientists belonging to
groups with cifferent mtional, economic, social, and
political allegiances can nevertheless agree on the
basic facts of the situation and carry out the neeced
educational work amone their own peoples wibhin the
framework of their vresent Loyalties.
An attempt is made below to formulate a set of statements
to serve as basis for the suggested educational effort.
However, formulations ean be only tentative, Continued
exchange of ideas and experiences between scientists of
different countries will be needed to evolve a more ade-~
quate and widely~accseptable formulation,
Tt is therefore submitted that one of the problems with
which the present confermce should concern itseif, is
the evolution of a mechanism for continued communication
between scientists in all countries concerned wth the
iinpact of the scientific revolution on human affairs.
A center should be established to foster the excnangs
of idezs, to channel communications, and faciiitate
the getting together cf scientists from different
countries«=in the same way in which the many existing
international scientific organizations assist in the
exchange of information in purely technical areas,
(More )
Proposal Submitted by
E. Rabinowitch = Pugwash, July 1957
Suéh a coordination center could sponsor future,
closer studies of different relevant problems, by
initiating more authoritative and more representative
international gatherings,
Eugene Rabinowitch
July, 1957
Pugwash Conference
"APPEAL"
A large proportion of scientists in the world are mow
engaged, directly or indirectly, in "military research" ~-
weprations for inflicting mass death and destruction on
other countries, and reducing the death and destruction
ofher nations could visit on their own. Much of mankind's
intellectual power and ingenuity and economic assets, are
now invested in the technological arms race,
Scientists--those who participate in military develop-
ments no less than those who are not involved in them--
are unhappy and bitter about this situation. They be~
lieve in science asman's efforts to comprehend the
world in which he lives, and as a means to advance the
health and wealth of mankind, They resent the waste and
misuse of science for the creation and accumulation of
tools to destroy mankind,
Some scientists see a way out of this predicament in
refusing to contribute to military effort, whatever
country or cause it may serve. The majority are either
unable or unwilling to seek this personal solution--
their loyalties bind them to put their capabilities at
the service of their countries and of the causes in which
they believe, as do other citizens, But this does not
reconcile them to the folly of the scientific arms race,
Inventing and building tools of destruction merely to
increase the hope that these tools will never be use~
which is the common justification makes a litile sense~-
certainly not as a permanent answer to the challenge of
the atomic age, Scientists want science to be released
from bondage to death and destruction, They want to
work for the advancement in man's knowledge, for increased
happiness and wellbéing of mankind, Scientists know that
the way out of the deadlock into which history hasled
mankind, is not easily found, They cannot--and do not--~
presume to tell the political leaders how they should
proceed to establish stable peace--a world community in
which gcience could turn its effort entirely to the
pursuit of pure knowledge and to its consttuctive appli-~
cation, However, scientists of all countries~--irres-
pective of the political, economic, and ideological
framework within which they choose (or are constrained)
to pursue their labors--share the knowledge of certain
important aspects of the situation in which mankind now
finds itself, and of the directianin which this situation
is bound to change, since these aspects and trends owe
their allegiance the precipitous advancement of science
and technology in our time, Mankind is passing through
a scientific revolution, the like of which has not occurred
in the past; and scientists are inevitably more acutely
(More )
ee ee ee ee ee
Page 2
July, 1957
Pugwash Conference
aware of the extent and implications of this wevolution
than the rest of mankind, Without proper appreciation
of these new facets of the world we live in, by the nations
and their political leaders, the threat of selfedestruction,
which nowhangs over mankind, cannot be permanently removed,
The first responsibility of scientists to their ow
nations and to mankind as a whole, is to help make
these new facts of human existence generally understood,
to help their followmen to find their bearings in the
world rapidly changed by science,
To this common task, scientists of all countriescan
dedicate themselves without becoming untrue to their
own nationg and to causes which claim their loyalty.
