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In the article "Missing Link in American RS oe
Hook makes two points, The first one is that if America is now behind
the Soviet Union in the development of long-range missiles (end the launching
oe Because or
of WOES is dee primarily political education of
Americen scientists: they hewr feiled jo recognize in time the danger of
erie s
communist sggression (as they did in 19 the danger of Nazi am)end have
therefore not shown Retest aay Sree interest in wer, search, Hook's
second contention is that because of this lack of political understanding,
conversations between American end Russian scientists on political subjects,
Lrtene iw (457,
(such os htve-been ottempted et Pugwash best July And which the Sovict
Academy of Science now wants te=8& expanded), ore likely to end in a
"rane of politicel virgins,"
dy tg
x fet cue Meals te—be wrong on both points -—— ox; to be more exact, he
4 sSeegonly one ——- 2nd not the most important=side of the situation. Tue, 4 qie
Pree
American scientists 2 g@7otietst, megy of iveps- did share with the/American
people certein illusions shout the Soviet ally during (and immedintely efter) fe
Weekd jhr #2; but this has not been the que. reeson for the slowness
One wit aoe nahesblo eer folihcrans
proprsae.of American missile research. bss Jneri opi SoreniT SEH sa irl
weer baker
are aot Kmod
% fl oN
Page et scientists,
ier beet ae ee Dr Keolk gtr ,
American Scientists and Military Research
Arms development is applied research, and applied research is
carried out, as a rule, at the initiative of those interested in the product,
In the case of srms, that means the military, Only on rare occasions does a
scientist become so convinced of the practical importance of prs of fuere
research, that he goes out of his way to persuade industry, or the government,
Kes uw :
to give it a pradticel try. = > i wy puysi (or
° otivation is interest
in the workings of nature, and not concern with practicel applications,
aot
A unique exception fem this general rule (xy occurred in 1939,
Physicists vorking on completely "impractical" problems of nuclear trans-
formetion suddenly recognized the possibility t utiliza the phenomenon of
nuclear fission for the creation of a new type of explosives of unimaginable
power. On their own SaLEERES oma IS went to the military — and found
them little interested, They then wen{— through the intermediary of
Binstein -- directly to President Roosevelt. What followed is history,
The fear that Nazi Germony we be the first to develop on atom
bomb was one important reason that caused scientists to take the initiative
afvuuc ant
in the development of Saepdoovom, One hea—te remember that that was after
Hitler's invasion of Austrie and Czechoslovaki@, at a time when war in Europe
threatened to break out any day. Even then, it was the refugee scientists
from Germany, Austris, and Hungary who started the ball rolling — the rity
of netive American scientists Sit AR concerned with the matter, ond had
to be prodded into action,
The combinetion of circumstances wes uniqueg, There was the greatest
break-through in experimental physics in history; the penetration of man from
the world of atoms into the world of nuclei, offering the prospect of mastering
forces x nttiton times greater than those at the disposal of mankind daectiicits
fttetory since the discovery of fire, There wes a group of scientists —
the flower of European theoretical and experimental physics -- aware, from
first-hand experience, of the terrible threat of the Hitler war machines
And there was, in Washington, a political leadership of sufficient imagination
to listen to their fentastic ideas and gamble two billion dollers on their
SUCCESS.
HX KKK KKK
In 1945, after Hiroshima end Nagaseki, there occurred a great
exodus of scientists from militery leborstories back into academic research
os ees
(heterkGosseot nn hy The Americen people, a8 well es its poTitical tender-
peseefel ) s
ship, hoped at that time for cooperntion with the Soviet Union, and the majority
of American seientists shared this hope. Another wer seemed an impossibility,
: Sole see ee war exhanted fy fe wer
particularly after the discovery of atomic weapons.\ Thtswas—the—+time—rhen ihe
7®epublicons a@teedTouder thon the Democrats. tha, Ament oan military establishment
| in Europe (which alone could have assured the restoration of political freedom
to central Europep end an effective international control of stomic enerey)g-
should be dismantled as speedily ‘as possible. The disconcerting experiences
; .
of, American military commend in wartime allinnce with the Soviet Union, kept
iy
secret from the American peoples It was the time when President Roosevelt
thought that he could influence Soviet policy by meking Stalin laugh st the
expense of Winston Churchill. It was the time when the suggestion of
Bertrand Russell that the Soviet Union should be induced to accent effective
international control of atomic energy, if necessary by the force of amp,
was generally considered y& 9 bad joke.
montaneous demobilizetion qhieh took place
cs A
Gd Te vary on all levels of American soos ety 3S Kooning
practically the entire body ofpoutstanding American scientists in their wartime
cuerters at Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, the Radiation Jahoretory > etc. wold
a ’ ’ V2
Union.
5 onda
| Way aw \— Gite —ronl d heave meant starving fundamental research ond/the piacauian of e
| at new generation of American scientistsy- damaging ultiweatol;-er_researchs
| wan have
k's Nothing of this kind ould empted -—- either in America, or in the Soviet
|
| Supra ons ,
|
4
What could have been echieved in 1939 was the creation of vigorous
centers of military research, in close exchange of ideas end people with
ecedemic laboratories, The main reason why this le not been done speedily and
purposefylly —— for » while the very survival of Los Alemos was in question —
was a of CABS lesdership in Washington, With the end of the
war, Weshington lost its interest in science and scientists; it was returning
to its pre-wer routine, in which science hed no importent B&.. With the
exception of Senator McMahon, who became deeply convinced of the crucial
importance of atomic energy for our military security and the whole future of
America ond mankind, Congress ond Administration garetts impressed
by the education which Ed Condon and other Natomie scientists" hawe tried to
dispense in Washington, Hook deplores the dunes scot ene political education
ui~ G4F a0 wo
of American scientists; more important was e lack of scientific education
of American politicians, , A Wht» fection of seiestietr veceKfee comet veanlty
back-before
may heve started/ BAF d ts the Second World War-as political illbterates; some,
disinterested in world affairs, heme cerried this political nrivete through
the early post-war years; but very fewetf-emy have not become caecat es by nowe
oe
The lack of understending of science end of its role in public affsirs, ins
Gide aber Chev
widely Srevadent TH Aner con government and American public opinion —- including
many so-called political scientists, Is it bemtty necessary to quote sgein
Somer
ate Hesof Secretary of Defense Wilson skomb-—=rtmite to prove the point?
C «
ve Cee nara Deere nc nome
the first statements of
atomic scientists", such es the seseebkbed "Frenck Report" of June he. 1945,
So
foresaw the acquisition of atomic wespons by the Soviet Ua as within four or reeca
"obutiy he A Ge exzsdenee Covad was
five ee en arms rece between America and ‘the Meer eee Union, ae ee
of the letter catching up with the American technological lead in ten or
fifteen years. (ues pen Caer Washington still lived in a fool's
peradise, believing in American monopoly of atomic weapons, and listened to
oe
Pouthoriti esp buch as General crover)yCetaseute bay f) d4hem that Russia tH not
kel
be able to build an see oa in 25 years, if wer,
uw
At-the sametime, tbe {tery minimized the revolutionary significance
of atomic weapons. When scientists fought the May-Johnson bill, which would
have given the military e preponderant influence in the pescetime management
Caasher of Mero pa book's
of the atomic energy enterprise, airy concerns was that in the hands
of the military, even the development of atomic energy 98 @ militery weapon
why
woald.he likely to get into a rute
ent was, however, the necessity of establishi
of/atomic weapons iff Japnne
a
&
The scientists! spjoattton ogstuat the use of the bomb in Japan,
and then ageinst mi riley control of atomic energy, and their propaganda
for international control of atomic energy, heve been widely misunderstood,
rh seo
eG
chomisis}-in—the—front lines of pure—nesearotr They heve been accused of
an urge to disclose the "secrets of the atomic bomb" to the-rortt-end—to
Russia ia_nortioular/ei ther as a anor ee well or(pthe-onimton of
‘ seonel Comenearsne *
more suspicious cntief, out of Aympathy with the-Soviet-tnien, This mis—
understanding kes found its wey into the memoirs of some ef —theomest
prominent political leaders of that time, such as Secretary Forrestal, Yet,
Senator McMahon -- who kw had more contact with scientists than any other
American political leader after the war7 Said that he hme never heen a single
American scientist asking for gratuitous revelation of atomic bomb secrets.
True, the catch word "let's give the atomic bomb to the United
Nations" (which meant, in practice, "let's divulge its construction to the
we
whole world") was ae some communist-front organization (such as
the "Committee of Art, Sciences and Professions"), but it/found no support
(estos —
among scientists, What tkey~Asked for, was effective international control
———
of atomic cans tine by inspection, or (as suggested in April, 1946, in
——
the Acheson-Lilienthal report), by international ownership and_management
— ——————
of all atomic enterprises in the world, ‘This plan was accepted by non—
communist nations and vetoed by the Soviet Union$ but suspicious politicians
eat
ink stea on considering it a diabolical onttempt to betray American atomic
Imov-how/ +40 the communists, Senator Taft, during the Congressionel
investigation of the ABC in 1947 (?) spoke of the Baruch proposal for the
internationalizetion of atomic energy
as if eee the Soviet plan, and of Gromyko's plan of ngtional ownership,
restricted awty by occasional UN inspectiong as if it sag the American
proposal}
The slowing down of American military research during the first
four years after Hiroshima was_the Pap ee The lack of clent
g end leadership in the top civilian snd military administration; and
“g
the predominant concern of American scientists with the resumption of normal
cy
research and teaching. The "atomic sci stl ae” when the atomic bomb experience
SproemTettasth e concern with the future of menkind in the atomic
ow) .
ALes —— geste eculd be called the "political ovantiardg” of the American
scientific community -- had no iT usd ons about “the: qeemtertny evoms eee eee
but their predominant concern was with stopping the race, not with winning it.
They were trying to prod the government 1th into more vigorous action for
international contro} and to make the public understand the full implications
of an atomic wer. ‘The concept of "saturation" iA — even now insufficiently
understood by the public —- sccording to which quantitative advantage in atomic
arms loses its importence when both sides approach the capscity to thoroughly
destroy each other, #mede them relatively unconcerned ebout America losing
the atomic arms rece, but deeply concerned with the impossibility of winning
it. They foresaw the advent of "atomic stalemate" with two (gr more) powers
able to destroy each other at » moment's notice. Dist / thi Brn the armaments
field, many scientists were alarmed by the lack of national effort in active
end passive defense agoinst atomic weapongg Givi defense gjdisnersion of
industry and population were extensively discussed by the 6S, without awakening
ae Notable public or official responsap Studi es on nective defense, pioneered
by spontaneous scientific groups such as the Lincoln Project ond the Summer
Study Group in Cambridge, the Pro jectfinst Hive’ in New York, -the Project Vista
at Caltech, had en almost equally herd time psig PsP ts conclusions on the
military officialdom, ond“secused of meddling with the neti ond strategic planning.
The SAC command considered any attempt to allot ® slice of the shrinking defense
dollar to active or passive defense ef threst to its function of protector
of American security by threat of "massive retaliation."
8
Individual scientists with such experience and ideas, who tried to
convince Weshington of the militery impértance of missiles and rockets, also
hed a difficult time mp getting eo aise and<encourerement,
In contrast to the teen—ottire atomic bomb, which sppesred elesr—and
overwhelmingly important to a larse number of scientists in 1939, 111 these oth,
military creas had no universal appeal to the scientific community es a whotes
and in the face of complecency end inertia in Washington, only small groups
of scientists remeined actively interested in them.
There was, however ——- or rather, there could have been -- once
exception: the thermonuclear bomb, ‘The one scientific possibility of
immense destructive power which could be appreciated by scientists at large,
was the "super bomb"; its possibility hoa occurred to many physicists
before en eee tees made the fission bomb possible —- end hae made the
attainment of Sosmi ¢ temperatures needed to maintain a hydrogen fusion
reaction feasible on earth, The history of te H-bomb development in America
after 1945 is the one case to which Hook's accusation hes been at all relevant.
The American scientific community, with the exception of Dr. Teller, Dr.
Pfitzer, and a few of his colleagues, did not press for the exploration of the
weapon, although its theoretical feasibility oeeern discussed at Los Alemos
during the war. The General Advisory Committee of the AEC, consi stir mainly
of scienti#® unanimously opposed to ® crash program in this field oes because
of doubts as to chances of its success, but in part undoubtedly because of
moral ond political considerations. They were reluctant to initiate a develop—
ment which could multiply, thousendtord the destructive power of the Hiroshima
homb, ‘The first Soviet A~bomb test in summer of 1949 and proof of the relatively
easy feasibility of the "dirty" ("fission-fusion-fission") thermonuclear bomb,
combined to silence the oppositions
The composition of the General Advisory Committee prectades the
interpretation of this attitude as stemming from communist sympathies or even
of indifference to communist danger. Dr. Oppenheimer's convictions t==, by
1949, developed ® long long way from his youthful communist affinities; ond
on the GAC
all his colleagues tes a widely different political past, supported his opposition
to a crash H-bomb program, It is very difficult to estimate now the strength
and validity of their arguments —- for the simple reson thet none of them
have ever been reverled. The pall of secrecy is still hovering over the
whole area, The scientific community at large was ignorant of the controversy.
Since 1945, mentioning the "super" in conversation or print was out of the
question, The decision whether the hah a ee feasible and whether
American scientists think it should #e developed, rested with a few scientists
Nin the know" =— competent but fallible, and not able to consult with their
colleagues outside. The American scientific community use abdicated its role
in influencing netional srmements policy to the scientific members of this
General Advisory Committee of the ABC -~ and if the convictions of the latter
were proved wrong by history, scientists at large cannot disclaim
responsibility.
But have they been proved wrong? Again, secrecy makes fully informed
judgment impossible. The construction of the H-bomb proved possible; and it
is clear now thet if no crash program would -heve been initieted in 1948,
the West would have been confronted, in 1950, with a Soviet monopoly in hydrogen
weapons — a passing state, of course, but a highly uncomfortable one, a
state ofimbalance of terror" which would have had catastrophic consequencese
However, unofficiel history has it thot American governement was advised, by
a group including smong othexs Oppenheimer, Vennevar Bush, end Alan Dulles of the
)
CIA, thet before embarking on a erash progrem for the construction of thermo—
nuclear weapons, an approach should be made to the Soviet Union suggesting an
agreement not to test such weaponse
The government and the American public oninion st lerge had very little
understanding for this kind of suggections.Until the advent of the Soviet
satellites it seemed exiometic thot in the rower contest between the Soviet
Union and the "nited States Americen strength resided in its unquestionalbe —
technological lesdership, vhilethet of Russie Iry in its supposedly umexhausti ble
reserve of brute monnower. Consequently ell ettermts to ston or slow down the
race in military technology wes considered ss nleying into the hends of pre-
Russia. In several orticles ¢f in the BAS I have tried to criticize both parts
of the nostulste: the cunlity of Russien dclientie particulerly in the fields
such as applied mechanics end nerodynemics was such thet , combined with the
capacity to concentrate on militarily imnortent projects and stifle the
development of gadgets for APA 6/ bon tol tz oot the use of the consumers, the
Soviet Union hed all chance to draw ahead or even overtake American leadership
in weapons technology, (in the rocket field, the lesdership has slweys been
on the Russian side.) 6n the other hend , the Soviet edvantage in norul etion
numbers was relatively small compared to America and nonexistent commsred to
the NATO block ns a wholes; end the ynossibility of reckless use of human
meses for war wes a thing of the pest once industrinlization has mode » lerge
provortion of the manpower needed in plnnts and factories. With the lower
productivity of the Soviet workmen and farmer, Russia must in fect be in more
pinch for manpower than the West.
Finally, the nolitical sn@ economic structure of the Vest made it more
vulnerable to atomic warfare end more susceptible to the threst of this wer
as means of nolitical pressure than the economically more dispersed ond
volitically monolithic Soviet Union. a
For 211 these renson s, it was in the interest of America , »t least os
much as that of Russia, to freeze the technological arms rece short of the
development of the thermonuclear bomb, Of course this could be done on'y
under conditions sefeguerding the complience of both sides. There is, however,
Hook 11 : 2s
no doubtthet the explosions of megtton bombs can be discovered by remote
monitoring outside the country and thet all doubts about violations of
the test ben through underground testing or thruuzh the use of low yield
gadgets cenld be discovered by rether limited system ofmonitoring stations sdat—
tered over all countries in a network which would prevent any tests being
carried ont et a cistence larger than a few hvndred miles from the nearest
monitoring station. In any case, this seems to bethe conviction of the
majority of scientists the world over. fhe possibility of evading an a
control system is vaguely hinted ot by some spokesman for the AEC, but
the only concrete thing distinguishbbbe behind this smoke screen seems to be
the possibility of shooting thermonuclear grdgets into the stratosphere
end exnloding them there--n possibility which was certainty not reute in
1950 and ageinst which adequate methods of detection probebly can be found
now.
In eny case, proposals to prevent the tosting of thermonuclear weepons,
short of their successful develooment either by America or Russia, found no
receptence then —and similar pronosnls hove been looked askance at evert
since, not so much because of the anprehension thet the ben can be evaded,
es because of the conviction thet it is to the Americen interest to let the
tebhnoloricnl crms race go ehend full speed, thus guarentecing America's
continuous advantage over the beclorsrd Soviet Union.
It is now clecr in retrospect thet an egreement tot to test thermonucl esr
wernons, if it could have been rerched at that time, and made stick by adequate
by an adequate monitoring system, would have been of the greatest advantage
to the United States, It would have effectively prevented the threat of
intercontinenta] bellistic missiles because they have become dangerous only
in combination with thermonuclear weonons, because of the wide radius of de-
structon end radioactive conteminetion the Intter can provide.
It is therefore understendshie that American scientists who advised
Hook 12
the government in 1950? egeinst ah all out development of hydrogen weapons
felt a retuctance to embark on this fateful develonment without full under-
stending of its implicationfor the future of. America and of mankind, and without
at least one serious effort to ston short of the plungeinto a hydrogen erms race.
This aspect of the conflict over the H-bomb develonment, like its technological
aspects, was veiled with deep Secrecy. The American scientist at large had only
® vegue idea of the controversy which raged Uh/tn6/ behind closed doors at the
ARC If Me Pentegon. Vegue hints coule be gathered from articles by former
AKC scienti sts<>€ommi ssioner Bocher in the BAS for the "anti-H—bomb" faction end
ex director of researbh Pfitzer in @hemical and Engineering News on the "pro-"—
bomb" side, but most readers could not fully understand what it wes all about.
The secrecy is what prevented the American scientific community et Jarge from
teking eny nosition either on the technological possibility of thermonuclear
wenpons or on the nolitical advisability of en «11 out development, ond the
dchence of stonpins this develonment bgfore its fruition by » test ban Apreement,
When the H-bomb controversy exploded in the accusttions against Oppenheimer, the
overwhelming me jority of American scientists took his side-—not because of
their endorsement of his advise in the H-bomb develonment, but because of indi
notion over the wey in which » nossible error of judgment wes converted , by
dragging in post sssocietions, into evidence of dovbtful lornity and mde p PeBject
vehicle for nersonsl defamation. of a nrominent Americen scientists, Whet hes
poisoned the reletions between the mejority of scientists and the croup of Dr.
Teller and his friends ns well as betyeen the Americen scientific community and
the Americen sovernment was not the perfectly legitimete desire of the latter
to substitute for Dr. Onnenhoimer end his friends Scientific advisérs 116K
in whose nolitical judgment they hed a better trust, but indienstion over the
use of innuendo of disloyalty as tool in echieving this nurnose, Meny scientists
ere and still are indignant over Dr. Teller's attitude Afd/ in this conflict,
not because of his disagreement with Oppenheimer on the tebhnical fersibility
to make his beliefs prevail, but because of his refraal to clearty dicso
himself from such “suspicions. A sincle sentence to this effect in his testi-
mony woujd heve made all the difference.
| Asi (lur
sophisti cation , * nee bare with man: Anevema intell ‘tuals, in particular
edi Prvowl
who, avn hu een Peserihn ty ifocs ae ROP uth / an ale
rope: liberals wi: ‘anderstendins of
Mr. Hook at taches great importance to the-qresttenof olitia 1
scientists, < is true that : ate 6. = 7 eerie ae =
naam a byyrrereetrr, have tk -
ah Teno, of pon ta = Doge mb nore weerse ee
Rurpese of i propéganda, and phlicios have acquired a unique understanding
- Sow Maren
of these-opéera’ ions ‘and aigkédy took at the average American intellectual of
vay &
eeodaetH as a babe in Rio wodee,
ay fad
However, political sonhistication has alee eistierrtapert whichin—the
piste ones, i ato is i a
or er Mr. Hook i sess, This is aN orover heer
&
of the different factors im the s tuation against each other,
ne
one—c7m—fully_underetand—el 1 The hidden sorta Rae oi such shane
¢ as the participation of Russian scientists in 2 ash i ence é
mig or Se ai
phd? the suyvbionp of the Sovi ee eademy Phd/ dui na st
any Arnie /”
others whitch e at least ue. “{uportitcey derived from
A fhe ee fie WT ¢ ae ca 4
objective facts o arms es situatio afd no them ge are ae
w
A 12 fe oe )
schemes of the irae Tbh ote Ue Tee deotortst: many
Ce " weyh Pras foto mm Pusin ftheat pectpreulls bt Ie Mak and bes buds
ebther-the mechenisiiy of Snviet propaganda ra
sel —hremert—e A
Ht — th ; Tastee elie
hei tL tee : a 7 fe Phe ee
Whether one should call American scientists nrive or not depends whether
one calls so the large part of the American people from Roosevelt and Eisenhower
on top to the average colle ge professor or journalist rt the bottom, After th
end of the war the vast majority of Americans believed in the poss bility of
peaceful relations with the Soviet nion , nd this included even militrry
end nolitical leavers who have alrendy heé their share of “isennointment in t ei
Soviet ally during the war which were concealed frm the Ameri can public.
in noncommunist societies, but also in proper palsuciae of the teestener ef the
diferent factors of which Pino ane guile of communists A ass
each other. me is where Hook's nelysis of the weapons stuation between
the United States and the Soviet Union fails pempketrty. This failure is
dangerous because it sugcests that the sitieion can be remedied without
ae me ; ;
addressing oneself to its most essential weeis. This root is the ignorance
by the Western political thinkers 7X6 well as b Western political leaders — 3 La
of thowey-of whet science is, how it works, and what is its importance for es %
the nation. Mr. Hook displays this ignorance when he implies that the majority a
¥
of American scientists-could have decided in 1945 to stey with war research, Pi
Military research is not something which can preoccupvy the majority © or even
e large fraction of
President Roosevelt had the naivete of thinkbrig that he can work his personal ~
charm on Staelin by teasing Churchill in his presence end ten years Ieter
3
President Eisenhower believed with equal nnivete in using his comrede-in-arms 3
reletionship with Zhukov to influence the Soviet nolicies, How could one
bleme American industrinlists who found that some of their counterparts
t
among the menagerial class in the Soviet Union » re'perfectly humen end
likeable beingsor scientists who have met their Russien colleagues at
internation71 conferences or in their lsborntories and found them warm friendly
f
end sharing common scientific fona other }intorerts,
|
One can even say thet scientists are less inclined then ll others
to see the vorld political situntion under such personel engle . In science
they sre accustomed to look *t facts nnd logicel relrtionshins rather than
' Ven pw qu mph eb pm bvinen “ne fditierd
at ne rsaonalties, If they have tried st sll to transfer this scientific
attitudes into the world of nolitics cia ations scidnitst" have atbemmted
at least to some degree in fhd¥# looking into their crystal ball t the eng
of the war, they have seen ahead not ant ideal of friendly collaboration
#Xd/ with the Soviet Union but by the force of fects anf inevitable
arms race in otomic srmaments with all the exacerbetions of pnoliticel
relationshins which this race is bound to bring in its wake. From 1944 on,
the atomic scientists have not ceased to predict the errly nequisition
of atomic weanons first by Russia end then by tother countries, and
the rece of destructive power which wns bound to follow, When they strongly
advocnted an sgreement with Russia on the control of atmic weapons—-it was
not out of illusions as to the ease of finding ways toward such an agreement
or belief in the good will and retiability of Soviet vromises, but out of the
clear vision of what an unlimited stomic arms race will weit for menkind
and hop that this disastrous development may appear abhorrentnot only to
American cemocracy but even to Soviet totalitarianism.
Hook
é ¥
The Politicel Educ>tion of Americen Scientists £)
The extremes ofynolitice] thinking end tff of nolitics] redicslism revenle
by the personel history of Dr. Onpenheimer unfolded nt his security herrings
hove not been typics] of American scientists ss a group: but undoubtedly before
the wer end the ptomic bomb » Ierge majorty emong them hes had but little
interest in politicel affairs, Thore origneting from intellectual eruns in
large cities mey have hed their fling t politicel radicelism ond even com
munism in common with other grouns of Americen intelledtusls.
The lerge group of Furonean refugee scientists who have nlayed such an
important rle in the development of the atomic bomb hed en entirely different
backeround. Some of them, n-rticularly those from Germeny, hrve been originally
even more epoliticel than their American colleagues , T téneiner vivdly how
when I was studying chemistry 2t the University in RBer'’in in the lete 20's
the head of the institutehesring me mentioning the plight of Russien refugees
from the Soviet Union asked me "What,ere the communists still in power in
Russia" Pdf
This indifference to poli:ics end the associnted respect for all government
authority was rufdely shaken by the advent of the Nezi regime in Germany. I
was quite amazed when upon meeting my o1a/SoPessors in America I discovered
the ective interest they hove ‘catired in volitical affairs . Since scientists
on the average have a rather acute analytical mings end sre incli ned to look
at the fects fist hand PAétdtAhdfddé rather then ae resdymade conclusi ns
from others, they sre inclined--once they become inierested in nolitics——
to apnly et least some of their critical cenacities also in this area. They
are. scientists end prom nent onfes who hove swallowed some noliticnl dopma
but they are the exception sone Nobel prize winner
hook, line and ~~
has been quoted perhaps maliciously .s having declared upon. joining
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munist porty that frm now on he will not have to think sbout anything but
science--opinions in ell other srecs will be*thought through for him by others}
Hook 2 7
But such cases are a rare exception;. —
In any case, when "ato mic scientists" first emerged from the secret¢t
laboratories of the Manhattan Project into thenolitical arena they were not
at all neive in respect to political reslities, in particular in respect to the
totalitarianism of any kind. They were well rware thet communistic nronageanda
wes continuously tr~ing to exploit #11 intellectusl movements in its own
interests; that it hes largely domineted the associations of scientific
workers in Europe; that the €ommittee of Arts , Scieces, end Professions was
an attempt to mobilize for communist purposes elso American scientists.
At first lprge grows of scientists have joined this committee, end they
possibility existed that they covld impress their wey of thinking upon the whole
orgonization, It s on turned out, however, that the wirenullerswho startee
this conimittee were only interested in 2 sounding board for their own
voli‘icel moves end vroclamations end not in © democratically run *ssociations
of intellectuels ond with very few exceptions scientists soon left it.
In the iz own organizations the emergency @émmittee of Atomic Scientists, the
Federation of American Scientists, °nd in their organ the B‘S they heve
been very cereful of nreventing the procommuni st/Si ohSato"EESE’ bee Foi sing
mny influence--which the l»tter often achieve not so much by any Mechinvellien
infiltretion methods but simply b- the dint of being more ready than any ody
else to “evote their time and energy to orgeizational snd political motters,
Nevertheless, the scientists heave not been ble to avoid susnicious
by those wh) considered every orgeanizati-n pr journal which “id not devote
itself exclusively to onticojnunism activity 2s susnicious of cryptocommunism.
The #A¢ddy whole retionsle of the scientists particinnti n in political life
required thet emmh»sis be put not on fighting the ideologicel war between
the/{ RESP eSkual end political freedom »nd the forces of communist totalitarian
ism, but in finding a way to lessen the violence of this fight end to sav id
dt ending in a nuclesr wer. From the beginning scientists have been convinced
Hook 3 3
that the development of atomic weapons (even without the construction o
thermonuclear "superbombs") will soon hfe gwar’ es nto a An AAT mutual
destruction of ne ‘ions, They hed no illusions ahout the inevitability of
the atomic arms race, and of a renid acquisition of atomic weapons by other
netions in rerticulnr by the Soviet Union. In the first published document
issued from this group —-the Franck Report -f June 16, 1945--the conviction
was expressed thet the rtom ce -rms race with Russia will start oh the day
of the fist explosion of an Americen atomic bomb in Jepen en that the Soviet
Union is likely to develon its own bomb infour or five years and drew ven with
America in its arms capabilities within 10 or 18 yeers.
Without illusions nhout the political system of the Soviet Union or the
personality of the Soviet lesders/ The atomic scientists hove set their
hopes--as scientists are inclined to do--on the retionslity of political
lesders of all countries whether totalitarian or democratic. They have ho ed
thet they will all recomnize that a nuclesr var will destroy their political
plens end hopes *s well as those of their enemies end thet therefore they will
be preprred to sacrifice as much of their freedom of rection ss was /Retganelly
to make atomic wer immossibleby internationelly controlled elimination of
stomic weapons. They never had great hopes that they would be able to immress
Americen noliticel lerdershin or the Soviet government of the necessity to
put the establishment of this contro cherd of «11 other/B3TE¢i cal aims, Some
my have even hed the dlucion thet §ust beeruse the Soviet Union is run b
® small grows of people it mey be easier to convince them then to transofmr
the nublic oni
ion in Americe which has ultimete control over the nolicies
of the Americon government: but even in this extrevegent version there wes no
sympothy for the Soviet regime or illusions about its toteliterian end ar-
bitrery cherecter--merely » vein ho e that this very trais may make it easier
for this government to meke a r dical new beginning in its nolicies . rE
The gemble on r-tionslity of soliticnl thinking hrs tft pd not succeeded.
The Americen government “nd the American public opini n has never quite acuired
Hook 4
the same conviction of the paramountcy of the control of atomic werpons over
ot other politics] problems; they felt secure in the Americen monopoly of
etomic weenons and in the belief of American technological ‘diperiioriidy over
ell other nations and particulsrly the Soviet Union. ‘The Soviet leeders on
the other hand reassured by the withdrawal of Americon »rmise from Furove
by the Inck of response to Rertrand Russell's sucgestion thet consent to on
effedtive control of atomic werons should be extracted from Russin if needed
by war, andverhans als o in the belief that the nower of the atomic wennons
has been exaggerated by Americans for pronscanda purposes, took the gamble
of dragging the negotions over nt mic energy control until their o:n etomic
wespons were develoned, so thot they cou,d negotirtie "from strength", In-
direct symptoms suggest thet Stalin really believed that etomic weenons will
never -ecisvely affect the courseof » war and thet the real anprehension of
the Soviet g-vernment shout the nossible effect o nuclesr warfare on the
Soviet Union dates from the tims from the Bop Soviet lesders witnessed
themselves the thermonuclear ve anons tests,
The American scientists followed with close attention the UN negotiations
on atomic energy controls end were ~uite clear of the role of Soviet renre-
entatives in the endless dragging out and reluctance to rive clear answers
even to the simplest ond most relevant questions. They vere ssare thnt the
only nhese of these negotirtions which eddressed itself to the real nroblens
at hend and has led to substential ngreement between the revresentstives of
West and of the Soviet Union was the discussion of ‘echnical fersibility of
fentrols in the scientific exert cormittee, From the beginning they hove
hoped that if they will be everpermitted to discuss these m» tters ond the
generel impliestions of the release of nuclesr energy for the future of menkind
with their Russian colleagues where they hove no difficulty in arriving at a
common ennrecintion of the facts °nd nerhans even at logienl conclusions con—
cerning the minimum necessary ennrture from the established national policies,
Hook 5 | | 7.
needed to elimihate the danger of the mutil destruction in a nuclear war and
to stop the inexorsble progress of the nuclear arms race-—2 senseless eccumulato
ion of more and bigger weapons of messcestruction and more enc faster methods o
of their delivery everywhere in the world, with the only _retional purpose thet
these weapons will never be used by either side.
Already in 1947 when the deadlock of UN negotiations hawé begun to
reveal itself American scientists heve made a weak tentative to contrct
their Russian colleagues through the in‘ermediary of the Soviet ambeassedor.
After some time they were told thnt the Russinn scientists were "too busy"
for discussing such matters. As “ prominent lussian scientist said recently,
during a visit to Americe, when this episodewas described to him , "It was
true--we were too buxy trying to catch up with you."
The hone to open sometime discussions with scientists of 11 countries
not excluding the communist >nes on the full imolintions of the "atomic age"
for the future of e]] mankind hes not died with this first ettemt but survived
hd/thé/thef¢/ through the yenrs whbn the cold war became more and mor e violent
It is incidentslly =» one-sided view to look st the problem entirely from 9
point of view of contnets between Western and Mastern scientists . The
rationnle is not thet bf a dinlog between fast end West but that of unifying
the scientific opinion of »11 countries in » common esti mete of the dengers
ahd @ common concept of what science can do for mankind as a whole if the
dangers of its de«tructive use sre banished.
ee r9r2:77, 1t/p FUAEEALHS/IN6/ OBS thcompertse pcaes He concludes
thet this lag is rs to insrftrttent politico] edwestion of American scientists,
Ip wow Sh, s ise rte of reeled _
v
m cient wee
tific education of American politicians.
T his is of coufse not the be ormul tion yf 9 us. fapdamen ts l-yan SS
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by, Sis chostn or the hai amen © totiooks pate What is
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meant is not th Spe eb tnower Dulles a An) Wilson opXother—representative +
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Iméividuals i iti ife have not lenrned enough physics @t
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shbhool, but thet they have Ww seauired (either an school for art-of—the, be
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atmosr Ameri lite prover understanding vnfimortance of E
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science for national strength in our time.
Mr. Hook sees evidence of poor political education of American scientists
oat Fa es ; ss
in their massive walkout from F=rti oars tories after the end of the-war (> A
fit aan
in their .spesitiémte“the May-Johnson bit whieh would heve vested essential =
control of American atomic energy progrem in military hends, aad the opnosition
yp RAL re inbe ee
of thefgenerel faxirsory fommittee of the ARC under Onpenheimers fo the develonmen [> 2
of the Aydrogen Fob end im'licitly in thr lack .f enthusiesm for the rocket
[tay dw &
probram, weteh,
is Opiabch, aniee have caued the deley in the launching of
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tise American satellites. He says thet the "sad fect is thas "manyof our able
scientists heve abandoned weapons reseerch ond pllied fields!'s and he believes
that this wes the result of their leck of underst nding frm 1945 up until
the current time of the denger of Soviet oftes inperialicmsé s contrasted with
we byt j
tke full understending of the denger of Nazi seas power *fter 1939.
= Politice] sophistication, the lack of which Mr. Hook deplores in America n
shod ane ae
scientists, ond of which he feels himself possessed, Comedet ot only fy
SBR understending of the devious ways in which Soviet political machine =
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tries to turn to its profit o 1 neturel movements of discontent or /godd will
aS
Hook 14 :
The reluctence Americen sdentists in universities mey herve felt xbout
nr return to militery work st the time when, Teller published in theB his Se
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eppenl BEack to the Laboretories"{ in 945>ras sustained by the wave of
investigetions end purges which Senator McCarthy end his sllies have wnloos— >
ened egeinst scientists in the following yesrs. The affair of the Fort
Monmouth wes perhaps the most voteht single event discourrging scientists from
entering military research Irboratories. It would be however quite ihcorrect
to sey thet this reluctance hrs heen the bottleneck which has slowed down :
the progress of Americen militery resorch, in norticu ar in the rocket and
missile field. Rather, it wes during this sem e period thit many lending
Ameriern physicists began to devote considereble pert of their time to
edvising snd doing reserrch et Los Alemos end other atomic weepbns Inboratories.
It was during the same time that »t the initictive of university sci anti ats
militery reseerch Inboratories heve been crested in ssrociation with many
leading universities——the Lincoln Lrborstories at MIT, the Control Systems
Leborptieries et the University of Illinois, the Porject Midwoy »t the University
of Chicago, end many others at Columbie, Princeton, Ca! Tech, ete. add Livermore
at the University of fslifornia Meny university professors began sharing
their time between their scademic terncting researbh nd work in these Inbora-
tories. All this develo-ment is end remains veiled tin Secrecy. But Lt/mft
p statement may be ventvred thet whetever delrys hove occurred, for exemmle in
the develomment of the rednr ecuinned network of rockets ond more Intely of a
missiles end sntelliter wee enused abuve 711 by indecision end under the
Louis Johnson end Ister under the Wilson regime in the Pentrgon by budgetary 3
cuts . Severs? teems in vorkous Ishorstories were orking for yerrs for
green Vicht to go rll out on the develonment of missiles end setellites. They
ates
had nl ety of enthusissm end enorch sciertific menpower. What was Iscking wes
the green light and the funds from Washington, The resignotion of Trevor
Gardner: beceuse of government reluctance to give prover attention ond
Hook 15
finnnoiang to the missile >rogram is well remembered. $3 end so is the more
recent testimony of Genernl Gevin .
To sum wy , the slowness in the develonment of missiles and satellites
cannot be Iri@ to the Iceck of noliticel consciousness by Americen scientists.
It is much more the result of Inck of understanding hy those in power perti-
culerly since the victory of the conservetive point of view in the 1952
el cotions) br the full imlicetions of science for nstional survivel;
The insufficient wnderstending of the tole of seience in the militery
techno ogy and the desire to economize on there develorments in the smug
betief in Americn's sutomotic technologice] lend is one aspect of the more
general and less essily curable werlmess of our Americrn voliticel lerdership.
—-and of the public ovinion on which it depends. This is the lack of under-
standing bf the extent to which science has trenséérmed the traditional poli-
tien? concents on which America's nosition in the world could be sofely based
in the past.
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