Mendershausen, Horst, 1965-1966

ANS. BY...

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LETTER No.

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“*teena OOF OROOC C0 62 Bee cictccce

Postonschrift: Deutsche Bundesbank + 6 Frankfurt 1 + Postfach 3611 F | L E

Herrn
Horst Mendershausen

1700 Main St.

yvanta Monica .
Californien 90406

Us chs
Bitte in der Antwort angeben % ihr Zeichen und Ihre Nachricht vom FRANKFURT (MAIN)

30. Juli 1965
Betreff

Lieber Herr Mendershausen!

Verbindlichen Dank fiir Ihren Brief vom 21. d. M. Ich antworte gern in
+ , ° ~ > *- -
deutscher Sprache, zumal ich heute in Urlaub gehe und noch verhéltnis-

maBig viel zu tun ist.

Bei den "Beistandskrediten tuber die Girozentrale", nach denen Sie fra-
gen, handelt es sich um langfristige Darlehen in Hohe von 80 Mio DM,
die 1963 gemeinsam von den Girozentraien der Bundesrepublik einigen

Geschaftsbanken der ‘Véreinten Arabischen Republik gewahrt wurden. Fur
diese im Rahmen der Entwi ckiungshilfe gezgebenen Kredite hatte der Bund

die Burgschaft.tubernommen. Ich nehme an, daf sie aus diesem Grunde als

"Beistandskredite" bezeichnet werden.

e- ih eet LL .

Die “Deutsche Girozentrale -—- Deutsche Kommunalbank" fungiert, wie Ihnen
vermitilich bekannt sein wird, als Zentralinstitut der regionalen Giro-

zentralen, d.h. der Spitzeninstitute der offentlich-rechtlichen Spar-

kassen, : :
Ende August werde ich wieder in der Sank sein. 965
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Att FRANKFURT AM MAIN: Hotel Frankfurter Hof, Hotel Monopol-Metropole,
Flughafen-Restaurants, Henninger Turm Restaurants, Frankhof K i
DUSSELDORF: Park Hotel — oO
DUISBURG: Hotel Duisburger Hof = g?
MANNHEIM: Palasthotel Mannheimer Hof —_— .
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KONSTANZ: Insel-Hotel ee. oO
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BAD HOMBURG V. D.H.: Ritters Park Hotel Cit —
KON STANZ AM BOD ENSEE BAD KISSINGEN: Kurhaus-Hotel a <
TELEFON: TELEX: TELEGRAMM: BAD REICHENHALL: Grandhotel Axelmannstein, Kurhausbegrfebe a rv
(07531) 5214 733 276 INSELHOTEL ROM: Hotel Quirinale, Birreria , Bavaria“ co ont =m
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June 30, 1966 WY &

Dr. Hans Speier
The RAND Corp.
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, Cal.

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RAND Gan

PRESICIN

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OPC MOTIONS “LR

VICE Pnesiailet
MATHEMATICS

Dear Hans:

I thought you might be interested in some of the interviews I have
been having in Germany. So I made carbon copies of the notes I trans-
cribed, and I am sending them to you with this letter. The notes
are rough and unedited. You must forgive the form. Some of the stuff
you will probably find tedious; but there may be a few things of interest.

It's not an inspiring scene. A lot of wing flapping and no flying.
All the political people want to go somewhere but cannot decide
what it is. The mass does not seem to care greatly for the great goals
and appears content enough with what it has or expects to get, in the
way of goods and comforts. ‘the government will probably do a lot

more "“lavieren", try a lot of things half-heartedly and avoid taking
a clear line on anything.

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After a few hot weeks in Paris and Bonn, I have run into cold
weather and rain. I visited the churches on the Reichenau. Two of
them are being refurbished and the third has been completed. Around
them, things have mushroomed that are either out of style, or try
awkwardly to be in style. I found the pictures in the books more

attractive than the churches themselves in their present state and
setting.

I hope you have been well. I'm heading for visits with Luchsinger
and Kellermann.

With kind regards,

Sincerelf, / /

tol, (ace

Horst Mendershausen

oo Registry No. Mie

INSEL-HOTEL

EHEMALIGES DOMINIKANERKLOSTER

KONSTANZ AM BODENSEE

TELEFON: TELEX:
(07631) 5214 733 276

eon -

Dr. Hans Speier
The RAND Corp.
1700 Main Street

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setting.

and Kellermann,

Santa Monica, Cal.

I hope you have been well. I'!

TELEGRAMM:
INSELHOTEL

June 30, 1966

—_——
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PRUGPAL 20.

CCN uiK AES
PRUGRAR. SO4.-AY

PREF*<

: a clear line on anything.

With kind regards,

“i Registry wo. LK

Ne ; ‘
Z . a

PRUGEAM MGP iSh

A. STEIGENBERGER HOTELGESELLSCHAFT K.G.a.A.

FRANKFURT AM MAIN: Hotel Frankfurter Hof, Hotel Monopol-Metropole,
Flughafen-Restaurants, Henninger Turm Restaurants, Frankhof K berei

DOSSELDORF: Park Hotel — oo
DUISBURG: Hotel Duisburger Hof ad Qa
MANNHEIM: Palasthotel Mannheimer Hof ne C.
STUTTGART: Hotel Graf Zeppelin — —
KONSTANZ: Insel-Hotel a

Ox.
BADEN-BADEN: Hotel Europdischer Hof, Badhotel Badischer hiof j

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BAD HOMBURG V.D.H.: Ritters Park Hotel Ct —
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BAD KISSINGEN: Kurhaus-Hotel —

BAD REICHENHALL: Grandhotel Axelmannstein, Kurhausbetriebe Pam
ROM: Hotel Quirinale, Birreria , Bavaria“

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SoceAL SCIENCE

FORE
ECO*724CS

CeMmeurer So NCES 3
COST ANAL. SES

S

I thought you might be interested in some of the interviews T have
been having in Germany. So I made carbon copies of the notes I trans-
cribed, and I am sending them to you with this letter. The notes
are rough and unedited. You must forgive the form. Some of the stuff
you will probably find tedious; but there may be a few things of interest.

6 It's not an inspiring scene. A lot of wing flapping and no flying.
. All the political people want to go somewhere but cannot decide
$ what it is. The mass does not seem to care greatly for the great goals

3 and appears content enough with what it has or expects to get, in the
* way of goods and comforts. ‘the government will probably do a lot
& more "lavieren", try a lot of things half-heartedly and avoid taking

After a few hot weeks in Paris and Bonn, I have run into cold
weather and rain. I visited the churches on the Reichenau. Two of
them are being refurbished and the third has been completed. Around
them, things have mushroomed that are either out of style, or try
awkwardly to be in style. I found the pictures in the books more
attractive than the churches themselves in their present state and

m heading for visits with Luchsinger

Sincerely, i,
/ J
Low (_

*

Horst Mendershausen

D. Ges. f.Ausw. Pol. , Bonn 6/14/66

Interim director of institute during sickness of Cornides;,expects to
continue for another 4 months. Continuing his journalistic work on half
time.- Institute went through a financial crisis; composed recently.
They now run two study groups: 1. Arms Control (ch'man Erler); and 2. (new)
Germany and the East (DDR to China)(ch'man Birrenbach). About 30 in
jatter grbup. Groups meet 4-5 times a year, with a secretary preparing
material for discussions (but not writing a book).
Institute planning a series of pamphlets, looking for authors to farm
out to.
I open discussion, proposing that Fed.Rep. foreign policy(or broader,
concept of self) has been located in a square, marked by the corners
(1) Atlantic unity (milit., econ., etc.)
(2) European union (Western Europe, econ., pol., etc.)
(3) Federal Republic sovereignty / “hee phe fii eu ox [5 fe *)
(4) Re-unification (chiefly with Sov.%one)
How has the point of gravity moved lately within the square?

Ws Away from (2); in the direction of (3) to come closer to (4).
Political union among the Six has lost attractiveness. For one thing, it's
incompatible with reunif.: 77 millions would be too big for that group,
although entry of the UK would be a possible compensation (for all those
Germans), They discussed European unification and "the German question"
in study group II and were unanimous that the 2 were incompatible.

Close connection between (1) and (4) in the CDU and SPD view. Reunif.
only possible in alliance with a strong US. it is not so much the military
security, as the "political support" America's that seems needed (where?).
One may imagine a future time when the SU wants a "settlement" in Europe.
To negotiate it advantageously requires"the entire West", France alone
cannet do this.
We Says he is reporting, not arguing his own view. Preceding argument is
basis for refusal to premature political concessions (frontiers, nuclear
abstinence). This is the dominant view today. Compared with it, the idea
of the united Western Europe has lost considerably. But this view has also
grown weaker compared with the new idea of an approach , in stages, to the
DDR. It is strong in SPD and FDP.

Also gained has the idea, that reunif. can gain from a ("pan')European
combination. De Gaulle's Moscow trip will strengthen that. SU seen in the
role of a European state. Even if the Russians "react litile'', the idea
will gain that there may be something in this. Straus, Guttenberg, and
some of the press will say that de G."does something" -~ and "why treat him
so badly?" (to Schroeder's address). But all this will fluctuate,

Str. + Gutt. aren't isolated. .French-inclined position is strong in the
—?p CDU (2/3)3 in the cabinet it has a narrow bu jority; Schroeder

Policy wephesents a sinority, but. one that includes: Ernardt.

Dees that inclination represent readiness to subordinate FedRep to France?
Ws Adenauer would say: Must follow Fr. lead; it's just a fact they are
stronger than FedRep.. Schroeder would answer: "revolting" to become a vassal

of France for reunification's sake. Strauss uses accents diff, from Adenauer's
Acceptance of France opens long-range perspective of a unified W-~Europe.

JUL 5- fggg (4nd in the short run he is for whatever

Schroeder is against.)

Postal Registry No. 4- ,/H

a,
é

Somewhat along Schroeder's line, v. Hassel refuses replacement of
Atlantic by European orientation. In connection with the nonproliferation
treaty imbroglio, v.H. does not mind an obstacle from that side

to a European nuclear force. Lack of such a force, to him, helps to hold

US in Europe. Therefore he supported Britisch proposals that
tended to exclude a European nucl. force,

De G's attack on larger-Europe and a reunif. prospect within
sounds"more modern" than Washington's approach; fascinates there~-
fore. (Reiz des Neuen; but what more?)

On corner (3) of the square: It is gaining although it is little
wanted. The idca of the ultimate acceptance of the iedRep as the
Germans’ political home is nearly absent. But the apparently unsur-
mountable obstacles to reunif. (and other fact rs?) make it practically
acceptable. "Bundesrepublikanische Eigenstaatlichkeit" gains from
such ideas as: Germany must not get too strong to alarm its neighbors;
DDR could be treated like another Austria; an appeased larger-Europe
ciuld be a suitable frame for a FedRep sovereignty (cites Jaspers
as an offshoot).

Confederation idea comes from th t today; no longer has a
basis catholic thinking as in 19th century (Franz). And on the
left, the extrerie left, the intellectuals.

Corner (4), In the official policy, there is no substantial

idea of reunif. Even the SPD leadership does not see a prospect.
“It wants to act "to increase the fecling of commonality (Zugeht-
rigkeit)" of the 2 populations, so as to prevent the complete cultu-
ral separation. The intellectuals do go further, other intra-party
,opposition, and BDP groups. SPD leadership very wary of the SED
regime, (they insisted that Br.,Erler, and Wehner travel in one

car to Chemnitz; they feared that travelling alone, W might be
kidnapped.9

Among the confedcration~happy, therm idea will not die that
there are two groups in the SED Jeadership, Moscow vassals and
"old" communists vs. "national communists" . Schirdewan, Herrn-
stadt, etc. are “assigned” that position. Today, however, one
hears no names. “Such a thing should exist". say the Benders, etc.

For the SPD leaders, especially Wehner, the "Deutschland Plan"
is dead. Bender believes in “appeasement"of the regime (to take
its fears away), large credits, breakdown (removal) of the wall.
"The entire establishment rejects that."

True, the SED leader speaks more of reunif. during the last
year. Some believe, it's defensive (against the urgings fron
the population), some, aggressive (to cause conflict in the Dedd.
Repe a positive reactioj to "Volksfront" in the SPD. But Dort-
mund congress showed that Wehner, etc. are holding such fenden-~
cies in check, opposing contacts on “lower level" (not, however,
at the frontier, where some of the contact~happy sit: Wetzlar),
at the trade-union level. Some trade-unions are receptive to
SED initatives: Metal, chemicals, paper(?); building workers
“strongly opposed. This current is not increasing. In Dortmund,

they were but a handfull. Brandt spoke against “contacts at lower level"
and was reelected chairman wi something like 324 out of 326,

We believes that the "dialo " with the SED wili soon be broken off
that there will be more "Zugeh6rigkeitsgeftihl" on both sides, but that
the fruitlessness of the contacts with regime will be apparent.

Did the initiative for the SED's acceptance of leader mevtings (proposed
by SPD in reply to the SED's usual message to the party congress) come from
Moscow? W. thinks, not necessarily. Ulbricht may have watehed Soviet
turn to "Volksfront effats for European parties, and may have hsked him-
self, what can we do about that? He may have been surprised by the SPD8s
practical proposal, may have found it difficult to reject it simply.
(Meanwhile, 6/16, the SED may have found a way to turn the thing off,
for July at least, by insisting on preparatory meetingg in Bonn, instedd
of Best Berlin. SPD reacted firmly.)

We says, the SPD leadership was very adroit. The Party Congress forgot
that the party had lost the fall elections, and never turned to recrimi-
nations. Instead of drawing the "lessons" of the lost election, the congress
developed a sense of having gained the leadership of the FedRep, of
"leading" the government. The initative was Wehner's idea. Yesterday under

fire in the party, he efmerged as the man who pulled everything together
and showed a way.

6/16/66 News.

Preparations for Chemnitz/Hanover have run into a snag over the locale
of the 5rd preparatory mecting. SED tock the occasion to stress separate-
ness of W.Berlin from Fed.Rep.; but SPD took occasion to stress unity of
SPD in Germany, inci. Berlin, “and its leader sits in German'ys capital,
which is Berlin". This could be the end for now, but not for ever. Soviet
voices are being cited that "September is also a nice month." Who will
gain from time, and what?

On the other hand, the CDU does not show itself entirely helpless.
Barzel, in New York, came out with new ideas (all-German commissions,
some Soviet troops possible in a unifying Germany, 4 power ectivity, and
(Western) three-power activity (a tri-partite working group). For the
inter-party batthe, that might not look so poor, if the SPD/SED meetings
fail; on the other hand, it might not look so good as to drive the SPD

to frenzy.

Wolfgang Wagner (cont'd)

Dinner and a very pleasant evening at his house. Excellent Baden wine.

He opens substantive conversation, saying that he would like to discuss

some ideas of his owns A dilemma: Should the FedRep. make itself "strong"
for the time when transactions about a settlement and reunific. become
possible; or should it make itself "weak"? By strong he means holding on

to claims (representation, frontiers, weapons, etc. at least in the sense

of preserving options); by weak he means appeasing "neighbors" by abandoning
claims.

Q. To what extent are the claims real assets? E.geavoidance of further
commitments to nuclear abstinence? A. For the longer run, this may present a
real possibility.

Q. Granted that FedRep. declarations abandoning claims against Poland and
CSR may make it more awkward for regimes there to maintain hostility to
FedRep, how can this improve prospects for reunific.? Probably little,

but it might help with loosening the Sov. bloc and diminishing their

support to or alignment with the DDR. |

Q.What could appease the Soviets? Would they not fear a Germany of 77
million even under an Ulbricht? what could a Fed. chancellor say to

diminish this aversion? Discussion turns to circumstances.

We wonders whether the lack of prospects for reunific. makes it sensible
for the FedRep. to continue “bearing the cost" of the claim to sole repre-
sentation of the German people. The principal difficulty with abandoning
it may be the problem that raises for the sense of identity of the
political society of the FedRep and of Berlin. On the other hand,

for the two German states to accept each other's representativeness

of "parts of the German nation" (and the 4-power statute continuing to
cover Berlin) might not exclude, even favor, pressure on the DDR. He thinks
that is worth exploring.

Discuss what the FedRep can do to increase "resistance" to DDR regime

by the Zone population. To some degree the regime may benefit from the
efforts to ostracize it.

Qe Do you expect that the parameters of the German situation will change
significantly in the next 5 years? A. No.

Q. What is the US political support that you feel the FedRep. needs?

A. Mainly the deterrent posture against SU.

Helmut Schmidt 6/16

Meet in his office in the Bundeshaus. He and his wife just returned from
Israel, much impressed.

I ask him for a comment on the 4 elements of German policy. First reaction:
they are all compatible.

Prerequisite for advance toward reunification is "the removal of fear"
of the Germans in the East. NATO contained fear of Gy. in the West,

to some degree even in the East. The main problem under the new circum-
stances is "to create security". To that effect the US/SU detente must
progress. As it does, the "degree of freedom of the little fellows"
increases.

He believes there exists an increasing community of interests US/SU,
despite Vietnam. In America, the idea to withdraw troops from Europe
spreads. The Soviets may reciprocate. The possible range of action of
FedRep and DDR increases in this "cooperative bipolarity".

What are the possibilities of FedRep. initiatives? Diplomatic rapprochement

NRCan a ee an ee RNs ete eee Coton aerehige By” gee

with Lbastern Europe; German arms control proposals; "practical
contacts with the DDR", hoping for greater travel possibilities.

Qe What prospects for Atlantic cooperation? A. Perhaps NATO will be
dissolved. What will become of the Bundeswehr? We have an interest
in the continuation of the alliance, but v.Hassel is too much of

a “satellite” (of NATO, US ?).

Returning to the Hast, he asks for "normalizatioyg" of relations with
the CSR, to diminish fear of Germans. Same with other small comm.
states, but not with Ulbricht. 9. Does that touch on es ential
German interests, notably the Moscow/Pankow powition and link?

A, There is no other way.

Regarding West-European relations: Looking beyond deG., the anti-Ameri-
can tendency in French policy will remain, but the anti-EEC component
will dminish (the fesegat idea in it??). Government and opposition
welcome the Europe of the Six as an economically useful thing.

But in Germany, especially the young generation)the disappointment

in "Europe" is growing. (No examples). European enthusiasm once
filled the national vacuum -- "not for me, I voted against the
Treaty of Rome", The young people travel all over Europe, unorga=
nized and organized; but one no longer expects a European parlia-
ment. The Monnet/Hallstein belief im the automatic growth of a
Huropean federal state on the EEC basis is "nonsense". Germany

too should treat this enterprise as something good for economic

FAN «

Franco-German reconciliation developed out of the acceptance of
Germany in the European consolidation process, R. Schumann, etc.
But the Franco-German treaty is"only a hindrance", France is no
lever for Germany, and deG's Europe from Atlantic to Urals no
help.

Qe Do you bélieve that deG. seeks some kind of equal distance

to US and SU? A. "Europe" could have such a position, but France
alone hardly. It overestimates its possibilities. DeG. really
counts on America's own interest in the integrity of \W.Europe.
This is realistic for now; but he asks, will this be true in

the 1970's? American public opinion could make a turn-about
("umschlagen") -- presumably become "neutral" toward W. Europe.
"A factor of insecurity".

Qe Is the development of the FedRep. into a more complete state
unwanted? A. He sees such a component in Schroeder, thought it a
novel thing that Barzel in NY talked openly of "provisionalism".
The CDU really focuses on "Eigenstaatlichkeit" in his view,

Vis a vis the Europe of the 6, he himself is for maintenance of
the FedReps seperate identity ("in contrast to some of my party
frténds"). Also in contrast to Adenauer, who hoped for a military
integration in Europe. That did not work. France and Holland

look at the Europe of the 6 as a guarantee against German reunific.
He prefers FedRep. provisionalism vis a vis reunification, and
"Kigenstaatlichkeit" vis a vis the West.

With the decay of NATO (meaning perhaps continuing US/SU detente
again), a more active FedRep. foreign policy becomes possible.
He cites Brzezinsky: rapprochement toward East. Europe plus

Vig eget So eras ee Ae canes aes wee ee 4

ostracism of the DDR. Encourage pressure of Zone population on regi me
through political debate. Good thing that the discussions about the
SPD/SED tournament made it legal again in the DDR to talk about the
SPD and all-German affairs. People continue to ask, why can't we
travel?

FedRep cannot see DRR as potentially another Austria. It is tooclose
politically, one nation (relatives, refugees). That's different with
Austria, he thinks. He also thinks that West German initiatives toward
Czechs, greater contacts, threaten the SED regimexmwikkxius, force it
liberalize travel ban. ND attacked fiercely a talk he gave (in Prague?)
proposéng better FedRep/Czech relations.

Alfons Dalma, Munich. Gave up Mlinchener Merkur to head Inst. f. Wehrkunde
and to be assistant publisher (active director) of Bayern Kurier, F.d.
Strauss's organ. Met first at his office, very pleasantly, and continued
conversation at dinner, with M. Rrsmsmrnxnmmx Franceschini of Le Monde
present. 6/27/66

D. had just written an editorial for the B.K.("Die Deutsche Politik
auf der Zuschauergalerie", signed SYRUS, 6/25)in which he complained
that Bonn was wallowing in useless efforts to bring movement into the
German question, while maintaining “die unbegreiflich spriéde Behandlung
Frankreichs von seiten des Auswurtigen Amtes", DeG. meanwhile had muxk
made such a fine gesture in the form of his Mumgretekotiariachesxund
"ungew¥hnlich unprotokellarisches und inhaltsreiches Telegramm ang
den Bundesprdsidenten"-— while flying over Germany on his way to Moscow--
in which he greeted "das deutsche Volk,ftir das es in einem Europa, das
seine Berufung als Faktor des Gleichgewichts und des Friedens in der Welt
wiedererlangt haben wiirde, einen festen Platz gibt. Ungracious Bonn did
not lay its fate in the hands of the man who is sleeping "als erster
franzUsischer Staatsprusident nach Napoleon in Kreml's Gemtichern" (and
thus presumably is responsible for the latter's bringing back so little
of interest to Germany from Moscow). Instead Bonn clings to the unhelp-
ful American ally, who is "diminishing its risks in Europe", answers
German faithfulness to NATO with "a more restrictive NATO policy" and
talks (Pres. Johnson to an Austrian delegation" about a "quasxz-Austrian
solution for Germany, even for Europe". The "special Franco-German rela-
tionship should be activated."-- The conversation elaborated on these
ideas.

Starting from my four elements of German policy, D. said that at first
I,ItIl, and IiI advanced quite nicely, pari passu, but that since Dulles's
departure, things turned for the worse. On the military plane, Mach.
began to "giminish the American r&sk in Europe". Johnson aimed to keep
things quiet in Europe to have a free hand in Vietnam. Thus former
basis for US/German agreement was reduced. America's nuclear cuarantee
is "no longer as clear as it used to be". (I recall Eisenhower's comment
on the unthinkability of nuclear war during Krushchev's Berlin crisis,
and sugeest that Kennedy/Macl. concern was with a more effective dterrent
posture, instead of nuclear bluster.)

D. continues that Germany is e posed now to American pressures to pay
more for troops and to "make concessions". At the same time, there is
‘increasing consciousness that close ties to America threaten the future
prosperity of Germany" through the extraction of research talent from
Europe. "Die Techniker wandern nach Detroit."

In the military security field, the European combinations
were not rewarding in the past. But then came deG. This opened
a prespect for Germany to "autonomize" deterrence. Germany shoulda
look towcrd a "new NATO system", with a Franco-German nuclear
basis; and for a kind of economic concentration in Lurope that
could make it vossible "to face America".

The key to that lies in Washington (!). The US has "fought"
intimete Bonn=-Paris relations, and its Bonn skaki satellites
have obediently op posed their development (not for German
reasons, in his beck). As a poor reward, Washington presses
Bonn to pay for undesired military hardware.

DeGaulle, he pretends, once wanted a European"nuclear community";
but rebuffed by Bonn he "withdrew" to a national force de frappe
(af ection unrequited).

In sum, Bonn's position vis a vis Wash. and Paris has deteriorated;
it suffers helplessly fpom the NATO cristés (which is a crisis over
the (nuclear) construction of NATO, not over deG's secession), and
it maintains a mere facade of friendship toe France. Of course,

a weak chancellor, who always finds everything cok.

French troops staying on in Germany offers "the last link for
combined military planning in peacetime". He says that the French
see in their troops there a "hinge" for A combined defense
planning. Doesn't elaborate of what that "planning" might mean,
and the "combination",

Q. What is possible between the FedRep. and France? A.We must
overcome the French disappointment in Germany's NATO policy,
and look for combined Franco-German R&D and defense production
projects. German industrial firms look for partners in projects
in electronics, aviation and space activities. America does not
need the German talent; but the Europeans do.

Q. Do you want to exchange the junior partnership with the US for
a junior partnership with France? Europeans have sought, and American
policy has stimulated the development of European combinations
on a non—=hegemonial basis. Isn't the trouble that France rejects
these? A. The talk about French hegemonial striving is demagogy.

I also was for NATO and a Monnet Europe up to the 1960's. But

the Atlantic comounity ("die nicht wegzudenken ist") needs a new
structure, and Europe needs a new structure, both structures adequate

to France's newly found power. Why does not American opinion draw conse-
quences from the fact that the Monnet approach did not create a political-
military superstructure (and presumably that that structure has to evolve
under de G's rule). DeG. "ean spoil all but create little" by himself.
(Germany's role, it appears, is to help him create...)

The US needs a new European concept and should make up for time
lost. "It should give the Europeans a nuclear strike force." And thus
for their political union. US should "dismiss Britain into Europe"
and Bonn into a Franco=German combination. They both hold back because
US won't let them move!

©. And would British and German readiness for a nuclear~political
European union on an equal-rights basis induce the French to accppt
it? He seems to think it might, or should. DeG's political/nuclear
nationalism is only France's second best choice, in his picture.

~-~ At dinner, the discussion continues in the ppesence of Franceschini,
who heads the German-Austrian-Swiss~Italian-Benelux desk on the
editorial staff of Le Monde, under A. Fontaine. F. wants to hear from

Dalima about German gaullism. He was brought in by a Munich representative
of Internaciones. De said he welcomed giving the conversation an Atlantic
scope by having a representative of RAND present. I asked him whether
he would mind if I debated with him some of the points he made, and
he said, on the contrary. I held back on a number of occasions so as not
to cisturb the interview. Interview and debate proceeded smoothly
enough, anc I think the three of us enjoyed it. Where thinks got a little
rough for D. he handled himself with charm and good humor. (My questions
continue to be marked:Q.)

D. began by explaining to F.that German gaullism was the modern form
of German Luropean-unionism; it was not nationalistic, in contrast
te present-day German Atlanticists who were true German nationalists.
Geographic proximity (and other things?) give him confidence that there
exists "a real identity of interests" between the FedRep and France,
and that the "consultative system" between the two can be made to work,
Only Bonn is not ready to play ball. "If deG. had taken with him to
Mescew & letter from the federal chancellor endorsing the French position,
what might he have gotten from the Soviets!" Q. What? A. More notice of
German wishes. (I refrained from asking what that letter should have
containec besides the things that Erhard did put in a "hand-written"
letter to the great Charles, before his takeoff.)

Qe Could you imagine that if Strauss represented the FedRep. in
Franco-German consultations, the differences with ceG. would be sharper?
A.(with a smile): Yes, I could; but being more clearly defined, the
differences could be conposed more easily. (Presumably because of the
necessary identity of interests!)

Qe Would composing of differences not mean following the French lead?
A. why not! France has the greater freedom of movement and the greater leader
(greater than Strauss?). And interests are substantially identical.

Turning to US. D. develops his idea of the gradual curtailment of
the American risk (meaning readiness to hinor gurantee by limiting the
guarantee, or something). Q.Are Europeans willing to take any of the risks
that you believe the United States is no longer willing to take, or
has become unwilling to take in the Kennedy-Johnson years? A. This is
a terribly leading questiong. (To Fs) Those people at the RAND Corp.
have thought all these things through. He relates how he visited RAND together
with Strauss some years ago and how he had to leave the room when techni-
cal-military matters came up for discussion, Strauss staying alone.

Qe Wasn't the transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy marked by the
recognition that engagements previously taken or implied by the US and
the Europeans required the development of both the nuclear deterrent and
conventional forces; that without such development, the engagements were
unrealistic and might, at the moment of truth, be found te be "unthinkable"?
Ae D. focuses on MREM's in Europe: and declaratory policy. In his outlook,
the curtailment of American risk (protection)began not with the development
of a military establishment incapable of dealing with crises, but with
MacNamara's Ann Arbor speech "at the end of the Berlin crisis, in the
summer of 1962". (For him the B. crisis did not end in the Cuba confrontation.)

Qe Would you expect the French force de frappe to strike the SU in a
Situation about Berlin in which SAC would not strike? A. bypasses the questio n
with a compliment to RAND's crisis studies; but he concedes that defense
planning against the Soviets,and deterrence thinking, should relate to
concrete conflict points, notably Berlin.(That is interesting.)

Fr. then asks, doesn't the FedRep. require national nuclear weapons
to be really sure of nuclear protection of its interests? A. It might, but
it's hard to conceive of a German government that would take the political

tp

risk of acquiring them, (He does not refer back at this point to the
4dentity of G. and French interests that would make the going alone
unnecessary for G.)

Fr, asks, is the German drive for reunification substantial now?
A. It's a "Rummel" now, but it will become substantial because of disappoint-
ments with the West. To become substantial it would take on the form
of “accepting communism", (i.e. it is presumed to come from the left?)
Prosperity would have to falter,too, or the prosperity of the DDR
come to equal that of the RedRep.(?)

Fr. says he interviewed Schroeder in Bonn and found him courteous,
not hostile to France. D. replies, S. has been chastized in the
CDU/CSU, and also taken aback by the experience in Brussels,
where he found Rusk and Couve agree behind his back, and himself
holding the lance for America, alone.

Fr. to D.: You talk as if the defense/nuclear issue were cantral
in your thinking about German foreign policy. D. remarks that that
just happened to be the aspeet our talk got into.

Some speculasion about what a development of WEU into a military
mechanism might do to US attitudes, whether US might think"the Euro-
peans no longer need us." I observe that US entry into NAT was
strongly linked to the sense that Brussels pact provided for no
effective defense, and that a sense of alliance developed only
after the dispatch of Gen'l. Eisenhower to become the first SACKUR,
and of the 4 divisions in 1951. That raises the question of whether
the process might work in reverse 45 NATO is stripped, WEU revived,
US troops diminished.

At the end, Fr. talked about the “handicraft" methods of
Le Monde (editorial staff of 20, cooption, cameraderie uncer the
strong hand of Beuve-Mery). He says, at Le Monde we speak about
"Le Monde and the press". A general consensus about interpretative
reporting. Fontaine still counts as "Atlanticist".
D. asked me to write something for Wehrkunds. (I thought after-
wards about: Is the Atlantic Pact an Alliance?)

Tnstitut Wissenschaft & Politik, Ebenhausen nr. Munich, 6/27

Had simple lunch and spent afternoon with Ritter, Nerlich, Roth,
Schwarz, and a fifth man (name ). Pleasant reception.
Institute works for for. and def. ministries anc chancellor's
office. Board of directors also includes university people an¢c
representatives of the three parties. The staff occupying the
former hunting lodge (then clinic) numbers 13 regulars now, plus
37 librarians, assistants, drivers, secretaries. It includes an
atomic scientist, but all the others seem to be on the "social
science" side.
At lunch, many questions about RAND. Does RAND still focus on
offensive weapons (Nerlich), leaving work on defensive weapons to
SRI? Who is taking the place of the people who are leaving? How
will change in presidency affect orientation? R. sugsests it would
be desirable to develop some kind of collaboration, perhaps via
inquiries by letter, besides visits.

W.&P. is the only political studies group with access to German
classified material. R. describes relations to his 5 masters as
not free from problems, but satisfactory so far. institute was

just being visited by accountants from some governmental office. R. was called
out 3 times for lengthy confabs with them, which interrupted his partici-~
pation in the discussions.

I start with some observations on the link between NATO and the German
question and lead over to problem of German for. policy orientation in
the present setting. I observe that I found a considerable flux of ideas
but also continuing stability in the political system of the FedRep,
and suggest that prosperity may stand in the way of development of
clearer and sharper policies . R. stresses the external constraints as the
main factor preventing policy crystallization.

We talk about the ef ects of Atlantic,European and reunific. frustrations.
I ask whether they tend to mmaphastrze lend greater weight to the teyks
tendencies to complete the development of the FedRep into a distinct,
sovereign state. This creates some stir: What do I mean? Do I favor such
a tendency? Who does? and some comment about the impossibility of the
FedRep. as a "Nationalstaat". Group accepts, hoever, that there has been
a good deal of such development, sometimes faute de mieux, and that there
may be more, unheralded and just happening. But they stress that there
would be no contentment with this kind of evolution, if it remained the
main direction or the only one in which things are happening.

Re emphasizes that frustration of Western and reunific. ambitions
will produce chaos, some kind of a dark turbulence. He does not describe
this further. (ihat it means to me is first of all a deep split between
the consciousness of Germany's place in the world and xksxrezk the real
place of the FedRep. K's chaos is a term for a deepened split. The politi-
cal minds in the FedRep feel compelled to search for a national and
recional mission.)

Re poses 2 questions: (1) Will US/SU detente develop further?

(2) Will progressive detente permit ‘a looser alliance" ( he says "loseres
Blindnis" and corrects me when I refer to it as “aufgelockertes Btindnis",
Wonder why?), and a "favorable dynamism" in Europe? If the answer to the
last part of que 2 is negative, that "would be bad news for us",

QO. Isn't there about as much US/SU detente now as can be expected?

R. answers, it can develop; and the special problem is whether it will
develop "over the heads of the Germans", meaning presumably that their
situation remains static. (Note that some think that detente cannot help
but put some flux into German situation: various SPB currents).

Q. What would be a "favorable dynamism"? Re-unification by 4-power fiat?
R. answers surprisingly modestly: freer traffic over frontiers.

Q. Wovld you expect favorable political changes in the DDR? R. rejects
"Wandel durch Annudherung". Soviet policy is fixed he says; it will admit
rap rochement only for the better pursuit of political ageression.No auto-}
nomous change in DDR possible, Apels and Havemanns notwithstanding.

The regime can only change when Soviet policy on Germany changes!

Q@,. What is the meaning of a'loosened alliance"? R. rejects idea of more
individual defense responsibility, German general staff, focuses instead
on somewhat reduced reliance on US. Nerlich and Schwarz tevekap sugcest the
development of an aiternative defense system out of WEU, and think of it
as (a) a European compact with (b) a"lower nuclear threshold" (in words, deeds,
what kind of deeds?)

R, talks of "restructuring the loosened alliance", I cause confusion by
sugsesting that what he may want to restructure is something broader than
Walliance™ and propose that that might be cailed "Germany's special
relationship with the West" (which has been put in question by the US
French disagreements, etc.) R. reacts to my surprise by stating emphati-
cally that FedRep. coulc not possibly adopt a Rapallio policy. “out of the
question! !

\ CSREES St a cae ate ge treet Bae Pipher Ane

Une asks what is the US concept for the future of the alliance?
I say that is difficult to answer beyond the point that the United
States wishes to be a party to a European security and German settle-
ment, dees not want to exclude itself or be excluded from it,
They ask, does not US have specific Ruxuyean objectives in HUuLrope «
I say one can discern the objective of preventing a Soviet-ruled
Europe and knakxm< a feuding Europe, that beyond that,little is
clear, notably in the direction of an antagonistic coalition of
Buropean states.

Nerlich: Would US agree to a lowering of the nuclear threshold?
I reply I see no return to a"massive retaliation doctrine",

Nz; To put it better, less constraints on the application of
fefensive nukes? I answer, this still is an open chapter for NATO.

Nt flow would US react if de G's concept of defense gained
adherents in lurope? In reply I ask what the framework of gaullist
defense arrangements in Europe might be.

N, and Schwarz sugsest, WEU. I say that for WEU to go back on
its delegation of military tasks to NATO and to assume a role of
its own might have a more explosive effect on the US relationship
to Buropean defense than deG's secession. It might lead to a sub-
stantial military disinvestment in Europe by the US. I refer to the
historical link, in the US mind, between being allied with BRurope
and the US role in the formation and cowwand of integrated forces.

After Nerlich refers to the gaullist idea of the danger of
Européan countries being drawn into a conflict that the US entered
on its own, I sugrest that the At. Al?Tdanee has shown a great deal
of immunity to contagion of this kind where one of the allies
got involved in a conflict outside Europe. They agreed,

@. Is a conflict imaginable in which W. Europe would refuse
being drawn into a US/SU quarrel. A. That seems extravagant indeed,

(Thinking of the group appears to be going in the general
direction of Strauss's ideas: a European defense community on
the basis of “equal rights" for Germany. They appear to hope that
the US will back up such a thing.)

Crecl, Consul Gen'l. Munich

About Strauss: He aims to achieve equality for the Fedkep with France
and Britain in a European defense setup. In a conversation with C.

he "conceded" it was ax utopian idea. (but that's a utopia he contithues
to favor).

Se's last visit to US was an unhappy one. The German press people
in Wash. gave him a hard time; and while he had a pleasant talk with
Rusk, he could not get to the President,

On bilateral US/German relations: they are excellent. Johnson is

‘more pro-German than Kennedy was"; and the mayors in American garrison
towns are pleased with the US troops, only wished commanders did not
change so often (old complains). Bamberg mayor just told him, relations
with the troops are “excellent”, Germans like stable forces, with depen-
dents; they would net like rotating bachelor forces as well,

Cis own view: "There must be a settlement... The harsh line dividing
Europe must be dissolved... Perhaps the automobiles that FIAT and Renault
will build for the Séviets will ‘make the shrimps whistle'... Soviet
embourgeoisement may bring Soviet imperialism to an end.*

Comuents on some econ. development in Bavaria, work on the remaining

—lie ana Nurnberg-Regensburg) and w oi ipe-
SPRod KGS frinete. Goncs and kets te png Ooma ee a

Dr. Eberhard Schulz, Geselisch. f.Ausw. Politik , Secretary of Study Group
TT, concerned with Germany and the East. ("Somewhat more on the left,
Wagner says.) Doing some work of his own on the foreign policy of Gomulka,

and Preblems of German Ostpolitik.

S. opens conversation by asking whether FedRep. can continue its
traditional policy vs. the last. The "Rechtsposition" has become less
favorable, he says, meaning apparently that Germany has betome more
effectively divided (since t617), and DDR more of a viable state.

But is re-establishment of a German national state a worthwhile goal,
he wonders. Such a state has existed for less than 100 fears. All neigh-
bors take offense. Their opposition so strong that reevunif. is doubtful,
for indefinite future. Perhaps in a more cohesive (les divided) larger

Europe? Could EEC be a nuclefus? (But for that, the reunified Germany
would be too big (see Wagner). Perhaps with EFTA countries and Eastern
Europe "in" a combination of sorts? That, it seems to me, locks to
him like the least hostile environment -- but how to get it?

The German national state, he says, has continued to shrink: Bismarck
Reich to Weimar Republic to FeddRep + Zone. The frontiers of 1957, so
much opoesed after Versailles, now appear as the "ideal",

Do the Germans really need a single state. One can live with a separate
Austria. Its is acceptable, because the Austrians"live in freedom", Same
with Luxemburc. Although they belong together from a “vBlkish" point of view.
Why not live with a "free DDR", in free communication?

ISN't the national state passe, anyways It cannot defend itself.
Some “Gemeinschaft"™ of nations could be an alternative.

Thefefore, looking toward the DDR, the FedRep's sufficient goal
might be to do what it takes to "ease the life of the people there."
I suggest, it would be important to study what that means, and what
relation can be assumed to exist between anything the FedRep can do and
such "Erleichterungen". Have you considered the oposite course:
sparation in two complete states, no responsibility for the others?

Even a counter-wall?
He replies, the latter would be in contlict with Grundgesetz, would

even recuire a dictatorship in the West.

I sugsest that the goal of Neasing the lives of others" is somewhat
ethereal unless it is attached to the goal of reunification, construction
of a political unity, or some other more vital foreign policy goal
(meeting an adversary); and that it raises the ppoblem of making life
more "“@ifficult"for onself, especially politically, in dealing with
a comiunist neighbor. - S. refers fo the West Germans bad conscience
vis a vis their cousins in the Zone (for what?) and acknowledges the
continued vitality of a "Nationalgedanke" encompassing FRG and DDR.

(Conversation continued on 6/16) |

S. speak of strengthened DDR-conscioucness. People there have resigned

themselves. Youth lives in that framework.
I ask, whether failure of astern integration of DR does not represent —

a parallel to FedRep's disappoin$ment in Western integration.

Yes, he thinks there is also a shock there’ but economic inte-
gration has advanced and made the DDR. so important to the Soviets,
and Eastern Europeans, that people feel reassured by that ("aufgewer-
tet"). This counterbalances some sense of being exploited, the more
easily since living conditions in the DDR have improved greatly.
(Note, that happened without "“Srleichterungen" provided by the FRG!)

Reunific. in a national state is unlikely, he says, but a confedera~
tion is more likely. I ask about the consequences for the political
structure in the West. He says some things are "not negotiable" for
the Fed.Rep: the system of political freedom, the refusal to become
a comiunist state, the refusal to join an Eastern power bloc.

I questiox whether movements in such directions might not be the
undesired byproducts of an unprincipled dash for contacts, recognition
and "confederation". S,. answers that he believes Ulbricht to be dis-
appointed over the prospects for a German couwmeunicm, (in the short
run:) over Dortmund, ie. the solidity of the SPD; over the susceptibi-
lity of his own pfopulation to SPD arguments and anti-regime implica-
tions in the contact business. Thus, if one wants to hope for
“irgendwelche Fortschritte”™ in the German question, why not try to
draw him closer? : |

"Phere is no communist danger in W-Germany™ S. believes Ulbricht
may be a victim of his own propaganda. Confederation, he thinks
would not enable the communists of the DDR to gain much influence
in the internal affairs ef the FedRep; because, in his view,
confederation will be Too loose for that, too peripheral.

Anyway, the SED in his view"no longer is a cadre party". It is

"also pluralistic, similar to CDU and SPD"(!}. The FedRep will not
depart from its pluralism. The challenge of the SED is diminished by
its unpopularity. It is "hated", not able to stand up to coalition
with dmamocratic parties(under free conditions?).

S. thinks that "Geistesfreiheit" in the DDR has increased,
Que Is it comparable to that in Poland? He concedes, no.
As he taiks on, S.appears increasingly more optimistic that in
a confederation exercise, comiunism would be the loser.

|S

Stefan Thomas, Ostbtiro der SPD 6/15/66

I ask about his evaluation of conditions in the Zone,

SED leadership has become more self-confident. One is proud of economic
advances. The economic system is "improved", While continuing loyal to the
Soviet leadership, the SED shows more stamina in dealing with them. One
is no longer a "satellite",

Nonetheless the unfavorable trade treaty was swallowed, and maximal
economic integration in the Soviet economic process is accepted. Prices
are unfavorable; and arrears have to be made good in Seviet trade,

The Soviets have adopted a "VYolksfront" approach to W. Europe; and the
SED sees a requirement ("Soli") for itself in that framework. The SPD/SED
"dialogue" is the way.

fn the FedRep., a national grounswell is visible. "National conscious~
ness" is developing (all-German, or West-German?). One fecls all-German, not
FedRep.national. One thinks widely of a "failure of the Federal gov't",

a lack of initiative by Erhard in all-German questions. In a student
meeting he attended, a CDU student explaining why it was hard for FidRep.
to set all-German affairs in motion, found no response. The SPD's
Dortmund outlook, on the other hand, finds much resonance. "Twenty
years of stagnation!"

Que What does Ulbricht seek from the “dialogue”, etc.?
He will push into the FEdREp. (hineinstossen") His euphria about state
of the DDR supports that. Ue believes himself tactically superior to
the people that face him, the uncoordinated Western body politic.
i. thinks the Dortmund party congress"pleased the Russians" (see Bahr,
below).

Que What does SPD seek? A."humanization". He believes in SED "Vorleistungen"
after the consummation of Chemnitz/Hannover, more frontier crossing points,
etc. "A @Gramatic chapter of the German development is opening."

There are alse SED apprehensions abcut "what may happen when Brandt etc.
come to Chemnitz". Own population so responsive.

Que Was not Apel's suicide a blow to the "new technocrats" that are
supposed to form the coming elite of the DDR? Yes, he thinks, they
were upset by his suicide.

I point to the diverse expectations re advantage from the SED/SPD
dialogue; and ask for an evaluation of the risks to the SPB. In reply
he talks of the hopes of the SPD: first imrpovements in the frontier
(wall) traffic. What second? The next main advance, he asserts, depends
on the formation of a "national government", i.e. SPD/CDU. Only that
can coordinate the complicated process. That was the meaning of Reandt's
proposal for a "German Council" (which was rejected by the CDU).
Further: SPD will demand free communications, newspapers, free travel
(the latter holds apveal on the other side.)

Que How does Ulbricht look at confederation?
That must be derived from " the lessons of October" (1917). They teach that
the self-confident, tightly organized minority gains power through "double
government", One governmental center overpowers the cther,. For German
purposes, the 2 centers are Bonn and East Berlin. Th. says, here lies
the risks but "there is no other way to reunific." To cope with risk,
a concentration of political power in the FedRep. is needed, the national
government, and the reduction of the party play over the issues.

Que Vould this not presuppose that the FedRep. parties find it possible,

Ee SESS e oe taoniet 2 Shee N AB a oR NCA SP ne Renee Cos

or necessary to focus all politics on reunification? National governments

are ordinarily in formed in wartime,
Yes, if would have to become the "all-overshadowing question",
This causes great uneasiness in the CDU. T. feels the CDU cannot
Suppress or stand aside from the process (of focusing). (Dees it
exist now, I wonder, despite all the noise?)
Que And if all goes well, what then?
Frontiers (FRG+DDRY will be accepted, nuclear weapons forsworn,
confederation made.

fh. seemed quite in the grip of his images, although things weren't
going smoothly with the prepartions for Chemnitz, and Barzel in NY
nad just launched his own offensive on the German question, single-
handedly and disconcertingly to some leaders, but not stupidly.

Thomas will now finally relinquish the leadership ef the Ostbtiro.

He is slated to become the rector of the Friedrich-ibert Stiftung
on July 1. His presumptive heir (FAZ,6/13) is his former assistant
Helmut Bdrwald.

He talked about stopping the OB's monthly reports on SU, Poland,
DDR. I said, if he stopped the latter, I would not believe that
he believed in the perspectives that he had drawn. If he Re did
how could one diminish the observation of internal DDR developments
at such a time?

Egon Bahr, Berlin 6/15/66

Conversation begins in low key. He knew of my interest in the link
between the Atlantic Alliance and the German question and began
by reviewing some of the"history as he remembered it." He was for
the FedRep's entry into NATC, but feared then integration westward
would be "excessive" and "irreversible" and thus come into conflict
with "the national interest in reunif,"

These fears secm to have ahated, and N. looks to him like possibly
a good thing to have around. It does not hold the Soviet danger
in check, US nuclear arms do, This is the basis for deG.'s wrecking
operation. NATO, which was to encompass something political, cultural,
as well as economic, now becomes "purely military", a mere "instrument
of utility" (whatever that may mean).

What is the situation now?

(1) Mil. integration is in question.

(2) "Cooperation"in Atlantic freme continues, but it is a
contradictory, constrained relationship, like the ESC.

(3) National consciousness increases -- a reaction on illusi-
ons about losing the national unit in the broader thing. Dec, only
helps that along. German national goal, reunific. moved into
the center of scene.

Now things got more interesting: The future of German democracy
depends, he says, on whether it can realize the national goal.
If it cannot, the danger will come from the Right. I ask whether
opportunities for radical Right are not far more restricted in
FedRep. than in Weimar, internally and externally. He Says, it would
probably take mass unemployment, but also, that FedRep. gov't is
so weak, it could provide openings. I observe that pol, structure
of Fed.Rep appears much stronger than that of Weimar, loyal opposition.

I ask whether integration and reunif. disappoihtments do not Signify
that actual developments realize chiefly a more complete FedRep statehood,
and will continue to do so. He reflects, and says,yes, that seems the
likely thing; but it's "dangerous" because the disappointments can
generake a strong NDP. To articulate idea would bring a shock,

Somewhat less likely, he thinks, ke is that FedRep and DDR move
toward cach other, develop contacts, "normal relations",

Que Does that not also signify accomodation to FedRep individuality.
His hopes obviously are that it will do the opposite, emphasize the
urge for unification.

“Amazing how much much things have changed in the last 4 months!‘
The possibility of the SPD/SED meetings has "electrified" the people;
but “who knows whether it will come off?" Taboos have been swept away;
nobody considers it impossible anymore to talk with those in power
in DDR. If the meetings came off, “something extraordinary would happen:
SED leaders and SPD leaders would speak from the same reostrun,"

"Unity sentiment would be realvanized,."

I wonder whether the getting together would not stres: the separa~
teness and difference, unless the SPD simply capitulated.

He says Spinelli and Guttenberg had an interesting exchange on
Europe and the German Question, S. asking what the Germans realiy
wanted, and G. coming out fer reunific. (7) (Europa und die deutsche
Frage, Bericht, 3=5 Nov. 1965, publ. by Europa Haus Berlin, mimeo.)

Who stopped the preparations for the meetings? The Russians; they
"feared upsetting the status quo." Ulbricht was not the stopper. He
"wanted to get out of the trenches." There was a great debate in
the S5D; fears expressed by party bosses (Magdeburg) that meetings
would revive "Sozialdemokratismus" in the Zone. That led to delays,
aud preparation through agitation. But at Dortmung, an observer sent
by Stoph, told him:"It will work. Well meet again in Karl Marx Stadt."

After Dortmund, Brandt met with Abrasimov, and found him cool on
the meetings. Qu. Just for now? A: At least for now.

(The picture drawn by diff. people of SU/DUR interactions on the
deal is contradictory; but the stories may not be mutually exclusive
insofar as there may have been change in time. Some say that Soviet

"pressure"brought U. around (D. Rousset, Figaro), sone that general
Soviet views were interpreted by U. as favorable to an initiative
that he was ready to make » Some that U. wanted tc meet, but

Soviets were cool (Grosser, Bahr). The true story would probably
run in terms of moves in time.)

B. thinks that in % year, U. could be greatly embarrassed by
an SPD move under the slogan "Deutsche an einen Tisch!" Could create
"great confusion" in DDR.
Que Don't you @nvisage that sooner or later, the FedRep and the
DOR would pull on one side of the rope, with S¥ and Western powers
on the other? What a reversal that implies! As Yes! But US and SU
must get together fer-thet to guarantee the peacefulness of the

Bahr, cont'd. 6/21

We met a second time. I wanted to get his expectations for
the “Redneraustausch", his ideas about the expectations of the
communists, and general views. Meanwhile (6/30) the SED has called
off the meetings in Hannover and Chemnitz. See below.

TO B., the hoped for meetings are"great events in themselves".
All of Germany will be listening to the same radio program, "the
first all-German experience". For the first time, a western docum ent
was reprinted entirely in the Neues Deutschland. In Chemnitz,
Ulbricht will speak, then Stoph and Norden or Ebert; but U. and
Se won't come to Hannover. 20-minute talks.

The confrontation will show "divergences in large questions,"
But the decisive point: Is there something one can do together?

If so, one will continue talking. Otherwise, “it will remain
homeric."

Communism will become a matter for discussion in West-Germany.
For that one will need legal communists in West Germany. Illusions
will be challenged: the FedRep's claim to sole representation,
the frontiers of 1937, even the 4-power responsibility for
Germany's reunification. The West-Germans will be disillusioned
about the perishability ofthe DDR. "They laugh in Karl-Marx Stadt
when someone calls their town Chemnitz."Add one will have to talk
more tuthfully about West Germany in the DDR.!!

QO. Will SPD orators demand the dismantling of the wall?

A. Now-- Will they demand the legalization of the SPD in the DDR?
Ae No. But"perhaps one of us will say, we have returned!"

Qe Do you expect to influence the political development in the
DDR in some fashion? A. The consolidation of the DDR has advanced,
It will continue with or without the tournament. There may be

Slow changes. Meanwhile we must “preserve the national substance,"
keep Ulbricht from isolating the population from Western ideas

(as if he could do that now!) Only 10 to 15 years remain for

the consummation of reunification.

@. What do you think the SED leaders expect from the tournament?
A. He “was compelled to do it." The SED becomes an "accepted partner
for conversations." They may also hope to separate the SPD from t he
CDU (at last a realistic thought), but he adds that's meaningless
for "the SPD is immune to communism",

Q. Does Ulbricht expect to achieve a sort of remote control of
Federal Republic politics. A. That's exaggerated.

(Bahr failed entirely in appreciating Ulbricht's objectives
that became apparent in the further conduct of the preliminaries
and the final rejection of the July meetings, i.e. to turn the
SPD into his agent in the Federal Republic, to diminish the
autonomy of the latter while increasing that of the DDR. If the
SPD does not function well in this role, he can hope, in the
present state of FedRep politics, to get some of the political
benefits anyway without risking the tournament.)

Be. seemed uncomfortable in developing his fantastic scenario.
He remarked to Harold H. later in the day that the conversation
had been “hard going". At the end, he launched into a profession

pee agree Gli ei Se Am a er ae ts ote Uh ee ee gars ape

of his belief that the technocrats are going to ryle the world.

It began with a story about the manager of the new DDR oil refinery at
Schwedt, brought back by some Western journalist who visited hin,

The manager talked about the uneconomic policies of the DDR government
and described how he brought the bureaucrats to reason by letting things
come to an impasse. When confronted with the prospect of the plant closing
down, the government would give in. The man said, “die Zahl entscheidet."
The journalist observed,"that's a funny way of talking about your
government." Said the manager, "they'1l1 learn; our way of thinking

grows like the rings around a tree. Some day, we'll be in power,

and then we'll understand each other and do business"(with the West).

So Bb. seems to think the DDR will "transform" itself; and the FedRep
Should assist the transformation by what amounts to economic development
assistance and political self-effacement.

He asks whether Mr. MacNamara will some day run for President.

Klaus Ellrodt 6/21

A young journalist who writes for Zeit, Spiegel. SPD-Pressedienst.
Often in Last Berlin and travelling in the Zone. Smooth, easy talking.
Marxist. I ask him to describe the famous"economic pragmatists" in the
GONE «

They want to disentangle their tasks from politics; make their
way up in the socialist state. They criticize its practices, especially
the tendency to administer everything.

There are up to 96 directors general of VVB. Most of them former
workers, with service in the SED. Were delegated to studies. Now 35 to
45 years old.

The second-line managers, about same age range, rose by professional
competence alone. Less dependent on party, have to be "persuaded" all the:
time.

Both types believe in a kind of "“weltoffenen Kommunismus". The
top men have contacts in the West, envy their Western counterparts but
also have privileges exceeding theirs. German reunification"means nothing
to these people"; but some kind of "confederation that would open the
doors to the West" would be good. One of their complaints is the transfer
of enterprise profits to the state, their investment in armaments and
wastage on uneconomic things.

These people liked the talkfest idea, expected from them better
contacts with the West, access to supplies. (He believes that SED advised
West German industrial&s&ts to back the SPD efforts.) Also think that
the affair will distract the party bosses so that they will leave the
managers alone for a whihe.

Managers would like to get easier access to Western publications.
Even ministers get western newspapers only to look at in offices, have to
lock them up in safes overnight. ADN has two services of excerpts,
the "red service", accessible to those who do "Westarbeit", and the
ampler "green service" for people selected by Politbureau, agitators.

Absence of runific. prospetts is accepted, because "the great powers
oppose it". But contacts are tought. E. blames the Allied Travel Board
for obstructing travel, as does the SED. The economic officials travel,
but the scientists have a hard time getting out. The French often

break the travel board rules when they want to talk to somebodg.
Sweden issues all-Scandinavian visas to DDR citizens getting over,
thus making entry into Norway and Denmark possible without Travel
Board approval. Party sends those it wants to go this way; others
it sends to the Travel Borrd to get refusals.

Q. What do the managers think of the “socialist camp"?
A. There, they are petty-bourgois nationalists! They approve of the
Rumanian stubbornness in shaping their own industrialization.
Loeschau, the former Leuna boss who lost his ministers job over
the matter of pay, visited Rumania and came back to East Berlin,
saying: The Rumanians get a modern chemical industry. But we get
forced into uneconomic branches by the SU.-- Opposition in these circles
to the continued reliance on lignite for power base. They would
like to expand electric railroading on an oil base; but Russians
veto that. Fear COMECON won't function, excessive dependdnce on Soviets.
The"new economic system" is inconsistent. Managers' freedom is
expanded, then curtailed again. They have to explain and justify
their decisions increasingly.

Q. Do the pragmatists have an exponent in the leadership?
A. They're like-minded peophe but unorganized. "Some suppose” that
Stoph is on their side. He joined the party only at age of 45,
"does not talk party chinese"; but one does not know. "Many
currants and motives.

Q. Who are the others? A. The "dogmatists" or "conservatives",
The people who pemsp believe the party is always right. Mentions
Honecker, Verner, Mattern, Ebert, Frtlich. Are concerned about the
rise of the technocrats, believe that they will make it harder for
the party to gevern. Find it tedious to have debates with economic
bosses trained in Marxism.

These people do not believe in a German communism; know that their
power depends on Soviet support. Some reduction in Sov. troops might be
ok, but fear that the withdrawal might go too far.

Q. How clear is the divide between "pragmatists" and"dogmatists"?
A. He concedes that he and others are oversimplifying, "to be better
understdfood by the readers". The wall and the order to shoct fugitives
is accepted by people of both groups. Same with the rejection of
private property in means of production.

Ee. may turn up in California in the fall. Expects to travel through
US with his wife.

if

Jim O'Donnell, Newsweek 6/19/66

Inept Am, establishment in Bln. Lack of contact.
Clay's distrust of Willy; capable of selling out.Thinks 7th Army will go soon,
Willy's three hats confused Washincton; LBY ordered only yo talk to Bonn
about German affairs.

The political prisoner blackmail netted the Zone about $ 100 million,
at the average rate of DM. 40,000 per head, and about 8,000 gotten out
since 1962.

wheelings and dealings between W-G. big industry and the Soviets
ang the Zone. Leopold travelling around to induce industrialists in
plants in the Zone (labor available), and thus to "“imrpove the lot
of felliow-Germans", Soviet officials provicing lists of desirable
objects for such investments. German industrialists providing 6
sports cars to Karlshorst officials, who are mighty pleased with
them. Some entertaiament operations run by the Havel for the Soviet
fellows. &. Bahr looking in on the fun and carrying out conversations.

Also, Swedish consul arranging for mectings between Brandt and
Abrasimov.

French pay attention to Berlin officials, tell the Germans what
the Russiang@ want them to do. Through this channel came the news of
a Soviet plan to move 5 divisions out of the Zone. The Germans told
British and US. O'D thinks deGaulle may bring back from Moscow
Russian proposal to pull troops back, perhaps in link with French
pull-back,.

Ke Sehtitz, Senator for Bundesangelegenheiten, 6/18/66

asks whether there is now "less excitement in Bonn" after the fizzling
of the troop negotiations with the French. schreeder, he thinks, tried
to negotiate with the French “like a great power" and wanted "to bring
them down to their knecs." Others were "more reasonable",

Comuents on changes in West Germany. Adenauer"took over deG's idea
that SU is a peace-loving state". This evaluation is now "“salonfuhig".
Se himself is skeptical. But if it is true that there no longer is
a Soviet threat, that must of course effect fundamentaliy defense
policy and also Berlin policy.

Everybody is searching for something new; and no one has a clear
conception. (So true!). If the Soviet threat is gonefs, one could do
"much more daring things"znxBertex#, Ou. What daring things?

A: Recuce military planning; put Berlin into the East-West traffic.

some study in the Senate staff seems to concern itself with¢d
the prospects of Berlin as a"great free port", an idea that Brandt
ventilated 6 months ago. They se m to be studying how that might be
recoyciled with the occupation statute, and what it wight mean economically.
(What would be the DDR interest in this, I wonder? Or would it be a thing
the DDR should permit in exchange for some fat subsidy from the FedRep.?)

Some time ago, Senate was hoping for the establishment of an Austrian

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airline intoTempelhof. The Allies vetoed that, would not want to
touch the air traffic arrangements (perhaps for more than one
reason, not to raise a problem with the Soviets and not to touch
the lucrative monopoly of the three airlines). But if Soviets
less threatening, should one not push again for such things?

Thus one speculates more freely; "a new climate". The Berlin-
FedRep. relationship does not get simpler with these developments.

Note: This freedom of speculation, searching, etc. gives the
German scene a more than usually uncertain coloring. Terms
and links azgppear to float too. In Dortmand, they called each other
"comrades", "friends", and"ladies and gentlemen". The Zone is now the
DDR and now the Zone. They all seem to agree on one thing, the

traditions or existing order do not suffice. To reject them is
the right thing to do.

JeassPedl. Pideser. 8/9 (was ass. at O.Suhr Inst.)

former student of Grosser, has lived in Berlin for many years/
presently doing his French military service, as a private, with
duty to pursue his field of study, which is the SED. Dissertation
(Strasbourg/Paris) on its way; result due in December. Married

to Berlin girl. Highly intelligent young man, fluent in G.Fr.Engl.

We talked about the SED, and he developed ideas that he has publiched
in the Revue Francaise de Science Politique, Febr. 1966,("Le Parti
comnuniste en Allemagne de l'Est"). Impresses me as a thorough socio-~
logicaljpolitical study. The balance of the presentation is the

story of the adaptation of the cadre party to the task of governing

a highly industrial society. P. shows this up as something of a success
story; in particular the introduction of the "technical intelligentsia"
in the apparatus of the governing party. He does not see serious
fissures along the line so popular among some of the Western "contact-
makers". He also believes that from the industrial element in society
and leadership, if not from others, the idea of a "DDR nation" finds
responses.

He has not been able to go to E-Berlin for study talks since ente-~
ring military service; but he seems to follow the press closely.
(French element contains a fairly active press collection and trans~
lation service.) He analysed the Soviet/SED side of the development
of the SED/S!D meetings proposition quite intelligently, on the basis
of who met with whom at what time and what position emerged there-
after (not infallible, but at least ay method). In particular, he
concluded from such analysis that it was not only the Soviets
but the State Security and Army people in the DDR who aimed to
hold back on, postpone at least, the meetings originally scheduled for July.
Ulbricht, he says, funstions largely as arbiter in the party, among
several elements. Soviet General Kolychev, commander of Sov. forces

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in East Germany is the principal transmis ion link of top Soviet views
to the SED. He is a candidate of the politbureau (or is it the central
committee?), and outranks Ambassador Abrasimov. P. feels that SED

is in no hurry to bring the meetings off. While it (or some in it)
desire the opening into West Germany that they may portend -- Ulbricht
and other oldsters are in his view more susceptibte to this alluring
prospect than the younger generation (!!)-- they are concerned about
their own people's confusion by such events. Some may also fecl that
delay may drive the SPD to more juicy offers,

A very interesting youngster. Promised to send his thesis when
done. Thinks of trying for a French professorship some time in the
future.

Pierre Hassner, ... Casanova, Gilbert Ziebura. Rix Lowenthal, 6/19

Dinner meeting of Professors (minus R. Aron whe had just conducted
a joint Franco-German seminar, with G. and Fr. students, on Nato
and German affairs.

Hassner a very pleasant and bright man, talking thoughtfully
about "polycentrism" and the state of the several "centric" countries.
4iebura talked about "the end of the Yerman nation". It has never been
able to find a definition of itsel@ (language, race, comiitment, or what},
and it doea not now. "Ho-one can tell what a reunified Germany (PRR
BR and DDR) would be about, why it would not get involved with Germans
beyond its frontiers."

Rix talked about sucessful developing countries having shown ambiva-
lence toward the West. One of China's problem is that it is altogether too
hostile to the West. This is an aspect that makes him wonder about
the prospects for China's development. He seems to think that the
regime there is in some kind of basic trouble.

Martin Rexin, free lancing, RIAS, etc.; Dettmar Cramer, Berlin correspondent
of FAZ; wives, Harold H, 6/20/66

I challenge the simplistic typology of SED leaders: pragmatists, dogmatists
and suggest nobody knows enough about a sufficiently large range of peopége
to form any meaningful groupings.

It emerges that these people » and apparently also Bahr, etce, depend
for their information on SED currents to a very hight degree on a single
man, von Berg, "the young man of Stoph". R and D go to see him in East B,
fie was at Dortmund (where he made the "pptimistic" statement retailed by
Bahr, above. C. just saw him today and heard him say that everything
was going forward in Chemnitz, pre arations (wiring, hotels, etc.) were
being made. So SPD should not stop hoping. C. Suggested, perhaps there just
would be no further "preparatory meeting", Qu. Is it needed? He thought no¢.
But the SED still has not revealed whom they would send,

R. described the background of v.B. Harold is writing a sumuary of it.
This man gives the impression that East German comiunism is not content
with its home in the DDR. He offers Opinions that "all must change", that
everyone must "take risks", "break the ice". Qu. What prospects does he sec
for SED gains in the talkfest? Noone knows; and I suggest that with this line,
v.65. could hardly persuade a skeptical SED boss or Russian.

This is one kind of "pragmatist". Another kind is Loeschau, the former
manager of Leuna who became minister of chemical industry and got fired
recently, demoted to a small managerial job. Apparently an outstanding
case of an industrial manager coopttd to the leadership. R. and C. dontt
know him, but believe he has little interest in "all-Cerman communism",

and in getting mixed up with revolutionary activity in the FedRep.
He is described as a man who truly lives up to the party idea of
‘material interestedness". C. knew that he had made 8,000 marks

a month at Leuna, only 4,000 as a minister, and that he had written
a letter to Stoph threatening to quit ("ktindigen") -~ supposedly
because of that. Considerable difference between this type and

von Berg, or Havemann.

Ulbricht "no longer is considered a dogmatist"; he stands now above
the groups. The idea that the pragmatists are wihling to play ball
with the SPD, and the dogmatists are not, is meaningless.

Re has not been in East Berlin ad&nce March; apparently difficulties
with his press pass. C. often gets over and visits the Satellite
embassies. There he finds people joking about the plans for the
talkfest, laying bets whether it wil). come off. The Eastern Europeans
he saya, irritate the DDR fellows by looking down their noses at

the non-national character of the SED. The DDR fellows in turn

find things in the Eastern countries primitive and obnoxious, SU
included. On the higher levels, the DDR is being upgraded because
of its economic accomplishments, to figure as the SU's main partner.
The two plus Poland and CSR are emerging as a kind of inner group
of the Bloc. On lowere levels, "the socialist camp" has little
meaning for most DDR types as a home for the Germans.

Rumors of Soviet intent to withdraw 5 divisions, for all kinds of
alleged reasons (including "service at the Chinese border"). Qu.
would the Soviets save something by moving these units back. C. be-~
lieves they would, because, he thinks, the DDR has obliged itself
to pay the Soviets a fixed sum for troops (?). But he also thinks
the Siviets would net want to pull these units out now, because
"together with the coming of the SPD to Chemnitz" that weuld risk
provoking something. Qu. Would not 15 divisions do for that something,
let alone the NVA? Other qu. Might not DDR be ready to let some go?

We drew up a hypothetical final communique for de G's Moscow visit:
(1) Farreaching coincidence of views on international situation; but
also divergent views.
(2) European nationa to concern themselves with the solution of Furo-
pean problems, notably the German problen,
(3( Against external interference with Vietnam
(4) Desirability of reducing troop strengths in Germany.
(5) Absolute prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-
nuclear powers demanded.
(6) Franco-Soviet cooperation in technological and artistic realms,
including space and comunications
(7) A Franco/Soviet "friendship" pact, substantially expressing vow
not to fight each other, but perhaps not labelled a nea pact.

CS

IFAS Berlin Report (Buro Berlin des Inst. f. angewandte Sozialwissenschaft)
of March 1965 deals with "confidence in the protective powers",

Trends show a considerable drop in % believing that France wants to hold
Berlin, from a level of 60-70% in 1963/64 to less than 50 at the end of
1965; corresponding belief for US remaining at about 90%.

Another interesting shift: Up to June 1964, inquiries showed consistently less

mure people expecting to stay in Berlin if the Western powers left than the
number expesting to stay, ratios of about 50 to 30. Begtaining July 1964,
five successive inquiries up to the end of 1965 showed a majority of

those expecting to stay over those expecting to leave (about 45 to 40
percent), with vercentage of uncertain answers dropping.

Readiness of Berliners to leave the city has risen a little in 1965, but
rot to a level comparable to 1961 (before and after wall) (40% then, end

of 1965: 31%).

Confidence in W. Brandt remains high (above 70%) although slightly slipping
at that level.

The percentage of those that believe the protective powers could do more for
Berlin xremainusxaraunad dropped from 61/63 (about 50%) to little over 40%

in 1964, and rose back to 50% or more in 1965. The percentage expecting
more from the Fec. Rep. for Berlin remained nearly constant throughout

the period, at about 60%, i.e. higher thah for the powers.

Confidence in the economic future of Berlin has dropped in 1965, from 82

in May/June to 66% in December. In October 61, 58% expressed confidence.
Lack of confidence in the protection of freedom by the powers seems some-
what higher among the 20 to 34 year old than among the 35-49 year old or
oldere

Incomes in 1965 have tended to rise for the majority.

Percentages of those who believe that "the Russians will have their

way in Berlin" remains low, at about 10%, in 1965. After "the wall" in
1961, it was 20%, but before the “April trouble of 1965" (in connection
with Bundestag mecting in Berlin), it had dropped to 5%.

6/20 Harold Hurwitz Works with IFAS on opinion surveying in Berlin,
office at the Senator f. Sozialwesen. Relationship to IFAS stzmined is
strained. He is looking for a job, hopes to work on Berlin and German
prospects. Jim O'Donnell is trying to interest the Mission in hiring hin.

Complains of lack of active participation of the Berlin Americans
in the development of ideas of Brandt's crew about Berlin as a'center
of East West trade", and such things. Believes the French may endear thenm-
selves more, perhaps by gestures (hardly more). Thinks the 3 allies
look more divide to Berliners, although it seems to me that they are
less divided in Berlin than elsewhere. Says, allies would have looked
better in last year's tmkme "Bundestag crisis" if they had put up
helicopters as a hindrance to buzzing Soviet jets.

Sup osing that the FedRep opened itself to Communist influence, as Bahr
suggests it do, Harold doubts that West Berliners would permit a like
development in the city. They would continue to look to the Senate for
assuring their protection, through cooperation with the allies.(This is
an element alright; but under conditions, it could be swamped by others.)

John A. Calhoun, Chief, Bln. Mission 6/20/66
Pleasant talk. He is a serious, thoughtful man. (Jim O'D. says
he hoped to become ambassador to Greece some day.)

Preservation of Am. position: US helicopter flights over East Berlin
have becn discontinued (somewhat in "exchange" for stopping of East-G.
heli. flights over West Berlin. US practices occasional flights over
East~Bln. in small fixed wing aircraft. Apparently none such from the
other side.

Relations to Bln. Senate. Tyree-power rulings are generally communicated
to Senate first informally (advance notice), to"reduce shock". Allies
tend to stay aloof from many Senate rummagings, e.g- in the "passes"
negotiation area, as long as "rights" are not touched."No prospect"of
a meeting of the Bundestag plenum in the Reichstag; but the committees
come at regular intervals, and Litbke comes often..

"Unification" agitation: Bahr is in a hurry: within 10 years or never."
But the prize of the efforts lies in Fed.Rep. politics rather than chan-
ging relations to the Zone.

The French tend to be more active in 3-power affairs than they used
to be, show no disinterest in their Berlin position. Have reduced the

facilities of the Maison de France on the Kuedamm, however, or changed
them; the restaurant is now open to Germans, and the “closed" French
restaurant is on the Tegeler See.

C. believes that Berliners are less sensitive ta US trnop¢ strength
in the Fed.Rep. than Bonn. (I doubt that this is true for troop strength
in Berlin.)

Qu. What is in US own national interest: continued, active presence
in Berlin, or aloofness and eventual withdrawal? C.'s answer dealt
only with Berlin's interest in US staying there.

Gleysteen (Dirk?) believes that Berlin SPD is solid in hts right-wing
leanings; considers Mattick's position as strengthened.

Dettmar Cramer in FAZ of Jan 15,66 66 summarized Brandt's thoughts about
fitting W-Berlin into East-West trdde and a “permanent East-West fair"
in Bln. Studies of possibilities seem to be continuing.

Otto Frei will leave Berlin for Lausanne in September. NZZ will have no
permanent correspondent in W-Bln. J. Boelke of T-spiegel will do current
work for them; Frei will come to Bln. occasionally. In Lausanne, He'll
deal with Swiss affairs, among other things with a turbulent situation
in the Western part of the canton Gf Bern, where a movement to secede
from Switz. and to join France seems to be on foot.

Asked about his view of Ulbricht's objectives in contacts with
the FedRep, F. suggests a kind of"remote contrat" of the FedRep
by the SED, enforcement of suitable behavior ("Wohlverhalten"),
paralysis, and extraction from its Western combinations.
U. fears “the third way" (not SED, not Bonn, but some "humane socialism",
Ue sees a "special relationship"developing between Su and DDR ("hUhe-
re, besondere Form der Beziehungen"), phrase used in a joint Soviet/
§.German planners! communique). Moscow, E-Berlin, Warsaw and Prague
form an inner-group in the "socialist camp". DDR is the no. 2 in that
bloc; that's more than the FedRep can say for itself.

ee a ee ee ee

Explanations of economiic progress in the DDR: The wall did more for it
than the New Economic System. The latter produces contradictions and
frictions. Apel was its victim. To support the trouble-shooting initia-
tive of some of his “entrepreneur"-friends, he overdrew his resources.
Ulbricht meanwhile made 8 new indyustry-ministers, who limit the powers
of the VVB-directors, notably in financial matters.

DDR agriculture did well last year, in contrast to that of much of
astern Europe. Liberal distribution of premia.

Berlin passes: A large number of passes issued were not utilized.

F,. wonders whether the vexations and disappointments of these laboriously
prepared mectings of relatives are not diminishing people's interest in
them.

Unrest at Free University: Many West-German students (7-8,000 in toto;
half of total enrollment?). They circulate freely across the wall, have
aiscussions in E-Bin about"humanitarian socialism" ("VerschwUrung der
Haveulnner"), in which they pit the socialist dream against the West-
German reality. The BNast-G. reality is treated as a temporary aberration.

In West Bln, Argumentklub and SSB.

F. speaks of about 1500 "engagierte" students at the FU, who are rebelling
against parents, mediocrity of western leaders, "fascism". They don't
agitate much for reunification, or the national idea, call themselves
"rational republicans" and emphasize their "scientific" approach. To
them, the "DDR is conceptually right", they like its educational principles,
other principles.

F. expects a crisis at the FU. The limitation of studies (to 9 semesters
in the law faculty) is resented. Students demand "reforms" of university
system, instead, basic reforms under participation of the elected student
representatives, as"partners"of the professors. The university constitution
("Berlin system") with its democratism (reaction to Humbold univ. conditions
in the founding days) favors these claims.The radicals demand participation
of students in professorial appointment, "community of the teachers and
students". Their conflict with the univ. administration is presented as
a case of "class struggle”. The administrators and professors are the
"“elass enemy". Studmnteught to be paid for studying.

On the opposite side they find a mixture of paternalistic, haughty,
authoritarian types and weak liberals, and the lagalistic attitudes of
authorities. The political leadership is "dead"; the students are
"the only ones who have stayed alive" and gain an importance that they
would never have in a normal democracy.

F. thinks that agitation may lead to demonstration against the Americans,
possibly joined by students from the other side.

Ideological development in the DDR (writers, theater men, etc.) is bothe-
ring the regime. Ittries to discipline them. The opposition attacks
socialist realism, demands free access to world literature, and free
travel. The regime tries to put the blame on travel restrictions by
the Allied Tyavel Board.

F. showed me an extreme postér that appeared at the time of the
attack on the Amerika Haus. It seemed to come from the “chinese faction".

Attended bréaéfly a demonstration in the courtyard of the FU, which
extended into the night. It succeeded in bringing Rector Lieber out
before the hostile crowd and making him plead with them to disband.
They booed and did not and read their demands to hin,

Willy Brandt 6/17

Spent an hour with him before he, Wehner, and Gradl addressed the crowd
before the Rathaus on the occasion of the 17th of June. There was a lot
of room in the Kennedy square. -- BE. seemed relaxed and talked easily.
The prospects for the SPD/SED mectiings seemed then fairly good.

I began again with the four elements of German policy. His first comme nt:
"As a practical politician, I would not want to make an unnecessary
choice." The Atlantic connection "remains vital". Regarding Europe,
the combination of the 6 gies on; but no political union is in sight.
National viewpoints are emphasized. He believes that England will
join the EEC eventually.

German policy does not turn back on Atlantic and European efforts,
but politicians think increasingly about a connection between Europe
and German reunification. Rounding out the FedRep as a sovereign state
seems a "surprising" direction to take. What does it mean? I suggest
frontiers, provisionalism, armed forces, as possible dimensions.

Regardink reunification, the goal appears no longer as one of
forming an all-German state. This appears unrealizable. But there is the
problem of the people. The interest in "imrpoving their lot" has increased
and will continue to increase.

Q.- Would such a concept of (improved) coexistence of the two states
have consequences for the development of the FedRep toward a more self-
contained political thing? A. Is that necessary? It should be possible
to differentiate between economic areas and the political constructions.
For the economic areas, some joint construction might be possible,
at least was possible. In the fall of 1962, Adenauer had 2 documents from
Stoph. One could have formed a higher office than the Treuhandstelle
for FedRep/DDR contacts,"perhaps under a consul general, retired".

This could have had two divisions: economic matters and others (and
presumably have dealt with some structure on the DDR side). "But now
it's too late for that. The DDR has grown too strong."

He talks about the new people coming to the top in the DDR. What do
they think about Germany? "They look at things differently from Ulbricht."
Have more self-confidence and confidence in the future of the DDR. And
they have less concern with revolutionizing the FedRep than Ulbricht.

The rise of these people goes on slowly. In 10 years they will be
leading. @. Who are they? A. The type that directs the great enterprises.
They will enter into the party leadership. And one can work with them
more easily than with the present bosses. (see Bahr.)

Comes back to the idea of the FedRep developing into a more complete
state. "That's fascinating. Have to think about that."

(After the evaporation of the prospects for the talkfests, he will
watch the results of the elections in N-Rhine-Westphalia with some concer n.
If they are not good for the SPD, the euphoria of Dortmund will be
disturbed.)

|

Kurt Leopold 6/22

Former head of the Treuhandstelle ftir Interzonenhandel. Now retired
and active in organizing industrial interests for a liberrlization of
West German trade policy vis a vis DDR. Just returned from a meeting
at Rhein/Ruhr Club in Dtisselidorf. He began by asking questions about
the war in Vietnam,seemed particularly interested in whether the

US forces faced a problem of morale there,

The DDR economy faces probktmm of rationalization, specialization,
investment and the reduction of over-developed industries. The iron
and steel industry has absorbed scarce resources; much of it is
not viable. Very foolish investment policy. Now chemical industry,
light machine building, electric power, and transport require
large investments.

The trade agreement with the SU (last winter) was a bad blow.

The Soviets forced the DDR to orient itself more to the Su than it had

wanted. The SU can only supply some of the things needed for the
rationalization of industrgz. Zone has to take Soviet tractors, which
are too heavy for its agriculture, instead of more suitable Western
tractors. This treaty disappointed the new managers.

Interst of West German industry in trade with the Zone continues
to be dependent on the state of activity. Coal and steel have ae
idle capacity now and are therefore interested. Others less. Bu
there is a degree of stagnation in West German ec. deWgilopment.”
Firms now go more readily to the Leipzig fair.

But prospect for coal sales are poor. Soviet coal preempts
the DDR market. Anyhow DDR prefers importing machinery from the
FedRep. That depends on credit more than on price. France gives
& year eredit on sales now and increased its trade with DDR
by 65% in 1965, hopes for another 60 percent increase in 1966,
Other Western countries (other than FedRep) increased their
exports to DDR by 20% in 1965.

Hitherto, FedRep had export credit insurance only for "foreign"
trade. For interzonal trade, an institution known as "TreveArbeit"
in Diisselforf, semi~public enterprise with Fed. gov't participation
has been guaranteeing bank credits for trade with the DDR against
the application of the revocation clause only. (This clause in the
Izf agreement, introduced during the Berlin crisis, has never been
applied, and FedRep has shown great fear of ever ap lying it.

This insurance should have been good business.)

Now, pressure from industry (which L. helped organize) is very
likely to bring about a broadening of the risks against which Treu-
Arbeit is going to insure banks, thus opening the valve for credits
to DDR customers in IZT. It will cover the same risks as Hermes
does for foreign trade (H. now gives guarantees for D=year credits;
L. is not sure whether TA will sop there or go to 8 years right
away.)L. expects a considerable effect.

There are also discussions about raising the swing credit
span bg another DM 100 million, in connection with efforts to sell
Ruhr coal. Renewal of basic I27 agreement is blocked by disagreement

‘a
on signature formula.

Q. Any plans to invest directly in DDR enterprises? A. It's hard to
find an acceptable form for direct participations by FedRep firms.
But something else is under discussion, cooperative arrangements between
FedRep and DDR enterprises, uncer which part of the production, components,
will be made here, and part there. E.g. in electric industry and chemicals
(where there existed a division of labor between E. and W. Germany in
the old IG framework, which has not yet comp&etely disappeazed.)

For example toasters are being considered.
It's desirable "from a German viewpoint", but there are difficulties

in making the arrangements. The existing IZT agreement presents risks
for the execution of such deals, because it require or involves govt.
approvals. The DDR is worried about becoming dependent in “important”
branches. Something will materialize, he thinks, at the time of

spring fair in Beipzig next year.

Q,. What about cooperation of FedRep and DDR firms on projects in
underdeveloped countries? A. Practically nothing.

Q. What are the prospects that the FedRep will adopt a program of
development assistante for the DDR? Xoo chexiesiraktes A. It would
| be desirable, but the Federal gov't does not yet contemplate it.
"Over the next 20 ywars, I expect that more normal relations will

develop between the two states."

J. Boelke, Tagesspiegel 6/21 Will do current reporting for NZZ after
Frei leaves. Had lunch. B. expressed disgust with the woolliness of German
politics, and the apolitical tendency in the population, Political interest

@f T-sp. readers is flagsing.