Tt’
e INTERNATIONALE WE
HRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG
in Munchen, 29. und 40. Januar 1966
TRILNSHMERI
a.
CONRAD AHLERS
stellv. Chefredakteur, |
ae co |
Bundesninisterium fur
DR. HANS ARNOLD
JACQUES BAUMEL
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ee ines
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ks
Landesverteidigung,
Legationsrat I. Klasse, Auswartiges Ant,
Sécretaire Général de 1'U.N.R., Paris
ANDRE BEAUFRE
A 7
Général d‘Armée, ‘Paris
KURT BECKER
Die Welt, Hamburg
WILLI BERKHAN, MdB
Bonn
HELMUT BRENNECKE
Oberregierungsrat, Bundesverteidigungsninisteriun,
Bonn
ALFONS DALMA
Wehrkunde, Munchen
ERICH DETHLEFFSEN
General © .D., Mtuinchen
PRITZ ERMARTH
tS = A, i a Fie
ae
Der Spiegel, Hamburg
DR. JOHANN CHRISTOPH BARON VON ALLMAYER-BECK
Wien
Bonn
* JOSEF FELDER, MdB
Bonn
ANDRE _PONTAENE:
be—Hernde,~—Perts—
BURGHARD FREUDENFELD
Chefredakteur, Bayerischer Rundfunk, Munchen
KARL He FRIEDRICH
Oberst 1.G. Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr,
Hanburg
CURT GASTEYGER
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London
GEORG REICHSRITTER VON GAUPP-BERGHAUSEN
Konsul, Liechtenstein
x CURT-ULRICH VON GERSDORFF
Wehrkunde, Munchen
X PROFESSOR DR. WILHELM GREWE
Botschafter, Paris
WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge/USA
KARL GUMBEL
Staatssekretar, Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
* KARL THEODOR FREIHERR VON UND ZU GUTTENBERG, MdB
Bonn | |
DR. FRANZ HEUBL
Staatsminister, Miinchen
HANS IMHOF
US-Enbassy, Bonn
* DR. RICHARD JAEGER, MdB
_ Bundesjustizminister, Bonn
THOMAS JANSEN
Universitat Bonn
DR. ERNST JUNG
Vortr. Legationsrat I. Klasse, Auswartiges Amt,
Bonn
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Center for International Affairs, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass./USA
% EWALD HEINRICH VON KLEIST
Wehrkunde, Munchen
DR. KONRAD KRASKE, MdB
Bonn
WERNER KUNZE, MdB
Bonn
* THEO M.. LOCH
Rheinischer erkur, K6ln
Pha RED SUCHSHGER
a PE iat cncalligeti attested
DR. MAETZKE
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurt
WERNER MANNS
Oberst i.Ge, Bundesverteidigungsninisteriun,
Bonn
% OTTO MERK
Munchner Merkur, Miinchen
EWG-Kommission, Briissel
% UWE NERLICH
Deutsche Gesellschaft ftir Auswartige Politik, Bonn
4¢ ROBERT E. OSGOOD
Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research,
Johns Hopkins University, Washington/USA
KK A.M. PALLISER
Foreign Office, London
*.
»
STEPHAN POSSONY
Hoover Institute, Standford/Cal./USA
WOLFRAM VON RAVEN
Schriftsteller, Bonn
EVOR RICHARD, M.P.
l ondon
JOSEF RIEDMILLER
Suddeutsche Zeitung, Mtinchen
GHOFFREY RIPPON
London
DR, KLAUS RITTER
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen
PROFESSOR DR. OTTO ROEGELE
Universitat Mtinchen
LOTHAR RUEHL
Die Welt, Hamburg/Paris
PETER RUTTER
US-Embassy, Bonn
DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P.
London
Vie . a .
Winis bP tes are Tens COMBAT EAATS PePTrs
GORDON BROOK SHEPHERD
The Sunday Telegraph, London
DR. THEO SOMMER
Die Zeit, Hamburg
HANS SPEIER
Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal./USA
ALTTERO SPINELLI
Fondazione Adriano Olivetti, Rom
* DR. hoc. FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS, MdB
* GERD SCHMUCKLE
Brigadegeneral, Paris
¥ DR. SWIDBERT SCHNIPPENKOETTER
Botschafter, Auswartiges Amt, Bonn
FRITZ=-RUDOLF SCHULTZ, MdB
Bonn
DR. URS SCHWARZ
Schriftsteller, Zurich
* GERD STAMP
Oberst, Bundeskanzleramt, Bonn
Munchen
DICK TAVERNE, M.P.
London |
HASSO VIEBIG
Oberst i1.G., Bundesverteidigungsministeriun,
Bonn
DR. HANS-JOCHEN VOGEL
Oberburgerneister, Miinchen
RONNIE WARING
Colonel, Cascais
TT oO
ond J
DR R-WER:
ARMIN ZIMMERMANN
Kapitan zur See, Bundesverteidigungsninisteriun
Bonn
DR, FRIEDRICH ZIMMERMANN, MaB
Munchen
V. INTERNATIONALE WEHRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG IN MUNCHEN
Sth INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER
Véme RENCONTRE INTERNATIONALE DE LA WEHRKUNDE
10./11, Februar 1968
TELLNEHMERDLISTE
PARTICIPANTS
LES PARTICIPANTS
Dr. CARLOS KRUS ABECASSIS, Staatssekretar a.D..
Lissabon
CONRAD AHLERS, stellv. Bundespressechef
Bonn
Dr. ACHILLE ALBONETTI, Abgeordneter
Rom
Dr. JOHANN CHRISTOPH BARON v. ALLMAYER-BECK
- Wien
Dr. HANS ARNOLD, VLR I.
Auswartiges Amt, Bonn
Dr. GUNTER BACHMANN, Ministerialdirigent
Bundeskanzleramt, Bonn
ANDRE BEAUFRE, Général d'Armee
Paris
KURT BECKER
"Die Zeit", Hamburg
WILLI BERKHAN, MdB
Bonn
RAYMOND BOUSQUET, Député
~~ Paris
JOHN BRADAMAS, Congressman
Washington
Oo
HELMUT BRENNECKE, Regierungsdirektor
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
BERNARD BRODIE, Professor
University of California, Los Angeles
Dr. BERNHARD BUSSMANN
Bundeshaus, Bonn
Dr. A. CATTANI
"Neue Zurcher Zeitung", Zurich
CARL-GIDEON v. CLAER
"Der Spiegel", Hamburg
ROBERT C,. CREEL
Amerikanischer Generalkonsul, Munchen
DIETER CYCON
"Stuttgarter Zeitung", Stuttgart
ALFONS DALMA, Chefredakteur
Osterreichischer Rundfunk und Fernsehen, Wien
Dr. ERNEST DAVIES, M.P.
London
ERICH DETHLEFFSEN, Generalmajor a.D.
Munchen
CLAUS DOHRN
"Time"/"Life", Ziirich
LOTHAR DOMROSE, Oberst i.G.
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
CHRISTOPHER EMMET
Executive Vice President, American Council @n Germany
New York
Dr. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Washington
oo Tus
Dr. ERHARD EPPLER, MdB
Bonn
Dr. ARVID FREDBORG, AuBenpolitischer Konsulent
Stockholm
JERRY FRIEDHEIM
Washington
KARL HERRMANN FRIEDRICH, Brigadegeneral
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
GEORG v. GAUPP-BERGHAUSEN, Vorsitzender der Gesellschaft
fur politisch-strategische Studien, Wien
FRANK T.R, GILES, Foreign Editor
"Sunday Times", London
Dr. GUNTHER GILLESSEN
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", Bonn
PROFESSOR Dr. WILHELM GREWE, Botschafter
Brussel
KARL GUMBEL, Staatssekretar
Bundesinnenministerium, Bonn
KARL THEODOR Freiherr von und zu GUTTENBERG
Parlamentarischer Staatssekretar, Bundeskanzleramt
Bonn
GUY HADLEY, M.P.
London
ARMIN HALLE
"Suddeutsche Zeitung", Miinchen
EKERN HALVOR
Amerikanische Botschaft, Bad Godesberg
WAYNE L, HAYS, Congressman
Washington
WILHELM HESS, Generalmajor
Befehlshaber im Wehrbereich VI, Miinchen
Dr. FRANZ HEUBL, Staatsminister
Munchen/Bonn
_ARTHUR HOCKADAY, Assistant Secretary for Defense
-WATO, Briissel
PETER HORNUNG
"Sonntagsblatt", Hamburg
JOHANNES V. IMHOF, US-Embassy
Bonn
Dr. RICHARD JAEGER, Bundesminister a.D.
Vizeprasident des Bundestags, Bonn
Dr. PAUL JALINK, Botschaftsrat
Botschaft der Niederlande, Bonn
WILLIAM W. KAUFMANN, Professor
Cambridge, Mass./USA
__EWALD HEINRICH v. KLEIST
"Wehrkunde", Miinchen
Dr. WILLY KNAPP, Regierungsdirektor
Bundespresseamt, Bonn
KONSTANTIN PRINZ v. BAYERN, MdB
Bonn
Dr. KONRAD KRASKE, MdB
Bonn
ALBERT KRAUS, Brigadegeneral
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
HANNS KUFFNER, stellv. Abteilungsleiter
Bundespresseamt, Bonn
“ —5-
Dr. ERNST-OTTO MAETZKE
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", Frankfurt
ERNST MAJONICA, MdB
Bonn
OLIVIER MANET, Conseiller
Diplomatique du Secrétaire Général de la Défense Nationale,
Paris
OTTO MERK
"Munchner Merkur", Munchen
WILHELM MEYER-DETRING, Generalleutnant a.D.
"Wehrkunde”, Munchen
Dr. KARL-HEINZ Narjes, Kabinettschef des Prasidenten der
EWG-Kommission, Brussel
_ UWE NERLICH
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen
PAWELCZYK
Hamburg
PAUL PEETERS, Professor
Salzburg
ISOLDE PIETSCH
"Bayern-Kurier", Munchen
STEFAN T., POSSONY, Professor
Stanford University,Stanford/Cal./USA
Dr. ARNOLD PUZMACCOM
Washington
WOLFRAM v. RAVEN, Journalist
Bonn
HELIMUTH REINHARDT, Generalmajor a.D.
Bad Boll
HERMANN RENNER
"Die Welt", Hamburg
HENRY REUSS
Congressman, Washington
IVOR RICHARD, M.P.
London
Dr. KLAUS RITTER
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen
Dr. OTTO ROEGELE, Professor
Munchen
JOSEF ROMMERSKIRCHEN, MdB
Bonn
CHARLES ROSSOTTI
Washington
HELOMUTH ROTH
Bundeshaus, Bonn
ANTHONY ROYLE, M.P.
pr cea :
LOTHAR RUEHL
"Die Welt", Paris
ANDRE SAINT-MLEUX
Franzosischer Generalkonsul, Miinchen
-==—GERD SCHMUCKLE,Brigadegeneral
Brussel
Dr. SWIDBERT SCHNIPPENKOETTER, Botschafter
Auswartiges Amt, Bonn
FRITZ-RUDOLF SCHULTZ, MdB
Bonn
Dr. THEO SOMMER
"Jie Zeit", Hamburg
Dr. HANS SPEIER, Professor
Rhe Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal./USA
GERD STAMP, Oberst
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
TIMOTHY STANLEY, Gesandter
NATO, Brussel
JOHN TOWER, US-—Senator
Washington
PAUL VERBEEK, VLR I.
Auswartiges Amt, Bonn
Dr. WOLFGANG WAGNER
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik
Bonn
WARING RONNIE
Staff College, Cascais
OLAF BARON v. WRANGEL, MdB
Bonn
FREDERICK S. WYLE
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO
Washington
ARMIN ZIMMERMANN, Kapitan zur See
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
Dr. FRIEDRICH ZIMMERMANN, MdB
Bonn/Miinchen
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V. INTERNATIONALE WEHRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG IN MUNCHEN
oth INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER
Véme RENCONTRE INTERNATIONALE DE LA WEHRKUNDE
10./11. Februar 1968
TEILNEHMERLISTE
PARTICIPANTS
LES PARTICIPANTS
Dr. CARLOS KRUS ABECASSIS, Staatssekretar a.D.
Lissabon
CONRAD AHLERS, stellv. Bundespressechef
Bonn
Dr. ACHILLE ALBONETTI, Abgeordneter
Rom
Dr. JOHANN CHRISTOPH BARON v. ALLMAYER-—BECK
Wien
Dr. HANS ARNOLD, VLR I.
Auswartiges Amt, Bonn
Dr. GUNTER BACHMANN, Ministerialdirigent
Bundeskanzleramt, Bonn
ANDRE BEAUFRE, Général d'Armee
Paris
KURT BECKER
"Die Zeit", Hamburg
WILLI BERKHAN, MdB
Bonn
AYMOND BOUSQUET, Député
Paris
HN BRADAMAS, Congressman
Washington
HELMUT BRENNECKE, Regierungsdirektor
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
ERNARD BRODIE, Professor
University of California, Los Angeles
Dr. BERNHARD BUSSMANN
Bundeshaus, Bonn
Dr. A. CATTANI | |
"Neue Zurcher Zeitung", Zurich
CARL-GIDEON v. CLAER
"Der Spiegel", Hamburg
ROBERT C. CREEL
Amerikanischer Generalkonsul, Munchen
DIETER CYCON
"Stuttgarter Zeitung", Stuttgart
ALFONS DALMA, Chefredakteur
Osterreichischer Rundfunk und Fernsehen, Wien
Dr. ERNEST DAVIES, M.P.
London
ERICH DETHLEFFSEN, Generalmajor a.D.
Munchen
CLAUS DOHRN
"Time"/"Life", Zurich
LOTHAR DOMROSE, Oberst i.G.
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
JHRISTOPHER EMMET
Executive Vice President, American Council Gdn Germany
New York
Dr. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Washington
~ =
Dr. ERHARD EPPLER, MdB
Bonn
Dr. ARVID FREDBORG, AuBenpolitischer Konsulent
Stockholm
JERRY FRIEDHEIM
Washington
KARL HERRMANN FRIEDRICH, Brigadegeneral
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
GEORG v. GAUPP-BERGHAUSEN, Vorsitzender der Gesellschaft
fur politisch-strategische Studien, Wien
FRANK T.R. GILES, Foreign Editor
"Sunday Times", London
Dr. GUNTHER GILLESSEN
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", Bonn
PROFESSOR Dr. WILHEIM GREWE, Botschafter
Brussel
1RL GUMBEL, Staatssekretar
Bundesinnenministerium, Bonn
KARL THEODOR Freiherr von und zu GUTTENBERG
Parlamentarischer Staatssekretar, Bundeskanzleramt
Bonn
GUY HADLEY, M.P.
London
ARMIN HALLE
"Suddeutsche Zeitung", Miinchen
EKERN HALVOR
Amerikanische Botschaft, Bad Godesberg
WEYNE L. HAYS, Congressman
Washington
WILHELM HESS, Generalmajor
Befehlshaber im Wehrbereich VI, Miinchen
Dr. FRANZ HEUBL, Staatsminister
Munchen/Bonn
ARTHUR HOCKADAY, Assistant Secretary for Defense
NATO, Brussel
PETER HORNUNG
"Sonntagsblatt", Hamburg
JOHANNES V, IMHOF, US-Embassy
Bonn |
Dr. RICHARD JAEGER, Bundesminister aD,
Vizeprasident des Bundestags, Bonn
Dr. PAUL JALINK, Botschaftsrat
Botschaft der Niederlande, Bonn
ZE-WILLIAM W, KAUFMANN, Professor
at Mass./USA
EWALD HEINRICH v. KLEIST
"“Wehrkunde", Miinchen
Dr. WILLY KNAPP, Regierungsdirektor
Bundespresseamt, Bonn
KONSTANTIN PRINZ v. BAYERN, MdB
Bonn
Dr. KONRAD KRASKE, MdB
Bonn
ALBERT KRAUS, Brigadegeneral
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
HANNS KUFFNER, stellv. Abteilungsleiter
Bundespresseamt, Bonn
Dr. ERNST-OTTO MAETZKE
"Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", Frankfurt
ERNST MAJONICA, MdB Ly
Bonn
OLIVIER MANET, Conseiller
Diplomatique du Secrétaire Général de la Défense Nationale,
Paris
OTTO MERK
"Munchner Merkur", Munchen
WILHELM MEYER-DETRING, Generalleutnant a.D.
"Wehrkunde”, Miinchen
Dr. KARL-—HEINZ Narjes, Kabinettschef des Prasidenten der
EWG-Kommission, Brussel
UWE NERLICH
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen
PAWELCZYK
Hamburg
PAUL PEETERS, Professor
Salzburg
ISOLDE PIETSCH
"Bayern-Kurier", Munchen
Ps I. POSSONY, Professor
Stanford University,Stanford/Cal./USA
Dr. ARNOLD PUZMACCOM
Washington
WOLFRAM v. RAVEN, Journalist
Bonn
HELUIMUTH REINHARDT, Generalmajor a.D.
Bad Boll
HERMANN RENNER
"Die Welt", Hamburg
ENRY REUSS
Congressman, Washington
IVOR RICHARD, M.P.
London
Dr, KLAUS RITTER
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen
Dr. OTTO ROEGELE, Professor
Munchen
JOSEF ROMMERSKIRCHEN, MdB
Bonn
7
JHARLES ROSSOTTI
Washington
HELLMUTH ROTH
Bundeshaus, Bonn
ANTHONY ROYLE, M.P.
London
LOTHAR RUEHL
"Die Welt", Paris
ANDRE SAINT-MLEUX
Franzosischer Generalkonsul, Miinchen
GERD SCHMUCKLE, Brigadegeneral
Brussel
Dr, SWIDBERT SCHNIPPENKOETTER, Botschafter
Auswartiges Amt, Bonn
LA)
FRITZ-RUDOLF SCHULTZ, MdB
Bonn
Dr. THEO SOMMER
"Sie Zeit", Hamburg
Dr. HANS SPEIER, Professor
Rhe Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal./USA
GERD STAMP, Oberst
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
TIMOTHY STANLEY, Gesandter
N£ATO, Brussel
em TOWER, US-Senator
Washington
PAUL VERBEEK, VLR I.
Auswartiges Amt, Bonn
Dr. WOLFGANG WAGNER
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik
Bonn |
leaeresy aaanE®
Staff College, Cascais
OLAF BARON v. WRANGEL, MdB
Bonn
FREDERICK S. WYLE
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO
Washington
ARMIN ZIMMERMANN, Kapit&n zur See
Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn
Dr. FRIEDRICH ZIMMERMANN, MdB
Bonn/Miinchen
eS Mea
MIMIND I be . TTF Fat
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6th INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE ENCOUNTER
1./2. February 1969
TET DNEAHMERSLS TE™
PARTICIPANTS
“bits—PARLICLPANTS—
cee yh Mey y FEdinad Mee Ope,
CONRAD AHLERS, eriint thitanivdiessnad-
Bonn
Dr. ACHILLE ALBONETTI, Abgeordnet+ex— ngash,
Rom
Dr. JOH. CHRISTOPH BARON ALLMAYER-BECK |
Wien Vipuga
WILLIAM ARTER
Washington
GEOFFREY H, BAKER, Britis¢her General/konsul / ;
MGachen buuiil
in CSU
KONSTANTIN PRINZ v. BAYERN, Map +4, )
Bonn
KURT BECKER, Weruiyst
"Die Zeit", Hamburg
— KARL WILHELM BERKHAN, MéB Prt, ( SPD >)
Bonn
M. NURI BIRGI, Ttirkis¢her Retechafter_bei_dex NATO.
Briissels
ye
| ~ Lia
SERGE BOIDEVAIR, Botsehafteras Cri ln, Rais 4 —
Branséeische Botschafs, Bonn
VOLKER BORHO, " Se.
"Miinchner Merkur" , Meneh gia
Folie C >) a
HELLMUTH BRENNECKE, Regierungsdirektor ,,/*U“ ) ‘S
Bundesverteitipunssministeriunm, Bonn
Dr. BERNHARD BUSSMANN
Bundeshaus, Bonn
PRATT BYRD, Konsul
Munchen
CARL GIDEON v. CLAER , [mwrutss ,
"Der Spiegel", Hamburg
ROBERT €& CREEL, Amerikanischer Generalkonsul
Mu en
DIETER CYCON, Uru ist
"Stuttgarter Zeitung", Stuttgart
oy ae Lucy , Pru Ates 2. Rohs errs / a
ALFONS DALMA, Ghefrecdakteur— Peete E,
| Kh
JONATHAN DEAN, Botschafterat Gru tw, Lt, mt wf!
AmerikanischeBotschaft, Bonn
ERICH DETHLEFFSEN, Generalmajor a.D. { “Cut, C/A )
Munchen |
KLAUS DOHRN
"Time" /"Life", Ziirich
Tr. CEL DESTEFANIS
Rom
CHRISTOPHER EMMET
Executive Vice President American Council on Germany
New York
PAUL FINDLEY, Congressman
Washington
BERND FREIHERR v. FREYTAG-—LORINGHOVEN, Generalmajor
Diez
JERRY FRIEDHEIM,
Washington
Btu
KARL HERMANN FRIEDRICH, Brigadegeneral ,» "jm taba
Bundesverteidisungsministeriun, Bonn
GEORG v. GAUPP-BERGHAUSEN, Prins,
Pprastdent—der Gesellschaft fiir politisch-strategische Studien,
Ween Wi pwn &
_ PROFESSOR Dr. WILHELM GREWE, Beutscher—Botschafter—bei der.
NATO, Brussels
_- KARL GUMBEL, Steatssekretar— Uuillu is, ,
Bundesinnenministerium,—Benn— AMLW | Vyerwer
-KARL THEODOR FREIHERR von und zu GUTTENBERG
esis siete oe Bundeskanzteramts~ Bonn
CAL OLA
ar )
ARMIN HALLE ,
"Suddeutsche Zeitung", Munchen
LEO HAMON, Député
Paris
Fick aw
KARL-GUNTHER von HASE, Staatsesekretar Riad Pali, , we
— Bundesverteidigungsministerium, Bonn Peyared / 4)
_ PIERRE HASSNER , (purr,
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris
WAYNE L. HAYS, Congressman
Washington
—_—
ron bated dunt - 4. renee, y
oe DENIS HEALEY, Verteidigungsminister-
ondon
-— SIR NIGEL HENDERSON, Admiral;
Chairman of the Military Committy, NATO, Briissel!
WILHELM HESS, Generalmajor a.D, , «uv
Munchen
THOMAS HIRSCHFELD, “<A.
Amerikanisehe Betschar | Bonn
_ ARTHUR HOCKADAY
~ Assistant Secretary for Defense, NATO, Briissel
{
PETER HORNUNG UAE
siomematiavit ,' telieare
Ee
Dr. RICHARD JAEGER, Bundesmintster—a.b
~ Vizepr&sident i gy Prt sit aie mee Bonn
_ JURG v. KALCKREUTH, Brigadegeneral
— NATO, Brussel
ANTHONY KERSHAW, MC, MP.
London
EWALD HEINRICH v. KLEIST
"Wehrkunde", Munchen
bry | |
__WALTHER LEISLER KIEP, map. ( CB |
Bonn
_ Dr. KONRAD KRASKE, MaB byw ( DU)
Bonn
HANNS KUPPNER, Abteidwmgsleiter— Rebs [4 Vase
Bundespresseamt, Bonn
lien
wililion
OLIVIER MANET, Conseiller Diplomatique du Sécrétaire
Général de la Défense Nationale, Paris
Dr. WERNER MARX) Map (
Bonn
WILHELM MEYER-DETRING, Generalleutnant a.D.
"Wehrkunde", Munchen
_ Dr. K. HEINZ NARJES, GeneraiPirektor] tur Press¢ and On fri ,
an <a Sie
information dex BHE., Brussels p-
— UWE NERLICH
"Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik", Ebenhausen
ARTHUR OLSEN, Public affairs advisor to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Europe, State Department, Washington
PROFESSOR PAUL PEETERS, Tournai
MANFRED PHILIPP, Major i.G. , iu Poa ty
Bundesverteidisungsministerium, Bonn
ISOLDE PIETSCH , mnescL
"Bayern-Kurier", Munchen
PROPESSOR- STEFAN T. possony , Pr AvnGele ,
Stanford University, Stanford/Cal. JUSA
Cyt yuk , Mpeg ) "eg, ,
Gunter PREUSKER, Oberst—i.G.-
Bundesverteidisungsministerium, Bonn
_
JOHANN RAMMING , /@wmrustd
"Neue Zurcher Zeitung", Zurich
WOLFRAM v. RAVEN, Journalist
Bonn
HELLMUTH REINHARDT, Generalmajor a.D.
Bad Boll
“a
_ IVOR RICHARD, M.P. ( 44)
London
= Rr ye)
— Rt.Hon. GEOFFREY RIPPON, QC. M.P. ( Witon rye
London
w% PROFESSOR Dr. OTTO ROEGHLE
Munchen
HELLMUTH ROTH ,
Bundéshaus, Bonn
ryt, thins - UW - Ur }
x) LOTHAR RUEHL, stebivs—Chefredakteur
"Die Welt", Hamburg
_— Dr. ULRICH SAHM, Ministerialdirigent | Prope, ]Pok
ApeweartieesAmt, Bonn
_. GERD SCHMUCKLE, Brigadegeneral
Wurzburg
Ae Abrt - ) Puy Yu
_ Dr. SWIDBERT SCHNIPPENKOTTER, Betschafter
~ paswirtigesAmt, Bonn
A
FRANZ JOSEF SCHULZE, Brigadegeneral , ‘Miu /tr+h
Bundesverteidieungeministerium, Bonn
HANS-B=RNHARD GRAF SCHWEINITZ, Regierungsrat—
Bunde.. vsresseamt, Bonn
Dr. THEO/S
"Die Zey/t", Hamburg
PROPESSOR HANS SPEIER
The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica/Cal./USA
yo BIMOTHY STANLEY, Gesandt+er-
NATO, Briissel
ROLF STEINHAUS, Kapitin zur-See- (% Muy | rye Tan, Wyre !
Bundesverteidicungeministerium, Bonn
; =
Men
- oo
Dr. HANS SPHINKOHL, Birgermetster— [7 Brg Pernrxiirvl
ign!
a; JOHN TOWER, Senator
Washington
\A Dr. WOLFGANG WAGNER
Deutsche Gesellschaft fiir auswartige Politik, Bonn
PROFESSOR RONALD WARING
Monte Estoril
A ADELBERT WEINSTEIN ; Uwretsl,
"Prankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung", Frankfurt
e..
rx GERHARD WESSEL, prffeident ae BND
Minchen
ALAN LEE WILLIAMS, M.P.
London
Dr. GISELHER WIRSING, Chefredaktaur—
"Christ und Welt", Stuttgart
lr uiedly
LUTZ WOLF, Oberstieutmant> Kyte
Bundesvertetdigungsministerium, Bonn
Urpury
BARON OLAF v. WRANGEL, Mast (<¢SU)
Bonn
Be,
aw teu KH
Dr. FRIEDRICH ZIMMERMANN, MAB D~/>( EE mrp! a peeelty >
Bonn Potro, ) 4 /
II. INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE-ENCOUNTER °
NATO'S NUCLEAR PROBLEI
by Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg
MaB, Bonn
Munich, January 29 and 30, 1966
von Guttenberg, - |
— The Atlantic Alliance finds itself ina state of per-
manent crisis. While it would seem to me that there iS
“uriversal consent on the necessity of a NATO reform, there
is a very considerable divergence of opinion as to the
proper methods and objectives. While one faction proposes
to extend integration, the other aspires to an at least
partial dis-integration. While one group believes in the
possibility - indeed the necessity - of even extending the
military commitment of the Alliance to other continents,
the other even Seeks to reduce the existing measure of
joint political activity. While one camp supports a stra-
tegy of flexible response, the other subscribes to nuclear
oriority and calls for a rearmament and re-organisation of
the Alliance along nuclear lines. The reasons ot this crisis
ana of the resultant discussions in recent years are many
and varied. I do not intend ~o discuss them here in detail -
a short enumeration will suffice.
There are, first of all, reasons of a military and of
a political nature. It would be vain to ask whether the
military problems have produced the political ones or vice-
versa. Tor there can be no doubt that the two catexzories
of questions are interdependent and wholly ins-parable.
cut there are also factual changes threatenin.; the
continued existence of a NATO structure frozen into immo-
bility ever since the end of the 1950's. The most impor-
tant oi them are the following:
1° The nuclear stalemate of the two leading world powers,
the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.
|
2° The increasin: ~- military and political - commitment
of the U.S.A. on trans-oceanic continents.
|
|
| . . oN . | . .
3 ° The discontinuance of the Soviet policy of provoking
critical situations in Europe tiarked by the end of
the acute Berlin crisis.
4 9 The mounting hostility between Red China and the
Soviet Union on the one hand, and a certain libera-
lisation and disintesration of the Last nuropean Bloc
on th= other.
OR
O
The (relative) recovery of Buropvean strength.
von Guttenberg
However, the present discussions concerning the Atlan-
tic Allience are not only centerin - or in part motivated
by - objective reasons such as those listed above. There
are also other arguments of allegedly “reat significance
wrich, properly speaking, must be relezated to the sohere
of pure theory or, even worse, Wishiul thinking. But within
an alliance of democratic states, which because of their
very nature are subject to the sniluenc: of public opinion,
theoretical and emotive arguments may carry ereater weight
than the bare facts. This psy chological law geeus to be at
work particularly when, for instance, American public
opinion rezsards Red China as the most dangerous ene.wuy of
all, or when Affericans a + Duropeans alike vaint the Yre-
assuring picture of 2 change of heart in the Soviet Union
and her growing readiness to cooperate.
No one will seriously doubt the possibility - or even
historical probability - of an eventual moderation of the
revolutionary and acvgressive character of Soviet Communist
policy. Nor can any one close his eyes to the fact that
throughout the Comuunist-controlled parts of burope - and
even in the Soviet Jnion itself - the brutal methods of
Lenin's and Stalin's reign of terror Lave been replaced by
a comparatively worse humane form of Communism. But what
suarantee is there ti.at this policy will not some day be at
Lleest partly revisec or reversed? And who could deny that
the present sodGiticatiors of method have changed absolutely
aothing about the fundamental, long-t«ru objectives ot Coi-
iunist policy’?
But let me cite an actual instance:
One might disagree as to whether another Berlin crisis
sg in the offing, but we all agree that such a development
is vossible and that therefore We must be prepared for it.
InGeed, the very decomposition of the Com.unist camp, which
we welcome for a variety of reasons, might actually induce
“oscow to return to its policy of fomenting political unrest.
for is not the practice ol totalitarian regimes to rely on
an agger-ssive foreign policy as a safety-value for the mount-
Af
ing pressure of internal discontent well establishec*”
The international scene has witn. ssed many chanJes in
recent years. Eut non of them affects the Atlantic Alliance
ag deeply as the shifting balance of power. Neither the re-
cognizable pressnt intentions of an enemy nor his presumable
future plans furnish a dependable Lasis and .uiding prin-
ciple tor th: orsanisation and measures of the Alliance. in
von Guttenberg
the absence of positive evidence that an adversary has onc:
and for all relinguished his hostile intent, there is but
one aspect which must deternmine our policy: the actual
power of the potential eneuy. -
And this means - above all ior the Buropean LATO
States and in particular for the iederal Republic - that
th. Atlantic Alliance has lost none of its importance
anc Weight.
As a matter of fact, its position is far nore critical
row than it was during the tirst decade of its existence.
For tocay NATO faces an incomparably stronger eneiy who has
pulled even with the leading power of the “‘est and who, in
the military sphere, has crested a situation of almost equal
"reciprocal nuclear deterrence", i.e. recivrocal paralysis.
ee
The popular argument that this disquizting development
has in no way disturbed tke total balance of power between
Hast and West is neither valid nor reassuring. I have no
Coubt - indeed, I am fully convinced - that an over-all com-
parison ot the numerical strength of N‘TO and that oft the
[] 80-08; 78 VYarsaw Tresty Organisation will prove the great
—
sup=riority of the “est. Lut a mere enumeration of rociets,
war-heads, divisions, planes and battleships fails to take
into account three other tasic elements of strategy which
are as decisive as ever: the tactors of space, distance and
time.
When proper allowance is made for their efiect on the
balance of Hast and ‘Yest, the safety of surope will be
clearly seen to rest only and solely on shat has been
called a "onesided balance’. True, there is no balance
of strenzth between the buro-Asiatic power of the Soviet
Union anc the Atlantic pover of the U.S.A. But it is
equally incontestable that these two Siants have struck
a vlance of deterrence. In the relations between the
Soviet Union and Europe, however, we have neither a balance
of strength nor one oi nuclear deterrence. Somewhat point-
edly one might say that the chance for peace in Lurope
Gepends on the Soviet Union's continued conviction that
to defend Europe the American Government will not even
shrink from the ultimate step and accept the risk of
challenging the nuclear strength of the powerful Soviet
Union.
von Guttenberg - 4 +
As long as American troops rewain stationed in wurope
and hold the front against the Soviet Army, the USSR must
fear that any military operation in this area might ul-
timately lead to a direct exchange of nuclear blows with
the United States itself. However, the comestic situation
might some day motivate the Soviet Government to adopt a
more azgressive policy in the hope that a limited mili-
tary operation in Europe will not sufficiently provoke
the U.S.A. to untold its whole strength and risk Soviet
nuclear retaliation on the American continent.
This brinzs me to another point. We have admittedly
no reason to fear that the Awerican troops might be with-
drawn from Europe in the near-future - but what Luropean ~
20Vernment can S0areantee that they will, so to speal., stay
here forever? And abov: all, would the Europeans truly
wieet their political responsibility towarc Durope if they
were forever content with this "onesided balance", if they
continued to accept the complete dependence of Hurope on
Atlantic safety guarantees, ii they resigned themselves
to the idea that Burope was inevitably fated to remain the
object of the decisiors of Non-European powers?”
It is, as a matter of fact, in this onesided depen~
Gence of European safety on the nuclear reassurance of
the U.S.A., that I see the main source ot the NATO crisis.
The quarrel about the French "Force de Frappe", the re-
grettable dispute about the more than unhappy MLF-project,
the British indecision in nuclear matters, the suggestion
of a world-wide "Non-Proliferation-Agreement", and many
other developments must be seen against the back-ground of
this "one-sided balance". For this uneasy equipoise does
put the two super-powers into a stalemate but it also
makes European safety a matter of faith. namely the faith
that America will put European interests first anc in an
emergency refuse to be kept in a nuclear check.
Let me point out that, although I have been compar-
ing military potentials and strategic possibilities, my
main concern has all the while been with the political
situation. For it appears to be an outstanding character-
istic of the nuclear age that on the one hand the actual
risk of a war between atowic powers - and, to a lesser
degree, between their non-nuclear charges - has been re-
duced to a miniimuu, but that on the other hand, purely
military considerations influence political decisions tore
than ever before because the latter are increasingly made
under the impression of an immediate threat or a distant
possibility of war.
|
|
yon Guttenberg - 5-
Therefore the practically unchanged nuclear monopoly
of America remains the basic element of NATO structure.
Ané for th» same reason America's political intention of
waintainins and, if possible, institutionalising this
monopoly, will remain the most decisive factor in all
future plans for NATO. For the continued existence of
this unrestricted monopoly would prevent all reforms which
might shift the severally mentioned "one-sided balance"
in the favor of Burope.
Not one of the responsible American suggestions made
hitherto in reference to nuclear "partnership" or "joint
comuand" would in fact have changed anything about the
ultimate responsibility of the American government tor
the use of nuclear w.apons. And - rebus sic stantibus -
the American attitude is entirely understandabl:. After
all, what principles should govern a possible consignment
of nuclear weapons to the national control of an ally”
“hich partners of the Alliance would "deserve" such con-
tidence, and which would not? How is an alliance to be
effectively co-ordinated and controlled if a great number
of its member states developed individual nuclear stra-
tegies - possibly with a built-in smergency exit?
But on the other hand it is also high time to dis-
card the illusio aat technicalities a la MLF or Al?
might give the cle Ns le atomic
ersenal of others. Projects of this kimd cannot ever be
Sxvected to change the present monopoly situation, they
vould only cause a lot of expense, a lot of contusion and
2 lot of unnecessary excitement. I deem it simply absurd
to think that such methods could "force" the U.S.A. to use
a "multilateral" nuclear weapon (under American veto) if
it did not anyway and at the saue moment intend to use
its own nuclear Weapons against the same targets.
An Atlantic "nuclear integration" is both a mis-
leading concept and a wish-dream. I[t is misleading, be-
cause the term "integration" would inevitably have to
m-an the establishment of a new sovereignty on the part
of the “integrated partners" - for the U.S.A. is firmly
resolved to surrender not one jot of its own nuciear so-
vereignty And it is a wish-dream because any such "inte-~-
gration" - possibly patterned on the MLF - would in prac~
tice amount to an institutionalisation of the existing
monopolistic or hegemonial structure of NATO.
There is no instant or short-term cure ior the un-
satisfactory state of Burope's nuclear defense. But na-
turally this does not mean that uecrman policy should
abstain from trying to gain more intluence on
the future shape of American nuclear strategy
the siting and selection of nuclear weapons
the choice of targets within the German sphere
of interests.
Nor is there any reason why the Federal Republic
should not step forward with her own suggestions con-
cerning the command over nuclear weapons already station-
ed in Europe. But the present situation does face German
policy with one necessity about whose urgency lI wish to
leave no doubt: it must renounce to all efiorts to gain
) 22 "“ohysical share" in the nuclear wenpons of others. For
any such attempt would very gravely damage our LOlitical
strtus in the whole world without in the least increasing
our safety.
Moreover, any project such as MLF would inevitably
orove 2 serious obstacle to the only, although distant,
solution of NATO's nuclear crisis. For there is only one
remedy for the present "one-sided balance": Europe must
some day establish itself within the frame of UATC as a
second nuclear power and partner of the United States.
£11 other schemes, which allegedly ain at a so-called
tAtlantic integration" and in truth serve to perpetuate
the present monopolistic situation, would merely stand in
the way of the tuture cooperation oi the U.5.A. and a
United Europe on the basis of equal ee eens
The Same aspect must also determine the European
attitude toward a possible accord between America and the
Soviet Union in the question of a "Non-Proliferation-
Agreement" for nuclear weapons. Europe would indeed be
faced with a number of serious problems if the two lead-
ing nuclear powers reached an agreement of this sort and
invited the NATO states to accede. For the signatures of
the European states on such a document would wake Lurope
—X | for an indefinite tine the political object of the non-
Huropean atomic giants.
Even if - as American policy would heve it - this
nuclear restriction allowed for the creation of a con-
munal organisation similar to MLF, the result would re-
main the same: the “one-sided balance" with all its in-
herent dangers for Lurope could never more be corrected.
An insuperable obstacle would for all time prevent the
esteblishment of a Buropean nuclear power.
von Guttenberg - 7 -
It is true that the drait of a "Non-Proliferation-
Agreement" presented by the U.S.A. contained a provision
which was interpreted by some as making allowance for th»
iuture creation of a comuon European nuclear power. In
actual fact, however, this clause only opened the possi-
bility of integrating the already existing nuclear potential
~ in a common organisation of Buropean states. At the same
time another provision in the sauwe draft prohibited all
other states to aid this organisation in the development
of nuclear weapons. And this amounts to a ban on all joint
efforts of the European states to build up a European
nuclear power.
I have stated that in my opinion there is only one
lasting solution for the problem of Europe's nuclear safety;
and that is the creation of a common European nuclear power
Within the frame of NATC and thus in alliance with the
United States. Let me underline once more that this is a
long-term objective. Indeed, no on: can with certainty pre-
dict that it will ever be achieved. But that a Huropean
nuciear power under Kurop:-an authority is a more realistic
concept than any Atlantic nuclear power under Atlantic
sovereignty could ever hope to be, is an equally incon-
testable truth.
I would suggest thet in the present situation a wise
German policy would be based on the frank avowal of the
above-mentioned objectives, ina strong opposition to all
measures likely to stand in their way, and in the energetic
pursuit of the gradual preparation of the necessary poli-.
tical toundation. It was President Kennedy himself who
inspired this concept when he spoke of the Atlantic part-
nership between the present world-power America and the
suture world-power Wurope.
(Il.
Munich,
INTERNATIONAL WEHRKUNDE-ENCOUNTER
TAG Of TWRVMANTY ANT DANCE
SE OF GERI VY AND FRANCE
} Aw
OS RRR E LL. Sk
Beaufre, Général d'Armée
e9th and 40th January 1
André Beaufre | | -\-
When a Frenchman has to discuss before a German audience
the subject on which I was invited to speak, he finds
himself in one of the most delicate situations imaginable.
I might easily have felt tempted to extricate myself with
the aid of some pleasant generalities, but my subject
permits no evasion - it calls for clear and unequivocal
answers. I am therefore faced with the necessity of
discussing with complete frankness some very difficult.
and decisive aspects of the problem of Franco-German
defense. I am fully confident that my German public
will not resent this approach, but will rather appreciate
my sincere endeavour to shed clear light on a question
which has so decisive a bearing on the future of both.
our countries,
We all agree that the new geopolitical, strategic and
technological situation has inevitably made national defen-
se the common problem of Germany and France. This means that
the two countries will simply have to stand side by side
whenever a threat to their common safety begins to take
concrete shape. And yet their efforts to achieve common
peace-time solutions are at present attended by grat
difficulties which can be traced back to the numerous
inherent contradictions of German policy resulting from
the situation created by the collapse of 1945. However,
satisfactory solutions can be expected as soon as the
Germans will have found an issue from their gravest.
dilemmas.
The New Strategic Situation
It is a truism that the technical development of new
weapons Since 1945 has radically changed the strategic
Situation. But as evident as this revolution may appear
to be - its real significance and proportions are by no
means universally understood and appreciated. Numerous
(and sometimes even eminent) experts seem unable to free
themselves from their World War II outlook and experience
although the latter have been made largely obsolete by
the changed dimensions and nature of strategy. The new
dimensions, the new magnitude, result from the enormously
increased velocity, reach and capacity of the weapons
carriers. Twenty years after the end of World War II the
planes fly ten times faster and much farther, the guided
missiles speed a hundred times faster and cover even
greater distances. In consequence, geographic entities
of the size of France and - even more —- of the Federal
Republic have lost much of their erstwhile strategic
Re
André Beaufre | ae oe
autonomy. By present-day standards warfare has acquired
continental dimensions, and Europe + the smallest continent
. of all - is no more than a theater of operations.
But the strategy of the Federal Republic and of France.
has even more in common. For the average distance of 180
miles separating the French border from the Iron Curtain
; make the Federal Republic once more the glacis against the
V hast which Germany had already been at the time of
Charlemagne. Th: defense of France will therefore largely
take place in Germany. But on the other hand the Federal
Republic can neither defend herself nor deploy her forces
unless she has access to the depth of the French and |
Belgian territories. For the purpose of gaining a sufficiently
large basis of operations for the proper disposition of the
available ground and air forces, the Federal Republic, France
and Belgium will of necessity have to regard themselves as
one Single area.
This same military concept already forced itself upon
us when Field Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny evolved the
first strategic scsomes for the defense organisation of
the Brussels Treaty. It was quite evident to us that the
Battle of Germany would decide the fate of France, and we
also realized that we should at least have togmin the under-
standing and support of the German civilian population for
the inevitable necessity of fighting on German soil. But a
favourable reaction was only to be expected if the German
people felt that it was going to be protected from invasion.
And there was only one way to achieve this reassurance: to
guarantee that Germany was going to be defended as far east
as possible. This military principle, which since then has
become known by the name of "forward defense", had been
evolved by France even before the Bundeswehr was called
into existence. Nothing but obsolete strategic concepts can
account today for schemes which fail to recognise that
France and Germany must adopt a common defense policy.
Nixt to the expansion of the basis of military
operations a second factor must be taken into consideration
whose significance is till frequently underrated or entirely
ignored. I refer to the changed nature of strategy resulting
not only from the development of nuclear weapons but, more
recently, also from the extraordinary increase of their
destructive force. While since 1945 the reach and speed of
Y the weapons carriers have increased tenfold, their annihilat-
ing effect has multiplied a million times. This unheard-of
technical break-through brought in its train revolutionary
-4-
André Beaufre | nites
innovations in many fields... The two world wars already
manifested the growing complexity of an ever more power-
ful war machinery whose enormous capacity for destruction
was out of all reasonable proportion with the political
motives and purposes of the combatants.. Numerous witnesses
of World War I were already awed by this vast disproportion
of cause and effect, and the second World War destroyed what-
ever doubts might still have remained on that score. Con-
sidering that meanwhile the threat of destruction has
increased a millionfold, the horrors of a future war would
be, to quote the expression of an American expert, simply
"inconceivable". The idea that a new conflict might follow
the same pattern as the last World War with only a great
number of nuclear weapons added, is mere fantasy. The very
existence and horrible cruelty Of thermo-nuclear arms
preclude all major military actions. Our strategy must
therefore primarily aim at converting the deterrence through
a classic system of national defense into the deterrence
through a system of threatening nuclear retaliation. The
fact that on both sides of the Iron Curtain there exist
large arsenals of nuclear weapons some of which - as for
instance the missiles-armed atomic submarines and the
"hardened" underground carrier rockets are invulnerable
and can therefore deal an annihilating counter-—-blow -
fortunately imposes utmost prudence in the question of
employing nuclear methods. In thepry this would point to
the necessity of a classic defense system permitting the
repulsion of relatively small agressions which would not
justify a major nuclear reprisal. Yet the enormous and
ever-present danger of ultimate escalation to an exchange
of atomic blows has in practice compktely hardened the
various positions taken in Europe today. This rigid
immobility makes it extremely improbable, if not
altogether impossible, that anyone would deliberately
provoke an armed conflict in Europe - and that no matter
what the political situation. But of that later.
All of these facts do not diminish the danger of an
unintentional conflict, however. For many years the Ameri-
cans harbored the apprehension that technical flaws or
imprudent actions of the lower echelons might spontaneously
trigger a war. This hypothesis can be safely dismissed
today because the present safety-mechanisms preventing
unintentional missile starts and the existence of
invulnerable nucelar weapons systems rendering rash
actions unnecessary, have put an end to these safety risks.
Meanwhile the nuclear balance of power has been equalised
to a point which makes us wonder under what circumstances
- short of the defense of absolutely vital positions -
André Beaufre | | "pip
the threat of using atomic weapons is still credible. But
this stalemate does not extend to the level of the conven-
tional forces. The more one deterrence cancels the other,
the greater the temptation to use conventional military
méthods in the eventuality of serious political complica-
eyong ron Curtain. A recurrence of something
like the Hungarian up-heaval either in East Germany or
elsewhere, and the repeated attempt of Soviet foroes to
re-establish the Communist order, would lead to an extremely
serious crisis with possibly very grave political and
military consequences. It is this sort of incident which
at the moment presents the likeliest cause of a crisis in
Kkurope. In this context it must be distinctly underscored
that such situations do not measure up to the definition
of military aggression which would justify the intercession
of NATO. For incidents of this sort would not be taking ,
place after the outbreak of a war but in times of peace for
which the NATO commands have actually no combat orders.
Besides, the sequence and interplay of the measures which
constitute the system of deterrence represent by nature and
definition a process which can fulfil its purpose only if
it is set going in times of peace, i.e. before the use of
military means. The Cuba crisis was an excellent example
of this policy.
It is only a logical consequence that the system of
national defense, which formerly consisted in military
preparations for the eventuality of war, is now more and
more shifting its emphasis on deterrence in times of peace.
In critical moments the effectiveness of a national systen
of defense rests, in other word, on the successful manipu-
lation of, and the convincing threat with the available
political and military means.
The skilful presentation of political, military and
material trumps in the decisive instants of a crisis calls
for a psychological insight greatly different from the
routine attitude towards conventional problems. And this
new situation bears at best only a slight resemblance to
the original concept of NATO embodying a strategy of
defense against military aggression. The effective
implementation of this new concept of nuclear deterrence
on a supra-national level will probably encounter certain
difficulties, for the national state still is at present
the only concrete embodiment of sovereignty in times of
preace,. | |
André Beaufre | —
The new magnitudes and the changed military situation
leave no choice but to regard the national defense of the
Federal Republik and of France as a common and inseparable
task. The same factors also call for a reorganisation which
extends beyond the military sphere and which does not look
backwards but is conceived in the light of today's and
tomorrow's necessities.
Political Disagreement
Unfortunately we are not only confronted with the
difficult problems resulting from the revolutionary changes
of strategy. We must also face the far more delicate questions
ensuing in part from a conflict o interests which has merged
in the past 20 years, and which are partly the consequence
of the inherent contradiction of German policy which must
be traced back to the German collapse in 1945. It is not
exaggerated to say that there is an absolute contradiction
between the agreement in matters of defense and the
disagreement in our political objectives.
World politics have undergone considerable changes in
the past ten years. The pressure which the USSR brought to
bear on Central Europe by means of its large conventional
forces and its expansive ideology has been replaced by an
incontestahle Melb GREY balance thanks to NATO and the
nuclear power of America. Simultaneously the interior
evolution of the USSR has notably modified its political
; attitude towards the West. More recently the Cuba crisis
demonstrated the impossibility of a nuclear conflict betwenn
Russia and America. These circumstances as well as the fact
that its steadily growing force will make China the main
source of international tensions in the E Qo come, have
roug about a certain rapprochement between the USSR and
the USA. It is true that this development is still slowed
down by numerous obstacles on either side, but the tendency
as such is too manifest to be any longer ignored.
In recognizance of the existing international situation, and
after many years of continous warfare in distant countries
which terminated in the grat crisis of decolonialisation,
France has withdrawn to her own native soil. Since then
She has built up her c rrence and the core of
a conventional military force, both of which are in full
André Beaufre 3 mbes
harmony with the peaceful and defensive nature of French
policy. At the same time France places full confidence in
the progressive unification of Europe. Although Great
Britain may still disagree in some important nueances, it
fundamentally adopts an analogous attitude.
Germany, on the other hand, is dissatisfied with the
present situation and therefore essentially remains an
unsaturated country imposing a considerable burden on
America's relations with the Soviet Union and making France
oe
fear for Europe inspite of all France-German
solidarity in matters of defense.
It is evident, of course, that Germany presents the
far more complex problem, for the consequences of the
collapse of 1945 inevitably involve the Federal Republic
in numerous political dilemmas.
In the interest of her safety the Federqgl Republic at
first saw herself forced to postpone her legitimate claims
for reunification. She had to resign herself to a military
d above all nuclear - status inferior to that of her
Allies. But she did so in the hope that the disadvantages
of this situation might be remedied by a policy of
integration which, while it might limit Germany's freedom
of action, could still be expected to increase German
influence within the Alliance, to lend emphasis to the
American safcty guarentee and to mitigate the unpleasant
Burden of discrimination. And so the Federal Republik renounc-
ed to the very same nuclear weapons which now emerge as an
indispensable component of modern defense. But the close
relations with the USA, which is regarded as the principal
., | Supporter of German interests, did not prevent America from
| seeking to establish a certain detence with the Soviet
Union. Nor is it any longer possible to calm down the
ever louder voice of certain parts of German public opinion
( which clamors for reunification and even return to those
1 eastern territories which belonged to Germany in 1937 « But
it is exactly these SL 8L58 amie a the wt Cha
he same rive the Soviet
satellites in East Sorcne beck into aeaece’a aw£€-—,
This host of contradictory tendencies and effects adds
up to an almost inextricable welter of complications which
render the European situation extremely difficult and prevent
a. satisfactory political solution of the common defense
problems of France and Germany. But no matter how difficult
the situation may be - effective solutions must be found at
all cost.
a /
André Beaufre . iD
The Political Solutions
From the French point of view the concept of defense
must not only be based on military considerations. Now
that the nuclear balance of power has changed the political
constellation so thoroughly that the possibility of a
Soviet invasation can be practically dismissed for the
moment, the questions of defense must be primarily regarded
Mie their political aspects. But this goal will remain a
mere vision unless (of course only by very gradual and
prudent steps) some form of political agreement is
achieved which will permit Europe to resume its traditional
relations with the various countries of the East. A
normalisation of this sort presupposes, however, a détente
between East and West which, incidentally, forms at present
one of the main objectives of both American and French
policy. |
opposition of the nion and its satellites, a
reaction which would be diametrically opposed to all
hopes and efforts to reestablish Kurope's and Germany's
historical union,
It is undeniable that this interpretation seems to
reflect not so much the necessities of German domestic
policy but rather the interests of the foreign policy of
France. But this point of view is nevertheless in complete
accord with the necessity of placing the German problem
into a more comprehensive logical context. One must also
be mindful of the dangers inherent to the frequent
declarations of Bonn that inaction is the only policy.
Allegedly, any German option would amount to a voluntary
concession and only weaken the European position when
some day the status of Central Burope will be finally
settled in a peace treaty. If Germany persists in these
fateful contradictions it wi tT elay the
solution 1ts problems and incur e risk o Lsappoint—
ee tains amen eee a “ne llailimelnt ene
ing in one way or another the false hopes of German public
opinion. It is simply impossible to achieve at one and the
Same time two diametrically opposed objectives.
-~3~
oO)
|
J
certainly discourage any Soviet attack on the Federal
Republic or Berlin.
7]
André Beaufre wp
The Military Solutions
AS soon as Germany has opted for the one or the other
political alternative, it will be possible to devise
effective military formulas which will not only safeguard
the military safety of France and Germany within the
Atlantic Pact but also furnish the basis of an adequate
future European defense system.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has successfully
established an extraordinarily powerful safety potential |
which no doubt has helped to protect West Hurope and
which at present constitutes a deterrence of the very first
order. As already mentioned above, China's appearance on
the internationaly scene and the development of the Soviet-
American relations on the one hand, and the nuclear and
conventional dispositions of the West on the other, will
Nevertheless it must be recognised that our defense
system has its soft spots. The most evident and immediate
weakness results from America's interpretation of
deterrence. The United States is rather envisaging a
containment of possible conflicts instead of their
elimination through total deterrence. But for us Europeans
even the smallest armed conflict on Kuropean territory
would entail the gravest, even incalculable, consequences.
It is quite true that the practical chances for such a
conflict are exceedingly small, but in theory they do
exist and so we must be prepared. The dire consequences
of this contingency loom particularly large in German
eyes, for the Federal Republic finds itself in the
psychological situation of an out—post. Therefore we must
do everything to bring about a re-orientation of American
strategy in the direction of total nuclear deterrence
which will confront a potential enemy with the inexorable
certainty that nuclear aggression spells for him nuclear
self-destruction. On thisscore Germany and France hold
identical and complementary views: the presence of a
number of tactical nuclear weapons in the front-—lines
_will add substance to the threat of total retaliation.
The same effect is achieved by the exceedingly decided
stand of France which leaves no doubt that any Soviet
attack will provoke a nuclear counterblast targetted on
the territory of the Soviet Union,
Andte Beaufre | -9-
The existing theoretical disagreements concerning the
use of nuclear weavons underline the absolute necessity of
evolving common concepts of nuclear strategy within the :
| Atlantic Alliance. France has been insisting on the urgency
of this problem for many years, although it is the United
, | states which controls the overwhelming majority of the West's
. | nuclear weapons.
France also demands that the Atlantic structure of
command be somewhat revised in favour of the European NATO
-Sartners. Only common investigations and efforts will
safeguard that the various wishes and requirements of each
individual member country will be properly considered in
the total strategy of the Alliance.
It must be remembered that the existing plans - subject
to the directives of Council Decision MC 70 provides that
in an emergency the Allies will be supplied with American |
nuclear war-heads - guarentee to the Federal Republic the
protection of a fully developed nuclear weapons system.
That, and a common defense strategy borne by the consent
of all members, should surely Satisfy German safety
interests even if the Federal Revublic does not possess
any nuclear weapons of its own. Collective systems such as
MLF would hardly make a noticeable contribution to the
existing safety factor.
(2) The second weakness of NATO results from the changing
\“ strategy of deterrence and the fact that Europe faces a new
situation in which a major Soviet invasion no longer
constitutes the principal cause of potential conflict.
While the original NATO conception is still based on this
contingency, it does not provide for the new main problen,
namely i.e. how spontaneous crises which might acquire
more or less critical proportions in times of peace without
amounting to deliberate full-scale aggression -— can be kept
under strict control. These new factors are far from
rendering NATO obsolete, for the Alliance was from the
| outset conceived for an entirely different purpose, namely
| as an instrument of ense in case of real war. But the
changed situation does ecseht alte Gr Poet the tes made
by America's leading European partners in reference to
Europe. The countries concerned must make allowance for the
sudden emergence of localised critical situations and must
devise methods to deal with them effectively and in the
well-considered interest of the community. This contingency
equally calls for joint studies and planning in which the
Federal Republic and France will have an important part to
play, ~10-
Andre Beaufre a | -10-
in this context it is by no means superfluous to state
that suggestions to build up collective nuclear arms Systems
such as the MLF have no practical bearing on the type of
critical situation described above. Their purpose is no
more and no less than retaliation: in case of aggression
they have to deal the "counter blow". Nor would the
directives governing a collective order to fire permit
any other use of such systems. From this follows the
necessity of preparing and coordinating national counter
measures with particular circumspection and thoroughness,
for in most cases it will not be possible to pursue a
rigid, pre-determined course of action. Common and extended
studies of the various potential patterns of crisis, on
the other hand, can confidently be expected to promote a
senuine spirit of political and military cooperation and
to deepen the awareness that agreement and partnership
are among the principal foundations of a future HULrOPe .
This common effort would initiate the first - and as
yet purely intellectual and creative - phase of a European
Defense Community of which we must hope that someday it will
be realized.
Within our community the Federal Republic provides
forces for the express purpose of defending a glacis or
out-post which - if need be - would be reinforces by
Kuropean and American complements. In view of the gradually
emerging political evolution the importance of these forces
would rather amount to a symbolic manifestation of solidarity
than to an effective military contribution. But France and
the Benelux Countries will provide not only the depth of
space required for the German defense dispositions but also
the indispensable second line of defense which might even be
| strengthended by full mobilisation should the nuclear stale-
mate lend new urgency to the threat of conventional war. The
depth of these defense dispositions together with the French
nuclear force provides the Continent with a very effective
nuclear deterrence complementing for Europe the general
effect of the vast nuclear strength of America,
But the nuclear potential of France has another impor-
tant function: it alone furnished the basis on which the
scientific, industrial and military applications of nuclear
power could develop also on the European side of the
Atlantic. These efforts, which for the time being are
limited to a national scope, will fully bear fruit with
the creation of a political European Authority which will
coordinate and make accessible all findings to all members
of the European Defense Community. 44
André Beaufre | -\1-
It is partly for this reason that France has so energeti-
cally opposed the "MLF" project. For this scheme would
irrevocably have led to the formation of an AtIantic
nuclear force. This would no doubt have prevented a
future European nuclear force which may be hoped to form
around the nucleus of the existing French and British
nuclear forces,
liiicieeerieeenemnnereetn ne
A complete integration of the European Forces will
only be possible once Europe has created the political
authorities empowered to make the necessary large-scale
strategic decisions. For in contrast to an illusion which
is widely held in the Federal Republic, it is indispensable
that the military instrument should be subjected to the
unquestioned and effective control of a political body.
This does not, of course, preclude a number of inter-
mediary steps: first of all one might start European
discussions and studies concerning the prevention of such
crises as ave mentioned above. Another rewarding subject
‘would be the possible effects of nuclear strategy on
Kuropean defense. France has for a long time been insisting
on the necessity of such political and military contacts
whose fundamentally peace-preserving purpose would be
universally manifest one the political options have been
made of which I spoke before,
A European agreement concerning the coordination of
defense production might be another intermediary step of
great consequence, particularly since the recenttalks on
France-Germany industrial collaboration have already
prepared the ground. The simultaneous existence of compet=
ing weapons systems which is so typical for Europe and
which has induces our countries each to rely on its own
(or even American) military equipment, a policy
diametrically opposed to the vital necessities not only
of weapons standardisation and effective common ligistis,
but also to the well-considered interests of our
industries. The idea of creating common funds for militar
research and development would not” dnly be another
promising ste eSired direction but would moreover
enable our most advanced European research centers to
compete successfully with American scientists. Beyond
their immediate significance these preliminary steps
might also blaze the trail for a future political union.
~10—
André Beaufre | stl he
Germany Must Choose
after many centuries of conflict France and Germany
have at last found their common mission in Europe. Their
geographic position, the complementary character of their
economies and the military requirements - all of these
factors combine to make joint defense efforts an absolute
necessity. The fact that German soldiers on maneuver in
France are so warmly welcomed by the French population
proves that the French have instinctively read the signs
of the times. And so one can confidently predict that,
inspite of our present difficulties, the essential
problems of Franco-German relations are about to be
solved.
Such disagreements as still divide us today are of a
political nature and a result of the fact that France
unhesitatingly grants top-priority to the reunification
of Europe, while Germany, caught up in its domestic
dilemmas, still hesitates which way to choose. But
sooner or later Germany must make its choice.
Permit me to express here my fervent hop that this
option will not be long in materialising so that Franco-
German solidarity may come to full fruition. In actual
fact Germany does not have to choose between safety
through NATO and reunification, between the possession
of nuclear weapons and discrimination - nor is it
confronted by the alternative of integration and
nationalism. Our whole future depends on the clear
recognition of the one and only way which will lead to
reunification in a greater Europe whose larger and more
generous political dimensions will make it easier to
heal the scars left by World War II and the. brutual
division of 1945,
XI. INTERNATIONALE VEHRKUNDE-BEGEGNUNG IN MUNCHEN
IWth INTERNATIONAL VEARKUNDE-ENCOUNTER IN MUNICH
11iéme RENCONTRE INTERNATIONALE DE LA WEHRKUNDE A MUNICH
1 Fe Februar 1974
TEILNEHMERLISTE
PARTICIP'NTS
LES PARTICIP'NTS
CONRAD SHLERS, MdB
Bonn
Dr. JOACHIM AHRENDT, 'Yehrkunde"
Kiel
‘dW, J.LTENBURG, Oberst i.G.
Bundesverteidigungsministeriun
Bonn
Dr. KLAUS AURISCH, vortragender Legationsrat
fuswartiges Ant
Bonn
Dr. GERHARD BAUMANN, Schriftsteller
Munchen |
KURT BECKER, "Kdlner Stadtanzeiger"
Koln
BRIAN BEEDHAM, "The Econonist"
London
HARRY E, BERGOLD, Deputy Assistant secretary for
European and NATO iffairs
Washington
CARL-VILHELM BERKH'N, parlanentarischer Staatssekretar
Bundesverteidigungesninisteriun
Bonn
NURI BIRGI, Botschafter a.D,
Istanbul
LUDYIG BOLKOW, Dipl.-Ing,
Messerschni€t-Bolkow-Blohn
Ottobrunn
VOLKER BORHO, "Mtinchner Merkur"
Munchen
JURGEN BR'NDT, Brigadegeneral
Bundesverteidigungsninisteriun
Bonn
Dr. BERNHARD BUSSMANN, MdB
Bonn
PETER HEINRICH CARSTENS, OTL i.G,
Bundesverteidigungsninisteriun
Bonn
Dr. PETER CORTERIER, MdB
Bonn
JULIAN CRITCHLEY, M.P.
London
KL*°US DOHRN, "Tine"/"Life'
Zurich
VOLFG'NG FECHNER, "Neue Hannoversche Presse"
Bonn
PIERO FERRABOSCHI, Botschaftsrat
Italienische Botschaft
Bonn
Dr. ALOIS FRIEDEL, nil.-pol. Gutachter
Bundeshaus
Bonn
RICHARD FRODL, Generalnmajor
Munchen
ERCUMEND GOKAYDIN, Tiingeneral
Ankara
Dr. WALTER F. HAHN, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Philadelphia
ARMIN HALLE
PIERRE HASSNER, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques
Paris
PETER HESS, "Neue Ztircher Zeitung"
Zurich
‘ILHELM HESS, Generalnajor a.D.,
Munchen
ARTHUR HOCKADAY, Deputy Under Secretary of State
London
FRANK HOFFLIN, Oberst
Kanadische Botschaft
Bonn
Prof. Dr. WERNER KALTEFLEITER, SozZialwissenschaftliches
Forschungsinstitut
Alfter/Bonn
MORTON A. KAPLAN, University of Chicago
Chicago
JORG KASTL, stellvertretender Generalsekretaér ftir poli-
tische Angelegenheiten
NATO
Brussel
EY.LD HEINRICH von KLEIST, "VYehrkunde"
Munchen
Dr. EGON KLEPSCH, MdB
Bonn
Dr. G2ORG KLIESING, MdB
Bonn
JOHN GODLOVE KORMANN, Koneul
A£nerikanisches Generalkonsulat
Munchen
Dr. KONR“.D KRASKE, MdB
Bonn
GEORGE LACH ‘NCE, M.P., Chairnan Parlianentary Standing
Connittee on External Affairs and National Defence
Ottawa
HAGEN GRAF L’MBSDORFF, "Der Spiegel"
Hanbureg
GEORG LEBER, Bundesninister der Verteidiguneg
Bonn 3
RANCIS MACGINNIS, Botschoftsrat
Britische Botschoft
Bonn
Dr. JOHN L. MC LUCAS, Secretary for the Air Force
Washington |
Dr. ERNST-OTTO MAETZKE, "Frankfurter illgeneine"
Frankfurt
FRINCIS M. MANNING, US-Verbindungsoffizier Bayern
Munchen
Dr. WERNER MARK, MdB
Bonn
YVILHELM MEYER-DETRING, Generalleutnant a.D,
"Wehrkunde"
Munchen
Dr. NORBERT MUHLEN, Journalist
New York
GEORGE F. MULLER, Politischer Berater des AuBenninisteriuns
bein Hauptquartier der anerikanischen Streitkrafte Europa
UNE NERLICH, "Stiftung Vissenschaft und Politik"
Bbenhausen
JEAN FRANCOIS NOUGEREDE, Sécretaire des Affaires Ktrangéres
Paris
SAM NUNN, Senator
Vashington
aCHIM OSTER, Generalnajor a.D,
Munchen
ALFONS PAWELCZYK, MdB
Bonn
PETER PETRIE, Botschaftsrat
Britische Botschaft
Bonn
CHRISTIAN POTYKA, "Stiddeutsche Zeitung"
Munchen
eg ere oe ae
GUNTER RAULF, Oberst i.G.
Bundesverteidigungsninisteriun
Bonn :
WOLFRAM von RAVEN, Journalist
Bonn
fH. REED, Generalkonsul
Britisches Generalkonsulat
Munchen
Prof. Dr. KLAUS RITTER, "Stiftung Vissenschaft und Politik"
Bbenhausen
Prof. Dr. OTTO ROEGELE
Munchen
HELLMUTH ROTH, Botschafter
Juswartiges Ant
Bonn
Dr. LOTHAR RUHL, Chefredaktion Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen
Wilesbaden
Dr. HANS RUHLE, Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungs-—
institut
Alfter/Bonn
WALTER SCHEEL, Bundesninister des AuBeren
Bonn
HERMANN SCHMIDT CWURGENDORE), MdaB
Bonn
GERD SCHMUCKLE, Generalnajor
Munster
FRANZ-JOSEPH SCHULZE, Generalleutnant
Erbisoeul
ROBERT G. SHACKLETON, Botschaftsrat
anerikanische Botschaft
Bonn ‘
|
Dr. THEO SOMMER, "Die Zeit"
Hanburg
Prof. HANS SPEIER
Hartsdale, New York
ROLF STEINH.US, Flottillenadniral
Bonn
JOHANNES STTINHOFF, General
Chairnan of the NATO Military Connittee
Brussel
HERBERT SPIV’CK, Generalkonsul
Anerikanisches Generalkonsulat
Munchen
Dr. VALLTHER STUTZLE
Bundesverteijigungsninisteriun
Bonn
JOHN TOVER, Senator
Vashington
HERBERT TREBESCH, Konteradniral .
Bonn
Dr. WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE, University of Southern California
Los angeles
HiSSO VIEBIG, Brigadegeneral a.D.
"Wehrkunde"
Munchen
R. VOGEL, Oberstleutnant
Bundesverteidigungsninisteriun
Bonn
OLFG'NG VOGES
Bundespresse=- und Infornationsant
Bonn
Prof. RONALD WARING
Monte Estoril
RUDIGER Frhr. von WECHMAR, Staatssekretar
Bundespresse=. und Infornationsant
Bonn
Dr. RICH‘RD von YEIZSACKER, MaB
Bonn
GERHARD WESSEL, Prdsident des Bundesnachrichtendienstes
Munchen
Dr. H'NS-GEORG YIECK, Ministerialdirektor
Auswartiges Ant
Bonn
SEPP J. “IOELKER,
fuswartiges Ant
Bonn
FRANZ WORDEMANN, "Miinchner Merkur"
Munchen
Dr. MANFRED ‘VORNER, MaB
Bonn
> PETER “URTZ, MaB
vd Bonn
ROBERT ZOELLY, Vissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter
Kusnacht |
