53 Bonn . den 8, Januar 1964
USAI3930
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Nr. 2061 (Bundeshous-Vermittlung) anrufen, =
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Fritz ERLER Bundeshaus Soon
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages ne
Herrn
Hans SPEIER
The Rand Corporation
1700 Main 51
Santa Monica, California
Lieber Herr Speier,
Ihnen ist sicher bekannt, dass im Frtihnjahr die in Europa stationier-
ten Verbuinde der US-Army mit Pershing-Raketen ausgerlistet werden.
Allerdings bin ich nicht sicher, ob es sich dabei schon um einsatz-
fahige Gerdte oder nur um Ubungsraketen handelt. Die Pershing
schiesst bis zu 720 Kilometer weit, und ist auch von der Bundes-
wehr bestellt worden, allerdings nicht fiir das Heer, sondern fur
die Luftwaffe.
Zu diesem Punkt nun hatte ich eine Frage: Sie wissen, dass es in
der NATO seit langem eine Diskussion tiber die Zweckmassigkeit
oder Unzweckmissigkeit der Stationierung von Mittelstrecken-
raketen auf dem europdischen Festland gibt. Ich personlich bin
mit der herrschenden Doktrin eigentlich dagegen. Ich ftrchte,
dass derartige Basen zu leicht in einer Krisensituation aus-
zeschaltet werden kénnen,und infolgedessen ihren militarischen Wert
verlieren. Ausserdem sind Gebiete, in denen sich derartige Basen
befinden, in hohem Ausmasse psychologischer Erpressung ausgesetzt.
Daher ging meine Meinung eigentlich mehr in der Richtung, derartige
weitreichende Waffen auf die See zu verlagern.
Die Pershing ist zwar mobil und bedarf insofern keiner festen Basis,
aber sie wiirde sich ja in den in Frage kommenden Landern aufhalten.
Mir ist nun etwas unklar, welche taktische oder gar strategische
Konzeption mit der Einftihnrung der Pershing in die Verbdande der
amerikanischen Armee auf dem europdischen Kontinent tUberhaupt
verbunden ist. Ware es Ihnen médglich, aus Ihrer Sachkunde heraus
mir dazu ein paar Anmerkungen zu machen?
Ich habe mich absichtlich nicht an das Pentagon gewandt, weil ich
ja keine Geheimnisse ergrtinden, sondern zu meiner eigenen Meinungs-
bildung ein etwas unabhangiges Urteil haben mochte.
In der Hoffnung, dass Sie mir in dieser Frage etwas behilflich sein
k6nnen, verbleibe ich
mit de sten Griussen
Thr
28 January 1964
L-1988
Mr. Fritz Erler, MadB.
Bundeshaus
53 Bonn, Germony
Dear Mr. Erler:
In response to your inquiry regarding the Pershing missile, | am
enclosing two statements made by Lieutenant General Dwight E. Bead,
to the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and
by General Earle G. Wheeler, to the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, respectively. The deleted phrases in Wheeler's statement
ore classified; the text | am sending is taken verbatim from the record
as published.
In the United States, the Pershing is, of course, a tactical Army
weapon like the Redstone, which it replaced. {tf can reach only
targets lying within the range ossigned to U. S. Army missiles. 1
do not know whether it would be technically feqsible to extend that
range by modifying the system. If that were possible, theYU. S.
Army could not continue to claim Pershing as one df “its” missiles,
unless the so-called Key West Agreement allocating missiles according
to range to the Air Force and Army, respectively, were revised once
more. You know better than | do why the German Luftwaffe rather
than the German Army will get the Pershings which your government
is buying. (This arrangement reminds me of the fact that the Thor
missiles in Britain were under RAF jurisdiction.) It is, of course,
a fact that the Pershing can reach targets that could not be reached
by the shorter-range Redstone and were for this reason assigned to
other weapons systems, including tactical aircroft.
From your published statements, including your October 1963 article
in Foreign Affairs, | was familiar with your preference for sea-based
rather than land-based missile delivery systems. You give two reasons
for your preference. First, you fear that land-based weapons of such
sride range can be too easily eliminated in a situation of crisis;
Mr. Fritz Erler ~2- 28 January 1964
L-1988
second, you say that the territory on which such bases are located
are to a high degree eslposed to psychological blackmail.
Let me briefly comment on these issues:
1. Given the range of Pershing (100-400 nautical miles) they
could not be based like Polaris on surface ships or submarines for away
from the coast. Instead, they would have fo stay close to the shore,
{e.g., not very for from Hamburg) if they were not to get out of
range and become militarily useless.
2. Such off-shore location would make them as much vulnerable
to attack as mobile land-based weapons. It might even be argued
that sea-based so close to the shore they would be more easily detected
and hence be more vulnerable than they are on land.
3. Elimination of the Pershings in a military conflict would in
any event have to involve the use of massive force against the West,
but such massive failure of the western deterrent would lead to nuclear
wor in any event. Perhaps, you will argue that destruction of sea-
based Pershings would be less likely to invoke nuclear retaliation by
the West than the elimination of land-based weapons? | do not con-
sider it likely that mager oggressive action could be limited to the
sea.
4. | have no specific information on the fall-out problem raised
by attempts to eliminate off-shore vs. land-bosed systems, but | ven-
ture to guess that the major diminution of collateral damage would be
confined to heat and blast effects.
5. Perhaps, the most important objection to basing Pershings on
ships can be derived from the fact that you would need a different
guidance system: (in your scheme, the Pershing would have to become
something like a short-range Polaris, as for as guidance is concemed).
There is probably no technical reason rendering such change of the
system impossible, but it would certainly involve major modifications
and these gould require additional time and money.
ie
“et
4
Mr. Fritz Erler ~3- 28 Januory 1964
L~1988
6. The modification of the guidance system would be avoided on
water-based Pershings, if they were mounted on barges and moved up
and down canals, but this is an idea different from your proposal.
7. As to your argument on nuclear blackmail, it may be useful to
distinguish between psychological pressure that is applied in peacetime
and pressure that could be applied at the beginning of a military conflict,
however smali. As you know, the first type of blackmoil was tried
many times by the Soviet government in the '50's against all European
NATO members as well as against Japan and other countries on whose
territories U. S. air and missile bases were located. In none of these
cases did blackmail work. No allied government has ever been in-
timidated, reneged base agreements, or taken similar divisive action
under such pressure. In all cases the blackmail attempts led to vigorous
political rejection of Soviet interference in the affairs of other countries,
to protests, assertions of sovereignty, etc. In shott, such blackmail
solidified rather than weakened the alliance.
| grant you that the response could conceivably be different if we
assume, soy, a border conflict that might escalate. Af such a moment
of high tension Soviet nuclear blackmail intensify fear and possibly
couse panic in the countries exposed to Soviet threats. But the risks
that the Soviets would incur by openly threatening escalation ore con-
siderable, given Western capabilities for nuclear deterrence and action,
Nor is it certain that under the assumed conditions resistance to black-
mail would be materially @ffected by the location of one particular
weapons-system. We must consider, it seems to me, that other weapons
and military manpower, not all of which could possibly be moved out
to sea, would continue to present targets for political pressure and
military aggression.
| would have sent these brief remarks more promptly to you had it not
been for the fact that | om in the midst of preparing a move to New
York ot the end of this week. {| have accepted an invitation of Mr.
McCloy to take a leave of absence from RAND for a year and will
serve as Senior Fellow to the Council on Foreign Relations. Thaee, |
will undertake a study of German Foreign Policy (in the Erherd era).
Some time in April | expect to be in Europe for two or three months.
| am looking forward with great pleasure to seeing you again.
Mr. Fritz Erler -4- 28 January 1964
L-1988
My address in 1964 will be c/o Council on Foreign Relations, 58
East 68th Street, New York 21, New York.
With kindest personal regards.
Sincerely,
Hans Speier
HS:thb
Attachments - noted
With respect to our field army guided-missile system, we are providing the
field army commander with a nuclear capability against targets in his zone of
tactical responsibility. The employment of these weapons is, of course, controlled
at the highest Government level, but they have to be ready for immediate use
once the decision is made. In the new PERSHING missile we get just over twice
the effective range of the earlier REDSTONE, more warhead weight, and a solid
fuel instead of the hard-to-handle liquid fuel. The requirement here is for
{deleted 7 which includes some for unit training and annual service practice.
Wecthove /deleted 7 PERSHINGS on hand or on order. We want to buy /deleted 7
PERSHINGS in the new year to round out the support of the /deleted 7 PERSHING
battalions in our troop structure, and replace the out-of-date REDSTONE missile
systems at a cost of $164.4 million.
Statement of General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, p. 512,
Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, First
Session on H. R. ds , Department of Defense Programs and Authorization
of Appropriations During Fiscal Year 1964 for Procurement, Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation of Aircraft, Missiles, and Naval Vessels for the Armed
Forces.
PERSHING is our 100- to 400-nautical-mile, two-stage, solid propellant
replacement for REDSTONE. It stands out as a fine development that will
enhance our ability to move and shoot. The PERSHING fire unit -- mounted
on four fully tracked vehicles -- can move into firing position and fire within
minutes. The fire unit -- less its tracked vehicles -- is transportable by
CHINOOK helicopters. Tactical equipment has been delivered to the first
unit and service test firings under conditions simulating various tactical
environmants ore scheduled to begin in August of this year at White Sands
Missile Range. In addition, firings are already underway at the Atlantic
Missile Range where military firing crews are launching production missiles
using production ground-support equipment.
Fiscal year 1964 funding for PERSHING will provide for evaluation of
service and environmental test programs as well as research and development
effort for corrections identified during final testing and initial field deployment.
Statement of Lt. General Dwight E. Beach, Chief of Research and Development,
Department of the Army, p. 1262, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, First Session on H.R. 7179,
Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending
June 30, 1964, and for Other Purposes.
