Trip report, 1968 February 8-24

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DRAFT
3/5/68 | TRIP REPORT

ania HANS SPEIER

The following is a recorded talk given by Hans Speier on 4 March 1968:

This is going to be in the nature of a trip report covering a period from
February 8 to 24 in Germany. I spent a few days in Munich, in Berlin, and

in Bonn.

In Munich, just to give you the background, I talked to some leading
person in the German intelligence service who is going to visit RAND in the
next few days--General Keenitz is interested in information storage and
retrieval for intelligence purposes, and the Air Force is sponsoring his
trip. So I met him in preparation for this trip.to RAND.

I also attended the Wehrkunde Conference which is a conference of some
military analysts, politicians, from Germany, France, Great Britain, the
United States, and some other NATO countries plus Austria and Switzerland.

I went to the research institute that is under the direction of Dr. Klaus
Riecter near Munich for a round-table conference, and I had a number of
subsequent discussions in Munich with various Germans.

In Berlin I went to the U. S. Mission, to the technical universities, to the
Free University, to the Senate, and I talked to a number of German and
American journalists. I was fortunate to be there during the weekend when the
big student demonstration against Vietnam took place, and I have yet to say
about that later.

In Bonn, apart from the U.S. Embassy, I talked to a number of deputies
in Parliament, a number of officials in the Foreign Office, and in the Defense
Ministry, in the Press Office, and again with some defense analysts--specialists

on foreign policy in the town.

Both the faushing and the flu cut short my schedule and made many
changes necessary, although I neither participated in fausching nor the flu,
but most of the people that I wanted to see seemed to be in the grips of
either one--fausching or the flu.

Now what I want to do to day is I want to talk about six subjects
that seem stand out in the impressions that I got on this short trip. Let
me list them for you so that you know what's coming up. I'd like to say a
word about the present German attitude toward the nonproliferation treaty,

a word about German Eastern policy, something about the British withdrawal

from the possessions east of Suez, something about German attitude toward

France and French policy toward Germany that transpired in the conversations,
fifth, something about German attitude toward the United States and particularly
Vietnam, and finally I'd like to conclude with a few observations on the

German domestic political scene which I found very interesting.

Now before starting on this, let me say a word first about the Munich
conference on which I will say about a fourth of my impressions are based.

It differed from all preceding conferences that I attended (four of them) and
that the American delegation was extremely large (and that was for the first
time). I learned that it was due to the initiatives taken by the German
Chancellory. They were interested in getting some German Senators and
representatives, as well as Defense Department officials, to the meeting,

and they succeeded in getting Senator John Tower from Texas and three
Congressmen--Ray Hayes, John Brodemus, and Henry Roes to the meeting. In
addition to that, the meeting was attended by Fred Wyle§ Bill Kaufman from

my suggestion (of course, I didn't know that Wyle would be there and I

i a

thought it would be important if somebody could speak for the official

McNamara policies toward Europe); Christopher Emmett, who is maybe known
Y)

ay 4

to some of you; Stephen Perseni; Timothy Stanley; the paper for the
United States was read by Bernard Brodie; and myself. Now that is a pretty
large list, I would say. And although some people like Bill Kaufman said
very little, and what he said was very polite, there were enough Americans
there to listen and to speak occasionally. I talked to the organizer of
the conference afterwards, and I asked him how on earth should these official
American representatives react to the meeting, and he told me that the
Congressmen and Senator Tower, in particular, who were sort representative
of the loyal opposition opening the meeting as a man requiring respective
dignity, not saying much and then keeping silent. By that the three
Congressmen, in particular, had thanked the organizer of the conference
quite profusely because they had not realized, they said, how uncertain the
fate of the nonproliferation treaty is in Europe, and evidently they had not
been quite correctly informed in Washington, or not fully enough informed, and
coming back to Washington they would certainly make inquiries how come they,
as U.S. Congressmen, were kept so ill-informed. So in this respect the
initiative of the German Chancellory was highly successful because this was
precisely what they wanted to accomplish and through the person of
Wittenburg, who was at the meeting and who made the main statement
against the nonproliferation treaty. The other American representatives or
the main lines taken by the American delegation were about as follows:
Brodie and aopaper that was not too much brought up-to-date concerning
recent NATO doctrine attacked the McNamara doctrine and the McNamara strategy
and also the involvement in the war in Vietnam. Christopher Emmett and

Congressman John Brodemus made toward the end of the meeting a rather pathetic

and tearful plea for help on the advance of payment problem. Fred Wyle and

wail

in a very short statement, Bill Kaufman lectured the Germans on the correct
behavior of a minor ally, and Fred Wyle distributed a sheet of figures about
relative strength--Western and Eastern fractional strength--to the German
newspaper men which fell in the hands of a representative of the German
Intelligence Agency who told me later that he considered these figures
completely hoax.

Stephan Personi, of course, talked about the silent partners in the
conversation, namely the technological revolution and weaponry that would
take place and resurrect not eater the Soviet menace but by possibly as early
as 1969 a Soviet superiority in strategic weapons. And Timothy Stanley did
not say very much--I forget precisely what he said. That was about it.

The British, of course, were preoccupied with their withdrawal from
éast of Suez, and there was a sensation at the meeting, namely a paper which
was officially read but clandestinely circulated by a member of the British
Intelligence and a member of the Conservative Party, who just blasted the
position of the Wilson government so that Mr. Richards, the MP from the
Labor Party,had a very rough time against something that was
not really open on the table, and the man remained silent, although his paper
was far better than by Richards--briefer and much better. I will give
you a few quotations in a minute.

The main French speaker was General ,and he was surprisingly
weak this time. I have heard him on various occasions at these meetings. He
was quite weak, giving sort of a minor, highly philosophical comment on the
nature of coalitions in the support of the recent paper that is at present quite

widely discussed in Europe on these three models of the future of Europe--the

Sie

, , and corporation paper, prepared by the

--which was not itself discussed but it was sort

of in the back of minds of many people.

The Germans presented two papers;. There was one from the CDU--a deputy

whom I hadn't heard before by the name of Krauska, allegedly a calming man--
and one by a social democrat on security policy and disarmament,presenting
some of the socialist views on armed control.

The central topic of the meeting was the alliance in the '70's, and
there was a vain attempt every once in a while to project something into the
future, but on the whole, it was really a voicing of current concern and
whatever there was of the future was quite pitifully extrapolated from what
is happening today. And that was the size of the futurology of the meeting.

Now so much for the general characterization of the meetings, and I
know we'll get some flavor as I go to the individual points that I would like
to discuss.

Let me start with the nonproliferation treaty. There were two main

schools among the Germans represented. One by Dr. Hans Arnold, who is a

personal, right-hand man of Willy Brandt in the Foreign Office, the designated
Ambassador : ee with which Germany has just agreed on exchange of
diplomaticsrelations. A few days before I left, something seems to have
happened so that Arnold's appointment is still uncertain, but at the time
the meeting took place everybody said he is the one who will go to Yugoslavia.
So he spoke, as it were, for the foreign office and also for the social

democrats, being close to Brandt and having joined the social democratic

party some years ago during an election campaign in which either Adenauer

-~6-

or attacked Willy Brandt for the fact that he was an illegitimate
child. And Arnold, until then, was not a Socialist, just left the foreign
office, went to the social democratic headquarters, and said, "I want to
kind of
join , I can't stand the/politics involved."' He became a close and trusted
MPT
collaborator of Brandt. He spoke in favor of the ampuxez, that is, the
current draft, saying I thought quite correctly, but during the last year a
great number of improvements in the text have taken place, partly upon
German insistence in negotiations in Washington, conducted on the German
side by and his scientific advisor, » whom
many of you know because he was here. S&S himself was one of
the persons who had the flu this time and couldn't come. But I learned by
inquiring that S$ himself holds the same view. He considers
this is a major achievement on his part, which it is, having gotten the
United States to agree to this improvement, so everybody on that side of
the house seems satisfied with the MPT, detailing the improvements and
‘enumerating them, pointing them out.

Then came Guttenburg, and he was seconded by Zimmerman, who is the
chairman of the Defense Committee in Parliament, and by Yaeger who is the
former Minister of Justice in the Erhardt government, also CSU men from the
very up and by a number of people such as Rxafgasax to a lesser extent by
Graver, that is the German Ambassador to NATO, and some journalists. So the
ring that I'm going to dksausx describe now, perhaps due to the location of
the meeting in Munich, but much more strongly, more vocally represented than

appeared

the honored line, which in German politics, of course, stronger than was at

the meeting. In fact, Arnold only had some dubious and qualified report from

Theo Zummer among the Germans.

a fie

Now the main arguments that Guttenburg made were about as follows: Yes,

there were some improvements but we now have a basis for discussion really
between the Allies putting aside not the fact that a year of discussions has
passed since Strauss and (Adenauer talked about the treaty as another

Yalta and super Versailles and so on. And he or somebody else referred to
the fact that Holstein too had said it is a perpetuation of Yalta, even in
its present form as a treaty; and he himself, Guttenburg, was a bit more
cautious. He said there are three types of problems that need to be ironed
out. One has to do with procedure. There has to be a conference to
examine the disarmament of the super powers from time to time. This is

not provided for in the treaty. There has to be a further discussion about
the duration of the treaty--25 years as provided in the last draft is more

than eternity. Then there must be also a procedure or clarification of

the conditions that have to be met before the treaty will be enforced,
particularly with respect to the number of ratifications required and the
types of states whose ratification is required. The Germans, in particular,
are always very anxious to point out that they and some other countries are
more important than some of these new African republics, so let's not put
them together in the same category. Outside the treaty text or treaty
draft, there are furthermore secondly questions of verification. The
question of verification has to be clarified further--the verification of
the actual work that is being done with the reactors in the various
countries. And this has to be clarified in such a manner as to make sure
that the European energy market will not be completely dislocated before:
it even has created a nuclear energy market before it is created. This is
what is really at stake. He said the control of five states, that is all

Eurotron states but France, in Eurotron would be dangerous if these five

states were to be subjected to a double control, namely by Euratron on the
one hand and the Vienna Agency on the other hand. The whole way in which
this will be handled is not clarified. Furthermore, he said, the question
of the interpretation of the treaty--which is by no means clear enough--
there is the danger that verbal agreement is taken for a substantial
consensus, particularly among the big powers whereas we, the Germans, do
not know whether this will be really the case. And he referred back to
the old standby of the Christian Democrats, namely the so-called Europe
Clause, or European Clause, meaning that the treaty should have a provision
permitting a unified Europe in the future to become a nuclear power. For
example, if France and Britain were to bring in their nuclear arsenals and
gave up the sovereignty as is our way in the future, but had significance
to the Christian Democrats as » aS a Social Democrat
pushes aside and says let's ‘not talk about something so far in the future.
He again brought up the fact that after all at the beginning of the whole
debate on MPT there was this article by Foster in Foreign Affairs in which
he said the agreement with the Soviet Union is so important as to be well
worth the price of any erosion of the European alliance. He unfortunately
did make this statement in writing and it has been haunting us ever since.
which
Now you might add to this that all this statement/was madmx more moderate
than the statement by Zimmerman, the CSU chairman of the Defense Committee,
was made déspite the fact that Guttenburg must have known,if anybody knows,
I mean he is State Secretary to the Chancellor and extremely well informed
on these matters, he must have known that in the negotiations in Washington

On various occasions, Foster and his deputy were overruléd: by the President

himself in favor of the German arguments. This happened I think two or three

times. And improvements were made. No recognition, except for a very
brief statement, "Yes, it is very good, but..." and then came a the long
list of grievances. No recognition of these improvements was made.

So &kkem when he was through, another Social Democratic deputy asked
immediately, "Mr. Chairman,did Rowen Guttenburg speak as a person or as
a representative of the Chancellor?" And the chairman obliged by saying,
"We all speak as persons. It's sort of anybody's guess how you do this,
you see--how you divide yourselves, your various roles that you play."

The other Germans with whom I talked about this in trying to get just
a feel at least as to what theyxkgekkxa viewed the seriousness of this issue
in Germany. They said, "Yes, it is one of the three or four issues, and in
foreign policy, the only issue. kke the only issue in sight which can lead
to a really very serious crisis in the Grand Coalition."

Now let me leave it at this, and if you want to come back to it, we
can later. Let me turn to the issue of Eastern policy.

On Germany's Eastern policy, characterized since the formation of the

Grand Coalition Government by efforts with the
Eastern European countries. The view generally expressed was that kke

we must pursue a datant policy because everybody else does. The French do,
the British are going to be much more active in this area now, and after all
your President has said that he wants to build bridges, so why don't we go
ahead? We must go ahead. At the same time it was realized that when the
Germans begin to talk with the Russians, if there is any chance that the
Germans will talk with the Russians, then a number of other countries get
very nervous, particularly Washinton gets nervous. There was the stein
memo, memorandum by the German Ambassador from Washington, warning Bonn that
there were certain people wh in the State Department who took the strongest
view of these attempts toward German-Russian direct negotiations, although

officially it was always said, "I didn't read the memo myself, but I talked

ee Oe eee

~1i=

to the author of the memo before I left the country and I know how he feels

about it." Its not written by stein himself. There I think the

main impact of the memo is "Let's be absolutely certain that we inform

Washington." I promptlyxasxxxxxxakxnansukakkanxcansukkakkanx it's a

question of consultation rather than action, or restriction of action,so
as to preclude any such misunderstandings that we are moving toward a
However, the impact of the stein memo
or the German fear that Washington might not like the Germans to talk with
the Russians was also increased by a visit--not much publicized--by
Mr. Ollis. Comrade Ollis, as the Deputy Press Chief in Germany, a very
intelligent man, extremely intelligent person, who was in Washington and
talked to some people in the State Department and apparently got very
definitely the impression that WAshington takes a very deem view of these
German activities. I even know who he talked to, and as usual, these
generalizations are based on a few conversations. I think the main people
who create this impression in Bonn were Mr. Bouie and Mr. Verjensky. he

I tried to stay away from this topic altogether, but I asked everybody,

as I had in the State Department before leaving for Germany, what the
interpretation was of the Berlin initiative on the part of the Soviets. You
may recall there has been this Soviet memorandum in January followed by three
notes to the common entour, to the Western powers, insisting that Germany
should dilute its political presence in West Berlin--that is, the Federal
Republic should have no meeting of the Defense Committee, kaxexma the
President shouldn't go there, ans so on. And this was in the Soviet note

tied in with the customary reproaches of neo-Nazism in Germany. So I asked

what the interpretation was. I got the interpretation that it was almost

win

unanimously first that it was more of the same anti-German propaganda that
we had gotten before and secondly, and more interestingly, and more in line
with my own interpretation, that it was an attempt to put the brake on
Uhlbrecht, who after all, since the beginning of the new Eastern policy, has
really made Communist policy in Eastern Europe with the Russians playing,

as it were, the second fiddle and by now preventing the memorandum and
threating to talk with Bonn directly, they write the music, and Uhlbrecht

has to play the second fiddle. This is, of course, more to their liking.

Even in the State Department thought that this was probably
correct or at least a reasonable hypothesis--who knows what is and
what is . It, of course, also serves the old Soviet purpose of

creating a schism kekwaaenxkke in the Western alliance or as to the extent
that it still exists. Note the stein memo and of course it is also
very unpopular with the French--that the Russians would talk with Bonn that
is really more important than Paris rather than with Paris--and so on.
Wherever I went, another issue to which my attention was called to in
a conversation, incidentally, in Munich on which I found quite an
interesting question. To my great surprise, I found that virtually
nobody claimed to be familiar with this situation. I said, "would it not
be possible that the Russians are preparing the ground, or a sort of
political gwkagcesxkaxy , for discussion with the Germans and the
Western Allies on the following subjects: There are three reactors in
West Berlin: two research reactors and one reactor that is to produce
nuclear energy. If you axgexkakkingxkkexcankkaek Euratron controls the

output of these reactors, it means that Russian implicitly recognize

af.

West Berlin
that khakksxkkhe is part of the Federal Republic. If the Vienna Agency,

however, controls these reactors, it means an implicit recognition on the
part of Bonn that West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic. And
that's really quite an interesting political problem, it seems to me,

and a great deal of political hay can be made by playing up this situation.
Now if this hunch is possibly correct, then, of course, the effort on the
part of the Russians (a)to come to a talk w to the Germans and (b) to
suggest to them that the political presence of the Federal Republic in
West Berlinm aukxka ought to be diluted makes a great deal more political
sense than it otherwise would. As I said, most people--including some
pretty high officials in the Foreign Office--said, "We're speechless; we
must study this."" They are quite right--possibly an interesting issue.
Only the American Embassy--the one person I talked to there--said'ho, no,
don't worry; this will not happen;" but he also said that the Russians are
quite right in insisting that the Germans should dilute their presence in

West Berlin--their political presence in West Berlin.

Point 3--the UK. As I mentioned, Ivar Richards,kex Labor MP, presented
a paper on the recent announcement that the British would vacate their
positions east of Suez sooner than originally anticipated--I think in 2 1/2
years instead of 7 or something like this. He presented this (what else
could he do?) as a matter that was absolutely necessary for economic reasons
but this he soft-pedalled and he emphasized instead that this would make
Britain a more European power and hence a more desirable member of the
Common Market, or the European arrangement. He got very very little
favorable response with this presentation from the Germans and some other

British people who were there, British representatives, as I said, really

a13<

pathetically pleaded with the Germans, "Don't you at least recognize that
now we are (at least much be said since we do this) that we are more
European now not having shed these extra European interests.'' And the
Germans didn't budge:much--not much, But,xks as I said, the really
interesting thing was the paper by Colonel Waring, who was stationed
in Portugal, and who spoke of the dismantling of British power to the
level of a third-class power, he said, air power to be now compared
poorly with Sweden, although Britain has 7 times the population as Sweden,
and we will have less and less weight as a world power and the United
States will have to look for another foreigner--who can that possibly
be?--only Germany but nobody will like that. And, of course, the U.S.
State Department created the power vacuum in the Middle East by its
decolonialization policy--he's a very conservative man who takes his
scotch in his bathtub every afternoon at 5 o'clock when he has a hot bath
before going out to dinner, you see. He still is evidently quite angry
eoing

about Suez, but he is wkxkkimg to forgive us now because we might as the now
more important presence of x saying something critical of the Labor policy
has come up. Of course, he was supported also by a Conservative MP, so that
the British, for the first time, presented a sort of ugly spectacle of almost
a dog fight between Labor and Conservatives there at the meeting.

Let me just give you the flavor of the Waring Memorandum. I'11 quote
something from it:

The United States, which in 1947 had about 47 percent of the

world's oil production, has now dropped to having only 15 percent

do to the huge in the Middle East and North Africa over the past

20 years. However, America produces enough for her own consumption,

since Venezuela has a certain surplus. Russia now produces from the

new oilfields in Siberia, as well as from the old ones on the Black

Sea and from Roumania, sufficient for her needs. Only Europe is
virtually without oil. In 1966 the European consumption was 421 million

tons as against only 8 million tons actually produced in Europe.

Of the 600 million odd tons which were produced in the Middle

East and North Africa, only 60 million was required for domestic

consumption in those countries, leaving 540 million tons for

export to South Africa, to India, to Japan, to Australia, and

above all, to Europe. The oil of the Middle East and of North

Africa is the life blood of Europe, without which she cannot

support her standard of living. She cannot maintain employment,

and she cannot defense herself. The withdrawal of Britain and

the rapidly increasing Russian presence in these areas will leave

the oilfields in the Middle East and in North Africa undefended,

and this is the prize that would give Russia control of Europe

following the dictum that the road to the conquest of Europe

lays through Africa.
He also had some figures which I cannot check that may be of some interest
ukkex since the end of the Israeli war in June up to the end of December
of last year, Russia has supplied over 1000 modern aircraft to the Arab
countries--some 3 1/2 thousand armored vehicles--2000 guns--some 6000
trucks--and in all, military equipment to a value of nearly &
$1,500 million, or double the estimated value of the war material lost
by the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli war. In addition, there are at the
present stime some 25,000 Russians in the Arab countries, of which at least
88 15,000 are military personnel. Russians bases will be established at
Aden, Promperon Island, as they already are in Akgxanmtxxx Iraq, in Cairo,
in Alexandria, in Port Said, in Yemen, and in Syria. There can be no
doubt that with British withdrawal from and Kuwait, Soviet and
Egyptian pressure against the oil chieftains will be increased as it will
shortly also against Iran. And so it went.

Now this was not discussed, but everybody knew it because about 20 or
25 copies of the paper were circulating and read at night so the effect

I

that the British Labor man was nothing but wrath. He was very unhappy.

possession
The French pesxkxan, as I said, was presented by Bauffer rather

poorly, I thought. As an illustration, let me give you one instance. In

general, I would say the German admiration for De Gaulle and for France

that was very evident a year ago in Munich has very considerably sobbered

-~15-

down--very noticeably less pro-French--the Germans I talked to and that's
not only
angkkexxkking the Social Democrats but the CDU people. And in line with
this, one speaker asked about the , which you may
recall (not the last one, the one before that) asdmmadvocated an all-around
defense concept indicating that the Soviet nuclear force was not only available
in the event of a war with the Soviet Union but for other purposes as well.
Somebody asked quite pointedly'who do you think General
had in mind?’ I didn't specify this--the Israelies,or Germans or the
Americans or what. But what is the meaning of this statement?" To which
Bauffer replied in great indignation, "It should be known to anybody who
concerns himself in military affairs, that military means xkax can be used
against anykimad kind of an opponent. It's up to the political will of the
political authorities mk to decide against whom, and when, and to what
extent the military establishment will be employed, or military means will
be employed in the defense of the national interest. At the moment the
hypothesis is the main danger is still the Soviet Union, although the
danger has lessened considerably, but who knows who it could be in the
absolutely
future. This is the answer." There was/nothing political in this, it
was samekhikng simply a commonsense statement among military analysts
according to General Bauffer. Now it struck me a little bit like bit like
a husband telling his wife at the breakfast table, "You know whak it happens
that couples get divorced." It's certainly true; it's a statement of fact.
But the fact that he made the statement must have a meeting, and this was,

of course, entirely shoved aside by Bauffer. And he got away with that, at

least nobody pressed harder than the first speaker. Naw

~1G-

3
Now I will not comment here on the/modelsX&K-- , , and

corporation-- in detail except the thing that it has two interesting features

in my mind. The last model, the corporation, which is maybe also the last

time phase of what he is talking about, preceded by and possibly,

advocates a four-power control taking the place of the alliance system--four-power
con

control with a European security system in which a German/federation would

be formed a la 1815 like the bundt.

Now that's feature number 1 which I find quite interesting but it didn't
occur to these political powers that they are proposing not only
something that the Communists have always proposed but that they are proposing
a consideration of two political systems that are politically,,socially, and
economically as far apart you see. And so that the German Confederation

large
in 1815 was after all formed of a hkaxsk number states, including small states,
of a similar political interest, with an anti-revolutionary ideology among
a common monarchial interest-- uniting ideology in other words--a common
economic interest in a larger area and no social competition of any kind, social
rivalry of any kind. So when it is sometimes said that Americans in making plans
for Europe don't seem to be familiar enough with European sensitivities and
European history, I think in this case it can be said of the French that they
are simply disregarding some of the most elementary facts that any person would,
with historical memory, recall.

That's point 1. Point 2, which is less comforting, from our point of view,
is while it is likely that the Germans in discussing these plans with the French--

ed
and they will be discussxmg on a high level--will resist features like this
one--like the one I have just mentioned--and will perhaps criticize. It is now

a fact that the French have seized the initiative on the political organization

of Europe. Neither one has anything comparable to this plan, nor has Washington,

wi Fu

not to mention the British. And it is for the first time, I think in the
post war period that kkex there are no competing American conflicts available
nor competing German conflicts available for the organization of Europe, if
I am not mistaken. We haven't had any since 1958. And this plan is very
clearly predicated on the burial of Atlanticism, on throwing the Americans
out of Europe, of getting Europe organized,on a neutralistic basis inside
central Europe shades of the Rapasky plan and so on,
and substituting four-power control that exists in '45 over a neutralized
Germany. It's a rather extraordinary plan. Now it will be changed, I
suppose, but the fact remains that for all its inadequacies and its
interesting features, the most important thing seems to me that political
ittiative on the future of Europe as conceived by France. (Hans, would they
need discussion of the authorship of this document?) I can tell you about
that; yes, there are a number of people apparently involved. There are already
different versions now floating around, but it has been discussedsuxBann between
Bannxandxkhisxdacumenkxbexekkxx Kuth , and allegedly Bonn agreed
that it would serve as one of the papers for a discussion on the future of
Europe. In Offenhausen they have xg no less than 35 papers on Europe or in
preparation, but not a single one has seen the light of day.

Now as to the fifth point, I have to rush a little. The United States.
In general, I would say the attitude among the politicians, not only in Munich
but also in Berlin and in Bonn and in the press on the whole struck me as more
favorable towards the United States than a year ago which has to do with the
shift in positions concerning France, which has deteriorated.from the French
point of view. The fact is that of course, except for the MPT, that an important

issue, NATO was not discussed very much. The discussions on NATO had a strangely

otis

semantic unsubstantial ring to them as to what the agreement really meant.
But there wasn't much of a discussion which I had expected to be in the
center of the discussion.

On Vietnam, when you talk with politicians, there is sort of polite
silence in the Bundestadt. There hasn't been a debate on Vietnam, a large
scale debate, but you sense what is going on when you look at the press
and at the student demonstrations. I read, for example, that when
Mayor Schutz was in this country (he came just as I was leaving--I saw him
in Washington briefly), he came to talk about the future of Berlin, economic
future of Berlin, and he saw Rusk (this is in this group here and not to
be broadcast). Rusk exclusively. They talked about a resolution of Social
Democratic Party concerning Vietnam. Having criticized Vietnam, he was
showing great agitation and allegedly distuub about the meaning of the
anti-¥xskanem Vietnamese stance that the German Social Democrats were kakk
taking on Vietnam, and here was Schutz, the Mayor of Berlin, couldn't
talk about Berlin because the Secretary of State would talk about back-up
support on our Vietnam policy.

Then you hear other things, some of them deeply disturbing, and I
heard on extremely good authority (I will not give you the name though) that
a very knowledgeable, a fastidious person, who in an international debate with
Frenchmen, Englishmen in Paris, while I was there, said it would be interesting

Khe Sanh Khe Sanh
to see what happens in ©S438sa, if the Americans permit Gasgem to become a
Dienbienphu, sort of a defeat without using tactical nuclear weapons. I will
take this as definite proof that we cannot rehy on the Americans ever to use

nuclear weapons in Europe. (Is this a French view or German view?--A German

view).

~

The extra parliamentary opposition to the United States, of course, centers
on Vietnam, and let me talk about that in the few remaining minutes that I would
like to impose on you. Let me start this way. Some of you may recall that when

pess
I came back last year from the same meeting, I was quite sapkimistic concerning
the new extreme right wing movement in Germany, the MPT, and I am now sort of--
not only for balance but partly *Xxamxkhkexkexx under the really terribly
impressive km experiences that I have had--inclined to take a much deemer
yan view than I did a year ago of the extreme left in Germany.

Now there is an interconnection between the two. I will go into this.
Krauska, whom I quoted before, the CDU man, they had made one remark about
the future of the alliance which was not commented upon wkigek in public which
several other Germans called my attention.&km He said what is going to happen
in NATO and Central Europe will depend on a very large extent the domestic
policies in the Federal Republic. When I talked to bach, who as
you know is a very important CDU man, an industrialist in Germany, he commented
on an unfortunate moment because he is being eroded in this country on both
Sides--the extreme right and the extreme left.

When I talked to Ollis, in my opinion one of the most intelligent of
German political scene, particularly &xmanxpaxx the domestic political scene,
he saxad took a somewhat more optimistic view but the way he did it made one wonder
too. He said, "Well, we may have to be prepared for a return to 7

also had a very strong right wing and a very strong left wing opposition.
And it would not be too bad if he had, would it? If he had an independent
Social Democratic Party in Germany, in the Federal Republic, and also probably
a Communist Party and a right wing party on the right." So I said let's talk
figures for a minute. How strong do you think the extreme right is about to

fit? So being the next election is in '69 and I had figures as high as 10-12

percent. He said 5-6. And this seemed to prevail among people I think highly of.

-20-

But we must recall that in the 1967 Lunthaus election, they got 9 percent in

Braeman, / percent in Lower Subsonia, 6.9 percent in Rhineland » and

5.8 percent in Schlewig-Holstein. Now they may increase--they have lots of

money--and they may increase their strength in part, I think, as a backlash to

the student riots to the left wing, extreme left wing. By the same token I
leaders

consider it possible that some of the Nationalists/like Strauss or knowing

how the wind is blowing will try (sensing where it is coming from) to take it

out of the sails of these radical movements and become more nationalistic
themselves when the time comes.

I will say that the authorities at the moment (that means Minister of Justice,
the Minister of the Interior, Parliament, and the Chancellor) seem to be quite
incapable of dealing with this left wing opposition efficiently and effectively.
You might say it doesn't have a class basis or a permanent social basis because
students wish to have generational basis. In a few years they are out of school,
other students come, the situation will have changed. That is right. Some of
the leaders in &kke what is curiously also the SDS, as in this country, a radical

already
student movement of a few years ago are now/considered to be a part of the
establishment by the current students who are far more radical. Now how radical
they are (just to give you a notion) is that this is the first page of a student
Terror.

newspaper of the Liberal Party./ Here it has instructions how to make a Molotov

cocktail (comment: just like the NY review of books). And the films on the

have been student
making of Molotov cocktails axexteing shown in the/meetings of the Free University
command

in Berlin. They chant, and they demonstrate, and they sameaxam at any time between

2000-5000 people in the city for a public demonstration. Berlin is a big

demonstrating city.

= 29m

As Ho Chi Minh. And their heroes are not the Russians because they are
part of the establishment. You see they have compromised with their revolutionary
tradition. (Doesn't this indicate that they are less important, really?) Maybe
sO, maybe so, Bukxkkex I think I see you point. They are more than
well, let me go on and describe it to you. Maybe they are of little importance.
I was terribly impressed by the fact that when I went to the Technical University
on Saturday (a week ago Saturday, as a matter of fact) and saw thousands of
students milling around, listening to speeches from Pakistani delegates, Swedish
delegates, French delegates, Black Power delegates from the United States, Belgian
delegates, all bearing Viet Cong flags, waving them, wearing Viet Cong emblems, not
calling for peace in Viet Nam but for more Viet Nams to defeat the United States,
for the end of NATO, not for the end of the Warsaw Pact, against the Springer
fellow, you know this best concern of West Germany not against the repressed
monopoly of the East Germans, not a word about terror of the North Vietnamese but
about germicide and immorality of the Americans in Vietnam and elsewhere in the
cities and so on. And you have newspapers appearing in Germany saying, "Is the
Viet Cong among us?" They have established their own universities, the so-called
Critical University in which the gift horses and the methods of provocation, and

very
these are attended not only by students but admittedly by a/small minority,
in this country about 1 percent. But also by assistance and some

assistant professors and some theology professors like Bolvwitz and so on.

Socially, the recruitment comes from (as in this country) the upper middle
classes. The people have money, many of them have second wives, some of them
have studied in the United States, As far as intellectual interests are con-
cerned, most of them come from the humanities and from Germanistics rather than

from schools of denistry or médicine. Here you have fixed career possibilities.

So there are many similarities between the United States Radical Student Movement

— a i ee

= IF

and other Radical Student Movements, and these all have now been studied
quite a bit . And the German Student Movement there are some
differences.

Very important differences, I think. For one thing, the German Radical

students are able by provocative techniques to rally behind them a very large
mass of the students, and of the high school students, for a socially effective
they

action. For example, wa have in Braeman succeeded through the high school
students to have a strike against raising of the fees of the means of public
conveyance, trolley cars, and so on. This was decided upon by the Senate of
Braeman, By the action of these youngsters, the Senate found itself forced to
reverse itself, and they reversed the raise in the rise in prices.

In Berlin at the time when I was there on that Saturday, the demonstration
for the following Sunday was prohibited by the Senator for the Interior Noybois,
and the addition was endorsed by the Mayor Schutz, whereupon a lawyer for these

students went to the Administrative Court and asked for an Administrative Court

order which came out on Saturday (tape change)

demonstrated afterwards. Secondly, before the prohibition of the demonstration
was lifted, I personally have (and I have here in my possession) collected one

of thousands of mimeographed sheets by the students saying that the order of the
Senate has to be disobeyed. We will assemble so and so strong and meet in these
streets at the following time.skwaukd Should the police intervene, we will assemble
at this and this time near the American Heattquarters and raid the American
Headquarters, :the American compound, and the American living quarters. Should

the police use sticks, we will use sticks too. And they were out, and I saw

these boys. They were like minors with these hard helmuts. &»

ah Ga

So there was open defiance of the authority in Berlin. Now this is
not only a phenomenum in Berlin. It happened in Frankfurt. Let me give
you another illustration. When Schutz became mayor, he wanted to talk with
the students because they are always interested in discussion. And he felt
no repressive measures should be taken because if they are taken, then
everybody cries about it. There is police brutality. So he met these
students and while he was meeting them on the rostrum, some students behind
him sneaked up, displaying a big placard saying don't talk to this
And some other students sneaked with a tape trying to put on his mouth which was
really prevented just by a sheer alertness of some of his lieutenants. This
is what they can , to finish a man--being made so ridiculous
that he cannot exert any authority. But this was prevented.

Carl Schmidt, however, was a member of the cabinet and a very distinguished
Social Democrat, almost 70 years old, Professor in Frankfurt, gave a talk, and
Radical students of the SDS stormed in, used physical violence, tore one of
his buttons off his jacket, and he just barely stopped them by saying, "This
is the second time this has happened to me. The first time was in 1932, and
they were Nazis."

They have invaded at Christmas time, in various places, churches, and
stopped the sermons and service, and said we demand discussions on Vietnam.
This happened to in Berlin. Hexwax Somebody used force against
him, and he started bleeding. He wiped the blood off his GREE, and put

satan's

it on the faces of two sextons and said you are the kmsxexakenxdisciples--

devil's disciples, you see. This was reported in the press, and some liberal

=~Ih-

preachers in Braeman, clergyman in Braeman, sent telegrams of sympathy to
Deutchka and said indeed he had behaved like Christ, discussing matters of
public interest with the Pharisees in church.

The Minister of Justice, when heard that one of the sermons by
Professor Telika in Hamburg, who is also one of the preachers there, was
threatened by the SDS because they wanted to talk about Vietnam instead of
listening to the Sermon, gave the advice publicly the congregation should
sing hymns which they did for a few hours in order to keep them under control.
Whereas the president of the Military Academy in Hamburg decided that this

officer
has gone far enough and he sends some of his/cadets into the church to see
to it that order would be maintained in the church, and he defended this.

You see, I give you just a few illustrations of the type of thing that
happens with Deutchka also saying in November, "By February we will be ready
to take action against the newspaper publisher," this fellow, and
indeed the first glass windows were knocked in in February. Now they have
developed new methods of provocation, trying to undermine authority of any
kind--whether it is municipal authority or whether it is the university senate
breaking done doors to faculty meetings and sitting down so that people can't
leave, professors can't leave. (This happened in . IL talked to one
of the professors who was there)sxor throwing pudding at Vice President Humphrey
when he is there. They are of course laughing because they thought it was a
bomb that they were preparing, where in fact they were preparing some kind of
pudding for him. Or throwing tomatoes. Then something does happen. The
police onee in a while may lose control. One student, like this fellow Orosok,

has killed and then all the students in Germany are on the side of the student

generation against the police brutality.

aR Gn

Schutz is a man who has only one arm. He lost one arm in the war. The
radical students have publicly written in Berlin that he lost the arm because
Of KMWAKAHESEXXEEKWAK COwardice in fighting brave partisans in
and Italy. I mean trying to undermine his moral authority also in this
regard. And so it goes.

I talked to some American observers there who are than I am
although I know the Berlin situation. Very well, but I go there only very
rarely and occasionally, and they go there more often. They said it reminds
them quite a bit of the tactics used by the early Nazi movement. Now they
are now Nazis. In fact, they present themselves quite hysterically as the
Jews of the present age. They are being persecuted by the establishment,
and the establishment has taken the position of assistance, as the Nazis
called it, and they are the Jews. So they engage in a discussion on the
| total

and of middle class woman, you see, The/population
of Berlin is, of course, very much opposed to the students, particularly
the workers--overwhelmingly so. Why don't you study or why don't you go
back where you came from or something to that effect? So the student in
utmost despair and quite hysterically says, "You can put me in the guards'

chamber right away.”

This you see is the kind of mentality XBW you meet
among all of them.

Now as to the finances, there was a public discussion in German parlia-
ment and the question was raised but not answered by the Minister of the
Interior. There are investigations going on at present about the whole
movement, and £<xkhknkikxisxknewaxkkhak one can know what will be found,

although one doesn't know the exact amount. But I know for a fact, for

example, some of the money comes from one of the trade unions, radical trade union,

RE 20

some money comes from Auchstein, who is the editor of Der Speigel and a
competitor of Springer, some money apparently comes from the well-to-do
wives of some of the leaders, some are from the United States, some money
comes from the East. Now, how much, I don't know. Nor do I know whether
it will increase in size. It certainly has increased in radicalism. I mean,
terrorism is far more pronounced than it was a year ago or two years ago or
three years ago. Don't forget that the Social Student Union, I mean the SDS,
was expelled from the party in 1961. This was, after all, only seven years
ago, because at that time they demanded that Germany should recognize the

Alliance. Now this today is no longer a taboo subject. Practically
everybody, every respectful politician says it's only a question of time and
the will be recognized. But the terror, the action program,
the provocation, the violence, and the unmanagability of the people, and the
undermining of authority, this is new. Now if I am pressed for a diagnosis,
which I hope I won't be, anyway, I would say the greatest danger is not this
movement, but the greatest danger is the backlash to it. On the right. We
are fortunate, by the way, for Rand, that we have a consultant in Berlin who
is extremely well-informed about this matter and he wrote a bit about it. And
he knows many of these people and has been very helpful.xm He also knows a
great deal about the attitudes of the population, the organizational form which
is quite new in German radical politics. It's been an archial, cylindré¢alistic

and
movement rather than a Communist movement, and they read Mao and Markusa £m ka
they &xaxwaxa Greverra and so on rather than Marx. They are better read, by
the way, than the American students, and they differ from the American left-wing
radicals on the American campus in many important respects.
For one thing, they don't take dope.. It's no dope. No LSD yet.in these

groups. There is no love-in--sit-in, go-in, everything, but no love-in. No hippy
nonsense of this sort. Notice there is a feeling which is common among some of

the hippies of this country that they are the first generation since Adam that

wi ve

has rediscovered that there is such phenomenum as sex. In reaction to
American puritanism, the sexual revolution, this is no filthy speech movement;
this is all nonsense xg#akky in Germany; nothing of this sort exists. They
have, of course I saw the program of the Critical University in Berlin, a
course on sex and power there, but that's about the size of it. And they
will occasionally compare some silly student who will say just as the Jews
were persecuted by the Nazis so we are persecuted because we don't behave
the way our landlady thinks when she thinks we should when we take a rented
room. And referring to the fact that they want to take a girl out. But this
has had so little difficulty in Europe and Germany included that there is
not much room for sexual revolution. But you have a great deal of politicization
devilishly

and the action pxgxam program is highly political and dakknkkeky clever. 2
The one deputy after another in the German Bundestadt said, "We were not
prepared for the new methods they are using. We were not prepared for
every new method they are using.'' And they learned from the Dutch, they
learned from the Cubans, and they learned from the Viet Cong the hope that
the United States may perish in the process because for a while they bekiexed
viewed the United States as a country which represented to them something
desirable, something democratic, and also they believed in the possibility
of organizing Europe. Then for a while they believed in the meaningfulness
of doing something against the Soviet Union in connection with the war in
Berlin.

All this had been taken away from them: the cold war, the American
purity, or the purity of the American image, And what they are left with

is a great deal of bitterness and activity and wildness against authority at

large. On this happy note, let me close.

; ~2G-

QUESTIONS

Q How about the low country--Belgiun, , etc. Are there any connections?
A Yes, there are connections. They have contacts with the so-called provosts
(HS )

in Amsterdam, but there you see the Dutch Marines used against them, and

they were just beaten up and this solved the problem.

Yes, they also have Belgium contacts--the student movements. is

their great hero, by the way.

S The difference in the other countries, I think, lies in the weakness of the
<eikkaw Federal Republic government. Or at least let's say the great fear in
the government.to request because of the image that that conjures up of mere

association with something that they were trying to request.

S$ That's very true. There's a police, there's state, there is a devil's power.
But what makes this German left radicalism so outstanding is the unwillingness,
the inability, unwillingness of the regime to respond toit. And that in turn,
I think, has something to do with the past, and it has something to do with
the sense that they have lost their pillars in the world in terms of the
alliance, in terms America, and so forth. This in turn, I suppose, means
some kind of an opening into which the radical right in Germany may be

(NPD )
in for. I expect to hear some day that the MPT will be offering its services

to restore order somewhere.

(HS ) Yes, it's also, you see, the authorities are really, to a large extent,
discredited. I mean, you will, Lubke has to defend himself against some
defendant of the Federal Republic against some allegations that are based
on the logical expertise of somebody in New York.during the Nazi regime
he did some documents having to do with the technologies. For the Nazis

the Chancellor himself is also a former Nazi, not a very bad one, but one.

(HS )

(HS )

=D inn

radical
However, the/students are mainly mad at people like Brandt and Weiner and

Skukx Schutz, the socialist leaders, who they feel have betrayed the cause
(a) beginning in '58 at the time of the Gutesburg Program and the Marxist

ideology--the leftist ideology--was given up in favor of the General

Party Program that would enable them to Beawme join the government and

(b) by the fact that they now have joined forces with the Christian Democrats
in a Grand Coalition Government and let from a Nazi, so it's like a

sect fighting the church much more vigorously than the heathens. And their

resentment of Brandt and Weiner is far more intense among these youngsters

than their resentment of a man like Lecours or Kissinger or the Chancellor.

When you mentioned before, did you mean that there was an extra

parliamentary breakdown of order, not political fractionalization?

No, he meant political fractionalization. He thought that it might best
talk about possibility of prohibiting the SDS, for having it underground
unless the Communist party is prohibited at the moment. But there is talk
at the same time about readmitting the Communist Party. Brandt talks about
that, and thete is opposition to prohibiting the SDS. And how can you

commands the
prohibit a party that really temandsxkhkexcommandxand respect of future of

the youth.

Are there any good gseaseas recent figures on the percentage of total German
students involved in some definable way this radicalism? I know Spiagek

Der Spiegel had a series of articles.

I have. The figures that I have, they had up to 1 percent of the students
organized the SDS and similar organizations, related organizations, but

being able to command the loyalty of up to 60-70 percent is necessary in case

(HS )

(HS )

(HS )

« 30)

of the slightest -- they can make a case of the authorities have trespassed
(like the Onazorg incident)--like the Onazorg incident or any student issue
having to do with kke this outdated belief or prindple of hierarchy:in the
internal organization of the German university. The whole student body is
behind them, and they are the ring leaders. They are the speakers, the

leaders, the pushers.

You're saying then that this is really different from Holland. That any
attempt to use the Marines in effect would cause a much greater reaction.

It wouldn't simply discourage them as in Holland.

I don't know. It has not been done.

All right, then in only theory.

There was, when I was there, everybody I talked to was talking about the
fact that tear gas would be used. There was no other way of doing it.
Everybody was expecting tear gas to be used within 24 hours in the streets
of Berlin, you see. And water would not be enough. And then the
demonstration was permitted and nothing happened. In fact, the police were
used to protect the demonstrators against the population. The policeman's

lot is not an easy one.

What is the issue of passes from East Berlin? What the situation is.
Well, if you have a West German residence, you can get a pass at any time.
If you have a Berlin residence, and only show that, you can't get across.
Now that's a West Berliner. There are various reasons that you do it, but

by having double residence and so on, but it's not easy.

=e

Q What is the possibility of the major split of the STZ and the formation
of the more radical purified Schumacher type and secondly, what would

be the possibility mk that this will channelize some of the students?

(HS ) You might channelize it somewhat if there were such a split, to answer
your second question. It might, and there are people who feel so. There
are other social democrats who say that they hope very much that the TDU
will be strong enough at the next election so that they, the SDT, can get
out of the Grand Coalition, go back into opposition in order to prevent
the split. I mean, it goes that far. Oh yes, there is discussion on
this subject. You have to be very careful with whom you talk in evaluating
this because many people were too - You know because of the subject
one doesn't like to admit too readily, particularly to foreigners. But
there is talk about it, no doubt. And there is also real danger--there are
so many groups already left wing you see. There are the pacifists,
there are the people excluded in '61, including Professor Fleishtyme, some
of you may know from the political scientist. While he is considered by
these students as another representative of the establishment because he
his propessitism? is against violence although he is very critical and
left the party, or was thrown out of the party, for his very good use.
wrote
Gunther Gres, who/in public against Kissinger and against the Grand Coalition,
is part of the establishment because at one time he campaigned for Willy Brandt.

But there is a whole slew of people left wing of the offidal party line, to

the left of the official party line.

(HS )

on 9D ne

One thing that impressions me most is the continuous ability of the United

“States influence

Not directly, but perhaps indirectly. We have a social situation in this
country which leads to student uprisings and hippydom and so forth. And
it's also a political situation which leads to an inability to deal with
a Negro revolution and a foreign policy which seems to give the minor
country the power and political chance to deal with us as they please.
This in combination with the technology which enables such images of the
United States to penetrate into Germany almost instantaneously seems to me
a very powerful sort of thing. It's a lesson in reverse in a way. But
this isn't what I want to ask. I want to ask whether on the official
level or with any means for inclination of using whatever relations they
have with China as opposed to deal with the Russians and the Eastern
European Countries and Eastern powers. And on the other official level,
why the students weren't counting, or whether they were counting, Mao

instead of Ho Chi Minh and with the Red Guard Movement rather than with

the Viet Cong Movement and

Well, I am not sure that I can answer the last question in detail. It's

a fact that Ho Chi Minh is perhaps merely because it lends itself to this
beautifil HO HO Ho Chi Minh chant. I am not trying to be facetious. nxany
In the case of Ho Chi Minh, the Germans read; they know that Ho Chi Minh is
for real. Most know there are Marxists still alive, Bmaksexxx Bolshevists

still alive, who know more about Europe and about Asia than anybody else in

the world,

(HS )

(HS )

(HS )

ED a

What's Mao done to the imperialists lately?

Besides, you see, he stands for and he is the
opponent of this giant, the super-power, and he is showing us he is
forcing us to be immoral. That is great merit. And his only

morality xx fades into insignificance because we are so much bigger.
By the same token, Cuba is more important than East Germany or Russia.
These peopletalk about the shop cots organization that you had at the
end of the first world war amdxakxkka in Russia organizing popular
plebicitarian organization of power. And they feel that this sort of
thing is to be found in Cubaxxx¥k rather than in the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Union has become an establishment. Now perhaps they don't know
so much about China. I don't really know what the answer to this is--

why it is just the small countries.

It looks like you need to the German super-radical societies.

No, no, no. Instead, it is an interesting anmsxweax question to answer:
Why is that so?

favor
There was a large demonstration in gamkxak Vietnam, was there not, in Berlin?

About the United States policy, a counter-demonstration.
There was a counter-demonstration. After. Called by the Mayor in response

to the student demonstration that he had to admit on and
even in order to prove to the Americanssgaupakikgsn the occupation powers and

loyalty of the cityers, you see; he called for this very big demonstration.

The students then on the sidewalks started to heckle the demonstrators, telling

them they were ordered there as they were in the Nazi period by the official

authorities to demonstrate for the official cause, that anybody with a beard

had to be careful not to show his face. And the police were to protect the

HS:

HS:

tt.

students from the violence of the mass demonstration. I think 25 people
were in the hospital, and there was a great deal of brutality (you mean

against the students?). Against the students, yes.

Was that demonstration -- did it use explicitly pro-U.S. slogans in Vietnam
or generalized pro-American policies?

Generalized pro-American policy as it's difficult for the United States in
Vietnam. But the protective powers, and we couldn't have the freedom that

we have in Berlin if it weren't for the Americans, etc. Which was akkxrxighkx
anaxkxkhknkxakxkhexsamexkime the right line to take, and I think at the same
time again some mishaps, freedom of anybody was not permitted to
What's the attitude of the studmts toward East Germany? Do they say anything?
concerned
Well, it used to be of concern to them as long as they were still/upsek about
the war. Some of these phobias of the students of the previous generation
these were the ones of Dr. which these people from East Germany
escaped. Organized an exhibition which travelled from city to city about the
persecution of the Jews by the Nazis. But now East Germany has faded from
their conscience, as it were, and it is is the United States and
Bonn. And the place of re-revolutionary action of Vietnam is the U. S. cities.
You get the most perverse kinds of situations. I happen to know from a personal
letter which I got a few days ago that the representative of Black Power in
Berlin stayed at the house of a survivor of one of the most prominent assassins
in the 20 of July push against Hitler. Another member of the family of the 20
of July who is a pastor wanted to demonstrate against Vietnam and he thought

youth should be supposed to demonstrate and found himself, to his dismay, by the

manipulation of these radical students, marching behind the flag of the Viet Cong,

HS:

HS:

HS :

«Fin

What sort of a psychology is it? ...impress the thought that everyone has a
past, somehow all these diverse attitudes...

Yes, there are very wild stories that you hear occasionally, such as that some
of the most active radical students come from well-to-do, relatively broken
homes, whose father, having been in the SS...

I've heard estimates to the effect that 50-60% of the NPD "the young generation"
No, that's not so. In fact, the young generation in the last figures I saw is
under-represented,

It's growing however, they make a point of that.
p

In the latest figures I have seen, maybe it has changed now, is that they are
lower, that the percentage in the NPD is lower than the population at large.
In the younger age groups, up to 25 or so.

Many thanks on my part.