To Legislate or not to Legislate? That is the Question:
How Legislative Inflation Boosts Prison Overcrowding
and the Design of Policies that Counteract It
Andrea Navarrete
Camilo Olaya*
Juliana Gomez-Quintero
Department of Industrial Engineering
Universidad de los Andes
Bogota, Colombia
* Corresponding author: colaya@ uniandes.edu.co
Abstract
Prison and penitentiary overcrowding in Colombia has increased (following a growing oscillatory
pattern) over the last decade in spite of plans to increase prison and penitentiary capacity and thanks
to a sustained increase in the prison population. The increase in prison population has become a
result of legislative inflation, a large control mechanism that creates and modifies a great variety of
norms that strengthen sanctions to criminal conducts, as well as an increase in criminality. The
overcrowding problem is worrisome; among other negative consequences, it hinders the system’s
capability to accomplish some of the purposes of prison sentences and preventive retention
including re-education and social reinsertion of detainees. Here we present and discuss a systemic
approximation to the jail and penitentiary overcrowding problem as a result of legislative inflation.
We introduce a simulation model and explain possible feedback consequences of legislative
inflation on the prison and penitentiary system of Colombia are explored. Finally we suggest the
design of policies that may counteract jail and penitentiary overcrowding both from punitive and
preventive perspectives. A systemic perspective allows us to compare and assess those policies.
Legislative inflation is a perfect example that shows why policy makers need to challenge and
improve their mental models in order to develop a dynamic understanding of feedback driven
systems.
Key words: legislative inflation, system dynamics, jail overcrowding, public policy, policy design,
justice administration
I Penitentiary Overcrowding and Legislative Inflation
Jail and penitentiary overcrowding
Since mid-1990s the Colombian penitentiary and prison system has faced an increasing demand for
a larger capacity that surpluses its actual capacity. Graph 1 shows this situation and its evolution
from 1991 to 2016. The graph also shows overcrowding indices through each year. As shown, the
system’s capacity has not grown at the same pace as the interns have and hence, overcrowding
indices have grown in oscillatory fashion from 14.5% in 2006 to 54.9% in 2016, almost 4 times
larger in only 10 years. Overcrowding indices are calculated as the difference between prison
population! and the capacity of the penitentiary and jail system’, divided by the capacity (Iturralde,
2011).
Equation 1.
Prison population—Capacity of the Jail and Penitentiary System
Overcrowding index =
Capacity of the Jail and Penitentiary System
Graph 1. Prison Population and Overcrowding Index 1991-2016
140.000 60,0%
Say et 553%
120.000 Fi99. 53.9% 50,0
45,1%
41,6% 40,0%
100.000 7 Ne fae 394% 35.0% 40,0%
34,3%,
80.000 © 311% 30,3% f= me 30,0%
26,9% 28,3%
20, re
60.000 a | ‘4 1 20,0%
16,8% 15,6% ‘7, 2%
40.000 10,0%
3,7% 0,6% 7.6%
ow 9
20.000 | A-45% 0,0%
0 Til -10,0%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 200
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
mmm Capacity mmm Prison Population —-Overcrowding Index
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from INPEC National Penitentiary and Prison Institute) (INPEC, 2016)
! Prison population refers to al detainees that are part of the Penitentiary and Prison System including convicted and
charged individuals.
? Capacity refers to the total quota (available or not) that is enabled to accommodate convicts and charged individuals.
In 2004 the Government decided that it was necessary to build new infrastructure to expand the
system’s capacity with the purpose of controlling high overcrowding indices, which were above
20% by that year (Conpes 3277, 2004). This determination gave birth to the plan called Prison
Construction and Refurbishing Plan — PCRP (Plan de Construccién y Refaccién Carcelaria -
PCRC) that aimed to attain an overcrowding index below 20% by 2006 with the increase of the
system’s capacity by a quota of 24331 by December of 2004 (Conpes 3277, 2004).
The PCRP had two strategies: 1. CEM: construction, endowment and maintenance, which aimed to
increase capacity by a 21200 quota, and 2.EFE: enlargement, fitting, and endowment of existing
prison establishments with the aim of increasing capacity by a 3131 quota (Conpes 3277, 2004).
Nevertheless, the CEM was postponed by two years (Conpes 3575, 2009) and the EFE only
generated 3010 new quotas that did not render the expected impacts on the overcrowding index
given that the prison population had grown at a faster pace. In fact, the overcrowding index was
39.4% by 2005 (see Graph 1).
Legislative inflation
Criminal behavior can be counteracted through several ways, which include punitive and preventive
measures. While punitive measures aim to preclude criminal careers by increasing the probability of
capture and the length of the sentence, preventive measures look for sustainable solutions that
anticipate criminal career building through social cohesion mechanisms and citizen culture building.
(Dyner, Prado, & Arango, 2009).
In spite of the purposes of preventive measures, punitive interventions have become more popular
by means of legislative inflation, a world spread phenomenon in which punitive measures have
become the most common alternative to react towards social problematics (A mbito Juridico, 2012).
Legislative inflation, however, trivializes norms and increases distrust in legislation because
legislation becomes a reaction to a specific problematic that does not consider future implications
for the penitentiary and prison system and hence produces much more complex problems such as
jail and penitentiary overcrowding (Fassina, Page, & Lammel). Legislative inflation is also found in
Colombia. Examples of these are the following: In parallel to PCRC, the Congress of Colombia
issued Law No. 890 which increased the minimum and maximum terms for major crimes.
Afterwards, in 2011 the Law for Citizen Security (Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana) was issued with the
purpose of increasing the capability of Justice and Public Forces to fight crime more effectively,
particularly in large urban centers (Semana, Santos firma Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana, herramienta
contra la criminalidad, 2011) (Saumeth, 2011). The Law of Citizen Security not only modified the
Criminal Code to increase the sanctions for specific criminal conducts but also limited the
possibility of benefits such as house arrest. As expected, prison population increased.
Scope of the paper
Prison and penitentiary overcrowding in Colombia has increased over the last decade in spite of
plans to increase prison and penitentiary capacity such as PCRP and thanks to a sustained increase
in the prison population. This increase has become a result of the creation and modification of a
great variety of norms that strengthen sanctions to criminal conducts as well as an increase in
criminality (Quintero Cuello, Lahuerta Percipiano, & Moreno, 2008). The overcrowding problem is
worrisome; among negative consequences, it hinders the system’s capability to accomplish some of
its central purposes: re-education and social reinsertion of detainees (Serje Jimenez, 2010).
We present and discuss a systemic approximation to the prison and penitentiary overcrowding
problem as a result of legislative inflation. We build a simulation model and possible feedback
consequences of legislative inflation on the prison and penitentiary system. Finally, we propose the
design of policies that counteract jail and penitentiary overcrowding both from punitive and
preventive perspectives based on a feedback-loop understanding of the problem.
Il. Actors and Decisions
Prison and penitentiary overcrowding behavior is the outcome of multiple decisions of actors
involved on the Colombian prison system. We identified the following actors whose decisions are
relevant to address the problem:
e Prisoners: It refers to all people detained in a prison or detention center. Prisoners are
divided into two main groups: accused and convicted. The accused prisoners are those who
are in custody as a precautionary measure, while a trial is conducted and a verdict about
their guilt is established. On the other hand, the convicted prisoners are those people
pronounced criminally responsible for a particular criminal offence in a final verdict
(Cambridge dictionary, 2012).
Prisoners are the ones who are directly affected by the prison and penitentiary
overcrowding. They have to live under unacceptable living conditions, with high rates of
insecurity, violence and disease. In addition, they don’t have the opportunity to fully or
partially resocialize during their stay in prison because there are no means to provide
education and job opportunities for all the inmates (Semana, El oscuro panorama de las
carceles en Colombia, 2008). As a result, prisons become “crime schools” where due to the
lack of activities to be undertaken, prisoners share their experiences and acquire new tools
to enhance their criminal activities. This fact generates an increase on criminal recidivism
and boosts the later reactions from the State against crime that end up further increasing the
growth of prison population (Soto, 2013).
e Infrastructure Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and Justice (DIN): This Directorate
has as main functions the design of policies for authorizing the construction, maintenance
and preservation of prisons infrastructure. It also coordinates with INPEC (National
Penitentiary and Prison Institute) the management of prisons in order to achieve efficiency
and economy in construction, manning and operation stages. (Ministry of the Interior,
2013). Thus the DIN is responsible for enforcing all policies related to the prison system
infrastructure. For this reason its decisions are reflected on the number of new prison quotas
that are constructed and / or fixed on each period of time.
INPEC (National Penitentiary and Prison Institute): The government agency in charge of
executing the jail and penitentiary policy. It is also responsible of the prison and
penitentiary system administration and of the design and implementation of rehabilitation
programs. It also contributes to law and regulation projects related with the Ministry of
Justice and INPEC’s goals.
The decisions of INPEC aim at developing programs and projects that seek to reduce prison
and penitentiary overcrowding. Among these projects are some of them on which INPEC
acts as a collaborator, such as infrastructure construction and upgrading of existing quotas
policies. Other projects driven by INPEC are related to post-prison assistance programs
(addressed to control criminality levels), and educational and employment programs of
inmates that seek to achieve their reintegration into society (INPEC, National Penitentiary
and Prison Institute , 2013).
Congress of the Republic: It is the highest representative body of the legislature and has the
power to amend the Constitution, create new laws and exercise political control over the
government and its administration (Colombia Senate). Its decisions are intended to combat
crime and ensure safety and cohabitation in the country towns and cities through laws and
policies that define the maximum and minimum penalties. The Congress also defines
behaviors as "new" crimes (that hence should be punished by freedom deprivation)
(Saumeth, 2011) (Semana, Santos firma Ley de Seguridad Ciudadana, herramienta contra la
criminalidad, 2011).
Attomey Generals Office: It is an entity of the judicial branch responsible for investigating
crimes and accusing alleged perpetrators to the competent courts. The Attorney General’s
Office must also ensure that alleged perpetrators go to court by taking the necessary
security measures. (Attomey General's Office of Colombia). Its mission is "to conduct
criminal investigations and develop and implement the state criminal policy, with the
purpose of generating in society confidence and legal security to inquire for truth, justice
and reparation". (Attomey General's Office of Colombia) For this reason, their decisions
take place through diverse forms such as crime prevention programs, the criminal
investigation and identification of suspects, their prosecution before the judges, the
execution of judicial procedures that determine the time to carry out trials, etc. (Avella,
2007)
Civil society: Society plays an important role within the criminal policy since it advocates
for social control (Orellana Wiarco, 2010). It generates pressure on the government for the
creation of new laws or strategies to reduce crime and prevent impunity. Their decisions
impact the annual number of new laws or criminal code amendments that are based on the
crime rate. When this rate is too high, the social pressure often leads to creating new laws
and punitive reforms.
e Public Ministry: It is an overviewer body that interfere in criminal proceedings (it is not
considered a part of it) if necessary, e.g. for defending the legal order, public property,
human rights and fundamental guarantees. (Avella, 2007). Its decisions are related to the
defense of prisoners’ rights for having minimal, acceptable living conditions in prison.
III. Feedback and Accumulations
Nowadays the different entities and institutions that form the Colombian prison and penitentiary
system take decisions based on a perspective limited by their scope. In most cases they only
consider numerical data and the occurrence of contingent events that make them react and act
against problems. (Joumal of Prisons report #1, 2013). However, it is only possible to describe the
observed prison and penitentiary overcrowding behavior through feedback structures due that this
problem arises within a social system that changes, learns and transforms over time. The
relationships that build feedback structures are the result of the decisions of the involved actors that
take action from their different interests and perspectives.
On this section we present within a simulation model the most significant feedback structures that
emerged from the conceptualization of the problem (See Figures 1-3; for clarity, each figure focuses
on a particular set feedback loops). These feedback structures are created as the dynamic outcome
of those decisions of the mentioned actors and end up driving the dynamics of the problem. Various
accumulations linked to capacity building (new quotas, new infrastucture), the flow and
permanence of prisoners through the system, the perception on overcrowding, etc. generate inertial
dynamics that coupled with the feedback mechanisms explain the bejavior of this complex system.
Notice the variety of balancing loops associated to “new laws” (i.e. legislative inflation) that
account for the controlling intentions of society for “fixing” the problem through punitive action.
These balancing loops contain numerous material delays (linked to the mentioned accumulations);
there is also an information delay (overcrowding index perception)—The following section
develops a dynamic hypothesis that explains the intertwined dynamics of accumulations and
feedback loops in this system.
Overcrowding
nde
ieee y aff. Ci
Pee i i ‘eplecalans eapack
cok
A Re) Rogaine ane
Overcrowding
Tndes>
Figure 1: R1, R2, R3, R4, B1, B2
and B3 feedback structures ‘Come index
eee
Figure 2: B4, B5, B6 and B7
feedback structures
ots constuctio
este co ™ BM
Figure 3: B8, B9, B10, B11, B12, B13 and B14 feedback structures
IV. Dynamic Hypothesis and Policy Design
We built a simulation model. We first propose a dynamic hypothesis as a “story” for explaining the
dynamics of overcrowding as a function of the feedback loop structure. This story is backed up by
literature on the subject, our understanding of the structure of the model and computer simulation.
As we could suspect, the oscillatory pattern can be associated to control structures permeated by
material and information delays (Figures 1-3). Based on this understanding we explore different
policies.
Overcrowding Index behavior: Dynamic Hypothesis
To best explain the behavior of the Overcrowding Index throughout the simulation, the graph has
been divided into three periods as shown in Graph 2; each period shows a different mode of
behavior: Period 1: balanced growth, Period 2: balanced decline and Period 3: reinforced growth.
Graph 2: Overcrowding Index - simulation
® overcrowding index 1 -
1 05
1 0,
Va
\
00 45,00 60,01
eS > Time s
. ©
NX comes e
Page 1
The behavior of the Overcrowding Index (OI) can be explained in the following manner:
Phase I
OI initially increases as the prison population grows while the system’s capacity remains constant
given that the perception of the OI index is low and consequently the Government does not react to
create new capacity. Moreover, the OI grows given the difficulties to resocialize that arise as a
result of a high OI and hence the increase in criminal recidivism (Serje Jimenez, 2010) that ends
producing more convicts and charged individuals. As a result, a reinforcing dynamics produce an
increase in the prison population by means of increasing the length of sentences (R1, R2, R3 and
R4) (Dyner, Prado, & Arango, 2009), increasing the time it takes to issue a sentence (R1), and
hence ensure better investigation processes and less impunity (Santos & Vargas Lleras, 2011), and
reducing the possibilities of convicts to pursue penal alternatives (R3). R4 in particular reinforces
the increase of charged individuals’ inflow with the creation of new laws and norms that compel
authorities to dictate preventive detention for criminal conducts that were not considered before for
this type of penalty (Iturralde, 2011).
At the end of Phase 1, control mechanisms gain strength the O1 perception starts to increase (B12)
up to a level where numerous balancing feedback loops start regulating O1 growth with the creation
of new quotas (B8 and B9) and the enlargement, fitting and endowing the existing quotas (B11).
Finally, the State builds higher capacity and hence contributes to the short-term control of the OI
growth (B13 y B14).
Phase 2:
In Phase 2, the regulation of OI continues by means of quota increase which is accomplished
through programs such as the PCRP, which generate approximately 24200 new quotas between
2006 and 2008 (Conpes 3575, 2009)—see loops B8, B9 and B11.
Given the increase of OI perception, the increase of the prison population is strongly controlled
through prevention programs (Vanderschueren, 1994). When institutions such as the General
Attomey Office recognize (OI perception) that the OI index is over critical levels (Conpes 3277,
2004), they design and implement prevention programs that reduce the criminality index and hence
control de increase of prison population through: regulation of the average time it takes to dictate a
sentence (B6), facilitating the access of convicts to penal alternatives (B7), controlling the increase
in the length of sentences (B5) and controlling the outburst of laws and norms that compel
authorities to dictate preventive detention for a larger range of criminal conducts (B4).
As a result in Phase 2, feedback mechanisms produce an increase in the system’s capacity as well at
the same time they control de prison population growth, producing a balanced decline of the OI.
Phase 3:
Nonetheless, once the OI index falls below critical levels, authorities stop their initiatives to
generate new quotas in the system given that they do not recognize it as necessary (Conpes 3277,
2004). The control mechanisms that seek to increase system’s capacity reduce their strength (B8,
B9 and B11).
In addition to relent in capacity building, there is a balanced increase in prison population (B1, B2
and B3). This rise gives dominance again to reinforcing dynamics of prison population growth
(given low resocialization levels) and increases the number of charged individuals that remained
detained without a sentence (R1); these dynamics also reduce the number of convicts that complete
their sentence (R2) or that apply to a penal alternative (R3), and increase the number of new
detainees under the status of charged individuals (R4).
Policy design
On the basis of the foregoing dynamic hypothesis about the OI, we designed two types of policies,
punitive and preventive. We used our understanding about how the feedback structures within the
system produce the dynamics of OI in order to formulate policies that transform feedback effects
into desirable outcomes, that is: OI reduction. Furthermore, we combined the two types of policies,
and explore and discuss the different outcomes from a systemic perspective.
10
Punitive Policies
(1) Limits on Preventive Detention
Restricting the number of crimes per law that is issued in which preventive retention is applicable
may weaken the reinforcing effect of OI growth (R4) in Phase 3. In this sense, even when faced
with a high OI that triggers legislative inflation, the prison population will not increase as much as
shown in the simulation in Graph 2. Graph 3 shows the OI behavior on scenarios with variations on
the additional percentage of detainees that enter the penitentiary and prison system per each law that
is issued. The percentage was varied between 0% and 0.25% (0.25% being the value used in the
original simulation).
Table 1: Limits on Preventive Detention - Scenarios
: 5
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 [Original simulation]
Additional % per law 0% 0.0625% 0.125% 0.187% 0.25%
that is issued
Graph 3: Limits on Preventive Detention — 01 behavior under Scenarios
® Overcrowding index 1-2-3-4-5
1 0,604
NN J
A
j SS i
re
‘2 2,
00 15,00 30,00 45,00 60,0
Page 1 Time
As shown on Graph 3, reducing the additional percentage of detainees that enter the penitentiary
and prison system per each law that is issued can reduce significantly the OI. With the reduction of
this percentage, feedback R4 loses strength and dominance, which modifies OI behavior.
Notwithstanding, unless the percentage is 0.0625% or less, OI continues to grow exponentially.
11
(2) Improve Access to Prison Benefits
Issuing bills that relax conditions required for convicts to obtain prison benefits such as sentence
reduction for those who undertake work or studies while incarcerated, and probation’ and early
release can increase the outflow of prison population’. With this policy B1 is able to regulate more
strongly the prison population by allowing a larger outflow of convicts that finish serving their
sentence.
Graph 4 shows scenarios of OI behavior with variations on the average length of sentences. The
average length was varied between 5 years to 15.8 years (15.8 years being the parameter used in the
original simulation).
Table 2: Improve Access to Prison Benefits - Scenarios
10
Scenarios 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 [Original
simulation]
Average length
of sentences 5 6.2 74 8.6 9.8 ay 12.2 13.4 14.6 15.8
(years)
® overcrowding index 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10
1 0,609
a
Page 1
WSS
00
%
Graph 4: Improve Access to Prison Benefits — 01 behavior under Scenarios
15,00 30,00
45,00
3 Ttis a prison benefit given to convicted prisoners who have served half of the deprivation of liberty or %4 of
it, which consists on an early release of the prison.
* For purposes of showing this policy’s effects in the simulation model, we assume that an increase in the
number of convicts that have access to this type of prison benefits will traduce in a lower average length of
sentences.
12
As shown on Graph 4, OI decreases as the average length of sentences decreases. The outflow
control of convicted prisoners (B1) increases in strength regulating OI growth and even producing
OI decline with the lowest values for the average length of sentences. Improving access to prison
benefits in order to increase prison outflow not only controls OI but as well may aid the
Government in resocialization process as it acts as an incentive for prisoners to engage in work or
studies; these effects could be explored in further versions of the model presented in this paper.
Preventive Policies
(3) Ongoing Preventive Interventions
Preventive interventions should be maintained ongoing, that is, their implementation should not
depend on the OI perception, however low it may be. They should be implemented both on local
and national levels such that they reach the whole population. With prevention interventions, crime
is reduced and hence the prison population inflow declines. Examples of these interventions are:
lighting public areas, increasing the coverage and number of surveillance cameras, creation and
recovery of public areas, prohibition of firearms possession, and establishing limits for alcohol
consumption (Vanderschueren, 1994); as well as implementing permanent prevention programs
aimed to vulnerable population, ex- convicts, among others that facilitate a safe and successful
integration to society so that they have alternative possibilities to gain a living, other than crime
(Vanderschueren, 1994). With this type of policies however, we do not suggest to cut feedback
from OI perception to the implementation of prevention programs. Instead, we suggest that even
though prevention might be intensified when OI perception is high, the impact of OI perception on
prevention programs should not be too sensible to OI perception variations and that prevention
programs should remain at a sufficiently high level even when OI remains at low values. Control
mechanisms are hence strengthened (B4, B5 B6 and B7) and are able to regulate OI growth more
effectively.
Graph 5 shows the OI behavior on scenarios with variations on the impact of OI perception on the
creation of new preventive programs.
Table 3: Ongoing Preventive Interventions - Scenarios
1
Scenarios [Original
simulation]
Impact of OI
perception on the
creation of new
preventive
programs
13
Graph 5: Ongoing Prevention Interventions — OI behavior under Scenarios
® Overcrowding index 1-2-3-4-5
1 0554
: * SS eee
1
,00 15,00 30,00 45,00 60,00
Pagel Time
Graph 5 shows that as the impact of OI perception on the creation of new prevention programs is
flattened (reduced sensibility) and overall increased, OI falls more sharply on Phase 2 and increases
less in Phase 3, although it maintains an exponential mode of behavior. Control mechanisms
produce a balanced OI decrease (B4, B5 B6 and B7) and counteract the exponential growth on
Phase 3. Nevertheless, the scenarios also show that to obtain a low OI, high prevention levels are
required; only scenarios 4 and 5 achieve this goal. Attaining such high prevention levels requires
high monetary investments, which would eventually reduce the budget for prison infrastructure
building (Conpes 3412, 2006); future developments on the simulation model presented here could
explore the implications of such tradeoff.
Punitive and Preventive Policies Combined
According to (Vanderschueren, 1994) in a society as ours, prison and penitentiary overcrowding,
and crime should be counteracted on multiple fronts; one side, punitive measures are necessary to
establish rules and impose sanctions that allow maintaining an organized society and defend
individuals’ rights. But relying only on punitive measures runs the risk of strengthening reinforcing
legislative inflation feedbacks. Henceforth, punitive measures should be combined with preventive
measures that reduce crime and hence minimize prison population inflow. We explored two
additional scenarios which combine the before mentioned policies (Table 4).
14
Table 4: Punitive and Prevention Policies Combined — Scenarios
‘ 1
Scenarios [Original — 2: 3
(Limits on Preventive 0.25% 0.13% 0.25% [original value]
12) Imnprowe Fosse 0 15.4 years 13.4 years 13.4 years
Impact of OI perception on | Impact of OI perception on | Impact of OI perception on
the creation of new the creation of new the creation of new
preventive programs preventive programs reventive programs
_——s a a
(3) Ongoing preventive
interventions
Graph 6: Punitive and Prevention Policies Combined — OI behavior under Scenarios
@ Overcrowding index 1-2-3
r 0.604
—
,00 15,00 30,00
Page 1 Time
45,00 60,0
Graph 6 shows OI behavior under the three scenarios described in Table 4. Both scenarios (2 and 3)
show significant decreases on OI. Scenario 2 evidences a more prominent OI reduction given that it
also includes variations on the Limits on Preventive Detention Policy, thereby including the effects
of debilitating reinforcing dynamics (R4). The combination of increasing strength of feedbacks that
control prison population increase (B1, B4, B5 B6 and B7) and strength reduction of feedbacks
that reinforce OI growth (R4) produces a balanced OI decline. Cost analysis should be taken into
account in order to decide which type of combinations is viable.
15
Vv. Outlook
We showed how system dynamics provides a different type of understanding (as compared to the
usual cause and effect, short-term and static thinking) that helps to build a rationale for exploring
and taking action. The problem of prison overcrowding is driven by large and delayed control
mechanisms which with societies and governments usually act for tackling urgent problems.
Legislative inflation is a perfect example of that type of static thinking that is not anchored on a
systemic and dynamic view that only complicates things further, as Graph 1 shows. Policy makers
willing to challenge their mental models can produce great transformations if their actions are
backed by a dynamic understanding of feedback driven systems, i.e., the very systems that they face
everyday.
VI. References
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16
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