Social Dynamics of Traffic-Related Pardons in Korea*
Nam Hee Choi
(Professor, Chungju National University, Korea, dmhchoi@ cjnc.ac.kr)
Yoo Jeong Ahn
(Ph.D Student, Chungbuk National University, Korea, anyuting@ naver.com)
Gi Soo Kim
(Professor, Chungbuk National University, Korea, gskim@ chungbuk.ac.kr)
and
Man Hyung Lee
(Professor, Chungbuk National University, Korea, manlee@ cbu.ac.kr)
*A paper prepared for the 29th International Conference of The System Dynamics Society, July 24 — 28,
2011, Washington, DC, USA
Abstract
In Korea, presidential pardons for traffic violations have been carried out almost every three
years, starting from 1995. Whenever Presidents announced pardons for traffic violators, they
repeatedly emphasized justifiable reasons that drivers under administrative ruling should be
given another chance to make a living by driving. Nonetheless, whenever Presidents issued
pardons towards violators of traffic offenses, they were not free from a series of criticism or
blame. In fact, the pardons were controversial from the outset.
Findings from this research imply that the traffic-related pardons have led to unexpected
results: notably, an increase in the number of traffic accidents between 6 and 18 months after
the pardon, and raising the moral question of ‘bad’ drivers. In addition, the findings stress that
President-initiated pardons acted as an essential factor in destructing the balancing
mechanism, which would rather significantly contribute to minimizing traffic accidents per se.
Even though Korean society as a whole has to endure additional social costs originating from
the increase in traffic accidents, why have traffic-related pardons been consecutively adopted
by Presidents? Simply speaking, political gains have been Presidents’ primary concerns, even
transferring socio-economic costs to ordinary citizens. Therefore, we propose a series of
policy alternatives which would contribute in reorienting policy designs of traffic-related
pardons in Korea.
1, Introduction
Korean President Young-Sam Kim authorized the first general pardon for traffic violators in
December 1995, commemorating the Republic of Korea’s 50” anniversary since
Independence,’ approving license restoration for about 1.53 million people and elimination
1 Independence Day, Gwangbokjeol in Korean, literally "Restoration of Light Day,"
celebrated annually on August 15, is one of the Public Holidays in the Republic of Korea. It
commemorates victory over Japan, which liberated Korea from Japanese rule. The Korean
government was created three years later, on August 13, 1948, when Syngman Rhee was
swom in as the first President of South Korea and Gwangbokjeol was officially designated a
public holiday on October 1, 1949.
1
of black marks for another 3.93 million people. Hereafter, Korean Presidents repeatedly
pardoned violators of traffic offenses. Korea’s current President, Myung-Bak Lee, has been
no exception. He initiated two special pardons: one in June 2008 to celebrate the 100" day of
his government and another one in August 2009 to commemorate the 64" anniversary since
Independence.
Beneficiaries and contents of these pardons are classified into two types. The first focuses on
pardons for people under heavy administrative disposition, typically license suspension or
cancellation. A pardon allows drivers whose license was suspended to legally drive a vehicle
immediately after their license is re-instated by a local police authority. Owing to pardons,
people whose licenses were cancelled would be given the opportunity to take a driving test.
However, if a driver’s license is cancelled because of a DUI (Driving Under the Influence of
alcohol or drugs), she/he is not eligible to take a driving test for up to five years. Therefore,
pardons remove these control periods of license revocation. The second deals with pardons
for people who have amounted ‘black points’ from violations of road traffic laws. These types
of pardons would practically lower a risk of license suspension related with a demerit point
system.
As shown in Table 1, there have been six examples where pardons were given. These have
been offered to 24.43 million Koreans, eventually giving pardons to most traffic violators,
even though the average number of traffic-pardoned people has been reduced over time. In
sum, about 3.66 million people were granted immediate license restoration or another chance
for obtaining a driving license. Also, a huge 19.77 million enjoys eliminations of black marks,
lessening the risk of license suspension.
Table 1. Presidential Pardons for Traffic Violators in Korea
President Pardon Types Date Beneficiaries (1,000 People)
Number Contents
Young —Sam Kim General Pardon, commemorating the December | 5,950 License Recovery 1,530
(1993.02 ~ 1998.02) | 40th anniversary since South Korea’s 1995 Black Mark Deletion 3,930
‘liberation’
Dae-Jung Kim Special Pardon, commemorating March 5,320 License Recovery 360
(1998.02 ~ 2003.02) | inauguration of Dae-Jung Kim’s 1998 Black Mark Deletion 4,450
Goverment
Dae-Jung Kim Special Pardon, commemorating South | August 4,810 License Recovery 850
(1998.02 ~ 2003.02) | Korea’s final four placing at the Soccer | 2002 Black Mark Deletion 3,960
World Cup
Moo-Hyun Rho Special Pardon, commemorating the August 4,210 License Recovery 500
(2003.02 ~ 2008.02) | 50th anniversary since South Korea’s 2005 Black Mark Deletion 3,710
‘liberation’
Myung-Bak Lee Special Pardon, commemorating the June 2,830 License Recovery 350
(2008.02 ~) 100" Day of Myung-Bak Lee’s 2008 Black Mark Deletion 2,480
Govemment
Myung-Bak Lee Special Pardon, commemorating the August 1,300 License Recovery 70
(2008.02 ~) 64th anniversary since South Korea’s 2009 Black Mark Deletion 1,240
‘liberation’
Total 6 pardons - 24,430 License Recovery 3,660
(Average Black Mark Deletion
4,105) 19,770
2. Traffic Pardons and Traffic Accidents
Whenever Korean Presidents announced pardons for traffic violators, they repeatedly
emphasized justifiable reasons that drivers under administrative ruling should be provided
another chance to make a living by driving. Nonetheless, whenever Presidents issued pardons
towards violators of traffic offenses, they were not free from a series of criticism or blames.
In fact, the pardons were controversial from the outset (Choi 2009).
First of all, even though pardons primarily targeted people who suffer financially without
driving, in reality, due attention was not given to the economic status of drivers. For the
absolute majority of beneficiaries, driving a vehicle is not an essential means of living.
Secondly, the recurrent presidential pardons were not free from public accusation. Such
claims made suggested pardons were sold for political gains, incurring morally questionable
decisions and an insensibility towards safe driving. Thirdly, critics also pointed out the fact
that traffic accidents, or ‘traffic collisions’, had shown upward trends after orders on granting
pardons to the traffic violators were issued. Lastly, owing to the increased traffic accidents,
society experienced a sharp increase in the traffic-related socio-economic cost and ordinary
people had to endure extra burdens or damages originated from the increased traffic accidents.
Among these complaints, a key issue given was whether Koreans may be confronted with
sharp increases in the number of traffic accidents after pardons were granted. As shown in
Figure 1, without exception, the traffic-related pardons were followed by sharp increases in
the number of traffic accidents.” In the same vein, arguing that pardons were used mainly for
the sake of political expediency, Kwon, et. al (2009) analyzed the effect of traffic pardons.
According to Kwon, et. al, the first and second years after the pardon recorded 3% and 5%
increases in traffic accidents, respectively. They estimated that the aggregated cost occurring
from the pardon would range from 1,396.5 to 2,981.1 billion KW(Korean Won). Judging
from data provided by the Korea Transport Institute, these figures were equivalent to 5.0%
and 8.2%, respectively, of the annual total road traffic costs.
In 2008, Korea Transportation Civil Organization Solidarity, a non-government organization,
issued a statement, criticizing that President Myung-Bak Lee should withdraw his promise
geared towards further presidential pardons for traffic violators as traffic accidents had
presented an increasing trend after previous pardons were granted. Korea Insurance
Development Institute also published their traffic statistics, showing that the accident rate
increased 7 to 10 percent after the pardons (see Table 2). In a similar context, the Korean
vehicle insurance industry expected the pardons would result in an increase in insurance
claims against traffic accidents for the first six to seven months after the pardon, and drivers
who were granted a pardon would be more liable to be involved in one or more traffic
accidents soon after the pardon. In addition, the industry regarded any presidential pardons
for traffic offences as political rhetoric which provoked moral questions, and an insensibility
towards safe driving, aggravating unwanted damage or economic burdens to ordinary citizens
and society as a whole (quoted from Munwha Daily, November 6, 2009 and Chosun Daily,
October 19, 2009).
> Trend in Figure 1 did not reveal the direct and indirect impact from the improvement of
vehicle design and road conditions which would significantly contribute to lessening the risk
of traffic accidents over time.
3
Figure 1. Measures of Special Pardons for Traffic Violators and Number of Annual Traffic
Accidents
Number of Annual Traffic
350,000
Special Traffic
Pardon by
300,000 gine Lee Myung
ee Bak
Ee Government
250,004 (August 2009)
200,000
Special Traffic
Pardon by Kim
Special Traffic Special Traffic
Pardon by Pardon by Kim
Special Traffic
Pardon by Rho
Special Traffic
Pardon by Lee
Young Sam kim Dae Jung Dae Jung Moo Hyun iknngtek
150,000 Government Government Government Goverment Gaotment
(December (March 1998) (August 2002) (August 2005) (une 2008)
100,000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
year year year year year year year year year year year year year year year
Source: Road Traffic Authority, 2009, Statistical Analysis of 2009 Traffic Accidents, various
pages.
Table 2. Accident Trends of Traffic Violators before and after Special Pardons
Date of Special Number 1-Y ear Accident Rate before | 1-Y ear Accident Rate after Accident Trends
Pardon (1,000 People) Special Pardon (A) Special Pardon (B) (C=B/A-1)
March
5,320 3.11% 3.44% 10.6%
1998
August
4,810 4.66% 5.11% 9.7%
2002
June
2,830 5.33% 5.71% 71%
2008
Data: Korea Insurance Development Institute
3. Causal Loop Structure between Traffic-related Pardons and Traffic Accidents
A number of factors contribute to the risk of traffic accidents including vehicle design, speed
of operation, road design, and driver impairment. Judging from previous studies and crash
data in Korea, driver factors, solely or combined with other factors, occupied the absolute
majority of traffic accidents. Figure 2 presents positive feedback as repeated traffic-related
pardons would increase expectations from the drivers under administrative rulings and
diminishing respect for traffic laws, both of which would bring about more frequent traffic
accidents. As a result, in order to palate the demand from the huge number of accumulated
traffic offenders, the traffic-related pardons were repeatedly adopted.
In contrast, Figure 3 shows the interrelationship between the traffic-related pardons and
4
traffic accidents. There exist at least 1 positive and 2 balancing loops. It also reveals the fact
that the traffic-related pardons would accompany time lags as political raison d’etre was
usually required for another round of traffic-related pardons.
Therefore, if more drivers violate traffic laws, it would yield more traffic accidents. In turn,
more accidents would result in more drivers whose license have been repeatedly suspended
or cancelled. It implies, ceteris paribus, that this cycle would reduce the number of ‘bad’
drivers who are more likely to invite additional traffic accidents on the road.
Figure 2. Deviation between Traffic Pardon and Traffic Violators
, aa
eof 4.
Expectation a
Psychology for Pardon,,
Figure 3. Traffic Pardon and Traffic A ccidents
In the diagram, B1 presents the typical balancing mechanism, controlling both the total
number of traffic accidents and the total number of drivers whose licenses are suspended or
cancelled as they have violated road traffic regulations. If the traffic pardons are issued,
however, the total number of suspended or cancelled drivers’ licenses would remain or even
decrease, as shown in the B2 loop. This implies that the traffic-related pardons would result
in an unwanted balancing state, not restricting ‘bad’ drivers by rule. In contrast, R1 presents
the deviated reinforcing relationship between the traffic-related pardons and traffic accidents.
5
That is, if the traffic-related pardons include ‘bad’ drivers whose licenses are repeatedly
suspended or cancelled, it seems inevitable that these drivers would be more ubiquitous on
the street, which might accelerate incidents of traffic accidents.
As shown in Figure 4 and 5, there exists a casual dynamic relationship between traffic-related
pardons and traffic accidents. Figure 4 shows the cyclical patterns in which traffic-related
pardons are immediately followed by an increasing trend in traffic accidents. In a similar
context, Figure 5 presents the fact that traffic accidents would peak when the road is occupied
with the highest number of pardoned drivers.
Figure 4. Trends in Re-Licensed Drivers and Traffic Accidents
Traffic Accidents Re-Licensed Drivers
a 2,000,000
290,001 \ 1,800,000
280,00 BS Traffic Accidents ee
270,00 \ 1,400,000
260,001 000,
Recovered 1,800,000
250,000 from Drive License \ 4,000,000
Suspension and
Revocation
240,00
230,00
220,00
210,00 J
200,00
8000000
600,000
‘4a0/0000
200,000
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 +2005 ©2006 §=2007 + 2008year
Source: Road Traffic Authority, 2009, Statistical Analysis of 2009 Traffic Accidents, various
pages.
4. Simulation Analyses
Conceming simulation models, major level variables include: registered cars, licensed drivers,
and re-licensed drivers (suspended and cancelled licenses). In contrast, rate variables consist
of: newly registered cars, newly licensed drivers, license suspended and canceled drivers, and
re-licensed drivers who benefit from traffic-related pardons (see Figure 6). Compared with
findings in the previous studies including Choi (2009) and Kwon et. al (2009), the simulation
model’s main concerns are given to changes in two rate variables, that is, the number of
drivers whose licenses are suspended or cancelled, and re-licensed drivers who benefit from
traffic-related pardons. Using Vensim DSS (version 5.3), the model covers more than a
decade, starting from 1998, when the second traffic-related pardon was announced under ex-
President Kim Dae-Jung’s government, to 2011.
Figure 5. Trends in License-Suspended and Cancelled Drivers and Traffic Accidents
Traffic Accidents
License-Suspended
and Cancelled Drivers
300,000
290,000
280,000
270,000
260,000}
Traffic Accidents /
200,000
250,000
240,000
230,000
220,000
210,000
License-Suspended
and Cancelled Drivers
/
1999 2000 2001 2002
2003
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: Road Traffic Authority, 2009, Statistical Analysis of 2009 Traffic Accidents, various
pages.
Figure 6. Stock-Flow Models Reflecting Relationship between Traffic Pardons and Traffic
Accidents
Tec Acide
eviy Reged ia
‘Newly Regateted
Cars
“Trail Accident Rate
pet Driver per Car
<Tme>
‘Trale Accidents
te
Trac Acsideat Probatilty of
FeLicensed Drwers Beneficed
‘vith Trafic Pardon
a
%
Average Expense per
‘Trafic Accident
Expectation Rate for
‘Licensed Drivers on 7 RL “Trafic Pardon
Se ‘Trafic Accident
Teton
[ ‘ °
Ces oot \ ae
\ ee
Annagtobret Pe ;
‘Newly Licensed Drwers Re-Licensed Danvers Lcense S 1d Cancell “Sin
Licensed | Beneizedwih Trafic Rate among Be-Licensed Dawes | ge
& Drive
‘Newly Licensed == imal a
Canceled Devers Ay,
gee?
nissan sane
Chacon Bato melon ate aneng
6 eee
\.
Average Time for Driver License
Re-suspension and Cancellation for
Ee-Licented Drivers Becetited with
‘Tralie Pardon
5. Simulated Results
As shown in Figure 7, the number of simulated traffic accidents presents a diminishing trend
over the proposed research period. Nonetheless, if the traffic-related pardons are confined to
drivers whose licenses were suspended or canceled with a cycle of, on average, 38 months, it
would cause an increase in the number of traffic accidents over a 6 to 18 month period. It
seems that an increase in traffic accidents partially originates from re-licensed drivers who
are open to presidential-pardons which permit them to legally drive a vehicle again. Figure 8
also presents similar results. That is, if a traffic-related pardon is announced, without
exception, drivers whose licenses are suspended or cancelled seem to rush to police stations
in order to retake their license or apply for a driving test. In contrast, Figure 9 shows traffic
accidents may be significantly diminished after the number of drivers whose licenses were
suspended or cancelled are again confiscated. The implication is that there exists a
meaningful feedback structure which would significantly contribute to reducing the number
of traffic accidents if “bad” drivers (those whose licenses are repeatedly suspended or
cancelled) are banned from using the road, and subsequently creating a limit to the expansion
of social costs. Therefore, the traffic-related pardon simply cuts off ‘constructive’ feedback
loops on Korean society. The typical social cost originated from traffic-related pardons are
presented below: see R1, R2, and R3 loops in Figure 10.
Figure 7. Traffic Accident after Traffic Pardon
Traffic Accident
30,000
26,250
&
22,500
18,750 4
15,000
0 24 48 72 96 120. «144 168
Time (Month)
Traffic Accident: Analysis!
Figure 8. License Suspension/Cancellation and Re-Licensed Drivers Benefited with
Traffic Pardon
License Suspension and Re-Licensed Drivers
200,000
0 24 48 72 96 120 144 168
Time (Month)
“License Suspension/Cancellation”: Analysis1
Re-Licensed Drivers Benefited with Traffic Pardon : Analysis1
Figure 9. License Regaining Based on the Traffic Pardon and Traffic Accidents
Pardon effect and Traffic Accidents
3M
30,000
200,000
2M
20,000 an
100,000 wf y +
1M
10,000
0
0 24 48 72 96 120 144 168
Time (Month)
“License Suspension/Cancellation”: Analysis1
Traffic Accidents : Analysis1
Re-Licensed Drivers Benefited with Traffic Pardon : Analysis
6. Summaries
In Korea, presidential traffic-related pardons have been carried out almost every three years
since 1995. These pardons have led to unexpected results: notably, an increase in the number
of traffic accidents between 6 and 18 months after the pardon, and raising the moral question
of ‘bad’ drivers. In addition, it should be pointed-out that government-initiated pardons acted
as an essential factor in deconstructing a balancing mechanism, which would significantly
contribute to minimizing traffic accidents per se. Even though Korean society as a whole has
to endure additional social costs originating from an increase in traffic accidents, why have
9
traffic-related pardons been consecutively adopted by Korean Presidents? Simply speaking,
political gains have been of primary concern to Presidents’, even if this means transferring
socio-economic costs to ordinary citizens.
Figure 10. Social Cost Originating from Traffic Pardon
‘Teallio Pusshtaent and
‘Tralic Education Level
\
Tete Vere
+4
Poiticel Support
(Oniaating fom Trac
Pardon
In order to reorient policy designs of traffic-related pardons, we suggest the following policy
alternatives. First of all, Korea’s government has to minimize the size of it’s target group if it
intends to implement another round of traffic-violation pardons. Secondly, it should
strengthen safe driving education opportunities for drivers whose licenses are suspended or
cancelled and want to reapply for licenses. Of course, the education costs should be covered
by drivers taking the required course. Thirdly, it should prepare appropriate procedures in
order to internalize additional social costs among beneficiaries. Finally, we propose the
Korean government raise the level of punishment for drivers whose licenses were restored
from a previous ‘heavy’ administrative ruling, i.e. a license suspension or cancellation, when
being punished for the same or a similar violation of traffic regulations.
References
Choi, Nam-Hee, 2009, "A Study on the Causal Feedback Relationship between Special
Pardon for Traffic Law Violators and Traffic Accidents," Korean System Dynamics Review,
Vol. 10, No. 4, pp.53-72.
10
Jang, Il-Jun, 2009, "Modeling of the Effective Levels of Traffic Violation Fines," Journal of
Korean Society of Transportation, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.111-118.
Jang, Seok-Y ong, Hun-Young Jung, Won-Gyu Lee, and Sang-Seon Ko, 2008, "A Study
about the Typical Patterns of Driver's Characteristics by the Q Analysis Method: With Traffic
Law Violator and Traffic Accident Causer," Journal of Korean Society of Transportation,
Vol. 26, No. 1, pp.165-180.
Kang, Dong-Soo, Sang-Kweon Park, and Jin-Soo Park, 2005, Rational Treatment Standards
in Handling Traffic Criminals, Korea Transportation Safety Authority.
Kwon, Young-Sun, Seong-Hun Han, and Chang-Gi Nam, 2009, “Effectiveness Test of
Pardon Policies toward Traffic Violators,” Korean Economic Association, Proceedings of the
2009 Economics Conference, Sungkyunkwan University, February 12~13, 2009.
Korea Transport Institute, 2009, Estimation of 2008 Road Accident Cost in Korea.
Lee, Hyeon-Ju, 2007, "The Analysis of the Differences of Driving Behaviors According to
Drivers' Personal Characteristics and the Causal Relationship between Personal
Characteristics and the Number of Traffic Violations," Journal of Korean Society of
Transportation, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp.39-50.
Park, Sang-Kweon, Man-Seong Hwang, Cheon-Hyun Lee, and Young-Sil Jeon, 2006, A
Study on the Improvement of Clemency Policy to the Traffic Criminals, Korea
Transportation Safety A uthority.
Yoon, Hong-Sup, 1997, "A Psychological Study on the Violation of the Traffic Rules:
Especially in Relating Autodrivers," Journal of Korean Society of Transportation, Vol. 15,
No. 1, pp.17-26.
11
