Understanding and Diagnosing Adversary System Behavior
in 4th Generation Warfare: A Soft Approach to EBO Mission
Analysis
MAJ OR WILLIAM E. YOUNG, JR
USAF AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
225 CHENNAULT CIRCLE
MAXWELL AFB AL 36112
334-953-6700/fax 334-953-9978,
William Y oung@Maxwell.AF.Mil
STUDENT PAPER
DISCLAIMER:
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the US govemment or the Department of Defense. In
accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the
United States goverment.
ABSTRACT
Effects-based Operations (EBO) is rapidly becoming the centerpiece of Western military
thinking. The concept is based on influencing the behavior of adversary complex adaptive
systems (such as terrorist networks) in dynamic environments. EBO mission analysis is critical
to overall campaign effectiveness and requires planners identify changes (effects) likely to
produce conditions consistent with the desired endstate. This paper proposes a new intellectual
framework using a soft systems approach to develop the critical linkage between effects and
endstate. The paper explains why Fourth Generation Warfare and adversary complex adaptive
systembehavior may frustrate EBO approaches seeking to determine endstate, arguing the
situation is better approached as a discovery or learning process. The key results are an initial
set of changes planners believe will successfully influence behavior toward the desired endstate.
These changes serve as input for subsequent, more detailed planning to determine specific
actions.
INTRODUCTION
“Command and Control is the ability to recognize what needs to be done in a
situation and to ensure that effective action is taken’! - Joint Warfighting Center
Joint Doctrine Series: Pamphlet 7: Operational Implications of Effects-based
Operations
Command and Control has always involved decision-making. This paper explores one
aspect of how a Joint Force Commander (JFC) exercises C” within Effects-based Operations
(EBO). Specifically, the paper examines the EBO mission analysis process. Within EBO,
“recognizing what needs to be done” begins with answering the question “what effects will yield
the desired endstate?” The JFC and planning staff answer this question during the mission
analysis process by providing two outputs: (1) a specified set of effects believed sufficient to
yield the desired endstate and (2) a shared understanding of the adversary system and the
environment? The foundation of effective C? is built upon the quality of these products.
F Anformation
Social feo namie.
\infrastructure
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me Kees \ ._ \ |
Soc fe
Nodes —" Military
Pott :
Figure 1: Adversary as System of PMESII Systems (Source: JFCOM Model)*
EBO, Old Wine in a New Cask? Maybe
EBO is many things to many people. For the purpose of this discussion, Effects-based
Operations are, “coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and
neutrals in peace, crisis and war.”* Conceptually, EBO views the adversary as a system of
Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, and Infrastructure (PMESIT) sub-systems
(Figure 1). EBO coordinates and integrates Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic
(DIME) national Instruments of Power (IOP) actions to generate effects within these adversary
systems to influence behavior towards an endstate (Figure 2).
Insome ways, EBO is nothing new. Politicians and commanders have used warfare and the
IOPs to influence adversary behavior throughout history.° Clausewitz’s classic quote “war is
merely the continuation of politics by other means” reinforces this idea®. Proponents argue EBO
is new because it thinks about campaign planning, execution and assessment in a more “holistic”
way.’ This new way of thinking about campaign planning changes the how campaign planners
develop linkages between tactical action and endstate.
Figure 2. EBO Operational Plannig Environment (Source: JFCOM Model) ®
In Effects-based planning (EBP), planners answer the what to do question during the initial
portion of the EBO planning process “by clarifying goals and objectives, developing a systems
‘understanding of the operational environment, ing commander's intent, and determining the
set of effects required to achieve desired objectives.”” It is the last part of this definition that is
new to the campaign planning process. In EBO, effects bridge the gap between campaign
objectives and tactical actions as shown in Figure 2.
The figure shows two distinct linkages. The first is the linkage between tactical-level action
and the resultant effects. Most Westem militaries are now pouring tremendous resourves into
developing technology and tools to better plan actions to achieve desired effects. United States
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is currently developing and fielding tools supporting an
Effects-Node-Action-Resource (E-N-A-R) process to help planners analyze, develop and
orchestrate these tactical actions. Linking actions and effects is clearly a necessary EBO
Planning function, but is it sufficient? A re-examination of Figure 2 shows it is not.
There is a second linkage in Figure 2. This is the linkage between operational effects and
campaign objectives. Planning staffs bridge this gap through the EBO mission analysis process.
EBO mission analysis determines the effects required to achieve theater and national
objectives.!° Objectives in this context mean “operational or strategic goals, conditions, or
outcomes, which describe the intended endstate from the combatant commander's perspective”!
Endstate is used in this context throughout the paper.
The Endstate-Effects Linkage (E-E-L) describes the connection between the two and
answers the questions “what effects will yidd the desired endstate” and “why do planners
believe this is so”? Currently, roughly the same traditional task-focused mission analysis process
is used during EBP. This means EBO mission analysis lacks a distinct methodology linking
effects with endstate."* This remainder of this paper proposes a new EBO mission analysis
process to develop this E-E-L during campaign planning.
What Needs to be Done is Obvious... Isn't It?
The linkage between effects and endstate has not received much attention. Perhaps this is
due to the fact planners already perform mission analysis using the traditional process. Using
this rationale, one of two conclusions is easy to draw. The first is the military effects required to
reach campaign objectives / desired endstate are relatively simple to determine and do not
require any special methodology. The second is traditional mission analysis is adequate for EBO
Plamning. Both are incorrect.
Table 1. Hypothetical EBO Simplified Planning Situation”
Situation: Two regional countries are contesting ownership of a set of islands. Both
state that they have longstanding historical basis for their claims. Both are relatively
equal in military capability, and C ountry X has placed limited military forces on one of
the islands. Country Y is threatening a military response. A war between the two
countries would destabilize the region, which the President considers a threat to US vital
interests. He has decided to intervene and has established several strategic objectives that
contribute to the desired end state.
Desired End State: Long-term peace and stability in the region.
US Objective: Countries X and Y resolve disputed islands issue peacefully.
Effect 1: Country X engages Country Y in diplomatic efforts to resolve crisis.
Effect 2: Country X withdraws military forces from the island.
Consider the hypothetical situation in Table 1. Country X engaging Country Y in
diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis may be a legitimate effect, but how did planners arrive at
it? Consider what happens if the occupation is viewed from a different perspective. The leader
of Country X may be using military action to send a non-military message to gain regional
influence. Furthermore, it may be culturally unacceptable for Country X’s leader to engage the
leader of Country Y diplomatically. Negotiating may be perceived as a sign of weakness, thus
further destabilizing the Country X regime and the entire region. Consider the possibility
negotiations between the two nations might actually make the situation worse in the long term by
causing them to unite against the U.S. The purpose of raising these issues is not to suggest
diplomatic efforts are not a valid effect. However, the above questions do illustrate the linkage
between effects and endstate may not be obvious and the wrong effect can have very negative
consequences.
Human systems are notoriously complex. Complex systems behavior is often hidden and
counterintuitive.'* The link between effect and endstate is difficult to establish because human
systems are themselves not govemed by rules like natural systems, designed systems or even
designed abstract systems.'° Behavior, especially at the system level, can rarely be simplified to
cause-and-effect, nor is the interaction govemed by a deterministic set of laws ornules.'° Blindly
assuming required effects are obvious or easily determined without a rigorous mission analysis
process is a recipe for disaster. In other words, being able to plan, generate, and assess effects is
important, but having a high degree of confidence the effects once executed will actually
generate the desired endstate is CRITICAL!
EBO mission analysis is fundamentally different from the current mission analysis process.
EBO mission analysis is less task-focused and more centered on connecting effects and actions to
objectives and the endstate. The difference in emphasis is central to the value of EBP over
current campaign planning.'” At the Operational level, EBP is focused much more on
effectiveness (doing the right things) than efficiency (doing things right). Current planning
emphasizes translating campaign objectives into the right tactical objectives (tasks). EBP adds
effects as an intervening step between tactical action and campaign objectives. This means using
the traditional mission analysis process for EBO mission analysis is incomplete since it does not
4
consider effects. Using the current mission analysis process neglects the link between effect and
endstate. This creates the possibility the possibility the JFC may plan and successfully win all
the battles, but may still lose the war because of the broken linkage. The E-E-L aspect of
mission analysis is too important to be ignored, too complex and ambiguous to be intuitive and
too soft to be solved by detenninistic rules or approaches. In either case, a new EBO mission
analysis process is required. One way to do this is by exploring the nature of the linkage
between endstate and effects (situation), then identifying a method to develop the linkage
(strategy) and finally determining a suitable means to go about it (tactic).
THE SITUATION
“War is thus an act of force to compel our eneny to do our will” !® -- Clausewitz
Puzzles, Problems, Messes and why it Matters to EBO Planning
In EBP, the JFC and staff are given a desired endstate with objectives and then decide on a
course of action (an integrated set of effects in the form of a campaign plan) to satisfy the
objectives and attain the desired endstate. What to do decisions fall into one of three classes;
puzzles, problems or messes/ wicked problems. Puzzles are well-structured situations where it is
generally clear what and how things need to be done to reach an objective. The decision process
is primarily concemed with identifying ways to optimize task accomplishment: Problems are
also well defined or structured. It is generally clear what things need to be done, but it may not
be clear how to do so. The decision process focuses on identifying how to accomplish the
objective.” Messes or wicked problems are unstructured situations. These situations include
“cansiderable disagrearnent about what needs to be done and why; therefore, it is impossible to
saytgeltomiieans ea
Human
Routine interaction
use
Puzzles Problems Messes/
wicked problems
Tools for routine
decision making
Figure 3. Tools Supporting Various Decision Types (Source: Systems Modelling: Theory
and Practice by Pidd)
Fig 3 shows the appropriate tools for each type of situation. Puzzles and some problems can
be resolved through tools for routine decision making. These tools include optimization models
and other traditionally quantitative (Operations Research) or “hard” systems thinking techniques.
Messes demand tools for thinking. Puzzles may require extensive thinking, but it is different
Tools for thinking
than the thinking required for messes. Messes tend to be the most difficult to resolve. Examples
include developing policy or perhaps even the family decision on where to go on next summer’ s
vacation. EBO mission analysis is best described as a mess /wicked problem for several reasons.
A Wicked Problem
Without even knowing the definition, many campaign planners would likely describe the
process of trying to identify the effects necessary to reach the desired objectives as a mess. This
is due to several reasons. The adversary is a complex adaptive system, a high level of
cooperation among friendly forces (including non-military) is required and 4” Generation
Warfare Environment (4GW) is ambiguous and non-linear. The interlocking sets of issues and
constraints confirm the situation is indeed a wicked problem?
Using a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) metaphor to describe the adversary under EBO is
appropiate, but complicates matters, particularly trying to plan effects to yield an endstate. CAS
behavior (the thing EBO seeks to influence) is govemed by the rules of complexity science.
Therefore, EBO mission analysis must also consider them. Three CAS qualities are particularly
important. CAS consist of a large number of interacting agents, they exhibit a property known as
emergence, and this emergence property is not controlled by a central mechanism within the
system. Emergence is the growth of large-scale system behavior from aggregate interactions of
less complex agents. This behavior cannot be predicted from the system’s parts.” “Irrational”
crowd action during a riot is an example of emergent behavior. Emergence is the single most
important quality of a CAS and it contains the key for understanding why influencing overall
CAS behavior through effects is difficult*® These three qualities mean CAS behavior is
decidedly non-linear. This non-linearity frustrates behavior “prediction.”””
Friendly system cooperative behavior is one of the keys to successful EBO. ‘This
cooperation enables integrated application of Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic
power. The current EBO concept calls for “virtual aggregation of individuals, organizations,
systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge
needed to plan, execute, and assess joint force operations.” Likewise, holistic understanding of
the adversary and environment is the key to this integration and forms the basis for all EBO
planning, execution and assessment”?
Shared understanding is the foundation for cooperative behavior. However, building this
shared understanding among Joint, Inter-Agency, and Multi-national partners, each with
different ideas of the effects necessary to influence adversary behavior, will be difficult.°° EBO
Planners are drawn from a variety of military and civilian, govemment and non-govemment
backgrounds and organizations, each with its own culture and biases. This means each Inter-
Agency planner will define the “problem” differently, according to his or her own unique social
contextual interpretation.*! They are not likely to initially see the situation the same way and
there will likely be many different versions of what is happening, much less “what needs to be
done.” There are many stakeholders, determining a “solution” may be secondary to gaining buy-
in from all agencies involved in implementation. There is also a requirement for accommodation
among the various views in order to find a solution. This fits within the definition of a wicked
problem or mess.”
Messes will likely dominate the 4GW EBO environment. EBO literature describes an
operational environment consisting of interconnected complex adaptive systems. The 2004
National Military Strategy identifies wider range of adversaries, a more complex and distributed
battlespace, and technology diffusion and access as the three key aspects of this new security
environment.* This matches the 4GW environment many envision. 4GW is non-linear,
possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. Actions will occur
concurrently throughout all participants’ depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a
physical entity.® Within this environment, proponents expect EBO to obtain a desired strategic
outcome or "effect" on the adversary system through the synergistic, multiplicative, and
cumulative application of the full range of military and nonnilitary capabilities at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels.° 4GW threats lack structure. The need to add structure before
making a decision is a property of messes. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is an
excellent example of this phenomenon. Defining terrorism and who is a terrorist depends on
perspective. These structuring questions must be answered before any discussion can proceed.
about how to address terrorism.
Situational ambiguity, adversary CAS-like behavior, and planning team perspective
diversity is much closer to “mess” or “wicked problem’ criteria in Figure 3. Lack of structure
increases the number of interpretations among even a homogenous group. When planners’
cultural and experiential diversity and CAS non-linearity is added to the situation, it becomes
easy to see how EBO mission analysis is a wicked problem Consequently, the idea of
“determining” effects required to reach the endstate (viewing E-E-L as a puzzle) is misleading,
suggesting a degree of determinism that simply does not exist in the situation for a variety of
reasons. A more informed perspective would be to view the process of attempting to influence
adversary behavior towards desired endstate as an exploratory process (viewing E-E-L as a
mess). The effects most likely to influence the adversary toward the desired endstate will
probably not be obvious, but must be discovered or leamed by planners.
STRATEGY
A Way out of the Mess... Analysis as L earning
EBO mission analysis is a Mess or Wicked Problem. Vail coins the term “permanent
whitewater” to describe Messy and ill-structured situations.” Leaming is his solution to
surviving and thriving in these types of situations Czerwinski echoes the same idea in
“aids” to leaming as a way of understanding complexity. He differentiates
between “aids” and “tools” noting in situations beyond mildly non-linear “nothing so overt as a
tool can be preassembled.” This is important since adversary emergence is a norlinear
phenomenon. Instead, he insists the - appropriate response requires use of more tacit “aids” that
improve leaming in novel situations.” He points out traditional problem solving really does not
occur in complex, nor-linear environments. Instead, individuals leam to “cope with the
environment.” This means instead of looking for an analysis tool to link endstate with effect,
Planners do much better approaching the EBO mission analysis process as one of discovery
using “aids” to help them leam, so they can understand the nature and eventually develop
campaign linkages connecting effects generated by tactical actions with the desired endstate and.
objectives. Adversary, friendly system and environment each impose leaming requirements on
the leaming “aid.”
Conceptualizing the adversary as a CAS requires the ability to understand behavior as a
whole, not merely reduce it into its PMESII sub-systems. Just because planners understand the
parts, does not mean they understand the whole. Emergence is about probabilities not
certainties.
Developing shared understanding is a leaming process. It is also the necessary prerequisite
to integrated action. Generating shared understanding is particularly difficult in complex,
ambiguous situations. In these situations, people tend to resort to what they know. This means
they rely on mental models formed over years based on both education and experience.
Therefore, building shared understanding requires a leaming process designed to accommodate
and then allow individuals to challenge their mental models. This must be a deliberate social
leaming process. In order to have any hopes of building a shared understanding, a leaming
strategy must provide a means to make the various planners’ mental models explicit so they can
be discussed and debated.”
The value of using multiple perspectives in confusing situations has long been
acknowledged. The 4GW environment is ripe with confusion and uncertainty. Bolman and Deal
as a technique to improve managerial understanding and decision-making in ee
environments pioneered the concept of “reframing” the environment. Managers reframe
viewing messy situations through a variety of frames until they make sense. Smee
reframe situations allows individuals to see and understand more of their environment and it i is
crucial to creating new opportunities and discovering new altematives.® Thus, reframing
becomes an important part of mission analysis leaming
Technology as a Strategy
Despite the nature of the situation and the resulting need to employ a leaming strategy
within the EBO mission analysis process, there is a definite role for technology. However, this
tole, particularly how computers should be used, is important to understand. Computers will not
structure an unstructured situation. They cannot, therefore, handle messes in isolation (without
aids for thinking). Once the situation is structured, computers can help process data. In this
way, computers do not solve the problems. Computers speed human leaming and increase
insight into how situational factors may influence overall system behavior. For example, even
CAS behavior may be predictable within certain localized limits. The resulting predictions may
be used as part of EBO mission analysis. However, the data is only a prediction (like the
weather) and should never be blindly accepted as the solution just because it is what the
computer spit out. 7
luman
Routine a interaction
use =
(1) Automation (2) Routine (3) Representing (4) Representing
of decisions decision support possible system _ insights for debate
designs and
changes
Tools for routine
decision makina
Figure 4. Technology Use ip Various Decision Situations (Source: Systems Modelling:
‘Theory and Practiceby Pidd)“*
Tools for thinking
Figure 4 shows the use of technology and computer-based models across the various types
of situations. As the situation becomes increasingly unstructured, the technology becomes more
useful as an aid to debate. A lack of understanding about the nature of the relationship between
EBO endstates and effects may inadvertently create a condition where mission analysis is viewed.
as a puzzle, prompting some to try and use computers for decision automation and routine
decision support. This is counterproductive. Instead, technology should be used in EBO mission
analysis to explore potential system changes and support planner leaming through debate.
izing technology without equal (or greater) emphasis on related leaming creates
problems within EBO mission analysis.
TACTIC
Using a Screwdriver for a Nail: Problems with the Current Approach
The current EBO approach to determining a set of effects to achieve the desired endstate is
depicted in Figure 5. In broad terms, planners define the endstate in terms of individual Political,
Military, Economic, Social, Informational, Infrastructure (PMESII) subsystem behaviors (B4, 5,
6). These endstate PMESII system behavior characteristics are then compared to initial state
PMESII system behavior (B1, 2, 3) in a “cut” method. The differences in the state of each
individual system are identified as the required effects necessary to generate the desired
endstate.° This method allows the use of advanced analytic models because the behavioral
change is examined on an intra-system level (e.g. political endstate vs. political initial state).
However, there are fundamental problems with this approach.
The most obvious problem is the reductionist nature of the approach. Reducing overall
adversary system behavior into component subsystem pieces does not adequately address the
CAS quality of emergence. According to Nobel Laureate Murray Gell-Mann, “when dealing
with any nor-linear system, especially a complex one, it is not sufficient to think of the system in
terms of parts or aspects identified in advance, then to analyze those parts or aspects
separately.”“° Overall, adversary behavior at the system-of-systems level is an emergent quality,
existing not within the various PMESII systems, but generated as a product of their interaction.
Therefore, as an emergent property, system behavior cannot simply be “cut” into its component
pieces without the probability of losing something. Failure to correct this problem means under
the current approach, even if the identified effects are successfully generated within the
individual adversary systems, the desired overall change in the aggregate adversary system may
not be reached (thus not reaching the desired endstate). In other words, successfully changing
the parts may not result in the desired overall change to the whole!
INITIAL STATE
EFFECTS = CHANGE IN SUB SYSTEM
BEHAVIORS
END STATE
Figure 5. Current EBO Mission Analysis CutApproach
The current approach lacks a means of accommodating the inherent ambiguity associated
with the situation and the potential disconnects among various planner perspectives. Expecting
State Department and Defense Department planners to agree on the exact problem is (much less
solutions) is asking a lot. High-level national policy disagreements within the US Govemment
as publicized in the media during Operation ALLIED FORCE and IRAQI FREEDOM illustrate
this point.
Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) as the Tactic of Choice: A Better Way
SSM” or a similar qualitative approach appears to be the solution to developing an EBO
mission analysis process. Within the EBO mission analysis context, the methodology is
promising for a number of reasons. The approach departs from current practice and does not
initially attempt to establish a cause and effect relationship between effects and endstate. SSM
allows planners to instead use endstate as a lens to identify problematic adversary system
behavior (Figure 6). This problematic behavior then becomes the subject of improvement efforts
(EBO effects).“* The SSM-based approach uses conceptual models to understand, leam about,
and defines the problematic adversary behaviors. The methodology’ s soft aspect allows planners
to analyze adversary behavior as a whole using the concept of a Human Activity System (HAS).
The HAS represents emergent adversary system behavior resulting from interactions and
components spread throughout the PMESII systems. ‘This approach resembles a “slice”
approach as shown in Figure 6.
10
ADVERSARY
SYSTEM
apvexsary |
SYSTEM WIT
PROBLEMATIC
BEHAVIORS (B1-3
IDENTIFIED
Figure 6. Proposed SSM-Based EBO Mission Analysis
Fig 7 shows the basic approach using SSM as a means of linking effects and endstate during
EBO mission analysis.” The inputs into the methodology are the endstate and strategic
objectives. The outputs are shared understanding and an initial set of effects. This initial set of
effects serves as the basis for continued planning by subordinate commanders as part of the E-N-
A-R planning process. Figure 7 also shows the overlap between the traditional SSM stages and
the EBO mission analysis process.
11
Effect Debate & ID
et Changes
5
2 Endstate onvert Change:
= & Objectives To Effects
&—/ Filter and Orient and Validate WMREN eorneee
relevant Data ales Conceptual
Desirable / bens
@® Feasible 5) ys
rd Situation
REAL
Rich Picture WORLD Co oe ee
Captures and ACTION I eframe
Accomodates () through Ged
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z Lens
Seinen ! Behavior as 7
Identify I A Vv
“Sg enevion a” Whole
Inconsistent -xamine as’
wiEndstate 1 —_ | Conceptual
Systems Thinking | *#\ system
S#= SSM Stage World Activities
Figure 7. Basic Steps of Proposed EBO Mission Analysis based on SSM
The process is not a rigid checklist but an iterative process. It is likely planners will
generate questions in subsequent stages forcing them to go back and re-examine earlier
conclusions. For example, it is possible planners’ discussions while building the rich picture in
stage 2 will reveal missing data that should have been included in Stage 1. This does not mean
stage 1 was performed incorrectly, only that by stage 2 planners have developed a deeper
understanding of the situation and potential actors influencing it. In this way, SSM promotes
problem structuring through leaming.
Simplified Scenario Application
The scenario presented at Appendix A is a hypothetical situation to illustrate the basics of
how an EBO mission analysis based on SSM might develop the link between endstate and
effects”. The example is greatly simplified and introduces the general process. It does provide
an overview and feel for how planners would hypothetically perform mission analysis by
applying SSM to answer the question of “what effects will lead to the desired endstate?”
Stage 1: Situation Exploration - What Factors May be Influencing Behavior
The goal of stage 1 is to examine the situation without invoking preconceived notions. Itis
immersion-based, exploratory and iterative. The purpose is to get a “feel” for what is going on
and the factors influencing the situation.*! In this case, planners begin by identifying the key
scenario behaviors or actions related to the endstate or objectives. This involves identifying
actors, behaviors and other factors in the situation that initially seem to be important in
‘understanding regional security (the desired endstate) and why Jupiter might invade (the strategic
12
objective). Another way to think about this would be looking at the present in light of the fubure
(desired endstate and objectives) to identify what things will be most important to understand. In
this case, examples of key factors are listed in Table 2.
The stage may sound similar to the current Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)
process, but it is not the same.°? SSM data are gathered from numerous traditional and non-
traditional sources, many of which are considered outside the bounds of current intelligence
products. Both qualitative and quantitative data are collected, including instruments such as
surveys, observations and measurements. History, culture and even media reports may also be
important to include. SSM's inclusion of broad, non-traditional intelligence data is consistent
with the latest suggested doctrinal changes to Joint Pub 2-0 Intelligence in light of EBO.™*
Table 2. Examples of Key Factors from Scenario
Data Element Inclusion Rationale
History of Region Both nations were formed from Mercupiter, invasion may
be seen as reunification
Culture Jupiterians have distinct culture, invasion may be viewed.
as rational altemative if assimilation viewed as unlikely
Key leaders Will make the decision to invade
United States US trade is 40%, economic and personal ties
Terrorist Organizations State-sponsored by both sides, escalating violence
destabilizes relationship, may setoff an invasion.
Russia Potential to influence Jupiter behavior and dissuade
against invasion.
Industrial base of Jupiter Failing due to high inflation and outdated production
methods/ gov’ t must make radical unpopular changes /
original reason for influx into JCY
Industrial Base of Mercury _| Initial cause for 1951 influx into MCY
Sabim Key Jupiter trading partner
Jupiter population Will support invasion if viewed as just
MCY Jupeterians Seen as Oppressed brothers of Jupiter population
EBO experiments in the United Kingdom confirm the value of this type of initial exploration
of the situation before attempting to generate effects. During the first UK Effects Based
Planning Experiment held in October 2003, the analysis team’s initial task was “situating
themselves in the data before looking at the database within the tools.”°° This represents the type
of collective “sense-making” that should occur during Stage 1 of SSM applied to EBO.
Stage 2: Problem Situation Structured - Accommodating Different Views of What is Going
On
The second stage of the process builds onto the first, but in practice, the two are typically
performed simultaneously. The purpose of stage 2 is to display the situation so a range of
possible, and hopefully relevant, choices can be revealed.°” In practical terms, Stage 2 produces
a “Rich Picture” (RP) capturing key elements of structure, processes, climate and issues within
the situation in graphical format’ The rationale for using a picture as opposed to narrative
description is related to the old adage “a picture is worth a thousand words.” More specifically,
13
since the purpose of stage 2 is to rapidly gain an overall “sense” of an extremely complex and
multi-faceted situation, a picture is a far better means to quickly capture the essence of what is
going on. The trillions of PowerPoint slides produced annually around the world also testify to
this truth.
a §£
Figure 8. Example Rich Picture Drawn from Scenario™
RP contain certain elements. Structures are those aspects of the situation that are relatively
fixed and slow to change. In the scenario, these include elements such as the various countries,
the MCY industry, the economic ties between nations and the religious ties between the Jupiter
population and the Jupiterians in MCY. Processes are the key actions (physical or otherwise)
canied out within the situation. They will typically be more transient in nature.° In the
scenario, process elements include terrorism and the growing power of Jupiterians within MCY .
Climate is the result of the interaction between structure and processes.” Jupiter's failing
econonyy is an example of climate within the scenario. Issues are both facts and subjective
opinions capturing the contentious aspects of the situation and may represent attitudinal barriers
to progress.” Jupiter's massing forces along the border while threatening invasion and
Jupiterians view that their “brothers” in MCY are suffering oppression are issues examples.
Rich picture development is iterative and continues until the final version accommodates the
variety of planner views of what is going on in the situation. Fig 8 is a Rich Picture developed
based on the scenario. The picture simultaneously reflects a variety of behavior believed
important to the situation. These include terrorism, Jupiter's intemal problems, the military
buildup and the historical roots of the dispute. The purpose of the rich picture is not to say
conclusively which of these adversary system behaviors, if successfully influenced through
EBO, is the answer to reaching the endstate, but rather to accommodate each of them as part of a
larger system.
Stage 3: Root Definitions - Identifying, Viewing and Reframing Problematic Behavior
Stage 3 goes from real world action into the systems thinking world of conceptual activities.
The purpose of the stage is to identify the aspects of the situation causing it to be viewed as a
14
problem. In practical terms, this means identifying those behavioral aspects of the situation
inconsistent with the desired endstate and objectives. Once planners perform this task, they
develop a conceptual Human Activity System (HAS) based on viewing the behavior through a
designated PMESII perspective or World View. Finally, planners “reframe” the behavior and
define altemate systems based on different World Views.
Table 3. Example of Scenario Problematic Behavior (Themes) Based on Endstate
Behavior / Action Why Problematic
Jupiter’ s threatened Military Invasion Objective is to prevent invasion and
invasion not seen as conducive to long-
term regional security
Terrorism by Jupiter’ s Thunder Destabilizing the region
MCY Jupiterians circumventing taxes and | Potentially negative unintended impact on
fees already failing Jupiter economy
Figure 8 captures the various planner perspectives of what is going on in the situation.
Problematic behavior within the situation must be identified next. In other words, why is the
current situation in the region a problem for the JFC? The answer is based on using the endstate
and objectives as the reference. This idea is captured in Figure 6 by the magnifying glass. The
magnifying glass is the filter through which the current situation is seen and interpreted. Table 3
lists several potential “problematic” behaviors based on the scenario endstate and objective.
Once these behaviors are identified, they are classified as “themes” and represent the set of
adversary system behaviors in the situation inconsistent with the desired endstate. By definition
then, these themes are the set of adversary behaviors that must be changed to make the desired
endstate a reality. Changing these aspects of adversary behavior represent the most effective
way of reaching the desired endstate. This is an essential element of the logic behind using SSM
for EBO mission analysis. It is a qualitative, rigorous process forming defensible connections
between effects and endstate. Theme identification also provides initial structure to the messy
situation and forms the basis for the leaming that will occur in subsequent stages. Stage 3 of
SSM has also avoided the trap of assuming the “problem” is somehow obvious or objective.
Themes become the starting points for developing conceptual Human Activity Systems
(HAS). HAS are tools for thinking about the situation in a systematic manner. In developing
them, the key question planners answer involves determining “what purposeful action is taking
place in the situation and under what world view does it make sense?” Each action/world-view
combination forms the basis of a HAS. HAS reflect, “If (action theme) were a system, how
might it be described?” Table 4 lists possible HAS based on the scenario.
Table 4. Examples of HAS based on Scenario Invasion Theme
15
Conceptual System WV
Regime Stability System Jupiter’ s Govemment desires to stay in power and is
concemed with mounting intemal pressures. Capitalizing
on a legitimate extemal enenry will generate popular
support for a conflict viewed as “just.” Invasion is
legitimate means of diverting Jupiter’ s population away
from intemal problems.
Economic Improvement Poor economy is caused by poor production capahilities.
System Mercury possesses advanced production capabilities in
MCY. Invading Mercury will allow capture of the
facilities and production capahilities required to improve
Jupiter’ s economy.
Dispute Resolution System | All other means of resolving the dispute have been
exhausted and military action is being used as a last resort.
Mercury’ s recent activities are causing the dispute to be
worse.
MCY Jupiterian Protection | Jupiterians in MCY are being oppressed and persecuted
through state-sponsored terrorism. Jupiter has a legal and
moral right to protect the MCY majority from tyranny by
the minority. MCY’s close religious and ethnic ties to
Jupiter justify intervention.
Defeat Mercurian Military | Invasion is a prudent military act to prevent Mercury from
Forces gaining an unacceptable military advantage. Mercury's
forces continue to gain a significant qualitative advantage
and something must be done or the regional balance of
power may be destroyed.
HAS are expressed by generating a Root Definition (RD). Table 5 shows the Root
Definition for the conceptual Regime Stability system. Developing the RD is structured to
ensure all relevant aspects of the system are captured. By capturing the CATWOE elements
(Table 7) in the RD, a coherent system meeting the general requirements of a well-formed
system is developed.
Table 5. Example of Root Definition for Regime Stability HAS
Root Definition: A system owned by Jupiter’ s national leaders, operated by key military
leaders to stabilize the regime by generating popular support among the domestic
Jupiterian population; tuming attention away from Jupiter's intemal problems toward a
worthy extemal cause focusing on an extemal enemy. The system maintains an air of
intemational legitimacy.
Table 6. CATWOE Elements for Regime Stability HAS
CATWOE Elements Scenario Example
C- Customer Jupiter government leaders
A - Actor Jupiter key military leaders
16
T - Transformation Regime unstable > Regime Stable
W- Weltanschauung Capitalizing on a legitimate extemal enemy will generate
popular support for a conflict viewed as “just.” Invasion is
legitimate means of diverting Jupiter’ s population away from
intemal problems (Political frame)
O- Owner Senior Jupiter govemment leaders
E- Environment UN 1950 Treaty / World Opinion /
Specifying a PMESII Perspective as part of World View
Specifying a PMESII perspective is a modification to the SSM process. Weltanschauung is
a German word literally translated means “World View” and is the most important element of
the Root Definition. It captures the viewpoint, explaining the action as part of a purposeful
system. This is critical since multiple Human Activity Systems based on viewpoint can describe
the same real world action simultaneously. Consider the case of developing a HAS using
terrorism as a theme and based on action by Jupiter's Thunder. If the HAS is developed based.
on a Mercurian perspective, Jupiter’s Thunder might be described and modeled as a “terrorist”
system. However, if viewed from a Jupiterian perspective, the same action might generate a
HAS described and modeled as a “freedom fighting” system. Both are equally valid HAS, based
on the observer's world view (WV).°” The goal is not to decide “which model is right.” Both
are right based on perspective. What is important is exploring scenario action from multiple
perspectives as a means of better understanding it and eventually developing changes to improve
it
The ability to interpret and understand the same action or behavior differently based on
Wodld View has serious EBO implications. EBO uses PMESII as a default model to describe the
adversary. Retuming to EBO’s goal of influencing adversary behavior, a potential problem
emerges. The same adversary behavior can simultaneously be understood as part of several
PMESII systems based on WV. This generates a requirement to specify a PMESII perspective
for each HAS. Consider an EBO approach to Jupiter's threatened invasion. Planners might be
tempted to focus their mission analysis on identifying desired effects within Jupiter's military
sub-system only (viewing the problem as Jupiter's military forces being positioned near the
border). They would then develop unified tactical action (Figure 2) to generate these effects.
Consider a second perspective or WV on the same real world action where planners examine the
threatened invasion as a regime stability system by Jupiter’ s leaders as reflected in Table 5. This
would mean the HAS WV would be based on adapting a political perspective (concept of
maintaining power). Tagging the HAS as a political-based system at this stage captures planner
perspectives and suggests the system framework (not necessarily the PMESII system) the effects
must eventually be applied and understood within. Therefore, World View succinctly captures
the assumptions planners make about the system. Capturing PMESII perspective during this
stage of the process forces planners to specify a viewpoint for the particular HAS and is an
important record-keeping aspect of the mission analysis process. The eventual “effects” planners
decide upon might be very different in the two cases. Just as in the previous example, the
purpose is not to say which is right or wrong at this point. It is to examine the situation froma
variety of relevant perspectives, since reality is probably a combination of both (Figure 9).
17
JUPITERIAN INVASION AS ?
Figure 9. Combination of Perspectives to Examine J upiterian Invasion
Forced Reframing
Reframing was one of the previously identified leaming requirements. This is accomplished
using the Ledingtons’ Expectancy-Desirability-Importance (EDI) Matrix (Table 7). HAS
should be generated for all the themes identified in this stage of EBO mission analysis. The
appropriate matrix quadrant for each is then determined. The HAS based on viewing a military
invasion as a regime stability system would fall into quadrant II. Quadrant determination is
subjective, but the discussion that accompanies the determination is valuable. Planners must
assess how important is viewing the action through the framework suggested by the HAS
(Importance). They must also determine the degree to which they expect the model to be like the
real world action (Expectancy) and the degree to which it is desirable to think of the real world
action in the terms of the model (Desirability).
Using the HAS based on a regime stability system, the importance might be considered
high. The scenario indicates Jupiter’s leaders hold on power (regime stability) may be
threatened due to the country’s intemal problems. Put another way, eventually effects must be
generated to do something about this aspect of the problem. The expectancy is probably also
high. It seems plausible focusing attention away from intemal pressures by threatening an
invasion could weigh heavily on Jupiter's leaders mental calculus as they consider the decision
to invade or not. Desirability is low. From the U.S. planner perspective, Jupiter's use of an
invasion as a means of staying in power is not desirable.
In a similar manner, planners ensure at least one HAS in each of the four quadrants is
developed for each theme. In this case, planners would develop HAS representing quadrants I,
II, and IV. This may initially appear hard to justify, especially since corresponding action may
not be present in the real world. However, EDI matrix variety is important. Specifying a
viewing perspective is a critical aspect of examining any complex system since any discussion of
complexity is context-dependent, even subjective.” Additionally, each HAS is based on
examining adversary behavior through a different perspective or “frame.”
18
Table 7. EDI Quadrant Determination Matrix (Source: "The Problem of Comparison in
Soft Systems Methodology" by Ledingtons)”
HIGH LOW
DESIRABILITY DESIRABILITY
HIGH Situation ought tobe | Situation expected to
EXPECTANCY like the model and the | be like the model but
model is desirablein | the model is
the context. undesirable.
® qa)
LOW EXPECTANCY | Situation not like Situation not like
model but model is model and model is
desirable undesirable.
av) ait)
By developing conceptual systems, planners make their underlying tacit mental models
explicit and open to debate. During the resulting discussions, they articulate why they believe
certain aspects of the situation are related to the endstate and why they believe viewing the
situation through the “frame” suggested by the HAS will be beneficial (providing insight and
leaming). Since the HAS is conceptual, planners are free from arguing the rightness or
wrongness of the models and can, instead, focus on the insight gained from viewing the
problematic behavior through the various frameworks suggested by the models.
Stage 4: Conceptual Models - A System Diagram
Conceptual Models are representations of idealized systems. They allow planners the
freedom to build idealized systems better understand the real world problem situation CM
capture and examine adversary system behavior as a whole, rather than forcing reductionism.
Logical consistency, not fidelity, is the key to model utility.” CM are checked against their root
definitions to ensure consistency. Other system thinking methods such as Systems Dynamics
can also be used.” It is here where higher fidelity models (technology) can be used as tools to
support thinking and leaming. Their purpose is not to provide the answer, but to validate and
enhance planners understanding of the factors influencing situation. Figure 10 is an example of a
Conceptual model for the Regime Stability HAS based on interpreting the invasion (undesired
behavior in light of the endstate and objectives) as a system to allow Jupiter’ s govemment to stay
in power.
19
Regime Unstable &
= Le ee
é:
~~ pene ~\
Regime Stable
Figure 10, Example of Regime Stability C onceptual Model
Stage 5: Comparison - Making Mental Models Explicit and Learning
During this stage, the conceptual models are compared to the real world action to examine
similarities, differences. Planners use comparison results to suggest system changes. The output
of the completed stage is a list of system changes and a direction for the changes (positive or
negative) for each of the key themes identified in stage 2. This makes common sense and
experience (in the particular action area) the key analytical skills.” There are a variety of ways
to perform the comparison. One approach is to use a basic set of questions to make general
observations about differences between the Conceptual Models and Real World Action.
Planners perform this comparison by examining the various conceptual models associated.
with each particular action theme. Each conceptual model represents a different interpretation of
the action occurring. This provides an opportunity to examine the implications of viewing the
problematic behavior within a certain frame of reference. For example, if the threatened military
invasion is viewed as an attempt by Jupiter's leaders to stay in power, what system changes
would be beneficial or detrimental given the current situation?
Model overlay is another type of comparison. The purpose of the model overlay is to
suggest specific changes based on the EDI quadrant the model falls within. The Rich Picture is
used to identify the key aspects of the real world action that are then captured in a rough HAS
model template and compared to the CM. The real world action will not fit or necessarily
completely match the HAS template. This is not a problem because the goal of the comparison
is to stimulate and structure the debate over changes necessary to improve the real world.
Differences between the real world and the HAS model are recorded and specific changes
are suggested according to the particular E-D-I quadrant rules in Table 8. The quadrants for
Table 8 are determined using Table 7 quadrant descriptions. For Quadrant I, the model is
expected to be like the situation and the CM is desirable. Activities without a real world action
equivalent suggest planners should consider changing the system by adding a related action in
the real world situation. Similarities between the real world and HAS suggest further analysis
may be warranted to analyze the functioning of the sub-systems.
20
Table 8. EDI Comparison Table (Source: "The Problem of Comparison in Soft Systems
Methodology" by Ledingtons)”>
HIGH LOW
DESIRABILITY DESIRABILITY
HIGH Identify weaknesses | Initiate action to
EXPECTANCY of situation in remove (or
relation to model. constrain)
Develop ways of operational aspects
improving operation | of situation that are
of activities like the model.
) (19)
LOW Initiate strategic Strategic action to
EXPECTANCY action to identify identify any threats
consider, decide, that unwanted
design, implement activity might
and develop develop and develop
appropriate preventative
purposeful action in | measures.
situation. ain
adv)
Quadrant IT changes are based on finding similarities between the CM and real-world action.
The CM represents a HAS expected to be like the situation, but the CM is considered
undesirable. Similarities should be identified and recorded as suggested changes to reduce or
eliminate the matching elements. In the example of invasion as a system to ensure regime
stability, Jupiter is using its military power to divert intemal attention away from domestic issues
by focusing the population on an extemal foe to generate popular support. Their purposeful
action is not to start a major regional war threatening national survival, invite the US to intervene
or pay more attention to the region (although planners might explore each of these as potential
HAS instage 3 and 4 if desired).
If “communicate legitimacy” was an activity in the HAS model (Figure 10) and occurred in
the real world (through means such as a comprehensive Jupiterian intemational media campaign
supporting their position), a desired System behavioral change might be to reduce Jupiter's
ability to “communicate legitimacy.” The change is targeted within the Political PMESII
subsystem as identified in stage 3. This does not rule out eventual military action, but this would
be a premature discussion at this point in the process. Military action is a means of generating
effects, but may not be the best. Granted, the “problem” may appear on the surface to be
Jupiter's fielded forces threatening to invade Mercury. However, in this case, the scenario
suggests the invasion must at least be considered from more than just a military perspective. It
also means the final set of effects should include system changes necessary to improve more than
just the military aspects of the situation (and military subsystem). This means even the
apparently military “problem” of the threatened invasion has behavioral aspects within the
political sub-system. Using SSM helps identify these aspects. The invasion in this case must be
viewed and evaluated through a political system PMESII lens and perhaps equally important,
21
eventual actions and effects must be understood within this framework. Finally, this analysis
suggests military action alone viewed within the military perspective as a change to the military
sub-system (destroying the capability of Jupiter's fielded forces) will be insufficient to reach the
desired endstate. Changing Jupiter’ s ability to communicate legitimacy is presented as one piece
of a comprehensive set of changes (generated from all relevant HAS). The collection of
adversary system changes represents improvements to the overall problematic behavior from
stage 2.
HAS within Quadrant IIT will not normally have a real world action to compare against.
This is because the HAS represents a system that is neither present nor desirable. What is the
value of such a conceptual system to EBO planners? The system captures a viewpoint (the WV
associated with the HAS) and a set of actions that do not necessarily exist, but would be
detrimental to planners attempting to achieve the desired endstate and should be prevented
through proactive action. HAS from quadrant III become the basis of undesirable effects the
campaign plan must guard against.
Changes based on Quadrant IV are similar to those of Quadrant IIT except they represent
WV and actions that should be developed and promoted. These HAS suggest new systems that
might be beneficial and improve the situation. For example, there is no system for the U.S or
Mercury to provide economic aid to Jupiter. Such a CM, if developed might be described as a
system to improve Jupiter's failing economy. When compared to the actual scenario, specific
changes throughout Jupiter’s PMESII system might be identified. It is important to note the
value of SSM in promoting a holistic view of problematic behavior. Even though the CM is
based on improving economic conditions, the changes (and eventually effects) to achieve this are
not confined to the economic system. Stage 5 concludes with a list of specific changes to the
system discovered and logically developed through the first 5 stages of applying the SSM
process.
Stage 6: Deciding on Changes - Going from Changes to Initial Effect Set
Stage 6 takes the list of system changes generated in Stage 5 and translates these changes
into a specific list of system effects. This stage contains the greatest departure from Checkland’s
methodology. During this stage, EBO planners validate the proposed changes using Checkland’s
suggested criteria.” They next convert the changes into effects using Cain’s Constructive and
Destructive verbs (See Appendix B).” Finally, effects are validated against criteria developed
by Tumer, Preece and Round.”
Despite the rigorous process, the proposed changes to the adversary system must be
validated. SSM literature proposes checking changes against two criteria: feasibility and
desirability.” Each change is examined to ensure it is feasible to the key audiences (identified in
the Rich Picture) in tems of the history, politics and culture associated with the situation.
Reducing Jupiter's ability to communicate legitimacy must be feasible in light of the nation’s
politics, culture and history. It must also be desirable in the same terms and not generate new
“problems.” Satisfying these validity checks, the changes are considered valid changes to the
Jupiterian system and are next converted to effects.
Changes are converted into effects by using the description of the change and the
direction (positive/negative) to assign an appropriate constructive or destructive verb according
to Cain's EBO Universe. Each HAS contains a WV and Transformation. These are used to
help identify an appropriate effect. The Transformation identifies the type of action (verb) and
the WV suggests the system the effect should be focused towards (but not restricted to) and the
22
framework the effect must be understood within. This makes sense because the action is
understood within context and the WV describes the desired context. Reducing Jupiter's ability
to commumicate legitimacy is a negative change. A potential corresponding effect would be to
neutralize Jupiter’s capability to commumicate the legitimacy of their invasion to the
intemational community.
Planners may have determined this was an appropriate effect using intuition, without
applying SSM to perform mission analysis. However, the value of SSM is the structured
systematic process planners used to develop the linkage between this effect and the desired
endstate. Rather than planners simply suggesting changes based on their mental model (which
others may not necessarily understand or agree with), using SSM captures and makes linkages
explicit in each progressive stage. Debate is generated and a shared leaming environment
results.
After converting changes to effects, the effects are subjected to a second validity check.
The validity check is based on criteria identified by Tumer, Preece and Round." Valid effects
are viable. Friendly forces should have the capability to achieve them. Friendly forces should
also be willing to execute the tactical unified actions required to generate them. Finally, they
must be measurable. An effect successfully passing these criteria is considered valid and is
added to the effects set for the given system.
Limitations
An EBO mission analysis process based on Soft Systems Methodologies does have
limitations. Perhaps the most obvious is the same as is commonly leveled against SSM; it does
not fully develop the campaign plan. Identifying a set of effects is not a campaign plan. As the
adage says, “the devil is in the details.” This is quite true, planners identified neutralize Jupiter’ s
capability to communicate the legitimacy of their invasion to the intemational community as a
desired effect, but who will take what action to achieve it? SSM does not answer this question.
However, it is important to note mission analysis does not focus on answering the how question.
The E-N-A-R process would take the effects and begin to identify the actions necessary to
generate them. This next level of specification would fall primarily to subordinate commanders.
EBO mission analysis based on SSM as presented still requires refinement Only the
general steps of the process have been presented here. Integrating the process into the current
campaign planning process will require overcoming several cultural and doctrinal bamiers.
Using SSM to support understanding and developing E-E-L through EBO mission analysis is
largely a qualitative process. It is also very much situationally dependent. Every different user
will apply it differently in every situation This means exact results will not likely be
reproducible. This is not really a problem because every adversary and situation will be
different.
CONCLUSIONS
Deciding what to do has always been the first priority of successful command and control.
Within EBO campaign planning, this makes the mission analysis process critical. EBO mission
analysis requires more than the traditional task-focused process can provide. In the complex
AGW environment, planning unified tactical action to achieve desired effects is a serious
challenge requiring due diligence in the development of tools and processes to better enable it.
23
Yet, being able to better plan, execute and assess effects is only half of the solution. Planners
must understand and develop a linkage between endsate and effect as part of a comprehensive
EBO mission analysis process.
This paper has presented an altemative to the current mission analysis process. A new
process based on using Soft Systems Methodology appears to resolve several of the
shortcomings of using task-focused mission analysis to perform EBO planning. SSM provides
planners the rigorous, defensible methodology necessary to explore, debate and eventually
decide on a set of adversary system effects most likely to generate the desired endstate. The
process leverages the power of multiple human perspectives to do what no computer model can,
structure an ambiguous situation. The methodology allows the JFC to leverage the smarts of
Planners to improve the overall quality of planning effort as multiple perspectives are
accommodated. This multi-frame approach will likely be the key to enabling planners to provide
the JFC with the well-developed systems understanding necessary to cope in an uncertain future.
1 United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint
Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational Implications of Effects-Based Operations (Ebo)," ed.
United States Joint Forces Command (2004), 5.
2 Thid.
3 Thid.,10.
4 Edward R. Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace,
Crisis and War, Information Age Transformation Series (Washington, D.C.: Command and
Control Research Program, 2002), xiv.
® Thid_xiv-xv.
® Peter Paret Michael Howard, ed., Carl Von Clausewitz on War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 87.
7 (FCOM), "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational
Implications of Effects-Based Operations (Ebo),"6
Thid.,7
12 USJFCOM Mark Seeley, SJFHQ(CE) S/T, Telephone interview, 13 Jan 05 2005.
3 (FCOM), "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational
Implications of Effects-Based Operations (Ebo),"13.
™ Tom Czerwinski, Coping with Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs,
ed. Institute For National Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defense University,
1998), 10-12.
1 Flizabeth S, Guy, An Introduction to Soft Systems Methodology ([cited 10 Dec 04).
16 Czerwinski, Coping with Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs,33-35.
17 (JFCOM), "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational
Implications of Effects-Based Operations (Ebo),"21.
*8 Michael Howard, ed., On War,75.
24
18 Michael Pidd, Systems Modelling: Theory and Practice (Chichester, England: Wiley and
Sons, LTD, 2004), 7.
Ibid.
(Springer, 2004), 3.
> Czerwinski, Coping with Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs,14-15.
8 Boccara, "Modelling Complex Systems: Graduate Text in Contemporary Physics."
27 Didd, Systems Modelling: Theory and Practice,22.
28 (JFCOM), "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational
Implications of Effects-Based Operations (Ebo),"9
* Thid.
» Thid.
5! Vicki Rast, Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia
(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 45-46.
© Pidd, Systems Modelling: Theory and Practice,203-04.
i US Joint Forces Command, "Joint Forces Command Glossary," (2004).
Richard B. Myers, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," ed. U.S.
Department of Defense (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 4-6.
* Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA) William S. Lind, Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC),
Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), "The
Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," Marine Corps Gazette, no. October 1989
(1989).
* United States Joint Forces Command, "Joint Forces Command Glossary."
57 Peter B. Vail, Learning as a Way of Being: Strategies for Survival in a World of
Permanent White Water (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996), 10-14.
% Thid.,19.
3 Czerwinski, Coping with Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs,55-56.
Ihid.,57.
“1 Pidd, Systems Modelling: Theory and Practice,6
® Lee G. Bolman and Terence E. Deal, Reframing Organizations, Second ed. (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997), 15.
® Thid 379-80.
Pidd, Systems Modelling: Theory and Practice,2
5 (JFCOM), "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational
Implications of Effects-Based Operations (Ebo)."
“6 Czerwinski, Coping with Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearity in Military Affairs,59.
4” For a detailed explanation of Soft Systems Methodology, see Checkland or Patching.
48 SSM is applied within this context not as an organizational intervention, but as a problen
structuring and leaming methodology. Although never intended for mission analysis, SSM has
been used for a variety of purposes as outlined in Patching, chapters 9-15.
“9 The basic 7-stage or Mode 1 SSM process is used for this application. Patching and
Checkland both recommend this version for new users. A newer, less regimented version (Mode
25
2) was later developed by Checkland. The structure of Mode 1 makes it a better fit within the
military planning process.
50'The scenario is meant only to provide a very basic background. It is a very short
overview and orients the reader to the situation. The actual scenario is published by the College
of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education (CADRE) at Maxwell AFB, AL and is 140
pages. This level of detail is omitted for the sake of brevity since the purpose of the paper is not
meant as an instructional manual, only to provide an overview and show the utility of SSM-
based EBO mission analysis.
51 David Patching, Practical Soft Systems Analysis (London: Pitman Publishing, 1990), 45,
53-54.
© Warfare Studies Institute, Joint Air Estimate Planning Handbook, second ed. (Maxwell
AFB, AL: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Eductation, 2003), 12-13.
°3 Guy, An Introduction to Soft Systems Methodology ([cited).
°4 (COM), "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational
Implications of Effects-Based Operations (Ebo),"20-21.
°° Paddy Tumer, "Findings from the First Uk-Led Effects-Based Planning Experiment"
(paper presented at the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium: The
Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies, Copenhagen, Denmark, 2004), 5.
°6 Peter Checkland and Inc NetLibrary, Soft Systems Methodology a 30-Year Retrospective
(Chichester, New Y ork: John Wiley, 1999), 165-66.
°7 Patching, Practical Soft Systems Analysis, 70.
* Thid.,55-56.
59 Thid.,54-55.
© Edward R. Tufte, The Cognitive Style of Powerpoint (Cheshire, Connecticut: Graphics
Press, LLC, 2003), 3.
°! This is a sample Rich picture based on only the aspect of the scenario discussed. Both
Patching and Checkland suggest drawing rich pictures by hand. In this case a hand drawn Rich
Picture was transferred into MindJet’s Mindmanager program for ease of inclusion in the paper.
There is no real right or wrong Rich Pictures, nor is there a universal style.
® Andrew Monk and Steve Howard, "The Rich Picture: A Tool for Reasoning About Work
Context," Interactions., no. March + April 1998 (1998): 23-24.
8 Tid: 24.
° Patching, Practical Soft Systems Analysis,55.
® Guy, An Introduction to Soft Systems Methodology ([cited).
% Patching, Practical Soft Systems Analysis,74.
°” Peter Checkland, Jim Scholes, and Inc NetLibrary, Soft Systems Methodology in Action a
30-Year Retrospective, New. ed. (Chichester, Eng.; New Y ork: Wiley, 1999), 309.
% Patching, Practical Soft Systems Analysis, 76-77.
® P. W. J. Ledington and J. Ledington, "The Problem of Comparison in Soft Systems
Methodology," Systems Research and Behavioral Science 16, no. 4 (1999).
7 Murray Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the
Complex (New Y ork: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1994), 33.
”! | edington, "The Problem of Comparison in Soft Systems Methodology."
” Checkland and NetLibrary, Soft Systems Methodology a 30-Year Retrospective,175-77.
26
73 Ricardo Rodriguez-Ulloa and Alberto Paucar-Caceres, "Soft System Dynamics
Methodology (Ssdm): A Combination of Soft Systems Methodology (Ssm) and System
Dynamics (Sd)," in Proceedings from 43rd. Meeting of the International Society for the Systems
Sciences (Pacific Grove, CA: Intemational Society for the Systems Sciences, 1999), 6-11.
7 Patching, Practical Soft Systems Analysis, 99-100.
® Ledington, "The Problem of Comparison in Soft Systems Methodology."
78 Checkland and NetLibrary, Soft Systems Methodology a 30-Year Retrospective,180-83.
7 Anthony C. Cain, "Ebo Universe," (Air Command and Staff College, 2004).
78 Andrew Preece Paddy Tumer, Mark Round, "Effects Based Planning - a Uk Research
Perspective" (paper presented at the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology
Symposium: The Power of Information Age Concepts and Technologies, Copenhagen, Denmark,
2004), 8.
® Patching, Practical Soft Systems Analysis,112.
® Cain, "Ebo Universe."
a1 Paddy Tumer, "Effects Based Planning - a Uk Research Perspective",7-8.
27
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29
APPENDIX A
Brief Scenario Overview
Situation: Jupiter is massing forces and threatening an invasion of Mercury. The Regional
Combatant Commander (RCC) has established a Joint Task Force to address the situation A
planning team of experts from the RCC’s Standing Joint Force Headquarters has deployed to
begin the planning process'. Other experts from other goverment and non-govemment agencies
have augmented them. The planning team begins the process by performing a mission analysis to
identify effects most likely to achieve the RCC’s campaign objectives and endstate.”
Sample Desired Endstate: Regional Security and Stability
Sample U.S. Campaign Objective: Maintain Mercurian Tenitorial Integrity
Scenario Excerpt
Tensions between Mercury and Jupiter
Pegasus has enjoyed a relatively peaceful 250 years aside from minor conflicts that fell
mainly along religious and ethnic lines. The recent tensions between Mercury and Jupiter can be
traced to religious feuds that erupted after both countries’ independence over 60 years ago. Until
1950, Russia controlled both countries as Mercupiter and kept religious and ethnic differences in
check. After Mercupiter’s peaceful independence from Russia in 1950, Protestant-dominated
Mercury and Catholic-dominated Jupiter separated into two countries and immediately disputed
the temitory of Y ork, a region in the southem areas of both counties. Soon after independence,
the United Nations (UN) established a Line of Control (LOC) in York splitting the temitory
between Mercury and Jupiter, creating a Mercury-controlled Y ork (MCY) and Jupiter-controlled
York (CY). While both countries recognize the LOC, both sides also dispute the right of the
other to occupy any portion of York. This decades-old dispute has brought both countries to the
brink of war.
The seeds for conflict were sewn in 1951 as a large influx of Jupiterians, who were fleeing
economic hardships in Jupiter, began to enter (legally and illegally) MCY. Pressures of increased.
immigration remained in check until the late 1970s when MCY, led by the city of Gammon,
began to develop into the main industrial area for the Pegasus region. The large number of
computer manufacturing jobs based there created another major influx of immigrants. Mercury’s
fast-growing, capitalistic-oriented, industrial economy that lured the Jupiterians was mainly
responsible for an ethnic Jupiterian population explosion in MCY. The majority of the workers in
MCY factories are Jupiterians while management remains Mercurian. Most were hired due to the
fact they were willing to work for lower wages than the Mercurians. This huge MCY Jupiterian
population has been a major source of instability in the region.
Recently, there has been a rise in terorism in MCY. Groups such as Jupiter's Thunder have
begun taking aggressive action to force Mercury to cede control of MCY to Jupiter. Forits part,
Jupiter is Jupiter suffers from outdated production facilities and working practices. Inflation is
high and the govemment will need to take drastic and probably very unpopular action if the
country is to be spared complete bankruptcy. The country is rich in natural resources, especially
coal, iron ore and water, and this has sustained the economy for many years but can no longer
mask production and trade imbalances with more technologically advanced countries, especially
Mercury.
t (JFCOM), "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7: Operational
Implications of Effects-Based Operations (Ebo),"3-4.
? The scenario excerpt is only meant to provide readers some back ground on the situation to
understand the application of the methodology.
APPENDIX B
Cain's EBO Verb List’
Constructive Verbs
Educate - Stimulate or develop mental or moral growth
(Confinm- Support or establish validity
Feed - Supply with nourishment, to serve food to
Restore - Bring badicto ariginal condition
Confort - Soothe in tine of distress
Protect - Keep frombeing damaged, stolen, or injured
Liberaie - Set free
Legitimate - Give legal farce to
Destructive Verbs
Deny - to prevent the use of
Destroy - to ruin congiletely, to render useless or ineffective
Delay - to cause to be dower than expected
Isolate - to out off fromothers
Neutralize - to render ineffective
Disrupt - to throwinio confusion or disorder/to impede progress or movenent
Inform (Deceive) - to mislead
Infonm (Enlighten) - to informor instruct
Inform (Confuse) - to cause to be unable to think with darity or act with intelligence ar
understanding
3 Based on Cain, "Ebo Universe."
Bibliography
(JFCOM), United States Joint Forces Command. "The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine
Series Pamphlet 7: Operational Implications of Effects-Based Operations (Ebo)." edited.
by United States Joint Forces Command, 2004.
Cain, Anthony C. "Ebo Universe." 1: Air Command and Staff College, 2004.
CC BY-NC-SA 4.0