Private-Public Cycle: Testing Hirschman’s Theory of Shifting
Involvements with a Formal Model
(in alphabetic order)
Cécile Emery
Min Liu
University of Italian Switzerland
Via Giuseppe Buffi 13
CH-6904 Lugano
Switzerland
University Phone: + 41 (0)58 666 4243
Cécile Emery Phone: + 41 (0)76 448 73 63
Min Liu Phone: + 41 (0)77 430 60 09
cecile.emery@1u.unisi.ch
min.liu@1lu.unisi.ch
Abstract
Why do societies oscillate, on a roughly twenty-year cycle, between modes
of private acquisitiveness and public spiritedness? Albert O. Hirschman
argues that disappointment is the main cause explaining why societies
never stop shifting from an ideology promoting private interests to
another philosophy which endorses public action and vice versa. The aims
of this paper are to reconstruct Hirschman’s reasoning using a System
Dynamics approach and to build a simulation model reproducing the
oscillations societies experiment between private and public interests. Our
simulation results reproduce the behaviour implied by Hirschman,
therefore showing evidence of the dynamic consistency of his
argumentation. Furthermore, an example taken for a novel and empirical
data, which represents the evolution of turn-out in the US, have been used
to gain deeper support of our findings. Further research using this model
is promising.
Key Words: Disappointment, Private Interest, Public Interest, Second Order Model
Hope is itself a species of happiness (... ) but, like all other pleasures immoderately enjoyed,
the excesses of hope must be expiated by pain. Expectations improperly indulged must end in
disappointment.” - Samuel Johnson
“Expectation is the root of all heartache." - William Shakespeare
Introduction
Many philosophers across ages, cultures, and language have reached the same conclusion that
humans are eternal unsatisfied beings. Whatever the satisfaction currently experienced,
people tend to believe that higher satisfaction can be increased by acquiring new goods, by
conquering someone, or by subscribing to new ideologies. If the previous actions are
successful, hopes and expectations are fulfilled, which provides satisfaction. However, in
their perpetual quest for happiness, people forget that desires usually do not correspond to
reality. Unable to reach their dreams, people experience a strong feeling of dissatisfaction. As
Friedrich Nietzsche noticed “hope in reality is the worst of all evils, because it prolongs the
torments of man.” The feeling of disillusionment is not out of consequences. Therefore, the
important role played by disappointment has been increasingly highlighted and studied
during the last decades from a variety of disciplines.
Philosophy and psychology were the first fields to do so (Craib 1994; Freud recurrently stated
that hallucinatory satisfaction would be followed by "disappointment"). Disappointment has
been particularly studied in marketing research since consumers’ dissatisfaction can generate
severe costs for companies (Farley et al. 1975; Jia et al. 1997, van Dijk 1999). Recently,
behavioural economists have also recognised the importance of disappointment in decision
making. Following David E. Bell’s theory on disappointment (1984), many models have been
constructed to understand the effects of such feeling on risky choice behaviour (Jia et al.
2001; Loomes & Sudgen 1986) and on decision making (Zeelenberg et al. 2000). Albert O.
Hirschman (1982) analyses the issue of disappointment at higher level by stating that
disappointment is a central element not only of human experience but also of societies’
evolution. According to Hirschman, disappointment is responsible for the shifting in
involvements between opposite ideologies: private versus public interests. The first ideology
states that happiness can be pursued by the stimulation of private interests, while the second
endorses public action as a way to do so. Here is a simple and general illustration of his
thoughts. Societies ruled by one ideology will build expectations. If reality does not
correspond to desires, disappointment rises. As disappointment accumulates, faith in the
ideology decreases while, parallelly, preference for the opposite one starts increasing. Once
the relative preference for the new ideology over the earlier is high, societies shift and start
adhere to the principles dictated by the recently implemented ideology. As it was the case
before, societies sooner or later will experience disappointment and shift to the original
ideology and the story will restart.
Hirschman’s work on disappointment and shifting in societies’ involvements is particularly
intriguing when analysed from a System Dynamics perspective. Indeed, his book “Shifting
Involvements - Private Interest and Public Action” provides not only clear reference modes,
by describing oscillations between periods of intense preoccupation with public issues and of
almost total concentration on individual improvements, but also precise and complete
mechanisms which explain the shifting in involvements performed by societies. Hirschman’ s
entire argumentation can therefore be easily reinterpreted in terms of feedbacks, delays and
behaviours over time. For that reason, the aims of this paper are to reconstruct Hirschman’s
reasoning using a System Dynamics formulation and to construct a simulation model
reproducing the oscillations in societies’ involvements. The process of summarizing and
modelling written theories is delicate and requires careful considerations from the
researchers. However, second order models, i.e. models of theories (Wittenberg 1992, Larsen
and Lomi 2002), have the potential to illustrate and to complete existing theories by
discovering new insights. Here, by making explicit and by modelling the main feedback
processes implicitly enumerated within the lines of the book, our goal is to prove the dynamic
consistency of the author's argumentation. Further research on the potential explorations of
the model are currently taking place but will only be briefly mentioned at the end of this
paper.
Validation of our model is carried out in two steps. The first step is accomplished on a “link-
by-link” basis (Larsen and Lomi 2002), through examining the formal and substantial
comparability between Hirschman’s theory and our model formulation. The sections of
Hirschman’s arguments and of the causal loop diagram together realize this first validation
approach. The second step of model validation is conducted with the help of a behaviour
reproduction test (Sterman 2000), which is illustrated in the section of simulation results.
We organize our arguments in the following way. The entire system takes into account two
ideologies between which societies oscillate: the private and public. Each ideology consists
of indefinitely repeated cycles characterised by emergence, growth and decline of ideas. The
paper will start by presenting the general mechanism implied in the private cycle as well as a
summary of Hirschman’ s justifications of such feedback mechanisms. The same will be done
concerning the public cycle. To highlight the main feedback effects involved in societies’
shifting in involvements between private interest and public action, the argumentation will be
translated in form of a causal loop diagram. An example, taken from the novel “Gone with
the wind”, illustrating societies’ shifting will then be provided. A fter presenting justifications
conceming our approach, simulation results will be presented as well as empirical evidence
which supports our findings. A discussion concerning contributions of our results and future
research will conclude our paper.
Understanding Hirschman’s A rgumentation
Are societies predisposed toward oscillations between periods of intense preoccupation with
public issues and of almost total concentration of individual improvement and private welfare
goals (Hirschman 1982, p.3)? Restated, which are the dynamism driving the shifting in
involvements from private interest to public involvement and vice-versa? To answer these
questions, comprehending the characteristics and dynamisms involved in private interest and
public involvement separately is first required. In the following section, explanations of the
underlying mechanisms involved in the private interest and public action will be described
separately. The aim is to provide the reader with a complete overview of Hirschman’s
argumentation.
Dynamism Regulating Private Interest
Societies have always been driven by ideologies, i.e. sets of believes which offer change
through a normative thought process. Over the past centuries, an ideology enhancing and
protecting private interests, welfare as well as consumption has repeatedly ruled societies for
significant periods of time. Such ideology is referred to as “consumerism” and states that
personal happiness can only be reached through consumption and acquisition of goods: the
more one possesses, the more needs are fulfiled, and so happiness spreads from satisfying
one’s needs. As believes in consumerism get stronger, citizens, driven by the idea that the
pursue of happiness is achieved toward consumption, increase their acquisition of goods. The
boom in consumption implies two elements. First, buying new goods creates, at least in the
short term, satisfaction: the perceived satisfaction created by the act of consumption rises.
Parallelly, people’s expectations tend also to inflate: consumers anticipate to receive a higher
level of satisfaction when increasing their expenditures as promised by the consumerists. If
desires correspond to reality, then consumers are satisfied and continue believing and
adopting the consumerism ideology. However, Hirschman notes that the previous is rarely the
case. Indeed, because desires usually exceed reality, the failure to fulfil one’s hopes therefore
creates a feeling of disappointment. The mechanisms described above being general, it is
interesting and necessary to go deeper into the analysis of disappointment.
Where does disappointment actually come from? To answer the previous, it is usufull to
restate the question and ask where satisfaction comes from. Concerning private interests,
satisfaction does not rise from consumption itself: it actually emerges from the pleasure
generated by the act of consumption. An important distinction must be introduced between
pleasure and comfort: “pleasure is the experience of travelling from discomfort to comfort
and is experienced only when the good is first acquired and used, while comfort is achieved
at the point of arrival” (Hirschman 1982, p.27). The discrepancy mentioned above between
expected and actual satisfaction can therefore be restated in term of “dishalance between
pleasure and comfort” (Hirschman 1982, p.33): the higher the difference between desired and
actual pleasures, the higher the disappointment. When societies believe in consumerims,
disappointment arises from three types of consumptions. Each potential source of
disapointment will now be discussed.
Non-Durable Goods Hischman makes a key distinction between nondurable and durables
goods since, according to him, they generate different level of disappointment. Nondurable
goods, i.e. goods that are entirely destroyed during consumption, are considered to be “both
pleasure-intense and disappointment-resistant” (Hirschman 1982, p.29). The pleasure
generated by their consumption is not only important but also repetited over time. Take the
simple example of food. Who did not experience the high and intense pleasure eating
provides when one is really hungry? Who do not appreciate eating fine and rafined food?
Don’t people use the expression “pleasures of the table”? Of course, non-durables are not
disappointment-exempted: simply imagine the stomach aches resulting from the over
consumption of a particular product. Other examples can be a pleasure trip, a ticket to an
opera or a stadium.
Durable Goods On the other hand, durable goods, which are promoted through mass-
consumption and constitute the core of modem consumption culture (television, cars,
waching machines, dry cleaners etc), have their pleasure-comfort balance tilts in favour of the
latter. The previous does not imply that durables do not generate pleasure at all. Pleasure is
experienced when the durable good is acquired and used for the first time. However, once the
utilisation becomes common and repetitive, comfort is assumed, apleasure is not longer
experienced, and disappointment emerges. People “fault durables precisely for being all
comfort and hardly any pleasure, in sharp contrast to more traditional purchases of
nondurables” (Hirschman 1982, p.33). Take the example of the private automobile. The
excitement and pleasure experienced when first driving it will disappear at a certain point.
The car will then be perceived as a motion instrument. It should be noticed that Hirschman
clusters durables in different categories to which correspond different level of
disappointment. Such details will not be discussed here as the main point is to show that
durables generate higher disappointment than non- durable goods.
Services Services, a major sector which continues expanding nowadays in modem societies,
also have the potential to disappoint consumers. However, the reasons for being disappointed
with services are quite different compared to durables. In the former case, disappointment
“arises out of a large number of cases in which there is partial or total failure to achieve the
purpose for which the services are acquired” (Hirschman 1982, p.44). A good illustration are
medical services. People except their doctor to cure them successfully in one session.
However, it is usually not the case that medical profession can instaneously, or even in the
long term, heal injuries or diseases. Since the quality of services is defined only when the
service is performed, the potential dissatisfaction is significantly high.
At this point, it should be clear that disappointment from private interest is caused
endogenously since the disappointing potential is embedded in the characteristics of durable
goods and services, which endogenously play an increasingly important role in our life with
the development of our societies toward the modern and wealthier direction.
To sum up, when periods promoting private interests and welfare occurs, individuals, who
increase significantly their proportion of durables acquiered, will experience and accumulate
disappointment which spread from a higher consumption of durable goods and services.
Accumulated dissatisfaction over time has crucial, but usually underestimated, consequences.
Indeed, on their perpertual quest of happiness, disappointed individuals will learn from past
experience, adjust their behaviour, evolve and allocate significant amount of time and energy
in finding new products, or ultimately ideologies, in order to become satisfied again. In this
sense, disappointment is said to be “a central element of human experience” (Hirschman
1982, p.11).
Hirschman pushes the reasoning one step further by believing that disappointment rules not
only individual lives but also entire societies. According to him, when societies are enhanced
by consumerism, a strong feeling of disappointment, instead of the promised happiness, will
be felt by the entire society. As the accumulation of disappointment rises, people start not
only questioning believes in consumerism but also reacting in two different ways to such
situation. They can exit the consumerism and embrace a dichotomous ideology which states
that the pursuit of happiness relies on the decumulation of belongings and on the stimulation
of public action (P.63). Consumers can also “rise their voices and engage into actions, which
range from private complaining to public action in general interest” (P. 64), to force
companies to modify the pleasure-comfort balance included in their products. As a result of
exit and voice reactions, societies, losing faith in the ideology that previous dictated their
conduct, decrease their preference for private interests while developing interest in another
ideology promoting that the increase of one’s actions toward society is a way to pursue
happiness. The latter philosophy is referred to as “public involvement”. Once the relative
preference of private interest over public involvement becomes significant enough, societies
evolve and adhere to the public involvement ideology. After this shift as been operated,
people, focusing on the potential satisfaction produced by their involvement in politics or
communities, reduce their private consumption as well as their expected satisfaction, which
slowly reduces their disappointment in private consumption.
Adding the Public Interest
As explained in the previous part, durable goods and services with high disappointing
potential increasingly occupy the modem societies and therefore cause disappointment in
private consumption. In contrast to consumrists’ idea that happiness is achieved through
stimulating private interests, Hirschman predicts that periods of “high mass consumption”
will bring disappointment which is ultimately responsible for changing societies’ ideology. In
their quest of eternal satisfaction, disappointed societies shift and adopt an ideology
encouraging public action.
This section will add the other part of the story dealing with the disappointments in public
involvements resulting from the institutional features of modem societies (see Figure 2).
Disappointed by their experiences in the private consumption, citizens are propelled into the
public arena and involve more in public actions. However, “life in the public arena has a
number of disappointments of its own” (Hirschman 1982, p. 92). Gap between expected and
perceived satisfaction for people involved in public activities will be endogenously generated
by at least four reasons: unsatisfying outcome, overcommitment, underinvolvement and
disillusion.
Unsatisfying outcome Unsatisfying outcome originates from the poverty of human’s
imagination, which produces disappointment. It is easy to understand that unsuccessful
attempts in public action will end in disappointment and thus a withdrawal from public life
(e.g. frustrated from an unsuccessful revolutionary attempt). However, in the majority of
cases, the outcome of public action can be said as neither successful nor failed since the
expected result of the public action is a product of people’s own imagination. Even worse,
human beings have a general “propensity to conjure up radical change” in the society and are
therefore not able to “visualize intermediate outcomes and halfway house” (Hirschman 1982,
p.95). Thus, people’s expected satisfaction will systematically exceed their perceived
satisfaction from public involvements and create in a gap between the high expectation and
the modest reality.
It is worth noting that the “unsatisfying outcome” does not lead necessarily to
disappointment. Dissatisfaction in public action can result either in disappointment or
encouragement (because of unfinished business). In other words, “dissatisfaction is not in
itself a reason why one would necessarily expect a tuming away from (public) actions”
(Hirschman 1982, p. 95). The next three types of gap will deal with more fundamental
reasons why people get disappointed, decrease their preference for public actions and finally
withdrawal from the public life.
Overcommitment Overcommitment results from the fact that, again based on the poverty of
our imagination, people often underestimate the time needed for public affairs. This leads to a
common experience for many people, that the public action requires much more time than
they originally expected. A permanent overmun of actual time needed on public activity over
the time people initially budgeted for it can be an important reason for disappointment
because the duration of an activity plays an important role for the pleasure perceived from
that activity. Hirschman explains this point with the example of extremely slow service in
restaurants. No matter how good the food is, if the waiting time between courses overruns
significantly what one has initially awaited, the pleasure seems to be reduced remarkably.
Besides underestimation of time required for public actions, the second reason for
overcommitment is that the public movement often takes a life of its own and people loss
control on it and thus need much more time to correct it. There exists an “asymmetry between
private and public life’. People can devote themselves entirely to private life and totally rule
out the public activities. However, it is only occasionally possible or even not possible at all
for people to completely concentrate on public issues. Therefore, it is not hard to imagine that
the systematic excess of actually required over initially planned time for public involvements
can be felt as very costly from some point of time (e.g. the rising opportunity cost of public
activity), cause disappointment in the public life and finally a turning away from the “practice
of citizenship” (Hirschman 1982, p. 97).
Underinvolvement To deal with the time scarcity and the overcommitment problem, our
modem society has invented the voting system so that all the citizens can participate in major
political decisions (mass participation) by spending only a very limited fraction of time in
public affairs (limited time requirement). However, Hirschman convincingly states that this
does not prevent the rising of disappointment in public life. As will be shown in the following
text, another type of gap between expected satisfaction and actual satisfaction is embedded
endogenously in the institution of the modem democracy and can cause underinvolvement
and thus citizens’ frustration and disappointment in public life. (Hirschman 1982, p. 103).
In private consumption, there is a clear distinction between the activities of producing income
in order to be able to consume and the enjoyment of the pleasure out of private consumption.
For public activities, on the contrary, there is not such a clear distinction between the striving
of pleasure from public life and the attainment of it. In fact, the process and the activities
public participation are themselves highly pleasurable and thus at least as important as the
result of the collective public movements (e.g. the realization of some revolutionary
objectives). (Hirschman 1982, p. 85)
In other words, the pleasure one can get from the public involvement is the sum of the
pleasure one enjoys from his (or her) participating activities and the pleasure resulted from
the outcome of the public action. However, the attainment and the result of the public actions
is a public good and available to everyone (Hirschman 1982, p.104), which leaves the
pleasure during the striving process in the public action being the only private enjoyment.
Therefore, people can only enhance their own benefits in public life through increasing their
own inputs.
The central body of the mass democracy in our society is the voting system with the “one
man one vote” principle. This institution, on one hand, grants every citizen a minimum share
in public decision-making; on the other hand, it sets some kinds of maximum. However, this
maximum or ceiling hinders people from stepping up their inputs and thus limit their pleasure
and satisfaction out of the participation in public activities. This gap between the satisfaction
people would like to achieve through their participation in public affairs and the satisfaction
their actually enjoy based on the voting system in the modem democracy can result in
frustration and disappointment and even a withdrawal from the public life. The general
political apathy in many democratic societies proves this argument.
Disillusion Disillusion is caused by the gap between the expected and the actually
experienced quality of the public experiences. At the end of last session from private
consumption to public action, public action is conducted by people as an alternative to the
emptiness, the narrowness and the disappointments in the purely private life. However, it is
well known that the practice in public life is far from idealism as people imagine (again the
poverty of our imagination). Alliances, making compromise on the cost of one’s initial
idealistic objective, violating one’s ethical code and even betray of comrades are necessary in
order to reach the “goal” for the sake of the “Cause”. The gap between people’s expected
idealistic quality and the actually experienced quality in public life is another source of
disappointment and an exit from public involvements.
There is one remark worth making here. Disillusion can lead to either withdrawal, as stated
before, or addiction. Some people will be addicted for the whole life; others will become
against public activities because they are aware of their addiction and want to get rid of it.
To sum up, regardless the causes, all the four reasons stated in the previous text justify the
“gap of satisfaction of public involvements” in Figure 2. Whereas dissatisfying outcome
concentrates on outcome of the public actions, the other three reasons (overcommitment,
underinvolvement and disillusion) focus on the nature of the public activities (Hirschman
1982, p.96) and reveal the fundamental reasons for “disappointment from public
involvements”, which result in people’s decreasing preference for public life and finally their
withdrawal from public actions.
Different groups of the modern democratic society gather opposite experiences through their
public involvement, both, however, result in disappointment. The one group who use voting
as their only way of public involvement feel that the “one man, one vote” principle prevents
them from fully expressing their intensive feeling and thus suffer from underinvolvement and
the disappointment of this kind. The other more active group with the capability of
participating actively in the public decision making experiences the systematic excess of time
actually required over the initially planed time for public activities and therefore suffers from
overcommitment. In other words, “participation in public life offers only this unsatisfactory
too-much-or-too-little choice and is therefore bound to be disappointing in one way or
another” (Hirschman 1982, p. 120).
Even if people could sustain the disappointment resulted from overcommitment or
underinvolvement and still keep their passion for public involvement, they may then
experience the gap between the expected and the actually experienced quality of the public
experience and thus get disappointed.
Now we are only one step away from the starting point of our voyage. Disappointed by the
public life, the citizens decrease their preference for public activities and increase their
preference for private consumption. In other words, they retum to “normalcy” and strive
again for private happiness. The next cycle from private to public and again from public back
to private begins.
Causal Loops Diagram of the Argumentation
The previous section described the mechanisms which, according to Hirschman, cause
societies’ shifting involvements between private and public interests. To test the dynamic
consistency of Hirschman’s theory, the next logical step consists in identifying the main
feedback processes involved in such a system. In other words, Hirschman’s argumentation
will now be transformed into a causal loop diagram. The goal of this section is also to
validate our model on a “link-by-link” basis (Larsen and Lomi 2002) by showing that our
model formulation is in accordance with Hirschman’s theory illustrated in the previous
section. The construction of the causal loop diagram follows the same reasoning as the
argumentation. The private interest cycle will be first modeled, and then the public interest
will be added to finish with a complete representation of the system.
Speaking in general terms, the mechanisms regulating the private interest cycle can be
summarized as follows. When societies adhere to consumerism, people, believing that new
acquisitions will increase their happiness, increase their private consumption. The acquisition
of new goods inflates not only people’s perceived satisfaction but also consumers’
expectations. As extensively discussed above, desires always exceed reality and so a gap
between expected and perceived satisfaction rises. The higher the gap of satisfaction, the
higher the disappointment experienced by consumers. As disappointment accumulates over
time, the preference for private consumption decreases. As believes in the consumerism are
weaken, an alternative ideology, public action, gains interest and becomes increasingly more
attractive compared to private interest. Finally, as the relative preference of private over
public interest gets smaller, consumers, now believing that public action will increase their
happiness, slowly reduce their consumption.
The loop described above is balancing under the assumption that expected satisfaction always
exceed perceived satisfaction and so that the gap in satisfaction leads to disappointment. The
characteristics of the loop generate oscillation between periods of high and low interest in
private consumption. The private interest cycle can therefore be represented by the next
causal loop diagram (Figure 1).
+
private 4
expected satisfaction nein 7
from private consumption +,
perceived satisfaction preference
from private private to public
consumption
i
+ B
gap of satisfaction from preference for priva
private consumption consumption
sein rok”
in private consumption
Figure 1: Causal Loop Diagram - Private Interest
The cycle characterising public action is exactly the same as the private interest cycle. By
increasing their public involvement, people’s perceived satisfaction and expectations rise. As
stated before, unsatisfying outcomes, over commitment, under involvement, and disillusions
will, sooner or later, create a gap between the expected and perceived satisfactions generated
by public actions. Disappointment follows the apparition of such gap. As disappointment
cumulates, the preference for public involvement decreases and private interest becomes
more attractive. Finally, as the relative preference of private over public interest increases,
societies slowly shift back to an ideology promoting private welfare and reduce their
involvements in public issues.
Like the private interest cycle, this loop is also balancing when assuming that expectations
must be higher than reality in order to create a feeling of disappointment. It is characteristed
by periods of intense participation in public live followed by periods of disinvolvement.
Put together, both cycles form the complete system representing societies’ shifting in
involvements as shown in Figure 2. The system is therefore composed of two symmetric
loops connected by one by variable, “preference private to public”, which is responsible for
the shifting from one ideology to the other. It is important to notice that delays regulate the
behavior of the system. Indeed, societies do not evolve extremely quickly.
10
2 ivate ti + expected satisfaction
expected satisfaction prival aan on per _ public involvement per from public involveme
from private consumption a period period Sh
perceived satisfaction from perceived satisfaction
private consumption from public involvement
preference
2 “ B private to public -
gap of satisfaction from + G gap of satisfaction from
private consumption public involvement
preference for privatepreference for public
+ disappointment from consumption involvement disappointment fidm
private consumpti ‘ Sa public involvement
Figure 2: Causal Loop Diagram- Private Consumption and Public Interest
Now that Hirschman’s argumentation has been summarized and interpreted in terms of
feedback loops, an illustration taken from a novel will illustrate how societies evolve between
private and public interest.
Illustration with the story in “G one with the Wind”
The well known novel “Gone with the Wind” (Margaret Mitchell 1936) offers a lively
description of the transformation of the society of the cotton-rich South of the USA from the
private happiness to public involvement and again back to the striving for private interest
through the A merican civil war.
Being bored from the peaceful and prosperous life backed by the wealth built on the cotton
richness, the middle and upper classes in the South part of the USA feel the war as a welcome
alternation. The poverty of their imagination lets a glorious picture of war emerging in their
mind- “riding a pretty horse and having the girls throw flowers at you and coming home as a
hero” (Margaret Mitchell 1936, chapter 6). Old generations who once experienced the
disappointment from the last cycle of public involvements (the Seminole war and the
Mexican war) tried to warn the majority against their enthusiasm to the total public
involvement. However, these disappointing experiences made by the older generations “was
a reminder of a cruder era... an era everyone would like to forget” (Margaret Mitchell 1936,
chapter 6). Blended by this ripping version of war and the feeling of being a part of a
“Cause”, the major topics on various parties changed from “cotton, slaves and tobacco” to
how they could “leak the Yankees thieves in a month” in coming war (Margaret Mitchell
1936, chapter 6).
However, during the four-year war time, people of both North and South part of the USA
experience disappointment originated from overcommitment (Both the actual monetary and
temporal cost overrun far more than the people initially were willing to sacrifice for the
“Cause”) and from the quality gap (instead of the glorious version of war, most of them
experience “hungry.. getting the measles and pneumonia from sleeping in the wet” (Margaret
Mitchell 1936, chapter 6). For the Cotton Kingdom (the South), even worse, at the end of the
11
civil war, a last disappointment was waiting for them- the gap between the expected and the
actual outcome. “It was all over, the bright beautiful dream they had loved and hoped for, the
Cause which had taken their friends, lovers, husbands and beggared their families. The Cause
they had thought could be never fall had fallen forever” (Margaret Mitchell 1936, chapter
29).
Being disappointed by their experiences in public involvement (war is doubtless one of the
most intensive types of public participation), people return to pursuit of private interest after
the ending of the war. “... they were caring about life again, caring with the same urgency and
the same violence that animated them before the war had cut their lives into two.” (Margaret
Mitchell 1936, chapter 38) For example, the only thought Scarlett was having in her mind
after knowing the news of the surrender is “we'll plant more cottons, lots more... Good lord!
Cotton ought to go sky high this fall!” (Margaret Mitchell 1936, chapter 29)
Why Simulation
As we have mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the model we build in this paper is a
“second-order model”, which is not a model of a historically determined process like the
majority of existing system dynamics models, but a model of a theoretical narrative. (Larsen
and Lomi 2002). Second order models have the potential of testing and completing existing
theories as well as shedding new light on the dynamic processes standing behind the theories.
However, this potential remains largely unexplored. Only a few examples are available.
Sterman made the try of using a second order model to test the dynamic consistency of
Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolution (Sterman 1985), Wittenberg then joined the discussion
together with other system dynamists (Wittenberg 1992, Radzicki 1992, Sterman 1992,
Barlas 1992, Sterman and Wittenberg 1999). Sastry’s paper of formalizing and testing the
conventional theory of punctuated organizational change by Tushman and Romanelli (Sastry
1997) represents another attempt in this area, followed by Larsen and Lomi’s (1999, 2002)
model of representing organizational inertia. A few other scholars like Hanneman et al
(1995), Masuch (1985) and Hall (1976) also contributed to this field of research.
We are using a second-order model of system dynamics approach in this paper for testing a
theory of social processes mainly because this methodology offers advantages in: (i)
formalizing theoretical concepts, which are originally described in natural language, within
more articulated theoretical framework in order to test the dynamic consistency of the theory,
without weakening the comprehensiveness and the ambiguity of social theories. (ii) providing
an alternative way of testing social theories in a simultaneous and complex system,
comparing to the traditional and unconvincing way of examining a series of sequential single-
proposition statements about complex and interdependent social processes. (iii) scanning
possible ramifications of alternative ways in which propositions might be connected (Larsen
and Lomi 1999).
Formalization of the Model
The model is divided into two macro-sectors that represent the private consumption and the
public involvements (see Figure 3). It must be noticed that Figure 3 is NOT the complete
stock and flow diagram, but a diagram showing the main links in the model. The complete
model is attached as appendix.
12
As it can be seen in Figure 3, the two sectors are linked through the variable relative
disappointment (RD), which is calculated as a proportion of disappointment from public
involvements (PUD) to the sum of PUD and disappointment from private consumption
(PRD).
RD, = PUD, (PUD, + PRD,) (1)
If RD is higher than 0.5, it means that people get more disappointed from the public
involvements than from the private consumption. Then public interest (PUI) will decrease
and private interest (PRI) will increase. If RD is lower than 0.5, PUI will increase and PRI
will decrease. The value of RD ranges between 0 and 1. With a table function, RD is
transformed into a variable called impact of relative disappointment on allocation of interest
(not shown in Figure 3), which regulates the flow between the both stocks PRD and PUD. It
is assumed that the sum of PUI and PRI is a constant of 100. In other words, what flows out
of PUI will flow into PRI and vice versa, and this flow is influenced by RD.
Private Sector Public Sector
perceived satisfaction
perceived satislaction from public involvements
from private consumption
if [ average perceived
j )\ L interest T et | public involvements
|
| |
vate consumption] ) {
{ \ '
trent in expected | trend in expected
satisfaction from | satisfaction from publi
ee natn
sie }
oe aise wl
‘expected satisfaction from from public involvements
|/ ‘gap of satisfaction from
‘ap of satisfaction from public involvements,
private consumption
disappointment —_—se
tee fomprate, [=D CME fompubic
consumption wolvements
Figure 2: Macro-sectors of the model
Having described how the two macro-sectors are linked, the micro-structure of the model will
be portrayed now. Since the both sectors are symmetrical in our model, we will only illustrate
the private sector as a represent of both sectors.
PRI is transformed into perceived satisfaction from private consumption (PSPR) through a
variable named impact of public interest on perceived satisfaction (not shown in Figure 3). In
order to calculate expected satisfaction from private consumption (ESPR), the trend in
desired satisfaction from private consumption (TPR) is computed as follows:
13
OAPSPR
TPR, -( apse (2)
where APSPR is the stock average perceived satisfaction from private consumption.
(=
at
PSPR by the adjustment time to change PSPR.
} represents the inflow into the stock APSPR, which is computed through dividing
As discussed in the previous text, acquisition of consumer goods or services not only inflates
people’s perceived satisfaction from private consumption (PSPR), but enhances even more
their expected satisfaction from consuming the next unit of goods or services (DSPR). In
other words, expected satisfaction always exceeds the perceived satisfaction from the real
consumption experiences. Therefore, in our model, citizens form their expected satisfaction
from private consumption (ESPR) based on their perceived satisfaction from private
consumption (PSPR) and the trend (TPR) as follows:
ESPR, = PSPR, x(1+TPR,) (3)
This approach is in accordance with Forrester’s claim about smoothing of information
(Forrester 1961), which is present in every decision-making point in the system. According to
Forrester, “smoothing is a process of taking a series of past information values and
attempting to form an estimate of the present value of the underlying significant content of
the data” (Forrester 1961, Appendix E).
The difference between expected satisfaction from private consumption (ESPR) and
perceived satisfaction from private consumption (PSPR) is represented by gap between
expected and perceived satisfaction from private consumption (GAP).
GAP, = ESPR, — PSPR, (4)
This gap, which is endogenously embedded in our modem society, will lead to new
disappointment (ND) and an accumulation of the stock disappointment from private
consumption (DPR), which is represented as an inflow into the stock DPR in our model. At
the same time, people also forget their disappointing experiences with time (FD). This
approach is reflected with an outflow flowing out of the stock DPR.
—— = ND(t)—FD(t) (5)
The model formalization for the public sector is symmetric to the private sector we just
illustrated.
Simulation Results
Having formalized our model, this section will deal with the behavior generated from the
dynamic explained before. In the following text, we will first present Hirschman’s expected
behavior of private and public interest. Then we will validate our model with the behavior
14
reproduction tests (Sterman 2000), in which we show that the behavior exhibited by our
model complies with what Hirschman expected.
With following words, Hirschman provides some description for his expectation concerning
how private and public interest should interact with each other: “...both pursuits of
happiness, the private and the public, have intrinsically monopolizing ambitions, and a stable
equilibrium between the two is impossible to achieve” (Hirschman 1982, p.99). Robert H.
Frank states the observed behavior by Hirschman with even more clear words in the foreword
he contributes to the twentieth-anniversary edition of Hirschman’s Shifting Involvements:
“His basic observation, which he documents persuasively with examples from several
modern Western democracies, is that societies seem to oscillate... between modes of private
acquisitiveness and public spiritedness” (Hirschman 1982, p.xi).
Figure 3 shows the simulation result over a period of 100 years for the private and public
interest stock. In the model, the sum of private and public interest is set to be 100. At the
beginning of the simulation, public interest is set as 52.6 whereas private interest equals to
47.4. Both private and public interest oscillate around the average value of 50 periodically
and exhibit a so-called sustained oscillating behavior. In other words, the behavior of our
model is in accordance with what Hirschman expected.
Public vs Private Interest
60
55
VKOOOXXXKXX
45
40
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Time
private interest : current14 Dmnl
public interest : current14 Dmnl
Figure 3: Behavior Public vs. Private Interest
Besides Hirschman’s book, we could find more evidence for the cyclic behavior generated
from our model. Figure 4 shows the voting rate in the USA from 1968 to 2000. “Voter
turnout is one measure of citizen participation in politics” (IDEA 2002, p.75), which is “the
number of votes divided by the number of names on the voters’ register, expressed as a
percentage” (IDEA 2002, p.120). Thus, voter tumout could give some hints on how much a
society is engaged into public interest during the respective period. Figure 4 starts from 1968
with high public interest in the American society, which marks the year of anti-Viemam war
15
demonstrations in the USA and the end of Johnson era. The next 3 decades shows an
oscillating behavior similar to what our model generates.
Voter Tumout (Vote/R egistration) in The USA (1968-2000)
100.00% +
90.00% 4
80.00%
70.00% we
60.00% , L
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00% r r r r r T r T T T T T T ; T ; 1
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Figure 4: Voting Rate in USA (1968- 2000)
Source: IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance)
Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, a system dynamics model to test Hirschman’s theory of shifting societal interest
and involvements between private and public sectors, is provided. The simulations results
proves the dynamic consistency of Hirschman’s theory and confirms the reference mode
stated in his book. It is hoped, that the second order model presented in this paper, could help
to illustrate the theory and provided some new insights into the dynamics ruling the private-
public cycle in our societal life.
This paper presents our first attempt to reconstruct the compelling story Hirschman tries to
tell in his book. Given the comprehensiveness of his story, more work can be done in the
future to incorporate more factors in order to make our model more realistic. For example, in
the current stage, our model shows a complete symmetry between the private and public
cycle. In other words, the periods of intensive public involvements and the periods of
widespread concentration on private interest within a society, have almost equal length.
However, reality often offers another picture as Hirschman tries to alert us: “An asymmetry
between private and public life must be noted here. It is easy for private pursuits almost
wholly to fill our lives and to squeeze out public-regarding activities altogether; this is, in
fact, what typically happens a great deal of the time under modern conditions and has been
unbeautiful named “privatization.” But the opposite process can occur only exceptionally...”
(Hirschman 1982, p.97). For the next developing stage of our work, some new features,
including the asymmetry between private and public life, will be added to our model.
Second order models, as state in the previous text, have the potential of testing and
completing existing theories as well as shedding new light on the dynamic processes standing
behind the theories. There exist a large number of theories, for instance, in social science
disciplines such as philosophy, sociology and psychology, though intuitively gripping or even
16
logically convincingly stated, however, are hardly testable with calculus or data. Second
order models, could be a powerful tool for testing these theories for the reasons stated before.
However, as we already made clear, in spite of its highly interesting nature and great
potential, second order model determines a less explored research field within the system
dynamics society. Therefore, it is also hoped by the authors, that this present paper could add
some bricks in this research field and call more system dynamists’ attention to this research
topic.
17
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20
Appendix
Allocation of interest=
IF THEN ELSE( impact of relative disappointment on allocation of interest<0, impact
of relative disappointment on allocation of interest\
*public interest, impact of relative disappointment on allocation of
interest* private interest\
)
private interest= INTEG (
-Allocation of interest,
47.4)
~ Dmnil [0,100,100]
public interest= INTEG (
Allocation of interest,
52.6)
~ Dmnl [0,100,100]
gap of satisfaction from public involvement=
perceived satisfaction from public involvement- expected satisfaction from public
~ Satisfaction Unit
trend in expected satisfaction from public=
(change in average public/average perceived satisfaction from public involvements)*3
~ l/year
average perceived satisfaction from public involvements=INTEG (
change in average public,
~ Satisfaction Unit
disappointment from public involvement=INTEG (
+new public disappointment-forgotten public disappointment,
3)
~ Satisfaction Unit
averaging time public=
10
~ year
21
delay in perceiving gap in public involvement=
1
~ year
change in average public=
(perceived satisfaction from public involvement-average perceived satisfaction from
public involvements\
)/averaging time public
~ Satisfaction Unit/year
expected satisfaction from public=
perceived satisfaction from public involvement* (1-+Htrend in expected satisfaction
from public\
)
~ Satisfaction Unit
new public disappointment=
IF THEN ELSE(gap of satisfaction from public involvement>0, 0, (-gap of
satisfaction from public involvement\
)/delay in perceiving gap in public involvement)
~ Satisfaction Unit/year
forgotten public disappointment=
disappointment from public involvement/time to forget past disappointment in public
involvement
~ Satisfaction Unit/year
time to forget past disappointment in public involvement=
20
~ year
time to forget past disappointment in private consumption=
20
~ year
forgotten private disappointment=
disappointment from private consumption/time to forget past disappointment in
private consumption
~ Satisfaction Unit/year
disappointment from private consumption=INTEG (
+new private disappointment-forgotten private disappointment,
22
2.7)
~ Satisfaction Unit
gap of satisfaction from private consumption=
perceived satisfaction from private cosumption-expected satisfaction from private
~ Satisfaction Unit
new private disappointment=
IF THEN ELSE(gap of satisfaction from private consumption>0, 0, (-gap of
satisfaction from private consumption\
)/delay in perceiving gap in private consumption)
~ Satisfaction Unit/year
~ Satisfaction units =- Disappointment units
|
delay in perceiving gap in private consumption=
~ year
average perceived satisfaction from private consumption= INTEG (
change in average,
30.05)
~ Satisfaction Unit
averaging time private=
10
~ year
change in average=
(perceived satisfaction from private cosumption-average perceived satisfaction from
private consumption\
)/averaging time private
~ Satisfaction Unit/year
expected satisfaction from private=
perceived satisfaction from private cosumption*(1+trend in expected satisfaction from
private\
)
~ Satisfaction Unit
o |
perceived satisfaction from private cosumption=
SMOOTH(impact of private interest on perceived satisfaction* reference perceived
satisfaction from private consumption\
23
, delay in perception private satisfaction
)
~ Satisfaction Unit
trend in expected satisfaction from private=
(change in average/average perceived satisfaction from private consumption)*3
~ l/year
perceived satisfaction from public involvement=
SMOOTH(impact of public interest on percived satisfaction* reference perceived
satisfaction from public involvement\
, delay in perception public satisfaction
)
~ Satisfaction Unit
# |
delay in perception private satisfaction=
2
# |
delay in perception public satisfaction=
2
impact of private interest on perceived satisfaction=
impact of private interest on perceived satisfaction table(private interest)
~ Dmnl
impact of private interest on perceived satisfaction table(
[(0,0)-(100,3)],(0,0),(100,3))
~ Dmnl
impact of public interest on percived satisfaction=
impact of public interest on perceived satisfaction table(public interest)
~ Dmnl
impact of public interest on perceived satisfaction table(
[(0,0)-(100,3)],(0,0),(100,3))
~ Dmnl
reference perceived satisfaction from private consumption=
20
24
~ Satisfaction Unit
reference perceived satisfaction from public involvement=
20
~ Satisfaction Unit
impact of relative disappointment on allocation of interest=
impact of disappointment on allocation of interest table(relative disappointment)
~ Dmnl
impact of disappointment on allocation of interest table(
[(0,-0.05)-(1,0.05)],(0,0.05),(0.5,0),(1,-0.05))
relative disappointment=
disappointment from public involvement/(disappointment from private
consumption+iisappointment from public involvement\
= Dmnl
GCC CRC RRR RKC RKC KKK
.Control
SR RC CC RC RRR
Simulation Control Parameters
FINAL TIME =100
~ year
~ The final time for the simulation.
INITIAL TIME =0
~ year
~ The initial time for the simulation.
SAVEPER =0.0625
~ year [0,?]
~ The frequency with which output is stored.
|
TIME STEP =0.03125
~ year [0,?]
~ The time step for the simulation.
25
\\\---/// Sketch information - do not modify anything except names
V300 Do not put anything below this section - it will be ignored
*View 1
$192-192-192,0,Times New Roman|12||0-0-0|0-0-0|0-0-255}-1--1--1|-1--1--1|96,96,5
10,1,public interest,561,317,40,20,3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,2,private interest,848,316,40,19,3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,3,disappointment from private consumption,952,631,53,26,3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,4,disappointment from public involvement,464,618,50,26,3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
12,5,48,192,627,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,6,8,4,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(364,628)|
1,7,8,5,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(252,628)|
11,8,48,308,628,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,9,new public disappointment,308,655,48,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,10,48,715,621,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,11,13,10,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(660,621)|
1,12,13,4,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(558,621)|
11,13,48,609,621,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,14,forgotten public disappointment, 609,648,50,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,15,48,1185,623,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,16,18,3,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1038,625)|
1,17,18,15,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1129,625)|
11,18,48,1077,625,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,19,new private disappointment, 1077,652,48,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
12,20,48,761,625,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,21,23,20,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(801,624)|
1,22,23,3,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(871,624)|
11,23,48,837,624,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,24,forgotten private disappointment,837,651,53,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
10,25,relative disappointment,724,552,73,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,26,4,25,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](565,544)|
1,27,3,25,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(855,549)|
10,28,impact of disappointment on allocation of interest table,901,463,58,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,29,impact of relative disappointment on allocation of
interest,697,441,80,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,30,25,29,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(687,500)|
1,31,28,29,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(816,453)|
10,32,impact of public interest on percived satisfaction,501,187,75,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,33,impact of public interest on perceived satisfaction table,574,75,85,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,34,1,32,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](561,245)|
1,35,33,32,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(541,125)|
10,36,impact of private interest on perceived satisfaction,937,185,78,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,37,impact of private interest on perceived satisfaction table,771,106,78,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,38,37,36,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(856,147)|
1,39,2,36,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(856,227)|
10,40,perceived satisfaction from public involvement,228,126,75,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,41, reference perceived satisfaction from public involvement, 107,46,73,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,42,41,40,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(168,86)|
10,43, reference perceived satisfaction from private
consumption, 1304,65,75,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
26
10,44,perceived satisfaction from private cosumption,1125,124,77,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,45,43,44,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](1212,94)|
10,46,delay in perception public satisfaction,320,39,60,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,47,46,40,0,0,0,0,2,65,0,-1--1--1,|12||255-0-0,1|(279,77)|
10,48,delay in perception private satisfaction, 1017,51,60,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,49,48,44,0,0,0,0,2,65,0,-1--1--1,|12||255-0-0,1|(1064,83)|
1,50,36,44,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](1012,138)|
1,51,32,40,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(384,132)|
10,52,average perceived satisfaction from private
consumption, 1371,227,55,31,3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
12,53,48,1143,223,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,54,56,52,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1](1278,223)|
1,55,56,53,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1190,223)|
11,56,48,1234,223,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,57,change in average, 1234,242,56,11,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
10,58,averaging time private, 1190,328,46,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,59,trend in expected satisfaction from private,1385,354,52,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,60,44,57,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1(1229,148)|
1,61,58,57,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1185,275)|
1,62,52,59,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](1381,268)|
1,63,52,57,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1322,267)|
10,64,expected satisfaction from private,1338,447,60,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,65,59,64,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](1362,398)|
1,66,44,64, 1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1099,239)|
1,67,57,59,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](1248,298)|
10,68,gap of satisfaction from private consumption, 1095,473,74,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,69,64,68,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](1233,481)|
1,70,44,68,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1035,288)|
1,71,68,18,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](1132,541)|
10,72,delay in perceiving gap in private consumption, 1267,704,80,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,73,72,19,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(1168,676)|
10,74,time to forget past disappointment in private
consumption, 923,741,79,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,75,74,24,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(850,698)|
1,76,3,24,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(909,671)|
10,77,average perceived satisfaction from public involvements,67,202,51,32,3,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
12,78,48,271,203,10,8,0,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,79,81,77,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(154,203)|
1,80,81,78,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(232,203)|
11,81,48,197,203,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,82,change in average public,197,230,57,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
10,83,averaging time public,245,292,51,17,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,84, trend in expected satisfaction from public,98,351,73,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,85,expected satisfaction from public, 173,458,60,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
10,86,gap of satisfaction from public involvement,408,467,74,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,87,40,82,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(226,164)|
1,88,83,82,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1
1,89,77,82,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1
1,90,82,84,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1
1,91,77,84,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1
27
1,92,84,85,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1 “htt 107,417)|
1,93,85,86,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(277,486)|
1,94,86,8,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1-- Le ,1|(326,615)|
1,95,40,85,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1-- iy 329,302)|
1,96,40,86,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1](432,348)|
10,97,delay in perceiving gap in public involvement, 183,735,72,19,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,98,97,9,0,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(239,698)|
10,99,time to forget past disappointment in public involvement,495,747,77,28,8,3,0,0,0,0,0,0
1,100,99,14,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(593,717)|
1,101,4,14,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(527,686)|
1,102,104,2,4,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1](759,316)|
1,103,104,1,100,0,0,22,0,0,0,-1--1--1,,1|(649,316)|
11,104,524,704,316,6,8,34,3,0,0,1,0,0,0
10,105,A llocation of interest, 704,343,56,19,40,3,0,0,-1,0,0,0
1,106,29,105,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(720,384)|
1,107,1,105,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(669,365)|
1,108,2,105,1,0,0,0,0,64,0,-1--1--1,,1|(786,369)|
28
