The Change in Residents’ Participative Behavior in Polluted Areas:
A System Dynamics Perspective
Tsuey-Ping Lee* Chin-Hsueh Wang
Associate Professor Project Assistant
National Chung-Cheng University National Chung-Cheng University
Taiwan, R.O.C. Taiwan, R.O.C.
SUMMARY
This article explores the reasons for the declining public participation of residents in a
severely polluted community from a system dynamics perspective by examining a set
of communities polluted with dioxin in southem Taiwan. The study examines three
aspects affecting participative behavior intention: residents’ perception of the
pollution, peer impact, and how residents perceive the impact of participation on
government response. A face-to-face interview conducted from August to September
2008 revealed that the unintended side effect of the government's indemnity policy
has created a balancing feedback loop that offsets the reinforcing feedback system
suggested by the normative theory of participation. In addition, the unique nature of
pollution victims mitigates the influence of an existing reinforcing feedback system.
This article concludes with policy suggestions to increase public participation in a
highly polluted community.
Key Words
dioxin pollution; system dynamics; public participation; environmental governance;
An-shun Plant; Taiwan
INTRODUCTION
Although environmental pollution and protection have been key issues in
environmental governance and sustainable development for decades, only recently has
public participation started to attract the attention of governments who try to make the
sustainability of polluted communities possible. Public participation has been a key
issue in the field of governance, which emphasizes the importance of involving
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 1
citizens in policy-making processes. It is believed that a higher level of public
participation during the stage of policy formulation can make things easier when the
policy comes down to the stage of implementation (Pierre & Peters, 2000: 1).
Recently, public participation started to attract global attention in the field of
environmental governance. For example, one of the vital statements of Agenda 21
emphasizes the importance of public decision making in the process of social and
economic change. It encourages public participation and involvement in
environmental decision-making processes, including policy formulation, legalization,
and implementation, so that sustainable development can be possible (United Nations
Department of Economic and Social A ffairs Web site). Accordingly, to formulate and
implement sustainable community programs in the polluted areas, residents’
participation is vital in the entire process.
However, how does the government motivate residents in polluted areas to
participate in local public affairs such as environmental and sustainable policy making?
In a sizable dioxin pollution case in southem Taiwan, the incentive for residents’
participation in a related policy process rose at the beginning and then declined even
before the real problem was solved. Why did resident’s participative incentives
change? This study seeks to answer these questions by examining the case of the
dioxin-polluted communities surrounding the An-shun PCP manufacturing plant
(An-shun plant) in southem Taiwan. The An-shun plant dioxin pollution is quite
typical of severe, sizable environmental pollution, and the communities that have
been polluted have been deteriorating socially and economically. For the past four
decades, residents who consumed products grown in nearby water ponds have been
suffering from high blood dioxin levels and poor health. It was only four years ago,
after a long delay, that central and local governments started to respond positively to
the pollution victims’ requests by providing health care and indemnity. The
government and the pollution enterprise are now working on a clean-up project, but
the residents’ incentive to participate in these issues has declined over time. Local
government bureaucrats complained about this declining level of public participation
in the community at a meeting held on October 31, 2008. Frontline civil servants did
not understand the reason why residents’ participation declined after the government
started to respond positively (An-shun Plant Dioxin Research Project Community
Meeting Report, 2008). According to the theory of public participation, a positive
policy response from the government can drive up the level of public participation
because the public will start to believe in the government's willingness to solve the
problem. However, the participative behavior in the dioxin-polluted community of
southern Taiwan did not correspond to this theory. Therefore, this study intends to
explore the major reasons for the change in residents’ participative behavior from a
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 2
systemic perspective.
BACKGROUND ON THE DIOXIN POLLUTION OF AN-SHUN PLANT
The now-defunct An-shun plant, located northwest of Tainan City in southern Taiwan,
was identified as a pollution remediation site by the Environmental Protection
Administration (EPA) of Taiwan in May 2004. The plant had been established by the
Japanese company Kanegafuchi Soda in 1942 to produce a variety of chemical
products, including hydrochloric acid, caustic soda, and liquid chlorine, as well as
poison gas for the Japanese navy. When Taiwan’s government took over the plant at
the end of World War II in 1945, it turned the plant over to a state-owned company
named Taiwan Alkali Industrial Corp (TAIC). Placed under the supervision of the
Ministry of Economic Affairs in the 1960s, the An-shun plant started to produce
pentachlorophenol (PCP)-related products— pesticides, herbicides, antifungal agents,
bactericides, and wood preservatives. These products were exported mainly to Japan.
By the early 1970s the plant had become Asia’s biggest producer of the pesticide
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). In 1982, the government shut An-shun down
because of economic and environmental reasons, but these reasons were kept
confidential at the time. The government also stockpiled 5,000 kilograms of PCP at
the plant site (Huang, 2002). Declassified government documents show that one of the
main reasons the government shut down An-shun was that some officials were aware
of mercury pollution around the plant site. However, despite this knowledge, the
government took no action to either prevent the further spread of pollution or forbid
the consumption of water products grown in these contaminated areas (Wang, 2005).
The Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC Corp.), another state-owned enterprise,
bought out TAIC in 1967. In 1983, right after the An-shun plant ceased to operate, the
government ordered the plant property be made part of a CPC Comp. subsidiary, the
China Petrochemical Development Corp. (CPDC). CPDC was privatized in 1994
(China Petrochemical Development Corp., 2007: 107-108). Although the An-shun
plant did not generate any environmental pollution after the merger with CPDC, it
was still surrounded by a very serious case of environmental pollution generated
during its four decades of operation. The major pollutants are pentachlorophenol,
dioxin, and mercury (Huang, 2002; Research, Development, and Evaluation
Commission, 2006). The mud at the bottom of the nearby Luermen River has the
highest dioxin level of all rivers in Taiwan. In January 2006, the dioxin concentration
in one ditch on the site was found to be 64 million toxic equivalents, or TEQ ng/m3,
which is 64,000 times the accepted standard (MacFarquhar, 2006). The dioxin level in
fish caught from the reservoir (which was used by TAIC as a toxic waste dump) was
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 3
28.3 pg-TEQ/g, significantly higher than the 4pg WHO-TEQ/g the World Health
Organization (WHO) has set as a safe level for human consumption. A record-high
dioxin level— 247pg-TEQ/g, more than 60 times the WHO standard— was found in
fish from the reservoir in 1995 (Huang, 2005). For decades, residents have been
economically and nutritionally dependent on catching and selling fish, oysters,
shellfish, and crabs grown in nearby reservoirs, fish farms, and ponds. They were
never informed of the danger of eating these water products.
Looking into the demographic statistics of An-nan district, where the An-shun
plant is located, we find that the residents’ average educational attainment is lower
than that of other districts in Tainan City. In addition, the district’s poverty rate is the
highest in the entire city (Tainan City Government, 2005). Although the existence of
dioxin pollution in nearby areas seems to have been widely accepted, and although
warning signs have been placed in the critically polluted areas, some residents refuse
to take this waming seriously. This is understandable, as these people, who have
depended upon the nearby waters for their food all their lives, find it difficult to
believe that the fish in the water are poisoned; it is therefore not surprising that even
recently people have still been catching and selling water products from the polluted
areas (Tsai, 2005; Liu, 2005).
A study conducted by National Cheng Kung University at the request of the
Tainan City government tested blood samples from 570 residents in Hsien-gong,
Lu-er, and Si-tsao townships, which surround the An-shun plant. The results show that
72 percent have higher levels of dioxin in their blood than the tolerance limit set by
the United Nations, with the average level being 71.1pg compared with the accepted
level of 32.0pg. One local resident has a blood dioxin level of 951.0pg, the highest
recorded in Taiwan. The average dioxin level of blood samples from Hsien-gong
township, located right next to the An-shun plant, is the highest of the three townships
(Chang and Chen, 2007). Dioxins are carcinogens that can cause birth defects,
diabetes, immune system abnormalities, and many other health problems when
exposure is excessive. The cancer rate in polluted areas is higher than it is at clean
sites. For example, the death rate from cancer between 1999 and 2003 in Hsien-gong
township is 39.3 percent, while the national average is 25.5 percent (Wang, 2005)
In July 2005, the Ministry of Economic Affairs agreed to set aside NT$ 1.3
billion (US$ 40 million) for a period of five years to compensate victims of dioxin
pollution from the An-shun plant. However, the government stated that the
compensation would be distributed only out of humane consideration. It held that the
government should not bear responsibility on behalf of CPDC, a privatized company.
Those registered as residents in Hsien-gong, Lu-er, and Si-tsao townships before June
30, 2005 are entitled to receive a monthly cash payment of NT$ 1,814 (US$ 55) per
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 4
person. People whose blood dioxin level is higher than 64pg-TEQ/g lipid will receive
NT$ 3,000 (US$ 91) a month, and those who have become physically or mentally
handicapped or seriously ill because of the pollution will receive NT$ 15,840 (US$
480) a month. The relatives of people who died as a result of the pollution will be
entitled to a one-time payment of as much as NT$ 200,000 (US$ 6,061) in
compensation. These monthly payments are intended to pay for the continuing
medical treatment of various illnesses, including cancer, as well as for social welfare
and living expenses (Tainan City Government, Bureau of Social Affair Web site).
However, residents have complained that the monthly payment of NT$ 1,814 per
person is insufficient to cover their medical bills and other expenses. Many seriously
ill residents are seeking state compensation on grounds that the plant was owned by
the government at the time it produced the dioxin pollution. The change in ownership
of An-shun plant, however, has made the issue a lot more complicated. Although the
pollution occurred when the plant belonged to the state-owned TAIC, in November
2007 the Highest Administrative Court held that CPDC was solely responsible and
ordered the company to pay the compensation and clean-up costs (Tainan City
Government, 2007). Since it was held responsible for cleaning up the dioxin pollution,
CPDC started to propose a clean-up plan to the government in 2008 (Cheng, 2008).
THE REINFORCING FEEDBACK LOOPS BASED ON THEORY
Public participation means that the public participates in policy formulation, planning,
and implementation processes (Arnstein, 1969: 216; Kweit & Kweit, 1987: 29;
Chandler and Plano, 1988: 175). It is believed that the level of public participation is
related to the government's policy responses. A positive interaction between citizens
and the government can help both sides develop trust toward each other. Consequently,
a policy can be implemented smoothly based on a cooperative relationship between
the two (Amstein, 1969; Desario & Langton, 1978). In the literature regarding
environmental issues, it is generally believed that the participation of stakeholders is a
must-do in environmental policy processes. Especially for people who are pollution
victims or potential victims, their opinion inputs in related policy processes can help
the government develop programs that are customized to local characteristics and
meet local needs. When better customized programs are formulated to meet local
needs, citizens’ participative behaviors can be encouraged; therefore, both the
government and the citizens will cooperate closely to deal with the unsolved problems
together (Rydin & Pennington, 2000; Konisky & Beierle, 2001; Daley, 2008).
Figure 1 shows the conceptual positive feedback loops drawn from the above
theory. Loop 1 shows an information feedback loop. The residents’ higher level of
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 5
participation requires clear and responsive information released from the government.
In other words, clear and easily understandable information from the government can
help the public realize in depth the on-going problems; hence, residents’ participative
incentive can be raised. A higher level of public participation can pressure the
government to expedite the problem-solving process and release more information.
Loop 2 is also a positive feedback loop showing that the government’s positive policy
response makes participants feel fulfilled and positive about their participation and
therefore raises their participative incentive. Loops 3 and 4 are about policy
implementation. It is believed that public participation can make the policy
implementation process run smoothly. Consequently, the government is willing to
encourage a higher level of participation by releasing related information and positive
policy responses to the public. In summary, loops 1, 2, 3, and 4 demonstrate an
increasingly closer relationship between the government and the citizens. The
government's positive responses, including information release and customized policy,
can be a trigger for developing a good relationship with the public; hence, a higher
level of public participation can be reached.
Pol Residents' Incentive Information
Ohey Sesponse for Participation Released
| \
. GQ .
2 Level of Public U
, Raracipekon Government's Incentive
Govemments for Releasing Information
Incentive for Solving +
Probl
Smooth Policy
lementation
Pressure on
Govemment
Figure 1. Loops drawn from theory
Based on conceptual model drawn from the theory shown in figure 1, figure 2
shows the system dynamics model. In figure 2, loop R1 and R2 sketch how the
government was motivated by public participation to release information and
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 6
formulate policies, respectively. The level of public participation is defined by the
stock variable named people participating related activities. If people are willing to
participate in activities such as public hearings or discussion forums, they can learn
more about the related professional knowledge and government's future policies.
According to the theory stated previously, more communication and mutual
understandings between the government and the public can help the government
implement policy smoothly. This concept is represented by a higher number of
compliant people. Smooth policy implementation encourages the government to take
policy actions. Government's incentive for taking actions is defined by government's
incentive multiplier. In this model, government's incentive multiplier is formulated
differently from what the theory addresses. Although a smooth policy implementation
motivates the government to respond positively, government's policy responses can
not be unlimited. In reality, the government's response may slow down because of
various reasons such as limited budget, bureaucratic inertia, or perceiving policy goals
having been reached. Accordingly, government's incentive multiplier, formulated as
table function, rises at the beginning and then goes down along with the increase in
the number of compliant people. This specific formula makes both loop R1 and R2
switching from a positive to negative loop along with the increasing level of public
participation.
Loop R3 and R4 show that a higher level of public participation can actually
pressure the government to take positive actions including releasing more information
and formulating more policies for the pollution victims residing in the community.
Both loops are positive.
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 7
Government's
+ Incentive Multiplier
* Ratio of
compliance
New Policy Compliant ComPL ion
Policy flow | Responses People . Released | Info flow
f + Ratio of
(BY ca Mnerstanding
People +
understanding related
Policy Response issues R1 Information
Multiplier + te Multiplier
People
+ icipating
related activities
Participation
flow ‘
People's
Ratio of ——™” opinions
Opinions
+
Gov Pressure.
Multiplier
Figure 2 System Dynamics Model Based on Theory
The simulation result of the theory model is shown in figure 3. The number of
people participating related activities goes up dramatically and then keep equilibrium
due to the formulation of government’s incentive multiplier. The system behavior does
correspond to the theory that public participation can be encouraged by the improved
interactions between the government and the public.
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 8
People Participating Related Activities
600
450
300
150
0 75 15 22.5 30
Time (Year)
People participating related activities : BASE
Figure 3 Simulation Result of Theory Model
However, the reality presented at the dioxin pollution site in southern Taiwan
does not fully correspond to the above theory. As stated previously, frontline civil
servants complained that residents’ participation declined after the government started
to respond positively (An-shun Plant Dioxin Research Project Community Meeting
Report, 2008). Why do the residents of polluted community behave differently before
and after the government took positive policy actions? From a system dynamics
perspective, this situation may happen when balancing feedback loops start to
function and offset the impact of the reinforcing feedback loops. What are the
balancing feedback loops? How are they constructed? This study will try to find the
answer through the following research design.
RESEARCH METHOD AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
To identify the change in public participative behavior and the reasons for this change,
a face-to-face interview was employed. The interview questions were developed from
the conceptual framework that included residents’ perception of the pollution, peer
impact, and how residents perceive the impact of participation on government
response. These three aspects can be used to predict the change in behavior intention
(Ajzen, 1991: 181-185; 2005: 132-136).
Ten residents from the polluted communities were selected for a personal
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 9
interview. Five of them are opinion leaders of the community and the other five were
randomly selected from the communities that have resided in the polluted
communities for at least 10 years. Interviews were conducted from August to
September 2008 using open-ended questions.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The analysis of the qualitative interview data shows that the characteristics of the
polluted areas have formed a very strong negative loop in the system and, in the
meanwhile, made the power of the existing positive loop much less than expected by
the theory.
Figure 4 revises Figure 1 by adding two feedback loops to substitute for loop 2
of Figure 1. These two loops were developed after the government set aside NT$ 1.5
billion for compensation. The compensation policy divided residents of the polluted
areas into two groups. One group was qualified to receive more cash benefits (NT$
3,000 per month) because of a higher blood dioxin level compared to the 64pg-TEQ/g
lipid benchmark. The other group of residents can only get a maximum compensation
of NT$ 1,814 per month because their blood dioxin levels are lower than 64pg-TEQ/g
lipid. The first balancing loop (loop 5) shows that for the people who qualified for
higher compensation, their ongoing fight with the government appeared toward the
end and that the problems appeared to be solved temporarily for them. Consequently,
their intention to participate in continuing affairs (e.g., health care, clean-up project,
etc.), which may even be more important than cash benefits, declined. This situation
is caused by the poverty of the polluted areas. For low-income residents in the
polluted areas, getting cash benefits for short-term survival is more important than
developing a clean-up project for long-term community sustainability. According to
the interview data, this study finds that the residents do not believe in the possibility
of pollution cleaning up in the near future. They just do not trust the goverment and
the company that generated the pollution, especially because this company was once
run by the government before it was privatized. It is difficult for the residents to
believe that the government and the company will invest a huge amount of money to
clean up a socially and economically inferior community. Therefore, getting cash
benefits is much more practical for them than fighting for an uncertain future. These
thoughts make the balancing loop even more powerful.
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 10
Perception of
Problem Solve
Satisfaction of
Residents with
igh Benefit ;
pe Residents’ Incentive Information
45) for Participation Released
Trust Toward i
+ mm Government GQ +
Satisfaction o Level of Public u
F es Faicpeign Govemment's Incentive
[+ for Releasjag Information
Policy Response
Smooth Policy
~~? “
Government's %
* Incentive for Solving
Probl hg
—— Pressure on
+ Government
Figure 4. Loops from Interview Data
The second balancing loop (loop 6) illustrates how the residents who did not
qualify for higher cash benefits responded to the government's policy response.
Although these people obtained some compensation, they were not satisfied with the
policy results because they felt unfairly treated. They complained that the
decision-making process of setting the 64pg-TEQ/g lipid compensation benchmark
was not transparent. Their trust toward the government declined accordingly and so
did their participative incentive.
In addition, the low education level of the residents can make loop 1 less
powerful. The demographic data of the polluted communities show that the residents’
education level is much lower than the city average. Although the govemment has
released some information to the public, this professional knowledge cannot be easily
understood by the public. For the people whose education level is low, it is
time-consuming for them to comprehend the professional and technical information.
The incomprehensible information is definitely a high barrier for residents to raise
their participative incentive. In fact, a sizable questionnaire survey conducted by the
author in February and March 2008 has shown that one-fourth of the questionnaire
respondents are illiterate. Therefore, the loop 1 in Figure 1 cannot be as strong as
what the theory expected.
In the interview data, this study also finds that one of the three aspects predicting
people’s behavior intention— peer pressure— is not significant in this case. Although
they know that participation is good for community development, there are always
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw sa
reasons to pull themselves back from participating, for example, work, poor health,
old age, and so forth. People living in the same community share the same
characteristics, thus they will not blame their neighbors for non-participatory
behavior.
A revised system dynamics model based on interview data analysis is shown in
figure 5, a revision of figure 2. We used loop R5 and R6 in substitution for loop R2
and R4 of figure 2. In both loop R5 and R6, the partial government's policy responses
are transformed to be accumulated services for high dioxin level. For people who are
not qualified for these services, an increase in such services for residents with high
blood dioxin level can drive down trust toward the goverment and therefore,
decreases their incentive for further participation. This feedback loop is shown as R5.
For people who are qualified for accumulated services for high dioxin level, they may
consider problem temporarily solved and therefore withdrew from further
participation. Participating public events held by the government is not a usual hobby
for the residents residing remote and socially inferior areas. Beyond everything, there
are various reasons (ex. Poor health, working etc.) that could excuse residents from
participating public events. This feedback system is shown as R6.
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 12
Government's
Incentive Multiplier
* Ratio of
compliance
New Policy Compliant “™P ne ion
Policy flow | Responses Reone : Released _| Info flow
i Ratio of
a mestanding
People é
understanding related
issues R1) _ Information
{ + + Multiplier
People
participating +
related activities
Participation
flow
People's
Ratio of ——” oPinions
Opinions
Gov Pressure
Multiplier
ratio of services
- Satisfaction of Satisfaction of
residents with Low DL residents with High DL
"
fi
Perggived
[Trust indicato Problems
oNvind _—_berception flo
( .
Multiplier of trust Multiplier of perceived
problem solving
Figure 5 System Dynamics Model Based on Interview Data
Figure 6 shows the different system behavior between the theory model and the
revised model. The revised model does show a small overshoot behavior which
correspondent to the reality. Participative behavior of residents was discouraged along
with an increase in government’s policy responses.
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 13
Comparison Between Theory Model and Revised Model
600
4 4 4 4 4 4
450
300
2.
150 2
pa 2
2212-42-44 a a a |
0
0 up) 15 22.5 30
Time (Year)
People participating related activities : BASE 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
People participating related activities : Revised 2 2. 2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 6 System Behavior Comparisons
CONCLUSIONS
This study has found two interesting points that the theory failed to notice
through a system dynamics perspective. First, for each stakeholder, a policy response
from the government is not necessarily positive. When there is a benefit gap among
stakeholders, people who obtain comparatively low benefits will not be satisfied with
the policy. In this case, their participatory intention can decline. Second, the
characteristics of policy stakeholders have a significant impact on their participatory
intention. For residents who can barely meet the subsistence level, their attention will
focus more on cash benefits rather than long-term pollution clean-up. Short-term cash
benefits can easily satisfy them and therefore mute their complaints. For the
government who does not want to pay too much attention to hard work such as
pollution clean-up, indemnity is an easy strategy for suppressing the noise from
polluted communities. However, for a government who wants to cooperate with the
polluted communities for future sustainable development, indemnity should be
carefully delivered. In addition, a lower education level makes it difficult for residents
to participate in a policy process that is filled with professional and inexplicable
knowledge. Therefore, in order to raise the participatory incentive of polluted victims,
the goverment should learn how to translate the scientific phrase of environmental
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 14
pollution issues into an easily understandable language for people to understand.
Although this qualitative study does not employ modeling to examine the
problem, the system dynamics perspective is employed here for three reasons.
Believing in the existence of a balancing feedback loop in the system helps the author
focus on searching for the balancing power in the system. In addition, the system
dynamic perspective helps us understand that the power of the dynamic loop can be
changed over time. It can become less powerful when some triggers reach their limits.
The system dynamics perspective also reminds policy makers to look into the
dynamic system constructed by the interactions between the govemment and the
pollution victims and understand that the system is changing over time. The
government's response can generate unexpected side effects and therefore offset the
positive impact expected by the normative theory.
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 15
REFERENCE
Ajzen, I. 1991. The theory of planned behavior. Organization Behavior and Human
Decision Processes 50: 179-211.
Ajzen, I. 2005. Attitudes, Personality, and Behavior. 2" ed. New York: Open
University Press.
An-shun Plant Dioxin Research Project Community Meeting Report. 2008. 10.31%.
Arnstein, SR. 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. J ournal of American Institute of
Planners 35(4): 216-224.
Chandler, RC, Plano JC. 1988. The Public Administration Dictionary. 2" ed. Santa
Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio.
Chang DL, Chen FQ. 2007. Compensation for dioxin pollution increased to be NTD
3000. Apple Daily 17/4/2007.
http://www.wretch.cc/blog/tepu&article_id=7637260 [Accessed 5 April 2008].
Cheng, JJ. 2008. Review committee rejected CPDC’s clean-up proposal for the
second time. Chong-Hua Daily 13/11/2008.
http://cpdc.recyclesources.com/news.asp [A ccessed 15 November 2008].
China Petrochemical Development Corp. 2007. Year 2006 Annual Report. China
Petrochemical Development Corp: Taipei.
http://www.cpdc.com.tw/upfiles/finan41182596680.pdf [Accessed 25 October
2007]
Daley DM. 2008. Public participation and environmental policy: what factors shape
state agency’s public participation provisions? Review of Policy Research 25(1):
21-35.
DeSario J, Langton S. 1987. Citizen participation and technocracy. In Citizen
Participation in Public decision Making, Desario J, Langton S (eds). New York:
Greenwood Press: 3-17.
Huang HC. 2002. Loosing memory: TAIC An-Shun plant pollution. Taiwan Watch
4(2): 80-87.
Huang HC. 2005. The dawn of justice: history of TAIC. Taiwan Ecology Quarterly 8:
http://ecology.org.tw/publication/issue1.htm [Accessed 1 October 2007].
Konisky DM, Beierle TC. 2001. Innovations in Public Participation and
environmental decision making: examples from the great lakes region. Society and
Natural Resources 14: 815-826.
Kweit MG, Kweit RW. 1987. The politics of policy analysis: the role of citizen
participation in analytic decision making. In Citizen Participation in Public
decision Making, Desario J, Langton S (eds). New York: Greenwood Press: 19-37.
Liu RH. 2005. Milk fish caught from An-Shun plant neighborhood found selling in
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 16
the market. Apple Daily 17/7/2005.
MacFarquhar C. 2006. Letter: TAIC story follow-up. Taipei Times (1/3/2006)
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/03/01/2003295213
[Accessed 5 A pril 2008].
Pierre J, Guy Peters B. 2000. Governance, Politics, and the State. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission. 2006. The history of An-Shun
plant. Taiwan Yearbook 2006.
http://www7.www.gov.tw/EBOOKS/TWANNUAL/show_book.php?path=8_011_
065 [Accessed 15 October 2007].
Rydin Y, Pennington M. 2000. Public participation and local environmental planning:
the collective action problem and the potential of social capital. Local
Environment 5(2): 153-169.
Tainan City Government, Bureau of Social A ffair. http://social.tncg.gov.tw/com.jsp
[Accessed 1 December 2007]
Tainan City Government. 2005. Tainan City Government 2005 Statistics Year Book.
http://www.tncg.gov.tw/warehouse/0708/94totalstat.pdf. [A ccessed 2 March 2008]
Tainan City Government. 2007. CPDC will pay for penalty and provide a plan for
An-Shun pollution site clean-up. Tainan City Government Press Release 3/1/2008.
http://www.tncg.gov.tw/news.asp?SUB 1=H1&SUB2=04&SUB3=15&ID ={68229
610-827E-4FE1-A 875-2E17BC68DB 14} [Accessed 5 A pril 2008].
Tsai WJ. 2005. Fishermen still eat and sell dioxin polluted fish. Liberty Times
16/7/2005. B6. http://food.doh.gov.tw/files/paper/p38.jpg [Accessed 5 April 2008]
United Nations Department of Economic and Social A ffairs. Agenda 21: Chapter 8 -
Integrating environment and development in decision making.
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda2 1/english/agenda21chapter8.ht
m. [Accessed 19 March 2009]
Wang WH. 2005. Who can end the sad song of Luermen? Common Wealth Magazine
328: 226-234.
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 17
Appendix 1 Model Formula
(01) Accumulated Services for High Dioxin Level= INTEG (Service flow,0)
(02) Compliant People=People understanding related issues* Ratio of compliance
(03) FINALTIME =30
(04) Gov Pressure Multiplier = WITH LOOKUP (People's opinions,
([(0,1)-(300,2)],(0,1),(30,1.15),(60,1.29),(90,1.41),(120,1.54),(150,1.63),(180,1.65),(2
10,1.67018),(240,1.68),(270,1.69),(300,1.69) ))
(05) Government's Incentive Multiplier = WITH LOOKUP (Compliant People,
([(0,-1)-(100,1)],(0,0),(10,0.08),(20,0.16),(30,0.25),(40,0.35),(50,0.42),(60,0.32),(70,0
.06),(80,-0.19),(89.5928,-0.43),(100,-0.7) ))
(06) Info flow=New Information Released*Govemment's Incentive Multiplier*Gov
Pressure Multiplier
(07) Information Multiplier = WITH LOOKUP (New Information Released,
([(0,0)-(100,0.8)],(0,0),(10,0.1),(20,0.2),(30,0.3),(40,0.4),(50,0.5),(60,0.56),(70,0.58),(
80,0.6),(90,0.6),(100,0.6) ))
(08) INITIALTIME =0
(09) Multiplier of perceived problem solving = WITH LOOKUP (Perceived Problems
Solving, ([(0,0)-(300,1)],(0,1),(300,0.01) ))
(10) Multiplier of trust indicator = WITH LOOKUP (Trust indicator,
([(0,-0.3)-(1,1)],(0,-0.3),(0.13,0.27),(0.28,0.59),(0.53,0.84),(0.73,0.94),(1,1) ))
(11) New Information Released=INTEG (Info flow, 1)
(12) New Policy Responses= INTEG (Policy flow, 1)
(13) Participation flow=People participating related activities* Information
Multiplier*Multiplier of trust indicator* Multiplier of perceived problem solving
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 18
(14) People participating related activities= INTEG (Participation flow, 100)
(15) People understanding related issues=People participating related activities* Ratio
of understanding
(16) People's opinions=People participating related activities* Ratio of Opinions
(17) Perceived Problems Solving= INTEG (Perception flow, 1)
(18) Perception flow=Perceived Problems Solving* Satisfaction of residents with
High DL
(19) Policy flow=G overnment's Incentive Multiplier*New Policy Responses*Gov
Pressure Multiplier
(20) Ratio of compliance=0.5
(21) Ratio of Opinions=0.5
(22) ratio of services=0.3
(23) Ratio of understanding=0.5
(24) Satisfaction of residents with High DL = WITH LOOKUP (Accumulated
Services for High Dioxin Level,
([(0,0)-(100,1)],(0,0),(10,0.1),(20,0.2),(30,0.3),(40,0.4),(50,0.5),(60,0.6),(70,0.7),(80,0
-8),(90,0.9),(100,1) ))
(25) Satisfaction of residents with Low DL = WITH LOOKUP (Accumulated
Services for High Dioxin Level,
([(0,-1)-(100,0)],(0,0),(10,-0.28),(20,-0.52),(30,-0.73),(40,-0.82),(50,-0.88),(60,-0.91),
(70,-0.94),(80,-0.97),(90,-0.99),(100,-1) ))
(26) SAVEPER =TIME STEP
(27) Service flow=New Policy Responses* ratio of services
(28) TIME STEP =0.125
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw 19
(29) Trust flow=Trust indicator* Satisfaction of residents with Low DL
(30) Trust indicator=INTEG (Trust flow, 1)
* Correspondent Author. E-Mail A ddress: tpinglee@ ccu.edu.tw
20
