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Illustrative report of a Strategy Dynamics analysis of
the Sierra Leone conflict
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Table of Contents
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.
REPORT LIMITATIONS: PLEASE READ FIRST.
Purpose of this APProa@ch ...........ceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaneees
Limited information, ..........cccccccccseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees
Need for involvement of experienced individual:
Human suffering
Quantification and estimation
Speed and effort
INTRODUCTION uv sscssssssensccsessevsccnerssavscnsecssessccssessessccnnerssesnenneessessccsnenss 6
Determining and identifying the desired outcome.............. 6
Resources drive the strategic outcome
Building the Architecture
MAKING PRACTICAL USE OF THE STRATEGY DYNAMICS
ARCHITECTURE... .ccccscessseeeeseeeeeeeeees sonnersensecnnesnssnennesssanes sonnensensecnaenee .13
The role of the UN...
Phase A: Establishing peace and order
Events from 1998 - May 2000.....
Architecture Explanation..........+.
Dynamic InSightt..scscsososesees
Events May 2000-June 2000.
Architecture Explanation
Dynamic Insight...
Phase B: Stab
ng the Environment
Events June 2000- current day... 7
Architecture Explanation 18
Dynamic Insight...co.0.0 vee 19
Phase C: Exit Planning. 19
Sierra Leone Police (SLP) wD
IDPs and Refugees... . 120
Re-integration of ex-combatants and children 21
Other Issues and Challenges oericcinecnrnenrorccocccrcccrnrccrnrcrnnccrnconcnnncnnennndl
SUMMARY osiessesscescescescsasceecesceseencescessnseeessescnscnseesssasesecnseesenascescesseseenaen 2
System Capture and Visualisation ............ceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 23
Scenario and Sensitivity Analysis
Communication and Decision-making e
Monitoring and RESPONnSiVENESS...........::cccceeeeeeeteeeeeeteeeeeeeteeeaes
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Executive Summary
This document will show you how Strategy Dynamics, an approach to strategic
decision making developed by Professor Kim Warren from London Business School
may be used as a tool to assist understanding and communication of strategy and
policy choices in the United Nations’ involvement in resolving country conflicts.
Based upon the longstanding and sound foundations of System Dynamics and the
Resource-based view, Strategy Dynamics provides a framework to understand how a
situation has developed through time and determine the key points at which
strategic decisions, policy interventions, and outside influences cause situations to
develop, both up to now and in the future.
Taking the conflict and subsequent restoration of peace in Sierra Leone as an
example we illustrate the approach by looking at the impact of the deployment of UN
peacekeepers on the progress and eventual ending of the civil war. We also highlight
issues that may still remain as the country pursues social, economic and political
sustainability. In particular we will show:
? How an architecture for the situation can be developed to improve
understanding of the dynamics (how things develop through time) including
both the tangible and intangible factors.
? What insights this provides regarding the drivers of change (such as the
impact of policy interventions) and how, by seeking out the key measures,
the UN might assess its impact on the developing situation.
? How by taking a holistic, fact based approach the UN may improve decision-
making — by which we mean achieving faster progress towards desired
futures, with limited effort -and gain consensus across different stakeholder
groups.
? The other benefits of Strategy Dynamics such as organisational learning and
communication, both within the UN and jointly with other agencies and
stakeholders.
This report is purely illustrative (based upon very limited desk research) and in no
way seeks to demonstrate an in-depth understanding of the complex environment
within Sierra Leone.
We conclude by extracting the potential value that Strategy Dynamics can add ata
strategic, organisational and tactical level for the UN.
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Report Limitations: Please read first.
Purpose of this approach
Strategy Dynamics would be applied for a specific purpose — to help decision-makers
with the complex challenge of working out “what to do, when, and how much to
bring about what desired changes, of what scale, in which indicators of the problem-
situation, over what time-period”. We expect that, for most UN interventions, these
questions will concern decisions regarding the numbers and skills of people to be
deployed, along with other physical resources, such as transportation. We have no
information on how UN teams currently calculate such decisions.
Limited information.
This report offers a limited representation of certain key facts in the Sierra Leone
situation, drawn from very brief desk research carried out by individuals with no
direct experience of the issues involved. Its purpose is purely illustrative, showing
how Strategy Dynamics may be used to represent the time-path behaviour of
complex social systems.
Need for involvement of experienced individuals.
Any practical attempt to apply Strategy Dynamics to a real-world challenge should
be carried out with the active involvement of people with a substantive interest in
solving such challenges, and with deep understanding of the issues involved.
Human suffering
We are most sensitive to the fact that many UN interventions concern situations
involving deep human suffering, often on a massive scale. In order to illustrate how
the Strategy Dynamics approach deals with psychological factors, we have included a
notional factor entitled ‘fear and anger’. This is clearly a gross trivialisation of a
deeply serious and distressing issue. However, since human behaviour in all contexts
is driven by ‘state of mind’, we would have no choice in a real case but to estimate
such factors and judge the rate at which they are causing change in the wider
problem situation. It is also likely that the specification of the UN’s objectives, over
time, would be dominated by examples of such indicators, so again, we cannot avoid
representing them explicitly.
Quantification and estimation
Strategy Dynamics is a totally ‘fact-based’ approach to policy-making, requiring a
willingness to seek and use extensive numerical information of any problem-
situation. We fully appreciate that most of the challenges that the UN tackles are
complex and messy, where reliable information is not available, and data-collection
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
not a high-priority. However, policy-makers in all such cases still have to make
quantified decisions. In doing so, they must implicitly be making assumptions about
the scale and rate-of-change of key factors in the situation. The proposed approach
merely asks participants to make explicit such assumptions, together with their best
understanding of how they inter-relate. This should not only increase the confidence
of key decisions, but also enable those decisions to be tested for possible errors in
the information, so that contingencies can be put in place, should the realities turn
out to differ from what is assumed.
Speed and effort
We appreciate that UN teams often face great urgency in tackling problem situations.
We wish to make it clear that the process of applying the Strategy Dynamics
approach is itself fast and efficient — it does not require lengthy periods of research
and analysis, but builds rapidly on what is known by participants on the ground, at
the time. Clearly, this does not produce a ‘perfect’ answer, any more than other
approaches, but does, in our experience with other contexts, generate greater clarity
and numerical confidence than the qualitative discussions it commonly replaces.
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Introduction
In this section we will describe the process we employed to look at the challenge and
build up an illustrative architecture of the Sierra Leone conflict. We will also highlight
the ‘fundamental’ principles upon which Strategy Dynamics is based as we develop
this architecture.
Determining and identifying the desired outcome
Before a clear or coherent strategy can be developed for any situation, the time-path
of history, and desired outcomes, must be specified. In business contexts these are
usually profit or revenue targets, but in situations that the UN may encounter they
may be stated as the following, for example:
? Reduction and elimination of deaths/injuries from civil conflict.
? Repatriation of displaced communities.
? Reduction of infant mortality rates.
What all performance objectives have in common is that they have to be achieved
over a period of time, and they can all be measured. These simple points are often
overlooked, both in corporate and public policy situations, leading to vague
pronouncements without any means of evaluating success. This is not, in our view,
an adequately professional approach to strategic management (evidenced by the
current global down-turn, which can be traced back to widespread poorly-chosen
strategies during the technology boom of 1995-2000).
For our case, we have taken the reduction of deaths and injuries from the civil
conflict as our (initial) desired outcome and it is displayed graphically on the chart
below. The data is based upon estimates for the number of deaths and amputees at
various stages of the conflict.
As we identify our ‘desired’ outcome, we have also explicitly stated the ‘feared’
outcome - an important discipline that clarifies the plausible range of outcomes,
forming a common basis for policy development. For the Sierra Leone situation, we
have taken a retrospective view of the situation facing the UN peacekeepers as they
took over from the ECOMOG forces in 1998
Figure 1: Illustration of the ‘Performance Objective’ with extrapolations indicating the
‘desired’ and ‘feared’ outcomes following UN intervention in Sierra Leone in 1998.
Deaths and injuries from conflict
per year
° -
toot 1903 1905 1997 1099 DEESILEM 2005
Years
fe Actual(Estimate) * *Dasired
= PFeared
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Resources drive the strategic outcome
The ‘resource-based view’ of Strategy asserts that resources determine the
performance of a system. By implication, you can only impact upon the performance
of the system by changing the levels of the resources within it. To explain, the unit
sales of a product today is equal to the number of customers multiplied by the rate
at which they buy. All else being equal, that was the case yesterday and will be
tomorrow. So, if sales per customer remain unchanged, the only way to increase
sales is to increase the number of customers.
Similarly, rates of injuries in a civil conflict are given by the number of combatants,
multiplied by the rate of “successful” attacks per combatant. If this attack rate
remains unchanged, then tomorrow’s injury rate reflects tomorrow’s combatant
numbers.
If we are to explain outcomes, then, we need a mechanism to explain resource-
levels. Unfortunately, resources have a unique and critical characteristic that
causes them not to be amenable to explanation by statistical correlation
methods - they ‘accumulate and deplete’ over time. This is a ubiquitous and
fundamental process that Strategy Dynamics makes operational.
The analogy of water in a bathtub is a useful illustration. The amount of water in a
bathtub is now, and always will be, precisely equal (to the drop!) to the amount of
water put in less the amount of water that has drained out (or evaporated!). This is
not opinion or theory, but a fundamental law of nature that is the defining
characteristic of any ‘accumulating asset stock’ such as water, cash, customers,
staff, combatants, arms-in-circulation etc.
Reverting to the Sierra Leone example, the resources relevant to the number of
deaths include:
? Combatant soldiers.
? Weapons and ammunition.
? SLArmy troops.
To illustrate the importance of resource accumulation in this context, Figure 2 shows
how an in-flow of 200 new combatants per month build a total population of 24,000
over 10 years. In the subsequent 5 years, an out-flow of 400/month is needed to
deplete this stock back to zero.
Figure 2: Resource accumulation - combatant numbers as the sum of all who ever
joined, minus all who ever left.
Combatants
‘000
new
combatants
per month
combatants
leaving
per month
ay ‘90 95 “00 “05 700
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
There is no mechanism for direct influence on the resource-stock, from
policy or other forces — the only way to change resource-levels is by actions
that accelerate or decelerate in-flows and out-flows. There is thus no means to
affect desired outcomes, such as rates of death and injury, except by altering the
flows of resources that drive these outcomes.
As well as tangible factors, intangible resources are also involved either by
influencing the number of deaths directly (e.g. combatant skill-level) or indirectly
(e.g. the amount of fear and anger within the population and the morale of the
combatant forces or SL Army).
Cash is also an important resource in civil conflict, as it directly funds the activities of
all parties in the system. Whilst we have not addressed the issue of cash
accumulation and depletion here (due to lack of accurate data), it can be treated in
the same way as any other resource.
Building the Architecture
In Figure 3, we have taken a few of the above resources to show how they influence
the performance outcome.
In prose, this diagram explains that the number of deaths/injuries from civil conflict
(committed by combatants) is determined by the combatant activity. The amount of
combatant activity can be directly estimated from the number of combatants, and
the number of weapons they possess.
Figure 3: Core drivers of deaths and injuries
‘000 Adult
combatants
Violent
Deaths and Injures incidentsimonth "
‘ per moni
6 o 90 ‘95 ‘00 ‘05
é f feared
aT Npeitoal Weapons
90 ‘95 ‘00 ‘05 \___\
*90 ‘95 ‘00 ‘05
We are therefore principally concerned to explain and influence the rates of
accumulation and depletion for these two critical resources (Figure 4).
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Figure 4: Focus on in-flows and out-flows to the stocks of combatants and weapons
New adult
combatants
*000/month
‘000 Adult
combatants
90 ‘95
combatants
removed or weapons lost or
killed given up
000/month ‘000/month
‘90 ‘95 ‘00 ‘05 . f) preferred
‘ fy
ss! feared
Figures 3 and 4 already expose the complexity of the questions facing any group
attempting to bring about change. With limited resources, such participants face the
challenge of working how many people and other resources, of what types, they
need, how to allocate them to which tasks, and how those allocations need to change
through time. Figures 3 and 4 alone imply at least 5 such alternatives:
? deterring violent incidents
? deterring or otherwise slowing the rate at which new combatants join up
? enabling and encouraging existing combatants to leave
? acting to slow and prevent the arrival of new weaponry
?. finding and enabling the removal of weapons from the situation
These are critical choices that have to be made, and revised through time - examples
of the generic strategic decision-making challenge ... “what to do, when, and how
much to bring about what desired changes, of what scale, in which indicators of the
problem-situation, over what time-period”. These are, unavoidably, quantitative
decisions, that must reflect underlying assumptions of decision-makers about how
much difference any particular scale of a specific activity will make to any one of
these phenomena.
We have no information on how UN teams currently make such choices on initial
engagement with a problem situation, nor on how those choices are revised as the
situation changes.
Civilian deaths and injuries increase the population’s fear and anger (Figure 5). If
violence were to cease, these feelings would gradually drain away, but so long as it
continues, fear and anger continues to be ‘topped up’.
We are most sensitive to the charge that this representation trivialises what is, in
reality, appalling human suffering on a massive scale. However, since such factors
are hugely powerful drivers of behaviour amongst those caught up in the situation,
there is no choice but to estimate their scale, and their influence on important
changes in the problem situation. By excluding any attempt to estimate the scale
and extent of suffering (treating it instead as only a qualitative outcome we wish to
see reduced), we will introduce gross errors into the analysis and resulting decisions.
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Figure 5: Deaths and injuries build up fear and anger
Anger and fear
rise in anger and
1.0 fear per month
ie Deaths and injuries
*000 per month
/ feared
;
4
‘
anger and fear “preferred
forgotten/month
‘90 ‘95 ‘00 ‘05
This fear and anger was perhaps crucial in driving a faster rate of individuals joining
the rebel cause. — Figure 6. (‘Faster rate’ is a crucial phrase - fear is thought to drive
people to move from one state, ‘civilian’, to another, ‘combatant’ ... it does not imply
that the stock of combatant numbers ‘correlates with’ the level of fear). This
completes the central cycle of violence. Fear for safety leads people to “reluctantly”
join the combatants. This fear and anger also drives displacement of the settled
population, either internally or refugees - not shown here.
Figure 6: Fear and anger drive increases in combatant numbers
New adult
Anger and fear Sggopacns
rise in anger and
1.0 "fear'per month
‘000 Adult
combatants
‘90 ‘95 “00 ‘05 eae Violent
Deaths and injuries incidentsimonth
per month
ys
. / om
i feared 4 “90 95 ‘00 ‘05
‘.
2 preferred
“90 ‘95 ‘00 “05
Deaths also lead to the displacement of adults and children, who fall prey to the
combatant ‘recruiters’. We understand that up to 30% of the combatants were child
soldiers. The process of ‘recruitment’ and subsequent ‘development’ of these adults
and children is shown in Figure 7. Note again the precise meaning of the causal
connections (curved arrows) i.e. the rate at which child combatants are recruited is
strongly determined by the number of adult combatants who are in place at any
moment.
RT IS PURE!
ON A LIMITED R
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Figure 7: Adding recruitment and development of adults and children to combatant
forces
beter
new child col lants
combatants} ‘000/month
“000/month
‘000 Child yy ‘000 Adult ,
combatants, new adult combatants [,
Ee. combatants
‘000/month
*90 ‘95 ‘00 90 ‘95 ‘00
In our discussion thus far we have only discussed the resources driving increased
deaths and injuries, but clearly there are other resources acting to reduce this, such
as the SL Government forces that are trying to maintain order. Hence we can re-
draw.
Figure 8 brings together the earlier elements, and includes this additional important
resource of SL Government forces, to portray an integrated architecture that
constitutes the civil conflict system itself. This architecture connects the resource-
levels to the performance outcome, and the interdependence that drives the
accumulations and depletions of these resources.
Figure 8: Core architecture of the Sierra Leone civil conflict
‘000 Adult
combatants
Nise in
1.0 “tear
Sierra Leone
sttorces twea forces “000
and traned:
ve
\wifeared
THIS REPORT IS PURELY ILLUSTRATIVE, SHOWING HOW STRATGEY DYNAMICS MAY BE USED. IT IS
BASED ON A LIMITED REPRESENTATION OF CERTAIN KEY FACTS IN THE SIERRA LEONE SITUATION
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CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
By identifying distinct states for each resource, Strategy Dynamics captures the
development path for each component in the system - combatants, civilians etc. This
provides a deeper understanding of how the system’s behaviour changes over time
and the impact that alternative interventions may have on its evolution. It should
also be clear, as signalled in the box on page 7, that decisions on the scale,
allocation and timing of any intervention in such a complex and interdependent
system is far from trivial.
? human intuition is ill-equipped to estimate how isolated resources respond to
rates of change (e.g. if the weapon-increase rate were to halve, what stock of
weapons would be present at a defined time in the future)
? the interdependencies make estimation challenging (e.g. if SL forces were to
double in number, and numbers of weapons were to be halved, by how much
would the rate of violent activity be expected to change)
? changes will continually be taking place to the range of factors involved, with
new issues rising in influence as others fall in importance
? the variety of individuals involved in decision-making process is likely to hold
different mental models regarding which of these multifarious factors are
most relevant, and how they interact.
Under such circumstances, decision-making based on qualitative debate is unlikely to
be error-free. Experience in corporate strategy-making (where similar considerations
apply, though rarely with such complexity), has been somewhat shocking - decisions
are frequently in error by large factors, sometimes orders-of-magnitude.
Our vision is that a situation architecture such as this could be “on your wall”,
starting from the early stages of any engagement, so that you may explore
questions such as the size and make-up of likely UN forces, the tasks they would be
allocated and the conditions under which, and by when, it would be “possible” to exit
the situation.
In the next section, we explore how this architecture might be used, and the
additional insights and answers strategy dynamics might provide.
A note on data and modelling
Naturally, in any situation as complex, messy and subtle as a civil conflict, data is most unlikely to be
accurate on many factors, or even available. This is not unusual, even in apparently clear corporate cases.
However, the problem does not destroy the value of a clear architecture.
First, the diagram clarifies how the various agencies involved in the situation perceive it to operate - any
alternative understandings can be made explicit, shared, and their implications explored. Secondly,
decisions are being made in any case —- presumably on the basis of some implicit assumptions regarding
likely consequences. All we are doing is providing a crystal-clear exposition of these beliefs by
participants. This not only offers a means of assessing the advisability of their choices, but also provides a
living scorecard that can incorporate emerging intelligence and cumulatively improve insight.
Note, too, that our emphasis with policy-makers is on helping them construct, a diagrammatic, yet fact-
based (as far as possible), ‘model’ of their situation. This alone often enables confident, agreed policy
choices to be made. However, it is possible, and often highly desirable, to test options and validate these
choices by building and exploring a dynamic mathematical model of the system architecture. Professional
software tools exist to accomplish this purpose. However, many modelling efforts go badly wrong, and we
strongly urge that policy-makers stay in control of the quantified, diagrammatic architecture.
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CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Making practical use of the Strategy Dynamics
architecture
So far we have shown how a challenge can be represented and understood with the
Strategy Dynamics framework. However the method's true value arises from its use
to make, monitor and continually adjust strategic decisions - ‘what to do, when and
how much, with what likely impact on desired outcomes over time’.
The role of the UN
From our initial understanding of the role of the UN in situations such as Sierra
Leone, we have identified some broad phases through which a typical engagement
might pass (this is by no means exhaustive and we use it purely to illustrate our
approach).
We have used the following criteria to characterise each phase:
1) UN's strategic intent
2) Performance Objective
3) Managerial and tactical processes being deployed
Table 1: The main phases of UN involvement:
Phase Strategic Intent Objective Process/ Tactics
A Establish peace and Reduce and Assess need for
order eliminate civilian peacekeeping troops and
casualties choose deployment options
B Stabilise the Confiscate weapons Monitor and manage the
economic and and establish situation to allow
political democracy diplomatic efforts to prevail
environment
iS Exit the situation, Restore civilian Train, empower and
leaving a confidence in support local agencies to
sustainable democratic authority maintain stability
environment and governance
Alongside these phases there are certain activities the UN peacekeepers can perform
and one of the major challenges facing the UN strategists is just how to deploy often
limited resources across these tasks. A selection of these tasks have been detailed in
the table below and we have looked at the consequence of successfully undertaking
the task on key resources in the system and also a measure that may be used to
assess the success or otherwise of each task.
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CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Table 2: Selection of alternative activities for UN peacekeepers
Peacekeeper Task Resource Impact Measure
Collect weapons Reduce the number of ‘weapons confiscated per
weapons available to month’
combatant forces
Deter violent events Reduce increase in fear ‘violent incidents per
and anger month’
Disarm and rehabilitate Reduce number of ‘combatant rehabilitated
combatants (engage in combatants so capacity per month’
combat where necessary) to act reduced
Round up and safe- Reduce ‘recruitment’ pool ‘number of displaced
house displaced children for combatants and so children taken into
cut rate of accumulation protection per month’
of child combatants
Train SL Army and Police Improve skill-level of SL ‘number of SL army and
recruits forces (not shown in Fig. _ police trainees graduating
8), reducing rate of per month’
violent incidents
Let us now look at each phase identified in Table 1, the tasks identified in Table 2
and how these now fit together to explain the Sierra Leone case and how extra
insights are gained from applying strategy dynamics.
Phase A: Establishing peace and order
Events from 1998 - May 2000
In the Sierra Leone situation the UN peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) was deployed in
1998 after ECOMOG had forcibly restored President Kabbah to power. UNAMSIL
maintained order around the capital Freetown, but combatant fighting continued in
other parts of the country. Diplomatic efforts to include the RUF (main combatant
force) in a democratic government failed, culminating in a shoot out with the UN and
the capture of up to 500 UN soldiers’.
Architecture Explanation
Our architecture suggests how this sequence of events might be explained
dynamically. The UNAMSIL enters an environment where there are already a large
number of combatants, continuing to fight (Figure 3) and recruit new soldiers (Figure
7). The task for the UNAMSIL is to disarm the combatants and encourage their
return to civilian life, whilst diplomacy takes its course. However they continue to be
occupied in just maintaining order (particularly around Freetown), due to the cycle of
fear and anger (Figure 6). Hence little impact is made on the depletion of
+ 2002 Country Analysis: Sierra Leone, World Markets Research Centre 29 Oct 2002
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CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
combatants or weapons (Figure 4) - i.e. the rate of weapons being confiscated and
rate of combatants returning to civilian lives. Worse still, the continued fighting
maintains the mechanisms that are accumulating these resources (notably child-
kidnapping). When the diplomatic efforts fail and nothing has been done to reduce
fear and anger, the combatants have the capacity, armoury and motivation to re-
ignite conflict, possibly more intensively than when the UNAMSIL arrived.
Dynamic Insight
The architecture and associated data provokes the following questions
1) Were there sufficient numbers of peacekeepers deployed initially to achieve
the desired objectives (as well as protect Freetown)?
2) How were they deployed and why were they not effective?
3) What skills were required by the UN peacekeepers and did they possess them
(previous experience of similar encounters for example)?
Whatever the answers here, we do know that the initial impact on the combatant
forces was inadequate.
Events May 2000-June 2000
In May 2000, around 800 highly skilled British paratroops arrived, to ostensibly
remove UK and other Western nationals. This initiative was provoked by the RUF
taking several hundred people hostage, including UN troops and foreigners. The
British Paratroops appear not to have been acting under a UN mandate and hence
may have been less constrained in their ability to use force against the combatants.
Their actions - supporting “aggressive” patrols in conflict areas, plus training of other
forces, improved the morale of the UN/Government forces and led to a sudden
retreat by the RUF - in our language, a rapid depletion of these problematic
resources, and a substantial choking-off of their accumulation.
Architecture Explanation
We see a massive impact on the depletion of the combatant forces and armoury
following the introduction of a relatively small but highly skilled group of British
paratroops. The ‘skills’ of the UN force is an example of a further category of
resource, known as an ‘attribute’, since it is associated with the tangible resource-
stock of UN peacekeepers (Figure 9).
Figure 10 widens the perspective - the increasingly skilled UN/Government forces are
massively more effective at deterring violence, defeating combatants, confiscating
weapons and so cutting civilian deaths. This reduces the fear and anger within the
society and reduces the inflow of new combatants to continue future violence.
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CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Figure 9: Number and skill of UN peace-keepers, boosted by arrival of highly skilled
paratroops
Peace-keeping
forces ‘000
forces added i
orgas addec forces withdrawn
Average skill of
os peace-keepers
—_
8 ‘00 02 ,04
skills added
*000/month
Average skill
Ke leavers
Average skill of
4 oe ‘arrivals
tL Total training rate
6 ‘000 hoursimonth
Figure 10: Direct and consequential impact of UN forces and paratroops on Sierra
Leone forces, depletion of combatants and weapons, and on rates of violence
000 Adult br
combatants combatants Perry
Anger and fear
Sierra Leone
forces ‘000
forces addea Peace-ke
owaharmwm = forces
THIS REPORT IS PURELY ILLUSTRATIVE, SHOWING HOW STRATGEY DYNAMICS MAY BE USED. IT IS
BASED ON A LIMITED REPRESENTATION OF CERTAIN KEY FACTS IN THE SIERRA LEONE SITUATION
16
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Dynamic Insight
We can now learn from the scenario by asking and answering the following questions
dynamically
? What particular skills or other resources did the British Paratroops possess
that the existing UNAMSIL force didn’t?
? What exact actions did the British paratroops take, where did they impact on
the system and why did these influence the situation so greatly?
? How might an earlier deployment of highly skilled forces have impacted on
the initial diplomatic process?
Phase B: Stabilising the Environment
Events June 2000- current day
Once significant inroads were made into the RUF retreat, the British paratroops left,
but set up Operation Basilica- a contingent of army training officers designated with
the task of training 1000 new and re-recruited troops for the Sierra Leone
Government Army. Also since May 2001, almost 12,000 SL troops have received
some form of military training from the British"
In November 2000, UNAMSIL negotiated a disarmament programme with all parties
and this was declared complete with over 46,000 combatants handing over their
weapons, almost double the number originally thought (Figure 11).
Figure 11: UN forces supervise end to hostilities, and control related resource-flows
Peace-keeping
forces ‘000 pater
non
SL police and
army ‘000
SL forces hired
ang trained
ied
ho
“02 04
“00
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Figure 11 once again exposes the challenging complexity of decisions facing any
attempt to bring about a speedy resolution of the problem situation. We have no
information on how UN staff, in conjunction with other agencies, attempt to answer
the question of “what to do, when, and how much to bring about what desired
changes, of what scale, in which indicators of the problem-situation, over what time-
period”. However, every link in Figure 11 implies an assumed allocation of a certain
number and skill-set of people, and other resources, to bring about an assumed rate
of change to each of the factors depicted. We are not aware of any alternative means
for making such choices that is likely to be superior to the process outlined here.
A rehabilitation programme for former fighters supported the disarmament
(vocational training for adults and schooling of children). Since September 2002 the
UNHCR has facilitated the return of over 90,000 Sierra Leonian refugees providing
them with two months’ food rations and household items. Another estimated 70,000
have returned of their own accord. Some 165,000 refugees still remain in the
region.* (Figure 12)
Figure 12: UNHCR and other agencies act to rehabilitate and resettle civilians
Other UN resources
04 ete and other agencies
retumin: other resources
a2 ‘000/month added or withdrawn
per month
ri
r
:
1
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4 © 02 "04
‘000/month
‘000 in
rehabilitation
‘00 ‘02 ‘04
Architecture Explanation
We can see how the joint impact of the disarmament programme and rehabilitation
process depleted the combatant and weapons resources in the system. Operation
Basilica is both building the skills of the SL Government Army and increasing the
confidence in them by the civilians. Consequently, the prevalence of conflict caused
by these forces themselves (which was a crucial feature in escalating the original
fear and anger that drove combatant recruitment) is being held down.
Looking at the reintroduction of former combatant soldiers, both children and adults,
into society, the desired outcome is for them to be rehabilitated, retrained and
absorbed as gainfully employed contributors to the economy. The fear is that they
? UNICEF Freetown Briefing Kit on Sierra Leone May 2002
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
will not get employment, leading to a rise in discontentment, and potentially causing
a new in-flow to the combatant forces, similar to the circumstances that led to their
original formation. The re-absorption of returning refugees and other displaced
persons would appear to increase this risk, implying that this rate too should be
controlled.
The UN force is still highly instrumental in maintaining peace and democracy. There
is still believed to be a proliferation of weaponry in the country, posing a continual
threat to stability.
Dynamic Insight
Based upon our architecture, we would seek information to assess the impact of the
following decisions:
? Has the disarmament programme been so successful that it can be termed as
‘completed’?
? Are 12000 trained SL troops enough to hold down violence and restore faith
in the SL security forces?
? The speed of repatriation of the existing refugees and in what form aid is
being provided to them?
? With ‘dormant’ resources in the system, such as weapons and ammunition,
what might trigger a return to civil war and how can this be avoided/risk
minimised?
Phase C: Exit Planning
Clearly the situation is too volatile for the UN to leave in the near future. In
September 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended the 17,000
UNAMSIL troops be reduced to 5,000 by late 2004 and later to 2,000 ‘depending on
need’. This process has already begun with approximately 4,500 troops expected to
leave by June 2003.
Data provided by the Sierra Leone Government in their National Recovery Strategy
indicates the progress already made and the key targets they have set themselves
for 2003. We have selected a few, which we believe have a key influence over the
ultimate success of the UN operation in Sierra Leone.
Sierra Leone Police (SLP)
By 2002, the force stood at 6,500 officers (700 new officers recruited in 2001-2002).
All these having been trained, equipped and deployed?. The objective is to have
7,500 officers by end of 2003 and ultimately restore the force to pre-war level of
9,500 in 2005.
Their capacity to perform their roles is constrained however as most of the Police
Stations and a majority of the Prisons were destroyed or severely damaged during
the conflict. (This is clearly another resource and we would subsequently add this to
a detailed model on the role of the Police).
3 Sierra Leone Government: National Recovery Strategy 2002-2003
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CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
We have been unable to find any information on the size and structure of the Sierra
Leone Army, but we do know that some 12,000 have received British sponsored
training". There is also a target to sensitise “at least” 1000 police/ military/prison
staff in civic /human rights.
Architecture Explanation
Using this data, we have drilled down into the dynamics of the build in SLP alongside
the depletion of UN forces to indicate how the UN might check that they are aligned
and whether there may be risks that have not been identified.
The resulting, speculative depiction of the exit path for the UN is shown in Figure 13.
This combines the recent progress in disarmament and resettlement (Figures 11 and
12), and adds both a projection for those time-lines and the involvement of the SL
police and army.
Figure 13: Exit scenario for UN forces and other agencies
Other UN resources
displaced = P x
oa pimshy and other agencies
ekeurhin :
=e :ooTmenene
Peace-keeping
forces ‘000
SL police and
army ‘000
St forces hired
and trained
*Doalgoneh
IDPs and Refugees
The Government Resettlement Programme has almost completed the resettlement of
all 206,000 registered IDPs and so far 97,000 refugees. They have a target of
resettling 50,000 further refugees in 2003. It has been difficult to get exact data on
the total number of IDPs and refugees displaced during the war but estimates state
that a further 78,000 refugees have returned spontaneously and around 137,000 are
still seeking asylum in the Sub region, giving a total of around 520,000 (between 10-
15% of the population). Each is given two months’ food rations, sheeting for shelter
and household items.
PORT IS PURELY ILLUSTRATIV
) ON A LIMITED REPRESENTATI
WING HOW STRATGEY DYNAMICS MA
IF CERTAIN KEY FACTS IN THE SIERRA LI
20
IT IS.
UATION
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Architecture Explanation
Adding this information into our architecture, shows us that care must be taken in
two areas, firstly the rapid repatriation may lead to a further drain on the country’s
financial resources impacting upon its hopes of revitalising the economy. Hence
continued financial support from the UN will be required. Secondly, the “resentment”
against the ex-combatants that they will harbour as those most affected by the war
may further hinder the ex-combatant rehabilitation process. This would be described
as another resource termed “Resentment of ex-combatants” (we have not included a
model of this for simplicity).
Re-integration of ex-combatants and children
The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration was
founded in 1998 and so far 72,490 ex-combatants have registered with them. Of this
number, 69,463 were discharged and deemed eligible to receive reintegration
support (remained joined army reintegration programme or self reintegrated).
56,351 registered for reintegration and 32,472 have since been provided with
reintegration opportunities. The target is to have the remaining caseload of 23,879
cleared in 2003.
A further 6,845 child combatants were released and 5,037 registered for support. A
further 2,097 children were also registered as separated. So far a total of 6,869 have
been successfully reunited with their families.
Architecture Explanation
The clear danger the architecture helps us understand is the risk that if the ex-
combatants are not successfully integrated there is a higher likelihood for them to
return to their former ways as a means of surviving (i.e. they may feel life as a rebel
combatant was better). The data we have here only relates to those combatants who
have registered for rehabilitation and there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that
there are a number of combatants who have just moved across the border to fight in
other countries such as Liberia. Hence, we may never actually reduce the number of
combatants in the system to zero.
Whilst the relative numbers of child combatants and displaced children appears small
and the reunification process successful, their reintegration will also be important as
failure here will provide a fertile recruitment ground in any future unrest.
Other Issues and Challenges
We are unaware of any further targets set on weapons confiscation in Sierra Leone.
Whilst complete eradication is impossible, unless efforts are made to curb future
proliferation, it may just be a matter of time before the powder keg is relit. What
continued strategies are being deployed to reduce the entry of ‘new’ weapons into
Sierra Leone, as well as confiscate existing ones? Of the ‘confiscated’ weapons what
chance is there that they might re-enter the system (who has them and how secure
are they?).
It is also worth mentioning that we need to look beyond the brief architecture here
and ask questions such as
? Where are the funds that drive weapons purchase/combatant training
originating and how can this source be drained?
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CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
? Where are the combatants who have not returned/given up?
? What is the ‘forgiveness’ rate for the ex-combatants to return to full social
acceptance? (We can make estimates on this from similar conflict situations)
To look at these in detail we do not need to re-create an entirely new architecture.
Just drill down into the main areas where these issues impact and input the data
available. With the overall system architecture as a guide, several different
organisations and functions can operate independently but still understand how their
activities influence the overall situation.
CSD Ltd-UN: Sierra Leone Report
Summary
We have shown an illustration of how Strategy Dynamics can be used to look at a
developing situation and to structure data gathering to enable greater fact-based
decision-making. Below we have highlighted the major benefits the approach can
provide if implemented in live situations.
System Capture and Visualisation
By building a resource architecture, we not only help gain an overall
understanding of the different resources within the situation but also how they
interact over time. Unlike many approaches however the architecture is flexible and
allows for adaptation and extension as the dynamics of the situation change.
Example: In the Sierra Leone example, we were able to first build the architecture
for how the conflict was developing and then adapt this to show the shift in focus as
we moved to re-establishing peaceful society.
Strategy Dynamics seeks to and achieves the explicit quantified representation
of intangibles and their often-significant impact on the tangibles.
Example: We see clearly how the drop in combatant confidence after the high
profile success of the British Paratroops accelerated the decline in combatant
numbers and consequently their activity.
Scenario and Sensitivity Analysis
By fostering a greater understanding of where policy decisions or uncontrollable
external influences will impact (the key flow rates) we can ‘simulate’ the impact
of various alternative occurrences into the future. The ease with which an
increase or decrease of the accumulation of a resource can be related to all parts of
the architecture enables decision makers not only test scenarios and sensitivity but
also conduct ‘pilot’ tests to check on strategies before blanket roll-out. These are
important as they may determine the ‘minimum’ resource required to make the
desired impact. We find that strategies often fail to deliver because the initial
resources allocated to achieving the objectives are woefully short. Spreading
resources thinly over several engagements may actually lead to not achieving
success in any, whilst selective placements may have been more productive.
Example: We could adjust the rates at which refugees return to Sierra Leone to
identify what is a sustainable rate and what might be the consequences of
undertaking sudden mass repatriation. This would highlight the key measures (for
example unemployment rate or number of people below the poverty line) that would
need to be closely watched.
Communication and Decision-making
Once created at a ‘high level’, pieces of the architecture can be drilled into by
specialists to help develop tactical plans on the ground. This is further enhanced by
the ‘building block’ construction of the architecture, which enables it to be easily
communicated and understood.
Example: By looking at the development chain of combatants from displaced
children through to ex-combatants in rehabilitation we can explain to both the child
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care agencies and the rehabilitation counsellors the role they play and its impact on
the entire situation.
Also by displaying the data graphically and with a purpose, it enhances the
efforts made in collection of data across the architecture, further improving decision-
making.
Strategy Dynamics also creates a framework upon which various parts of an
organisation and other external stakeholders can relate to each other more
effectively. In the UN for example, it would allow the Econometricians to show the
relationships and value of data, the implementers in the field to see the value of
their role and use ‘intuition’ to improve the accuracy of ‘estimated data’ and finally
the Senior Policy makers to support their strategies with robust factual justification.
The learning and knowledge transfer benefits of Strategy Dynamics cannot be
underestimated. By quantifying the ‘gut feel’ of experienced professionals, new
recruits can benefit from both explicit and tacit skills development. Also, whilst
each situation would require its own unique architecture, common structures from
other conflicts can be added to speed the analysis process.
Example: The combatant development chain is based upon that employed by many
professional services firms when analysing the recruitment and promotion policies for
their staff.
Monitoring and Responsiveness
Once decisions have been made, the architecture helps to pinpoint what factors need
to be measured to assess whether the desired impact is being made. The graphical
and holistic nature of data representation enables you to trace around the system
the counter intuitive outcomes as well as the time lags between action and
performance outcomes.
Example: The intangible resource of ex-combatant resentment may increase to
dangerous levels if the repatriation of displaced persons is undertaken too quickly.
The resentment levels can be measured by “number of attacks on ex-combatants”
for example and we also need to track displaced people from a state of dependency
to self-sufficiency.
Strategy has to change and evolve over time to deal with unexpected events and
changing objectives. By providing the ability to explain extraordinary events by their
impact on the system, strategy dynamics enables policies to be developed quickly
and confidently. As each architecture includes all the key resources in the system,
any change in objective can not only be quantified but also the key drivers that
effect it can be understood rapidly
Example: The sudden depletion of combatants and restoration of democracy
significantly changed the UN role to that of restoring communities and training the
SLP. New strategic choices and measures now have to be put in place to enable the
UN meet its exit objectives.
This completes our report showing the illustrative application of strategy dynamics to
the Sierra Leone conflict.
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