System-Dynamical A nalysis
of Mutability, Rational and Emotional Commitment
for Explaining Failure to C hange in Organizations
Nicole Zimmermann
Mannheim University
Industrieseminar
Schloss, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
phone: +49 621 181-15 78
e-mail: zimmermann.nicole[at]gmail.com
Abstract: There exists a large body of literature on organizational change and on the puz-
zling effect of change failure. This paper adds the often missing element of combining sev-
eral reasons for change inefficacy. These reasons for failure to change are a low systemic
mutability (inertia), as well as insufficient political, rational, and emotional commitment
(resistance). The provision with resources, incentives, participation and discourse are then
presented as solutions to the problem, each addressing a different aspect in relieving resis-
tance and enhancing mutability and commitment.
Key words organizational change, failure to change, inertia, mutability, political rational
and emotional resistance, commitment, participation, emotion
Introduction
Organizations encounter continuous transformations and developments in their environ-
ment, be it initiated by competitors, the judicial system, or else. OECD’s Program for Inter-
national Students Assessment (PISA) can serve as an example for triggering such transfor-
mations. The program tries to make comparable students’ education across countries. The
aim is to show intemational gaps which will then in many countries make necessary ad-
justments of the educational system. These changes will have to be implemented and man-
aged by the respective organizations and their people. In completely different sectors
changes in organizations’ environments equally occur. In 1995, for example, the German
postal services were privatized. This made changes necessary, and environmental transfor-
mation goes on till today. The company faces the extinction of the monopoly on letter ser-
vices in the end of 2007 and has to react to the changes in its surrounding system.
Many organizational transformations are considered to be failures, and researchers es-
timate their number to approximately 40% (P. Scott-Morgan 1994). Numbers of up to 70%
exist (M. Beer und N. Nohria 2000). In other cases organizations successfully implement
change and consider this as one of their core capabilities. If they strive for a fit with their
surroundings and want to keep pace with other organizations acting in the same environ-
ment, they are forced to adapt in an active way. Leveling off at a status once achieved does
not create the stable situation because due to the loss of adjustment to the environment, an
organization’s fit deteriorates. Organizations wanting to keep or even improve their posi-
tioning are therefore forced to turn away from the hitherto existing and to undergo change.
Sufficient knowledge about change and about its constituents is then necessary for change
Management.
In organization theory, organizational change and particularly planned change be-
came a topic of discussion in the 1940s. Researchers studied the diffusion of technical in-
novations and they noticed and addressed a central problem: adoption (C. A. Parker 1980).
Kurt Lewin (1951) introduced his famous ideas of unfreezing—movement— refreezing
because he remarked the ephemerality of change, i.e. the failure to sustain the higher level
of performance that was intended. At the same time as Lewin published his ideas, Zander
(1950) as well as Coch and French (1948) attended to a crucial implementation problem,
namely employee resistance to change. The latter carried out a study and described resis-
tance as an employee behavior and emotion being apparent through performance reductions
and frustration (L. Coch und J. R. P. French, Jr. 1948). Participation in the change process
was the authors’ primary solution to this problem. Today the study is questioned for statis-
tical accuracy and validity (C. S. Bartlem und E. A. Locke 1981), but during that time it
was one of the most influential writings on organizational change. Zander then distin-
guished between resistance itself and its underlying protective causes. He defined resistance
as a "behavior which is intended to protect an individual from the effects of real or imag-
ined change" (A. Zander 1950, p. 9). He also expresses the difficulty of giving up an estab-
lished behavior.
Although adoption, resistance, and emotions have been addressed early, the imple-
mentation problem still exists today. Repenning (2002) remarks that the problem does not
stem from any inefficiencies of the innovation itself but rather from the fact that changes
are often not adequately implemented. One reason for the improvement problem is organ-
izational inertia which requires a sound and long-term implementation program. Stanley et
al. (2005) as well as Oreg (2006) add that employees of organizations resisting change still
pose a major problem. Their resistance bases on rational factors when employees do not
understand the change message or if their incentive system countervails the abandonment
of habitual behavior. Additionally, affective elements like uncertainties and fear resulting
from new demands cause resistance to change.
There already exists a body of literature on organizational change, on inertia, resis-
tance and on the psychological factors determining motivation. Little research has been
done, though, on linking these determinants of change efficacy. In order to capture the
complexity of failure to change, modeling will be used, and the different determinants will
be linked in a single model which captures their interdependence. Within modeling, system
dynamics is a highly helpful method because it helps understand the logic of the system and
of the situation (J. W. Forrester 1994, p. 252). It accounts for non-linear developments,
feedback, and dynamic processes, and by providing understanding of the change situation it
also provides better possibilities of action and reaction. The dynamic interplay of organiza-
tional inertia, political, rational, and emotional resistance and commitment will be consid-
ered in this paper. Starting from a base model of performance, pressure, and change that
can be seen in Figure 1, the base will then step by step be extended by representations of
systemic inertia as well as the different forms of commitment and resistance.
systemic
mutability
Processes P *
Undergoing
Change
LS ae
Adequate
Pressure Change [Processes
performance4,
Figure 1: Change (CLD)
Base model
The base model which is presented in Figure 2 very roughly follows earlier system dynam-
ics models of organizational change. Sastry (1997) and Pala and Vennix (2003; 2001) al-
ready formalized similar relationships of the adequacy of processes, performance, and
change. The adequacy of processes is a measure for the processes’ degree of implementa-
tion and up-to-datedness. Weick and Quinn (1999, p. 381) note that “change starts with
failures to adapt".Performance pressures derive from competitive pressures (M. L.
Tushman und E. Romanelli 1985). This is why adequacy of strategic orientation of proc-
esses is a central variable which drives performance, which then determines pressure to
change. It is more realistic that the pressure itself is determined not only by performance
but also directly by appropriateness. This means that if the processes are appropriate, pres-
sure to change does not come up. Influenced by the strength of a general “pressure by man-
agement” management's pressure to change is then transformed to a perceived pressure to
change by employees. This is a measure for the perceived urgency and need to change the
organization's processes. After a month-long delay, this pressure brings about a decision to
actually change certain processes. This is represented by the pressure determining the deci-
sion rate to initiate change and the processes expecting change. With several delays, the
processes expecting change are then transformed into processes undergoing change and
into implemented and adequate processes.
It is an important facet of this model that change is not implemented directly. There is
ample literature on change initiatives which take place but fail to reach an impact (see Gil-
bert 2005; M. Beer und N. Nohria 2000; C. Gilbert 2005; P. Scott-Morgan 1994). In order
to account for this effect in the model, changes are started proportionally to the system’s
mutability. Processes undergoing change are then implemented proportionally to the degree
that there exists a commitment. Sustainably implemented and adequate processes then im-
prove the adequacy of strategic orientation of processes again.’
Additionally, planning is introduced in order to account for the delays which occur between the recognition
of pressure to change until the processes’ implementation. Here, pressure to change, and processes expect-
systemic mutability <commitment>
+
change rate (start)
Processes Processes
Expecting Undergoing
Change 7 Change
DURATION
CHANGE
change
cessation rate
decision rate to ||, DURATION ;
initiate change DECISION
we DURATION implementation
RAMP IMPLEMENTATION rate
ENVIRONMENT
DURATION PULSE
PRESSURE ENVIRONMENT. DURATION INNOVATION
CHANGE & POBSOLESCENCE INTENTION
environmental +
transformations
Pevd ‘Aohaiy Implemented
ies) Pressure to Demanding and Adequate
pressure Ghange Change obsoleszence rate Processes
change rate g 7
fe EFFECT EXPERIENCE
ON PERFORMANCE
ere besser Change y adequacy of
pie nedatnance: strategic orientation* +
PRESSURE BY - ol pmcesses
MANAGEMENT o
DESIRED <Total Experience> TOTAL
PERFORMANCE PROCESSES
Figure 2: Base model of organizational change (SFD)
In order to illustrate model behavior, two shocks of process obsolescence are simulated
which may result from environmental transformations like the extinction of the monopoly
on letter services for the German postal services or by the management's innovation inten-
tion in order to improve an organization’s competitive situation. When driven by these
shocks, the model each time shows the same balancing behavior where change allows ade-
quacy and performance to reasonably fast move back to a value of 100%. But in reality
change does not occur that easily; the change process is thwarted by systemic inertia.
Systemic mutability
Inertial forces are present when an organization does not keep pace with and reacts to
changes which occur in its environment (M. L. Tushman und E. Romanelli 1985). This
describes a lack of adaptation ability (A. Kieser, C. Hegele, und M. Klimmer 1998; M. T.
Hannan und J. Freeman 1984). Tushman and Romanelli distinguish between structurally
and socially anchored inertia. Both determine the systemic mutability of an organization
which is a concept describing the inverse of inertia. Mutability describes the ability of an
organization to change, i.e. its change possibilities. Social and structural influences on the
ing and undergoing change together determine the planned changed processes. By conditioning the planned
ad lequacy, they determine the effect of adequacy on pressure and finally the perceived pressure to change.
Figure 16 shows these coherences graphically.
systemic mutability of an organization have different causes like (1) incentives, (2) re-
sources, and (3) experience.
Research highly supports that management's support of change, which in Figure 3 is
expressed by the provision of resources and the offering of incentives, is a crucial factor in
driving change (M. Beer, R. A. Eisenstat, und B. Spector 1990; M. Vakola und I. Nikolaou
2005). First, Tushman and Romanelli (1985) propose that organizations which effectively
implement change have reliable incentive structures. The offering of incentives determines
the adaptation of the incentive system to the new situation. Incentive systems do not need to
be monetary; they can also become apparent by social appreciation, task enlargement,
flexible working times, and else (E. Staudt et al. 1990). If employees are still rewarded for
habitual behavior, however, it will be difficult to expect a change in behavior from them.
Forrester (1969) explicitly says that improvement initiatives which are imposed from out-
side will probably always be inferior to amendments of the internal incentive system. Sec-
ond, the provision of resources as a further component of management support exerts an
indirect influence on systemic mutability. Resources affect mutability by determining
change capacities available. Organizational change capacity is therefore defined as the
amount of resources available for change initiatives that remain available once the core
business realization is guaranteed” (A. M. Wyder 2006, p. 39). Further, the capacities that
an organization has to provide training determine skills and competence of employees for
dealing with the new situation, which then have an influence on systemic mutability.
OFFERING OF PROVISION OF
INCENTIVES RESOURCES
os +
adaptation of training
incentive system
+
competence ZZ timpetence
increase rate | Skills and |decrease rate
Competence
for New
Processes
DURATION DURATION
capacities © COMPETENCE COMPETENCE
INCREASE DECREASE
+
systemic mutability <commitment>
4
change rate (start)
Processes Processes
Expecting Undergoing
Change : Change
planned changed _+ DURATION
processes CHANGE
| change
Figure 3: Systemic mutability: management support (SFD)
The third component acting on mutability is experience (0. Pala und J. A. M. Vennix 2003;
E. R. Larsen und A. Lomi 1999, 2002, 1999; D. Leonard-Barton 1992; and M. T. Hannan
und J. Freeman 1984). As can be seen in Figure 4, long periods without change let experi-
ence and routine grow, whereas change renders the experience obsolete with which proc-
esses run.” Experience has an adverse effect on mutability so that past changes lead to
higher systemic mutability.? Hence a reinforcing feedback loop is created determining sys-
temic mutability from past experiences with change.
Formally, mutability can be expressed as follows:
Systemic mutability =
skills and expertise * adaptation of incentive system * capacities * effect experience on
mutability
EFFECTSKILLS duration DESIRED DURATION
ON LEARNING “P'leaming EXPERIENCE Chance
oe —Beleaiiing rat TEFFECT
LEARNING P= leaming rate
# picnics ROUTINE ON
Ps MUTABILITY
4
DURATION outing
OBSOLESCENCE am Sbsolescence
EXPERIENCE ps
ip effect routine on
mutability
aN
TEFFECT effect change on
CHANGE experienre systemic mutability <commitment>
3 Inertia
es
change rate (start)
Processes Processes
xpecting indergoing
Change Change
planned changed _* DURATION
processes CHANGE
ap Py
Ir ;
Figure 4: Systemic mutability: inertia (SFD)
Tushman and Romanelli claim that by diminishing experience and competence,
change adversely influences the organization’s effectiveness (M. L. Tushman und E. Ro-
2 Tt is important to note that this is experience with which processes of an organization run. Experience with
handling changes is not the focus of this loop.
3 Although this is not the point of concem here, some authors also regard this higher mutability as a form of
inertia, In their opinion the organization is inert at changing from a period with much change and a high
mutability to a more stable phase again. (Cf. Larsen, Erik R. und Alessandro Lomi: Resetting the clock: a
feedback approach to the dynamics of organisational inertia, survival and change, in: Journal of the Opera-
tional Research Society, 50. Jg. (1999), Nr. 4 and Kelly, Dawn und Terry L. Amburgey: Organizational In-
gra and omentum: A Dynamic Model of Strategic Change, in: The Academy of Management Joumal,
. JG. , Nr.
manelli 1985). This is captured by an explicit effect of experience on performance. Hence,
high experience has opposed effects on an organization. It enhances performance, but it
also diminishes systemic mutability and makes changes very difficult to achieve.
As one can see in Figure 5, two change initiatives are simulated. As a facilitating pre-
sumption at this stage of the paper, all changes which are initiated are also implemented
and sustained. The simulation shows that low mutability of an organization impacts the
change rate and slows down the return to adequacy of processes. When the first environ-
mental transformation occurs after year 1, the organization returns to adequacy much
slower than in the base run. Two years later, another sudden obsolescence of process ade-
quacy is simulated. Due to the previous change, mutability has increased so that the retum
adequacy is achieved a little quicker, although still slower than in the base run.
Implemented and Adequate Processes
100
0 2% 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225, 250 275 300 325 350 375 400 425 450 475 500
Time (Weekj
Base run with 100% mutability and commitment ——~——————— processes
Only influence systemic mutability = =8=8=829----------------- processes
Figure 5: Systemic mutability (BOT implemented and adequate processes)
Political commitment
Often authors limit themselves to the analysis of systemic mutability as source for the fail-
ure to implement change. If the failure to implement sustainable change only resulted from
a too low systemic mutability, it should be able to realize change implementation with very
high efforts on creating sufficient capacities and an adequate offering of incentives. But as
research revealed, resistance to change among employees exists besides the systemic im-
pediment. Whereas the mutability rather describes the ability to change, resistance concems
employees’ willingness (A. Kieser, C. Hegele, und M. Klimmer 1998). Dent and Goldberg
describe the facets of resistance as follows:
“We assert, however, that the best way to challenge the conventional wisdom is
to suggest that people do not resist change, per se. People may resist loss of
status, loss of pay, or loss of comfort, but these are not the same as resisting
change. The belief that people do resist change causes all kinds of unproductive
actions within organizations. It is time that we dispense with the phrase resis-
tance to change and find more useful and appropriate models for describing
what the phrase has come to mean— employees are not wholeheartedly embrac-
ing a change that management wants to implement. Employees may resist the
unknown, being dictated to, or management ideas that do not seem feasible
from the employees’ standpoint.” (E. B. Dent und S. G. Goldberg 1999, p. 26,
emphasis in original)
Hence, it seems to make sense to address the problem of resistance by its roots and to
analyze the causes of resistance separately. If one knows what resistance means, one may
effectively lessen it because one can address its causes instead of the symptoms (A. Zander
1950). Resistance to change is a lack of commitment to changing. This lack of commitment
also causes inertia-like forces which become apparent through uttered and non-uttered ob-
jection, delays, and obstruction up to sabotage (H. I. Ansoff und E. J. McDonnell 1990).
OFFERING OF DEGREE OF
INCENTIVES £ PARTICIPATION
adaptation of
incentive system ‘
pevd change
incentive
pevd change of
+ authority and power political
networks - em Re
EFFECT OF
-
pcvd impact<¢—— CHANGED systemic mutability t+) resistance <@— commitment
PROCESSES + 4 Power and Politics
PrOcesaes change rate (stat POSES
Expecting Undergoing
+ Change Change
planned changed DURATION
processes + CHANGE
~~
change
cessation rate
decision rate to M DURATION rs
initiate change DECISION
+ DURATION + implementation
RAMP IMPLEMENTATION - rate
Figure 6: Political commitment (SFD)
Political, rational and emotional resistance have different mechanisms of action, and they
are altered dynamically in response to past and present change processes. Employees per-
ceive the impact that changes has on them. When they perceive change of authority and
power networks that goes against their interests, they will lower their political commitment.
Vahs and Leiser (2004) are of the opinion that employees’ political change willingness or
commitment particularly grows through participation in the change process as well as
through the offering of incentives.’ Accordingly, the offering of incentives does not only
4 Conceming incentifes, cf. Orea, Shaul: Personality, context, and resistance to organizational change, in:
European Journal of Work & Organizational Psychology, 15. Jg. (2006), Nr. 1, p. 79; Staudt, Erich, et al.:
Anreizsysteme als Instrument des betrieblichen Innovationsmanagements, in: Zeitschrift fur Betriebswirt-
determine the systemic mutability, but— together with the degree of participation as a
measure of the employees’ involvement in decisions—it also conditions the perceived
change incentives by employees. This is presented in Figure 6. The perceived incentives
which can be expressed in monetary and non-monetary ways then determine the compati-
bility of the change with self-interest. Innovative tasks can even serve as a high intrinsic
reward for employees (A. Kieser und P. Walgenbach 2003).
Rational commitment
Rational opposition or a low rational commitment establishes, when in the opinion of the
employees either costs for implementing a change outweigh the expected benefits (S. Oreg
2006 and M. Beer 1980) or when the employees are aware that necessary skills for imple-
menting change are still missing (M. Beer 1980). In this sense, Cacaci regards resistance as
feedback to change objectives (A. Cacaci 2006).
Rational commitment is low if employees do not understand the change message. As
Figure 7 reveals, understanding ameliorates by the adequate provision of resources.
Genzwirker (2006) assumes that information and communication also plays a major role
here. Particularly in times of change employees do not wish to be left doomed, they want to
understand the reasons behind, and they want to be able to communicate their own views in
order to make the change initiative effective. This helps them deal with the arising com-
plexity. In Figure 7, this is represented by the aggregate influence of openness of informa-
tion policy, of communication and of participation on information concerning the change
intention. The effect of information is then twofold: information has a positive effect on
rational commitment, whereas information overload affects commitment negatively.° Ra-
tional opposition also develops when the required expertise for the change is still missing
(M. Beer 1980). As can bee seen in Figure 7, the feedback loops “New Demands and Ra-
tional Commitment” develops from the influence of planned changed processes on the per-
ceived impact by new demands. The ratio of skills and competence to perceived impact by
new demands then determines the effect on rational commitment because the competence
indicates how strongly the employees themselves believe to be able to meet the new de-
mands.
schaft, 60. Jg. (1990), pp. 1184, 1187-1194 and 1197 and Vahs, Dietmar und Wolf Leiser: Change Mana-
gement in schwierigen Zeiten: Erfolgsfaktoren und Handlungsempfehlungen fur die Gestaltung von Ver-
anderungsprozessen, Wiesbaden 2004, p. 69 and for the effects of participation cf. Vahs und Leiser: Chan-
ge Management in schwierigen Zeiten, 2004, p. 69 and Zander, Alvin: Resistance to Change--Its Analysis
and Prevention, in: Advanced Management, 4g. (1950), Nr. 5, p. 10.
° According to Oreg too much information Surprisingly negatively influences commitment by a factor of -
0.15. Oreg and Beer assume the existence of an optimal level of information. Therefore, in line with Oreg,
a nonlinear, u-shaped relationship between Gomprehensibility of the change message and rational commit-
ment is assumed in the model. (Cf. Oreg: Personality, context, and resistance to organizational change,
2006 and Beer, Michael: Organization Change and Development: A Systems View,
anta Monica, Cali-
fornia 1980)
PENNESS OF PROVISION OF
INFORMATION RESOURCES: + pcvd impact by
POLICY y new demands
trainin
Ta competence Z_tompetence
COMMUNICATION increase rate [SKIS and Hecrease rate
+ Competence
+ + for New
i Processes
DEGREE OF + anton iage DURATION DURATION
PARTICIPATION COMPETENCE COMPETENCE
intention
INCREASE DECREASE
TEFFECT
INFORMATION T EFFECT
OVERLOAD AN INFORMATION
SCEPTICIS. +
i i effect
5 New Demands and Rational Commitment inkeoton stechaeiatal
overload 3
rational
commitment
+
EFFECT OF
pevd impact<¢— CHANGED systemic mutability resistance-<q— commitment
PROCESSES +
Processes change rate (start) Processes
Expecting Undergoing
+{_ Change Change
planned changed DURATION
processes + CHANGE
~H
change
cessation rate ¥
decision rate top) DURATION DURATION implementation
initiate change DECISION gamp —s IMPLEMENTATION - rate
Figure 7: Rational commitment (SFD)
In most cases, executives and researchers regard resistance as an unnecessary burden. It
would nevertheless be smarter to study the causes and to learn from the situation. Insuffi-
cient rational commitment slows down the transformation of processes, but it nevertheless
bases upon well considered reasons, and it indicates that employees are missing resources
for the implementation of change. According to Kraus, Becker-Kolle and Fischer, organiza-
tions in such a situation should try to explore the underlying causes for their employees’
attitudes because it may be reasonable to reconsider certain aspects of the change initiative
and to look for solutions which benefit both sides.°
In order to account for the phenomenon that people may support a transformation for
rational and political reasons but still resist it for emotional reasons, all three commitment
variables together determine the aggregated commitment variable, and emotional commit-
ment will be analyzed next.
5 Translated from Kraus, Georg, Christel Becker-Kolle und Thomas Fischer: Handbuch Change-Management:
Steuerung von Y cranderungsprozessen in Organisationen; Einflussfaktoren und Beteiligte; Konzepte, In-
strumente und Methoden, Berlin 2006, p. 64.
10
Emotional commitment
The nature of emotional resistance is manifold. It reaches from unconscious skepticism to
fear, anger, and the display of opposing behavior (A. Zander 1950). Zander explains that
pressure to change is perceived as a threat which causes fear. He adds that resistance builds
up corresponding to the degree to which pressure to change is put on people. A study of
Vince and Broussine (1996) showed that change creates ample and ambivalent emotions
which are often linked to uncertainties.
pevd change of PERSONALITY
authority and power TRAITS
Bevd change of networks
identification
networks + \ot
‘bevd impact by new ————m uncertainty, fear, DURATION EM
demands + ‘and stress ASSOCIATION
EFFECTSTRESS _. emotional forgetting rate
ON EMOTION association | Emotional emotion
Towards
6 Emotion Change
, EFFECT OF DURATION
pevd impact =¢- CHANGED + FORGETTING
. emotion EMOTION
EFFECT EMOTION
emotional NEW
commitment ouiMitMENT
systemic mutability +
+ commitment
change rate (start)
Processes Processes : |
xpecting ndergoing
Change A Change
resistance
planned changed ae” +
processes + t-) +
Adequate
rekatge Processes
% fe
performance
Figure 8: Emotional commitment (SFD)
In Figure 8 this is represented by planned changed processes’ leading to a perceived per-
sonal impact. The perceived personal impact translates to three mechanisms of action creat-
ing a feeling of not being able to cope with the change. By three different mechanisms of
action this creates perceived uncertainty and fear. Having to deal with uncertainties further
results in stress for the employees. First, emotional resistance is triggered by the feeling of
Pressure
i Flanned changed processes are the aggregate processes expecting change and those currently undergoing
change.
11
not being able to cope with and adapt to new demands (M. Beer 1980; A. Cacaci 2006; D.
R. Conner 1993). Second, emotional resistance rises and emotional commitment declines
with the degree of loss of relationships when processes or departments are altered. In the
view of Hannan and Freeman (1984) changes to the identity are always the most difficult
ones, and the difficulty to change increases with complexity. Doppler and Lauterburg
(2001) emphasize how the alteration of complex personal identification networks creates
fear and defense resulting in a safety mechanism of resistance. Third, since the network of
authority and power comprises how things work in an organization, changes to this net-
work take away the predictability and create instabilities. Loss of power or the anticipation
of a loss will set people against change (A. S. Judson 1991), and it will further impede any
alteration.
The higher the perceived impact trough change in demands, identification and author-
ity networks the higher is the changees’s perceived uncertainty for dealing with the change
and for coping with it. This accumulates as a negative emotional attitude towards change
which then influences present emotion. Emotion has a direct impact on emotional commit-
ment which further influences commitment, change, etc. so that the reinforcing feedback
loop “Emotion” is closed.
But as can be seen in the “Energy”-loop in Figure 9, past changes also have an impact
on employees’ reactions to further alterations. They create a negative position towards
change because people project past experiences with transformations onto the future (A. S.
Judson 1991). If an employee is not emotionally committed to change and at the same time
remembers past innovations, the emotion regarding change will cause energy depletion
which results in a reduced change energy which is in fact a change fatigue. This feedback
loop reinforces the descent of emotional commitment once changes in general have accu-
mulated and a negative attitude against change has formed.
12
pcvd change of PERSONALITY
authority and power TRAITS
Bevd change of networks
identification
networks rs +
‘bev impact by new —————m uncertainty, fear, | DURATION EM.
demands + and stress ASSOCIATION
EFFECT STRESS emotional forgetting rate
ON EMOTION ~® association [ Emotional ‘emotion
EFFECT CHANGE Coe} Aitttude
6 Emotion ON ENERGY Change
EFFECT OF DURATION energy energy DURATION
vd t CHANGED ENERGY recovery
Pewlimpactiat—, CHANGED. DEPLETION depletion rate Change iste RECOVERY FORGETING
nergy bagg—SZcy
m (eee) emotion
P Energy EFFECT EMOTION
emotional ace
Remembered commitment ComntMENT
growth rate Change forgetting rate +
systemic mutability remembered change Temembered change ‘
‘ 8 Remembered Change
DURATION commitment
change rate (start)
Processes 3 Processes] FORGETTING
Expecting Undergoing
Change Change
resistance
planned changed ae” +
processes ay +
Adequate
res eure Processes
1 Change
a 7,
performance
Figure 9: Change energy (SFD)
Figure 10 reveals the high impact of emotion by showing how the dynamic behavior
of strategic mutability and commitment act together. Compared to the base run, if one just
allows mutability, political and rational commitment to have an influence (emotional com-
mitment is set to 100%), one can see the obvious worsening of the green dashed line com-
pared to the base run. The situation aggravates though with the effect of emotional com-
mitment. Since adequacy is not restored as quickly as in the previous examples, the second
external influence severely reduces the adequacy of processes. Emotional commitment de-
pletes and never succeeds to build up again. To a certain extent changes do take place, but
due the impact of change fatigue (i.e. a low change energy level) they cannot be sustained
in the long run. The reason for this slow implementation can also be seen in Figure 11. If
one does not allow energy depletion and change fatigue to come up by leaving out its im-
pact in the model, emotional commitment stays at a much higher level. This is not the case
if the dynamic behavior of change energy is included into the model. Here, energy depletes
and does not allow emotional commitment to rise again.
13
100
90
80
60
Implemented and Adequate Processes
0255075 00 125150 17520022}, 25H, 2/S 300 325 350 375 400 425450 475 50
Base run with 100% mutability and commitment —————————— cesses
Additionally rational and political commitment — - processes
Additionally emotional commitment - -------------------- processes
Figure 10: Emotional commitment (BOT implemented and adequate processes)
0.5}
0
A
A
Emotional Commitment
025 5075 100 125 150 175 200 225,259,275 300 325 350 375 400 425 450 475 500
. processes
= « processes
dditionally influence of emotional commitment without energy depletion
ditionally influence of emotional commitment
Figure 11: Emotional commitment (BOT emotional commitment)
A sufficiently large lack of emotional commitment thus amounts to the failure of the
change initiative. As the high number of canceled change projects shows, in reality, man-
agement w
time with disastrous performance (see Figure 14 on page 16). Hence, inability to change
may even threaten organizations’ survival.
Participation
ould abandon the initiative midway, or they would have to hold out for a long
A solution to this problem therefore has to put great value on the emotional side of
failure to change. As already proposed by Coch and French (1948), participation could
have an effect on emotion and this way facilitate change. The impact of participation is
actually twofold. First, could already bee seen in Figure 6, the degree of participation
represents a change incentive. Employees have a say and can impact the change in a way so
that they are more advantaged by it. Second, as is shown in Figure 12, Bordia et al. (2004,
14
p. 516 and 520) support that participation furthermore reduces emotional strain. This is the
case if participation together with an open information policy translate to the usage of open
discourse. This is a special form of open discussion which is known for being constructive
as well as for providing emotional relief (P. Bordia et al. 2004; P. E. Spector 1986 and A.
Zander 1950). The rate of emotional relief ameliorates the emotional attitude towards
change which then in several steps impacts commitment, change, adequacy, and perform-
ance. The thorough discussions in open discourse also improve the understanding of the
change message (J. D. Ford, L. W. Ford, und R. T. McNamara 2002).
<OPENN
usage of open
discourse
DURATION EM. rate of
ASSOCIATION lemotional relief
EFFECT STRESS emotional forgetting rate
ON EMOTION association [Emotional
‘Attitude emotion
Towards
Change
DURATION
4 FORGETTING
emotion EMOTION
Figure 12: Participation (SFD)
The impact of participation on a quicker implementation change can explicitly be
seen in Figure 13. There is a dynamic retum to adequacy which is much closer to the ideal
base run. The graph does not differ to a very high extent from the run in which change en-
ergy was not allowed to build up. This shows that through participation the great part of
energy depletion can be stopped, and commitment is therefore higher. This also becomes
obvious in the much higher performance that can be seen in Figure 14.° Without participa-
tion, the gap between actual and desired performance can hardly be extinguished. For par-
ticipation, performance still shows a gap to the base run, but this gap is diminished to some
extent. Performance and the triggered open discourse thus represent important aspects when
planning to implement change.
® The low point of the base run at around weeks 65 and 165 arises from an increase in adequacy mixed with a
decay in experience through initiated change.
15
Implemented and Adequate Processes
100
90
80
60
025075 TOD 125 150 175 200 225,35, BIS 300 325350 375 400 425 450475 500
Base run with 100% mutability and commitment ~~ Pocesses
Additionally rational and political commitment — -: — processes
Additionally emotional commitment processes
Additionally discourse processes
Figure 13; Participation (BOT implemented and adequate processes)
Performance
1
0.85}
07
0.55}
04
O25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225, 259, 275 300 325 350 375 400 425 450 475 500
ime {Week}
Base run with 100% mutability and commitment ———————————__ processes
Additionally influence of rational and political commitment —--—-:—--—-> processes
Additionally influence of emotional commitment ---------------- processes
Additionally discourse processes
Figure 14: Participation (BOT performance)
Implications
Stepping back from the detailed model, six major feedback mechanisms were created.
Figure 15 reveals that the balancing mechanism of the change loop is thwarted by inertia,
by change in power and in demands as well as by emotions. These reinforcing loops hinder
the main loop to equilibrate.
16
pevd change of
identification
Emotion
Demand:
networks oman’ Energy S
‘+ pevd new tb) political i ae nergy]
demands commitment
rational \_ emotional
Authority. ower commitment “commitment
bevd change
ot authority Experience
2 power
ft. a topy ot
systemic
tae
Processes
+
eee +)
Change
4
Adequate
Processes
¥.
|P ressure|
Change
performance
Figure 15: Causal mechanisms of change (CLD)
Then, even given a reasonable change ability expressed by strategic mutability,
change is not necessarily carried out. A lack of change willingness, i.e. commitment can
still thwart the implementation of a change initiative. If management plans an innovation or
wants to react to an environmental transformation, it therefore has to anticipate the employ-
ees’ behavior and provide adequate resources and an adapted incentive system. Although
individual resistance started out early to be considered an impact factor on failure to
change, it was not regarded as such a crucial factor in impeding change. Here, particularly
emotion proved to be important. This supports the early ideas of Coch and French (1948)
although their study may show statistical inaccuracies. They called attention to not only
behavioral but also emotional aspects. Coch an French also supported the opinion that one
could ameliorate change implementation by allowing employee participation— an opinion
which the rungs of the present model supports as well.
It could further be noticed that the first change attempt has an impact on the second
one. This particularly became obvious for systemic mutability and emotional commitment.
In the case of mutability, the first change initiative enhances mutability in the second
change attempt. This implies that, on the systemic side, consequent changes get carried out
with more and more ease. The situation is different concerning emotional commitment. As
described earlier, the change history can reduce change energy to such a slow level, that
following changes can not be carried out. The emotional effect gets so strong that it easily
outweighs any positive effects of higher mutability. Here, particularly the second change
attempt revealed the high impact of change fatigue. Emotional commitment decreased in
the first attempt which let fatigue grow. In the second attempt, it has grown so far that a
change is no further possible. One can imagine, for example, that employees are so cynic
17
about the past experience with change that just hearing about a new change initiative works
like a warning bell stirring up opposition. This makes it very difficult if not impossible to
successfully initiate subsequent change initiatives. No matter how well thought out the ini-
tiatives may be, they are foredoomed to failure due to emotional resistance.
Some research does address the peculiar aspect of emotion; so for example, Vince
and Broussine (1996) revealed different often ambiguous expressions of emotions during
organizational change. Further research starts to address the issue; for example Mossholder
et al. (2000) argue for a similar system of a hedonic change pleasantness which resembles
emotional attitude to change and of a change arousal which resemble change energy.
Nevertheless, coming back to the system dynamics model, one has to admit that it is
still a very limited model. It was on purpose kept general to make it applicable to a variety
of change situations. If one looked at a specific change in a particular organization, like the
privatization of the postal services or an adaptation to international standards of an educa-
tional organization, the model would need adjustments on how experience develops as well
as on what kinds of behavior determine resistance. This is a facet that is so far left out of
the model.
Future research therefore needs to address improvements to the existing parts of the
model as well as extensions with other measures to facilitate change. Participation and dis-
course are the first drivers for change, but including aspects like leadership, trust, organiza-
tional culture, or further types of communication would give additional insights. A ddition-
ally, the simulation of incremental change promises to give interesting results. This may
provide a clearer picture of the different effects of radical and incremental changes on the
development of the different kinds of resistances.
18
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Appendix
systemic mutability
+
change rate (start)
Processes Processes
expecting Undergoing
Change Change
planned changed + DURATION
processes CHANGE
change
cessation rate
decision rate to || DURATION
initiate change 4f*——— DECISION
+ DURATION
RAMP IMPLEMENTATION
ENVIRONMENT
DURATION PULSE
PRESSURE ENVIRONMENT | || DURATION INNOVATION
URGE OBSOLESCENCE INTENTION
environmental
2 transformations +
Pevd Actually Implemented
- Pressure to Aerie and Adequate
pressure | Change Change obsoleszence rate Processes
change rate _g 7
+
actual pressure
to change
PRESSURE BY
MANAGEMENT
DESIRED
PERFORMANC
effect adequacy
1 Change
EFFECT EXPERIENCE
ON PERFORMANCE
adequacy of
strategic orientation +
performance ot proce
+
<Total Experience>
on pressure
TEFFECT
ADEQUACY ON
PRESSURE
Figure 16: Base model including planning of adequacy (SFD) ;
2 Planned Adequacy
sses
TOTAL
PROCESSES
planned adequacy <——
<commitment:
+,
implementation
rate
