Table of Contents
Barry Richmond, System Dynamics and Public Policy
Steve Peterson
The Peterson Group
West Lebanon, NH
steve@ evans- peterson.com
Abstract
Bany Richmond left a rich legacy in many application areas of system dynamics,
including the field of public policy. The paper identifies a key belief that motivated
Bany’s efforts in this arena. It draws out Barry’ s view of the relative value-added of
various system dynamics activities, explaining Banry’s bias toward simpler, smaller
applications of the framework, tool and language. The paper then distills five principles
which characterize Bamy’s work in public policy, illustrating each with a recent example.
The paper concludes with a brief reflection on what it might mean to carry on Barry’s
legacy.
Introduction
Bamy Richmond was one of those larger- than- life characters whom one seldom
encounters in this world. His incisive intellect, his passion for building understanding,
his gifts as a teacher and as a communicator, his boundless energy, his charisma, and his
intellectual curiosity put him in a class by himself. For those of us who counted Barry as
acolleague, collaborator, or friend, his passing in August of 2002 created a huge gap in
our lives, a gap that will not soon be filled.
Bamy’s death created a gap in the field of system dynamics as well. Ata memorial
service shortly after Barry's death, several speakers— family, friends, and professional
colleagues— commented on what Bamy’s life had meant to them. Toward the end of this
service, Peter Senge spoke briefly. Peter stated that he was struck by both the importance
and the incompleteness of Barry’s work, noting that it was “up to us” to continue this
important work.
Since Barry’s death, I have spent a lot of time reflecting on his life and on his
contribution to the field. I’ve been wrestling with a host of questions, including the
following: What was the essence of Barry’s work? Where was he “coming from” in his
approach to system dynamics? Are there distillable sets of operating principles and
leaming strategies that guided Barry’s work? What can mere mortals do to continue
Bamy’s work if we so desire?
In this brief paper, I explore Bany’s contribution to the use of system dynamics within
the context of public policy. The paper is composed of two major parts. In Part 1, I
sketch with broad brush a conceptual framework, in an effort to put Barry’s work in a
larger context. I identify the fundamental belief that I contend provided the motive force
for virtually all of Barry’s professional activity. Additionally, in Part 1 I outline how this
belief played itself out, in terms of Bamy’s view of the relative value-added associated
with various system dynamics oriented activities. Part 2 tums its attention to Bany’s
work in the arena of public policy. In Part 2, I distill five “operating principles” that I
believe sculpted Bamy’s system dynamics work, illustrating these principles using
Bamy’s public policy- oriented work. These five principles can be viewed as a set of
guideposts or design criteria for adding value with system dynamics. While these
principles are specifically applicable to work in public policy, they also have applicability
in business, in education, and in other areas of inquiry. Finally, by way of summary, I
offer a few thoughts about the nature of Barry’s legacy in the realm of public policy, and
about how one might build upon that legacy.
A Broad-Brush Conceptual Framework
To gain a deep understanding of Bany’s work, it is first necessary to have some sense for
where he was “coming from.” What motivated his activities? What were his ideas
regarding the real value of system dynamics?
Fortunately, Barry left a good paper trail that documents his thinking. For example, the
STELLA and ithink user guides (HPS, 2003) do an excellent job of presenting Bany’s
view on how to “do” system dynamics. Various white papers available from Pegasus
Communications develop Barry’s thoughts about the key thinking skills behind the
effective practice of systems thinking. These are great reference materials, and I would
highly recommend them.
I contend that there was a fundamental belief that provided the motive force for these and
other efforts. This belief is simple to state, and all- encompassing in its outlook. It gives
a clear sense for where Barry was “coming from” in many of his professional endeavors.
1 like to phrase it this way:
“The framework, tools, and language of system dynamics should be
accessible to all. Anyone can do this at some level, and everyone should
ty!”
This belief is an assertion about the nature of the value of system dynamics. It’s an
assertion that the primary value of system dynamics consists in the process not the
products of that process (although Barry would readily agree that products were
important, too!). It’s also an assertion about who should be doing this stuff. Bamy’s
take: Everyone should be doing this to some degree. As more people use the framework,
language, and tools to generate generating systemic insight— and act accordingly— the
more likely we will be to solve the big problems facing the world today.
Over the time that I worked with Bany, this deeply- held assumption usually lay beneath
the surface of conversations, forming the sub- text for our work together. But it was never
very far out of sight. This assumption would often come to the surface in the context of a
formal presentation, an essay, or a paper. Consider, for example, Barry’s contribution to
the 1985 System Dynamics conference held in Keystone, Colorado. This paper
introduced the STELLA software to the world. It was entitled STELLA: Software for
Bringing System Dynamics to the Other 98%. The title clearly reflects Barry's
fundamental belief that everyone should be doing this. Or consider the paper Barry
presented at the 1994 Conference in Sterling, Scotland. That paper carries the
provocative title of System Dynamics/Systems Thinking: Let’s Just Get On With It. Early
in the paper, describing the spirit embodied in the STELLA software, Barry uses this
characterization: “The feeling was: anyone can do this, and everyone should try. No
few and privileged here!” Elsewhere in his paper, Barry asserts that we “have
something... that is quite unique, quite powerful, and quite broadly useful as a way of
thinking and or leaming. It’s also capable of being quite transparent— leveraging the way
we leam biology, manage our businesses, or run our personal lives...”
It’s important to ask how this belief played itself out in Bamy’s professional career. I
would assert that huge part of Barry’s life was devoted to tuming his deeply- held belief
into reality. Accordingly, over time this belief found its expression in a variety of
products and services, including software, various leaming environments, workshops,
and specific client deliverables. The common theme in these efforts was one of
increasing the base of people who could partake in the process of gaining value by doing
system dynamics.
For me, a simple graphic below nicely captures our view of the nature of this value
added, as it applies to “the other 98%”. This graphic, adapted from one presented in
workshops that Barry and I led for many years at HPS, gives a very clear picture of our
perspective on the relationship between expending effort and deriving value.
“Mother of all Models"
Value/Utility A
<q ‘Complex model/interface
<q Sirmple modeyintertace
<q Simple stock & flow map
<q “Conversational” use of thinking skills
Effort/Time Expended
This graphic relates effort or time expended to the value or utility that one can expect to
derive from expending that effort. As the curve shows, there is significant value to be
added from simple “conversational” uses of the fundamental thinking skills. Examples
would include drawing a reference behavior pattem to cast a problem in dynamic tems,
“elevating” from the specific players to characterize an issue in generic tems, or asking
operational questions such as “how does this work?”
Another quantum increment in value/utility can come at relatively low cost from the
creation, simulation (mental simulation), and communication of a simple stock & flow
map. A third quantum increment in value can be added, again at relatively low cost in
terms of time or effort, by transforming a map into a running simulation model, perhaps
with a simple interface to facilitate controlled experimentation.
Note that once you move past simpler applications, diminishing retums can quickly begin
to setin. As the complexity of the model increases, in our experience the amount of
effort, skill, and time required to underwrite that complexity increases disproportionately
relative to the amount of value derived! Out at the end of the curve, it may well be that
adding complexity may result in negative retums.
If one puts together Barry’s core belief with the more experientially- derived view of the
nature of the value added from doing system dynamics, it’s a bit easier to see the essence
of Bamy’s vision for the use of system dynamics in pretty much any context. A very
simple characterization of Barry’s vision might include the following key points:
« Anyone can do this at some level
« Everyone should be doing this at some level
«There are many ways to add value. Specifically, one doesn’t need to build large
models (or even running models!) in order to gain value.
Five Principles: Guideposts for Barry’s Public Policy Efforts
This section distills what I believe are key principles that guided Barry's public policy
efforts. The principles fall into three broad categories, associated with the three activities
that Barry viewed as fundamental to any modeling effort, as outlined below:
Building
1. The Principle of Operational Thinking
2. The Principle of Irreducible Essence
Simulating
3. The Principle of Controlled Experimentation
Communicati
4. The Principle of Mental Model Confrontation
5. The Principle of Controversial Topics
In the discussion which follows, I’ll consider each principle in tum. For each, I will
begin by providing a brief definition, highlighting the key implication of the principle—
the “so what” associated with its use. And finally, I’ll illustrate the principle by drawing
from some of Bany’s public policy work.
Principle 1. The Principle of Operational Thinking
This principle was at the bedrock core of Barry’s work in system dynamics. Barry
himself viewed operational thinking as the key thinking skill required for the effective
application of system dynamics.
Operational thinking entails getting to the essence of how a process works. It involves
asking questions about key accumulations and flows in the system. It requires careful
thought about the physical relationships that generate flow processes. The effort is one of
building understanding of how it works rather than simply listing the factors that
influence the process.
The “so what” of operational thinking is this: it facilitates the identification of levers for
changing system performance. If you understand how a process works at a fundamental,
physical level, you are in a solid position systematically to walk through the policy space,
asking focused questions about altemate proposed policy interventions and more
accurately thinking through the implications of a proposed initiative. If, on the other
hand, your thinking consists of simply a laundry list of factors that influence the process,
your efforts to identify levers for actually changing the process may well be limited.
An excellent illustration of operational thinking can be found within Bary’ s presentation
at the 2001 Systems Thinking in Action Conference. This conference took place a
shortly after the September 11 airplane hijackings. Issues associated with intemational
terrorism were very much on the minds of participants at the conference. Here’s one part
of a storytelling progression within Bany’s presentation:
oOo €
We're not addressing the inflows!
This little stock/flow map very nicely captures the essence of the process. Note the
salient features of the map:
* Terrorist activity is represented operationally as a flow— generated by terrorists,
each with an associated “productivity” term. From this map, you can identify two
fundamental ways to reduce terrorist activity: either reduce the number of
terrorists, or make terrorists less productive.
* The policy space for directly attacking the problem is clearly mapped (eliminating
terrorists, eliminating supporters, and implementing defensive initiatives).
« The diagram captures both the outflows and the inflows to the terrorist stock. In
so doing, it identifies the levers for long-term improvement in the performance of
the system
Principle 2: The Principle of Irreducible Essence
This principle is simply a variation of the old KISS principle. Another way to state the
principle is to use Einstein’ maxim: A good explanation is one that is as simple as
possible, but not simpler. Or, to use Occam’s razor: A simple explanation is to be
favored over a more complex one. Following the Principle of Irreducible Essence, one
recognizes that simplification is necessary in order to make sense of the world— it’s
impossible to hold all the relationships in your head. The challenge is one of preserving
the relevant essence of that part of the world upon which one wishes to act.
The “so what” of this principle is twofold. First, it enforces a mental discipline that can
lead to greatly increased clarity of explanation. Second, it greatly increases the set of
people who can derive value from the effort.
In a public policy context, Bary’s “Stories of the Month” (HPS, 2001-2003) provided
multiple opportunities to view the principle of irreducible essence in practice. These
stories typically used a simple stock/flow map or a small simulation model to provide a
systems perspective on current events in the news. An excellent example of this principle
at work can be found in the story that Barry was working on at the time of his death.
This story, entitled “Hot Air and Greenhouse Gases” was motivated by some dynamically
sloppy statements about global warming, coming out of the White House in the summer
of 2002. Among other things, there were statements to the effect that the president had a
plan that would reduce greenhouse emissions while sustaining economic growth.
Apparently, implicitly this was to result in a reversal in global warming trends.
In response to these statements, Barry could have developed an elaborate model of
greenhouse gases, or he could have pointed people to large, detailed models produced by
others on this topic. Instead, Bary began working on a very simple model and story.
Here's a diagram taken from the story.
2. Growth, Gases, & Warming
This diagram is stark in its simplicity. It provides just enough of the relevant essence of
the issue to get at the dynamics of the greenhouse effect in a simple and compelling way.
It includes just enough structure to facilitate investigation of the relationship between
reduction in greenhouse emissions in a productivity sense, and the increase in economic
activity that is serving as the base for generating greenhouse emissions.
Principle 3. The Principle of Controlled Experimentation
The principle of controlled experimentation is a simple yet powerful one. It entails
making one-at- a- time structural or parametric changes in the model to facilitate
simulation experiments.
The “so what’ of this principle is both rich in its implications. Controlled experiments
add value directly, by building understanding. They add value indirectly, by building
capability. The obvious direct value added of controlled experimentation is the role that
it plays in building individual understanding. By making a one- at-a- time parameter or
structural change, one has a clear basis for leaming why a model behaves in a particular
way. Mental simulations can be compared against computer simulations, with any gaps
between the two providing the impetus for modifying one’s mental model of the
situation. By designing a set of controlled experiments that operate cumulatively (in
which a small structural addition provides the basis for a simulation experiment, which
provides the basis for the next structural addition, and so on), it’s possible to bootstrap
ones knowledge in a systematic and efficient manner.
A second result is that simple, controlled experiments can create the activity basis for
building a shared understanding. A sequence of controlled experiments can yield
extremely productive conversations, particularly when the results of experiments are
compared against the results of mental simulations. Differences of opinion can be
discussed; commonalities of thought can be identified; tacit assumptions can be surfaced.
Less directly, controlled experiments simulation are like aerobic exercise or strength
training, building an individual’s capacity to accurately trace dynamics and to make
structural/behavioral connections. Barry was a firm believer that humans simply weren't
very good at doing mental simulations of anything except the simplest of systems.
Nevertheless, he believed that people could build their mental simulation capacity
through sustained practice. Indeed, this was one of the methodological motivations
behind the Story of the Month concept.
Many of the stories reflected this principle. An interesting one to consider is the very first
Story of the Month produced by HPS. The context for this story was the pre- Enron
debacle run- up in energy prices in Califomia and elsewhere in April of 2001. Barry was
in Califomia at the time. Everywhere he went he read news articles about organizations
that planned to simply “pass on” increased energy prices to consumers. This raised a very
interesting systems question: Is it possible for everyone to pass on costs? Oris there
some self- limiting process at work?
We developed a simple story to address the issue. The first part of the story looks at
raising prices in response to step- increase in energy costs, as shown below:
al
Can energy prices be "passed on" to the consumer?
To conduct a simulation, click the “Run” button. Youll see an >
animation of the diagram. You'll also see the graph trace out the
behavior over time for profitability (in blue), price (in red) and wages | |
in green). Click and hold, and then drag along one of the plots to
view the associated numbers for all variables in the graph : |
‘After youve run a simulation or two, hit the spacebar to continue the gee 2 — er
story progression - os
As the graphic shows, there’s a nice self- corrective process at work here that uses price as
amechanism to keep profitability at desired levels. A simple, controlled experiment!
The next step in this progression is to expand the model boundary just a little bit, adding
some structure that relates increasing prices to decreasing purchasing power, and hence,
to upward pressure on wages. Again, experimenting with a step- increase in energy costs
we get some very interesting results:
Can energy prices be "passed on" to the consumer? ja]
io Ea:
To conduct a simulation, click the "Run" button. Youll see an
animation of the diagram. You'll also see the graph trace out the
behavior over time for profitability (in blue), price (in red), wages (in| | =
green), and purchasing power (in pink),
When you're finished simulating, hit the spacebar to gain access
to a brief wrap-up. S 2
By using controlled experiments in a simple progression, it’s possible to build
understanding, stimulate good conversations, and strengthen mental simulation muscles.
Principle 4. The Principle of Mental Model Confrontation.
Like the principle of controlled experimentation, the principle of mental model
confrontation is simple but powerful. Whenever possible, bring the prevailing mental
model to the surface of the discussion. Explore the dynamic implications of that mental
model. Then, provide an altemative mental model (often in the form of a stock/flow
diagram) that offers benefits such as a better explanation, a more robust policy suite, or
an improved insight into the issue at hand.
The process of confronting the prevailing mental model is a key part in creating a
compelling case for changed behavior— often the desired outcome of work in public
policy. Implicit assumptions can be surfaced and critically scrutinized. When there are
multiple, conflicting mental models involved, the principle of mental model confrontation
can be used to facilitate communication among key stakeholders. There's leaming to be
had when mental models are systematically compared, tested, and evaluated!
In Late September, 2001, Barry put together a story of the month on terrorism. This story
very nicely illustrates the principle of mental model confrontation. In it, Bary begins
by...
“... Surfacing the mental model underlying such rhetoric [the rhetoric
of the Bush administration in response to the September 11 attacks,
for example, ‘leading the world to victory in a war against
terrorism’ ] so you can critically examine its implicit assumptions.”
The resultant map, and Bamy’s characterization of it, looks like this:
e {)
The next chunk of the story represents the US plan to "win the
war against terrorism” by taking actions to reduce (and hopefully
eliminate) the number of terrorists. Such actions could take the
form of arrest and legal prosecution, death through armed
conflict, or perhaps other means.
The logic revealed thus far is at the heart of the mental model
underlying current US policy toward terrorism. Click the
"Simulate..." button, then simulate this chunk of logic to see
what happens to the terrorist population, and hence to the rate
at which terrorist acts are being committed.
When you've reviewed the simulation results. click the Back link
to return to this screen. Then press the space bar to continue
with the story.
Next, Bary builds upon this simple mental model to offer a critique of the prevailing
thinking. It looks like this (a simulation output graph is shown with the diagram:
of Terrorists & volume of terrorist
“$00 400 7.00 10.00 13.00
r 7
Frage 1 om Months 12:00 AM. Mon, May 19, 2003
Naas 2 Se aly ae ee
As the graph shows, adding a bit more richness to the structure leads to longer: term
difficulties for the “war” on terrorism. In the long term, the reinforcing loop associated
with the recruiting process, as turbocharged by increasing anger at US-led actions, leads
to a rapid growth in terrorists and to the committing of terrorist acts.
Later in this story, Barry offers a systems thinking based altemative to looking at the
situation. The altemative consists of two components: a defensive component that
minimizes current threat, and an offensive component that gets what Barry sees as the
root cause of terrorism. Barry’s map of the offensive component is rich in its use of
qualitative concepts. Building it up a piece at a time, Bary ends up with a map that looks
like what's shown below. This map has a lot in it! Y ou should focus on the note text and
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on the highlighted flows that drain stocks of hatred, as these are key components of
Bamy’s thinking about the locus of an effective policy.
This means that if tolerance is to be built up,
stocks of hatred must be drained first-not an easy
task..but one that would appear essential to
pursue.
Let's now bring what we've seen in this discussion
to bear on the issue at hand._terrorism. Press the
spacebar to continue...
In this map, notice the refocusing of the issue from one of “winning the war” to one of
building tolerance of another’ s viewpoint, managing anger, de- fusing hatred, and maybe
even adjusting one’s position. By initially confronting the mental model that appeared to
be prevalent in the Bush administration, Barry sets us up to hear what he has to say in the
way of a systems thinking- based altemative.
Principle 5. The Principle of Controversial Topics
This principle flows directly out of the Bamy’s deeply- held view that anyone could (and
should be able to) use the language, framework, and tools of system dynamics in a
productive way. He believed strongly that an informed layperson could generate insight
into any topic of interest. For Bary, controversial or “hot” topics were especially
important to pursue. Often they have the least clarity around them. They’ re often the
most confusing or perplexing, and therefore the most potential for value-added through
the use of system dynamics!
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I've interspersed several of these controversial topics through this paper thus far. To
make the point very clearly, I’ll introduce one more controversial topic that Barry worked
with in his story of the month series. In response to the tragedy at Columbine high school
and at other schools in the United States, Bay put together the “Guns at School” story.
Bamy wrote, “Until we have a solid grip on the relationships responsible for producing
and maintaining this scary phenomenon, we have scant hope of doing much to effectively
address it.” His story was an effort to come to grips with these relationships.
The story begins with a brief history of gun- related school violence, and then
incrementally develops a stock/flow map that seeks to explain the phenomenon. The map
is shown below:
Alienstiom
@
q
ae
tage pe
This map depicts the progressive buildup of alienation, and rage, relating these to the
acquisition and use of guns within a student population.
Against this model backdrop, Bamy sets up a set of policy-based experiments. The
“policy space” is shown below.
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Policy Initiatives
Gun-related Media Student Coping Skills
Initiatives Initiatives Initiatives
Screening Disarming, Aatti-Copycat Rage Management Alienation Management
ns Initiative Initiative Initiative Initiative
= =
oO a
Back
Readers are encouraged first to conduct one-at-a-time controlled experiments, Then, ina
second round, they are encouraged to create a “policy cocktail” that is effective under a
wide range of behavioral assumptions regarding the speed of buildup of rage, the rate of
dissipation of alienation, etc. The intent of these experiments is the same as the intent
behind the model structure: To provoke thought and to stimulate discussion as it
promotes an exploration of the relationships that drive this pressing social issue. Is the
topic controversial? Yes! Is the story helpful in shedding light? Absolutely!
Wrap-up: Barry’s Legacy in the A pplication of System Dynamics in Public Policy
In the realm of public policy, Bary did not have a huge publication record. Most of his
work was done in the context of client work, or more recently in the context of
presentations or stories of the month. I do not think that Bamy’s work, by itself, is where
his legacy resides. Rather, as befitting the teacher that he was, Barry’s real legacy in
public policy work resides in the mind-set that he brought to his work, along with the
principles that he employed in doing this work.
The mind-set that Bary brought to his public policy efforts fueled his zeal, particularly in
his stories of the month. Anyone can do this at some level, and everyone should try. In
doing “this,” there is significant value to be added with simple uses of the framework,
tools and language. One doesn’t need to develop a complex model in order to derive
quantum improvements in insight.
In terms of principles that Bary employed, I've identified five that are particularly
relevant in his public policy work. Operational thinking, irreducible essence, controlled
experimentation, confrontation of mental models, and the effective use of controversy are
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key attributes of the typical Richmond effort in public policy. This package of attributes
makes Bamy’s work easily identifiable in the world of system dynamics.
For those of us who wish to “carry on the work,” I believe that there is much to glean
from this legacy. For me, the primary lessons are as follows...
* Maybe not everyone can do this, but there are a lot of people who could do this at
some level who currently are not. Those people need access to this stuff.
* Most people/organizations are on the steep part of the effort/value curve. They
therefore can derive significant value from conversational uses of system
dynamics, from simple stock/flow maps, and from simple models with interfaces.
* The five principles worked well for Bary. They aren’t rocket science— although
there is some art associated with their application! They ought to work well for
meas well.
While it is beyond my ken to consider how one might replace someone like Bany, I
believe that it is possible to carry on his work. It will require sustained effort and
application, but it can be achievable.
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