A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE CREATION
Warren Topp
P.O.Box 147, Noordhoek, South Africa, 7985
Telephone +27 21 7891517 Fax +27 21 789 1517
Email soothsay@iafrica.com
This paper describes systems methods that have been developed to support knowledge
creation in post-industrial business. The methods are appropriated from post-modern
philosophy and assume a pragmatic position in regard to knowledge. Knowledge in
business is viewed as guides for human action. Businesses build knowledge that is used to
steer member's actions in managing, developing, coordinating, producing and
implementing processes that produce products, services or further knowledge. New
knowledge, as guides for action, emerges in organizational conversation. Two main
forces precipitate this emergence: the individual subjects and the formative system they
find themselves in. The utterances that make up conversation are seen as emergent
phenomena whose occurrence enable or regulate further utterances.
Introduction
There are three sub systems within any organization as a knowledge system:
1. The formative system: this is the system that enables or regulates what can be said and
thought by individuals within a specific business situation. The a priori matrix of
concepts, procedures, patterns, and stakes that are in circulation are used to guide
member’s actions within the business.
2. The conversation system where the formative system and the individual subject meet.
These conversations are either regulative or generative in nature. Regulative
conversations have a priori elements that govern how the utterances of individuals are
articulated and linked to each other. Generative conversations have as their stake the
creation of new knowledge. They seek the development of new concepts, procedures,
patterns and stakes.
3. The individual subject: as a system the individual has a set of a priori concepts,
procedures, patterns and stakes that guide their utterances actions.
These sub systems are in dynamic interaction and as a whole form the organizations
knowledge system. This system of elements that guide human actions and the human
actions that in turn shape it is ultimately uncontrollable at a micro level. Interventions
however can be made into the system with the aim of regulating and governing the
conversations that guide the human system of actions. In appropriating aspects of post-
modern philosophy into new systems methods for knowledge creation in post-capitalist
business, this paper will argue for the relevance and usefulness of the above model and
develop heuristics to support interventions aimed at specific areas of the knowledge
system.
Speaks and writes
statements and
Makes
s within the
ations in
which he or she are
positioned.
Governs
and regulates
conversations.
THE INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT
(Personal a priori)
Statements and phrases that are heard or read may
become future personal a priori concepts. These a
priori elements affect future interpretation and
articulation by the individual. Individuals are
positioned within conversations. It is from these
positions that they make moves in the form of
statements and phrases. The individual subjects are
not free to say or write anything, but are restricted in
the type of moves they may make by the stakes
(explicit or implicit) of the conversation game. A set
of linked moves (utterances by individuals) are linked
together in a conversa
THE CONVERSATION SYSTEM
The individual subject and the formative
system meet in conversation (speaking,
listening, reading or ~_ writing).
Conversation is a set of moves (statements
or phrases). Conversation is a dynamic in
which both the subject and the formative
system may be altered. There is
something at stake in conversations — to
learn, to entertain, etc. These stakes guide
the way that moves (statements and
phrases) are linked to one another.
THE FORMATIVE SYSTEM
(Historical a priori)
System enabling the emergence and maintenance of:
1. Objects of conversation / discourse
2. Concepts used in conversations
3. Themes of conversations
4. Modes of articulation used in conversations
This tangled matrix of elements and relations regulates
a priori what can be written or said by individuals
within the business.
Listens and reads
statements and
phrases. Becomes
positioned in
conversation games.
Leads to action
that changes the
elements and
their relations in
the formative
system.
Figure 1: Conversation, individual subjects and the formative system
The individual subject
Kant (1786) is interested in the a priori concepts that enable us to have knowledge: the
principles that allow a synthesis and bringing together of particulars so that we may
know. In this sense he takes a systems approach and builds a descriptive model of the
components and workings of an individual as a knowledge system. There are three
fundamental components of this system that interact and in so doing enable us to produce
knowledge. Sensibility allows us to receive initial representations as objects.
Understanding enables the individual to think about the objects sensibility has given them
as concepts. Reason makes use of principles to arrange and organize understanding’s
concepts.
A clear distinction is made between understanding and reason. Understanding enables
“the unity of appearances by virtue of rules” reason enables “the unity of rules of the
understanding under principles” (ibid. b358). Reason is not applied directly to sense data
as understanding is, but attempts to arrange the concepts produced by the understanding
into an a priori rational unity or system. The systemic nature of reason is highlighted by
Kant claiming that, “If we review our knowledge in its entire extent, we shall find that the
particular business of reason is to arrange it into a system, that is to say to give it
connection according to a principle” (ibid. b672). Reason’s task is to provide systems
principles through which understanding’s concepts may be connected and organized into
wholes. It allows the individual knower to make sense of the multitude of different
concepts of objects that are produced through the a priori conditioning of the
understanding. An individual’s representations can contain three general relations. Firstly
they can relate to one as a subject, secondly to objects as appearances, and thirdly to
objects of thought in general. For each of these relations reason requires an unconditioned
systems idea representing the “synthetical unity of all conditions” (ibid. b390). The idea
of pure reason containing the unity of relations of representations in the subject is the
‘soul’ (psyche) and “is the concern of psychology” (ibid. b391). The ‘world’ as an idea of
pure reason represents “the sum total of all appearances” and is “the concern of
cosmology” (ibid.). Finally, Kant (ibid.) argues that the whole (idea of pure reason)
containing “the possibility of all that is capable of being thought” is ‘god’ and “is the
concern of all theology”.
Lewis argues that knowledge is created when the individual “can frame the data of sense
in a set of concepts which serve as guides for action" (1926 p.243). The a priori concepts
that are used by an individual to frame the sense data given to them are influenced by
their need or interest at that time. Individuals have the potential to reflect on the
usefulness of the a priori concepts they have assumed, and to assume new concepts.
Knowledge is constructed through a process of trial and error learning in which
individuals interpret situations through one conceptual pattern after another. Their
practical success or failure leads them to adapt their concepts which then guide them to
act in ways that are more likely to best serve their purposes. Lewis (1929 p.267) is critical
of pragmatism that is used in the justification of belief by superficial individual desire.
He argues that important ends, that are required for long term satisfaction of needs,
should take precedence over individual desires. Such overriding ends include intellectual
consistency; economy; completeness of comprehension; and simplicity of interpretation.
The process of creating and improving knowledge is not simple since “any set of basic
concepts has vested interests in the whole body of truth expressed in terms of them, and
the social practices based on them.” (ibid. p.269). An individual’s knowledge needs to
somehow fit into the network of external concepts and systems ideas that are in use
within their work or social situation. The mind deals with increasing complexity by
imposing new systems ideas of order into it. These new ways of arranging simplify the
chaotic reality in more and more powerful ways. Skolimowski (1994 p.103) expresses his
thesis in ancient Greek terms: “Logos is continuously organizing the chaotic cosmos” we
may express the same notion as systems ideas are continuously organizing the chaotic
cosmos. An individual’s reality-making process continues using a certain logos until that
framework is unable to cope with the ontological complexity at which time a new logos
emerges which has more powerful ways of simplifying.
The formative system
The section interprets the philosophy of Foucault (The Archeology of Knowledge, 1972)
in order to develop a model of the knowledge formation system at work within a
business. It provides a radical opposition to the individual-centred view presented above.
The formation of the objects, concepts, themes and modes of articulation used in business
conversation are described. An inquiry frame is developed that helps map these elements
and relations, which make up a business’s system of knowledge formation. This section
describes ‘the formative system’ component of the knowledge systems model. The
inquiry framework is labeled Knowledge Systems Diagnostics (KSD) and aims to
uncover an organization’s “rules of formation” (Foucault 1972, p.38). These rules make
possible the creation and maintenance of knowledge within an organization. Foucault
(1972) approaches knowledge from a position which sees discourse (a group of
statements) as having regularities and patterns which enable or constrain the emergence
of new ideas and concepts. This view is radically different from the individual-centred
approach of described above, which focuses on the individual mind as the primary
component in knowledge creation. This section argues that individuals occupy certain
positions within a matrix of rules, which enable them to articulate statements. This
knowledge matrix contains the rules of formation of objects, concepts, and themes, as
well as the positions which individuals may occupy in conversations. Appropriating
Foucault’s (1972) approach allows us to view organizational change as a shift in the
knowledge matrix rather than the shifting of individual minds.
In order to understand and appropriate Foucault’s (1972) approach one needs to clarify
his use of certain important terms. Foucault (ibid. p.107) describes discourse as “the
group of statements that belong to a single system of formation”. There is a system of
elements and relations that enables statements to come into existence; a discourse is a
group of statements that share the same formative system. This focuses the analysis of
knowledge specifically at the formative level, that is at the level just before the individual
says something. At the level, that enables individuals to think, talk or write about, this or
that. The concern is not with what things said may mean, but with how statements are
able to come into existence and remain in circulation and disappear. A statement is “the
modality of existence proper” to a group of signs (ibid. p.107). Foucault makes it clear
that statements are not to be viewed as units of grammar (sentences), or units of logic
(propositions). Statements are seen as articulations that exist because of a series of
conditions that function at a certain time and place. It is from this perspective that the
usefulness of Foucault’s ideas in organizational knowledge diagnostics can be
appreciated. What are the conditions that enable certain statements (spoken or written) to
be articulated and to survive within a business, while others are smothered or never
articulated?
Foucault (ibid. p.15) distinguished between two types of knowledge ‘connaissance’ and
‘savoir’. In this work these are referred to as first and second order knowledge. First
order knowledge concerns “the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules
that govern it” (ibid. p.15). It is at the level of concepts and systems ideas that an
individual’s actions are guided, at the level of a discipline or body of know-how. Second
order knowledge refers to “the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this
or that type of object to be given to connaissance [first order knowledge] and for this or
that enunciation to be formulated” (ibid. p.15, brackets mine). KSD provides a
framework for inquiry into the second order knowledge that is operating within an
organization. This inquiry produces a description of the system of formation that enables
the emergence and articulation of statements of know-how (first order knowledge) by
individuals within an organization. Business knowledge is seen as a system containing
two key components: a system of formation and bodies of knowledge. KSD’s term ‘body
of knowledge’ is synonymous with Foucault’s ‘discourse’, and depicts a group of
statements (things said or written) that share a common system of formation.
Business
First order knowledge: bodies
of knowledge (discourses).
Supports the emergence of
LA
Second order knowledge:
the system of formation.
Figure 2: A business knowledge system
Foucault (ibid.) approaches first order knowledge by probing what makes a body of
knowledge a unity. He does this by shifting his inquiry to the second order and searching
for common rules of formation that give rise to it. KSD follows this and assumes that the
unity that makes up a body of knowledge within an organization does not rest in its
coherence at the first level, but in the system of second order conditions that enables
statements to be made within it. Foucault (ibid. p.38) defines rules of formation as the
“conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and
disappearance) in a given discursive division” (body of knowledge). Foucault (1972)
divides systems of formation into four interrelated areas:
The formation of objects of conversation;
The formation of statement modalities;
The formation of concepts;
The formation of strategies or themes.
lod
Each of these divisions is organized into three elements that interact in the formation
process. KSD inquires into each of these in order to develop a map of the rules of
formation that are supporting a business’s first order bodies of knowledge. A framework
of questions that focus on the three elements and their interrelations within each
formative area is provided to guide inquiry.
The conversation system
Conversation is the medium in which the individuals as knowers meet the formative
system. This section describes conversation as a system consisting of individuals in
certain positions, their utterances, and the stakes that make the flow of utterances
meaningful. In keeping with the appropriation of post-modern philosophy into systems
methods, the description appropriates a conversation model from Lyotard’s (1984, 1988)
works. The meeting of individual worlds and the formative system is a dynamic that
integrates the intentions of individuals and the local rules and relations guiding the
formation of concepts and systems ideas. What is at stake in the conversation regulates
these two forces. This stake limits the possibilities of what individuals can say at any
point in the conversation. However, individual utterances are only reasonable against the
current flow of utterances. The flow of utterances forms the theme of the conversation.
Any utterance has to link to this theme or run the risk of being judged irrelevant. In most
business conversations, the formative system provides the stakes and themes that regulate
the range of possible utterances available to any individual knower. Individuals can
however change the stakes and themes of conversations by linking new systems ideas and
concepts into the conversation. Individual utterances are moves within a game. The
stakes and themes regulate the game. Conversations as systems are complex because
individuals both play, and are played by, the game.
Generative conversations aim to create new stakes, themes, concepts and systems ideas
that may be developed into new knowledge as guides for future action. The majority of
business conversations are regulative. They limit what can be spoken or written by any
individual. In contrast, generative conversation attempts to escape the regulatory forces
of the formative system by encouraging creative individual moves that link concepts and
systems ideas in new ways, thereby enabling the emergence of new stakes and themes. In
pursuing these purposes, this section is motivated by the issues of post-modern
philosophy that have been identified by Jackson (1991, p.299) as having “important
implications for systems thinking and practice”. Jackson highlights four issues:
« Logic and order — Post-modernism questions their feasibility in systems;
+ Progress — Performance and emancipation are considered potentially dangerous traps;
+ Power —Is ignored or simplified by systems thinking, but central to post-modernism;
« Language — Is assumed transparent by systems thinking, but is assumed deceptive by
post-modernist philosophy.
Lyotard’s key philosophical work is The Differend (1988). He reconceptualizes
conversation by focusing on the phrase as a unit of analysis. This is essentially a move
against Wittgenstein’s (1953) humanistic assumptions that give individuals the power to
dominate language games. Lyotard balances the power of the individual by focusing on
the pragmatic nature of the phrase. This paper interprets a phrase as a conversation
system-state. Over time, conversations move through a series of phrases. Phrases present
a universe consisting of instances: an addressor, addressee, a referent and a sense. The
addressor and the addressee are not independent of the phrase — it is not a message
passing between them. The phrase is a system-state, a constellation that “is defined by —
as it, in fact, defines — the situating of its instances (addressor, addressee, referent, sense)
with regard to one another” (ibid. p.193). The phrase is “is not a grammatical — or even
linguistic entity . . . but a pragmatic one” (ibid. p.193). Phrases, “which are moves in
language games” (Lyotard 1993, p.21), may include gestures, music and signals. The
instances of a phrase are simplified as follows (Lyotard 1988, p.14):
+ Referent: what a phrase is about, a pointer to ‘reality’;
+ Sense: what is conveyed, expressed and signified about the referent;
« Addressee: that to which the sense of the referent is addressed;
« Addressor: that from which or in the name of which, the sense is addressed.
Referent
Dy
Figure 3: The phrase universe and its instances as a conversation system-state
The interrelationships of the instances are arranged in the phrase universe. There may be
none, one or many of each of the instances in a phrase. In presenting his thesis, Lyotard
(1988, xii) outlines a structure in which a phrase — as a constellation of instances — is
constituted according to rules. These rules make up regimens such as “reasoning,
knowing, describing, recounting, questioning, showing, ordering, etc”. One cannot
translate a knowing phrase into a questioning phrase. However, phrases from different
regimens can be “linked one onto the other in accordance with an end fixed by a genre of
discourse” (ibid.). These stakes link phrases as pragmatic conversation system-states in
teleologies. Different conversations have different stakes — “to know, to teach, to be just,
to seduce, to justify, to evaluate, to rouse emotion, to oversee” (ibid.). Phrases are linked
in terms of these ends. The conflict and agonistics of language games now occur “not
between humans or between other entities; rather, these result from phrases” (Lyotard,
1988, p.137).
Phrases have to be linked, “...to link is necessary; how to link is contingent” (ibid. p.29).
The necessity of linking is ontological; the necessity of there being a next phrase “is a
presupposition for ‘objects’, for their ‘witnesses’ and so on” (ibid. p.66). This is the
comerstone of Lyotard’s approach to discourse: one must link phrases — human reality
depends on it. A ‘differend’ occurs where phrases cannot be linked, where individuals’
worlds encounter one another. It often occurs when different language games or bodies of
knowledge meet. It is “a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be
equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. One
side’s legitimacy does not imply the other’s lack of legitimacy” (ibid. p.xi). The differend
is that state where feelings are not yet communicable. This may demand the creation of a
new link across conversation system-states. It is important that the differend is not
‘smothered’ by litigation; we should rather search for idioms that can express them (ibid.
p.13). In organizations the differend may be a creative source of new knowledge. This
source of new idioms and knowledge is wasted if it is not respected, and if strangled
could lead to alienation of people and mere compliance, such as in businesses where
there is a “monopoly on procedures for the establishment of reality (ibid. p.4).
Lyotard argues that even in modern institutions “the limits the institution imposes on
potential language ‘moves’ are never established once and for all (even if they have been
formally defined)” (1984, p.17). He identifies two different kinds of progress in
knowledge: firstly, “a new move (a new argument) within the established rules” and
secondly, “the invention of new rules, in other words, a change to a new game” (ibid.
p.43). These are comparable to the notions of first and second order change (Watzlawick
et al, 1974). First order change emanates from solutions that are logical within the current
context of rules. Second order change occurs when the context of rules itself is changed.
In order to support the creation of new knowledge within organizations one needs to
escape the limits of regulative conversation that assume certain stakes and restrict the
kinds of moves (utterances) allowed. Such an intervention must free individual subjects
to collaborate in the formation of new stakes, patterns and themes. In providing structural
support for generative conversations, the purpose is to increase the probability of
participants making creative moves. This bottom-up approach lets the links and relations
emerge into themes and stakes. It focuses on relations between utterances and allows new
concepts, systems ideas and stakes to emerge. This is in contrast to traditional regulative
systems approaches that start with the systems purpose and logically deduce the required
parts and relations. This open, bottom-up approach encourages participants to explore
“the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think”
(Foucault, 1984, p.46). The heuristics are arranged here into five steps.
Step one: Becoming aware of games
The strategy, goals, and objectives that govern organizations also regulate phrases and
linkages. Participants become trapped in regulated conversations, which to some extent
shape how they think, speak and act. There is a way out of this trap. When attempting
generative conversations, it is first necessary to explain the idea of conversation as a
game. This enables participants to see the nature of regulative conversation and to avoid
becoming trapped in it. Watzlawick et al (1974, p.99) identifies Wittgenstein (1956,
p-100) as the first to point out the fact that once one becomes aware of the game one is in
one “can no longer naively go on playing”. Once there is an awareness of the regulative
nature of normal organizational conversation, steps can be taken to free oneself.
Step two: The linking rule
The strategy is to replace one game with another. Generative conversation is a game in
which one’s ability to link phrases is the stake. Instead of letting traditional business
goals unconsciously govern the linking process, one can consciously link in any desired
way. Generative conversation attempts to create new knowledge. It is creative and
divergent, and it builds new relations between previously separate bodies of knowledge.
There is only one rule in generative conversation and that is always link to the previous
phrase. This stops the occurrence of phrases that link to some higher regulatory business
stake. It is possible to link to any of the four instances: the addressor (AD), the addressee
(AS), the referent (R) or the sense (S). Some examples of linking are:
+ applying another S to the same R;
+ applying the same S to a different R;
« linking a new R to the current R;
+ unpacking the detail of a S or R;
« describing the containing R;
« describing the history or future of a R;
« linking the R to the history or future of an AD or AS;
+ re-describing a S or a R through metaphor;
+ Switching a S from a R to an AD or AS.
Step three: The guides
The following guides are presented to participants before beginning a generative
conversation. Each is in italics, followed by a supporting explanation.
Generative conversation is a game in which we play with ideas, not against each other.
This aims to reduce the amount of competition between players and focuses participants’
attention on concepts and systems ideas. If the conversation is playful then there is less
chance of defensive and limiting moves by participants.
Appoint a facilitator at the start to monitor the application of the rule. The facilitator
only points out when a phrase is not linked directly to the previous phrase. This keeps the
participants vigilant against using some higher level stake as a linking medium. It keeps
the linking fresh and open to possibility.
There is no rush; regulative conversation occurs at speed. The regulation of conversation
seems just to ‘happen’. One has to slow the conversation system in order to become
conscious of the regulative trap. One’s first thought is usually a regulated one. Discarding
the first thought enables creative linking.
Allow at least three seconds of silence between each phrase. This facilitates two things.
Firstly, it breaks up reactive jostling between any two participants by allowing others to
utter a link. Secondly, it allows for a listening to and respecting of the last phrase.
Watch the pull of habit and pattern. Be aware of the tension to link in a certain way. One
can only escape the trap of regulation when one becomes aware of it. Stepping back
allows participants to feel the tension of regulation.
Keep a notebook to jot down ideas so that they are not forgotten. Conversation only
allows one out of many possible links to occur. Participants may be unable to make their
linking utterance because someone else has already linked. Unless their thought can be
directly linked to the one that has ‘stolen’ the slot it will be lost. Noting it down frees
participants to concentrate on the current link. It also keeps a record of possibly useful
concepts and systems ideas.
Questions can form part of the conversation but must obey the linking rule. This stops
participants from using questions to judge the last phrase against some higher-level stake.
A question is only valid if it links directly to the last phrase.
Make use of creative misunderstanding. This supports a free interpretation of phrases. If a
participant misunderstands the sense of a phrase, he or she may make a creative link. In
this case, the game continues with the next link even if it arose from a misunderstanding.
Listen, take a few breaths, think, link. This sequence allows the participant to realize the
current conversation system-state before linking. Taking a breath after listening to a
phrase makes it difficult for a participant to make a purely reactive link since it is
unlikely that they will be able to talk while breathing in.
Remember, silence is a phrase. This is to remind participants that it is acceptable to have
periods of silence. Silence as a phrase does present the theoretical difficulty of having to
link to silence! Practically someone usually comes up with a link. If a group is totally
stumped and remains in silence for longer than three minutes, present a new phrase as a
starting point.
Try to link multiple previous phrases. By linking the last phrase to multiple earlier
phrases, participants can create new concept and systems idea combinations. As the
conversation develops, this combination of the last phrase with previous phrases becomes
easier.
The following ‘LINKING’ acronym serves as an overall guide for generative
conversations: Listen to the whole phrase; Inhale, take a few breaths; Nurse the current
theme; Kerb your initial reaction; Invent New moves Gently. The only part of the
acronym that needs further motivation is the ‘nursing of the current theme’. This is to
allow the emergence of new themes. New themes can emerge even when participants
strictly respect the linking rule. This occurs when a referent or sense is present through a
series of phrases (conversation system-states). The label of the referent or sense need not
be the same, as different phrases may provide varying explorative re-descriptions.
Step four: Setting a broad context
Goals and focus regulate conversations. Generative conversation begins with linking and
lets themes and stakes emerge as they may. It is a process of relating that supports the
possibility of thinking and saying something new. It can be used as an underlying
practice for any creative group process. A systems method may guide the group but all
interactions are based on the linking rule. When generative conversation is attempted as a
stand-alone approach, the starting context of the conversation needs to be as broad as
possible. Being too specific in defining the issue of concern may exclude possible phrases
and linkages.
Step five: Capturing new stakes and themes
If generative conversation supports other systems methods, then themes may emerge
from the structure of the containing approach. In pure generative conversation, themes
and stakes should be identified in later analysis of the conversation transcripts. The initial
stake of any generative conversation is the ability to link to the previous phrase. In
practice, the conversation develops lives of its own as themes first emerge and then begin
to regulate further linking. Jt is within these themes that the seeds of new knowledge
reside, in the form of new objects, concepts and systems ideas. Re-describing the themes
and stakes as systems purposes enables the application of contemporary systems
methods. They may then be explored using Checkland’s (1991) idea of a root definition
(a system to do x by y in order to achieve z) and accompanying activity system. The new
theme could also be modeled as a viable (Beer, 1985) or dynamic system (Forrester,
1961). Describing the new themes and stakes as systems purposes helps to build a richer
understanding of the new knowledge and its implications for human action.
References
Beer, S., (1985). Diagnosing the System for Organizations, John Wiley, Chichester.
Checkland, P and Scholes, J., (1991). Soft Systems Methodology in Action, John Wiley, Chichester.
Flood, R. L., & Jackson, M. C. (eds.), (1991). Critical Systems Thinking: Directed
Readings, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester.
Forrester, J., (1961). Industrial Dynamics, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Foucault, M., (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge, Routledge, London.
Jackson, M. C., (1991). Modernism, Post-Modernism and Contemporary Systems
Thinking. In Flood, R. L., and Jackson, M. C. (eds.), Critical Systems Thinking: Directed
Readings, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, pp. 287 — 301.
Kant L., (1787). Critique of Pure Reason, Everyman 1996, Guernsey.
Lewis, C. I., (1926). The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge, University of California
Publications in Philosophy 6. Reprinted in Moser & Vander Nat, 1995.
Lewis, C. L., (1929). Mind and the World-Order. Charles Scribners’s Sons, New York.
Lyotard, J. F., (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Lyotard, J. F., (1985). Just Gaming, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Lyotard, J. F., (1988). The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis.
Lyotard, J. F., (1993). Political Writings, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Skolimowski, H., (1994). The Participatory Mind: A New Theory of Knowledge and of
The Universe, Penguin Books, New York.
Watzlawick, P., Weakland, J., and Fisch, R., (1974). Change: Principles of Problem Formulation and
Problem Resolution, W. W. Norton and Co., New York.
Wittgenstein, L., (1953). Philosophical Investigations, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.
Wittgenstein, L., (1956). Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Basil Blackwell,
Oxford.
CC BY-NC-SA 4.0