ELEMENTS OF CONTROL IN ALLIANCE FORCE DEVELOPMENT
by
C. White
Operations Research Division
Abstract
This paper introduces an aggregate view of factors and policies that
ean influence the development of military forces in two international
alliances which see each other as potential adversaries. The growth
of forces observed in the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances is taken
as a reference mode. A conceptual System Dynamics Model ts desertbed
which can accommodate a number of different perspectives on this
issue.
SHAPE Technical Centre This document consists
The Hague of iv + 13 pages
(excluding covers)
-ili-
TABLE ur
1. INTRODUCTION
2. INITIAL MODEL DESCRIPTION
3. DISCUSSION AND MODEL EXTENSION
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
REFERENCES
PP-181
CONTENTS
Page
12
13
oP
=e
1. INTRODUCTION
Press reports in recent years have referred to the growth in military
capability achieved by both the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances since their
inception. The subject is particularly topical today with each side
promising further increases in its forces in the near term. It might be
argued that there appears to be no control in what the media calls "the
arms race" and that one is witnessing a state of "runaway inflation", or
positive feedback somewhere in the force buildup system. However, given
the proclaimed alliance policies and the real-world constraints that bound
them it is more rational to assume that this system is goal seeking
although it may be difficult for each side to be specific about its
respective goal.
This paper discusses how differing viewpoints of the force development
behaviour witnessed in the two alliances can be illustrated by means of a
conceptual system dynamics model.
Where signs are shown in the diagrams the sign convention (ref. 1)
is: if the variable at an arrow head changes in the same direction as the
variable at the tail of the arrow, a positive sign is shown, while if it
changes in the opposite direction a negative sign is shown.
The model in Fig. 1 is described first and is expanded into Fig. 2 and
3 during the discussion. The two symmetrical circular loops in Fig. 1 will
be referred to as the "force design loops" and the presence of one negative
sign in each loop indicates its assumed goal seeking nature. The following
text will bring out how the competition between the two goal seeking loops
over the value of a common variable ("actual force ratio") can lead to
continuous growth in each side's "force strength".
PP-181 oP
NATO
FORCE :
+| STRENGTH
DELAY
- +
STRENGTH |-+
NATO OTHER ACTUAL WP OTHER
POLITICAL RATE OF FORCE RATE OF POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC & |e] INVESTMENT RATIO INVESTMENT feg———J ECONOMIC &
TECHNICAL IN FORCES we IN FORCES TECHNICAL
FACTORS + NATO + FACTORS
DELAY ven / \ uy DELAY
+ +
FORCE |y. FORCE RATIO] [FORCE RATIO _[ Force
REQUIREMENTS kag@—— PERCEIVED PERCEIVED | el REQUIREMENTS
GENERATOR BY NATO BY WP GENERATOR
_ { |
NATO we
DESIRED DESIRED
FORCE RATIO FORCE RATIO
81157-NU-A3
Figure 1 WATO and WP Force Development - Initial Model
2. INITIAL MODEL DESCRIPTION
The words "force strength" appearing at the top of the loops imply
the inclusion of everything that contributes to an alliance's military
capability. The concept of a "force ratio" is meaningful to most people
in considerations of both deterrence and war-fighting capability. Detailed
understandings of "force ratio" certainly differ, however, and reliable
quantification is elusive. For the purposes of this discussion the
“practical difficulties of identifying precisely what is meant by the term
"force ratio" can be left aside - acceptance of the concept is enough.
On this basis it can be postulated that each alliance has its own
perception of the force ratio and has policies which drive towards the
achievement of a "desired force ratio". For NATO and the Warsaw Pact
countries the "desired force ratio" is shown at the bottom of the diagram
as a separate input to the respective force design loop. (There is,
incidentally no significance in defining force ratio as WP force strength
divided by NATO force strength. Taking the reciprocal as the definition
would merely change the places in the force design loops at which the
negative signs appear).
The "force ratio" perceived by each side is determined after a delay
following the “actual force ratio". The words "perceived" and "delay" here
imply the military intelligence communities at work, their associated time
requirements, predictive capabilities, and probable measurement errors. All
arguments regarding perceptions of the opponent's intentions are subsumed
in this activity.
In each side's “force requirements generator", a comparison of the
perceived with the desired force ratio, combined with a knowledge of the
current force strength, leads to changes in the "rate of investment in
forces". The term "investment" is intended to cover all resources of
finance and manpower. The delay between the “force requirements generator"
and the "rate of investment in forces" accounts for the alliance planning
process and decision time.
PP-181 oP
The "other political, economic and technical factors" whieh influence
the "rate of investment in forces" aré shown for simplicity initially as
exogenous inputs to each alliance's force design loop. Finally, the delay
between “rate of investment in forces" and "NATO (or WP) force strength"
represents the research, development and production cycle times, force
training times; etc.
nn 404 Jap
abe
3. DISCUSSION AND MODEL EXTENSION
The basis for this model is the assumption that each alliance views the
other as a potential adversary. This may be a simplified view but it is hard
to see how it can seriously be disputed in today's world. The first point to
recognise is that the model's symmetry provides an unbiassed starting point
for the discussion of certain policy issues; The asymmetry in force
capability claimed by each side, whether it is real or the result of
differences in viewpoint, can be accommodated by arguing differences in
content and emphasis (i.e. considering different values) for the factors
shown in the diagram.
Two observations of a more general nature can be made. Firstly, if the
force design loops rather than the exogenous political, economic and technical
factors are dominant in determining force strength, then in the long term,
the alliance with the more responsive loop is going to be able to pull the
actual force ratio closer to its own desired force ratio. In other words
one can demonstrate the advantages accrued by the alliance that can modify
or reduce one or more of the three delays identified in its force design loop.
On the other hand, if the rate of investment in forces is totally dominated by
the other factors then efforts to modify two of the delays (those due to the
intelligence efforts and the alliance planning efforts) are futile.
In all probability both the perceived threat and the other factors play
a réle but in the West one has the uneasy feeling that NATO responds less to
the threat signals than it should and pays more attention to the "other
factors". This leads to the second observation which concerns the relative
dominance of the feedback loops and exogenous inputs between the alliances.
It is tempting to suggest that on the Warsaw Pact side the force design
loop which strives to meet the desired WP force ratio dominates the other
political and economic factors in determining investment in WP forces. It
was suggested above that the reverse seems to be true for NATO. The
Warsaw Pact might therefore benefit more from reducing the delays in its
force design loop than NATO would following corresponding action. Each side
PP-181 uP
can seek to alter the relative importance of the force design loop and of the
other factors. The Warsaw Pact could aim to degrade the Western economies
by influencing the flow of oil. NATO could use economic measures to shift
the dominance in WP force development from the design loop to the other
factors. Such activities run the risk that they might lead to military
intervention and it is here that the weakness of such a simple model becomes
apparent.
Figures 2 and 3 introduce successive modifications of the initial model
designed to permit expression of these and further concerns discussed below.
Referring to figure 2, each side's awareness of its own current rate of
investment in forces combined with information gained (after a delay) of the
other side's expenditures, can serve to stabilise the force design loops.
Stabilising in this context means avoiding large oscillations in the force
ratio and does not mean stopping the force enhancement on either side from
continuing. The analogy is with "velocity" or "rate" feedback in Control
Theory in which advance notice of a trend, given proper emphasis to avoid
over reaction by the system, can be instrumental in securing a more controlled
system response.
From the standpoint of military deterrence strategists on each side
who perceive aggressive intentions in the other, world peace may ultimately
be best served by neither side ever being thought to have achieved its
desired force ratio. The smaller that the fluctuations in force ratio are
allowed to be, then the smaller would seem to be the risk of precipitate
military action encouraged by one side's perception of a temporary overriding
advantage. The stabilising loops shown in figure 2 help to keep the force
ratio between bounds while force improvement programmes continue.
It is interesting to note that the model shown in figure 2, which
encapsulates a large part of the arms race argument, could also illustrate
the course of a controlled reduction in forces by both sides in the event
of disarmament. The model could accommodate a downward spiral in force
strength while preserving the force ratio within acceptable limits. The
impetus for such a change in direction would however, have to come from
we
NATO
FORCE FORCE
+] STRENGTH STRENGTH |-+
DELAY DELAY
- +
NATO OTHER ‘ACTUAL
POLITICAL RATE OF FORCE RATE OF
TECHNICAL © SENS RAT INVESTMENT
IN FORCES |. ( we ) 7 {IN FORCES
FACTORS + X ‘NATO 7 +4 |
\ petay \ wan DELAY / opty |
\ i ; + + ‘a “
{ FORCE |4. FORCE RATIO] [FORCE RATIO| _[ Force
1 REQUIREMENTS PERCEIVED PERCEIVED REQUIREMENTS |
\ GENERATOR BY NATO BY we GENERATOR !
= /
DELAY \ i PO act DELAY
1 NATO WP /
NATO PERCEPTION | | PERCEPTION OF WP
\ DESIRED OF WP RATE OF! | NATO RATE OF DESIRED /
\ FORCE RATIO INVESTMENT INVESTMENT FORCE RATIO] /
\ : a as 7
N ee 7
a een hea ey get
81215 -NU-A3 Figure 2 Stabilising the Force Design Loops
WP OTHER
POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC &
TECHNICAL
FACTORS
=/-
outside the force design loops. Arms control agreements constraining
weapons development and acquisition such as the one reached between the
US and USSR in the area of Anti-Ballistic Missiles can be effective in
limiting the rate of investment in forces. Arms control verification
procedures become particularly important in this regard as they affect
the timeliness and accuracy of each side's perceptions of both the force
ratio itself and the future trends. Each side has a strong requirement
for controlling the dissemination of information on its forces for reasons
of military security. This requirement, which follows naturally from
perceptions of aggressive intentions, acts to inhibit each side's efforts
to track the other's force developments and hence degrades the efforts
to stabilise the force ratio. The open publicity given to many defence
expenditures and decisions in the NATO arena contrasts sharply with the
more covert nature of these activities in the WP countries. WP planners
may therefore have an advantage over their NATO counterparts with regard
to monitoring trends in the force ratio and formulating appropriate
responses. The "Spy Satellites" in use by each side can be viewed as
useful verification tools for arms control negotiators and also as a means
for stabilising the force ratio by preventing significant changes in forces
and trends from going unnoticed. Negotiations between NATO and the WP
such as those conducted under the umbrella of MBFR (Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions) offer a possible route for initiating a downward movement
in force strength but have notso far met with success, It is in the outer
loops of figure 3 that effective arms control mechanisms are sought and are
potentially to be found. (In figure 3 the stabilising loops introduced in
figure 2 should be understood as remaining in the model and are only omitted
from the diagram for the sake of clarity in the discussion which follows).
There will be other common variables between the alliances, such as
raw material resources, that will lead to further competition between them.
Political and economic circumstances (or "threats") as well as the military
threat all play a réle in force development. The delays shown in the new
outer loop of figure 3 between one alliance's "other factors" and the other
alliance's perception of those factors accounts for the time it takes to
PP-181 oP
oe
we
PERCEPTION
eee,
OF
NATO's .
OTHER FACTORS
NATO we
FORCE FORCE
+| STRENGTH STRENGTH ]-++
DELAY DELAY a
- + Y
NATO OTHER ACTUAL WP OTHER
POLITICAL RATE OF FORCE RATE OF POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC & |e INVESTMENT RATIO INVESTMENT keg] ECONOMIC &
TECHNICAL IN FORCES we IN FORCES TECHNICAL
FACTORS ¥ ‘NATO + FACTORS
rt TO.
ty DELAY DELAY DELAY DELAY ri
Pan + + ir:
Sy FORCE |4. FORCE RATIO] [FORCE RATIO _| “Force 4:
ey REQUIREMENTS fl———j PERCEIVED PERCEIVED }——ge4 REQUIREMENTS 4s
‘ GENERATOR BY NATO BY WP GENERATOR Zoe
Ny = : : + ¢
N ! . ge
Y . ‘“ < . oa .
OE ~ Se NATO . ‘, we uc @
bay ~—~p}_ DESIRED . . DESIRED je — a
"he, FORCE RATIO o FORCE RATIO
81158-NU-A3
NATO
PERCEPTION
OF
WP's
OTHER FACTORS
Figure 3 NATO and WP Force Development
Extended Model
~6-
-10-
analyse these variables. Perceptions (or misperceptions!) of the state of
one side's factors can then influence, after a further delay, policy making
and developments in the other side's political, economic and technical
spheres of activity.
The "desired force ratios" will probably change over time in response
to changes that occur in the political, economic and technical factors
pertaining to each side (hence the new links shown with dashed lines in
Fig. 3). Moreover, the deliberate use of bluff or deception to alter one
side's perceptions of the overall threat may well be as effective as a
variation in force strength in striving to achieve one's own desired force
ratio.
By the additions of these extra links, the mechanism by which each side
tries to shift the dominance in the other's force development from or to the
"force design loop" is conceptually included in the model.
i
Changes in perceptions of the overall threat can be brought about not
only by overt variations in force strength but also by means of the many
avenues open to nations for diversionary tactics. Such tactics might
extend from simple physical deceptions, through subtle propaganda, to a few
well chosen words spoken by political leaders at the right time.
Given the risk of military intervention referred to earlier, each
alliance's freedom of action in political and economic spheres is influenced
by what it perceives the military threat to be. The dotted links in Figure 3
are added to reflect this interdependence.
Examination of the literature on strategic issues reveals differing
schools of thought on the reasons for (or even the existence of) "the arms
race". There are those who point to pressures arising from the momentum
of the "military/industrial complex" within each alliance as the dominant
factor driving force development. Their argument puts the emphasis on the
‘rate of investment in forces - force strength - other factors' loops
rather than on those loops which include perceptions of force ratio.
PP-181 oP
Tis
The concept of "force strength" itself merits expansion into at least
three of its well publicised components - strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear
and conventional force strength (the "triad"). Discussions on "the arms
race" tend to relate to one or more of these elements at a time. The IISS
report on the Military Balance (Ref. 2) confirms a growth in capability in
conventional and tactical nuclear forces in both alliances. However, papers
by Wohlstetter, (e.g. Ref. 3) question the commonly held view that there
is an arms race (in the sense of a real growth in capability) in the area of
strategic nuclear weapons. His assessment of the facts would suggest that
the dominant factors responsible for the development and acquisition of
these weapons lie in technical, political, and economic fields rather than
in more direct military capability comparisons between the alliances. In
terms of Figure 3 Wohlstetter's arguments translate into an emphasis on
the outer loops as determinants of policy in this area. A model expanded
further to accommodate the three components of the triad might provide a
medium for describing the presumed interaction between conventional, tactical
nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons holdings as contributors to deterrence.
An approach using influence diagrams might complement and enhance an
appreciation of the subtleties which pervade the literature on the analysis
of deterrence issues.
PP-181 JP
249s
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A conceptual System Dynamics model has been used to support a
qualitative discussion on alliance force development. At this stage the
utility of the model shown in Figure 3 lies in its potential for focusing
discussion and for demonstrating the common ground and the interdependencies
between what are often considered to be quite different schools of thought.
It might, for example, be reasonable to argue with the aid of Figure 3 that
each school of thought on the arms race has been right for part of the
time. Within the loop structure can be found the basis for a number of
differing points of view. An analysis of the historical background could
show that the dominance in this area of policy making shifts from one loop
to another following changes in alliance circumstances,
The degree to which the aggregate variables identified in the diagrams
are open to interpretation needs to be recognised. Bearing this in mind it
may prove to be more challenging to try to find a rational viewpoint on the
arms race question which cannot be accommodated within the framework of
this conceptual model. The System Dynamics approach appears to offer potential
as a means for broadening the understanding of the course of alliance force
development.
PP-181 uP
-13-
REFERENCES
fie "Management System Dynamics", R.G. Coyle, 1977, John Wiley and Sons.
2. "The Military Balance 1980-1981", The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1980.
3 "Is there a Strategic Arms Race?", Albert Wohlstetter
Foreign Policy Number 15, Summer 1974.
PP-181 oP
3
DISCUSSION AND MODEL EXTENSION |
The basis for this model is the assumption that each alliance views the
other as 2 potential adversary. This may be a simplified view but it is hard
to see how it can seriously be disputed in today's world. The first point to
recognise is that the model's symmetry provides an unbiassed starting point
for the discussion of certain policy issues. The asymmetry in force
cepability claimed by each side, whether it is real or the result of
differences in viewpoint, can be accommodated by arguing differences in
content and emphasis (i.e. considering different values) for the factors
shown in the diagram.
Referring to figure 2, each side's awareness of its own current rate of
‘investment in forces combined with information gained (after a delay) of the
other side's expenditures, can serve to stabilise the force design loops.
stabilising in this context means avoiding large oscillations in the force
ratio and does not mean stopping the force enhancement on either side from
continuing. The analogy is with "velocity" or "rate" feedback in Control
Theory in which advance notice of a trend, given proper emphasis to avoid
‘over reaction by the system, can be instrumental in securing a more controlled
system response.
WTO OTE rar one
PoumicaL,
‘
frcocaL
FACTORS,
TAD
estat
Jroace patio
Figure 2 Stabilising the Force Design Loops
95
There will be other common variables between the alliances, such as
raw material resources, that will lead to further competition between them.
Political and economic circumstances (or “threats") as well as the ‘military
threat all play a role in force development. The delays shown in the new
outer loop of figure 3 between one alliance’s “other factors" and the other
alliance's perception of those factors accounts for the time it takes to
analyse these variables. Perceptions (or misperceptions!) of the state of
one side's factors can then influence, after a further delay, policy making
and developments in the other side's political, economic and technical
spheres of activity.
The “desired force ratios" will probably change over time in response
to changes that occur in the political, economic and technical factors
pertaining to each side (hence the new links shown with dashed ines in
Fig. 3). Given the risk of military intervention each alliance's freedom
of action in political and economic spheres is influenced by what it
perceives the military threat to be. The dotted links in Figure 3 are
added to reflect this interdependence,
ca
Peacertion
‘oF
NATO",
oven sactons|
Tae
penetrtion
C3
wos
oven Factoes
Figure 3 HATO and WP Force Deveiopmnt - Extenied Model
