Table of Contents
Executive Force: A Dynamic Model for Strategic-Level
Decision Making in Politico-Military Conflicts
Martin Gilljam, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)
Bjorn Bakken, Norwegian Defence Leadership Institute (FIL)
Abstract
This paper presents a modd with a holistic view on the forces goveming a “typical” large-scale
politicomilitary oonflic: As such, the modd oould be used to highlight various consequences of
nation decision-making in reetlife conflids such as eg. the USA-Iraq conflict the Israd/Arab
conflict and so on. However, the model itsdf is designed in a vay simplistic feshion, so thet it
wil never povide decisive solutions to any specific conflict - sill it gves vay gered
guiddines that may apply to ay inferetioml seaumity conflict The modd is amenly under
devdopment, and a prototype has been tested on 74 students at the Norwegian Defence Staff
College (FSTS). Students report that the modd succeeds in focusing on the holistic view, the
aiitical ability to see military and political means as an inseparable whole, and the importance of
the decision-making group having a common understanding of the situation.
Key words: system dynamics, modd, decision making, expaiment, military, political
1 INTRODUCTION
Decision-making in organizational and managed ooniexts is a highly complex task This hes
long been recognized (Simon, 1956; 1978). Most reallife situations require that the decision
maker has acquired the skills of his profession through 1eeblife expaience This is a farfrom
tivial demand, when decisions and their consequences are (widely) separated in time and space
Repeated instances of what might appear to be the same problem, in teality differ on important
characteristics, which only ocontibutes to the difficulties people have when it oomes to make
velid and robust inferences.
These diffiailties ae dso present in the typical nilitay staff exatisa Whee a higherlad
comba/conflict situation is simulated This kind of exercise requires considerable resourves and
takes days or weeks to conduct. Replays to investigate altemative outcomes are just too costly.
However, the only “reatlife’ operational experience most nilitay officas will get duting thar
career, is what they get through more or less realistic exercises.
The main obstade in contemporary devdopmrent for higherlevd militay taining sears to be
the desire to achieve the greatest possible technical detail and accuwacy in the simulations that
are to support such taining In practic the aeation of higherled smildions has ben
regarded as a problem of integaling/aggregating as many loweelevd (tactical) smilations as
possile, and in real time As a consequence devdopment budgets “explode”, and the real
Jeaming remains with the devdopment team and the application testers.
Minimalist Decision Training (MDT), which will be described in this paper takes the opposite
“aogle of attack’. With this approach, the simulation moda focuses nanowly on the problem at
hand, which (for an operational or strategic commande) is usually rdated to the pavepiion and
handling of dynamic dilemmes, featuring aspects such as time lags, feedback and nonlireatities
Most, if not all, of the technical detail concaming weapon pldfomms is just let out of the
simulation moda.
2 MDT CONCEPT
A mininelist decision trainer (MDT) is a vay simple and peckgogicdly designed smuladion
supported system for use in the taining of highe-levd commandes (both existing and tobe).
The training focus is to build and rehearse the commande's ability to quiddy fom a mental image
of a combei/oonflic: situation, axl to inhitivdy compehend Wet ae the likey combined
outcomes of the inherent dynamics goveming the situation, and the decisions made to act upon
the station This ability is required when it comes to meking rapid decisions of high qudity -
essential for achieving success in (over)complex and “dramatic” situations.
MDT is aimed & putting a commander or the command group in chage of own logistics and
Operations resources in a scenario. The soema@io may oontain any implied or eqilicit mission
The resources reflect a combined joint opeadtion; typically the lower limit of resources will be
less than a lwmdred units representing land, sea ard air resources, with upper limit being les
than a thousand The representation need not be resticed to the militay oganization -
Political, psychological, economical, and legl meas of exating influeme may dso be
induded
MDT bdongs to a dass of taining solutions refered to as “Management Hight Simulators’
(MEFS) - a tem invented at MIT’s Sloan School of Management (Bakken @& al, 1992). Instead of
individuds flying a simulated aicaft, a management team “flies’ the compordion, ceating
products that “fly in the marketplace” through making appopide stalegic, opaationml and
tactical decisions. MDT represents the best of tabletop war games and MES for its playas: the
operational level commander- ormore typical - his associated command group.
Tsaacs and Senge (1992) argue that micoworlds used in a taining context will dleviate many, if
not mos, of the so-called “baniess to leaming’ in dynamic exvironments. Thee is an apparent
tisk, however, that such tools - simplified as they are, and often to the extreme - could be misused
An example of such mistse ood be to support short-sighted/nanow-minded views and
polices, aising (more or less consciously) because of inacouaidy fonmlafed modds or of
misinterpreted feedbackcfrom the moda.
3 PREVIOUS MODELS
Since Summer 2001, FH! and AIL have built and tested two simple potoiype modds for nilitay
Operations. These are implemented at the Norwegian Defence Staff College (FSTS) and used as
an educational toal.
Moda 1 is desgned for individial playeas, and no extemal opadior is necded The moda
simulates a deployment task, and the decisiomlevd is stategic to opadtional. The whole game
can be played in less than one minute, but the aveage time would be about two or three
minues. The player's mission is to deploy combat units and supplies, and the two deployment
lines have different dynamic behaviors. One principle the player will lean fiom this gare is to
concentrate forces to pre-empt the enemy, who then will be deened from deploying more units.
The player will dso lean the importance of dlocating add balancing his resoucess in m
appropriate manner (strategic logistics focus).
Moda 2 (Bakken and Gilliam, 2008) is payed by two commend gous - or two smgle
commanders - who act as opposing forves. The opadiion is high intensity and is smulded a an
operational to tactical levd. The soenatio depicis one nation’s tenitorial attack on the other As
such, it conveys the view of a “Classical” warfare situation While having the advantage of being
well known (at leest in theory) to most playes, this kind of situation appears less relevent today
than it did 15-20 years ago. However the main emphasis is of course on leaming oatain basic
concepts, which to a great extent ae context-free Each player or group of playas, will make
three types of decisions every simulated day: How many Ground Fore units to employ at each
combet area, and how many Ctuise Missiles and Special Force units to support ongoing combat
or to disturb transportation routes between combat areas. One game will take in the region of 42
hours and requires interaction with a graphical user interface in addition to the moda itself.
4 EXECUTIVE FORCE
“Executive Force” is the latest modd devdoped by FFI and FIL. The modd presents a holistic
view on the forces goveming a typical laye-scdle politico-militay conflic: As such, the modd
could be used to highlight various consequences of ration decisionmaking in rellife
conflicts such as eg. the USA-lraq conflict, the Isad/Arab conflict’ and so on However the
modd itsdf is designed in a vay simplistic fashion, so thet it will never povide decsive
solutions to any specific conflic: - dill it gives vey gena guiddines that ney aplly to ay
infemaional security conflic: The modd is sill under developing (this is the first vesion, and it
hes not been revised since the first (and only) full scale test), consequently the modd will not be
41 Scenario
Country A bordes on county B, and the border area has a huge amount of natural resources.
The C-people live in this aea but mainly on the A side of the border The two counties ae
given two different desciptions of the situation (about 2 wiitten pages). Country A hes received
hints thet the C-people ae planing a libaty fight to etablish ther own side County A
suspect that B are supporting the Gpeople to get their hands on A’s natural resources, and that
they also support the comdey unfounded tenor activities in the area County B, on the other
and, observes the Gpeople’s justified struggle against the evil oppressors - county A. B fear
that the inhumane conditions of the C-people will resilt in a disaster with a lage mmber of
refugees, unless something is done.
4.2 A model overview
The schematic figure below (figure 1) shows an overview of the modd, from A’s point of view.
The modd is symmetical, and the structure is almost exactly the same for B (it only diffas in
the way the two counties ae providing the financial income). The interference between the two
countries is merely the different decisions taken by the other county and the nillitay foes
located in the disputed area (respectively Disp area A and B). Therefore, when this is added to
the structure of county A (es shown in the figure), the overview is complde (when you bear in
mind the symmety). The figue shows the moda’s four main siuctures (the sub modds):
Militay Fore, Intelligence Finances and Performance. The figure is just an oveview of the
moda, and some parts of the modd will be described in more defail laterin the paper.
A’s Intelligence
A
Int
OC) Intelligence
effort
ss ae st
= B forces
N © reported
A’s Finances a A’s Performace \
B in disp
Strengthen Mil Weakened Mil area
infrastructure
infrastructure
Mil infrastr
Financial
Financial
pending
income
Strengthen Weakened
Pub opinion
Financial
balance
Pol Political stand-point
Mil Military manoeuvre Mil Mil
Act Level of activity Act Act
Mis Use of missiles Mis Mis
Int Use of intelligence Psy Psy
Decision | Psy Psychological operations
PlayerA J inv Investment
Figure 1 A schematic view of the model “Executive Force’
The mein part of the notation in figure 1 should be quite familiar to most readers, but we have
added a feature that hopefully will ease the understanding of this model. Decisions are marked
by a pole, |, followed by the code for the particular decision(s), Pol, Mil, etc. The Ieter on top
indicates the county. The aows between decision-poles, flows and converters indicate influence
on this particular variable.
4.2.1 | Model decisions and politico-military domains
Perhaps the most appopiiale way to begin eqoring the moda would be to sat with the
politicomilitary domains represented in “Executive Force’ and the range of decisions each
Player has to their disposal. There are five domains represented in the modd, and each of these
demands eqpicit decisions: political influence militay fore intelligence psychological opaations
(psyops) and financial means.
In the modd, the political means ae quite smple Almost as simple as “Either you're with us,
or youze against us’, but not quite You choose to be either politically coopadtive which is
equal to follow the laws s& out by the infemadiond socidy, or politically independent which
means you decide whet intemaionl laws add resticions you should obey. The politica
standpoint is the only mean that is without any financial cost. However thee’s no such thing as
a free lunch, and the decision will be an important factor when calailating the financial income
(which will be described late). Basically, the intamationd socidy will only agaove when you
ae following the ground tules, st out by the UN, and don't break any previous agreements. On
the other hand, being friendly towards your long time enemy, and sharing important resources
with neighbors, might not always be the safest way to keep your own population happy. It will
also restrain your posshilities in the other domains sme you ae required to follow the
intamational convention.
The decisions to be made in the military domain ae more extensive than in the political domain.
The player must decide whet nilitayy manewes to conduct which activity leve the formes
should have and consider the use of missiles The military manewers ae conducted with
deployment of military forces from the home bese to the disputed area as a percentage of total
military capacity. If the capacity rises (tough investments), moe nilitay pasomd will
automatically be sent to the disputed area The same will happen if personnd at the front are lost,
because the percentage has been reduced. There is of course a time lag from the decision is made
(this goes for all the decisions) and implemented, due to information flow, but the deployment
itsaf is dso hassed with ddays, and the dday is a fimction of mmber of pasona in
‘transportation and extent of fighting going on.
The force activity tdls the military forces what ther main god is to attivdy/aggressivdy
search for situations that need action (pre-emptive), or just defend when atfacked The nilitay
forces will only influence the militay infrastructure if the aggressive instructions ae the case.
This also applies for any loss of military forces, except when nissiles ae used - that catainly
will kill a lot of enemies, regardless the instructions. Missiles ae sent (and effective) as soon as
the decision is mack (the only time delay being the information flow).
The playas have a fixed amount of resources a their disposal for the use of intelligence
(surveillance) and psychological operations. The decision is basically to dllocate the resources
between intelligence, friendly psyops (infonvation opations) and aggressive psyops (ddibaately
concealing the truth). By emphasizing one of these three tasks, the others become less effective
The intelligence will give the playa more acamde infonretion about the opponen’s nilitay
maneuvas. The more money spent the less noise will follow the intelligence report. Both the
friendly and aggressive psyops will give you advantages in the pubic opinion The friendly psyops
is the less effective of the two, but on the other side you don't have to wony the campaign will
backlash, due to exposure of “shady” operations.
The decision in the financial domain is merely to consider the need for investment, ie, expansion
of the military force (however al the decisions in the other domains have implications on the
financial balance, so one might argue that these decisions also should be induded in the
financial domain). Thee ae two ways of consuming the financid resouves By investrents
(acquisition of extra military forces) and operational costs. The latter will be active as long as
there is any military foes in (or in deployent to or fiom) the disputed aea, or if missiles,
intelligence or psyops is being used. Investment can give you greet advantages in the form of
increesed military capecity, but it is a dangerous instument The time of “ddiveay” of exta
military forces is vey long and the investment must be done way in atvance One should also
keep in mind that both the nilitay situation and your financia abilities ood be denaicdly
changed when reinforcement finally arrives.
All you do in this moda (except making political decisions) will trouble your financid balance
as can be seen in figure 1. Thankfully, there is a way to raise funds as well. Each day a fresh
amount of finances in added to the balance as a function of the public opinion And hee is the
main asymmetry in the modd: A’s fundraising is a function of the intemetiona public opinion,
while B ae dependent of the satisfaction of ther own people This might se off the two
countries in different directions regarding their goal for the campaign.
4.2.2 Performance
So far, we have only disoussed the different domains and the means to influence them It’s about
time to consider what the players are supposed to aim fir whet their goal should be Well, to be
connect; the goal is up to the players to decide (as will be explained later in the paper). But some
Obvious benchmarks would be the public opinion (both infamation and domestic), the nilitay
infrastructure ard the financial balance This should also include the opporent’s situation, as
wel as ther own Although both paticpants must define ther opponents failure to be as
important as (or equivalent with) their own success for the game to be refered as a zaosum
game, it has some zerosum game characteristics. Not only can it be a goal in itsdf to weaken
the opponent as much as possible - an impaired opporent is less likey to inflid danege on
yoursdf,
Apart from the financial balance (which can be argued to medy be a mean to obtain other
goals) the performance is, of course, described in the submodds as A’s and B’s Peformance
respectively. From figure 1 one can se that own military infrastruc will be strengthen by own
military forces in the disputed area, and weakened by the opponent's presence in the same area.
The forces must be at a cattain level of activity to have an effect. To achieve any increase in
own infrastructure (or reduction of the opponents), the own forces must be aggressive However,
be ware of the extra expenses this will lead to - not to mention the reection fiom the public
opinion!
The public opinion is more complex than the nilitay accomplishment (just ask George jr).
Fosily, it coves both the infemdiond ani the domestic opinion Second, it is affected (both
direct and indirect) by most of the decisions that ae made by both playas. As if that wasn't
complex enough, most of these decisions are combined to give an effect. This means, for instance,
that a oatain political standpoint can give both weekened and stengthened public opinion,
depending on your nilitay strategy. To be more specific the intamaiond public opinion will
be pleesed if you announce that you ae following the ground mules, but will be double anqy if
you are lamching missiles a the save time (this will be desaibed in more ceil in th next
chaptey). In addition, loss of personnd will obviously affect the home opinion in a negetive way.
43 Challenges for the participants
4.3.1 The core concepts
The modd integrates the influence of all domains as a whole - this is only prattical if each
domain is “stripped” of technical detail and complexity. What remains are the core concepts:
¢ The decisions to be mack (as thoroughly described earlier in the paper)
¢ Thedilenmes presented (implicitly rather than explicitly)
¢ The resoutves involved (which have acquisition and operating costs as described in
connection with the financial domain)
¢ How resources are combined to equip operations (eg, how political and military means
needs to be coordinated in order to achieve a good result, and that it can be more cost-
effective to use a balanced mix of means, rather than maximizing the use of one single
domain)
° Theeffects of applying resources on various operational/strategic “targets” (the
importance of resisting the temptation of using all available means towards one single
target, without considering that the goal may change during the campaign)
* Theoveall goal(s) to be achieved (there may be a hierarchy of goals and therefore be
able to pronitizing between different goals that are mutually attainable, and willing to
adjust the goals if necessary)
Since this just is a prototype, and changes may oocur (both in the model design and in importance
of concepts), only ane core concept will be presented in more depth; the concept of combination
of domains, described on the next page.
The operation types may have different time scales, oost and effect on the dynamics. Although
the impact of each domain (structure as represatied in modd) may look smple wren isolated,
the complexity increases dramatically when integrated Not to mention the resulting behavior!
So, even if the participants ae presented with the whole modd (and think it’s fairly eesy!), the
potential for misperception is great They create a mental mode that can be confirmed both by
misinteyeed the schematic view of the modd and (sdected) ach incidents when playing.
Bakken and Vamraak (in forthooming SDC-proceedings, 2008) descibe this type of misperception
4.3.2 Combination of domains
In “Executive Force’ thee ae several domains that combines in a way thet the resiting
behavior of the moda diffeas from what one would inhiitivdy expec: The sum of the results
from two different decisions, made uncer the same oonditions, may not equal the result from the
two decisions combined This is eqlidt imperented in the moda. Two oonbiraiions of
military and political domain will be disawxsed in this chapter the playas’ political decisions
and the relation between the political and military decision of each player
Table 1, bdow, indicates the resulting behavior of different combinations of your own and the
opponent’s political decision (es you might remember the two fesse political standpoints ae
cooperative and independent), where N and I ae the immediate impact in respectivdy your own
‘ational and intermational public opinion (which will lead to charge in the public opinion). The
direction of change is given with one or more (stonge) plusses and mimuses (0 if status quo).
The table shows that both our own national and infemetioral support is slightly strengthened
when both playas are politically coopaative (od number 1).
Opponent’s political standpoint
Cooperative Independent
Own political Cooperative 1 NT 2 N I
standpoint Independent 2 NT 4 NT
Tahle1 Change in national (N) and international (1) public opinion at different
combinations of own and opponent’ s political standpoints
What would then be the incentives to move from this favorable position (for both playas)? If
you choose to be independent, thus move to cdl 2, your rational popularity will be strengthened
more rapid than before This is a result of your county benefiting in negotiations with your
“nai ve’ neighbors. Obviously, your intemetional support will decrease as long as this standpoint
stands firm This could still be a wise thing to do if your goal is domestic suocess or you want to
decrease the opponent’s domestic support- as he obviously will end up in cdl number 3.
Given the mechanism desaiibed above, your opponent would now be located in odl mimber 3.
In this call (when you are coopative and the opponent is independent) the national public opinion
will not thank you for bang soft with a opponent who's politic standpoint ae known as
anything but coopaative. The intemational sociey, however is happy as long as you coopaaie.
Your opponent could decide to stay in this position (3) or change his political standpoint; hence
move to cdl 4 (you would then move fiom 2 to 4). By doing that, his dedining national support
would halt since he is standing up politically, but his intanaional sittation will go fiom fair to
honific as a result of the fact that neither one of you are very concamed about the intemational
law. Whether this is a good move or not depends on his goals, bit your situation will sudy
worsen both domestic andintemetionally - and that might be a good enough reason for him!
To summarize the mechanism for going from odl number 1 to 4: Participant A discovers that he
is better off braking any bonds with B, and a few days after he will have achieved what he
aimed for (despite some loss of intemational support). After a while it is obvious to B thet he
bes placed him sef in the worst possble position and is forced to take on @m indepandett
standpoint Both playes have gone from slowly gaining both nation and intemdional support
to respecivdy satus quo and rapidly dedining. The obsavant reader should have recognized
the prisoner's dilewma (Binmore 1992) by now. Although this isn’t a “real” Prisoner's Dilemma,
it has many of the same darents (you don't know whet decision the other participant is going to
make, thee is a short-time reward for “stabbing” your opponent and multilateral coopaaiion is
the long-temm win-win outcome, but is unstable on the short tam).
The combination between the political and military decision of each player is another important
rdation in “Exeoutive Force’, but it is much smper than the combindion of political standpoints
(es desctibed above). If political cooperation and military activity (use of use of missiles, psyops
or other military force) ae combined, the player is punished by the intematioml public opinion
They see this combination as a indication of your double agen - you dedlae your will to
cooperaie, but fail to cany it through The more nilitay active you ae, the longer is the fall n
theGalup
5 PRACTICAL EXPERIMENT
5.1 Data collection
During one day in January 2008, a total of 74 students (officers) at the Norwegian Defence Staff
College (FSTS) patticpated in a taining program with the mod “Executive Fore” as the
pimay “object of study’. In the moming - pior to the playing of the modd - a hief of the
game scenario and niles wee given to dl officas in a pleway session (45 mimes). In the
aftemoon, a de-bief wes given (30 min). The de-bief included a mediated discussion of “lessons
leamed’, as well as an opportunity for the best pafoming team to pest thar pan ad
expatiences. The desciiption of the game and the scenario was handed out along with the pe
brief. As can be sem in the abstract of the soematio (described above), thee ae obvious
possibilities for misunderstandings between the two teams as a reailt of the two desciptions
different viewpoint - even though the facts are exactly the same in both descriptions.
As communicated to the students, the purpose of the game was to make participants aware of the
special conditions that a twosided game may induce with foas on illustating the diffeaenoss
between a static and a dynamic decision world This indudes among others: to expaience the
dynamics that arises between the actors; the importance of knowing the “batildidd’ ad
undastand the situation; and experience the kind of poblers that an impefect situational
comprehension may lead to.
10
The patticpating officas ranked (dmost exdusivdy) from Major to LtCol, and had therefore
considerable professional expatience from the Norwegian Anmed Fores All three services -
Amy, Navy and Air Fore wee repesented in almost equal proportions Beng Norwegian
officers (with a couple of exceptions) at this levd, it is unlikely that any of them had experience
from “sharp” operations, however.
Inmediady following the de-bief the officas wee instuced to individilly comde a
questionnaire. There were 3 questions, with answes to be marked on a sx-pont “Stony
disagree - strongly agree” scale The survey wes anonymous, even though team number rank
and savice would have to be indicated The questions encompassed all kinds of aspects
somehow related to the “aporoptiateness” of using “Executive Foroe’ as an exacise and training
instument The answers we consider here, are those rdated to how well the modd represents
the puinciples of crisis management (derived from maneuver principles used in FSTS).
The students wee distibuted to aight teams, tus there wee 910 officas per team No
instructions or restrictions were given on to how to organize teams. Observations of teams under
Play indicate however that few teams sought to divide tasks between thm - wally, al
M™membas on a team would take the paspective of operational commander School instructors
and managers also sporadically observed the teams while playing - whichis common.
A team would play the modd for one day. First one game before lunch, then a second after
lunch Before each game the teams wote down the goal(s) for their campaign As mentioned
before, this was all up to the teams to decide (based on the background of the scenario), and any
changes in these goals should be accounted for after the game. In the first game the decisions of
all domains except the financial domain wer available to the playas. The subsequent game was
Played with the posshility of investing in exta nilitay foes as wel as meking infonel
decisions. These decisions could be verbal or wiitten in the form of threats, negotiation or other
only the imagination sds the limits The modd wes reinitialized between games, so that results
on one game would not have impect on following games Thee was no shict tine limit m
Playing. However the teams eventually managed to make decisions in vey short time using less
than ten minutes to plan and decide for the three day decision patiod.
5.2 Analysis and results
The data collected cove; among others, offices individual ratings (N=59 respondents) of how
wel they bdieved the modd “Exenttive Fore’ repesatied catain pinciples of aisis
Management. The actual question wes worled as a assation “The following factors or
qiinciples had significant impact an operational outcome.” [followed by list of factors]
11
Principle Scale
Understanding the opponent's intention(s)
Conceeling own intention
‘Unpredictable/unexpected behavior 1=Srongly disagree
Rapid implementation of plan
Coherence of political and military means
Rand thinking
Holistic perspective
To co-operaie if the opponent chooses to co-operate
‘Long-term perspective
10 Common understanding of the situation
Tahle 2 Fadctors (principles) in questionnaire.
_
4
CON) a> whe} te
Answes were marked on the provided 6-point “Strongly disagree -strongly agree” scale, one
scale for each principle For each pinciple we take a rating of mor than 35 (the “aitical
point”) to indicate that the principle in question is believed by the player to have a strong impact
on outcome of operdions. It should be emphasized that no direct mention of “principles of aisis
Management” wes mack in the questionnaire.
# Principle Rating (std dev)
1 ‘Understanding the opponent's intention(s) 4.2 (1.2)
2 fing own intention 44 (1.1)
3 ‘Unpredictable/unexpected behavior 4.2 (1.2)
4 __| Rapid impanentation of plan 45 (L.0)
5 Coherence of political and military means 4.5 (1.2)
6 _ | Rapid thinking 43 (12)
Z Holistic perspective 4.5 (1.0)
8 | To co-operate if the opponent chooses to co-operate 3.7 (1.4)
9 Long-term perspective 45 (1.0)
10 [Common understanding of the situation 47 (1.0)
Tahie3 Principles and their ratings.
The amalysis shows (see Table 3) that all principles except mumber 8 safed in the range 4.247,
with standard deviations ranging fiom 1.0 to 12. Principle 8 rated 3,7 with standard deviation
14. This is however, still above the ciitical levd, and the slightly higher standard deviation indicates
deviations suggest that the officas are in strong agreement, and shows in essence that “Executive
Force” to a large degree fulfils the ambition of representing principles of crisis management.
The participants were also asked to rate their degree of satisfaction with the model. The soore on
the statement "The Staff College should use this kind of game for taining’ wes 40 with
standard deviation 1.3. This oould indicate that participants were convinced of the game's
usefulness as a pedagogic instument The rest is evn mor inteesting knowing that the
ratings for realism were bdow the aitical point (2.8, standard deviation 1.1) - beared in mind
that realism never wes an oljective for this moda.
12
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER MODEL DEVELOPMENT
6.1 Experiment and testing
So fay prototypes of three simulation modds for opaational and strategic leaming have ben
tested with great suooess at the Norwegian Defence Staff College, and are due for further testing
at other militay educational organizations a wel a opadioml commands The pilot was
(staff, instructors and students) report a high degree of satisfaction with the models as exetise
evironments. In a post-exercise survey participants indicated that ten out of ten suggested
qiinciples of crisis management were believed to have substantial impact on operational outcome.
The experiments showed that the combinatory effect of the different domains did play a oental
tole in the outcome of the conflic. Even if the students were well aware of these effects, they
‘wer not able to move the focus from their own “word” to the “word” that incorporated the
opponents. When their political decisions suddenly gave a different resilt than ealier in the
game, they tended to Hame “strange mathematics in the modd” or “calalation eros” rather
than their own neglect of their opponents.
Despite the ovawhdming complexity - is the answer to the “Executive Force” conflict achally
quite simple? Is thee a “non-technical” decision that could have lessened the tensions between
the parties? None of the 8 groups in the FSTS-expaiiment tied to figure out how the opponent
saw the oonflict No meetings were arranged to discuss the different views on how the conflict
‘wes initiated in the first place Everybody automatically assumed that their inteyeation wes
the only comect one And when both sides assumed that their cause was the only justifiable a
peaceful solution was not easy to reach.
6.2 Further work
The inboduction a “conflict-indicator” to “Executive Force” has been discussed. The indicator
would affect the outcome of political means: a high degree of oonflict will demand diffeent
decisions than a situation of no conflict (this is only implicit in today’s vesion of the moda).
The political means will again change the nature of the indicator - in a wey that evaluation of
forthcoming decisions will change This is a mechanism thet would ocatanly add more dynamic
conplexity, and one question must surdy be asked before adding ay oonplexity: have we
already reached the limit of the students’ ability for dynamic complexity?
A third player could bing mor life info the modd and cede inteesting situations This wold
add even more dynamic complexity to the modd, and the (two othe) playas have to oonsider
additional unoattainty: What are the goals of the third player? What did he do - and why? Is he
taking side - and for who? The third player could be UN, the Gpeople, a ‘God’ that can make
thing happen, etc.
FHI and AIL bes cdevdoped a moe nilitay foowed modd within the save minimalistic comet
as “Executive Fore’, which comsides a ononflid beyond a diplomatically soluim
(“Commander's Quest”). To couple these two modes together with a suitable soenaio should
be interesting, and not vey difficilt The change in the different dynamic aspects and scenarios
13
can then be of a greater magnitude than would be possible within one single modal.
“Aneconda’” and “Strategos’ are two forthcoming modds from FAI and FIL. The first pudy
focusing on logistic opadions o a high led of ommend ad “Staegos’ smuiding
investments and transformation in the military defence structure in a 20 year perspective.
7 REFERENCES
Bakken, B. E,, eal, (1992), ‘Experimentation in Leaming Organizations: A Management Flight
Simulator Approach’, European J ournal of Operational Research, 59, 167182.
Binmor K. (1992), ‘Fun and Games - A Text on Game Theory’, pg 310-314.
Bakken, B. T. and Gilljam M, (2008), Training to Improve Decision Making - System
Dynamics Applied to Higher-level Military Operations, Journal of Batilefidd Technology,
vol 6, Nol, March.
Bakken, B. T. and Vamtaak, T., ‘Mispaveption of dynamics in military planning
Exploring the counterintuitive behaviour of the logistics dein’, (2008), (forthooming SDC
proceedings)
Isaacs, W. and Senge, P., (1992), ‘Overcoming limits to leaming in computer based leaming
exvironments’, European Journal of Operational Research 59, 183-196.
Simon, H, (1956), Administrative Behaviour, New York, Wiley.
Simon, H,, (1978), ‘Rationality as Process and Product of Thought’, American Economic
Review 68, +16
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