Title: Leamer-centered Communication on Nuclear Risk: Public Participation and Transparency
through a Gaming/simulation A pproach
S. Tsuchiya*, K. Sekimizu** and N. Tsuchiya***
* Professor, Chiba Institute of Technology, 2-17-1 Tsudanuma, Narashino-shi, 275-0016 JAPAN
Phone & Fax: +81-47-478-0463; E-mail: tsuchiya.shigehisa@it-chiba.ac.jp;
** Aitel Corporation; *** Japan Women’s College of Physical Education
Abstract: This paper discusses our project under a three-year research contract with the Japanese
Government to gain public acceptance of nuclear facilities in local communities by improving risk
communication through a gaming/simulation approach. Evidence suggests that nuclear public
education programs are not communicating the critical safety information necessary to eliminate
anxiety of people living around nuclear facilities. To most utilities and government, risk
communication means persuasion. Based on the findings of our visits to several authorities,
municipalities and nuclear facilities in Japan, Sweden, Norway and USA, we built a causal-loop
model regarding nuclear risk communication. According to our model, the root cause of the problem
is lack of trust, and the leverages are public participation and transparency which can create
leamer-centered two-way communication environment. “THE TREASURE HUNTING”, one of our
five gaming/simulations for this project, is intended to create such an environment so that local
residents may deepen understanding of nuclear risk and build up a mutual trust relationship with
disaster prevention experts. After many intemal test runs, we have run this exercise six times so far
with the nuclear disaster prevention experts and the local residents near nuclear facilities in various
parts of Japan. The results have been quite satisfactory.
Keywords: causal-loop model, gaming/simulation, leamer-centered, nuclear risk communication,
public participation, transparency.
1. Introduction
Despite a substantial effort to provide people living around nuclear facilities with a variety of risk
information, evidence suggests that nuclear public education programs are not communicating the
critical safety information that would be needed eliminate their anxiety.
For example, although emergency plans for protecting public health and safety in a nuclear plant
accident are predicted on the assumption that people will follow instructions, most EPZ (emergency
planning zone) residents say that they will make decisions in an emergency contrary to those
recommended. Instead of waiting for official instructions in a nuclear plant emergency, a majority of
EPZ residents are more likely to try to contact family members not at home, telephone for more
information, or simply leave the area. They will take a first action contrary to the recommended
response of turning on a radio or television for instructions. Those contrary actions could be
extremely harmful to the public health and safety.
Gwin (1990) critiques risk communication programs and questions whether these programs have
convinced residents close to nuclear power plants to follow instructions in an emergency. His study
demonstrates that:
e Programs do not communicate critical safety information
e People living near plants will make decisions in an emergency contrary to those
recommended
e Technical risk perception differs from lay risk perception.
The purposes of this paper are (1) to examine how risk information is communicated to the
public near nuclear plants, (2) to build a causal-loop model on the issue, (3) to find the leverages to
solve the problems, and (4) to discuss our gaming/simulations to support risk communication with
local residents.
2. Analysis and modeling of the issue
2.1. Risk communication
To most utilities and government, risk communication means persuasion. However, trying to address
risk controversies primarily with more science is, in fact, likely to exacerbate conflict. The risk
communication should be defined as the “interactive process of exchange of information and
opinions among individuals, groups, and institutions conceming a risk or potential risk to human
health or the environment” (NRC, 1989).
Risk communication is a process by which scientific organizations both disseminate technical
information and gather information about the opinions and concems of nonscientific groups. The
implication for those who communicate risk is that any form of successful risk communication must
incorporate that “exchange of information and opinions” and the participation of the stakeholder
groups from the beginning.
A contributing factor to the apparent failure of nuclear risk communication is the industry’s
historic reluctance to raise issues it considers “negatives” about nuclear power for fear that these
issues will somehow “delegitimize” the industry as a contributing force toward achieving societal
goals of safety and security. To many of the manufacturers or managers of technologies that create
risks, “risk communication” means persuading the public that the risk from a technology is small and
should be ignored.
Risk is inherently subjective. Risk is subjectively defined by individuals who may be influenced
by a wide array of psychological, social, institutional and cultural factors.
Risk perception is influenced by the interplay of psychological, social and political factors.
Members of the public and experts can disagree about risk because they define risk differently; have
different worldviews, different affective experiences and reactions or different social status. Another
reason why the public often rejects scientists’ risk assessments is lack of trust. Trust in risk
management, like risk perception, has been found to correlate with gender, race, worldviews and
affect (Slovic, 2000).
2.2. Causal loop model
In order to investigate present situation and find problems related to risk communication with local
residents, we visited twelve municipalities, seven Offices of the Inspectors for Safety Management
of Nuclear Installations, three nuclear power plants in Japan, and several competent authorities,
municipalities, nuclear power facilities and researchers in Norway, Sweden and USA.
Based on the findings, we built a causal-loop model that shows the root cause of risk
communication failure and the leverages to improve the situation. Leverage is where actions and
changes can lead to significant, enduring improvements. Figure 1 is the current version of the model
after many revisions based on the discussions with experts and stakeholders.
The model clarifies the following:
e Scientific safety and perceived safety are often quite different. Scientific literacy and public
education are important, but they are not central to risk controversies. It is not safe until it is
perceived as safe.
e Elimination of anxiety is only possible by improving ‘perceived safety’ by local people.
e Perceived safety by local people depends on trust.
2.3. Building up trust
Social relationships of all types, including risk management, rely heavily on trust. The limited
effectiveness of risk communication efforts can be attributed to the lack of trust. If you trust the risk
manager, communication is relatively easy. If trust is lacking, no form or process of communication
will be satisfactory (Fessenden-Raden et al, 1987). Studies by risk perception experts demonstrate
that people must trust the disseminator of information before they will accept that information
(Stenzel, 1987).
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Figure 1: Risk Communication
Figure 1 shows that the apparent failure of nuclear risk communication is due to insufficient
public participation and inadequate transparency.
2.3.1. Transparency
There is a sharp dichotomy between the experts and the public. Experts are seen as purveying risk
assessments, characterized as objective, analytic, wise and rational. In contrast, the public is seen to
rely on perceptions of risk that are subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish and irrational. In
addition, experts tend to believe that they should give to the public information that, in their opinion,
is relevant to them, whereas the public want to know almost everything happened at nuclear
facilities.
For decades, people were told by “experts” in government and industry that accidents at nuclear
power plants were extremely unlikely. However, accidents did happen, and investigations revealed
that the experts had been overconfident or simply wrong in their analysis of what could and could
not happen at a nuclear power facility.
2.3.2. Public participation
Although nuclear experts have been trying very hard to communicate risk information to them, most
local residents living near nuclear facilities are of the opinion that they have few occasions to talk
with or give opinion to local government or nuclear power plant people.
Figure 2 shows the results of a questionnaire survey conducted in Japan by Central Research
Institute of Electric Power Industry, in 2002. The samples were taken from the residents living in
Tokai Village and its adjacent areas. The results prove a deficiency of two way communication
between nuclear experts and local residents. To the question “Do you have occasions to talk with or
give opinion to local government officials or nuclear power plant people?” 19 percent replied none
and 69 percent replied few. What is more important, 82 percent replied “No” or “Don’t know” to the
question “Can you readily talk with or give opinion to local goverment officials or nuclear power
plant people?” although most of them believed that it was important to have many occasions to do
so.
Do you have occasions to talk with or give opinion Is it important to have many occasions to talk
to local government or NPP people? with or give opinion to local government or NPP
people?
(ro replvinany some
not so much "Overy much
Can you readily talk with or give opinion to local Why don't you think you can readily talk or give
government or NPP people? opinion?
70%
(no reply) Because Ihave had
60% rno such experience
50x Because such
‘actions will not
change anything
Because Iam no
good at speaking in
|__| | front of many people
Because they will
1 | not listen to what I
say
408,
30%
20%
108
don't know
oO
Questionnaire survey conducted by Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, 2002
Samples: Tokai Village 1,000, its adjacent areas 600, Responses: Tokai Village 703, its adjacent areas «
Figure 2: Questionnaire survey to local residents
2.3.3. Leverage
From the above discussion, we argue that the leverage to build trust indispensable for perceived
safety by local residents is risk communication with public participation and transparency.
3. A search for new methodology
According to our analysis, trust is indispensable to effective risk communication and that public
participation and transparency are the key elements in building up trust. How, then we can realize
public participation and transparency and build up trust?
In order to realize two-way risk communication by public participation and transparency, we
need to transform interpretative frameworks through double-loop leaming (Argyris, 1993). Based on
the results of their recent research, the first author and his colleague claim that gaming/simulation
can provide interactive leaming environment and make double-loop learning possible (Tsuchiya, T.
& Tsuchiya, S., 1999).
The most powerful leaming comes from direct experience, but "learning by doing" only works
so long as the feedback from actions is rapid and unambiguous (Senge, 1990). Leaming by
experience is difficult because, in the real world, there exist what Senge called the "dilemma of
leaming from experience." The factors include:
e Learning horizon: Individuals and organizations have a “leaming horizon,” a breadth of vision in
time and space within which they assess the consequences of their actions. When our actions
have consequences beyond our learning horizon, it becomes impossible to leam from direct
experience.
e Scarcity of experience: History offers only meager samples of experience. Historical events are
observed, and inferences about historical processes are formed, but the scarcity of historical
events works against effective learning.
e Irreversibility: Actions cannot be reversed or taken back in real business. The risk and cost of trial
and error is often too much for us to take. Therefore, even when the feedback is rapid and clear,
most of us tend to avoid tests and therefore we miss opportunities to lean.
e Ambiguity: In addition, ambiguity in the real world makes it difficult to lean from experience.
The problem is in the intuitive-uncalibrated quadrant in Armstrong’s theory where scientific
techniques are hardly effective. Gaming/simulation can provide an overview or gestalt mechanisms
which illustrate the major dynamics of the linkages among the system components (Duke, 1974).
Gaming-simulation is a simulation that works wholly or partly on the basis of players’ decisions.
Gaming/simulation can overcome the dilemma by compressing time and space, providing risk-free
environment for trial and error, and making shared experience possible. It can change actions of
participants in their work and in their life through experiential leaming in the simulated world
(Tsuchiya, S. & Tsuchiya, T., 2000; Tsuchiya, S., 2003; Tsuchiya, S., 2005).
Figure 3 briefly describes process of a gaming/simulation. Gaming/simulation design starts with
the clear expression of purpose and the careful definition of the intended audience. Then, a
schematic (conceptual map) such as Figure 1 is developed before construction of the
gaming/simulation. It is a graphic representation of a problem environment and has been found to be
valuable tools in communicating complexity in gaming/simulation. A gaming/simulation can be
designed at various level of abstraction. The higher the level of abstraction, the safer the participants
feel to open up their minds and make trials and errors. Debriefing is systematic facilitator-controlled
discussion at the conclusion of the exercise to evaluate the initial objectives (Duke & Geurts, 2004).
The primary function of the debriefing is to refocus the participants on the issues and problems in
the real world.
Issues and Systemic . . Exercise .
Problems [7] Analysis [ "| Schematic -*) Design r actared experience [> Debriefing
Running
the Exercise
Designing
an Exercise (simulated world)
Schematic (causal-loop map) Debriefing (reflection)
Issues and Problems
in the real world
Issues and Problems
in the real world
Fig. 3 Gaming/simulation
4, ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’
In order to realize public participation and transparency to building up trust essential for
effective risk communication, we have developed five policy exercises so far:
@ ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’: To provide the local residents with a space (environment)
of two-way communication with nuclear disaster prevention experts
‘THE CHAIR OF THE PRESIDENCY’: To let NPP employees realize importance of
good relationship with local community and change their behavior
@ ‘HITTING MOLES’: To let nuclear experts appreciate difficulties in communication
among people with different expertise and background
@ ‘THE TRANSFER STUDENT’: To let nuclear experts understand difference of
interpretative frameworks and change their action
@ ‘THE SHEPHERDS IN ALM’: To let nuclear experts recognize the gap of risk perception
between experts and the public
In this paper, we will deal with ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’.
4.1. Background
Nuclear public education programs are not communicating the critical safety information that would
be needed eliminate their anxiety. The typical examples of risk communication failures are:
@ Contrary to the recommended actions, most emergency planning zone (EPZ) residents say
that they will try to contact family members not at home, or simply leave the area.
© Most people still believe a nuclear power plant could blow up like a nuclear bomb.
Despite a substantial effort to provide them with a variety of risk information, most local residents
living near nuclear facilities are of the opinion that they have few occasions to talk with or give
opinion to local government of nuclear power plant people.
According to our analysis, trust is crucial for effective risk communication. Public participation
and transparency realize leamer-centered two way risk communication that is indispensable to
building up trust.
4.2. Objective
The purpose of ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’ is to minimize anxiety about nuclear plant accidents.
Its Objective is to provide the local residents with a space (environment) of two-way communication
with nuclear disaster prevention experts in order (1) to deepen understanding of nuclear risk and (2)
to build up a relationship of mutual trust with the experts.
4.3. Structure
Figure 4 shows the outline of ‘THE Winner:
TREASURE HUNTING’. One team
consists of one leader and five to seven
members. Several teams can play this
exercise simultaneously under one facilitator.
In addition, the monitor screens of the
members are projected on the wall of the
ca
Member 1 |
The winner is the one who has Facilitator
got the largest number of
treasures
Roles:
Facilitator: to setup the
equipment and keep scores
room so that even the observers can
participate in the process. Therefore, the
number of participants can be quite flexible.
The time required for the exercise itself
Leader (one for each group): to
lead members to their treasures
Members (3 - 7 persons in
each group): to go inside the
castle and get the treasures
Member 3 |
ee PCs are ona LAN
Member 4
is about 30 minutes and about one hour is
allocated for debriefing and two-way communication.
The structure of ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’ is as follows:
@ Only the leader has a map of the whole area. It shows the location of the treasure for each
member and the location of the gates which are moving clockwise. However, it does not
show the location of the members.
@ Each member has a detailed map (information) covering only a small area around him/her
Any member can stop the moving gate by placing his/her car at the gate
@ In the first cycle, (1) every member has the same speed, and (2) can find and get the next
treasure as soon as he/she gets one. The prize money is given to the highest scorer.
Figure 4 The outline of the exercise
In the second cycle, however, (1) one of the members is much slower than the others, and
(2) the next treasures do not appear until every member in the team gets his/her treasure.
At the end of the exercise, (to the surprise of the participants) the facilitator gives a
Championship prize to the member who stopped the gate and helped others get treasures.
In the debriefing, the facilitator shows two slides (Figure 5) and explains how the elements and
mechanism in the exercise correspond to the issues in the real world. The most important points are:
e@ Hunting for a treasure selfishly corresponds to immediate evacuation without waiting for
official instructions. Such an action could unnecessarily clog roadways and prevent others
who were at risk from leaving the area.
e@ A low-speed member corresponds to a weak person unable to evacuate quickly in a nuclear
accident. Just like in the exercise, it is very important for you and your neighbors to know
in advance what kind of problem you and/or your neighbors have in order to evacuate
orderly.
@ Many people believe a nuclear power plant could blow up like a nuclear bomb. In reality,
however, it is extremely unlikely that any radioactive particles are released to the
atmosphere during a nuclear plant accident. Even when they should be released, the release
will be many hours (for example 30 or 40 hours) after the accident in the plant.
Exercise and the real world (1) Exercise and the real world (2)
Exercise Real World Exaile’ Real World
Leeder Evacustlon/shelteleader Since members have only limited If everybody act separately
Members Residents near nuclear facility information, it is hard for them based on his/her limited
to get treasures without united information, evacuation will
Leader has a map of the entire Evacuation leader has whole efforts become extremely difficult
area, but members have only a __ information, but information of
‘small part of the map residents is limibed Due to time pressure, players _Believing a nuclear facility can
tend to take independent action blow up, many residents are
Information about location of Information about evacuation/
treasures shelter
Routes to treasure are different Evacuation routs are different
likely to take self-centered action
Speed of each player is different Some residents have various
kind of difficulties in evacuating
Location of the gates changes rapidly
Some members do not follow the | Some residents take actions To get a high score, it is In preparation for emergency,
leader's instructions contrary to official instructions. important to identify and help _residents should share information
the low-speed member about difficulties some of them
Nobody can get next treasure _ Selfish actions can prevent others may have
until all members get treasure _at risk from evacuation
Figure 5 Exercise and the real world
Then, the facilitator guides the participants to think together about nuclear accidents. He/she
encourages the local residents to ask any questions and/or express their anxiety about nuclear
accident and evacuation to the nuclear disaster prevention experts. In order to open up conversation,
the facilitator gives the participants one of the following scenarios, and asks them what they would
do in such a situation:
4.4,
The television is broadcasting a serious accident has happened at the nuclear power plant
nearby. You are concerned about safety of your children at school.
What would you do?
You are visiting your mother in hospital. An evacuation order was issued.
What would you do?
You are going to take shelter in a concrete building as ordered. However, neighbors have
got into a panic and are evacuating the area by car.
What would you do?
You are living near a beautiful swimming beach. It is a nice summer day. You happen to see
people on the beach are hurriedly evacuating the area by car. Turning on the television, you
know a serious accident has happened at the nuclear power plant nearby.
What would you do?
Outcomes
After many in-house test runs, and a test run at the Annual Conference of International
Simulation & Gaming association in Munich in 2004, we have run ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’
six times so far with the nuclear disaster prevention experts and the local residents near nuclear
facilities in various parts of Japan.
At the end of ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’, the participants are asked to answer a
questionnaire. The questions are as follows:
(1) In this exercise, were you able to communicate satisfactorily?
(2) In this exercise, have you done any selfish behavior?
(3) Did today's exercise give you an opportunity to think together about nuclear accident?
(4) Through today's exercise, did you find answers to your questions about evacuation?
(5) Through today's exercise, did you understand that a nuclear plant cannot explode like
an atomic bomb?
4.4.1, Test run at Munich
We ran ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’ with about fifteen participants of the ISAGA Annual
Conference in Munich in 2004. Partly because of language problems, the exercise took more than
one hour, more than twice as much time as planned. However, the evaluation by the participants was
encouraging.
Figure 6 shows the results of the questionnaire after the gaming/simulation. Nine persons filled
out the questionnaire. The questionnaire showed that most participants were quite satisfied with the
exercise.
(1) In this exercise, were you able to (2) In this exercise, have you done any selfish
‘communicate satisfactorily? behavior?
Definitely No
Relatively Yes
(8) Did today’s exercise give you an opportunity (4) Through today’s exercise, did you find answers
to think together about nuclear accident? to your questions about evacuation?
Defintaly Yes
(5) Through today's exercise, did you understand
that a nuclear plant cannot explode like an atomic
bomb?
Relatively Yes
Figure 6 Questionnaire at ISAGA 2004
Some of the comments from the participants:
“I believe cognition can reduce anxiety with sufficient knowledge about nuclear energy +
reactor and simple game like today. It will move!”
« “This exercise was quite eye-opening for me. Language is very important especially in the
case of emergency.”
@ “Though 15 km/h (his speed) is extremely slow and get a lot of troubles, I enjoyed the other
member's support.”
“This is interesting, simple, but has very deep meaning.”
«@ “Nice game. Overall speed could be faster.” (Based on this comment, we improved our
exercise)
@ “Too long. Bit confusing.” (Based on this comment, we improved our exercise)
44.2. ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’ in Japan
We have run ‘THE TREASURE HUNTING’ six times so far with the nuclear disaster prevention
experts and the local residents near nuclear facilities in various parts of Japan. The total number of
the participants was about seventy.
(1) In this exercise, were you able to (2) In this exercise, have you done any selfish
communicate satisfactorily? behavior?
Definitely No
Relatively,
Relatively No
Definitely Yes
Relatively Yes
(3) Did today's exercise give you an opportunity (4) Through today's exercise, did you find answers
to think together about nuclear accident? ‘to your questions about evacuation?
Relatively No Definitely No
Neutral se
Relatively No
Definitely Yes
Relatively Yes
(5) Through today's exercise, did you understand
that a nuclear plant cannot explode like an atomic
oti IRS
Relatively No
Relatively Yes
Figure 7 Questionnaires in J apan
Figure 7 shows the results of the questionnaires after the gaming/simulation. Fifty five
participants filled out the questionnaire. A large majority, 89 percent, replied affirmatively to the
most important question “Did today's exercise give you an opportunity to think together about
nuclear accident?”
The comments we received from the participants were also very encouraging. Some evidence of
success is evident in the following statements:
¢ “I think this exercise simulates very well the actual situations in the nuclear disaster
prevention drills”
¢ “Participants will become interested in disaster prevention”
¢ “Ihave leamed many things applicable to real situations through the exercise”
¢ “I was totally absorbed in the exercise and tried to get as many treasures as possible. But,
when the Champion was announced and the reason was given, I regretted what I had done. I
think I will remember this experience in a real disaster prevention situation”
¢ “I was waiting at the place where the next treasure would appear while the player Green was
trying to stop the gate (to help the slow player Black. I am ashamed of myself.”
« “When I found my speed was much slower than the others, I became very reserved and did
not dare to ask others for help. Now I understand the feeling of the elderly persons who were
reluctant to go to the place of refuge in the Niigata Earthquake Disaster. It has been a good
education for me.”
5. Conclusions
The effectuation of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 has given a strategic importance to nuclear power as
one of the clean energies lowering carbon dioxide emission. Our project has proved that a
gaming/simulation can be an effective methodology to improve risk communication with people
living near nuclear facilities and ease anxiety about safety by providing leamer-centered
communication environment. In the last year of this project, we will try to disseminate our
gaming/simulations all over Japan and help nuclear power plants establish symbiotic relationship
with local communities.
Acknowledgements
This research project has been conducted under the research contract with the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry of the Japanese Government. It was partly financed by the grant from Foundation
for Fusion of Science & Technology.
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