|THE PLANNING AND CONTROLLING |
| OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY JOINT }
j COMBAT OPERATION \
' !
DR.MAZEN J. ALWANI
SENIOR EXPERT IN PLANNING,MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, KUWAIT
VISITING RESEARCH FELLOW,BRADFORD UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT
CENTRE U.K.
THIS PAPER DEMONSTRATES THE USE OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS AS A
DEVICE TO SIMULATE A SYSTEM OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY Co~
OPERATING IN JOINT COMBAT OPERATION
THE SYSTEM UNDER STUDY DOES NOT REPRESENT A REAL OR
ACTUAL BATTLE_FIELD .THE MODEL REPRESENTS A SCENARIO DESCRIBES
HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM OF ACCEPTED THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF HOW
INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY MAY CO-OPERATE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A
DESIRED ADVANCE ON A REAL BATTLEFIELD.
THE PAPER WILL GIVE ATTENTION TO THE PLANNING AND
CONTROLLING OF ANY NEED TO SUCH CO-OPERATION,AND WILL GIVE
BETTER INSIGHTS TO DECISION MAKERS BEFORE AND DURING SUCH JOINT
OPERATIONS.
WE MAKE NO CLAIM FOR REVEALING ANALYSIS OF ANY ARMY
STRATEGY ,AND SEEK ONLY TO SHOW HOW A SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL
GOULD DO IF IT WERE CONSTRUCTED BY PEOPLE WHO FULLY UNDERSTOOD
THE PROBLEMS AND HAD ACCESS TO INFORMATION AT WHICH WE CAN ONLY
MAKE GUESSES.
THE PAPER SEEKS TO HIGHLIGHT THE MAIN VARIABLES AND
MAIN FEEDBACK LOOPS AFFECTING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM AND
PRODUCING ITS MAIN DYNAMIC BEHAVIOURS. IT SHOWS HOW ARTILLERY
GAINS ITS EFFECTIVENESS TO INSURE HIGHER CUMULATIVE ADVANCE TO
THE INFANTRY, HOW THE PROCESS OF ARTILLERY COMMITMENT TAKES
PLACE.AND HOW ENEMY EFFECTIVENESS CAN BE REDUCED.
WE BY NO MEANS REGARD THE PAPER AS A FOREGONE
CONCLUSION: SUCH AN ANALYSIS WOULD OF VALUE IF IT HAD .SAY,THREE
MAN-MONTHS OF WORK BY WELL~INFORMED EXPERTS.
THE MODEL, DESIGNER WILL USE MICRO COMPUTER
SOFTWARE (DYSMAP2) TO RUN AND ANALYSE THE MODEL...
THIS MILITARY STUDY IS PART OF THE RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
OF THE SYSTEM DYNAMICS GROUP IN KUWAIT WHICH HAS BEEN FORMED
RECENTLY WITH THE SCIENTIFIC CO-OPERATION OF BRADFORD
UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT CENTRE(U.K.)~
THE APPLICABILITY OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS IN COMBAT OPERATIONS
IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE USE OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS IS FAR FROM
NEW IN MILITARY ANALYSIS IN GENERAL (1) ,WE WILL GIVE SOME MORE
DETAILS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS IN SUCH SYSTEMS
SIMILAR TO THE SYSTEM UNDER STUDY.
FIRST WE EXAMINE THE PROSPECTS FOR APPLYING SYSTEM DYNAMICS IN
RELATIVELY SMALL MILITARY SYSTEMS, IN ORDER TO, ANALYSE THEIR
SHORT TERM OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOUR, THEN WE ATTEMPT TO INCORPORATE
CONTINUAL CONTROL AND ADJUSTMENTS TO THE ARISING SITUATIONS OF A
LIMITED BATTLE FIELD, TO MAKE IT ADVANCE ,IN THE LIGHT OF .ENEMY
REACTION ,IN THE DIRECTION PLANNED AND DESIRED BY THE COMMANDER.
SETS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH DESCRIBE THE PROBLEMS OF
MANAGING OR LEADING-A JOINT COMBAT OPERATION ARE DISCUSSED BELOW:
591
1. THEY ARE CONTROL PROBLEMS
COMMANDS OUGHT TO BE CONTROLLED AND READJUSTED ACCORDING TO
THE ENEMY CHANGE AND RECHANGE OF POLICIES. THIS PROCESSES TAKES
PLACE IN ANY DYNAMIC SYSTEM BY THE NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS
STRUCTURED IN THE SYSTEM (2).
SYSTEMS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS CONTAIN ENORMOUS NUMBERS OF POSITIVE
AND NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOPS. A BROAD BOUNDARY OF THE SYSTEM AND
ITS MAIN FEEDBACK LOOPS ARE SHOWN IN FIGURE (1).
IF A SYSTEM UNDER STUDY SEEMS TO LACK CONTROL LOOPS IN THE MENTAL
MODEL OF THE MANAGER, THE RESEARCHER HAS TO SEEK TO FIND THEM IN
THE LITERATURE OF THE REAL SYSTEM. THE MORE FEEDBACK NEGATIVE
LOOPS INTRODUCED TO THE SYSTEM, THE MORE POSSIBILITY OF
ENHANCEMENT ITS CONTROLLABILITY AND PERFORMANCE .
THE DYNAMICS PRODUCED FROM THE FEEDBACK LOOPS OF THE SYSTEM UNDER
STUDY SHOULD BE DOING WHAT THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO DO. IN THIS CASE
THE CUMULATIVE INFANTRY ADVANCE SHOULD BE AS CLOSE TO THE DESIRED
INFANTRY CUMULATIVE ADVANCE AS POSSIBLE.
@. THEY ARE DYNAMIC PROBLEM:
THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH COMBAT OPERATIONS ARE MANAGED
IS DYNAMIC RATHER THAN STATIC.
THE: PAST DYNAMICS OF THE JOINT COMBAT OPERATIONS SYSTEM
ILLUSTRATE ITS PAST PERFORMANCE WHICH ARE NATURALLY THE
RESULTS OF THE COMMANDER PAST POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO PAST
EXOGENOUS SHOCKS.
THE FUTURE DYNAMICS ARE THE EXPECTED PERFORMANCE OF THE
SYSTEM IN THE FUTURE. IN FACT, THEY ARE THE RESULTS OF THE
SIMULATED POLICIES IN THE MODEL. IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE MODEL
SHOULD SHOW, WITH SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE, THE MANNER AND TRENDS OF
THE FUTURE DYNAMICS OF THE MODELLED POLICIES.
THE MAIN EXOGENOUS DYNAMIC SHOCKS WHICH COMBAT OPERATIONS ARE
EXPOSED TO ARE THE FOLLOWINGS:
~THE ENEMY REACTION AGAINST CERTAIN AVERAGE OF INFANTRY
ADVANCE ..
“ENEMY FORCES DEPLOYMENT STRUCTURE.
“READY FOR DISPATCH FRIEND ARTILLERY.
E PRBLEMS IN SYSTEM WITH NON-LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS
A SYSTEM WILL BE NON-LINEAR IF AT LEAST ONE OF ITS CAUSAL
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TWO VARIABLES IS NON-LINEAR.
MOST OF CAUSAL LINKS OR CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS IN A COMBAT SYSTEM
ARE NON-LINEAR. WE CAN SAY WITH REASONABLE CONFIDENCE THAT THE
AMOUNT AND DIRECTION OF ENEMY REACTION TO CERTAIN CHANGES OF
FRIEND POLICIES WILL NEVER BE LINEAR.
4. THEY ARE PROBLEMS OF COPING WITH DELAYS:
IN A COMBAT OPERATION SYSTEM, DELAYS EXIST IN MOST FLOW CHANNELS
OR RATES. THE ARTILLERY COMMITMENT RATE AND THE ENEMY REACTION TO
CERTAIN AVERAGE OF FRIEND INFANTRY ADVANCE ARE EXAMPLES OF DELAYS
IN THE SYSTEM.
THE ABOVE MENTIONED CHARACTERISTICS OF A JOINT COMBAT SYSTEM
PROBLEMS NOMINATE THE SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELLING METHOD AS A VERY
SUITABLE CANDIDATE TO STUDY THEM.
THE SIMULATION MODEL IN SYSTEM DYNAMICS IS A PURPOSIVE DEVICE. IT
REPRESENTS AND SIMULATES A SYSTEM UNDER STUDY. THE MODELLING
PROCESS IN ORDER TO BE IMPLEMENTED, REQUIRES A CLEAR
UNDERSTANDING OF, FIRSTLY, THE PURPOSE AND, SECONDLY, THE
BOUNDARY OF THE MODEL.
THE PURPOSE OF THE MODEL:
THE FIRST STAGE IN MODELLING A PROJECT IS THE DEFINITION OF ITS
PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF A MODEL DETERMINE ITS BOUNDARY AND PLAYES
THE ESSENTIAL ROLE IN THE SELECTION PROCESS OF THE VARIABLES TO
BE INCLUDED IN THE MODEL.
THE PURPOSE OF THIS MODEL IS TO DEMONSTRATE HOW A SYSTEM DYNAMICS
MODELLING APPROACH CAN BE USED TO SIMULATE A JOINT COMBAT
OPERATION SYSTEM AND ANALYSE ITS BEHAVIOUR, AIMING AT
DISCOVERING THE RIGHT POLICIES TO BE FOLLOWED AND APPLIED
IN A REAL SIMILAR BATTLE_FIELD.
593
THE MODEL BOUNDARY =
A VERY ESSENTIAL LESSON ANY OFFICER IN THE ARMY MUST LEARN IS
HOW, WHY, AND WHEN TO BEGIN FIRING AND HOW, WHY, AND WHEN TO
CEASE FIRE. IT IS NOT AN EASY MATTER AT ALL. SIMILARLY IN THE
DRAWING OF THE BOUNDARY OF A MODEL, SIMILAR QUESTIONS SHOULD BE
ANSWERED AND THE SAME DIFFICULTY IS FACED. IN FACT IT IS WELL
KNOWN THAT IT IS HARD TO GET STARTED ON A DYNAMIC MODEL AND EVEN
HARDER TO STOP. ANYWAY, THE MODEL BOUNDARY CAN BE DEFINED AS THE
VOLUME OF THE SYSTEM AREA WHICH IS ENOUGH TO BE MODELLED IN ORDER
TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO FULFIL THE PURPOSE OF THE MODEL. THAT
MEANS THAT THE MODEL BOUNDARY DEPENDS UPON ITS PURPOSE AND THE
SIZE OF THE SYSTEM. IN GENERAL, THE MODEL BOUNDARY MUST CONTAIN
THE MAIN FEEDBACK LOOPS WHICH LINK THE MAIN VARIABLES AND CAUSE
THE MAIN DYNAMICS OF THE SYSTEM CONCERNED.
FIGURE (1) SHOWS THE BROAD BOUNDARY OF THE MODEL WHICH IS
THE SUBJECT OF THIS STUDY.
IT CONSISTS OF THE FOLLOWING AREAS:
i- THE FRIEND POLICIES OF THE READY FOR DISPATCH ARTILLERY WHICH
AFFECTS THE ARTILLERY COMMITMENT RATE.
THE ARTILLERY COMMITMENT RATE IMPOSES THE AVAILABLE ARTILLERY.
2- THE FRIEND ARTILLERY EFFECTIVENESS WHICH IS INFLUENCED BY THE
MARGIN BETWEEN THE ARTILLERY AND THE INFANTRY AND BY BOTH THE
ARTILLERY AND THE SHELLS SUFFICIENCY .
3- THE ENEMY DEPLOYMENT FACTOR WHICH WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE
‘ENEMY AIR INTERFERENCE CAPABILITY INFLUENCES THE FRIEND INFANTRY
ADVANCE RATE .
4- THE FRIEND AND ENEMY REACTION TO CERTAIN RATE OF ADVANCE OF
THE INFANTRY. IF THE INFANTRY ADVANCE RATE IS LESS THAN WHAT
IT HAS BEEN DECIDED, THE FRIEND AIR FORCES WILL REACT AND
INTERVENE TO INTERCEPT AND REDUCE THE ENEMY AIR INTERFERENCE
CAPABILITY WHICH INFLUENCE BOTH ‘FRIEND INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY
ADVANCE RATE.
594
S- THE INFLUENCE DIAGRAM CAN SHOW THE ESSENTIAL CAUSAL
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL.
FOR EXAMPLE, IT ILLUSTRATES HOW THE ARTILLERY EFFECTIVENESS
AFFECTS THE ENEMY DEPLOYMENT STRUCTURE WHICH IN ITS TURN AFFECTS
THE INFANTRY ADVANCE RATE.
IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO BE CLEAR THAT THE MODEL WILL BE
CARRIED OUT AT A HIGH LEVEL, OF AGGREGATION. THEREFORE, THE
VARIABLES WHICH ARE INCLUDED IN THE MODEL ARE THE MAJOR
AGGREGATES OF THE COMBAT JOINT OPERATIONS.
SESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM
THREE MAIN FACTORS AFFECT THE INFANTRY ADVANCE IN A BATTLE_FIELD
FIRST, THE SOLIDITY OF ENEMY FORCES AND THE WAY THEY ARE
DEPLOYED. THAT IS THE STRUCTURE THE ENEMY ORGANISES ITS INFANTRY,
ARTILLERY AND OTHER DEFENDING FORCES. THIS SOLIDITY OF THE ENEMY
DEPLOYMENT CAN BE SHAKEN AND WEAKENED BY EFFECTIVE FRIEND
ARTILLERY. THE MORE EFFECTIVE FRIEND ARTILLERY , THE WEAKER THE
ENEMY DEPLOYMENT AND HENCE, THE LESS POSSIBILITY TO STOP THE
ADVANCE OF THE FRIEND INFANTRY.
SECOND, THE ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY MAKES ADVANCE VERY DIFFICULT FOR
BOTH FRIEND ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY. THE ONLY WAY TO REDUCE THE
THREAT AND IMPACT OF ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY IS BY INCREASING THE
NUMBER OF FRIEND INTERCEPTIVE SORTIES.
THIRD, THE NATURE OF THE LAND ON WHICH THE INFANTRY IS ADVANCING.
SOME LANDS GIVE COVER AND FACILITATE THE INFANTRY ADVANCE, BUT
SOME CREATE GREAT DIFFICULTIES. THE EFFECT OF THIS FACTOR HAS
BEEN SHOWN IN THE MODEL AS A RANDOM SINE WAVE WITH SOME NOISE
FACTORS ON IT.
THE MODEL, SHOWS HOW THESE THREE FACTORS WORK TO HINDER. AND DELAY
OR STOP THE INFANTRY ADVANCE. IT ALSO DEMONSTRATES THE ACTION
WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN BY COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES. NATURALLY THE
SIZE OF INFORMATIONS AND THEIR RELIABILITY THE COMMANDERS ARE
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION PLAY DECISIVE ROLE IN SECURING DESIRED
PERFORMANCE. BECAUSE WE HAVE NO CLEAR IDEA ABOUT THE REAL AND
ACTUAL INFORMATION COMMANDERS MAY USE , WE TOOK REFUGE TO (DYSMAP
TABHL FUNCTIONS) WHERE WE ONLY MADE SOME GUESSES.
INFLUENCE DIAGRAM OF JOINT COMBAT OPERATIONS
ARTILLERY CAPABILITY
READY, ARTILLERY > AVAILABLE, ARTILLERY <__ ENEMY
FOR COMMITMENT ARTILLERY LOSS RATE SORTIES
DISPATCH RATE A H
ARTILLERY tA ! 1
rt ARTILLERY H H
H H SUFFICIENCY : i
I ACTUAL/ : H
t REQUIRED t H
i ARTILLERY ! :
\ £ f f
{ | H 1
Hl REQUIRED -——» ARTILLERY ENEMY
H ARTILLERY H EFFECTIVENESS REACTION |
1 ' At a !
' ' tt i 4
Vv i fea i ‘
RTILLERY SHELLS | tt ' H
ESERVE SUFFICIENCY | | H :
f 1h ' t
H 1} CUMULATIVE INFANTRY |
! 1 t ADVANCE OF ¢, ADVANCE |
: ! 1 INFANTRY RATE H
iH SHELLS 1 i at i
Ht AVAILABLE 14 ! ! Hl
TARTILLERY A! v i
ASSEMBLING v FRIEND |
tRATE ENEMY REACTION |
H DEPLOYMENT t !
H FACTOR v i
H FRIEND '
H SORTIES. |
1 t i
H MARGIN H H
1 y f
H CUMULATIVE ENEMY __!
: ADVANCE INTER-
: OF FERENCE
:
:
H
CONCLUSION,
THE ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS GIVEN BY RUNNING THE MODEL,
WITH DIFFERENT CONTROL POLICIES, GIVES SOME BETTER INSIGHT
OF HOW CHANGING COMBAT OPERATIONS COULD BE MANAGED. IT HELPS FOR
EXAMPLE TO DECIDE WHEN AND HOW MORE ARTILLERY OR AIR SORTIES TO.
BE COMMITTED: AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE.
IT IS CLEAR THAT USING SUCH SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL DOES
NOT ONLY HELP IN EASIER ADVANCE BUT IT ALSO DOES HELP
TO REDUCE CASUALTIES AND IMPROVE THE WHOLE ECONOMICS
OF THE OPERATION.
WE HAVE TRIED TO GIVE EMPHASISE TO HOW SYSTEM DYNSMICS
METHOD OF ANALYSIS, WHICH IS OF. PROVEN SUCCESS IN THE FIELD OF
BUSINESS PLANNING, COULD BE APPLIED TO SOME ASPECTS OF DEFENCE
STUDIES.
OUR DEMONSTRATION HAS BEEN OF SIMPLE MODEL IN THE SENSE THAT WE
HAVE NO ACCESS TO INFORMATION WHICH WOULD EXPAND AND IMPROVE IT.
IN OUR JUDGEMENT, HOWEVER, THERE WILL BE NO PARTICULAR TECHNICAL
DIFFICULTIES IN DEVELOPING. THE MODEL AS REALISTIC AS ONE WISHED,
PROVIDING THE NEEDED INFORMATION COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE. ()
IN FACT, WE CONSIDER THAT SYSTEM DYNAMICS HAS USEFUL APPLICATIONS
IN MILITARY TRAINING ACTIVITIES. MILITARY COLLEGE CADETS CAN GAIN
EXPERIENCE IN THE SIMULATING OF REAL WELL KNOWN PAST COMBAT
OPERATIONS AND TRY TO IMPROVE THEIR PERFOMANCE IN SUCH A
COPETITIVE EVIRONMENT, WITHOUT THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES SHOULD
THEY MISGUDJE OR MAKE MISTAKES.
1~ R. GEOFFREY COYLE 1980,A MODEL OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE THIRD
WORLD WAR ,WORKING PAPER ,BRADORD UNIVERSITY MANAGEMENT CENTRE.
2- JAY W.FORRESTER 1961,INDUSTIAL DYNAMICS,THE M.I.T. PRESS.
MODEL FOR COMBAT JOINT OPPERATIONS
1 INFADR
1 ARADR
! FAFAD
sc
1 2.7000
i 0.00000
1 0.30000
!
6.7261 i 0.00000
5.7179 1 4.0000
~1 0081 1 0.40000,
4.0000 7.3152 0.00000
10.700 4.9804
3.5846 0.49804
i
1 6.0000 5.0514 1 4.6489
t 15.096 ! 0.09000
i 10.045 i 0.49223
' 1
1! 8.0000 8.3784 Hi
H 19.578 | 0.00000
i 1
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1 10.000 4.7382 3.6032
1 24.583 0.900000
i 19.845 1 0.50825,
4.2589
0.00000
0.38568
i
t
1 6.4447
H t 2
i 1 40.408 0.00000
H i 35.684 9.51550
BASIC MODEL
FAREFF
ENDEPF
ENINTF
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i
t
! 1.0000
{ 1.0000
1 0.30000
i
t
t
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0.79034
0.78067
0.40000
{ 0.65063
1 0.60000
1 0.49304
0.54611
0.49225
0.66067
0.46317
0.36317
0.74827
0.55414
0.50823
0.77472
0.48368
0.38368
0.79192
0.59436
0.58872
0.78301
0.55775
0.51550
0.76461
ARCR
ENSOR
RFDARR
0.00600
6.0000
6.2500
0.00000
4.2535
6.7500
0.00000
0.00000
2.1966
31.000
1.7586
33.000
0.00000
1.6264
26.750
115.00
1,5404
28.750
0.00000
1.5850
23.563
i
}
t
i
i 132.00
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t
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102.25
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1 25.563
{
598
MODEL FOR COMBAT JOINT OPPERATIONS BASIC MODEL
t
MARG H INFADR FAREFF ( ARCR
CINFAD 1 ARADR ENDEP i ENSOR
CARAD H FAFAD ENINTF i RFDARR:
f 6.0000
i
0.60000 0.67234
{ 1g.000 4.7646 i 5.0260 0.64822
H 46.448 § 0.00000 0.60000
H 41.684 } 6.60000 0.73113
! ! ! ~
: H + 9.00000 0.60847
Hi H 1 6.0000 0.60000
; H 1 0.60000 0.65069
! ‘ | eee
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1 22.000 H 1 0.00000 68176 0.00000
H ! 1 6.0000 0.60000 2.1539
i. H i 0.60000 0.66922 19.379
4 ! a a a
H 0.0000 0.64071 85.516
H 0.60000
Hl
26.000 0.00000
O9n4
0.60984
GO. 70492
0.60984
0.62130
0.00000
2.3935
18.034
28.000 tres 0.00000 0.66131 80.137 i
78.360 6.0000 0.60000 2.4289 1
70,583 0.61425 20.034 t
0.60000
t
4.9683 1 4.7264 i 0.00000 1
i 83.534 { 0.00000 1 2.1283 i
78.566 1 0.63578 1 17.026 1
' |
'
