THE DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC TERRORISM
Bahadir K. AKCAM
University at Albany, SUNY
Information Science PhD Program
Albany, NY, 12222
Tel: (518) 322 6821
E- mail: bahadirakcam2000@ yahoo.com
Victor ASAL
University at Albany, SUNY
Rockefeller College of Public Policy & Administration
Albany, NY, 12222
Tel: (518) 591 8729
E- mail: vasal@ email.albany.edu
ABSTRACT
Despite the fact that much of recent terror is ethnically based, little attention has
been paid to systematically explaining ethnic violence. We built on the work done by the
Minorities at Risk Project (MAR) to the issue of ethnic terror using systems dynamics.
While there has been important work done using MAR to explore ethnic violence as a
base using statistics and qualitative analysis (Gurr 2000), there has been little work
exploring ethnic terrorism specifically and none that has exploited systems dynamics as
an analytical tool. The application of a systems dynamics approach is expected to help us
go beyond some of the limitations of statistical analysis to explore how government
policy and ethnonationalist terrorism feed of each other in a cycle of violence,
discrimination and repression. This work has three broad goals. First, it is targeted at
understanding the causes of ethnic terror and second examining the way the relation
between the ethnic policies of governments and the behavior of ethnic groups -
particularly their choice to use or not use terrorism relate systematically. Third, this
work sees to apply for the first time the tools of systems dynamics to political violence.
Keywords: Ethnic Terrorism Dynamics
INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that much of recent terror is ethno- nationally based, little
attention has been paid to systematically explaining ethnic violence. We built on the
work done by the Minorities at Risk Project (MAR) and apply the model and the data to
the issue of ethnic terror using systems dynamics. While there has been important work
done using MAR to explore ethnic violence as a base using statistics and qualitative
analysis (for examples of both see Gurr 2000), there has been no work exploring ethnic
terrorism specifically and none that has exploited systems dynamics as an analytical tool.
The application of a systems dynamics approach is expected to help us go beyond some
of the limitations of statistical analysis to explore how government policy and ethno-
nationalist terrorism feed of each other in a cycle of violence, discrimination and
repression
This work las three broad goals. First, it is targeted at understanding the causes
of ethnic terror and second examining the way the relation between the ethnic policies of
governments and the behavior of ethnic groups - particularly their choice to use or not
use terrorism relate systematically. Third, this work sees to apply the tools of systems
dynamics to political violence which has yet to be explored using this methodology.
Theoretically, this project draws on the literatures of ethnic conflict to shed light
on the causes of ethnic terror. Based on the literature on ethnic conflict, we seek to
examine how group capacity, repression, group’s perception of rebellion activity,
salience of ethnic identity, comparative disadvantages, opportunity structure (Tarrow
1998), political economic- cultural discrimination (Gurr 1970, Staub 2002), authenticity
of leadership, international support, territorial concentration, government’s decision
structure and political economic-cultural differences impact the likelihood of rebellion
and how rebellion in turn impacts goverment 's discrimination policies.’
We believe that this effort has important theoretical and policy implications. From
a theoretical perspective we draw on the strengths of the existing conflict analysis
literature and the tools of systems dynamics to empirically analyze the causes of
terrorism. Besides deepening our understanding of terrorism, this effort will also enrich
the broader comparative understanding by testing conflict theories in a new and important
context using an underutilized methodology. From a policy perspective, given the threat
that ethnic terror presents, the identification of causal factors of terrorism that are
susceptible to change through policy initiatives has taken on added importance.
DYNAMICS OF ETHNIC TERRORISM
Gurr (2000) sketches a theoretical framework for understanding the causes of
ethnopolitical conflict. In Figure 1, he describes the etiology of ethnopolitical conflict by
showing the relationships between a set of propositions. In these propositions, he
identifies four general factors (variables) to answer theoretical questions on ethnic
terrorism. These factors are the salience of ethnocultural identity for members and leaders
of the group, the extend to which the group has collective incentives for political action,
the extend of the group’s capacities for collective action and the availability of
opportunities in the group’s political environment that increase its chances of attaining
group objectives through political action.
The Ethnic Terrorism Model is built based on his propositions and explanations of
relationships between these propositions.
1 Recent work by Fearon and Laitin (2003), Goodwin (2001), Gurr (2000), Sambanis (2001) and others
have identified these as key factors in explaining conflict.
The Salience of ethnocultural identity is
a function of:
O Extend of cultural differentials vis-a-vis
other groups
© Comparative advantage or disadvantage
O Intensity of past and current conflicts with
the state and rival groups
Incentives for ethnocultural action are a
function of:
o Overcoming collective disadvantages vis -
a-vis other groups
o Regaining lost political autonomy
o Resistance against repressive state control
o The salience of ethnocultural identity
Shared incentives
Territorial concentration
Preexisting group cohesion
oeoo0o°o
Authenticity of leadership
Group capacity for collective action is a function of:
Coalitions among diverse segments and contending leaders
|
autocracy to democracy
Domestic Opportunities for ethnopolitical action are enhanced by:
Breakup of old states and establishment of new ones
o Transitions from one type of regime to another, especially shifts from
o Leadership transitions and formations of new ruling coalitions
Domestic political factors that
encourage strategies of protest:
Democratic norms, institutions
o Strong states with ample resources
Domestic political factors that
encourage strategies of rebellion:
o Authoritarian norms, institutions
o Weak states with limited resources
0 Traditions of elite accommodation of o History of elite reliance on repression to
segmental interest (class, religion, control challenges
ethnicity)
ETHNOPOLITICAL
——— >|
ACTION
International sources of support for ethnopolitical action:
o Global doctrines of nationalism, indigenous rights, and minority rights
o Regional and global networks of ethnic kindred and co-religionists
o Diffusion and contagion of ethnopolitical conflict among similar groups
0
External political and material support
Figure 1 - The Etiology of Ethnopolitical C onflict (G urr,2000)
There has been generally very little study of ethno-nationalist terrorism (for an
exception see Byman 1998). In adopting Gurr’s theoretical model, we are looking at
terrorism as a strategy of contentious politics like protests and revolutions. Gurr, building
on his own work of focusing on grievance (Gurr, 1970), draws on the work of those who
have focused on political opportunity structures and resource mobilization (Tarrow
1998, Tilly 2003) to create a model which can serve as a useful basis for our purposes.
Specifically, Gurr is arguing that Ethnopolitical action, in our case terrorism, is a product
of how the government has treated the group and the group’s past responses to this
treatment.
ETHNIC TERRORISM MODEL (ETM)
Gurr (2000) indicates some feedback loops in his ethnopolitical action
framework. In his inquiry from the feedback loops is to identify root causes. His
correspondence with his college describes the origins of ethnopolitical conflict as
“chicken-and-egg” bsue. The origins of conflict are different for different groups. Gurr
suggests the examination of the consequences of each episode of protracted conflict using
the concepts employed here.
We believe system dynamics modeling is the right tool that answers Gum's
suggestion. System dynamics methodology helps us to understand how systems change
over time. System is a collection of elements (variables) that continually interact over
time to form a unified whole (Martin, 1997). Gurr’s theoretical framework of ethnic
terrorism can be an example of such a system. The structure of ethnic terrorism is defined
by the interactions between several variables such as rebellion, group capacity,
repression, group’s perception of rebellion activity, salience of ethnic identity,
comparative disadvantages, opportunity structure, _ political economic-cultural
discrimination, authenticity of leadership, international support, territorial concentration,
government's decision structure and political economic- cultural differences.
We used Gum's theoretical framework to build causal relationships between
variables. While his model of etiology of ethnopolitical conflict describes some causal
relationships, it doesn’t describe complete feedback loops. His descriptions of
relationships between variables are used to define causal loop diagrams. These causal
loop diagrams are explained below.
Extend of group capacities defines intensity of rebellion. Goverment adopts
repression policies on ethnic group to decrease rebellion activities. This repression
decreases group’s resources dedicated to rebellion such as terrorists and ammunitions
(Figure 2).
Rebellion “+
( (Bl)
+ Repression
decreases
Government \ rebation /G. roup Capacity
repression -for rebellion
Figure 2- Repression decreases rebellion
Government repression also decreases other variables that affect group capacity
such as leadership, international support to ethnic group, and territorial concentration
(Figure 3). Government can capture or kill leaders of terrorist organization (ex. Israeli
Government in Hamas case killed Hamas Leaders in 2004), can put pressure on terrorist
supporting countries (ex. Turkish Government’s pressure on Syria, Russia, Italy and
Greece during October-November 1998) and can decrease ethnic group’s territorial
concentration by moving them from original towns.
Territorial
International concentration
support to ethnic
Rebellion +
Government
repression fo
Se eadership for
rebellion
Figure 3 - Government repression decreases group capacity for rebellion
While this balancing loops decrease rebellion, other effects caused by the same
repression increase rebellion. Repression on ethnic group increases disadvantages for
ethnic group (Figure 4). The existence of collective disadvantages creates opportunities
for ethnic leaders to mobilize the ethnic group for rebellion.
Rebellion +
B)
é Repesion
Government \ ‘sition Arup Capacity
repression forrebellion
tease
a
Ry)
Region
Comparative —\ grb, Incentives for
disadvantages of rebellion
ethnic group
Figure 4-Repression increases group's disadvantages
Government's discrimination policies may create these disadvantages or other
factors such as geographical disadvantages may create them. Along with the counted
government repressions above, government's discrimination policies can increase
comparative disadvantages of ethic group (Figure 5).
Government's ———___
understanding of ~~ Rebellion +
a rebellion
Discrimination of
ethnic group oot)
ones porcies (61)
ve Re
ants o ig ‘cos,
ic group Govemment ‘onlin ‘Group Capacity
for rebellion
= economic Saat F +
differences
—
differences
cultural “Leadership for
differences rebellion
+\e
Comparative | io" 7 Incentives for
disadvantages oNorrebellios rebellion
ethnic grou
Figure 5 - Government discrimination increases comparative disadvantages of ethic group
Government’s discrimination policies can be based on government's
understanding of rebellion. This process is closely related to regime type. Although
rebellion is a way to communicate the political message of ethnic group, increase in
rebellion can increase govemment’s discrimination of ethnic group. Government's
discrimination policies may be based on a trend analysis of rebellion, government's
perception of rebellion, or there may be a certain discrimination policy tied to regime
type that isn’t affected by rebellion level. This sector is important to explore how
governments response ethnopolitical actions, and how their response affect level of
actions.
Intensity of past and current conflicts with the state and rival groups can be
incentive for ethnic group to rebellion (Figure 6). Conflicts might have occurred too
many years ago, but group has a perception of conflicts and it will take some time for
them to forget those conflicts. Sometimes these conflicts are never forgotten (for example
conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland).
Group's perception of
an activity
hn
Bn)
Repression Coen
decreases enciy,
Government \ rebellion Ag, roup Capaci attracts new recruits
A ap for rebellion \\andiasss in ethnic
eS ‘groupsmemories
Leadership for
rebellion
Comparative | ess | Incentives for
disadvantages ofNor rbelliog rebellion
ethnic group.
Figure 6 - Group's perception of rebellion activity
Salience of ethnic identity plays important role in group's capacity. There are two
variables in our model affect the salience of ethnic identity. First variable is cultural
differences. The greater ethnic group’s cultural differences than dominant group which
they interact regularly, the more salient their identity is likely to be. Second variable is
group’s perception of rebellion activity. Intensity of past and current conflicts with the
state increases salience of ethnic identity (Figure 7).
Salience of Group's perception of
; (22) Group's
Ethnic Identity penmepton ot 4 rebellion activity
+/(Rd) Cultura
diferences
aime] Government's Temitorial
shnic identity, understanding of International concentration
a rebellion support to ethnic
Discrimination of
ethnic group
conpaxative
shat of
Economic See
differences
Political
differences
(R3) Group
R peroeption of
rebellion activity
atracts new recruls
and lass in tnic
(groups memories
c Ny Leadership for
differences rebellion,
wags t \t Repesion
Comparative | pores | Incentives for
disadvantages olor rebellic rebellion
ethnic group
Figure 7 - All causal loop diagrams in ETM
CONCLUSIONS
We mapped Gurr's theoretical framework on etiology of ethnopolitical conflicts to
several causal loop diagrams and built Ethnic Terrorism Model (ETM). We believe ETM
helps us to understand the causes of ethnic terror and it helps to examine the relationship
between government policies and ethnic group behaviors. According to our knowledge,
this work is the first systems dynamics approach to political violence.
In ETM, we didn’t include an important variable, “protests”, in our model. Literature on
ethnopolitical conflicts also indicates the relationship between protests and rebellion as a
function of some political factors (political norms, institution policies, state resources... )
in the country. We will include “protests” variable and related causal relationships in our
next model.
We also received important feedback during the System Dynamics Conference. Our
colleagues offered several difference perspectives on both model and approach. For
example, Markus Salge offered to consider “youth effect’ in our model by modeling
based on aging chain structure. We appreciate these feedbacks and we will consider them
in our following modeling efforts. We believe that we reached our goals by reflecting
Gurr’s ideas to a system dynamics model in this project.
During the modeling process, we also worked on “Kurds in Turkey” case to see how our
model performs. Although we reached some results, we didn’t publish those here. We
both need to work more on the case and get more data about it. We will work on other
cases to test and improve our model.
REFERENCES
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