1994 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM DYNAMICS CONFERENCE
Strategic Cultural Interventi in Sy Science - Examining the
Prospects for the Further Development of Methodological
Complementarism
John Brocklesby
Graduate School of Business and Government Administration
Victoria University of Wellington
Box 600, Wellington
New Zealand
E-mail: John.Brocklesby @ vuw.ac.nz
Abstract
This paper contemplates the prospect of the complementary use of hard, soft, and critical systems
methodologies, becoming a more established Practice among the diverse company of operational
hers and s in and Government, who have been
trained in systems thinking and apply its language and concepts in dealing with organisational
problems.
The paper takes the line that because matters concerning methodology always embody deeper
of ing, and ings are largely culturally determined, it is worthwhile drawing upon
ideas from the literature on organisational culture to illustrate some of the key factors that are likely
to obstruct this and other similar initiatives. From a culture Perspective, transitioning from the
existing specialisations of systems science towards d ‘ism is
conceptualised as requiring a form of organisational learning. Learning is contingent upon the
existence of a broad set of propitious circumstances; a scenario, it is argued, that is not met in this
particular case. Although the idea of complementarism is the principal focus of the paper, much of
the argument applies equally to other attempts to deliberately intervene in the culture of systems
science.
Problem - Se
ving Alethosa goes. Pots
1994 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM DYNAMICS CONFERENCE
Strategic Cultural Interventions in Systems Science - Examining the
Prospects for the Further Development of Methodological
Complementarism
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to contemplate the prospect of the complementary use of hard, soft,
and critical systems hi a more bli a Practies among the diverse
1 ‘ and
and
Government, who have been trained in systems thinking and 7 its language and concepts in
dealing with organisational problems.
Because matters concerning methodology always embody deeper structures of meaning, and
i are largely cul ined, the paper draws upon ideas from the literature on
organisational culture to illustrate some of the key factors that are likely to obstruct this and
other similar initiatives. From a culture perspective, transitioning from the existing
specialisations of systems science towards ism ism
hereafter) is conceptualised as requiring a form of organisational learning, a concept borrowed
from Lundberg (1985). Learning is contingent upon the existence of a broad set of propitious
circumstances; a scenario, it is argued, that is not met in this particular case. Although the idea of
complementarism is the principal focus of the paper, much of the argument applies equally to
other attempts to deliberately intervene in the culture of systems science.
At the outset attention needs to be drawn to two points. Firstly my personal bias. Basically I am
sympathetic to the idea of complementarism, and would like to see it become better established,
even to the extent that it becomes perhaps the major framework guiding system practice.
Secondly, I have not attempted here to locate complementarism within any broader philosophy
of systems practice, notably Flood and Jackson's Critical Systems Thinking, of which
complementarism is just one element. This is not merely due to the fact that one cannot cover
everything in a single paper. Although I also subscribe to much of what critical thinking stands
for, I do believe that complementarism can stand as an approach to systems practice in its own
right.
METHODOLOGICAL COMPLEMENTARISM AS CULTURAL VISIONING
Cultures can change in one of two ways. Firstly as a result of on-goi
that occur as members go about their daily affairs. Secondly, as a result of influential actors
formulating new ideologies, or visions, perhaps as part of a deliberate strategic culture change
initiative. Creating a vision of complementarism as integral to the development of the discipline
of systems is conceptualised here as one such strategic intervention in the culture of systems
science.
As an explicit philosophy of systems practice, complementarism fi first emerged during the 1980's.
It responsed to the suggestion that the field was in a highly fragmented state, and held out the
promise that systems people could cast aside narrow ions, thereby ding their
competences and their usefulness to clients. Jackson and | Key's well-known System of Systems
Methodologies (SOSM), provided its major th ical thrust.
The SOSM classifies a range of different systems thodologi ding to tl
the
made by each on the matter of the complexity of the system in which the problem is located,
and on the level of agreement among key participants regarding the purposes of the system. It
was the first framework to attempt to categorise some of the key differences between hard, soft,
and, _more recently, critical systems methods, and, in doing so it laid the foundation for their
ina y approach to problem solving.
Ten years on from when the SOSM first appeared, there are enclaves within the systems
community where the philosophy and practice of complementarism appear to be well-
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1994 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM DYNAMICS CONFERENCE
established. In spite of this, the approach has not been as influential as one might perhaps have
expected given its undoubted intuitive appeal. 1 submit that the explanation for this takes us to
the very heart and soul, or inner culture, of systems science.
SYSTEMS PRACTICE AS THE ENACTMENT OF CULTURE
The rationale for portraying systems practice as the enactment of culture centres upon the idea
that, in addition to developing knowledge and complex capabilities in its members, the ‘discipline’
also weaves a complex web of meanings that strongly influence 'how we do things around here’.
These socially constructed meanings are made up of largely tacit cognitive and behavioural 'rules'
that prescribe and prohibit certain behaviours, and, most importantly - in the context of this
discussion - abet or delimit new developments. Thus, because values and assumptions channel the
attention of b to some hodologies and not others, decisions about methodology
choice, as well as most other aspects of the day to day work of systems people amount to the
enactment of culture.
Although the focus here is upon how
and how these are used, acculturation also bears heavily upon other aspects of i including
where one looks for problems, and how these are seen; what one chooses to include in the
research or omit from it; how one interacts with clients; what one believes 'works' and what does
not 'work'; whose interests one supports, and how findings are presented. Systems people then,
are best conceptualised as contextually and historically situated actors who, by committing
themselves to a particular way of thinking about the world in a particular place at a particular
time, are severely constrained by the norms, values and assumptions that their various cultural
alignments impose upon them
PREDICAMENTS, INQUIRY AND REFORMULATION - CULTURE CHANGE AS
ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING
Much of the impact that cultural forces exert upon individuals operates through tacit and sub-
conscious processes, and, as a result, it is an unseen and unheard of source of energy. So at the
same time that a culture is providing its members with a distinctive way of viewing the world and
understanding their experiences, it is also preventing an examination of the content of such
meanings and the basis upon which these are created. Under normal circumstances, questions
about culture do not appear on individuals' agendas for consideration and debate. Thus
‘predicaments' must be faced in order to initiate the cycle of learning that eventually leads to
culture change. Individuals must experience a major jolt, a surprise, or an ‘out of the ordinary’
event that is of sufficient concern to warrant an inquiry into the at aesal of existing
cultural phenomena. Inquiry results in the discovery of new p and
to cultural that under leads to ar ion of the
cultural state where the cycle began.
When culture change is conceptualised as a function of organisational learning, it is clear that in
any particular instance the transition from one culture into another will occur as a result of the
interaction of a complex array of variables. Generally though, learning seems to require a build up
of pressures and tensions within the system. This creates a situation in which members are in a
state of receptiveness to particular events, including cultural visioning, that, under such
circumstances become triggers for learning.
Assuming, then, that initiatives are being taken to alter culture in a particular domain, it is this
t that determines how receptive the members will be to
potential ': surprises! and hones whether or not the learning cycle will be triggered.
In what follows below, we apply these ideas to the situation that is perceived as current in the
systems field. The main thesis to be presented is that while it is possible to discern a number of
circumstances and activities that have the potential to trigger learning, this is not transpiring
because of a gi lly low state of recep' among the group in question.
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STRATEGIC VISIONING AND OTHER POTENTIAL 'SURPRISES'
Although I suspect that in recent years the differences between the two domains has become less
marked, intervening strategically in the cultural make-up of acad and
is generally much more difficult than is the case in most businesses. Business managers have to
recognise that culture is a socially d ing out of historical processes,
and therefore they cannot always be guaranteed to get their own way when it comes to
deliberately changing the cultural make-up of their organisations. However they do have
advantages over their counterparts in the academic and scientific world. They are better
positioned to intervene directly within their organisations, and, once they have decided upon an
‘appropriate’ culture, they are more empowed to put in place sustaining organisational structures,
systems and processes. The balance of power also favours managers in the business world. In
business, employees frequently have to ‘toe the line' for fear of losing their jobs. This can also be
true for academics working in particular institutions, and it most certainly is the case for in-house
scientists. However, as constituents of a parent discipline or field of enquiry, they generally have
more autonomy such that they are better placed to reject or choose to ignore advice, guidance, or
new ‘knowledge’ if it does not suit.
To a greater or lesser extent the 'cultures' that emerge in the world of knowledge and ideas, are
continually in a state of flux as a result of spontaneous activities and interactions. However,
deliberate interventions also occur periodically and these are usually initiated through visioning
processes. In cultural visioning, opinion leaders typically reveal the inappropriateness of existing
cultural phenomena and present as alternatives new ‘better’ systems of meaning. Thus Beer
tendered his viable systems model as an improvement on much classical OR partly on the basis of
his antipathy towards the reductionist tendencies of OR; Checkland his Soft Systems
Methodology as inherently superior to systems engineering approaches in dealing with problems
arising in purposeful 'human activity systems’; and Rosenhead's often passionate appeals to the
OR community to widen its client base. All of these interventions are ‘cultural’ in the sense that
they are not merely arguing the merits of particular techniques relative to others, but they are
imploring systems people to subscribe to new sets of meanings. This is also true for
complementarism. Its case is not championed solely on the basis of the idea that using hard, soft,
and critical methods is better than any single domain approach. It also invokes changes in
meaning, and it is these deeper meanings, that I believe will cause problems.
The point is that these visioning P are to gic cultural interventions’
enacted by influential leaders of opinion. Often having experienced predicaments themselves, and
inquiry and reformulation of cultural values, they are descriptively shaping an
image of a new organisational culture, and inviting others to subscribe to their own preferred set
of meanings.
Visioning can occur in parallel with other activities, that, under favourable circumstances, can
initiate learning. Changes in the external environment of the system that leads to a decline i in
‘performance’, is one of these. For example, visionaries can italise upon real or
crises that threaten the viability of the system. Ackoff's (1979) paper perhaps represented the
zenith of the impending disaster period in the systems field. Ackoff, and others proclaimed that
because external circumstances were no longer comparable with those that prevailed during OR's
period of major development in the WW2 and immediate post-war era, then unless radical steps
were taken, it would inevitably continue to decline. This view has been rehearsed extensively
elsewhere, and it is implicit in both the content of ism, which also prop a form
a radical surgery, as well as the way in which pl m has been p d to the
members of the systems community.
Technological i ion is another « i that can trigger learning. 'New' methodologies
are arriving on the scene; SSM, ive Planning, Options Devel and
Analysis, Strategic Assumptions Surfacing and Testing, Critical Systems Heuristics, are de-facto
that have und triggered learning, although one could not argue
that any of these have radically altered the shape of the entire systems field. Certainly it is
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possible that Flood and Jackson's imaginative inter-linking of hors with the SOSM and
individual systems methodologies in Total Systems Intervention, may provide the technological
catalyst that sparks the process by which individuals become motivated to learn more about the
deeper ‘cultural’ layers embodied in the idea of I ism.
Having outlined some of the events and ci that, under
could invoke learning, it is now appropriate to assess whether the circumstances are, in fact,
favourable or not. Put another way, the question is, "how receptive is systems science to the
vision of complementarism?"
The organisational culture li id a number of factors that combine to determine the
extent to which a ‘system will be receptive to visioning. The first three of these - Tinimal
coupling, the availability of spare resources, and stable and i are
below in the context of the obstacles caused by the existing fragmented culture of systems
science. The fourth - the amount of change - is discussed later.
Minimal coupling, spare resources, and leadership
Without question, complementarism is invoking profound changes in systems practice. Its'
message to bring about a closer operational linking of hard, soft, and critical methods is not being
dispersed as an incremental change in modus operandi to a highly specialised unit located in a
narrowly-bounded organisational setting. Rather it is being broadcast widely throughout the
systems and p as a generic approach in dealing with complex organisational
problems. The issue at hand, is whether the existing cultural configuration of the discipline will
facilitate or hinder such a process. In answering this question it is important to make some basic
observations about what this culture entails.
There is no doubt that the overall culture of what we know as 'systems science’ is complex.
Broadly it contains a loose amalgam of individual sub-cultures. These have ‘ged over time in
particular historical and organisational settings, often under the tutelage of influential leaders.
Because systems people are widely dispersed around various acad and
and tend not to interact as one large group, the overall picture is one of a large number of sub-
cultures many of which subscribe to their own disti shared i Some have developed
their own ideologies and created their own cultural form embodying distinct paradigms that focus
upon different phenomena. Hence the priorities of these groups, their theories, preferred
methodologies and viewpoints, tend not to be replicated across the
Even the notion that there exists a single dominant culture based upon hard systems thinking
supported or countered (depending upon one's point of view) by soft and critical sytems thinking
. May be an While the differences within these groupings, for
example between British and North American OR, or between the approaches of Checkland and
Eden in the 'Soft' school, may not be as great as the differences between the three domains, they
are significant, and should not be discounted.
Inevitably then, one has to question whether there exists the minimum coupling that the
culture claims is a p dit for triggering learning out of visioning
processes. The visioning may be astute and intelligent, but one wonders whether the message is
being heard by the audience to which it is being directed. The difficulty, one suspects, is that
although the message is being widely broadcast, many of the potential audience is attending
different conferences, reading different journals, and, as a result, dealing with quite different and
distinctive cultural phenomena.
While interaction processes account for both the emergence and transmittal of cultures over
time, explaining why particular cultures develop ii in particular ‘organisational’ settings requires an
understanding of two key factors. The first is the 'business' that an organisation is in.
Most systems people are involved in problem solving of one sort or another and they subscribe
to a common language. However this is not to the ofa sense of
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identity. Invariably the cultural bearing of groups of systems people is 'business' specific, and,
localised 'business' demands often fully occupy their attention. This applies as much to an in-
house OR person as it does to an academic who specialises in doing work of a particular sort.
Hence, even if the visioning message is heard, providing there is a continuing demand for
particular expertise, it is unlikely that the provider will perceive the call to change as a
predicament. Even if they did, they may not have the spare capacity to engage in the learning
that the change would require. For example, although the 'business' circumstances surrounding the
lop of many cl: IR tech notably the war effort and post-WW2
reconstruction are now part of history, in many quarters there is still a big demand for the
services of specialists in techniques such as linear programming, systems analysis or queing
theory. These experts may hear the message, but one suspects that the rallying cry will not
create predicaments for many of them, and even if it did, continuing pressures of work may
preclude learning.
The second factor that has a major impact upon organisational culture is the values and
assumptions of ‘founding fathers'. Most readers of this paper will not need reminding of the
impact that influential leaders can have upon the direction taken by particular systems groups -
Woolsey at the Colorado School of Mines, Forrester at MIT, Beale at Scicon, Rivett at
Lancaster, Churchman at Berkeley, Ackoff at the Wharton School, Checkland at Lancaster,
Eden at Bath and Strathclyde, Friend and Jessup at the Institute for Operational Research, and
there are others. Although not all systems people have come under the tutelage of such well-
known leaders, even less well-known leaders at a local level are able to create distinctive cultures.
These people have direct access to their staff, they can physically intervene if necessary, and
they control scarce resources such as research funds and promotion that can be used to sustain
their own, often narrow and specialised, interpretations of the world. Consequently these
narrowly bounded sub-cultures often create more of a sense of cultural identity for members than
does the somewhat nebulous body of knowledge and ideas that frames and informs their work.
In constrast to ‘local’ leaders, the odds seem to be heavily stacked against visionaries promoting
discipline-wide change from the ‘outside’. To some extent at least, the visionaries' level of
perceived credibility and therefore influence, will depend upon the ‘culture gap' that exists
between where the audience is right now. and where complementarism would like it to be. If the
gap is large, then the visionaries may not be recognised as leaders at all, and they will have little
influence. In addition the inability to physically intervene, through developing close personal
relationships with colleagues or the inability to control resources that impact upon others’
careers, will make the situation even less propitious. Relative to local leaders, these visionaries
are in a weak position. Notwithstanding the desirability of this, creating a more integrated culture
of systems science, a systems discipline, out of a large number of diverse sub-cultures through the
di powers of pers and mainly relying upon the written media to get the
message across, is likely to be difficult.
In summarising the argument to this point. | am ing that the fr d cultural landscap
of systems science would appear to create a number of difficulties for the champions of
complementarism who are seeking to initiate discipline-wide organisational learning. Weak intra-
organisational communication links reduce the likelihood of the message being heard. On-going
commitment to the concerns of their local ‘businesses’ coupled with continuing demands for their
specialised services, places investing considerable time in learning new approaches low on the list
of priorities for many members. Finally. the visionaries have limited powers of influence in
communicating predicaments. and most importantly neutralising the counterveiling and often
conservative force of local leaders. We can now turn our attention to another important related
factor that the organisational culture literature identifies as having an important influence upon
the level of receptiveness to visioning. and that is the amount of change that the vision would
invoke.
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The amount of change
Following Trice and Beyer (1975), it is possible to identify four independent dimensions that
allow us to assess the amount of any culture change. These are pervasiveness, magnitude,
innovativeness, and duration of cultural changes.
Pervasiveness
The pervasiveness of an envisioned change is the proportion of activities in a particular cultural
arena that will be affected by the change. This is determined by two major factors - the number
of members whose cultural bearing i is expected to change, and how often they will be called upon
to behave differently in carrying out their work.
Because the case for complementarism is nearly always presented within the context of a
ion with narrow sp and the d state of the discipline, one has to
assume that it is being tendered as a credible approach across the full width of systems seience. It
does not come across as an approach that could sit ly as an abb
v ide the present i ions where the majority of systems people remain aiitin “the
boundaries of either the dominant hard domain, or the less well-populated areas of soft or critical
systems thinking.
‘Gi it ism ions the legiti of narrow ialisati The SOSM, for example, is
d upon the ont i 1 assumption that there are multiple equally legitimate
perspectives on what any problem situation is, and th Pp fig about what needs
to be done. Thus, because the possibility that problem i
unambiguously i is rejected, it would seem inconceivable for analysis i » offer their services as
and specific experts. The same conclusion may be reached by following
the logic of enquiry laid down in Flood and Jackson's Total Systems Intervention. TSI explicitly
requires the analyst to deploy a range of different metaphors prior to determining, in
consultation with the various stakehold which h ) is in the of
concern. This then informs the Process of making decisions about methodology choice. Because
one has no means of knowing, in advance, which metaphors are likely to emerge as dominant in
a particular situation, then analysts have to be multi-methodology literate. In the event that an
analyst's favoured methodology does not emerge as appropriate or relevant to the intervention,
it is always possible that they could withdraw gracefully from the scene and defer to some other
‘expert’. I submit that this is unlikely however, for all sorts of reasons, not the least of which is
the self-perception that there could be damage to the analyst's perceived credibility and a decline
in their standing in the eyes of the client.
It would be unreasonable to suggest that those promoting complementarism believe that
converting the broad mass of systems people into multi-methodology literate problem solvers is
feasible. However, because d is t to this way of thinking, one
must conclude that the intent has been to influence across a broad front,
The second factor that impacts upon the pervasiveness of change also leads one to the
| that the i d change is sub and fore difficult. This concerns the
proportion of time spent engaged in the new activities. Doubtless, this should be viewed as an
empirical question, the answer to which will depend upon a number of factors. Certainly there will
be local variation. For example it will depend upon whether the individual in question is employed
in the ‘operational’ or the ‘managerial’ domains of systems Selene or whether they are closetted
in some research setting engaged in abstract theory work.
The vast majority of systems people though, fulfill "operational roles to a greater or lesser
extent, by which J mean that they are engaged in applied problem-solving. Inasmuch as problem-
solving is what most systems people do, and it is largely 'methodologies' that frame this activity,
then it would be difficult to envisage major aspects of their day to day work that is not touched
by methodological concerns in some way or another.
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Magnitude
The magnitude of an envisioned change refers to the distance between the old understandings and
behaviours and the new ones members are expected to adopt. There are a number of issues here
that surface as likely ot les to the devel of ism, and most arise as a
consequence of our need to conceptualise the concept as invoking changes at 'deep' levels of
culture.
Strategic cultural interventions can focus in upon any or all of the various 'layers' that make up
the culture concept. These layers include physical, verbal, and behavioural artefacts at the ‘outer’
surface layer of culture, through values, norms, and beliefs, to more permanent and enduring basic
assumptions that reside in the central core of any culture. Whereas it is relatively easy to alter
cultural artefacts, and somewhat harder to change attitudes and beliefs, the most optimistic
scenario for modifying basic assumptions is that it is likely to be a difficult, long, and drawn out
affair. Because these non-conscious underpinnings of the other levels of culture, emerge out of
lengthy socialisation processes, many attempts at assumption modification do not succeed.
The issue of the 'level' of culture that I ism targets is imp because it provides a
key indication of the likely feasibility of change. Hence if one presents the idea on the basis that
soft and critical methods could be incorporated within the prevailing sets of meanings associated
with the hard systems domain, then the feasibility of it triggering ‘learning’, of a sort, is
enhanced. Introducing this form of complementarism should not present any great difficulty. I
suspect that many systems people have been practising it for a long time.
When someone chooses to use a particular methodology, it will embody meaning for them.
These might include beliefs about its value in dealing with problems, about when it should be used,
and about how it should be used. These beliefs are manifestations of even deeper sub-conscious
tacit assumptions about the world, about problem solving, and the role that the analyst should
play in intervention. The problem is that no-one can determine in advance what meaning will
operate for a particular user. Neither can meanings be legislated for by any external party. So
when a suitable occasion presents itself, there is nothing, for example, to prevent a
i from. the classical OR genre from ‘doing’ soft or critical
systems projects, even ‘fe they steadfastly refuse, or are simply unable to question the meanings
one normally associates with the hard systems digm. For that individual, the 'new'
are amplifying (arguably) their ability to deal with the rich variety in problem situations that
have to be dealt with in the external world. The fact that they are effectively only using these
methods as artefacts adorning existing and (under this scenario, inappropriate) sets of values and
pti may not be d by the user as a problem.
However, the true of pl ism, (and therefore the culture of
complementarism), involves ‘more than “this. Flood and Jackson claim that "different
methodologies express different rationalities stemming from. alternative theoretical positions
which they reflect. These al must be resp and d and their
appropriate theoretical underpinnings developed in partnership". Of course it is possible that I
am doing Flood and Jackson a gross diservice here, but it is this notion that “alternative
(theoretical) positions must be respected" that confirms my belief that they are invoking changes
in the deeper layers of culture. When one i ing at this
level, one can understand why it involves what one ‘might call 'real' cultural change. One can also
see why it is likely to initiate major changes at the level of practice, the magnitude of which
needs to be spelt out.
Take SSM for example. In using SSM it is widely accepted that this does not merely require
individuals to become familiar with a new set of routines and techniques. Shifting from a hard to a
soft systems mode triggers fundamental changes in both the content and the style of the
intervention. The primary task shifts from problem solving to problem structuring; system
optimisation is replaced by iterative learning, engineering consensus and system ‘improvement’;
the interest domain shifts from objective ‘facts’ fo subjectivities and multiple rationalities;
qualitative hni replace ive the ipline basis shifts from
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mathematics to the social sciences, models of perceptions (holons) replace models of real world
entities (systems); interventions occur more at the levels in or i than at
operational levels, implied metaphors are political system and culture instead of machine and
organism. This list is not exhaustive.
When 1 ism is und das itating fu | changes in cultural bearing as
well as the isition of new and additional technical ip the difficulties of bringing it
about become crystal clear. Refor ing values and ip has to nullify the pervasive
impact of accumulated past experiences and often ingrained sets of meanings. This is not to
suggest that such changes cannot occur. There are enough prominent members of the systems
community who, for example, have admitted radical it in the way in which
they see the world and their role within it, or admit to having experienced ‘epistemological
breaks’ in which the assumptions of one paradigm are replaced by another, to believe that it is
possible. Beer, Ackoff, Checkland, and Rosenhead are well-known cases in point. However, long-
held basic assumptions and values, have a habit of retaining their sub- even
under circumstances in which they have been publically repudiated. Thus, i in an incisive critique of
Soft Systems Methodology, Rennie (1989) shows how Checkland's engineering and hard systems
d has d the ions upon which SSM is said to be
based. If such an infl may be di d in who has devoted many years to a single
approach, and who has reutenty proclaimed the virtues of being true to the intrepretive
philosophy upon which the method is built, one wonders what hope there is for the rest of us.
The major difficulty for complementarism is that if people are going to be true to the spirit of
the concept, it is highly likely that the new practices, values, and ideologies will be viewed as
being somewhat distant from meanings they already hold, and this is going to have a huge impact
upon whether or not the learning cycle is triggered.
The point is that for a hard systems person who has remained cocooned for years within the
boundaries of, for example, classical operational research (or even one of its sub-specialties),
these changes represent huge disturbances to the status quo. Because complementarism does not
seek to displace hard systems thinking and methods, but instead advocates complementing it with
more emphasis being placed upon soft and critical systems approaches, one could not assert that
adopting complementarism would amount to a complete destruction of the existing culture.
Nonetheless, the distance between the ‘old’ and the 'new' culture is enormous. What is perhaps
more important, is the fact that some existing tacit assumptions about the world, especially those
of an onto-epistemological nature, are clearly incompatible with the assumptions upon which the
methods of the 'new'culture are premised. Changing one's view about whether 'reality' consists of
‘hard', observable, ‘concrete’ facts, to a ‘softer’ interpretive position, where reality is viewed as the
product of cognitions, is not impossible, but it is also not something most people will take
lightly. Undoubtedly paradigm shifts do occur, but when they do it is often a painful experience
for the individual concerned, as perhaps decades-old ‘truths’ are dispensed with and replaced by
alternatives. Even if it were thought desirable (and I am not going to delve into the paradigm
incommensurability thesis here), one has to question whether most systems people will have the
inclination or the wherewithal to make these sorts of paradigmatic shifts on a regular basis.
Innovativeness
The innovativeness of the envisioned change refers to the extent to which the new
and behavi are or have some Similarity to what has happened
elsewhere. Generally, the process of culture change p in where
there is some internal or external precedent for what is proposed. Under such circumstances
members can adapt what others have learned. If the desired culture is genuinely innovative, then
change is often difficult, uncertain, or even impossible. Originality will be required to create new
cultural forms including new networks of ideologies.and values to give it substance.
We have already drawn attention to some aspects of existing systems practice that amount to
complementarism of a sort. Although the general picture is one of a fragmented discipline, from
time to time members do cross the boundaries between the three major domains. Many, for
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example, combine hard and soft, and possibly even critical methods in their daily work. Others
may primarily operate in a single domain, yet, as a matter of routine, incorporate insights from
other domains to enhance their overall level of competence. Thus, Bryant (1988) reminds us
that while many classical operational researchers, particularly those from the more
pragmatically-inclined British genre of OR, concern themselves mainly with the technical aspects
of problems, they do posses an acute and i intuitive of | matters
that one normally associates with soft systems methods.
As I suggested earlier however, the search for true precedents must look beyond episodes of
interventions in which analysts merelyuse a range of different methods. It must seek to discover
practices and interventions where methods from di ins are clearly gi ded in a
ding of the digm to which each belongs. It is only
when it is possible to identify situations where individuals embrace the full ramifications of a new
paradigm when they enter it from elsewhere, that one may lly claim that a p di
exists. At this stage, | have no means of knowing whether such precedents do exist in any great
numbers, although I suspect that they do not.
A search in other disciplines and fields of enquiry for precedents where as a matter of routine
individuals are required to cross paradigm boundaries, is also unrewarding. The vast proportion of
theory generation and research in most such areas of knowledge, emanates from within the
boundaries of a single paradigm. Thus effort is concentrated in a relatively narrow area that is
usually defined as the dominant orthodoxy within a particular field (Burrell and Morgan 1979).
Often, competing perspectives exist within dominant paradigms or they reside elsewhere, but
rarely do they develop beyond the stage where they are perceived as deviant or the work of an
aberrant or eccentric minority. If these arguments about the absence of precedents for what
complementarism proposes have any validity, then the envisioned change is highly innovative.
Duration
The final element in the mix pertaining to the amount of cultural change is its duration, in other
words the length of time that a change effort is likely to take. Although all substantial changes in
culture takes time, some are more protracted than others. Against this background, it is hard to
avoid drawing the conclusion that if change does occur, then it will be as a result of a long and
drawn out process.
Irrespective of whether one operates Primarily in the hard, soft, or critical domains of systems
science, building up one's knowledge of residing elsewt is the result of a
cumulative process of investigation, learning and hands-on experience. When one then
introduces the requirement that user's fully appreciate the theoretical and philosophical
assumptions embodied in a particular approach, then the extent of the task becomes crystal-
clear. Even if the analyst is committed to the idea of complementarism, developing
methodological competences across the three domains while being true to each's theoretical
presuppositions is going to take time.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
The main thesis presented in this paper is that while the possibility of the sort of culture change
that complementarism would require certainly exists, the probability of it happening among the
diverse group of systems people discussed here is somewhat remote.This is because of structural
and other impediments within the system that imply an overall low level receptiveness to
visioning.
Because at the outset, I d enthusiasm for the i ism idea, it is inevitable that
like-minded colleagues will level the accusation that the tone of the paper has been unduly
negative, and not consistent with the spirit of systems thinking which is to do something about
problems, not just say what they are. In anticipation of this I offer some brief concluding
comments.
Problem - Solving Methodologies, page 53
1994 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM DYNAMICS CONFERENCE
Like any cultural phenomena, it is possible that complementarism will emerge spontaneously
over time. More likely, some form of strategic intervention will be required to bring it about. The
question is what. What strategy and action plans should those who support it invoke? Visioning, I
have argued, | will probably 1 not work | for the broad mass of systems people. Although there have
been and during the last twenty years or so, and
at times the visioning associated with these has been intense, the prevailing culture of systems
science appears to be largely intact. The prospects for change are probably much better among
the ranks of practising managers who often do not carry the sort of scientific cultural baggage
that systems people do.
The strategy for bringing the vision about must be grounded in a realistic understanding of what is
possible and what isn't. Thus I believe that a more indirect and long term approach is likely to be
more effective than one that draws upon the powers of direct persuasion. The intervention needs
to be less direct and unobtrusive, otherwise it runs the risk of creating the sort of predicament
that does not lead to learning, and that is conflict. Under this scenario, entrenched interests seek
to preserve their territory, their self-esteem and imagined threats to their future security.
Krefting and Frost's (1985) notion of culture change as ‘surfing waves' provides a pointer - wait
for the right wave to occur naturally and then ride it for all it is worth. Attempting to alter
cultures through the powers of persuasion when the majority are not in the audience, and those
that are, are not really listening, is a bit like trying to create waves in a huge swimming pool
without the forces of wind and tide, it is very hard work. The problem for the visionaries is that
creating a good wave to bring about culture change depends upon a large number of factors many
of which are not under their control.
But they do have some cultural leverage. For example they are highly influential in some
quarters, especially where they interact directly with people. Already sub-cultures of like-minded
people have emerged. These now need to become more widely dispersed through the community
so that there is a gradual accumulation of these ideas occuring at the grass roots level. This would
help to alleviate the problem of minimal coupling. The prospect of competing views about ‘how
we do things around here’ developing would then become a real possibility. Because they also have
influence over what is taught in the universities, they are able to nurture the development of
newcomers into the systems community who are capable of performing across a broader front
than has been the case hitherto. Moreover they can facilitate the entry of people from non-
traditional backgrounds into the field. These sorts of actions are not going to change the shape of
the discipline in the short term. Over time though, one would expect this to increase the build-up
of tensions and pressures within the system, and create circumstances under which visioning is
more likely to initiate learning, even among those who have previously resisted change.
The difficulties are still formidable. As Jackson said recently "The creation of a systems
discipline is an immense task and one which still lies before us" (Jackson 1993). And Flood
(1993) "I believe that the summit of complementarism is worth struggling (my emphases)
towards' The paper concludes by agreeing with both sentiments, and reiterating the point that in
spite of what has been said here, cultures do change.
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