24th International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, 2006
Hierarchy or Network in Military Command Organizations? Preliminary Results from
Experiments with the NCW Learning Lab
Bjorn T. Bakken
Norwegian Defence Leadership Institute
Oslo Mil / Akershus
NO-0015 Oslo
Norway
Email: btbakken@fil.mil.no
Phone: +47 90196149
Fax: +47 230973771
Thorvald Haerem
Norwegian School of Management
Nydalsveien 37
NO-0442 Oslo
Norway
Morten Ruud
Norwegian Defence Leadership Institute
Oslo Mil / Akershus
NO-0015 Oslo
Norway
Abstract
In environments that demand a high degree of flexibility together with rapid and accurate
decision-making, network centric command structures have been promoted as “the”
organizational solution to meet these demands. Network centric command structures,
arguably, enhance the situation awareness and the understanding of the situation. The NCW
(Network Centric Warfare) Learning Lab was developed to allow systematic, simultaneous
experimental manipulation of structural and individual varibles, in order to observe the effects
on dependent variables such as actual and perceived operational effectiveness. The Learning
Lab was designed to particularly stimulate the dynamic aspects of decision making. Our
preliminary results show that a network centric organization does not necessarily lead to
higher perceived situation awareness or better understanding of the situation. Although our
findings are in contrast to contemporary writings on the organization of military operations,
we find them to make sense in light of basic theories about information processing in
organizations.
INTRODUCTION
The changes in threats to defence organizations have changed radically over the last couple of
decades. The change from the threats of the cold war to the threats of asymmetric warfare
together with the technological changes in effectors, sensors and tools for decision support
raises the question of whether the traditional hierarchical structures of the past are appropriate
structures for the future.
Organizational theory agree that the specific changes in the environment combined with the
changes in technology, i.e., the ways operations are run, provide good reasons to question the
traditional ways to organize (e.g. Scott, 2003; Thompson, 1967). In light of these
developments, the network structure of organizing has been advocated as providing several
favorable opportunities and properties. In short, military strategists propose that the network
organization is a more appropriate way to organize modern operations, than the hierarchical
organization (e.g., Alberts et al., 2001). The fundamental question of hierarchy versus
network raises several associated questions. Two such questions have been mentioned in
particular: First, the role of visualization technologies and second; the role of communication
technologies and amount of information.
We have developed a research model to test the relationship between organization structure
(hierarchy versus network) and performance. This model also allows investigating whether
the effect of the organizational structure, i.e. hierarchy versus network, is different between
organizational levels, i.e. the operational and tactical. In addition to the aspect of effectiveness
we have included two factors we have assumed to mediate the effect of organizational
structure, namely situation awareness and perceived task complexity. More models and
relationships are designed and proposed for future experiments and investigations of the
interplay of human factors in a network centric defence organization. To support
experimentation, the NCW Learning Lab was designed, implemented, tested and set in
production during 2003-2005 (Bakken, Ruud & Johannessen, 2004).
THE NCW LEARNING LAB
The NCW Learning Lab is a simulation environment that has at least two features that makes
it different from other simulators used for experimental purposes. First, the lab allows the
operation of an entire multi-level command system. The NCW Learning Lab can simulate and
investigate decision-making on a range from one to (currently) four levels of a command
system. This is different from most labs we know of, that primarily permit investigation on a
single (usually tactical) level. The fact that the lab opens for simulations of organizational
mechanisms that works across levels is important because such mechanisms are assumed to
be a core property of organizations. Moreover, the empirical studies of such phenomena have
been done by cross-sectional surveys which have often shown conflicting results. Thus, the
inclusion of more than one level introduces opportunities to investigate relationships that to
our knowledge have not been studied in such semi-controlled environments that a research
simulator represents. This project has defined these opportunities as important to ensure the
value of the experiments’ contribution to the existing knowledge base.
More specifically, NCW Learning Lab supports the manipulation of organizational structure,
for example in term of hierarchical and network structures. Since the lab also supports
simulation of several levels in command systems we are able to design studies that investigate
the effect of organizational structure on both an operational and tactical level. The lab also
supports investigation of the influence of technological factors, such as use of different
communication media and visualization tools.
The First Experiments
The data for this first study was collected from 79 respondents, 9 % women and 91 % men.
All the respondents were enrolled in military activities associated with the Norwegian
Defence. To elaborate; the participants served in the Army (51.2 %), the Navy (41.9%) and
the a Force (7%). In total, the data was collected from six main runs of experiments during
2005".
Figure 1. Military officers interacting with the NCW Learning Lab using the CODS’ display.
Overview of the Gaming Environment
A session with NCW Learning Lab starts with the players reading the scenario description,
which is a narrative describing a fictitious or real security policy crisis situation. The scenario
is usually structured as follows: A background which describes history and events leading up
to the present situation, including any orders or directives issued by NATO, UNSC or other
national or international supreme command authority. Then the operations area (OA) is
defined, with borders of sea, land and air territories. The territory description usually names
geographical areas (nations, regions etc) that are included in the OA, and/or which border on
the OA. Lastly, the resources and capabilities available to resolve the crisis situation are listed
along with key characteristics such as their main function or role, transportation speed, sensor
coverage, combat power and the like.
Detailed documentation of the experimments: theory base, design, measures, procedures and results are found
in Haerem, Bakken and Myrseth (eds.) 2006: Human Aspects of Network Centric Organization. Research
Report, Norwegian School of Management (Oslo) / Norwegian Defence Leadership Institute (Oslo) / Norwegian
Battle Lab and Experimentation (Stavanger / Bodoe).
? CODS = Common Operational Decision System, by Lenco AS, Norway, and Norwegian Battle Lab and
Experimentation (NOBLE).
Attached to the scenario is the mission and intent statements issued by the supreme command
(e.g., SACEUR in the case of an international crisis, or National Strategic Command in the
case of a national crisis). The intent defines (among others) the purpose and objectives of the
mission; the means or methods with which the crisis can be resolved; and the desired end
state. The mission and intent statements may be followed by a plan for “conduct of
operations”, which usually proceeds through four phases (example taken from a NATO led
and UN approved crisis response operation): 1. Preparation and deployment; 2. Establish and
maintain security; 3. Termination; 4. Redeployment. Success criteria for the mission may be
stated as “decisive points”, for example: reduced criminal activity, reduced para-military
activity, neutralization of threats to democratic process.
The mission may contain several tasks to be handled, tasks that may vary in complexity along
the variability and analyzability dimensions.
Examples of tasks are:
« National force protection operation:
o Secure and protect military bases (against terrorist attacks)
o Prepare and execute escort operations of allied vessels
o Protect national waters against border violation
o Prevent resource crimes (e.g., illegal fishing)
e International crisis response operation:
o Establish and maintain security in deployment areas
Contain ethnic violence
Collect illegal weapons
Arrest persons indicted for war-crimes
Reduce smuggling of weapons and drugs
ooo0°0
The tasks may be presented sequentially to the players in a pre-programmed manner, or may
“emerge” as a function of actions and events occurring through the course of a game. Usually,
the tasks are a combination of pre-programmed and emerging. Even though the initial
situation may be identical between sessions, the actual flow of events may take completely
different turns, making several instances of the same scenario appear quite different.
It follows logically that the “stream” of tasks that constitute the crisis situation may occur
relatively frequently (high variability) or infrequently (low variability). Likewise, the tasks
may differ in the degree of analyzability, i.e., whether they may be solved with well-known
procedures and methods, or whether a solution is not well known. This classification follows
the framework developed by Perrow (1967).
A game with NCW Learning Lab is usually played with a group of players forming a
command organization (see figures 2 and 3 for example illustrations).
The lowest layer of the command chain always controls the actual resources (military forces
and other objects representing capabilities) that move within the operations area to
accomplish the tasks that have to be solved; whether pre-programmed or emerging. The
remaining (higher-level) layers are indirectly commanding the forces by issuing plans, orders,
directives and Rules of Engagement (ROE).
The surface complexity of a task is represented by its appearance to the player as presented by
the user interface and the mechanisms for directing objects on the geographical “surface” to
resolve the task. In addition come various indicators of status and progress, as well as a mail
system containing narrative information concerning tasks. Such narrative information may be
pre-programmed by the scenario designer, or ad-hoc messages written by actual co-players.
The deep complexity of a task concerns the relationships between actions that may be taken to
resolve the task, and outcome as a function of how the task has been handled. The most
general outcome property of a task is the degree to which its resolution contributes to
achieving goals defined at superior levels of command. At the most abstract level, this is a
question of escalation or de-escalation of the situation (meaning that the crisis situations
worsens or improves due to actions taken, respectively). Matters are complicated when a
short term improvement in the situation may be followed by a long-term worsening, or vice
versa. Thus, the player in command, when confronted with a task, must ask him/herself two
questions to guide the decision-making process:
¢ To what degree will the resolution of this task contribute to (long-term) de-escalation
of the crisis?
e What resources are needed to resolve the task (and, are the resources available at an
acceptable cost)?
Military Decision-Making as a Dynamic Process
It is highly appropriate to recognize military operations and security crises as dynamic
processes, continuously unfolding in time. Consequently, managing such processes is similar
to handling a dynamic decision problem, with the following features (adapted from Brehmer,
2002):
It requires a series of decisions
The decisions are interdependent
Decisions must be made in real time
The state of the problem changes, both autonomously, and as a consequence of the
decision-maker’s actions. This implies among others:
o Deciding to do nothing is also a decision (albeit it might be unconscious)
o Decisions may not be reversed (at least not without a cost)
o. There may be prominent time delays, both in information and physical flows
co. The problem may be dominated by feedback and non-linear relationships
eecee
At the highest level of a military operation or a security crisis, the decisions to be made are
mainly concerned with resource allocation, to be done in a way that provides for the best
possible overall outcome. The most basic decision of this kind is to order a movement of
forces from one location to another. It can also involve setting priorities for subordinate
commanders, as well as guide the attention of sensor equipment (in a C3I system), and so on.
This conceptual idea is also implemented in practice. Consider this general description of
crisis management, taken from the NATO/P£P “Generic Crisis Management Handbook”
(1997 interim version): “Procedures and activities in crisis management range across;
information acquisition and assessment; the analysis of the situation; the establishment of
goals to be achieved; the development of options for actions and their comparison; the
implementation of chosen options, to (finally, as feedback to close the loop) the analysis of
the reaction of the parties involved.”
Following Brehmer (2000, 2002) this kind of task can be seen as a problem of finding a way
to use one process to control another process, and it is the relation between the processes that
determines what strategies are possible. It also means that the time scales of the task are
important. The decision maker thus has two essential tasks:
e To control the system
e To control his workload and avoid being overwhelmed by the task
That a series of interdependent decisions is required means that the decision maker must learn
to allocate (in time and space) his resources in a way that provides for the best possible
overall outcome. That the task changes both autonomously and as a consequence of the
decision maker’s action means that he must be able to distinguish between the effects of his
own actions from autonomous effects.
That the decisions must be made in real time means that the decision maker must be able to
find a strategy that protects him from being overwhelmed (according to Brehmer (2002)
expert decision makers are recognized by their capability to adapt their work strategies to
control their work load). He/she must learn not only about the task, but also about his own
abilities. He/she must understand how to use a process for controlling another process, find
ways to handle the delays, and possess an understanding of the time scales.
OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF HIERARCHICAL AND NETWORK STRUCTURES
Network and hierarchy can be distinguished by the nature of the communication structure in
an organization. Thus structure can be operationalized as ways of observing the
communication channels available for each unit of the structure (Hansen, 1999). The
dimension of authority, as a distinguishing factor of each organizational structure, has been
described in ways of assigning the nature of authority vested in each unit (Stinchcombe,
1959).
In an experimental setting these variables are possible to manipulate in order to test their
respective relevance for performing tasks that requires collaboration within a group. In an
experimental setting, centralized or decentralized communication channels might define the
organizational type (Guetzkow & Simon, 1955).
Furthermore, the organization structure may be obtained through either observation, self-
report or by paying attention to the perception of individuals of authority relationships. Katz
and Kahn’s (1978) concept of perception of authority structure might give guidelines for
making an instrument and obtaining data on perceived authority. According to their theory,
organizations have different degrees of hierarchy that are determined by the level of
differences of perceived and objective control among people on different levels of the
organization. If there is a higher difference in control, a hierarchy exists.
In the experimental settings in the NCW Learning Lab, organization structure is manipulated
in order to test influence or organization structure on task performance. The NCW Learning
Lab allows manipulating command systems in terms of hierarchy and network structures.
In the experiment, the operationalization of organizational structures is done through the
manipulation of communication channels. Six scenarios were conducted. Preceding the
scenarios, the participants where told by the staff what kind of communication structure they
were allowed to use. In three scenarios, the participants were told that the communication
structure was centralized, meaning that the communication between headquarters at different
levels had to follow the hierarchical communication lines. No verbal communication was
allowed. Whereas in the three other scenarios, following network structures, the players where
told that communication among all players were legitimated and indeed encouraged. The
different communication structures used are illustrated conceptually in figures 2 and 3 below.
Strategic
command
Operational Operational
HQ1 HQ2
Tactical
unit 2B
Tactical
unit 2A
Tactical Tactical
unit 1A unit 1B
Figure 2: Hierarchical command structure (communication strictly along vertical lines)
Strategic
command
Tactical
unit 2B
Tactical
SA
SLY
NSLSZ
Operational
Tactical
unit 2A
Tactical
unit 1B
Figure 3: Command structure networked on tactical-operational levels (“all-to-all” comm.)
RESEARCH MODEL
We have developed a resarch model that contains relationships between organization model
(hierarchy vs. network), and level in command system (operational or tactical), as
independent, interacting variables. These variables affect perceived situation awareness and
preceived task analyzability as intermediate variables, that in turn affect opertational outcome.
The outcome variable is a compound of speed in the operation, information sharing, success
in the operation, and effectiveness in the operation. All the outcome components are currently
operationalized as perceived’, that is, participants themselves assess them by responding to
questionnaires (see Appendix A for questionnaire items relating to perceived outcome).
/ Levelin
command
\_ system
Perceived ~
<—- ( Situation ) _—s
Hierarchy > “Awareness ~~ y >
{ \ ea OLE neSS / ,
( Vs ; Z . Outcome q
\ Network J aa =
" — (Perceived
\ Task
\\_Analyzability _~
Speed in the operation
Information sharing
Success in the operation
Effectiveness in operations
Figure 4. Resarch model.
In accordance with reviewed literature, our hypotheses state that network structure contributes
to better/higher:
e Situation awareness
Analyzability of the task
Speed in operations
Information sharing
Degree of success
Degree of effectiveness
eoceee
... as opposed to the hierarchical structure.
* For details on operationalizations, see Haerem, Bakken and Myrseth (eds.) 2006: Human Aspects of Network
Centric Organization. Research Report, Norwegian School of Management (Oslo) / Norwegian Defence
Leadership Institute (Oslo) / Norwegian Battle Lab and Experimentation (Stavanger / Bodoe).
PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND ANALYSES
We have analyzed the relationship between command structure and the decision makers’
perceived situation awareness, task analyzability, speed in operations, information sharing,
effectiveness and success of the operation. We have also studied how this varies depending on
the level (operational vs. tactical) in the command structure. When interpreting these results it
is important to note that it is perceived measures of operation success, effectiveness, speed
and quality of information sharing which is applied, and not objective measures.
Direct effects
The results of the Multiple Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) shows that the structure of the
command system influences the situation awareness and task analyzability significantly
(p=.02), while the level of the command system does not seem to have any significant
influence. This is illustrated in figures 5 and 6 below.
Percelved Situation Awareness
Level:
a = tear
0.50000 Ti
p,00000 4 Ss
0.500004
Task Analyzability
-1,90000 +
Hierarchy Network
Figure 6: Task analyzability as a function of command structure and level.
The results furthermore show that structure has a significant influence (p=.05) on speed,
information sharing and perceived success. Level in the command structure seems, based on
this analysis, not to have an effect (p=.75). But, as we shall see from the analysis of the
interaction effects below, the effects of the tactical and operational level are opposite of each
other and thereby cancel out the direct effect.
The first main result is the significant difference between the hierarchical command structure
and the network centric command structure, when it comes to perceived situation awareness
and perceived task analyzability. Both measures scored higher in the hierarchical structure
than in the network structure both on the operational and tactical level.
These findings do find some support in the research stream viewing organizations as
information processing systems, although the findings contradict some of the popular writings
on the virtuosity of network centric organizations. In a hierarchical command structure the
tasks and responsibilities of each unit and role within each unit is delimited and clearly
defined. The communication lines between units, superiors and subordinates are equally
clearly defined. This is in contrast to a network organization which stimulates task resolution
processes and resource dispositions on a tactical level, between tactical units and actors, to
facilitate quick response to unexpected situations. Such self-synchronization on the tactical
level, generates high demands for information processing and problem resolution. Together
with time pressure and other stress factors these conditions are likely to produce increased
perceived uncertainty. Although the perceived analyzability is significantly lower in the
network centric command structure, it is interesting to note that the “objective” uncertainty is
constant since the scenario is constant. This indicates that the organization structure also
influences the perception of uncertainty in operations.
Interaction effects
There is a difference in the perception of speed, and quality in the information sharing
between the operational and tactical level under the network structure. There is no such
difference under the hierarchical command structure. Tactical level perceives the speed in the
operation as higher, and the information sharing as better than the operational level does. This
is in line with main stream theory which argues that a network structure opens for direct
communication lines between the actors and reduces the amount of bottlenecks which easily
arises in a hierarchical structure. However, this difference is not statistically significant with
the sample size we have.
10
Levelt:
— Operational
fides
Speed in operation
Ve
Hierarchy Network
Level
Operatonal
‘a ~ Stee
Information
Sharing
/
f
/;
Hierarchy Network
Figures 7/8. Interaction effects of command structure and level on speed & information
sharing.
On average, there is no difference in the perception of success and effectiveness under the two
command structures. But, there is a surprising difference in the perception of the success
between the two levels in the command structure. In the network structure, operational level
perceived the degree of success as significantly higher compared to the tactical level. In the
hierarchical structure there were only marginal differences: The perceptions of the
effectiveness in operations follow the same overall pattern, but the differences are not
significant.
11
Levek
Ac »
» Operatonat
Pe Tactcal
O26 Powe
2 “
Z
S ae A
5 %
B ox .
°
(4 \
Scat
o
FA
o
Ba.
3
3 x
no
Hierarchy Network
Level:
Effectiveness in operations
Hierarchy Network
Figures 9/10. Interaction effects of command structure and level on speed & information
sharing.
One might want to explain the drop in perceived success at the tactical level with the drop in
perceived situation awareness and task analyzability. However, the drop in perceived situation
awareness and task analyzability is also found on the operational level, which perceives an
increase in success. Equally troubling is that the tactical level, in contrast to the operational
level, perceives an increase in speed and quality of information sharing, which one might
assume would lead to an increased sense of control and success.
The best explanation we have for this finding is that the network structure encourages the
tactical level to take responsibility for the problems that arise, not only in their own unit, but
in other units as well. The hierarchical mechanisms, which buffer each individual from direct
negotiation with other units about assistance and request for resources, serve to reduce
uncertainty, focus attention and sets clear criteria for success or failure. In hierarchical
command structures it is the operational level that is supposed to handle the uncertainty and
define clear orders for the tactical level. The network centric command structure does not
have this information processing property. In the network structure the tactical level receives
direct requests from other tactical units about assistance and other issues that require
coordination. These findings also find support in studies of command and control at the Team
Effectiveness Lab at Michigan State University (Moon et al., 2003).
12
In this respect we may say that the network structure requires self-synchronization on the
tactical level. Self-synchronization, in the sense of network coordination, introduces both
complexity and uncertainty on the tactical level. One reason to lower perceived success may
be that others’ problems become vivid to the units and individuals on the tactical level and
that these problems become every unit’s responsibility. This is very different from the way
responsibility is delegated in the hierarchical structure.
That the operational level perceives a higher degree of success in the network structure may
be caused by the same mechanism. If it is so that the tactical level takes on responsibility to
handle the situations as they emerge by self-synchronization, then the operational level may
perceive fewer requests for resources to handle unexpected difficulties.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In environments which demand a high degree of flexibility together with rapid and accurate
decision-making, network centric command structures have been promoted as “the”
organizational solution to meet these demands. Our objective was foremost to contribute to a
methodological platform for experimentation with command concepts in the years to come.
The measurement instruments developed and reported above have been found valid and
reliable (Harem, Bakken, & Myrseth, 2006). This set of instruments and manipulations,
including the NCE Learning Lab, allows us to efficiently capture central aspects of human
aspects of decision-making in future experiments. Hence, we have contributed to a good
foundation for future experimentation.
The practical importance of this project is the indications given by the preliminary results.
Our findings are in contrast to contemporary writings on the organization of military
operations. But the findings make sense in light of basic theories on information processing in
organizations. Network centric command structures are argued to enhance the situation
awareness and the understanding of the situation. But our results show that a network centric
organization does not necessarily lead to higher perceived situation awareness or better
understanding of the situation. In fact, the data show the opposite relationship.
The results show that the perception of success and effectiveness of the operations was
significantly different between the operational and tactical level, as the structure shifted from
a hierarchical structure to a network structure. As explained above, this is not an entirely
surprising result. The cause may be the removal of the buffering and delegation principles that
the hierarchical command structure holds. In addition, the self-synchronization, required in
the network structure, was argued to pose a heavy load on the information processing
capacities of the decision makers on the tactical level.
Gaining knowledge about such relationships will have great practical relevance for the
development and improvements of existing concepts of operations, planning processes,
command structures, in addition to the understanding of intention based management and
improvements in decision-making on an individual, social and organizational level.
The results from this series of experiments indicate that Network Centric Warfare, NCW, sets
different and difficult demands on the decision makers in such a command structure. A main
impression from this series of experiments is that many aspects of human interaction have to
be managed before a network centric structure may give benefits in operations. Further
13
experiments are necessary to evaluate the robustness of the relationships uncovered in the
experiments performed in 2005. Until stronger evidence is established we have to settle for
these humble speculations.
REFERENCES
Alberts, S., Garstka, D., Hayes, J.J., Richard, E. & Signori, D.A. 2001. Understanding
information age warfare. CCRP Publication Series.
Bakken, B.T., Ruud, M., Johannessen, S. 2004. The System Dynamics Approach to
Network Centric Warfare and Effects Based Operations - Designing a "Learning Lab"
for Tomorrow's Military Operations. Presented at the 22nd International Conference of the
System Dynamics Society, Oxford.
Brehmer, B. 2000. Dynamic Decision Making in Command and Control. In McCann &
Pigeau. The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience. Kleuwer, New
York.
Brehmer, B. 2002. Learning to control a dynamic system. Unpublished manuscript,
Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm.
Guetzkow, H., & Simon, H. A.1955. The impact of certain communication nets upon
organization and performance in task-oriented groups. Management Science, 1:233-250.
Haerem, T., Bakken, B., & Myrseth, H.P. (eds.) 2006: Human Aspects of Network Centric
Organization. Research Report, Norwegian School of Management (Oslo) / Norwegian
Defence Leadership Institute (Oslo) / Norwegian Battle Lab and Experimentation (Stavanger /
Bodoe).
Hansen, M.T. 1999. The search-transfer problem: The role of weak ties in sharing knowledge
across organization subunits. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44: 82-111.
Katz, D., & Kahn, R.L. 1978. The social psychology of organizations. New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
Moon, H.et al. (2004). Assymetric Adaptability: Dynamic Team Structures as One-Way
Streets. Academy of Management Journal, 47(4): 681-695.
Perrow, C. 1967. A framework for the comparative analysis of organizations. American
Sociological Review,32: 194 -208.
Scott, R.W. 2003. Organization, rational natural and open systems. Upper Sadle River: New
Jersey.
Stinchcombe, A.L. 1959. Bureaucratic and craft administration of production: A comparative
study. Administrative Science Quarterly, 168-187.
Thomson, J.D. 1967. Organizations in action. New Y ork: McGRaw-Hill.
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APPENDIX A: Measures of outcome (extract from Haerem et al., 2006)
Operational effectiveness of military operations, according to Alberts et al. (2001), is
impacted by several key concepts and the relationship between them. Some of the key
concepts he mentions are; awareness, shared awareness, collaborative planning, and
synchronized actions. To elaborate, it is stated that in network-centric operations, the power
of the network is manifested by increased richness through increased reach, increased shared
awareness and improved collaboration. Increased richness through increased reach refers to
that networks enable information richness to be increased by enabling information from
multiple sources to be shared, correlated and accessed. Increased shared awareness, on the
other hand, point to that networks contribute to the generation of shared awareness by
enabling richness to be shared. Whereas, improved collaboration indicate that network enable
information sharing which transfer shared awareness into collaborative planning and
synchronized actions that create a competitive advantage. Together, these processes increase
the effectiveness of a military operation. Furthermore, Alberts et al. (2001) emphasize that
quality of interactions and speed in the operation are hypothesized to influence operational
outcome or what they refers to as degree of operational success and force effectiveness and
efficiency (Alberts et al., 2001).
Perceived Operational Effectiveness
We chose to measure perceived operational performance or effectiveness by developing
several items based on the concepts in Alberts et al. (2001). An exploratory factor analysis
was used in order to gather information about inter-correlations among the set of variables
The validity of the scale was tested by using a principal component analysis; the results are
shown in the table below. The Kaiser was sufficient, showing value beyond .7.
Items Components
Information
Success sharing Speed
Success according to targets 93
Success according to intention 82
Effectuated a successful operation 72
Necessary quality of sources to information and 584
communication
Sources of information and communication have (82
contributed to distribution of information
Minimized risk
73
Effectuated within time limits
82
Table Al. Perceived Operational Performance; Success, Information Sharing and Speed.
Rotated Component Matrix. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation
Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
15
