Game theorists have recommended lots of reasonable strategies for resolving domestic and international policy problems. In general, they use a concept of equilibrium strategy for analyzing dynamic consequences of available policy options in game situations. One of the most famous policy recommendations suggested by game theorists is that of George Tsebelis (1989). He contends that an increase in penalty against law-violation is not a viable policy tool for decreasing the violation tendencies of drivers. That is because the interactions between police and drivers can be best represented as a mixed strategy game in which each player choose their alternative actions with a probability. In a mixed strategy game between police and driver, the probability of driver's law-violation cannot be decreased by increasing penalty against law-violation. Tsebelis's suggestion seems to be contradictory to common sense. For most policy makers, an increase in penalty is conceived as one of the most effective tools for policy implementation. In Korea, the increase in penalty have vastly reduced the number of drunken drivers. In many countries, the penalty management is a major policy implementation tool for inducing compliance from the people. Our SD model for a mixed strategy game shows that it takes a very long time for an gametheoretic equilibrium to appear. Therefore, game players cannot and should not depend on the equilibrium state for choosing their actions. Furthermore, our mixed game model shows that an increase in penalty can induce a compliance from the people. Our model shows a behaviors which are contradictory to the game theoretic solution, but consistent to the real world behaviors. We have proposed that these gaps between SD model and a game theory come from the ambiguous conception of equilibrium state and the lack of dynamic and transient behavior analysis in the game theory.

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Date created

• 1995

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• Document

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12420ec6bd5f758d2b4dea59aabd75a9

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23d738ba88f8333bc39725f9cb5bd0b8

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b83f2ce2912343b559f967dd985da515

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System Dynamic Society Records

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• This collection is part of the University Archives