In a study done by Saeed and Pavlov a generic microstructure of resource competition was developed and stylized using the dynastic cycles that occurred throughout Chinese history. The result was a model that demonstrated how economic drivers contribute to the cycles observed in the rise and fall of dynasties and lawlessness. Using their structure, with only a few substitutions of names, the same model suitably describes numerous systems where similar cycles in resource levels can be observed. Yet, in some systems, such as gangs, the economic motivations alone do not adequately describe the social factors clearly evident in rise and fall of criminal behavior attributed to gangs. This paper explores the social influence gaps in the purely economic model, identifies a social structure that can be used instead of the economic mechanisms, and then examines implications of a model that combines both aspects of the system. The result of this research indicates that both economic and social influences are capable of producing cycles and when combined, only further exacerbate the problem. These findings have import implications on policy design, suggesting that solutions will need to simultaneously consider both aspects.

This is the whole item.

Date created

• 2009 July 26-2009 July 30

Type

• Document

Processing Activity

• Processing documentation available at: https://wiki.albany.edu/display/SCA/Processing+Ingested+Digital+Files

License

• Creative Commons BY-NC-ND Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International

  
  Contact Us for questions or additional rights.

ITEM CONTEXT

Part of

4818cb531cdd68d6ec6af3f291216fc7

Scope and Contents

Part of

b3584c6b53c3f58e0202549d7d851f84

Scope and Contents

Part of

23d738ba88f8333bc39725f9cb5bd0b8

Scope and Contents

Collection

System Dynamic Society Records

Scope and Contents

Collecting area

• This collection is part of the University Archives