Fishery policies have largely developed in response to current problems. One of the last policies to be implemented is individual transferable quotas, ITQs. This seems to be a promising policy instrument compared to those which have shown weaknesses. Extrapolating from previous experiences, however, a further investigation of the ITQ system may reveal weakness of this instrument as well, and may help improve the policy or stimulate the development of alternative policies. One such alternative may be auctioned seasonal quotas, ASQs. A laboratory experiment of a market with seven fishing firms is used to compare the two policies. Compared to traditional laboratory experiments, this experiment allows for dynamic adjustments of fishing capacities as well as quotas. Weaknesses and strengths are revealed, some of them surprising. For instance, having to pay variable prices ASQs may lead to less variation in equity than owning ITQs.

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Date created

• 2006 July 23-2006 July 27

Type

• Document

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• Processing documentation available at: https://wiki.albany.edu/display/SCA/Processing+Ingested+Digital+Files

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• Creative Commons BY-NC-ND Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International

  
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ITEM CONTEXT

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32937c7b43e3e015509bb71fd40d2054

Scope and Contents

Part of

23d738ba88f8333bc39725f9cb5bd0b8

Scope and Contents

Part of

f9377a3ac7b50b1fca5e04fb6d679ec2

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Collection

System Dynamic Society Records

Scope and Contents

Collecting area

• This collection is part of the University Archives